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Snyder 93
Scaling Down:
The Subnational Comparative Method*
Richard Snyder
Subnationalunitsofanalysisplayanincreasingly importantroleincomparat ive
politics.Althoughmanyrecentstudiesoftopicssuchasethnicconflict,economic
policyreform,anddemocratizationrelyoncomparisonsacrosssubnationalpoliti-
calunits,insufficientattentionhasbeendevotedtothemethodologicalissuesthat
ariseinthecomparativeanalysisoftheseunits.Tohelp fillthisgap, thisarticle
explores how subn ational com parisons ca ne xpand and streng then the method -
ologicalrepertoireavailabletosocialscienceresearchers.First,becauseafocuson
subnationalunitsisanimportanttoolfor increasingthenumber of observations
andformakingcontrolledcomparisons,ithelpsmitigatesomeofthecharacteristic
limi tations of asm all-N res earch desi gn. Second, a fo cus on subnat ional unit s
strengthensthecapacityofcomparat iviststoaccuratelycodecasesandthusmake
validcausalinferences.Finally,subnationalcomparisonsbetterequipresearchers
tohandlethespatiallyunevennatureofmajorprocessesofpoliticalandeconomic
transformation.
Weliveinanageofdecentralization.Theeconomicandpoliticalmega-
trendsthatarethehallmarksofthelasttwodecades—free-marketre-
forms and democrati zation—have unleashed powerful centr ifugal forces. In
theadvancedindustrialcountries,forexample,free-marketpolicyreformswere
implementedinconjunctionwitha“devolutionrevolution”thattransferred
authorityandresourc esfromcentraltolocalgovernments.Guidedbythe
doctrine of “fiscal fe deralism ,” the World Bank and othe r development
NGOsexportedthe devolution revolutiontopoor countries byfervently
promotingthe decentralizationofpolicy making andgovernment services.
Combinedwiththeworldw idemovetowardderegulated,openeconomies,these
decentralizingreformsundercutthecapacityofmanycentralgovernmentsto
coordinateeconomicactivity.
TheThirdWaveofdemocratizationthatswepttheglobeduringthelastquar-
tercenturyalsogeneratedpow erfuldecentralizingpressures.Thedemocrati-
Richar dS nyderis assi stant professor of poli tical science at theU niversity ofIl linois at Urbana-Champaign .
HeistheauthorofPoliticsafterNeoliberalis m(2001).Hi sarticlesonregimechangeandthepoliticaleconomy
of development have appeared in World Politics, Comparative Politi cs, Journal of Democr acy, and Brit ish
Journal of Political Science.
Studi esin Comparative Intern ational Developmen t,Spr ing 2001,Vol.36, No. 1, pp.93–110.
94 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2001
zationofwhatwereonceonlynominallyfederalsystemsincasessuchasRus-
siaand Mexico shifted the distribution of pow er between national and
subn ationa l govern ments inwaysthatgreatly strengthened thelatter.More-
over, democratization wasassociate d with bo th the“federalization ” offor-
merlyunitarysystems(e.g.,Spain)and thebreakup offederalsystems (e.g.,
Czechoslovakia,Yugoslavia,SovietUnion).Anextremeformofdecentraliza-
tionisseenincaseswhereachangeofpoliticalregimeresultedinthecollapse
ofthecentralstateandtheemergenceofanarchicalwarlordpolitics(e.g.,Congo/
Zaire,Liberia,SierraLeone,andSomalia).
Inresponseto majorcentrifugal trends such as these, co mparativists
havef o c u sedincreasingattentiononsubnational unitsofa n a lysis.Thus
manyrecentstudies oftopicssucha s e c onomicpolicyreform,democra-
tization,a n dethnicconflictrelyo nco m pari sonsacrosssubnationalpo-
litica l units.1Despitetheproliferationofworksthatemploysubnati onal
comparisons,insufficientat tentionhasbe e n devoted totheme t hodologi-
calissuesthatariseint heco m p a rativeanalysisofsubn ationalunits.2To
help fill this g ap , this articleexplores how the subnatio nalcomparative
methodcanexpand andstrengthenthemethodologicalrepertoire available
tocomparativeresearchers.
Iarguethatthesubnationalcomparativemethodofferthreekeyadvantages.
First,itcanhelpbettermanagesomeofthecharacteristiclimitationsofasmall-
Nresearchdesign.Theuseofsubnationalunitsisanespeciallyeffectivestrat-
egyforincreasingthenumberofobservationsandthusmitigatingtheproblem
of“manyvariables,small N.”3Moreover, afocusonsubnational unitscan
makeiteasiertoconstructcontrolled comparisonsthatincreasetheprobabil-
ityofobtainingvalidcausalinferencesinsmall-Nresearch.
Second,subnationalcomparisonsstrengthenthecapacityofcomparativists
toaccuratelycodetheircases.Comparativiststoooftenrelyonnational-level
meansandaggregatedatawhenstudyingcountrieswithhighdegreesofinter-
nalheterogeneity. Thistendency tounr efle ctively g ravita te tow ard national-
leveldataandnationalunitsofanalysi s—atendencythatSteinRokkan(1970)
sometimeagocalled“whole-nationbias”—hascontributedtoamiscodingof
casesthatcandistortcausalinferencesandskeweffortsattheorybuilding.4A
greater se nsitivityto w ithin-nat ion variation and c om plexity c an he lp
comparativistsavoidthesepitfalls.
Third,afocusoncomparingsubnationalunitsbetterequipsustohandlethe
spatially unevennatureofmajorprocessesofpoliticalandeconomictransfor-
mation.Processes suchasde mocr atiz ation andeconomic reformoftenhave
varied effectsacross the territoria lly-defined subunits ofapolitical system.5
Becausethesubnationalcomparativemethodmakesiteasiertoseethiswithin-
nationvariation,itcontributestoamoreadequatedescription ofcomplexpro-
cessesofchange.Inadditiontoprovidingasalutaryincreaseinourabilityto
accurately describe complex processes,afocusonsubnational unitshas im-
portantimplicationsforhowwetheorizesuchprocesses.Disaggregatingcoun-
tries alongterritoriallinesm akes it possi ble to expl ore the dynamic linkages
am ong the distinct regions andlevelsofapolitical system.Analyzing these
Snyder 95
linkagesisanindispensablestepforunderstandingandexplainingfundamen-
talprocessesofpoliticalandeconomicchange.
The Subnational Comparative Method and Research Design
Thesubnational comparativemethodhastwokeystrengths withregard to
resea rchdesign:(1)itcanserveasapowerfultoolforincreasingthenumber
ofobservations,and(2)itmakesiteasiertoconstructcontrolledcomparisons.
