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Adam
Smith
and
Three
Théories
of
Altruism
Elias
L.
Khalil*
American
Institute
for
Economie
Research,
and
Department
of
Economies,
Vassar
Collège
Introduction
During
the
past
three
décades,
economists
hâve
developed
théories
of
al
truism
that
départ
in
différent
ways
from
the
narrowly
conceived
Homo
economicus
model.
Thèse
théories
can
be
broadly
classified
into
three
broad
approaches.
The
first,
called
hère
the
"egoistic"
perspective,
can
be
seen
as
a
variant
of
reciprocal
coopération
models
such
as
the
one proposed
by
Axelrod
(1984).
It
maintains
that
one
may
share
his
income
with
ano-
ther to
induce
a
reciprocal
transfer
in
the
future.
The
second,
named
the
"egocentric"
view,
as
epitomized
in
Becker
(1976),
argues
that
the
donor's
utility
function
includes
the
utility
of
potential
récipients.
That
is,
the
donor
would
donate
a
resource
if
the
vicarious
enjoyment
of
watching
the
pleasure
of
others
exceeds
at
the
margin
the
donor's
satisfaction
from
consuming
the
resource
himself.
The
third,
dubbed
the
"altercentric"
framework
("alter"
after
the
Latin
"other"),
can
be
surmised
from
the
work
of
Mead
(1934),
Etzioni
(1986),
Frank
(1988),
and
Simon
(1990).
It
views
the
benefactor's
action
as
stemming
from
a
moral
dictum
as
binding
as
rules
of honesty.
Smith
leveled
direct
criticisms
against
three
théories
of
altruism
cur-
rent
in
his
time.
Amazingly,
thèse
théories
are
replicas
of
the
ones
just
men-
tioned.
Smith
put
forward
an
alternative
based
on
the
idea
of
sympathy.
Behavioral
Sciences
Research
Council,
a
division
of
the
American
Institute
for
Economie
Research,
www.brc-aier.org,
and
Department
of
Economies,
Vassar
Collège,
elkhalil@vassar.edu.
A
longer
version
benefited
from
the
comments
of
Gary
Becker,
Ulrich
Witt,
Robert
Goldfarb,
Mark
Wilhelm,
Timothy
Crippen,
John
Davis,
Thomas
Nitsch,
Roger
Masters,
participants
of
sessions
at
the
University
of
Freiburg,
Univer-
sily
of
Chicago,
and
American
Economie
Association
meeting,
anonymous
référées,
and
especialiy
Robert
Frank.
This
work
was
made
possible
by
a
research
fellowship
from
the
Alexander
von
Humboldt
Foundation.
The
usual
disclaimer
applies.
421
422
Recherches
Économiques
de
Louvain
-
Louvain
Economie
Review
67(4),
2001
Although
a
few
modem
writers
hâve
noted
Smith's
theory
(e.g.,
Collard,
(1978;
Frank,
(1988),
a
fewer
realized
its
pertinence
to
the
modem
debate.
Section
one
provides
a
succinct
statement
of
Smith's
theory.
Section
two
summarizes
Smith's
critique
of
the
three
théories
of
his
time.
Section
three
identifies
the
modem
approaches
and
shows
how
they
still
fail
to
answer
Smith's
critique.
Back
to
Smith
1.1
The
Principle
of
Sympathy
Smith's
theory
of
ethics
was
greatly
influenced
by
David
Hume's
notion
of
sympathy
(Mackie,
(1980;
Haakonssen,
(1981).
However,
in
The
Theory
of
Mord
Sentiments,
Smith
departed
from
Hume's
utilitarian
position,
which
portrays
sympathy
as
the
mechanism
by
which
the
agent
calculâtes
social
welfare.
For
Smith,
sympathy
stems
from
instantaneous
sentiments
towards
immédiate
expériences;
it
does
not
generally
arise
from
meditated
calcula-
tion
of
the
welfare
of
ail
concerned.
Smith
viewed
sympathy
as
the
foun-
dation
of
virtues
pursued
for
their
own
sake,
not
for
the
sake
of
advancing
social
welfare.
He
regarded
sympathy
to
be
the
foundation
of
beneficence
(altruism).
self-command
(the
propriety
of
behavior),
respect
and
admira
tion,
and
social
rank
(Khalil
(1990),
(1996)).
