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Components of Value and Representation in Coalition Formation
Abstract
This paper presents an extension of Leiserson's formulation of the process by which actors balance value and power considerations in coalition formation. First, two components of value are considered (e.g., ideology and interests). The two component version of the model is evaluated by data provided by participants in a simulated interreligious decision-making council. Estimates for model parameters are provided and the amount of variance accounted for by various combinations of parameters is determined by multiple regression techniques. The formalization is then generalized to the case of n-components of value. A further extension takes account of the conflict between representational role obligations and personal values. Finally, various elaborations of the model are discussed including the consideration of changes that occur through time in the weighting (balancing) process.
... These results suggested the unexpected outcome that interests trump values on issues that, in essence, define the religious groups represented in the simulation. This research is discussed in some detail in Dmckman et al. (1974) and in Krause et al. (1976). ...
Unlike the previous contributions to this section on Models of International Negotiations this chapter deals with a concrete
and as yet unsolved international conflict, namely, that between Greece and Turkey over the breadth of territorial waters
in the Aegean Sea. Greece claims that it has the freedom to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, whereas Turkey has
indicated that a Greek extension of territorial waters constitutes a casus belli. Currently, both countries apply the six-mile
limit; several crises have occurred over this issue in the past, but the status quo has remained unchanged.
The conception of turning points advanced in this essay emphasizes events that occur in a chronological sequence which the author, in his previous work, has incorporated into a framework for case analysis. The framework covers three stages: precipitants that trigger change; departures which are the reaction to the precipitant; and consequences, which refer to the direction the negotiation takes as a result of the departure. Building on his earlier work, the author uses examples of a less-bounded international negotiation and cases culled from the headlines to demonstrate the framework's generality. He then considers the concept at the individual, relational, and collective levels in an attempt to probe the psychological and social processes that occur before, during, and after departures (turning points); and may be in fact, the underlying impetus for departures.
Key negotiations questions—whether to engage in or break off negotiations, what position to stake out, and whether to accept
a deal—are crucial matters of state, and such decisions are often taken out of the hands of the bureaucracy and made by a
small circle of top leaders. In this chapter, we present a model of small group decision-making dynamics that draws on social,
cognitive, and political psychology. The model can address questions involving whether or not a decision-making group will
reach consensus or deadlock in a given policy debate, the basic policy direction that will be chosen, and the stability of
the decision in the face of new events and information. The model’s foundation in social psychology and the use of a dynamical
systems methodology represents an alternative perspective to most formal treatments of group decision making and negotiations
that take a rational choice and game-theoretic approach. In addition, the social network over which group influence is exerted
is a fundamental aspect of our approach.
The Regional Air Pollution INformation and Simulation (RAINS) model provides a consistent framework for the analysis of strategies
to reduce emissions of air pollutants focusing on acidification, eutrophication, and ground-level ozone [9]. The RAINS model
combines information on the anthropogenic driving forces of emissions (with databases on current and future economic activities,
energy consumption levels, etc.) on the sources of emissions, on emission control options and costs, on the atmospheric dispersion
of pollutants, and on environmental sensitivities (i.e., databases on critical loads). In order to create a consistent and
comprehensive picture of the options for simultaneously addressing the three environmental problems, the model considers emissions
of sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), ammonia (NH3), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). A schematic diagram of the RAINS model is displayed in Figure 1.
In 1994 I surveyed game models of peace and war for the Handbook of Game Theory: this review summarizes some of the developments since that time. When the Cold War ended, concern over nuclear war yielded
to broader issues, such as ethnic conflict, humanitarian intervention, nuclear proliferation, sanctions as tools of compellance,
the establishment of stable democracies in new nations, globalization and trade, and the formation of supranational bodies.
Current game theory applications on war and peace responded to these political changes, so that the variety of topics the
field now treats has made it especially interesting. More than before, the literature can be seen as analyses of different
kinds of international bargaining.
Game decision situations are characterized by independent decision makers with diverging preferences making independent decisions. While these situations are apparently described by noncooperative game theory, practical applications of this theory are limited by several factors:
1.
Generally, but particularly in strongly competitive situations, decision makers are not inclined to reveal their preferences, especially in the basic form of a utility or value function. This makes it extremely hard, and often impossible, to compute game equilibria that could be used in negotiations, for example, for estimating BATNA (best alternative to negotiated agreement) as a status quo point. Game equilibria can be computed only under extremely simplifying assumptions (e.g., that all players minimize the costs of environmental protection) and thus can serve only as rough approximations.
2.
In more complex situations, characterized by nonlinear or multicriteria models, equilibria are essentially nonunique (a nonlinear equation usually has multiple solutions). The analysis of multiple equilibria, their stability, etc., is for various reasons1 not very far advanced in game theory that concentrated on arguments for choosing a unique equilibrium as a rational outcome of a game. In addition, multiple equilibria often lead to conflict escalation processes.
More than half a century after the birth of game theory as an academic (sub)discipline, many experienced negotiators and mediators
continue to work without any formal support from game theory or related subjects. In the last decades, hopes have risen that
mathematical procedures for the fair division of goods might be able to bridge this gulf. “Adjusted Winner” (AW), a procedure
suggested by Brams and Taylor [2], promises to satisfy several standards of fairness simultaneously and, for this reason will
be scrutinized here.
International-relations theory can identify and frame important questions, but Pentagon and State Department officials will
probably always be more interested in detailed case studies, prepared by area-studies experts. Theorizing about the causes
of war might occasionally generate clean, law-like propositions that appeal to policymakers. But more typically, the discipline
generates broad patterns that can be applied to particular cases only with a great deal of caution.