Increasing the Number of Observations
Focusingonsubnatio nalunitscanprovideanefficientwaytoincreasethe
numberofobserva tionsinthecontextofasmall-Nresearchdesign.Asem-
phasizedbyGaryKing,RobertKeohane,andSidneyVerba(1994:208,see
also30–31),ourtheoriesusuallyhaveobservableimplicationsatmanylev-
elsofanalysisand“whatmayappeartobeasingle-casestudy,orastudyof
onlyafewcases,mayindeedcontainmanypotentialobservations,a tdiffer-
entlevelsofanalysis,thatarerelevanttothetheorybeingevalua ted.”6Thus
atheoryoriginallyfocusedonanationalcasecanpotentially betestedinsub-
unitsofthatcase:suchasstates,counties,cities,regions,oreconomicsectors
(K inge tal. 1994: 21 9).7Moreover,moving downtoasubnatio nal levelof ob-
servation hasthe additional advantage ofnot requirin g trave l to learn about
anothercountry.
Althoughthestrategyofincreasingthenumberofobservationsbyshifting
toalowerlevelofaggregationhasconsiderablemerits,itshouldbeusedwith
caution.First,whenmakingcross-levelinferences,theresearchermustbecare-
fultochooselower-levelunits thatareappropriateforreplicatingthehypoth-
esisunderconsideration.Thatis,thelower-levelunitsshouldbeonesinwhich
“theprocessentailedbythehypothesiscantakeplace”(Kingetal.1994:221).8
Thus, it would be inappropriate to study subnational political unitsto test a
theory about macroeconomic policy making. Second,observations atthe
subna tiona l level do not necessarilyprovideindependen ttests of the theory,
becausestates,counties,andothersubunitswithinapoliticalsystemareoften
interconnected,notfreestanding.Suchpotentialinterconnectionsamongcases
can lead to “Galton’sproblem” andthus require caution against overstatin g
thecertaintyofconclusionsbasedontestsusingsubunitsdrawnfromthesame
political system (Kingetal.1994: 222) .9Moreover,it isag ood pra ctice to
analyzethesourcesofinterconnectionsamongsubunits(e.g.,policydiffusion,
borrowing,migration)inanefforttodiscoverpotentiallyconfoundingomitted
variables.10
Making Controlled Comparisons: Strategies of Subnational Analysis
A fo cus o n s ubn at ional u ni ts c an g re atly s tr engthe n th e a bi lity of
comparativiststoestablishcontroloverpotentialexplanatoryvariables(Linz
anddeMiguel1966;Lijphart1971:689–90).Inthisregard,twostrategiesof
subnational analysiscanbedistinguished:(1)within-nationcomparisonsthat
96 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2001
focus on subnational caseswithin asingle cou ntry; a nd (2)between-nation
comparisonsthatfocusonsubnationalcasesacrosscountries.Moreover,these
twostrategiescanbefruitfullycombinedinasinglestudy.
Within-NationComparisons.Subnationalunitswithinasinglecountrycan
oftenbemoreeasilymatchedoncultural,historic al ,ecological,andsocioeco-
nomicdimensions thancannationalunits.Forexample,myownworkonthe
politicsofeconomicpolicyreforminMexicoemployswhatIcalla“onesec-
tor, many places”strategythatfocuses on four of Mexico’s m ost imp orta nt
coffee-producing state s (Snyder1999a, 2001).11 Because thefour sta te s—
Oaxaca,Guerrero,Chiapas,andPuebla—arealllocatedinsouthern Mexico,
havelargeindigenouspopulations,andareamongthepoorestinthecountry,I
amabletocontrolforecological,cultural,andsocioecono micconditionstoa
fargreaterextentthanisusuallypossibleinstudiesthatcomparenationalunits.
Bymakingiteasiertoestablishcontroloversuchnon-politicalfactors,afocus
onsubnationalunitshelpspinpointhowvariationinpoliticalinstitutionsshape s
economicperformanceandpolicychoice.
Itshouldbeemphasizedthatwithin-nationcomparisonsdonotnecessarily
improve ourability toholdconstant cultural, histor ical, ecological,and so-
cioeconomicconditions:theremaybeasmuch,ifnotmore,variationwithin
countriesasbetweenthem.Forexample , statesinsouthern Mexico may
havemore in common withsubnational units inneighboring Guatemala
than with statesinnorthern Mexico.Thus,asB . G uyPeters (1998: 35)
cautions,comparativistsshouldbecarefultoavoidbeinglulledintoa“false
senseofsecurity” sim ply becausethey areusing subnational unitswithina
singlecountry.12
Between-NationComparisons.Comparingsimilarsubnationalunitsacross
distinctnationalunitsmaybeamorepowerfulstrategyformakingvalidcausal
inferences thancomparingnational units. Forexample, Linz and deMiguel
(1966:269)argue thatacomparisonbetween“advanc edandbackwardsec-
tions”ofSpainandItalywithsimilarculturalandsocioeconomicfeatures
isanespeciallyeffective waytoexplorehowthedifferentpoliticalinsti-
tutionsof the twocountries influencemembershipinvoluntaryassocia-
tions. Similarly,O’Donnell(1973: 21) proposesa“cross-modernareas”
comparisonthatjuxtaposes themostdevelopedregionsandsectorsofBrazil
andArgentina.13
Byanalyzingcontiguoussubnationalunitsacrossnations,scholarsmaybe
abletodesign between-nationcomparisonsthatachieveanespeciallystrong
degree ofcontrolover c ultural,historical,andecologicalconditions. Forex-
ample,studiesoftheimpactofcolonialis minAfricahavefocusedonadjacent
villagesorregionslocatedonoppositesidesofaninternationalbordersepa-
ratingaformerFrenchfromaformerBritishcolony(Miles1994;Firmin-Sell-
ers 2000) . Inhis c lassic article on the c ompa rative method,Arend Lijphart
(1971)endorses RaoulNaroll’s(1966) suggestion that inorder to study the
effectsofpresidentialandparliamentarysystems,ratherthancomparingthe
UnitedStatesandBritain, itmaybe a m orefruitfulstra tegytocompare
NorthDakotaandManitoba.Suchacomparisonwouldminimizevariation
infactorssuch aslevelsofeconomicdevelopmentandeducation. I nhis
Snyder 97
analysis ofagrarianradicalismintheNorthAmericanw h eatbelt,Lipset
(1950)comparesthecasesofSaskatchewanand NorthDakota,whichhe
(1950:215)describesasnearreplicasineconomicandgeographicterms.14
Thisbetween-nation com parisonhighlights how theNew Dealundermined
agrariansocialistmovementsinthewheatbeltoftheUnitedStates,whereas
theabsenceofareformistfederalgovernmentprograminCanadaduringthe
depressionprovidedamorefavorablecontextforagrarianradicalism(Lipset
1950: 17, 119–20).In h is study of po litica l c onflic t in the Basque country,
Linz (1986: 372–98) also usesbe tween-nationcompariso nsbyanalyzing the
Spanish and FrenchBasque regions. Thisresearch design allowshim to explore
howindividuals belonging toacommon ethnicgroup (i.e., Basque)yet living in
differentcountriescanhavesharplycontrastingunderstandingsoftheirethnic
andnationalidentities.15
Thewithin-nationandbetween-nationstrategiesofsubnationalanalysiscan
be c om bined in a single st udy.For exam ple , i na d ditiontocomparing
SaskatchewanandNorthDakota,Lipset(1950:216–19,121–4)alsocompares
Saskatchewanwithits neighbo ring provinces ofA lber ta andManitoba.In
Albe rta , w her e the eco n om y an d so cia l s tru ctur e cl o sel y re sem b le d
Saskatchew a n’s, Lipse t (1950: 216) found t hat “far m ers, l ike thoseof
SaskatchewanandNorthDakota , arequic k toreactpoliticallywhenathreat
ar ises.” By contrast, in Manitoba, w hichdiffere d fromSaskatchewanalong
manyofthekeydimensionsthatLipsethypothesizedwouldinfluencelevels
ofpoliticalactivism,theagrarianpoliticalmovementwasweak.16 Thusthese
subnationalcomparisonsservetostrengthen Lipset’soverall argumentabout
thecausesofagrarianradicalism.
