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“Defining Accountability”
By Andreas P. Kyriacou
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Girona (Spain).
Background paper prepared for Aids Accountability International (AAI) workshop on
May 12-13, 2008, Stockholm.
I. Introduction
Accountability has been defined in the following terms: "A is accountable to B when A
is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them,
and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct" (Schedler, 1999, p.17). To
help elucidate this definition consider the role of elections in promoting political
accountability. An election gives a chance for the candidate to run for campaigns and
attend forums so as to explain and inform their purposes and goals if they are elected.
On the other hand, it is also a sanction for those who misbehaved or failed to represent
one’s interests in the past tenure – by giving the vote to someone else. The concept of
accountability implies that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in
ways that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be
sanctioned for failures to do so (Grant and Keohane, 2005, p.29).
In this brief background paper I will begin by making what I hope will prove a
helpful distinction between horizontal and vertical accountability
1
. Having done so, I
will present what has been called the accountability cycle pointing to some of the key
elements involved in making institutions or bodies more accountable. I will then present
an overview of vertical accountability across different world regions so as to give an
idea of the sharp differences that exist. I will end this article with some concluding
comments on the relevance of these ideas to AAI’s stated mission to help improve the
quality of the global response to AIDS and ensure its implementation by holding key
actors accountable for their promises and performance.
II. Horizontal versus Vertical Accountability
A distinction has been made between horizontal and vertical accountability (O’Donell,
1999). In a well functioning state, the government is subjected to accountability that is
both imposed upon it from outside by citizens (vertical), and accountability that it
imposes upon itself through public institutions empowered to restrain the political
executive (horizontal). Vertical accountability may include citizens acting through the
electoral process or indirectly via civic organizations (“civil society”) or the news
media. Horizontal accountability covers the range of public entities created by the state
to check its own abuses and inefficiencies (for example, the judiciary, auditors general,
anti-corruption units and Ombudsmen).
1
It’s important, I think, to take seriously Mulgan’s (2000) warning of the danger of unnecessary
academic complication of the concept.
1
Government
Judiciary, Auditors
General, Anti-corruption
Bodies, Ombudsmen
Horizontal
Accountabilit
y
Figure 1. Types of accountability
Horizontal accountability crucially depends on the degree of autonomy or independence
of such Institutions of Accountability (IA). Moreover, governments are more likely to
bind themselves through institutions of horizontal accountability under circumstances
where they may be punished for failing to do so. In relation to this, horizontal
accountability can be buttressed by strong vertical accountability. The effective
operation of vertical accountability, through the electoral process, the news media and
concerted civic action, causes governments to take seriously the perils of failing to
sustain horizontal accountability. At the same time, the effectiveness of mass media and
civil society in holding government accountable depends to a large extent on the actions
that properly authorized state agencies may undertake in order to investigate and
eventually sanction wrong doings. Contrary to the case of horizontal accountability,
most expressions of “vertical accountability” have little possibility of applying
sanctions other than public disapproval. The distinction and relationship between
horizontal and vertical accountability is illustrated in figure 1 above.
III. The Accountability Cycle
Schacter (2000, p.2) talks of an accountability cycle which has three stages namely,
information, action and response (Figure 2). At the information stage, the IA – for
example the Ombudsman in the case of horizontal accountability or an NGO in the case
of the vertical kind – is able to obtain relevant, accurate and timely information about
the activities of the government. In stage 2 the IA will act on the basis of this
information something which depends on its capacity both to analyze the information
and to make demands on government. The final response stage refers to the degree to
which government feels compelled to respond to the IA. The accountability cycle helps
clarify the difference between accountability and transparency. The former refers to the
government’s response at the end of the cycle while the latter refers to the quality of
information available in the first stage. Another concept worth distinguishing is that of
“checks and balances”. These are mechanisms designed to prevent action that oversteps
legitimate boundaries while accountability mechanisms operate after the fact. As
Vertical
Accountabilit
y
Elections, Civil
Society (NGOs),
Media
2
explained by Grant and Keohane (2005, p.30) the executive veto power in the U.S.
Constitution is part of a system of checks and balances while the impeachment power is
an accountability mechanism. Notwithstanding the fact that accountability mechanisms
operate ex post, they can exert influence ex ante, “since the anticipation of sanctions
may deter the powerful from abusing their positions in the first place” (ibid).
Institution of
Accountability
Figure 2. The Accountability Cycle
What emerges from this perspective is the importance of the quality of the information
available to the IA (relevance, accuracy, timeliness, comprehensiveness) as well as its
capacity to analyze this information and to transform it into practical demands on
government. This said, the IA has relative control over stage 2 of the accountability
cycle but less so over stage 1 to the extent that government is an important source of
quality information. The IA’s influence in stage 3 is constrained, among other things, by
the attitude of political and bureaucratic leaders towards accountability since
insufficient high-level commitment to robust accountability negatively affects the
impact of an IA’s work.
