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The Comparative Politics of Climate ChangeKathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom
Introduction
The Comparative Politics of
Climate Change
•
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom*
Introduction
Climate change represents a “tragedy of the commons” on a global scale.1The
nations of the world, and individuals within them, over-exploit the planet’s
atmosphere because they gain all the material advantages from the activities
that contribute to global warming but suffer only a fraction of the environmen-
tal costs. In turn, nations and individuals typically are unwilling to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions unilaterally, because in doing so they would pay the
full price of abatement but gain only a fraction of the beneªts. Indeed, their
sacriªce may be futile if other actors do not exhibit similar restraint.
Despite this formidable challenge, international efforts to address global
warming have met with some, albeit limited, success. Under the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which took effect in 1994, more than
180 nations committed to a long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas con-
centrations “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.” While the Convention itself contained only hortatory
emissions targets, at the third conference of parties to the FCCC (COP-3)
in 1997, agreement was reached on the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, through which industrialized coun-
tries committed to reducing their collective emissions to 5% below 1990 levels
by the period 2008 to 2012. Although the United States, which contributes
roughly one quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions, withdrew from the
treaty in 2001, it was ratiªed by a sufªcient number of other countries to take ef-
fect in 2005.
1
* We are grateful to the Weyerhaeuser Foundation for ªnancial support, to Katherine Boothe for
superb research assistance, and to the other contributors to this issue—Yves Tiberghien,
Miranda Schreurs, Laura Henry, and Kate Crowley—whose work has been a source of much in-
sight and who also provided valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Hardin 1968.
Global Environmental Politics 7:4, November 2007
© 2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
As the international community negotiates a post-Kyoto regime, it is
timely to consider what lessons we can learn from experience to date. How can
we understand the progress that has been made and why it has been so limited?
Until very recently, most political scientists who have studied climate change
have done so from an international relations perspective, with a focus on ex-
plaining international agreements based on the interests or ideational orienta-
tions of states as unitary actors, without opening the “black box” of domestic
politics.2However, when international meetings conclude, actors invariably re-
turn home to their domestic constituents. Decisions whether or not to ratify in-
ternational agreements and adopt national policies to mitigate climate change
are in the end domestic political decisions, taken in the context of home-grown
electoral interests, national discourses, and domestic political institutions.
It is this domestic process to which we now turn. This issue of Global Envi-
ronmental Politics compares ratiªcation of the Kyoto Protocol and climate poli-
cies of Annex 1 countries, since only those states faced binding emissions targets
under the Kyoto Protocol. The articles cover the two Annex 1 countries that did
not ratify, the United States and Australia, as well as four other jurisdictions, the
European Union (EU), Russia, Japan, and Canada, which are the next largest
Annex 1 emitters after the United States. (We treat the European Union as a sin-
gle case in the analysis that follows since EU member states decided on ratiªcat-
ion jointly and also coordinated development of climate policies at the EU-
level.) The authors employ a common theoretical framework that focuses on
the impact of electoral incentives, policy-makers’ own normative commitments,
and domestic political institutions, though with attention to international im-
pacts on both electoral politics and domestic norms.
The International Context
Of course, ratiªcation of the Kyoto Protocol would not be a matter for domestic
politics if it were not for prior international negotiations. A multilateral agree-
ment facilitates domestic action by both reducing individual countries’ costs
and providing reassurance of environmental beneªts. Countries that may be un-
willing to act unilaterally, whether because they do not want to harm the inter-
national competitiveness of local ªrms or because they anticipate that their uni-
lateral actions would be of limited environmental beneªt, may be more willing
to take action with assurances that others will do the same. However, the costs
of action depend on the particular terms of the treaty and may differ among sig-
natory countries, with important implications for domestic political debates.
Several features of the Kyoto Protocol are relevant to assessing national
costs of compliance. First, in recognition of the fact that industrialized countries
have much higher per capita emissions than the developing world and also have
2• The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
2. Paterson 1996; Oberthür and Ott 1999; Grubb, Brack, and Vrolijk 1999; and Newell 2005. Au-
thors who have employed a comparative politics perspective include Lantis 2006; Busby and
Ochs 2005; Zahran et al 2007; and Dolsak 2001.
contributed the majority of greenhouse gases that have accumulated in the
atmosphere to date, the Protocol speciªes binding emissions reductions targets
only for industrialized (Annex 1) countries. While the normative basis for lead-
ership by wealthy countries is indisputable, the inevitable implication is that
mitigation measures undertaken by industrialized countries may hinder their
competitiveness vis-à-vis developing countries. Second, the Kyoto Protocol in-
cludes differentiated targets even among Annex 1 countries, as indicated in
Table 1. The EU accepted a collective target of -8%, with member states’ targets
further differentiated within the EU “bubble.”