Concerning
benevolence,
Smith
stressed
that
sympathy
expresses
the
genuine
concern
over
the
interests
of
others,
in
short
"other-interest".
This
concern
entails
that
the
benefactor
has
to
suspend
his
own
interest.
The
négation
of
self-interest,
however,
does
not
mean
that
altruism
stems
from
a
principle,
which
is
radically
différent
from
self-interest.
For Smith,
the
motive
to
satisfy
self-interest
and
other-interest
stems
from
the
same
gé
néral
tendency
of
humans
to
sympathize-
in
one
case
with
the
self
and
in
the
other
with
the
beneficiary.
That
is,
Smith
did
not
view
self-interest
as
radically
différent
from
other-interest
:
both
are
simply
différent
instances
of
sympathy.
We
witness
that
raan
acts
more
often
in
sympathy
with
the
self
(i.e.,
out
of
self-interest)
because
man
is
obviously
more
familiar
with
the
circumstance
of
his
own
self
than
with
the
circumstance
of
others.
That
is,
for
Smith,
there
is
no
fundamental
distinction,
but
only
a
différence
in
de-
gree,
between
one's
own
feelings
as
opposed
to
the
feeling
of others
towards
one's
interest.
To
be
précise,
however,
Smith
appears
to
note
a
différence
between
self-interest
and
the
sympathy
of
others
with
one's
interest.
While
self-
interest
seems
to
be
an
"original"
sensation,
the
sympathy
of
others
with
one's
interest
does
not
take
place
immediately.
Rather,
it is
a
mediated
or
"reflected"
sympathy
with
the agent
who
is
originally
experiencing
the
benefit
or
pain
:
Elias
L.
Khalil
423
Every
man,
as
the
Stoics
used
to
say,
is
first
and
principally
recommended
to
his
own
care;and
every
man
is
certainly,
in
every
respect,
fitter
and
abler
to
take
care
of
himself
than
of
any
other
person.
Every
man
feels
his
own
pleasures
and
his
own
pains
more
sensibly
than
those
of
other
people.
The
former
are
original
sensations;
the
latter
the
reflected
or
sympathetic
images
of
those
sensation.
The
former
may
be
said
to
be
the
substance,
the
latter
the
shadow
(Smith
(1976)
p.
219).
That
is,
a
spectator
can
assess
a
benefit
or
pain only
through
the
reac
tion
of
the agent
who
is
experiencing
it.
Nonetheless,
this
différence
does
not
change
the
claim
posited
hère
that
there
is
no
fondamental
distinction
bet
ween
self-interest
and
sympathy.
When
an
agent
sympathizes
with
someone
else's
feelings
towards,
e.g.,
an
apple,
it
is
a
reflective
sensation.
Likewise,
when
the
agent
sympathizes
with
his
own
feelings
towards
the
apple,
it
is
also
a
reflective
sensation
:
That
is,
both
sensations
involve
sympathy
and.
hence,
by
définition,
are
reflective
of
original
sensations.
The
only
différence
between
the
two
cases
arises
from
the
degree
of
familiarity
occasioned
by
the
usual
fact
that
the
agent
is
more
familiar
with
his
own
feelings
than
with
the
feelings
of
the
other.
(To
note,
however,
this
is
not
always
trueas
in
the
case
when
an
agent
is
more
attuned
to
the
feelings
of
others
than
to
his
own.)
For
altruism,
the
degree
of
familiarity
is
crucialand
agents
act
most
of
the
time
in
a
self-interested
manner
only
because
they
are
familiar
mostly
with
their
own
original
sensations
than
with
the
original
sensations
of
others.
Obviously,
there
is
a
stronger
motive
to
help
a
stranded person
if
the
person
happens
to
be
a
close
acquaintance
rather
than,
ceteris
paribus,
a
distant
associate.
And
man
is
more
motivated
to
help,
after
himself,
the
ones
who
live
in
the
same
house
with
him
than
"the
greater
part
of
other
people"
:
After
himself,
the
members
of
his
own
family,
those
who
usually
live
in
the
same
house
with
him,
his
parents,
his
children,
his
brothers
and
sisters,
are naturally
the
objects
of
his
warmest
affections.
They
are
naturally
and
usually
the
persons
upon
whose
happiness
or
misery
his
conduct
must
hâve
the
greatest
influence.