Negotiation over conflicting interests and demands involves two separate but interacting dimensions. One dimension is given by the problem, which includes the content and the structure of the negotiation. The other dimension comes with the players, and it characterizes how the game is approached. This perspective offers a broader understanding of the negotiators’ behavior because it allows one to distinguish between the actual actors in negotiation and the role they are playing in the conflict.
Consequently, there are two components of bargaining power, which Underdal [27] classifies as structural and behavioral, that have an influence on the negotiated agreement. Since the roles are part of the structure (i.e., the problem), structural bargaining power is what remains when the players of the game are exchanged. To what extent the structure affects the outcome, of course, depends on the players’ individual bargaining skills. However, if negotiators are similar in their skills—a situation one might expect in high-level negotiations—then the outcome of negotiation will be determined by the structure. Moreover,
only knowledge of the game allows one to assess how well negotiators play and to appreciate the quality of their agreement—Is it fair? Is it satisfactory? Who won? and so forth. In order to give negotiators advice on how to achieve their desired outcome, one needs an analytical approach that is focused on the game (the problem), while at the same time acknowledging that it is being played by real players (the negotiators), who are interacting with one another in some way.
A scientific curiosity for almost a century, the mineral resources of the deep ocean floor took on a sudden importance in
the 1960s and early 1970s when it was claimed there were hundreds of billions of dollars worth of minerals lying on the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (see [3]). Suddenly this curiosity became the center of attention in efforts to
develop a new and comprehensive law of the sea to replace the already outdated and insufficient Geneva Conventions on the
Law of the Sea, adopted in 1958.
The focus of this chapter is on the usefulness of formal models to the practice of international negotiations—quite in the
spirit of the mission of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)—and also to the theory of international
negotiations itself, and less on lessons for the formal theory, even though many ideas about what should be done in the theory
itself can be found in previous chapters.3 These conclusions deal with lessons for practitioners of international negotiations such as businesspeople, diplomats, and
politicians, as well as providing lessons for modelers who want or have to develop formal models for the purpose of analyzing
past negotiations in a descriptive way or, more challenging, for providing formal aid to actual negotiation.
Conflicts between states can be subdivided into several phases which characterize the intensity of the tension between the
states involved. According to [7] these phases are stable peace, unstable peace, major tension, and war. In general, the transitions
between the different phases are caused by decisions of one or several government or states that are party to the conflict.
In principle, governments have three kinds of decisions at their disposal (see e.g., [11]), namely, cautious actions, de-escalating
actions, and escalating actions.
A variety of modeling approaches have been used as tools for analyzing aspects of negotiation and related interactions. Many models represent the mixed-motive feature of negotiation where parties are torn between cooperating to get an agreement and competing to get an acceptable agreement close to their own preferences. This feature is highlighted in the two-person games-particularly the Prisoner's Dilemma-constructed and analyzed in the game theory tradition. The focus of these games is on solutions or outcomes, with attention paid to the distinction between equilibrium (minimizing losses) and optimal (maximizing joint gains) solutions. Similarly, outcomes or end states are the focus of models in the tradition of decision analysis: the bargaining frontier is a tool for identifying optimal or integrative solutions. Other models concentrate more on the negotiation process or throughputs including how impasses are resolved and how a process moves or transitions through stages. Some of these models provide a diagnostic function from which advice is generated; other process models identify the conditions that can either stall the talks (as when the parties are stuck in a stage or have disagreements within delegations) or provide momentum toward an agreement (as when they move quickly from one stage to another or reach consensus within delegations). Examples of each of these types of models are discussed in this chapter.
Presents techniques for using multiple regression (MR) as a general variance-accounting procedure of great flexibility, power, and fidelity to research aims in both manipulative and observational psychological research. The identity of MR and fixed-model analysis of variance/covariance (AV/ACV) is sketched. This requires an exposition of means of expressing nominal scale (qualitative) data as independent variables in MR. Attention is given to methods for handling interactions, curvilinearity, missing data, and covariates, for either uncorrelated or correlated independent variables in MR. The relative roles of AV/ACV and MR in data analysis are described, and the practical advantages of the latter are set forth. (16 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
A coalition is the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a decision, which must take place in a situation that has elements of both coordination and conflict. This chapter discusses the coalition situation, theoretical alternatives, experimental evidence, and ideal conditions for the theories. Different theories, each with a specific set of assumptions about norms and motives, are available to explain the experimental results. The minimum resource theory emphasizes the initial resources, which the players bring to the situation. Minimum power theory focuses on strategic position in bargaining; while, anticompetitive theory focuses on the potentially disruptive aspects of bargaining. Utter confusion theory emphasizes the importance of a large number of fortuitous factors, which have nothing to do with the resources, pivotal power, or stable social relationships of the players. Each theory finds some support in experimental evidence. However, the coalitions predicted by minimum resource theory are confirmed in a number of experiments. Although, there is some support for each theory, one could, if so inclined, create experimental conditions that would support any of them.
Coalition formation is a pervasive aspect of social life. This paper presents a theory of coalition formation with a statement of conditions and assumptions. While applicable to groups of varying sizes, it is shown to be consistent with Caplow's theory of coalitions in the triad. It successfully handles the experimental results of Vinacke and Arkoff. Finally, the applicability of various work in n-person game theory is discussed with the conclusion that, in its present state, it fails to provide a basis for a descriptive theory of coalitions.