Third, the Kyoto Protocol included a number of mechanisms that in-
creased participating states’ ºexibility in meeting their targets, and thus offered
the potential to reduce compliance costs. These included multi-year averaging,
with compliance based on each country’s emissions over a ªve-year period from
2008 to 2012, and inclusion of a “basket” of six greenhouse gases, which allows
countries to trade off greater reductions in some gases against lesser reductions
or even increases in others. The Protocol also allows countries to take into ac-
count changes in land use, thereby offsetting emissions either by reducing their
rate of land clearing or increasing forest cover. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol in-
cluded three international ºexibility mechanisms, each of which offers the po-
tential for participating states to take advantage of less expensive mitigation op-
portunities in other countries: emissions trading among Annex 1 countries,
“joint implementation” by Annex 1 countries to earn credit for cutting emis-
sions or increasing sinks in the least expensive Annex 1 locations, and the
“Clean Development Mechanism” through which Annex 1 countries can gain
credits toward their targets by investing in projects in developing countries.
The proximity of the targets for Japan, Canada, the US, and the EU in
Table 1 is, of course, hardly fortuitous. Central to the discussions for each coun-
try was a desire to address the common pool problem, but in a way that did not
entail accepting greater costs than other parties. Based on the formal Kyoto
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom •3
Table 1
Comparison of Kyoto Protocol Targets and Ratiªcation Decisions
Kyoto Protocol Target, Net Greenhouse
Gas Emissions in 2008–2012 relative
to 1990 base year
Ratiªcation of the
Kyoto Protocol
Australia ⫹8% No
Russia ⫹0% Yes
Japan ⫺6% Yes
Canada ⫺6% Yes
USA ⫺7% No
EU15 ⫺8% Yes
targets, however, it is hard to understand the pattern of ratiªcation and non-
ratiªcation decisions evident in Table 1. For instance, the EU ratiªed the Kyoto
Protocol despite having the deepest reduction commitment, while Australia
chose not to ratify despite an apparently lenient target.
In practice, however, the formal target relative to 1990 emissions is at best
a crude measure of the magnitude of effort required to achieve compliance. By
the time of the Kyoto meeting in 1997, some countries, including Canada, the
US, and Australia, were already well above their 1990 emissions while others,
most notably Germany and Russia, were well below. Moreover, depending on
anticipated population and economic growth, countries also were on very dif-
ferent trajectories for future emissions. An alternative measure of the depth of
commitment that takes into account both of these factors is the degree of reduc-
tion below the “business-as-usual” trajectory for 2010 (the midpoint of the
Kyoto compliance period) that each country thought it was undertaking at the
time of its ratiªcation decision.
Table 2 reorders the cases in Table 1 based on the anticipated cut below
the business-as-usual projection. Viewed in these terms, several countries’ deci-
sions make more sense. As Henry and Sundstrom argue, it was relatively easy for
Russia to ratify because it had already met its target by 1997 as a result of eco-
nomic collapse and most economic models did not project that Russian emis-
sions would return to their 1990 levels by 2010.3Russia not only didn’t need to
do anything to comply, but actually stood to gain ªnancially from the sale of
any remaining business-as-usual or “hot air” credits to other countries. It is also
less surprising that the US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol when one considers
that it faced the most demanding target relative to its business-as-usual trajec-
tory. Similarly, Crowley reports that although Australia negotiated what seemed
like a lenient formal target and also anticipated heavy reliance on ongoing re-
ductions in land clearing, dramatic growth in the coal sector nonetheless im-
plied that Australia still would need to make signiªcant emissions reductions in
order to comply.4
Schreurs and Tiberghien report that an important part of the EU story lay
in the emissions trajectories of Germany and the UK.5The former experienced
signiªcant emissions reductions in the early 1990s as a result of closure of
inefªcient East German facilities following reuniªcation. The UK, for its part,
anticipated that replacement of coal by newly exploited reserves of offshore gas
would yield signiªcant emissions reductions by 2010. Indeed, building on its
windfall reductions, Germany’s proposed reduction target accounts for 75% of
the total EU reduction, and the UK and Germany together account for more
than 100% of the EU’s commitment, thus providing room for other EU states’
emissions to grow, in some cases quite dramatically.6
4• The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
3. Henry and Sundstrom, this issue.
4. Crowley, this issue.
5. Schreurs and Tiberghien, this issue.
6. Germany’s and the UK’s promised reductions of 21% and 12.5% below 1990 emissions would
The disparity in the depth of anticipated reductions below projected emis-
sions, particularly between the EU and US, prompts one to ask why the US
would have agreed to what looks like a rather bad deal. The terms of the Kyoto
Protocol reºected a grand compromise between the US (and its allies) and the
EU, in which the US conceded to a deeper reduction than it had originally pro-
posed while the EU agreed to various ºexibility mechanisms proposed by the
US. However, in relaxing its principled opposition to emissions trading and
other ºexibility mechanisms, the EU actually gained materially—both because
it cut its own reduction commitment to roughly match that of the US and be-
cause it too stood to beneªt from international ºexibility. Thus, the nature of
the central compromise reached in Kyoto, between US material interests and EU
norms, had the effect of increasing the disparity in costs between these two juris-
dictions.
