All content in this area was uploaded by Fred S. Mcchesney on May 17, 2016
Content may be subject to copyright.
... We define land tenure security as recognition and respect-on the part of the government-for the rights of affected populations over their claimed territories. Land tenure security requires an implicit or explicit agreement between the presiding government and the affected population regarding land ownership and the former's commitment to honor such an agreement (Harstad andMideksa 2017, Anderson andMcChesney 1994). ...
... While the lack of faith in government and its ability to uphold environmental justice may lead some affected populations to engage in protests, it may also not. Much depends on their assessment of the status quo and their beliefs about the prospects of achieving objectives unilaterally (Anderson and McChesney 1994). Our hypothesis is therefore a probabilistic one: ...
When do indigenous and other negatively affected populations mobilize against fossil fuel companies? We revisit social movement theory and environmental literature to identify three factors that may plausibly shape mobilization decisions of negatively affected populations—democratic institutions, community perceptions of government shaped by land tenure security, and firm attributes. Democratic institutions afford more opportunities for affected populations to air their grievances through protests than non-democratic ones. Land tenure security guaranteed by government contributes to the perception among affected populations that their objectives are better achieved through government mediation than protests. Characteristics of fossil fuel firms, such as state ownership, also shape activist perceptions of government credibility as a mediator. By analyzing fifty-seven countries over the period 1990 to 2013, we find that democracy and state ownership of fossil fuel firms are positively associated with protests, whereas land tenure security is negatively associated.
... 9 Developed in the west, such technologies have become cheaply available to governments desirous to use them. Offering a similar explanation, Anderson and McChesney (1994) contend that the reason why the federal government chose war over treaties with American Indians was that the former's costs declined after the Civil War once the US government had a permanent standing army. When technological changes arise exogenously, the net benefits may shift in ways that favor repression, even without government investment in such technology. ...
We use the predatory theory of the state to explain China’s violent assimilationist campaign targeting the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim minority group in China that constitutes a population majority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Our analysis suggests that growing political centralization under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, combined with technological changes that reduced the costs of implementing predatory policing in Xinjiang and elevated the perceived economic benefits from integration, contributed to the choice of destructive cultural assimilation rather than respect for the rights and autonomy of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. While the economics literature sometimes describes the political economy of China’s growth miracle as the byproduct of a constrained Leviathan, the present paper shows that a predatory theory of the state is more useful for understanding how a cultural genocide can occur alongside economic growth.
... Various 6 In this word game, kiszczak in Polish means 'from the guts,' but it also denotes the name of the communist Minister of Interior General Czesław Kiszczak. 7 For instance, models of 'raid or trade' consider explicitly different costs of conflict and cooperation for different players; see Anderson and McChesney (1994), Rider (1993), and Skaperdas (1992). ...
I analyze institutions of prison subculture that mitigate potential violent confrontations among inmates, in contrast to Hobbesian-Zimbardo default spontaneous violence. The games that are relatively rarely played in prison are Chicken and other violent confrontation games. Incoming rookie inmates are subject to initiation tests that allocate them into different subcultural groups, which signals their toughness and disincentivizes fighting. Most experienced inmates develop the eristic skills utilizing prison argot, use informal conflict adjudicators, and fake aggression toward rookies. All inmates form defensive coalitions. Finally, when inmates commit self-injuries, they follow well-rehearsed protocols to minimize the damage to their bodies and to maximize the impression made on the authorities. The secret knowledge of the associated rules, tricks, and cons is passed down over generations of prisoners through informal schooling. The material for this study comes from two Polish prisons, where the author spent 5 months as a political prisoner in 1985.
This article introduces a simple application of contest theory that neatly captures how Boulding’s ‘loss of strength gradient’ determines the geographic extent of territory. We focus on the ‘supply side’ of territorial conflict, showing how the costs of initiating and escalating conflict over spatially dispersed resources shape the nature and scope of territory. We show that economies of scale in the production of violence and varying costs of projecting power at a distance combine to affect the intensive and extensive margins of conflict, and ultimately the geographic distribution of territory. Comparative statics analysis shows how the distribution of conflict and territory change as costs change, helping shed light on, for example, why new transportation technologies have historically led to a redrawing of territorial boundaries. We test and probe the boundaries of this model in two experiments varying the marginal costs of conflict over space and the fixed costs of entry. Increases in both costs interact to increase the probability of exclusive territories. The first experiment directly tests the theory in a static, one-shot setting that strictly matches the information conditions studied in the theory. The second experiment examines conflict behavior under conditions analogous to those in conflicts outside the lab: where no contestant knows the probability of winning, let alone the function determining that probability, and parties interact repeatedly. Median behavior closely tracks equilibrium predictions in all treatments.