Althoughthesevariousstrategiesofsubnationalanalysisserveaspowerful
toolsformakingcontrolledcomparisons,theysharealimitation:thepotentia l
fordiffusionandborrowingamongsubnational units inasingle country and
amongcontiguoussubnationalunitsinneighboringcountriescanmakeitdif-
ficulttoachieveindependentobservationsandtests.17 Onetechniqueformiti-
gatingthetradeoffbetween(1)theabilitytoestablish controloverpotentia l
explanatoryfactorsand(2)theabilitytoachieveindependenceamongthecases
istocombinewithin-nationcomparisonsandbetween-nationcomparisonsof
non-contiguoussubnational units in orde r to reduce the potential ef fects of
diffusion(alongthelinesofcomparing“advancedandbackward”sectionsof
SpainandItaly,asproposedbyLinzanddeMiguel(1966:269),andthe“cross-
modernareas”comparisonproposedbyO’Donnell(1973:21).18 Suchadual
strategycouldhelp ma ximize both controlove rp oten tial exp lana tor yfactors
andindependenceamongthecases.
The Subnational Comparative Method and Measurement: Coding Cases
Al l compara tive researchfacesthechallenge of coding cas es: the analyst
mustemployimplicitorexplicitindicatorsforcategorizingthecasesincluded
inthestudy.Subnationalcomparativeanalysiscanhelpmitigatetwoformsof
biasthataffecthownationalcasesarecoded.Thefirstinvolvestheinappropri-
ateuseofnational-levelaveragesinstudyingcountrieswithahighdegreeof
98 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2001
internalheterogeneity.Thesecondkindofbiasresultswhentheattributesofa
well-studiedorespeciallysalientsubunitareimproperlyusedtocharacterize
thenationalcaseasawhole.
Mean-Spirited Analysis: Inappropriate Uses of National Averages
Cross-na tionalresearchoftenreliesonnational- l evelmeanstocodecases.
Theuseofnationalmeanshasplayedanespeciallyprominentroleinquantita-
tiveresearch.19 However,nationalmeansarealsocommonlyemployedinquali-
tative research—forexample,ac ountr y withalargedeveloped sectoranda
largeunderdevelopedsectormaybecodedas“semi-developed.”Consequently,
althoughtheymaynotexpressnationalmeansinnumericalterms,manyquali-
tativestudiesrelyonwha tcouldbecalled“mean-spiri ted”analysis.
Theproblemsassociatedwithmean-spiritedanalysisaresuggestedbyLinz
anddeMiguel’s (1 966: 271)ob serva tion th at “m any socie ties w ecall semi-
developedonthebasisofanumberofnationalindicesarereallyamixtureof
developedandunderdevelopedsectors.”20 Moreover,intermsofsuchnational
indices,countriesthatareinfact“semi-developed”wouldpotentiallyhavethe
samemeanascontrastingcasesthatarecompositesofdevelopedandunderde-
velopedsectors.Consequent ly,thetwotypesofcasesareindistinguishableif
onereliessolelyonnationalmeans.
O’Donnell(1973)madethispointforcefullyinhiscompar isonofArge ntina
andBrazil,highlightinghowthecodingofcasesbasedonaggregate,national-
level averages masksimportant diff eren ces in the form of a distribution of
traits(e.g.,normal,bimodal,etc.)aswellasinthedegreeofdispersionofsuch
traits.O’Donnellshowsthatafocusonnational-levelmeansledmanystudies
inthe1960stocodeBrazilasanunderdevelopedcountry.Thiscategorization
obscuredthefactthatBrazil’smodernsectorwasinfactquitecomparablein
siz e toArgentina’s, acasethat lac ked al arge ruralperiphery and w as thus
frequentlycodedassemi-developed(ratherthanunderdeveloped).
Linz andde Miguel’s (1966) pioneering stu dy of regional differences in
Spain illustrates howcarefully-selectedwithin-nation comparisons canhelp
guard aga inst the miscoding of anational case. LinzanddeM iguel (1966:
314–15) used subnational comparisonstoshow that causalrelationshipsbe-
tweenindustrializationandreligiosity thatwereestablishe dusingaggregate,
nationaldatadidnotholdatthesubnationallevel.Byanalyzingregional-level
dataonculture andeconomicstructureinSpain,LinzanddeMiguelshowed
that,contrarytostandardversionsofmodernizationtheory,theleast industri-
alizedregionsofSpainwereverysecular.Moreove r,amongSpain’smostin-
dustrialize dregionstheyfoundawiderangeofvariation:Cataloniawa squite
secular,whereastheBasqueCountrywashighlyreligious.