As discussed below, disparities in reduction commitments in turn were
reºected in the balance of political support and opposition to ratiªcation
within different jurisdictions. However, while the magnitude of commitments
can help to explain the ratiªcation decisions of Russia, the US, and Australia,
signiªcant questions remain. In particular, why would the EU, Japan, and espe-
cially Canada commit to undertake very real reductions, particularly after a ma-
jor economic competitor, the US, had withdrawn from the treaty, thus increas-
ing potential impacts on economic competitiveness for remaining parties? The
sections that follow examine domestic electoral incentives, politicians’ own
ideas, and political institutions in order to understand why these countries de-
parted from their apparent national interests.
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom •5
yield 257.5 MT and 97 MT respectively, which together exceed the EU’s commitment of 341.2
MT.
Table 2
Comparison of Kyoto Targets Relative to Business-as-Usual Trajectory
Kyoto Target
Anticipated Reduction rela-
tive to projected “business as
usual” emissions in 2010 Ratiªcation
Russia ⫹0% ⬎0% Yes
EU15 ⫺8% ⫺3% to ⫺9% Yes
Japan ⫺6% ⫺12% Yes
Australia ⫹8% ⫺17% No
Canada ⫺6% ⫺29% Yes
USA ⫺7% ⫺31% No
Sources: Henry and Sundstrom, this issue; EEA 2002 a, b; Schreurs and Tiberghien, this issue;
Crowley, this issue; Harrison this issue.
Electoral Incentives
An important motive for a politician in any democracy is that of re-election. All
else being equal, the greater the public demand, the more likely a democratic
country should be to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and adopt mitigation measures.
One partial exception to this rule is the Russian case, since democratic account-
ability in that country is minimal compared to the other Annex 1 states covered
in this issue.
Interpretation of public opinion polls concerning climate change is chal-
lenging because protecting the environment is a valence issue that typically elic-
its support from a majority of those polled in virtually all countries. A more rel-
evant question is the degree to which voters are actually paying attention to
their governments’ climate policies as opposed to other potential conºicting is-
sues, such as energy prices. However, cross-national polls suggest that voters
have been more concerned and thus presumably more attentive in some coun-
tries than in others. Table 3 reports the results of a cross-national survey con-
ducted by World Public Opinion in 2003, shortly after most countries’ decisions
with respect to ratiªcation of the Kyoto Protocol. Although neither Australia nor
Japan was included, the results indicate higher levels of concern in Western Eu-
rope than in Russia, Canada, and the United States.
The articles in this issue provide further support for the inºuence of elec-
toral pressure. Consistent with the Europe-US differences reported in Table 3,
there were larger protests across Europe than in the US itself when the Bush ad-
ministration announced in 2001 that the US would not ratify the Kyoto Proto-
col.7In the case of Japan, Tiberghien and Schreurs argue that the Kyoto Protocol
took on symbolic signiªcance for voters because it bears the name of a Japanese
city, rendering it virtually impossible for the government not to ratify.8In con-
trast, Harrison asserts that although American and Canadian voters indicated
support for ratiªcation when asked, they simply were not paying close attention
to environmental issues.9
When voters at large are not attentive, one can expect politicians to weigh
more heavily the voices of organized interest groups on either side of the issue.
The articles in this issue collectively suggest that politicians faced relatively
greater political opposition, and thus were less willing either to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol or adopt domestic abatement measures, the greater the costs of com-
pliance for their own countries. While environmentalists actively supported
ratiªcation in all countries studied, the degree of business and labor opposition
was consistent with the magnitude of reductions below the business-as-usual
trajectory reported in Table 2. Thus, the US saw formidable opposition from
both business and labor, which yielded bipartisan opposition to ratiªcation
6• The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
7. Schreurs and Tiberghien, this issue.
8. Tiberghien and Schreurs, this issue.
9. Harrison, this issue.
and ultimately resulted in non-ratiªcation.10 In Australia, concerns from both
business and labor resulted in opposition from the Liberal Party and perfunc-
tory support at best for ratiªcation from the Labor Party.11 At the other end of
the spectrum, Henry and Sundstrom report that the business community in
Russia was supportive on balance, making ratiªcation a politically easy deci-
sion. That material interest would tend to make most countries, and economic
actors within them, reluctant to undertake mitigation is hardly surprising. The
question remains why the EU, Japan, and Canada ratiªed, despite anticipation
of considerable costs and attendant political opposition.