He
is
more
habituated
to
sympathize
with
them.
He
knows
better
how
every thing
is
likely
to
afféct
them,
and
his
sympathy
with
them
is
more
précise
and
determinate,
than
it
can
be
with
the
greater
part
of
other
people.
It
approaches
nearer,
in
short,
to
what
he
feels
for
himself
(Smith
(1976)
p.
219).
Social
proximity,
in
addition,
illuminâtes
for
Smith
why
the
agent
feels
less
affection
towards
the
children
of
his
cousins
than
towards
the
children
of
his
sisters
and
brothers
:
The
children
of
cousins,
being
still
less
connected
[than
"the
children
of
brothers
and
sisters"],
are
of
still
less
importance
to
one
another;and
the
affection
gradually
diminishes
as
the
relation
grows
more
and
more
remote
(Smith
(1976)
p.
220).
Social
remoteness
also
explains
for
Smith
why
the
parent-child
affec
tion
is
weaker
if
the
child
was
separated
from
the
father
from
its
infancy
:
424
Recherches
Économiques
de
Louvain
-
Louvain
Economie
Review
67(4),
2001
A
father
apt
to
be
less
attached
to
a
child,
who,
by
some
accident,
has
been
separated
from
him
in
its
infancy,
and
who
does not
return
to
him
till
it
is
grown
up
to
manhood.
The
father
is
apt
to
feel
less
paternal
tenderness
for
the
child;
the
child,
less
filial
révérence
for
the
father.
Brothers
and
sisters,
when
they
hâve
been
educated
in
distant
countries,
are
apt
to
feel
a
similar
diminution
of
affection
(Smith
(1976)
pp.
220-221).
Smith's
notion
of
social
proximity
is
conceptually
analogous
to
genetic
proximity
at
the
biological
level.
Sociobiologists
hâve
employed
such
genetic
proximity
as
the
explaining
factor
of
altruism
in
human
and
non-human
ani
mais,
what
is
known
as
the
"inclusive
fitness"
hypothesis
(Hamilton
(1964);
Wilson
(1975)).
The
contrast
between
Smith's
theory
and
the
inclusive
fit
ness
hypothesis
cannot
be
elaborated
hère.
However,
it
is
suflicient
to
state
that
the
ideas
of
social
proximity
and
genetic
proximity
try
to
account
for
the
strength
or
weakness
of
sympathetic
sentiments.
Whether
sympathetic
sentiments
are
learned
reactions
through
conditioning,
or
hâve
deep
biolo
gical
foundation,
is
another
issue
that
is
not
discussed
hère.
It
is
sufficient
to
note
that
Smith's
theory
allows
us
to
conceive
al
truism
as
an
elastic
behavior.
It
varies
with
the
variation
of
social
proximity;
it
is
not
limited
by
fixed
genetic
proximity.
To
account
for
social
proximity,
which
partially
détermines
the
altruistic
act,
we
need
an
operative
morpho-
logy
of
the
station
of
the
actor
in
relation
to
the
récipient's.
1.2
Sympathy
as
Station
Switching
As
stated
above,
Smith's
principle
of
sympathy
entails
continuity
between
the
pursuits
of
self-interest
(what
Smith
calls
the
"virtue
of
prudence"
)
and
other-interest
{the
"virtue
of
beneficence").
He
grounded
the
commensura-
bility
between
self-
and
other-interest
on
the
"self
acting
from
a
separate
station-a
station
that
impartially
adjudicates
between
the
needs
of
the
self
and
the
needs
of
the
other
:
We
can
never
survey
our
own
sentiments
and
motives...
unless
we
remove
ourselves,
as
it
were,
from
our
own
natural
station
and
endeavor
to
view
them
as
at
a
certain
distance
from
us.
...
We
endeavor
to
examine
our
own
conduct
as
we
imagine
any
other
fair
and
impartial
spectator
would
examine
it
(Smith
(1976)
p.
110)
(emphasis
added).
When
I
endeavor
to
examine
my
own
conduct...
it
is
évident
that...
I
divide
myself
into
two
persons;
and
that
I,
the
examiner
and
the
judge,
represent
a
différent
character
from
that other
I.
the
person
whose
conduct
is
examined
into
the
judged
of
(Smith
(1976)
p.
113).