IV. Vertical Accountability in the World
The World Governance Indicators generated by the World Bank cover 213 countries
and territories and measure six dimensions of governance since 1996 until end-2006
(see Kaufman et al, 2006). The indicators are based on several hundred individual
variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources
constructed by 25 different organizations. Some of these sources are commercial risk
rating agencies, others governments and multilateral organizations, and yet others
NGOs. Several are surveys of individuals or domestic firms with first-hand knowledge
of the governance situation in the country.
One governance variable which is included in these indicators is termed Voice
and Accountability (VA) and defined as the extent to which a country’s citizens are able
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom
of association, and free media. In terms of our previous discussion therefore, this
captures the notion of vertical accountability. This variable like all the others is
measured on a scale from -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better
Information
Response
Action
Government
3
outcomes. In figure 3 below I represent this indicator across regions and for the period
1996-2006.
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank Governance Indicators at
http://www.govindicators.org
Figure 3. Voice and Accountability in the World, 1996-2006.
What become immediately apparent are the large differences in perceived accountability
levels across regions. As expected, governments in North America and Western and
Central Europe and to a lesser extent those in Oceania, are perceived to be accountable
while those in South and South East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and
especially Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa and the Middle East have consistently
much lower perceived accountability levels. It’s important to note that such a regional
based classification masks strong differences across countries. This is clearly the case
for Sub-Saharan Africa where the strong negative values for Eritrea, Congo Democratic
Republic, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia are in sharp contrast to the positive values for
countries like Benin, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.
It is obvious that such an accountability indicator could be used to measure the
impact of greater accountability in health outcomes in different countries and across
time. Is greater accountability associated with improved outcomes after controlling for
other variables deemed to influence such outcomes
2
? From an empirical perspective
this question could be approached either by way of cross-section analysis or, ideally, a
fixed effects panel data analysis that can go some way to address the problem of omitted
variable bias which plagues macro-analyses of public policy outcomes.
2
“Outputs” ideally should be measured using indicators of the actual provision of government services,
rather than their ultimate effects, “outcomes,” since the latter depend on many factors beyond the
government’s control.
4
5
V. Implications for AAI
As reported in an advanced draft of the Pilot Study Initiated by AAI, “there is both a
need and a demand for independent entities [in the field of HIV AIDS] that: 1) monitor
the performance of key stake holders in the response to the AIDS epidemic; 2) promote
improved data collection and analysis; 3) provide tools to help bridge the gap between
data collection and analysis, policy and advocacy; 4) hold leaders and institutions
accountable for how their policies and programmes impact high-burden countries; and
5) reinforce leadership of the response, particularly in high-burden countries. ... [There
is a] need for an independent, scientifically based assessment tool that can
systematically compare actors’ performances on a regular basis.” (AAI, p. 4). The
literature reviewed in this background paper brings to light several insights concerning
the factors which may improve the effectiveness of Institutions of Accountability in
general and AAI’s efforts in particular. AAI is right to place a considerable emphasis on
the need for good quality information and a scientifically rigorous rating methodology.
Its impact will, to a great extent, depend on generating a consensus among the scientific
community with regards to the appropriateness of its methodology and the reliability of
its ratings. In relation to this, the independence or autonomy of AAI is an important
factor contributing towards its legitimacy and, ultimately, towards achieving its mission.
The previous discussion also suggests that the effectiveness of AAI’s efforts would be
buttressed by the strength of horizontal accountability since this would potentially
introduce stiffer sanctions which, recall, are an important element in making
organizations accountable. Thus, beyond “soft” sanctions such as public or peer
pressure mobilized by AAI’s ratings, the existence of public entities created by
governments or organizations to check their inefficiencies may introduce the possibility
of “hard” sanctions thereby enhancing accountability efforts. Notwithstanding the
possibility that AAI may also contribute towards strengthening vertical accountability in
the area of HIV Aids, the effectiveness of its efforts in generating a response from the
organizations rated, may ultimately depend on their willingness, disposition or
commitment to be held accountable in the first place.
References
Aids Accountability International (2008). “Developing an HIV/AIDS Country Rating”, Pilot
Study Initiated by AAI, Draft 7 January 2008.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo, Mastruzzi (2006). “Governance Matters:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996–2005” World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 4012
Mulgan, Richard (2000). “Accountability: An Ever Expanding Concept?” Public Administration
78(3): 555-573.
O’Donnell, Guillermo (1999). “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, in Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner: The Self-Restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 29-51.
Schacter, Mark (2000). “When Accountability Fails: A Framework for Diagnosis and Action”,
Institute of Governance Policy Brief 9, Ottawa, Canada.
Schedler, Andreas (1999). "Conceptualizing Accountability", in Andreas Schedler, Larry
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner: The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in
New Democracies. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 13-28.
Grant, Ruth W.; Keohane, Robert O. (2005). "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics". American Political Science Review 99 (1): 29-43.