Policy-makers’ Ideas
In the face of such opposition, policy-makers could conceivably be motivated
by their causal knowledge (science) and principled values,12 rather than their in-
terests in re-election. With respect to the former, the more convinced politicians
are that climate change is real and caused by human activity, the more strongly
one would expect them to support costly measures to address the problem. This
is nominally supported by the cases examined in this issue. While there was
strong consensus among scientists in all jurisdictions concerning the contribu-
tion of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to climate change, there was
greater political debate about climate science in three countries, two of which
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom •7
10. Harrison, this issue.
11. Crowley, this issue.
12. Goldstein and Keohane 1993.
Table 3
World Public Opinion Survey, 2003
Approximately 1000 respondents in each country were asked the following question:
“How serious a problem do you consider climate change or global warming due to the
Greenhouse Effect to be? Is it a very serious problem, somewhat serious problem, not
very serious problem or not a serious problem at all?”
Very Serious Somewhat Serious Not Very Serious Not at All Serious
Italy 63 30 5 1
Germany 54 33 10 2
UK 50 35 9 3
France 46 43 8 1
Russia 43 34 15 1
Canada 40 41 11 5
USA 31 40 13 11
Source: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr06/ClimateChange_Apr06_quaire.pdf
(Australia and the US) did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, while the other (Rus-
sia) was a late ratiªer. However, while Henry and Sundstrom argue that Putin’s
doubts concerning climate science may well have been real, prompted by the
surprising skepticism of the President’s lead scientiªc advisor,13 Crowley and
Harrison question whether Australian and US policy-makers were genuinely un-
certain about causal mechanisms of global climate change or merely questioned
climate science as a strategy to defend powerful business interests.14
Even if a politician believes the science, the question is how willing she or
he is to accept political risks in order to pursue a personal commitment to envi-
ronmental protection. The impact of a politician’s own values was most evident
in the case of Canada, where Prime Minister Jean Chrétien personally made the
call to ratify despite strong opposition from the business community, though
Harrison argues that the Prime Minister’s imminent retirement facilitated that
sacriªce. However, that Chrétien’s successors did not follow through and Can-
ada’s emissions have continued to soar suggests that policies inspired by politi-
cians’ own ideational commitments may be more fragile than those inspired by
sustained voter support.
The extent to which policy-makers’ partisan ideology matters is an open
question. Green Parties have long argued that protection of the environment is
“neither left nor right.” However, parties on the left could conceivably be more
willing to pursue the kinds of regulatory or tax interventions needed to arrest
growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Although left and right meant nothing in
the Russian context, in other cases covered in this issue, ideology was a reason-
ably good predictor of governing parties’ stances on Kyoto Protocol ratiªcation.
Thus, Democrats were generally more supportive than Republicans of ratiªcat-
ion in the US, Liberals were more supportive than Conservatives in Canada, and
social democrats in Europe were more supportive of action to address climate
change than their more conservative counterparts. That said, party ideology was
by no means the dominant inºuence on either ratiªcation or adoption of do-
mestic policies. In the face of strong public demand, even right-wing subnation-
al governments in the United States have adopted aggressive climate policies,
while Christian Democratic German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently led the
international charge as President of the EU.15
Political Institutions
Other scholars have noted the contingent nature of political institutions, the ef-
fects of which depend on their interaction with other variables.16 We focus in
particular on two institutional characteristics: the ways in which electoral sys-
8• The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
13. Henry and Sundstrom, this issue.
14. Crowley, this issue; and Harrison, this issue.
15. Harrison, this issue; and Rabe 2004.
16. Weaver and Rockman 1993.
tems express voters’ interests; and the degree to which institutions concentrate
or diffuse authority.
The articles in this issue conªrm that proportional electoral systems that
more closely represent environmentally concerned voters’ interests, often
through the emergence of Green parties, yield stronger electoral incentives for
action than majoritarian electoral systems. Schreurs and Tiberghien argue that
proportional representation (PR) in key EU member states as well as the Euro-
pean Parliament helps to explain the EU’s consistent support for strong interna-
tional and domestic policies to combat global warming.17 In the Japanese case,
Tiberghien and Schreurs report that introduction of PR for a fraction of parlia-
mentary seats prompted politicians to become more attuned to issues of
concern to urban voters, and to build alliances with nongovernmental organiza-
tions including environmental groups. In contrast, majoritarian electoral sys-
tems in Canada, the US, and Australia’s lower house reward appeals to median
voters, for whom the environment has not been highly salient until very re-
cently. In two other cases, however, PR systems did not have the same impact. In
Australia, the Senate is elected by a single transferable vote system, which has re-
sulted in election of Green Party representatives. However, because the lower
house is the conªdence chamber, the Senate does not initiate most Australian
legislation. In the case of Russia, although half of its legislative seats at the time
of the ratiªcation debate were elected by proportional representation, the State
Duma is a weak body compared to the president, and pro-presidential parties
dominate the legislature. The Australian and Russian cases demonstrate that
proportional electoral systems only advance voters’ environmental values to the
extent that the legislature to which they apply has meaningful inºuence.