Abundant land and strong property rights are conventionally viewed as key factors underpinning U.S. economic development success. This view relies on the “Pristine Myth” of an empty undeveloped land, but the abundant land of North America was already made productive and was the recognized territory of sovereign Indigenous Nations. We demonstrate that the development of strong property rights for European/American settlers was mirrored by the attenuation and increasing disregard of Indigenous property rights. We argue that the dearth of discussion of the dispossession of Indigenous nations results in a misunderstanding of some of the core themes of U.S. economic history.
Previous game-theoretic analyses of the settlement of the United States assume that Indigenous peoples and settler colonizers either engaged in free exchange or total war for land. We reframe the model to consider that violence, including coercion, was present in most of their interactions; that is, we allow for the settler colonizer to engage in coercion to strategically lower their appropriation costs for Indigenous peoples’ lands. We find that the settler strategically uses violence to pay less in exchanges for Indigenous peoples’ lands. In addition, we examine how uncertainty, about whether an agreement can ensure the avoidance of all-out conflict, affects initial violence and resistance. We find that the likelihood of all-out conflict affects settler violence and it critically depends on whether the Indigenous people can seek compensation.
Property institutions should ideally provide economic actors with certainty that their local choices about investment will not be unsettled by shifting political economic equilibria. We argue that for this to occur, political autonomy, administrative and enforcement capacity, political constraints, and accessible legal institutions are each necessary. A comparison of the evolution of property rights for settlers and American Indians in the United States shows how political and legal forces shape the evolution of property institutions. American Indians, who had property institutions before Europeans arrived, could not defend their land from Europeans and later Americans due to lacking military capacity. Settlers' property rights were relatively secure because the government had sufficient autonomy and capacity to broadly define and enforce their rights, political institutions constrained the government from expropriating settlers' property, and legal institutions provided a forum for settlers to adjudicate and defend their rights in court. Native Americans, in contrast, had systematically inconsistent and often expropriative policy treatment by the government. Although tribes have technically been sovereign since the 1970s, tribal governments continue to lack sufficient political and legal autonomy and capacity to define and enforce property institutions in response to evolving local conditions.
This paper analyzes the impact of FORIS contracts on litigation and settlement decisions using a simple divergent-expectations model. A FORIS contract introduces contingent fee arrangements under the British legal cost allocation rule: the plaintiff pays a percentage of his settlement or trial returns to FORIS and obtains coverage for trial costs in case he loses in court; the plaintiff?s attorney receives the standard fee. We take into account the sequential nature of the settlement and trial decisions. Without FORIS contracts, only cases with positive expected value provide credible threats for the plaintiff and thereby motivate the defendant to agree to a settlement. A FORIS contract has two important effects: cases with negative expected value are turned into credible threats, hence a settlement is triggered. Even in positive expected value cases, the settlement result for the plaintiff is increased. According to our results, FORIS should prohibit settlement negotiations before a contract with the plaintiff has been made. The paper argues that FORIS should abolish the non-disclosure clause which prohibits the plaintiff to reveal the existence of the FORIS contract to a third party. -- Das Paper analysiert die Wirkung eines FORIS-Vertrages auf die Bereitschaft zu klagen und zum au�ergerichtlichen Vergleich. Dabei wird ein einfaches Optimismus-Modell angewendet. Der FORIS-Vetrag erlaubt es dem Kl�ger, trotz Geltung der Europ�ischen Proze�kostenregel (Velierer zahlt) mit den (in Amerika �blichen) "contingent fees" kalkulieren zu k�nnen: Der Kl�ger zahlt einen Teil seiner Ertr�ge aus Proze� oder Vergleich an FORIS; diese Firma wiederum zahlt die gesetzlichen Geb�hren an den Anwalt des Kl�gers und tr�gt die Proze�kosten, wenn der Kunde unterliegt. Das Modell zieht die sequentielle Struktur von Vergleichs- und Proze�entscheidungen in Betracht. Ohne FORIS-Vertrag w�re eine Klagedrohung nur dann glaubw�rdig, wenn der Proze� dem Kl�ger einen p