For
Smith,
humans
are
capable
of
judging
themselves
because
the
principle
they
use
to
judge
others
is
readily
available
:
The
principle
by
which
we
naturally
either
approve
or
disapprove
of
our
own
conduct,
seems
to
be
altogether
the
same
with
that
by
which
we
exercise
the
like
judgements
concerning
the
conduct
of
other
people
(Smith
(1976)
p.
107).
Elias
L.
Khalil
425
However,
there
is
an
irregularity
that
Smith
overlooks.
Agents
often
apply
double
standards
:
In
many
cases,
agents
tend
to
do
what
they
would
condemn
in
others.
At
first
examination
at
least,
there
is
a
différence
bet-
ween
the
agent-as-actor
and
the
agent-as-judge.
Agents
in
many
occasions
do
not
switch
stations
when
they
judge
their
own
actions
as
fairly
as
when
they
judge
the
actions
of
others.
Although
Smith
discusses
many
other
ir-
regularities
stemming
from
the
weakness
of
character,
such
as
false
pride
and
self-aggrandizement
(Khalil
(1996)),
he
does
not
discuss
this
irregula
rity
explicitly.
Smith
does
discuss
similar
self-biases,
such
as
self-deception,
and
reasons
that
"gênerai
rules",
or
what
modem
economists
call
"institu
tions"
,
arise
to
correct
them.
It
would
be
outside
the
scope
of
this
essay
to
détail
Smith's
discussion of
the
origin
of
gênerai
rules
(see
Khalil (2000)
pp.
381-384).
However,
following
Smith's
order
of
theoretical
approximations,
it
would
be
consistent
to
assume,
at
first
level
of
generality,
that
agents
do
not
suffer
from
double
standards,
and
then
account
for
anomalies
such
as
double
standards,
and
corresponding
remédies,
at
second
and
third
levels
of
generalities.
In
this
light,
double
standards
are
not
fatal
anomalies
because
they
can
explain
the
origin
of
gênerai
rules.
Disregarding
double
standards,
self-judgment,
for
Smith,
is
possible
because
nature
has
endowed
the
agent
with
the
quest
to
be
"what
he
himself
approves
of
other
men",
and
to
"dread
the
very
thought
of
resembling"
what
he
hâtes
and
despises
in
other
people
(Ibid.
p.
117).
Thus,
when
the
agent
examines
the
merit
of
his
action,
he
adopts
the
view
of
a
would-be
impartial
spectatoror
at
least
he
is
supposed
to
adopt
the
view
of
the
impartial
spec
tator.
It
is
true
that
almost
ail
people,
at
least
in
a
few
occasions,
fail
to
do
so.
But
this
is
a
problem
for
second
and
third
theoretical
approximations
as
just
noted.
Smith's
theory
of
sentiments
resembles,
at
the
formai
level
only
howe
ver,
Becker's
egocentric
approach.
It
differs
from
Becker's
at
the
substantive
level.
To
reconstruct
Smith's
theory,
we
hâve
at
hand
the
station
of
the
ac-
ting
self,
S,
the
station
of
the
récipient
other,
O,
and
the
station
of
the
would-be
impartial
spectator
occupied
by
the
self
reflecting
on
itself,
coined
hère
"spectator
self."
Ss.
Figure
1
illustrâtes
such
a
three-station
scénario,
where
Ss
examines
the
utilities
of
O
and
Ss
from
a
detached,
third
station
whose
location
is
determined
by
the
degree
of
familiarity.
The
occupation
of
the
third
station
of
the
impartial
spectator
by
the
actor
himself
has
two
clear
implications.
First,
when
the
actor
empathizes
with
the
suffering
of
the
other,
it
is
not
by
imagining
such
suffering
as
happening
to
his
own
person
as
supposed
by
Becker's
egocentric
view.
Second,
the
judge
of
the
potential
action
is
not
an
actual
spectator
for
two
reasons.
The
first
reason
is
that
the
judge
is
not
a
disinterested
observer
according
to
whose
opinion
agent
5
tries
to
conform.
In
other
words,
we
do
not
hâve
hère
a
socialization
process
where
5
tries
to
appease
the
public
and
gain
its
applause.
Rather,
S
adopts
the
view
of
Ss
-
the
impartial
spectator
who
émerges
which
S
examines
his
own
act
from
a
distance.