A second institutional characteristic concerns the concentration of author-
ity. Analyzing international and domestic climate commitments prior to the
Kyoto Protocol, Dolsak found that countries with parliamentary systems were
more aggressive than those with presidential systems.18 Similarly, Lantis found
that leaders in parliamentary systems had greater success in ratifying interna-
tional treaties than those in presidential systems.19 We ªnd evidence here of in-
stitutional interactions with both ideas and electoral incentives. With respect to
the former, concentration of authority can facilitate leadership if key policy-
makers are personally committed to action, as was the case with Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien’s decision that Canada would ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly,
Russian President Putin decided that Russia would ratify, though the degree to
which this was motivated by norms as opposed to economic interests is unclear.
In contrast, US President Bill Clinton also supported ratiªcation, but did not
have comparable institutional capacity to deliver on his ideals. By the same to-
ken, however, concentration of authority can make it easier for actors who wield
authority to decline to act if they do not believe it is the right thing to do. Thus,
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom •9
17. Schreurs and Tiberghien, this issue; see also Busby and Ochs 2005.
18. Dolsak 2001.
19. Lantis 2006.
Chrétien’s successor, Stephen Harper, simply declared upon his election in 2006
that Canada would no longer even try to meet its Kyoto Protocol target.
The impact of the diffusion of authority also depends on interactions with
electoral incentives. Multiple veto points can be employed more effectively by
opponents than supporters of ratiªcation or mitigation policies. This was most
evident in the US case, where members of Congress, both unconstrained and
unprotected by party discipline, were beholden to local economic interests, thus
yielding bipartisan Senate opposition to ratiªcation.20 Busby and Ochs also
note the importance of US politicians’ reliance on private campaign contribu-
tions, in contrast to other jurisdictions’ systems of public campaign ªnance, in
explaining the US Congress’ responsiveness to business interests.21
Federalism is of particular interest in that it diffuses authority vertically
among levels of government. With the exception of Japan, the jurisdictions un-
der study all involve federal or quasi-federal arrangements. Institutional im-
pacts were again complicated, however, depending on the particular division of
powers, the regional distribution of costs, and electoral incentives. At the limit,
in the EU, where key member states and members of the European parliament
faced strong pressure from environmentally concerned voters, Schreurs and
Tiberghien document a competitive dynamic that facilitated EU leadership with
respect to both ratiªcation and adoption of mitigation measures. In Australia
and the United States, national governments rejected ratiªcation of the Kyoto
Protocol and federalism thus did not yield a comparable competitive dynamic.
However, leadership by “green” states did allow sub-national governments to
partially compensate for federal inaction.22
In contrast, Canadian federalism to date has been an obstacle to adoption
of climate policies.23 In part this reºects the considerable powers of provinces
within the decentralized Canadian federation, including most notably their
ownership of natural resources. However, another explanation for why some
vertically decentralized systems display upward pressure on climate policy while
others hamper action seems to lie with the regional distribution of costs and
how that determines the interests of the most powerful players within such sys-
tems. In the EU, the two member states with the greatest emissions, Germany
and the UK, could afford to adopt aggressive positions on climate change given
their windfall reductions. Similarly, in the United States, the state governments
that rank ªrst and third in emissions, California and New York, do not have par-
ticularly greenhouse gas-intensive economies and thus were able to exercise
leadership more readily. In contrast, the two Canadian provinces with the great-
est emissions both rely heavily on industries threatened by climate policies, oil
in the case of Alberta and auto-manufacturing in the case of Ontario, and those
10 • The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
20. Harrison, this issue.
21. Busby and Ochs 2005.
22. Crowley, this issue; and Harrison, this issue.
23. Harrison, this issue.
provinces have consistently opposed any federal proposals that might harm
“their” local industries.
International Inºuences
International factors not only set the stage for the question of ratiªcation, but
also continued to interact with electoral incentives and ideas during domestic
debates concerning ratiªcation and adoption of domestic climate policies. The
articles in this issue identify three distinct international mechanisms: normative
pressures from foreign governments and NGOs, international negotiations to
reduce the costs of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, and business concerns
about competitiveness in the global economy.