MyownresearchonthepoliticsofeconomicreformincontemporaryMexico
provides arecentexam ple ofhow disaggregat ing countries along territorial
linescanimprovethecodingofnationalcases(Snyder1999a,2001).Basedon
highlya ggregatednationalindicatorsofmacro-economicpolicy,suchastariff
levelsandtheoverallsizeofthepublicsector,mostscholarshavecodedMexico
asaninstanceofsuc cessf ul free-market,orneoliberal,policyreform.21 This
Snyder 99
relianceonna tiona l-l evel da ta obscured the fact tha t theimplementation of
neolibe ralreforms inMexico, rathe r thanunleashing marketforces,actually
re sulte d intheconstructionofnewregulatory institutions atthesubna tiona l
level.22 Looking belowthenational level made iteasiertoseethat theimple-
mentationofneoliberalreform striggered“reregulation ”processesthatresulte d
indifferentkindsofnewinstitutionsformarketregulation,notinthe triumph
offreemarkets.Thusafocusonsubnationa lunitsprovidedabasisforamore
accuratedescriptionandcodingoftheMexicancaseandchallengedthecon-
ventionalviewthattheimplement ationoffree-marketreformsatthenational
levelresultsinderegulated,competitivemarketsacrossanentire country.23
Misusing the Best Known Place: Invalid Part-to-Whole Mappings24
Invalidpart-to-wholemappingsresultwhentraitsorprocessesspecifictoa
well-studied regionorother subnationalunitareim prope rly e levated to the
sta tus ofanational paradigm. Consequently, national cases are inappropri-
atelycodedasifthewholenationpossessedthesetofattributescharacterizing
aspecificregionorsetoflocalities .25 Suchmiscodingcandistortcausalinfer-
encesandskeweffortsattheorybuilding.
TheliteratureonGermanindustriali zationprovidesanespecially vividex-
ampleoftheconsequen cesofmisusingthebestknownplace.Buildingonthe
pioneeringworkofAlexanderGerschenkron(1962),mostscholarshaveseen
the Germancase asa paradigmatic instance ofcentralizedindustriali zation
dominatedbylargefirmsandbig,national-le velbanks.Aprovocative recent
bookbyGaryHerrigel (1996) challengesthisconventionalviewby showing
that the industriali zation processthat Gerschenkron a nd othe rs at tribut ed to
Germa ny as awholewas,infact,aregionally-specificformofindustrializa-
tion.Herrigelshowsthatother,less-studiedregionsofGermanyexperienceda
differentkindofindustrialization rooted insmall-scalefirms andbanks.By
situatingtheprocessofindustrializationinaregionally-differentiatednational
framework,Herrigelisableto“recode”Germanindustrializationasabimodal
phenomenon.Whatemergesisareconstructednational compositecharacter-
izedbytwodistinctmodesofindustrialization:centralized,“organizedcapi-
talism”insomeregionsanda“decentralizedindustrialorder”inothers.26
Inaddition to offeringa more valid descriptionofthe Germancase,this
reconstructionofthenationalcompositehasimportantimplicationsforcausal
inference and theorybuilding. Inlight ofHerrigel ’s analysis, it wouldbe a
mistake to conclude basedontheGermancase tha t anentire c ountr y could
followthepathofcentralized,organizedcapitalism.Rather,Herrigel’srecoding
ofGermanysuggests thatorganizedcapitalismissuitedonly forspecificre-
gionsandkindsofenterprise s, not entirecountries.Moreover, tothe degree
thatGermany’scentralizedindustria lizationwasnotanindependent, separately
det ermi ned proc ess, but w as in fac t cau sally connected tothe decentralized
industrialorderexaminedbyH errigel,afailuretoanalyzethelatterphenom-
enoncouldleadtoaseriousmisunderstandingoftheformer.Thusashifttoa
territorially-differentiatedframeworkinanalyzingaparadigmatic caseserves
bothtocallintoquestionalongstandingmodelofindustrializationandtoopen
100 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2001
anewtheoreticalagendatha tfocusesonthelinkagesbetweendistinctmodes
ofindustrializationwithinasinglenationalunit.
Insum,mean-spiritedanalysisandthemisuseofthebestknownplace pose
important problems of measurement anddescription:mean-spirited analysis
inappropriately employs highly aggregateddata to code cases, whereas the
misuseofthebestknownplaceinappropriatelyemploysdisaggregateddatato
makeinferencesaboutnational units.Astheearlierexa mplessuggest,inhet-
erogeneous societies thedistortionsassociated w ith these twoproblems can
leadtotheinvalid codingofnationalcases.
The Subnationa l Comparative Method and Theory Building:
Taking Territory Seriously
Afinaladvantage ofthesubnationalcomparative methodconcernshowit
canhelpusbuild theories that explainthe dynamic interconnec tionsamong
the levels andregions of apolitical sy stem . Di saggr egating countries a long
territorial linesmakesitea sie r toseehowtheconstituentpartsofapolitical
systeminteract.27 This invites us to explore the causa lc onnecti ons amo ngre-
gionsthatexperience diverg ent p atte rns ofchange.Analyzingtheseconnec-
tionscanhelpusgainastrongerunderstandingbothofnationalpoliticsandof
majorprocessesofpoliticalandeconomictransformation.
Within-Nation Variation and National Regimes
A r egiona lly differentiated perspect ive that highlights variation across
subnationalunitsinacountrycanbeessentialforunderstandinghownational
politicalregimeswork.Implementingtheirpolicyagendas—orsimplystaying
inoffice—oftenrequiresnational-levelpoliticianstobuildcoalitionswithdif-
ferenttypesofsubnationalactors.Thusa“center-centered”approachthattreats
thenationallevelasanautonomous,separatesphereandobscurestheconnec-
tionsbetweenactorsintheperipheryandthecentermaymischaracterizethe
strategiccontextin whichnational politicians labor.28 Avividexamplefrom
the lit eratu re on political regim es inLatin Ame rica show s how a foc us on
subnational units canhe lp avoid this proble m and thus im prove our under-
standingofpoliticsatthenationallevel.
Popu l i s t Coalitions: The Missing Rural Dimension. Populism in Latin
Americahas typically beenviewed as a“metropolitan”phenomenonrooted
inthemosturbanizedandmodernregionsofthecountry.Thestandard inter-
pretationregardspopulismasapoliticalstrategyfavoring“urban-industrial inter-
ests” at the expense of a tr aditional oligarc hy whose power is usua lly seen as
anchoredinrural,peripheralareasofacountry(DiTella1965,1968).