Such
a
Smithian
approach
means
that,
at
first
ap
proximation,
the
"self
précèdes
public
opinion
or
the
sociocultural
milieu.
426
Recherches
économiques
de
Louvain
-
Louvain
Economie
Review
67(4),
2001
lst
Station
5
^
«^
2rd
Station
O
2nd
Station
O
Figure
1
:
Three-Station
Scénario
of
Altruism
But,
for
Smith,
the
milieu
is
not
totally
disregarded.
It
plays
a
rôle
when
it
helps
the
formation
of
the
self
by
allowing
the
agent
to
reflect
on
his
action
as
he does
on
the
action
of
others.
Without
society,
the
agent
cannot
take
a
look
at
his
action
from
a
distance.
So,
society
acts
as
a
reflection
mirror
that
clarifies
and
intensifies
5's
view
of
himself.
For
Smith,
while
society
is
essential
for
the
development
of
the
self,
it
does
not
act
as
a
construction
engineer
à
la
Mead.
The
second
reason
is
that
the
judge
of
the
action
is
not
O
as
entailed
by
the
Mead/Frank
altercentric
view.
Rather,
it is
Ss
who
judges,
given
the
degree
of
familiarity,
whether
the
benefit
of
O
is
worth
satisfying
at
the
expense
of
S's
interest.
This
entails
that,
besides
familiarity,
one
has
to
introduce
the
issue
of
comparative
benefit
in
order
to
provide
a
determinate
judgment
if
someone
should
help
a
potential
beneficiary.
It
is
insufficient
that
the
other
is
a
close
associate.
The
benefactor
may
prefer
to
donate
funds
to
a
charity
that
helps
abused
children
than
to
help
a
less
needy
but
a
closer
acquaintance.
Smith
did
not
discuss
the
issue
of
comparative
benefit
explicitly.
However,
Smith
succeeded
in
locating
the
question
of
familiarity
or
sympathy
as
the
proper
entry
point
to
the
study
of
altruism.
1.3
The
Advantages
of
Smith's
Theory
Smith's
notion
of
sympathy
is
fruitful for
several
reasons.
First,
Smith
uses
the
concept
"sympathy"
in
a
sensé
much
broader
than
altruism.
He
employs
it
to
explain
étiquettes,
the
propriety
of
émotions
in
public,
the
judgement
of
respect,
the
expression
of
admiration,
and
so
on
(Khalil
(1990),
(1996)).
Se
cond,
Smith's
notion
of
sympathy
allows
one
to
commence
with
the
interac
tion
of
rational
agents-where
agents
make
décisions
in
light
of
préférences
of
the
self
and
cared-about
other,
constraints,
and
technology.
Smith's
notion
of
sympathy
accounts
for
altruism
without
appealing
to
spécial
préférences.
In
this
sensé,
Smith's
notion
accords
with
one
major
thrust of
économie
theory,
i.e..
the
stability
of
préférences
:
Do
not
start
theorizing
at
the
abs-
tract
level
by
tracing
différences
in
décisions
to
différences
in
préférences
(Stigler
&:
Becker
(1977))ranging
from
God's
commandments,
social
values
and
commitments,
genetic/biological
factors,
to
cultural
institutions.
The
commencement
with
préférences
and
variation
across
cultures
begs
a
bigger
Elias
L.
Khalil
427
question
:
why
do
préférences
differ
?
In
fact,
one
may
use
Smith's
notion
of
sympathy
to
uncover
the
origin
of
many
cultural
institutions
and
social
norms.
Third,
Smith's
approach
locates
the
explaining
variable,
sympathy,
at
the
same
level
as
the explained
item,
the
genuine
concern
about
the
recipient's
welfare.
Fourth,
Smith's
notion
allows
us
to
avoid
the
arbitrary
division
of
agents
into
the
altruist
and
egoist
types
(e.g.,
Becker
(1976)).
To
détermine
who
is
the
altruist
and
who
is
the
benefîciary,
one
does
not
even
need
to
assume
différent
intensities
of
sympathetic
sentiments
or
appeal
to
tastes.
The
only
déterminant
can
be
relative
incomes
or
endowments.
Fifth.