Both foreign governments and transnational NGOs applied normative
pressure in an effort to inºuence decisions by late ratiªers. This was most evi-
dent in the cases of Japan and Russia, since those two states’ ratiªcation became
essential to the treaty’s survival once the United States backed out. However,
with respect to Japan, Tiberghien and Schreurs note that there was relatively bal-
anced pressure both for and against ratiªcation from the EU and US, respec-
tively.24 While some transnational NGOs, such as Greenpeace and WWF, were
active in Japan, and thus may have contributed to some degree to public sup-
port for ratiªcation, the authors do not consider that as a particularly inºuential
factor in Japan’s ratiªcation. Greenpeace and WWF also worked with partners in
Russia to promote ratiªcation, but Henry and Sundstrom conclude that this had
little effect on the outcome given the lack of contact between President Putin
and NGO activists and the unchangingly low level of public awareness of the
Kyoto Protocol in Russia. International norms nevertheless were cited as inºu-
encing some leaders’ decisions to ratify, though it can be difªcult to discern
whether this played a decisive role relative to material interests, and in all likeli-
hood these decisions involved a combination of strategic and normative fac
-
tors.25 The Russian president in particular, according to many observers, was
concerned that Russia should appear to be a good international citizen. Yet
given the potential material beneªts to Russia from ratiªcation, normative im-
pulses are unlikely to have weighed heavily in the decision. In the case of Can-
ada, a desire to promote the norm of multilateralism was cited by many observ-
ers as a factor in Jean Chrétien’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Here the
normative argument is less fettered because Canada accepted tremendous mate-
rial costs in ratifying, though it remains difªcult to assess the degree to which
Chrétien was motivated by international versus domestic norms.
Foreign governments not only applied moral suasion, but also engaged in
diplomatic bargaining that reduced the material costs of compliance for later
ratiªers. This was most signiªcant in the Russian case. The EU and Russia were
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom •11
24. Tiberghien and Schreurs, this issue.
25. Checkel 2001.
simultaneously negotiating the conditions for EU approval of Russia’s bid to en-
ter the World Trade Organization while Russia was considering Kyoto Protocol
ratiªcation. Although never conªrmed ofªcially by either side, the two decisions
roughly coincided, suggesting that WTO approval was granted as a side payment
to Russia to induce its positive ratiªcation decision. Signiªcant diplomatic con-
cessions were also made by the EU to Japan and Canada. As noted above, the
agreement reached in Kyoto in 1997 included provisions concerning carbon
sinks and various international ºexibility mechanisms. However, the parties to
the treaty were still debating the degree to which parties to the Protocol could
rely on these mechanisms in lieu of domestic emissions when the US withdrew
from the Protocol in 2001. In response, at the continuation of COP-6 in Bonn
in 2001 the EU made generous concessions on each point that offered the po-
tential to signiªcantly reduce the costs of compliance for both Japan and Can-
ada. However, while these diplomatic gains may have helped at the margin, they
did not eliminate the prospect of signiªcant compliance costs nor eliminate at-
tendant political opposition in either country.
The third international factor inºuencing domestic ratiªcation debates
was the interdependent global economy. Governments of states that had ac-
cepted tougher targets for emissions cuts below business as usual were con-
cerned that their industries would not be able to compete with industries in
countries that either had less onerous targets or, in the case of developing coun-
tries, no binding targets at all. As noted by Crowley and Harrison, both the US
and Australia cited this factor in withdrawing from the treaty. Once the US had
withdrawn, the governments of other countries—particularly Canada and
Japan—became even more concerned that they would not be able to compete
with their chief trading partner, the US. However, in the end both of these coun-
tries did ratify despite concerns about international competitiveness raised by
their business communities.
Overall, international factors were mixed in the direction of their inºu-
ence on ratiªcation decisions. The simple presence of an international agree-
ment to cut emissions resolved the basic collective action problem typically in-
volved in global environmental issues. A norm of multilateralism seemed to
push Canada somewhat towards ratiªcation, while material concessions also
eased ratiªcation decisions for Russia, Japan, and Canada. However, concerns
about international competitiveness played a central role in the withdrawal of
both Australia and the US from the treaty, and, as discussed below, may also
have hindered ongoing implementation efforts by other jurisdictions that did
ratify.
Ratiªcation vs. Domestic Policy Adoption
Thus far we have discussed the two outcomes of interest, ratiªcation of the
Kyoto Protocol and adoption of domestic mitigation policies, simultaneously.
However, the two do not necessarily go hand in hand: a country could, for in-
stance, ratify but make little effort to comply.
12 • The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
One way to compare policy stringency is to compare policy impacts, that
is, trends in greenhouse gas emissions. Table 4 compares emissions trends from
1990 to 2004 among the jurisdictions covered in this issue. While there is tre-
mendous variation in performance, from a 33% decline in emissions in Russia
to a 27% increase in Canada, the variation in population growth evident in the
next column suggests that emissions trends reºect more than just policy efªcacy.