Apath-breakingarticlebyEdwardGibson(1997) challengesthisviewby
showingthattheprototypicalpopulistregimesofJuanDomingoPeróninAr-
gentina andLázaroCárdenas in Mexicowerein fact based on tw odistinc t
subcoalitions:ametropolitancoalitioncenteredinurbanareasthatgavesupport
to the development strategies of the populist r egime, and aprovincialcoalition
centeredinruralareasthatwasresponsibleforgeneratingtheelectoralmajorities
Snyder 101
thatkeptthepopulistregimeinpower.29 Fromthisperspective,thestandardinter-
pretationofLatinAmericanpopulismasalabor-basedphenome no nwasinsuffi-
cientlyattuned tothelinkages between metropolitanandperipheralregions .
Consequently,populism’smetropolitanfacewasseenasitsonlyface.
Whatiswrongwiththisunderstandingofpopulism?First,suchaperspec-
tivepotentially distortstheforcesthatkeptpopulistgovernmentsinpow er:a
focus limited to themetropolitansideofpopulism canobscurethe fact that
laboralonewaselectorallyinsufficienttosustainpopulistpolicies.Moreover,
ignoringtheprovincialdimensionofpopulist governmentsmiscaststherela-
tionshipbetweenthesegovernmentsandtheold,oligarchicorderthatpreceded
them. Thelopsided viewofpo pulism as anurban, labor-based phenomenon
eitherpitspopulistgovernments againstperipheral,traditional elitesor,more
simplistically,relegatessuchelite s toamarginalroleinnationalpolitics.By
contrast,abalanced understandi ngofpopulismasacompositeofmetropoli -
tan andprovincial coalitions provides ave ry d iffer ent, lessadversarialper-
spectiveonhowpopulistgovernmentsinteractedwithruralelites:Ithighlights
howpopulist governments accommodated and even de pended onprovincial
oligarc hsinorderto“linkpopulismtothetraditional order,giveitcoherence
asanationalelectoralforce,andextenditsreachthroughoutthenationalterri-
tory”(Gibson1997:341).30
Backwaters or Undercurrents? Illiberal Peripheries in Latin America
Focusingonthedynamiclinkagesamongthelevelsandregionsofapoliti-
calsystemprovidesanewwayoflookingattherelationshipbetweencontrast-
ingpoliticalphenomenaobservedatthe“center”(i.e.,thenationallevel)and
atthe “periphery” (i.e ., the subnational le vel). Inthe study of political and
economicliberalizationincontemporaryLatinAmerica,aregionallydifferen-
tiatedframew orkhighlightshowilliberalpoliticalandpolicyregimesthatper-
sist, and evenproliferate,in the peripheralareas ofm any countries maybe
undercu rrent sthatarecausallyintegralcomponentsoftheprocessofliberal-
ization seen atthe center.31 Bycontrast, studiesthat focusonly onpolitics at
the national level e ither do not “see” these illiberal peripheries, or,alterna-
tively,inappropriatelydismissthemasisolatedbackwaters ,disconnectedfrom
andlef t behind bythe proc esses ofpolitical transf ormation observed atthe
center.Suchacenter-centeredperspective,whichhastendedtodominatere-
centresearchonpoliticalandeconomicliberalizationindevelopingcountries,
canleadustomisunderstandthesefundamentalprocessesasfarmoreuniform
thantheyinfactare.
TheSpatial Unevenness of D emocracy.GuillermoO’Donnell’spioneering
workontheshortcomingsofcontemporarydemocraticregimesinLatinAmerica
highlightshowafocusontheinteraction amongtheterritoriallydefinedcom-
ponentsof a political system helps us bett er un derst and theprocess ofde-
m o c ra t i z a t i on . O ’ D on n e l l a r g u e s t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i b e ra l i z a t io n a n d
democratization areterritoriallyunevenprocesses.Consequently,within
aparticularcountry, therulesandnormsthatdefinethen ational regim e
andstatecannotbeassumedtoapplyequallythro ughoutthecountry. For
102 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2001
example,inma nyLa tinAme ricancountries“blueareas” c haracterizedby
robu struleoflawcoexistwith“greenareas”wheretheruleoflawispartially
attenuatedand“brown areas” wheretherule of lawisextremely attenuated
(O’Donnell1999:139).
O’Donnell’sproposalthatwedisaggregatecountries intoblue, green,and
browna re as prom ises asa luta ry inc rea se ind escri ptive accuracy.Moreover,
thisproposalhasprofoundimplicationsforhowwetheorizeaboutdemoc rati-
zation.Byrejectingthenotionthatpoliticalliberalizationisaterritoriallyuni-
formprocess,O’Donnellurgesustoexplorethepotentialcausalrelationships
betweenplacesandunitsthatexperiencedivergentpatternsofchangeinthe
contextofaunified(butnotuniform)politicalsystem.
The“bluing”ofanationalregimemayhaveadirectcausalrelationshipwith
“brow ning” in subnational units. For example, incountries with highly-
malapportioned electoral sys tems tha t over represent rural ar eas—a pattern
commonacrossLatinAmerica(SamuelsandSnyder2001;SnyderandSamuels
2001)—theabilityofnational-levelpoliticians to imple ment andconsolidate
democraticreformsmayironic allydependonwinningtheovervaluedsupport
ofsubnational authoritarian elites.Atthe same tim e, overrepresentationof
subnationalauthoritarianenclavesatthenationallevelcanstrengthentheabil-
ityofthesesubnationalelitestofendoffeffortsbyexternalgroupswhoseek
to reform local politics.A goodexample of this scenar io isthe roleof so-
called“Stalinist”votere servesinsouthern Mexicanstatestha thelpedtheIn-
stitutional Revolutionary Party(PRI)securethepoliticalmajoritiesthatkept
theliberalizingreformersoftheSalinasandZedilloadministrationsinpower
during the1980sand1990s.32 Hence,adialecticalprocesscanresultwhereby
de mocra cy issimultaneously strengthen edat the center andundermined on
theperiphery.33
PatchworkLiberalization:E conomicReforminContemporaryLatinAmerica.
Economic liberalization, like democratization,hasalso bee na territorially
unevenprocessincontemporaryLatinAmerica.Recentresearch(e.g.,Snyder
1999a,2001;GibsonandCalvo2000;RemmerandWibbels2000),highlights
howneoliberaleconomicreformshavecontributedtothemaintenanceandeven
proliferationofilliberalpolicyregimesatthesubnational(especiallystateand
provincial) level. U nderstanding this patc hwork pattern r equires af ocus onthe
interconnectionsamongthelevelsandregionsthatcomprisethepoliticalsystem.