Smith's
notion
permits
us
to
use
the
principle
of
rationality
in
the
sensé
of
the
maximization
model
of
standard
économies;
i.e.,
there
is
no
need
for
the
evolutionary
Darwinian
model
or,
in
spécifie,
the
inclusive
fitness
hypothesis.
This
is
an
advantage
since
the
evolutionary
model
cannot
explain
easily
altruism
when
there
is
no
genetic
proximity.1
Sixth,
Smith's
starting
point
with
sympathy
highlights
the
importance
of
social
proximity
(Smith
(1976)
pp.
219-221).
Familiarity
provides
the
operative
morphology
of
the
station
of
the
actor
in
relation
to
the
station
of
the
potential
beneficiary.
To
quote
Smith
on
the
importance
of
familiarity,
as
much
as
a
man
of
humanity
in
Europe
sympathizes
with
the
victims
of
a
calamity
in
China,
he
is.
"provided
he
never
saw
them",
more
stressed
for
losing
his
little
finger
:
Let
us
suppose
that the
great
empire
of
China,
with
ail its
myriads
of
inhabi
tants,
was
suddenly
swallowed
up
by an
earthquake,
and
let
us
consider
how
a
man
of
humanity
in
Europe,
who
had
no
sort
of
connexion
with
that part
of
the
world,
would
be
affected
upon
receiving
intelligence
of
this
dreadful
calamity.
He
would,
I
imagine,
first
of
ail,
express
very
strongly
his
sorrow
for
the
misfortune
of
that
unhappy
people,
he
would
make
many
melancholy
reflections
upon
the
precariousness
of
human
life,
and
the
vanity
of
ail
the
labours
of
man,
which
could
thus
be
annihilated
in
a
moment.
...
And
when
ail
this
fine
philosophy
was
over,
when
ail
thèse
humane
sentiments
had
been
once
fairly
expressed,
he
would
pursue
his
business
or
his
pleasure,
take
his
repose
or
his
diversion,
with
the
same
ease
and
tranquillity,
as
if
no
such
accident
had
happened.
The
most
frivolous
disaster
which
could
befal
himself
would
occasion
a
more
real
disturbance.
If
he
was
to
lose
his
little
finger
to-morrow,
he
would
not
sleep
to-night;
but,
provided
he
never
saw
them,
he
will
snore
with
the
most
profound
security
over
the
ruin
of
a
hundred
millions
of
his
brethren,
and
the
destruction
of
that
immense
multitude
seems
plainly
an
object
less
interesting
to
him,
than
this
paltry
misfortune
of
his
own
(Smith
(1976)
pp.
136-137).2
The
suggestion
that
evolutionary
theory
is
somewhat
irrelevant
goes
against
the
work
of
Frank
(1988),
Margolis
(1982),
Simon
(1990),
Bergstrom
(1995),
Getty
(1989),
and
many
others
who
try
to
trace
altruism
to
some
genetic
foundation.
Even
if
sympathy
has
some
biological
foundation,
one
cannot
explain
the
variety
of
choices
by
appeating
to
gènes.
Also,
if
sympathy
has
a
biological
foundation,
it
does
not
mean
it
is
the
product
of
natural
sélection.
In fact,
natural
sélection
cannot
explain
the
origin
of
sympathy;
it
can
only
explain
its
diffusion
given
that
it
exists.
The
inclination
to
invoke
natural
sélection
as
soon
as
one
appeais
to
the
reievance
of
biology
with
respect
to
behavior
probably
stems
from
the
misidentification
of
organization
(physiology)
with
evolutionary
diffusion
(evolutionary
biology)
(see
passim
Boyd
&
Noble,
(1993);Rosen,
(1991);
Khalil,
(1999)).
428
Recherches
Économiques
de
Louvain
-
Louvain
Economie
Review
67(4),
2001
Seventh,
Smith's
notion
of
sympathy
allows
us
to
model
self-
and
other-interest
(what
he
calls
the
virtues
of
"prudence"
and
"beneficence"
)
as
lying
along
a
continuum.
In
this
regard,
Smith's
conception
is
congruent,
as
suggested
earlier,
with
the
modem
egocentric
view,
where
altruism
is
regarded
as
a
motive
in
the
utility
function that
is
smoothly
substitutable
with
self-interested
motives.
2
Smith's
Critique
of
Three
Théories
of
Altruism
of
His
Time
Although
he
referred
to
them
by