Canada, the US, and Australia have experienced much greater increases in emis-
sions in large part because they have experienced much greater population
growth than other jurisdictions. Indeed, when one compared trends in per capita
emissions, it is striking that the only country to see a decline other than the
three that experienced “windfall” reductions (Germany, the UK, and Russia) is
the US, which has been viliªed for its decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
In fact, with the exception of Germany and the UK, the rest of the EU has experi-
enced increases in per capita emissions comparable to those of Canada and Aus-
tralia.
The ªgures in Table 4 suggest that few, if any, countries have adopted effec-
tive climate policies to date. One might argue, however, that it is simply too
soon to assess impacts on emissions since most parties to the Kyoto Protocol
only became serious about devising policies to reduce their emissions after
ratiªcation. Another means of comparing climate policies is to consider the
range of policy instruments various jurisdictions have adopted to date, though
such a comparison is necessarily preliminary in light of ongoing policy devel-
opment in all jurisdictions. Table 5 summarizes the degree to which different
jurisdictions have employed instruments ranging from politically less challeng-
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom •13
Table 4
Comparison of Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends
Country
Emissions Growth
(without LULUCF)
1990 to 2004
Population Growth,
1990 to 2004
Increase in Emissions
(without LULUCF) per
capita, 1990 to 2004
Australia ⫹24.3% ⫹17.0% ⫹6.3%
Canada ⫹26.6% ⫹17.0% ⫹8.2%
Japan ⫹6.5% ⫹3.1% ⫹3.4%
Russia ⫺33.1% ⫺3.0% ⫺31%
United
States
⫹15.8% ⫹17.1% ⫺1.2%
EU 15 ⫺1.0% ⫹4.5% ⫺5.3%
Germany ⫺17.4% ⫹3.8% ⫺20.3%
UK ⫺14.3% ⫹4.8% ⫺18.2%
Rest of EU ⫹12.8% ⫹4.7% ⫹7.8%
Sources: Emissions data from UN FCCC emissions proªles (http://unfccc.int/ghg_emissions_data/
items/38954.php). Population data from US Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/
idbrank.html).
ing planning and voluntary measures through to more contested, but arguably
more effective, measures such as regulations and taxes.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the two jurisdictions that have not ratiªed the
Kyoto Protocol, the United States and Australia, have not made very aggressive
efforts to date to control or offset greenhouse gas emissions. Both have relied on
expenditures, especially on research and development, but have declined to
provoke either the business community or individual consumers by regulating
or taxing emissions. While the relatively weak domestic programs of these two
jurisdictions are consistent with their status as non-ratiªers, more striking is the
degree of variation in domestic policies among the countries that ratiªed. Russia
represents a special case because that country received a generous target in the
Kyoto Protocol and thus does not have to undertake mitigation measures in or-
der to comply. Among Canada, Japan, and the EU, one might have expected
differences in the aggressiveness of domestic policies reºecting more or less de-
manding targets in the Kyoto Protocol. However, the variation observed is in-
consistent with that. Canada arguably faces the most demanding reduction tar-
get, yet of these three jurisdictions, it is the one that has done the least to contain
its emissions. Like the US and Australia, Canada to date has relied exclusively
on voluntary programs and subsidies to business and consumers. In contrast,
the EU has established a Europe-wide cap and trade program and several EU
countries are also relying on the Kyoto international mechanisms. Japan lies be-
tween these two poles, with extensive reliance on international mechanisms
and spending, but to date only voluntary programs to promote behavioral
change among ªrms and individuals.
14 • The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
Table 5
Comparison of Policy Instruments Employed by Different Jurisdictions
USA Australia Russia Canada Japan EU
Plan to meet Kyoto
target
No Yes Yes No Ye s Ye s
Voluntary Programs Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Spending on Do-
mestic Programs
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Spending on Inter-
national Mecha-
nisms
N/A N/A No No Yes Yes
Regulation No No No No No Yes
Carbon Taxes No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table draws on discussion of climate policies in this issue by Crowley, Tiberghien and
Schreurs, Schreurs and Tiberghien, Harrison, and Henry and Sundstrom. Only federal-level, or in
the case of the EU supra-national, policies are considered. International mechanisms are not appli-
cable to the US and Australia since they are not parties to the treaty.
Canada, Japan, and the EU converged with respect to ratiªcation, yet have
diverged with respect to domestic abatement policies. We suggest three plausi-
ble explanations. First, the settings of key variables can change between the time
of ratiªcation and a later date when concrete policy options are debated. This is
most pertinent in the case of Canada, where a change in government in 2006 re-
sulted in a signiªcant shift in climate policy.
A second explanation lies in characteristic differences between the enter-
prises of ratiªcation and adoption of domestic abatement policies. In most
jurisdictions, the decision to ratify received a great deal of media and public at-
tention. However, the black and white issue of ratiªcation then gave way to
technical questions of cost-effectiveness and complicated emissions projection
scenarios. Good intentions confront persistent interest group opposition when
the hard work of devising policies to deliver emissions reductions proceeds out
of the limelight. In addition, while voters tend to be strongly supportive of the
idea of compliance with international environmental treaties, they can simulta-
neously be strongly resistant to the reality of higher taxes or energy prices.