Forexample, toexplainhowthedismantling ofamassive federalgovern -
mententerprise inMexicore sultedinthefor mationofnewregulatoryinstitu-
tionsatthestatelevel,Ianalyze the linkages betweenpoliticiansatthestate
andfederallevels(Snyder2001).Myresearchshowsthatstategovernorswere
ableto take controlofpolicyareasabandonedbytheoldfederalgovernment
enterpriseandreregulatewhatfederallawhadderegulatedinpartbecausethe
rulingPRIfacedagrowingthreatfromoppositionpartiesatthenationallevel.
Thuspresident CarlosSalinasdeGortarihadstrongincentivestoallow state
governorstochoosepoliciesthathelpedmaintainpoliticalstabilityandgener-
ateelectoralmajorities,whetherornotthesepoliciesconformedtotheortho-
dox neoliberal prescriptions that he endorsed.This permissive environment
madeitpossible forg overno rs topursue regulatory po licie s thatcut against
Snyder 103
theagendaofneoliberalreformsetatthenational level by the president.In
fact,Salinasdidno t merelytoleratesuch subnational deviations fr om his
neolibe ralline,heselectivelypromotedreregulationbyvigorouslysupporting
populistgovernorsincertainstates.Thusliberalizingeconomicreformsatthe
na tionallevel andthe proliferation ofilliber alpolicy enclaves atthesubnational
levelwerecomplementaryandcloselyarticulatedcomponentsofasingleprocess:
thelatterhelpedsecurethepoliticalstabilitynecessaryfortheformertoproceed.
GibsonandCalvo(2000)alsoemployasubnationalcomparativemethodto
explaintheterritoriallyunevennatureofeconomicreformsinArgentina.They
showhow electoralrulesheavilyoverrepresentedsparselypopulatedruralar-
easinthenationallegislature.Thissitu ation gave natio nal po liticia ns str on g
incentivestoshieldruralareasfromneoliberalpolicyreform sinordertose-
cure the le gisla t ive m ajoriti es n ee de d t o im pl ement the se r eforms in
underrepresented,urbanareas.34 Thusthepersistent illiberalpolicyregimesin
theArgentineperipherywerenotstagnantbackwatersleftbehindbythepro-
cessofeconomic reforminurban areas.Rather,theywe recausally integra l
componentsoftheoverarchingeconomicreforms.
Astheseexamplessuggest,understandingeconomictransformationincon-
temporaryLatinAmericarequiresthatweexplorethelinkagesbetweenliberal
andilliberalareasinthecontextofasingle,unifiedsystem. Thesubnational
comparativemethodisakeytoolforachievingthisgoal.
Conclusion
Thesubnational comparativemethodoffersimportant advantagesinthree
coreareasoftheresearchprocess:researchdesign,measurement,andtheory -
building. Byincreasing th e number ofobservations and m aking it ea sier to
co ns tru ct controlled c omparison s, a f oc us on s ubnation al unitshelps
comparativistsmanagetheproblemof“manyvariables,smallN.”Subnational
comparativea nal ysis alsostrengthensthecapacity ofcomparativiststocode
casesaccuratelyandthus makevalidc ausa l inf erenc es.Finally,subnational
comparisonsprovideafirmfoundationforbuildingtheoriesthatexplainspa-
tiallyuneve n processesofpolitical andeconomictransformation.Inaddition
tothesemethodologicalbenefits, subnational comparativeanalysisoffersan
indispensabletoolforunderstandingthedecentralizingpoliticalandeconomic
trendsofthecontemporaryera.
Althoughthisarticlehashighlightedtheadvantagesofanalyzingsubnational
units,ithasalsoemphasizedthat,likeallmethodologies,thesubnationalcom-
parativemethodhaslimitations.Onelimitationconcernsgeneralizability.This
problememergesmostclear lyinthecontextofwhatIcallthe“within-nation”
strategyofsubnationalcomparativeanalysisthatfocusesoncasesfrom asingle
country.Althoughwithin-nationcomparisonscanprovideanespecially pow-
erfulwaytoe stabli sh control overhistorical, ecological ,andculturalcondi-
tions,thisstrategyofteninvolvesatrade-offbetweentheabilitytogaincontrol
andtheabilitytogeneralize.35 Onetechniqueformitigatingthistrade-offisto
combine within-nation co mparisonsand between-nationcomparisonsof
subnationalunitsfromdifferentcountries.Alternatively,subnationalcompari-
104 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2001
sonscanbeusedinconjunctionwithcross-nationalcomparisons.Howdistinc t
strategies ofcom parison canbe combined to strengthen both th e ab ility to
establishcontroloverconditions andtheabilitytogenerali zeisanimportan t
questionforfutureresearch.
Thepossibilitie sforgeneralizi ng from subnationalcasescanalso be en-
hancedbyimproving ourtoolsformakingvalidinferencesfromsubnationa l
tonational levelsofanalysis.Recentworkonquantitativemethodsprovides
newwaystomanagetheproblemsthatariseinmakingcross-level inferences
(e.g.,Grofman1995;King1997;KatzandKing1999).Adaptingsuchinsights
toqualitative,small-Nresearchshouldprovidebettertechniquesforgeneral-
izingfromsubnationa lunits.
A se cond limitation of thesubnational comparative m ethod concerns the
problemofinterdependence.Becauseofthepossibilityofdiffusionand bor-
rowing amongsubnational units ina single country,within-nation compari-
sonscaninvolveatrade-offbetweentheabilitytoestablishcontroloverpotential
explanatoryfactorsandtheabilitytomakeindependentobservationsandtests
of hypothe s es. Combiningwithin-nation comparison s andcomparisons of
subn ationa l unitsfr omdifferent countriescanreducetheeffectsofdiffusion
andcouldthushelpmitigatethistrade-off.
Itbearsemphasisthattheproblemofachievingindependenceamongcases
isbynomeanslimitedtosubnationalcomparativeanalysis:cross-nationalre-
searchondiffusion,dependency,andinternationaldemonstra tioneffectshas
longrecognizedtheimportanceofinterconnectionsamongnationalunits.The
processofglobalizationandtherecentgrowthofinformationtechnologyhave
undoubtedlymagnifiedthescopeanddensityofinterconnectionsamongboth
national andsubnational units. Thusfreestandingpolitical units that canbe
legitimatelytreatedasisolated,experimentalobservationsareprobablyharder
tofindatanylevelofanalysis. Studiesthataddressthemethodolo gicalchal-
lengesposed bythetrendtowardmoreinterconnectednesswillprovideafar
strongergroundingforfuturecomparativeresearch.
