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China's energy geopolitics: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia
... It was until the financial crunch of 2008 that Russia was able to restrict rising Chinese influence in Central Asia. The world's economies struggled because of the economic slump of 2008, and Russia and China were no exceptions in this regard, and both of them needed capital fusion badly [58]. However, the Chinese were of those few countries that not only recovered quickly from that but also made incredible breakthroughs in economic development. ...
... Resultantly, the Chinese had significant leverage over other countries, and they utilised it to reshape the power balance in their favour by employing neo-mercantilist methods. The huge investments made by the Chinese in the region through their state-owned firms, loans for energy contracts, and status-seeking development schemes helped them extend their influence in Central Asia [58]. Eventually, the energy projects and pipelines that could not be materialised for years were completed. ...
... For instance, only in 2010, the Chinese bought 50-100% of shares of fifteen of Kazakhstan's energy enterprises. Chinese hold on the oil sector of Kazakhstan could be witnessed through the amount of oil that was shipped to China in 2010, which was 26 million tons out of its overall production of 80 million tons [58]. The Western concerns and campaign to malign China through the "debt-trap" philosophy have been exposed by Ramay in the following words: "the Western campaign of the debt trap is actually an effort to hide the Western debt trap" [23]. ...
This paper offers a critical analysis of how the new regimes in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China complement its energy diplomacy to ensure economic sustainability driven by an uninterrupted supply of overseas energy. Recognising the centrality of energy in its foreign policy, China’s initiative in the AIIB and the BRI to complement its energy diplomacy is a subject of immense significance requiring extensive research. The present study investigates whether the transformations in China’s energy diplomacy caused primarily by these new regimes in the AIIB and the BRI are a step toward economic internationalisation or consistency of its years-old mercantilist practices. It adopts a well-defined analytical methodology by utilising the “case-based” approach of John Gerring. This article argues that the new global institutions of China successfully complement the country’s energy diplomacy, and its energy diplomacy towards Central Asia is predominantly neo-mercantilist. However, it shows a strong inclination to facilitate economic interdependence towards regions that carry some strategic weight in China’s national interests. In contrast, countries enriched in energy resources but isolated, with little strategic worth, are put under sheer dependency on China.
... China's steady penetration in energy markets and infrastructure investments, combined with the will of the EU and US to remain influential, lead to a messy brawl for influence through special deals and grants. China has also been pushing for alternative institutions, as a means of extending its growing economic power (Pirani 2011). Some evidence from Chinese involvement in Africa points to a new form of influence on a grand scale (Tan-Mullins, Giles, and Power 2010; Brautigam 2011). ...
... China's steady penetration in energy markets and infrastructure investments, combined with the will of the EU and US to remain influential, lead to a messy brawl for influence through special deals and grants. China has also been pushing for alternative institutions, as a means of extending its growing economic power (Pirani 2011). Some evidence from Chinese involvement in Africa points to a new form of influence on a grand scale (Tan-Mullins, Giles, and Power 2010; Brautigam 2011). ...
... China's steady penetration in energy markets and infrastructure investments, combined with the will of the EU and US to remain influential, lead to a messy brawl for influence through special deals and grants. China has also been pushing for alternative institutions, as a means of extending its growing economic power (Pirani 2011). Some evidence from Chinese involvement in Africa points to a new form of influence on a grand scale (Tan-Mullins, Giles, and Power 2010; Brautigam 2011). ...
This special issue illuminates diverse realities of post-Soviet development in Central Asia through a multidisciplinary prism. The contributing articles are grounded in a range of social science disciplines including architecture, anthropology and geography, as well as drawing from mainstream social sciences. The analyses demonstrate how a synthesis of specialist knowledge from area studies and individual disciplinary methodologies can provide well-grounded critical positions on development.
Cambridge Core - Russian and East European Government, Politics and Policy - Energy Security along the New Silk Road - by Anatole Boute
The following paper strives to (1) present the reader with the results of my preceding book on the subject (Eder 2014) and to (2) review the trends that had been predicted therein. It provides a concise analysis of the Sino-Russian relationship’s history, an account of post-Soviet regional energy projects, and an analysis and interpretation of the mainland Chinese discourse on the impact of the Central Asian energy issue on this relationship. The issue has been broadly discussed as a possible source of friction since the global financial and economic crisis. Chinese authors predicted that a great deal of co-ordination and compromise would be needed because of Russian sensitivities but conveyed confidence that their country’s ‘inevitable’ expansion of crucial energy relations would be manageable. The book thus predicted a successful handling of competing interests in the short term but still foresaw a challenge to the ‘strategic partnership’ through the gradually shifting power balance. Over the last 18 months, China has advanced even faster and more comprehensively than anticipated and already overshadows Russia. Now undergirded by a more substantial political strategy, it quietly but resolutely pushes Moscow (and all its schemes of post-Soviet re-integration) aside. Managing ensuing frustrations and more blatant counter-measures will likely test the resolve and aptitude of Chinese policy-makers earlier than expected.
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