The political incentives thus can be very different between ratiªcation and im-
plementation of that international commitment. While this is true in all juris-
dictions, as evidenced by considerable foot-dragging even in the EU, the impli-
cations tend to be greatest where the costs of compliance are highest, thus
provoking stronger interest group and voter backlash.
Third, institutions can have different impacts at different stages in the pro-
cess from international negotiation to domestic implementation. In the case of
Canada, provincial governments that opposed the Kyoto Protocol were not in a
position to block ratiªcation, but given their ownership of key natural resources
they were in a position to obstruct implementation of that international com-
mitment. Moreover, institutional diffusion of authority is again relevant. As dis-
cussed above, in systems where multiple actors exercise vetos, it is often more
difªcult to achieve agreement on a course of action. However, to the extent that
agreement can be reached, participants may insist on central oversight to ensure
that their hard-won compromise is respected. Thus, after the complex negotia-
tions of EU burden sharing and ongoing negotiation concerning abatement
strategies, the European Commission was granted authority to approve or dis-
approve member states’ abatement plans. The Commission is now playing an
“enforcer” role with respect to national allocation of carbon credits in the sec-
ond round of the European emissions trading system.
Conclusions
Our exploration of the impact of domestic factors using the theoretical lens of
comparative politics yields several insights. First, even when policy-makers are
motivated by moral imperatives to conserve the planet’s resources and protect
future generations, costs still matter a great deal. The existence of an interna-
tional treaty is a critical step toward equalizing costs to different countries. How-
Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom •15
ever, the Kyoto Protocol equalized costs crudely at best. The commitment by in-
dustrialized countries to demonstrate leadership in the ªrst round, while
morally laudable, raised the specter that they would lose competitiveness to de-
veloping countries, an argument voiced loud and clear by domestic producers.
Moreover, Annex 1 parties to the treaty took on commitments of varying depth.
Those that committed to deeper reductions in turn faced greater domestic oppo-
sition from the business community, which threatened higher prices, loss of
jobs, and impacts on economic growth. While it is tempting to paint the US as
an international outlaw for its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, it is also the
case that the US accepted a more demanding commitment than other jurisdic-
tions in Kyoto. Comparison of costs relative to business-as-usual can explain
both why Russia would ratify the Kyoto Protocol and why the US and Australia
did not.
The case of Canada demonstrates that under the right institutional condi-
tions, leaders’ normative commitments can carry the day, despite considerable
political opposition. However, the fact that Canada did not follow through after
ratiªcation by adopting domestic policies to reduce its emissions suggests that
policy-makers’ ideational commitments can be fragile in the face of persistent
political and institutional obstacles. In the cases of Japan and the EU, it was vot-
ers’, rather than policy-makers’, normative commitments that ensured a positive
outcome by affecting politicians’ strategic calculations. Consistent with Vogel’s
earlier comparison of US, UK, and Japanese environmental policy,26 the EU and
Japanese cases demonstrate that when voters feel strongly enough, politicians
can and do rise to the challenge.
However, the magnitude of that challenge also depends on political insti-
tutions in several ways. Proportional electoral systems give greater expression to
environmentally-motivated voters’ concerns than ªrst-past-the-post systems,
thus amplifying electoral incentives for policy-makers. Institutional diffusion of
authority can either facilitate or obstruct action on climate change, depending
on interaction with other factors. Comparison of the Canadian and US cases,
which were otherwise remarkably similar, reveals that the separation of powers
in the US presidential system played a critical role in preventing US ratiªcation.
Schreurs and Tiberghien report that a competitive dynamic emerged between
EU member states and the European parliament. In the US, federalism has al-
lowed subnational governments to partially offset inaction by national govern-
ments. However, in both cases it was fortuitous that the largest and most
inºuential players faced relatively low costs to abate emissions. In contrast, fed-
eralism has to date been a negative force in Canadian climate policy, where the
most inºuential provinces have been intent on protecting greenhouse-gas inten-
sive industries.
In the time frame during which actions are urgently needed to address
global warming, institutional reform is unlikely to be an option. Climate policy
16 • The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
26. Vogel 1993.
thus will remain more of an uphill battle for some jurisdictions than others.
However, the case studies analyzed in this issue suggest that, while institutions
may facilitate or deter action, there is no substitute for voters caring enough to
demand action by their elected representatives. In that respect, it is heartening
that the environment has enjoyed an increase in salience among voters in Can-
ada, Australia, and the US in the last year. In the end, it is voters’ sustained com-
mitment to addressing the problem of climate change that will matter; arguably
it is the only thing that can.
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18 • The Comparative Politics of Climate Change