Notes
*IappreciatehelpfulcommentsonthismaterialfromNancyBermeo,DexterBoniface,David
Collier,John Gerring,Edwa rd Gibson,Robert Kaufman,JuanLinz,JamesMahoney,Kell y
McM ann,G erardo Munc k, Pete rNa rdulli, David Sa muels, Judit hTendle r,a nd two anony-
mousreviewers.Ialsobenefitedgreatlyfromtheinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraftpro-
videdbytheparticipantsintheconferenceon“RegimesandPoliticalChangeinLatinAmerica,”
heldattheUniversityofIllinoisatUrbana-ChampaigninAugust1999.
1. See, for example ,Kohli (1987, 1990) ; Fishman (1993) ;Fox ( 1993, 1996); Putnam (1993) ;
Locke(1995);Hagopian(1996);LockeandJacoby(1997);Rubin(1997);Stoner-Weiss(1997);
Tendler (1997); Sam uels (1998); Snyder (1999a , 2001); Firm in-Sell ers(2000); G ibson and
Calvo(2000);Heller(2000);Montero(2000);RemmerandWibbels(2000);Varshney(2001);
andJonesLuong(2002).Althoughsubnationalunitscommandincreasingattention,subnational
politicalanalysisisnot an ent irely new phenome non in c ompara tivepoli tics: a number of
earlierworksfocusedonsubnationalcases(forexample,Tilly1964;LinzanddeMiguel1966;
KesselmanandRosenthal1974;andTarrow1967,1976) .
2. TheseissuesdoreceivelimitedattentioninLijphart(1971);King,Keohane,andVerba(1994);
Snyder 105
andPeters(1998).LinzanddeMiguel(1966)isoneofthefewworksthatfocusesprimarilyon
methodologicalissuesinvolvedincomparingsubnationalunits.
3. TheclassicdiscussionofthisproblemisLijphart(1971).SeealsoCollier(1993).
4. Theproblemofwhole-nationbiasisalsodiscus sedinLijphart(1975:166-9) .
5. See,forexample,O’Donnell(1993);Fox(1994);Kurtz(1999);Snyder(1999a,2001);Gibson
andCalvo(2000);andRemmerandWibbels(2000).
6. Collier(1993:112)alsodiscussesthevalueofwithin-case,“internalcomparisons”forincreas-
ingthenumberofobservations.
7. Inthisconte xt,Kingetal.discussAtulKohli’s(1987)researchonsocialpolicyinIndia.To
testhypothesesabouttheeffectsofstate-levelpoliticalregimesonpovertypolicy,Kohliuses
additionalobservationsfromthelocal,panchayat level(Kohlialsolooksatothercountriesto
evaluatetheobservableimplicationsofhishypotheses).Recentworkondivided government
atthestatelevelintheUnitedStatesprovides anothergood illustrationofhowmoving toa
lowerlevelofaggregation canhelpsolvethesmall-Nproblembyinc reasingthenumberof
observations.See ,forexample,AltandLowry(1998);andLowry,Alt,andFerree(1998).
8. Lieberson(1985:108)adoptsaquitedifferentviewofthisissue,concludingthatevidenceata
lower levelof aggregation “isirrelevantfor determiningthevalidityofaproposition about
processesoperatingonthehigherlevel”andtha t“nousefulunderstandingofthehigher-level
str ucturecanbeobtainedfromlower-levelanalyses.”
9. “Galton’sproblem”issonamedbecauseoftheobjectionraisedbyFrancisGaltonatthemeet-
ingoftheRoyalAnthropologicalInstitutein1889toapioneeringpaperbyEdwa rdB. Tylor
introducingthecross-culturalsurveymethod.Galtonpointedoutthatbecausetraitsoftenspread
bydiffusion(forexample ,byborrowingormigration),observationsofsuchtraitsacrosscul-
tureswerenotnecessarilyindependentinstances(Naroll1961:15).
10.Asdiscussedbelow,dynamicinteractionsamongthesubunitsofapoliticalsystemshouldnot
necessarilybeseenasatroubling hindrancetomakingvalidcausalinferences.Rather,such
interactionscanbeafertilesourceoftheoreticalinnovationandprogress.
11. SeeLocke(1995)foranintriguingresearchdesignthatcombinesthestudyofvariedsubnational
unitswithananalysisofmultiplesectors.LockeoffersasubnationalstudyoftheItalianauto-
mobileandtextileindustries.
12. Rustow(1968:45)madearelatedpointwhenhearguedthat“meregeographicproximitydoes
notnecessarilyfurnishthebestbasisofcomparison.”
13. AsO’Donnellhimselfobserves(1973:21),suchastrategyoverlooksthepossibilitythatthe
presenceora bsenceofalarge,underdevelopedperipherymay haveacrucialimpactonna-
tionalpolitics.Hence,eventhoughthemodernsectorsinArgentinaandBrazilaresimilarin
size,theireffectonnationalpoliticsmaydifferbecauseofthediffer entsizesoftheagrarian
sectorsinthetwocases.
14. Thisbetween-nationcomparisonthusenablesLipsettoemploya“mostsimilar”systemsde-
sign.On“mostsimilar”and“mostdifferent”systemsdesignsseePrzeworskiandTeune(1970).
15. Anothercommonly-employedstrategyofbetween-nationsubnationalcomparisoninvolvesfo-
cusingonthesameeconomicsectoracrossdistinctcountries(see,forexample,Evans1995;
Bates1997; Ka rl1997; a ndPa ige 1997). Because of cross -country differ enceson a wide
rangeofothervariables,suchanapproachma ybelesseffectivethanwithin-countrycompari-
sonsforexploringhowvariationinpoliticalfactorsshapeseconomicoutcomes.
16. InthecontextoftheSaskatchewan-Alberta-Manitobajuxtaposition,Lipset(1950:217)makes
anintriguingcross-temporalcomparison,notingthat“during theperiodbetweenthe1890’s
and the earlytwentiethcen tury,when economic andecologicalconditions in Manitoba ap-
proximatedthoseofSaskatchewanandAlbertatoday[1950],theManitobaagrarianpolitical
movementwasstrong.”
17. Thisdifficultyofachievingindependentobservationsamongspatiallyproximateunitsisdis-
cussedintheeconometricliteratureon“spatialautocorrelation”(e.g.,Anselin1988).Thespa-
tialautocorrelation problem isi nm any waysanalogoustothe“temporalautocorrelation”
problemintime-seriesanalysis(Eagles1995:7;King1997:166).
18.Thevalueofbetween-nationcomparisonsofnon-contiguousunitsforincreasingtheindepen-
denceamongcasesissuggestedbyWaldoTobler’s“firstlawofgeography”whichpositsthat
106 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2001
“everythingisrelatedtoeverythingelse,butnearthingsaremorerelatedthandistantones”
(Eagles1995:7).
19. See,forexample,Lipset(1959)andthehugeliteratureinspiredbythisstudy.
20. Peters(1998:44)makesarelatedpointwhenheobservesthatwholecountriesareoftencoded
as outlie rs when only one par t of the countr y has extr eme values , where ast he res tof the
countryactuallyhas“normal”valueswithrespecttothecross-nationaldistribution.
21. See,forexample,Nelson(1990)andCórdoba(1994) .
22. Asimilarrelianceoneasilyavailable,national-levelOECDdatainmuchrecentworkonthe
comparativepoliticaleconomyofadvancedindustrialcountrieshasalsoundoubtedlyobscured
importantprocessesoccurringbelowthenationallevel.
23. Moving tot hesubna tional leveld oesnot nec essar ilyguara nteeacorrectcodingofna tional
casesbecausescholarscanmiscodethesubnationalunitsthemselves.Forexample,Gaines
(1999) shows that schol ars misc oded province -level party s ystems in Cana da as two-pa rty
systemsandthusincorr ectlyconcludedthatCanadaconformedtoDuverger’slawatthepro-
vincial,ifnotatthenational,level(Duverger’slawstatesthatpluralityruleelectionsresultin
two-partycompetition).Bycontrast,Gainesshowsthatprovince-levelpartysystemsinCanada
actua llyha ve more t han two part ies. Thus Cana da stands as agenuinecounterexampleto
Duverger’slaw.
24. Ontheratherdifferentproblemof“themisuseofthelittleknowncase,”seeKenworthy(1973).
RuthBerinsCollierandDavidCollier’sinversionofKenworthy’sformulation—“themisuse
ofthebestknowncase”—hasobviouslyinfluencedmyformulation(CollierandCollier1991:
14).
25. Theproblemofmisusingthebestknowplacemightbecharacterizedasthewell-knowneco-
logicalfallacy“inreverse”inthatdisaggregateddatafromsubnunitsresultsinabiasedinfer-
enceabouttheaggregatelevel.Theecologicalfallacyreferstothebiasesthatcanresultwhen
usingaggregatedatatomakeinferencesaboutindividual-levelbehavior(Robinson 1950).A
methodformakingunbiasedinferencesfromaggregatedataispresentedinKing(1997).
26. Initsviewofnationalpoliticaleconomiesascomplexcompositesofdiversesubnationalsys-
tems,Herrigel’sworkexemplifieswhatmightbecalledthe“MITschool”ofpoliticaleconomy
associatedwiththeworkofscholarssuchasSuzanneBerger,MichaelPiore,Cha rlesSabel,
andJudithTendler.RichardLocke’sresearchonItalyalsoexemplifiestheMITschool.In
his impo rta nt boo k on theItaliancase,Locke ( 1995) arg ues for a“micro-politics” a p-
proacht opoliticalec onomy rootedin theassumptionthat“nati ona l politicaleconomies
arenotcoherent systemsbutratherincohe re ntcompositesofdiversesubna ti ona lpatterns
thatcoexist(oftenuneasily)withinthesamenationalterritory.”Locke(1995:16-20)criticiz es
tendenciesbysomescholarstoextrapolatetheeconomicsuccessesanddynamismoftheso-
called“ThirdItaly” basedonsmallenterprisesandflexibleproductiontothenationalcaseas
awhole.Thistendencyprovidesagood exampleofwhatImeanbymisusingawell-known
place.
27. Intheircritiqueof“dualist”perspectivesondevelopmentthatdividedcountriesintoamodern,
capitalisteconomyandabackward,pre-capitalistone,dependencytheoristsoftenexpresseda
strongconcernwithdescribingandexplainingtheconnectionsbetweencontrastingregionsof
acountry.See,forexample,Stavenhagen(1968)andPortes(1983).
28. Theterm“center-centered”isfromRubin(1997:12).
29. SeeTendler(1999:105-19)foranintriguingextensionofGibson’sargumentthatshowshow
“two-pronged ”coal ition-bui ldingstra tegiesthatmar rymodern andtradit ionalconst ituencies
havebeenimplementedatthesubnationallevelbycontemporaryBraziliangovernors.Roberts
(1995)makesarelatedargumentabout “neopopulism ”asacoalition-buildingtoolinthecon-
text of the impleme ntation of free- markete conomic ref ormsi nP eru during the 1990s. On
neopopulism,seealsoWeyland(1996,1999).
30. Hagopian ’simport ant work on Bra zil also shows that a keen sensitivityto varia tionatthe
subnationallevelcanhighlight howtransf ormationalnationalregimesaccommodate,rather
thanmarginalize,traditionalelites.Asintheliteratureonpopulism, workbypoliticalscien-
tistsonBrazil’sbureaucratic-authoritarianregimetendedtofocusexclusivelyonurban,met-
ropolitanareas.Inthisrespect,Hagopian(1996:xiii)notes,“Manycountrystudiesthatidentify
themselvesasnationalinscope arein factanalysesofthe mostadvancedregions—Riode
Snyder 107
JaneiroandespeciallySãoPaulo.Assuch,theyhaveacollectiveblindspotand…havepaida
pricefortheirmyopia.”SeealsoMigdal,Kohli, andShue(1994)onthevalueofsubnational
analysisinthestudyofstate-societyrelations.
31. By“illiberal”Imeannon-democraticinthepoliticalsphereandnon-free-marketintheeco-
nomicsphere.
32. OnsubnationalauthoritarianregimesinMexico,seeFox(1994)andSnyder(1999b).Onthe
important,yetoftenoverlooked,roleofnon-democraticruralelitesinsecuringpoliticaland
economicliberalizationatthenationallevelinChile,seeKurtz(1999).
33.We mightwanttoconsiderhowweshouldcodesuchacase.Isacountrycharacterizedbythe
coexistenceofa nati onal democr atic regim ea longside s ubnationa l author itarian regim es a
full-fledgeddemocra cy?
34. RemmerandWibbels(2000)alsoanalyzethedivergenteffectsofneoliberaleconomicref orms
acrossArgentineprovinces.Theyarguethatthepersistenceofilliberalpolicyregimesatthe
provinciallevelmay jeopardizenationaleconomicperformanceand thusunderminethe
sustainabilityofreformsatthenationallevel.
35. Ontherelatedtr ade-offbetweengeneralizabilityandconceptualvalidity,seeSartori(1970;
1984); Collierand Mahon (1993); Collierand Levitsky(1997); Collier andAdcoc k(1999);
andMunck(1998).
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