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ndia and the Middle East
Prithvi Ram Mudiam
London: British Academic Press, 1994. 232 pages.
$59.50 (ISBN 1-85043-703-3).
Reuiew by
P. R. Kumaraswamy, Ph.D.
The Hebrew Llniversitv of Jerusalem
s a major non-Arab and non-Muslim powerbutwith a substan-
tial Muslim minority, India has maintained strong historical,
cultural, and religious relations with the Middle East. While the
prolonged absence of diplomatic relations with Israel received wide-
spread attention in the West, Prithvi Ram Mudiam seeks to look at the
broader picture of India's relations with the region. In discussing the
developments from 1947 to 1986, the author provides a detailed
background of the evolution of India's policy during the freedom
struggle. This is the second major work on the area in recent years.l
Exceptfor a minorreference to a domestic developmentconcerningthe
Muslim community, the author does not deal with the Rajiv Gandhi
era, when India took certain sma11, yet positive, moves towards Israel.
The author has devoted considerable thought to structuring his
work and has wisely confined his treatment. The first two chapters
dealwiththe revolutionary (Egypt and lraq) andconservative (Saudi
.A,rabia and Iran) regimes respectively. While the next two chapters
deal with the security and economic dimensions of India's interests in
the Middle East, the iast two chapters deal with India's policy towards
Israel and the PLO respectively.
68 oo9ilE.t
It should be noted that both in official as well as academic circles,
the term "Middle East" is a misnomer in India. Even though many,
both within and outside the region, prefer this term, the more accurate
geographical term "West Asia" is popular in India.
Two strong and over-lapping currents, namely Islam and secular
nationalism, strongly influenced India's Middle East policy. F or
various historical reasons and demographic compulsions, Indian
perception of the Middle East, especially the vexed Arab-Israeli
conflict, is heavily in{luenced by the Islamic dimension. Furthermore,
its strong opposition to cold war-related military alliances compelled
India to forge a strong relationship with Egyptian President Gamal
Abdul Nasser. Both these factors had therr benefits and shortcomings.
The former resultedin Indiapursuing an overtlypro-Arab policy that
for long has not been friendiy towards Israel. Though it did maintain
contacts with the Jewish State, it is not accurate to portray them as
'cordial' as the author does (p. 167). Its close friendship with Nasser,
at least until the June war, considerablS, limited India's long-term
options vis-a-vis conservative and pro-US regimes in the region.
Both these tendencies were further complicated and even under-
mined by India's pre-occup ation with Pakistan. The Kashmr probiem
and Pakistan's prolonged attempts to forge a pan-Islamic organization
have heavily limited India's flexibility. Pakistan's prolonged failure to
forge an Islamic alliance was independent of New Deihi's endeavors.
In short, India's Middle East policy fails rnto two distinctphases.
Until the mid- 1960s, its emphasis on Arab nationalism and secular-
ism enabled it to maintain a cordial relation with the key players in
the Middle East. Mudiam is correct in arguing that "India did pay a
price for closely identifying itself with Nasser by alienating politically
conservative states" (p.50).Untilthe mid-1960s however, the damage
was iimited. The defeat of the Arabs in the June war was a major
turningpoint as itendedthe domination ofArab nationaiism based on
secular principies. In its p1ace, a new Islamic trend more favorable to
Pakistan emerged, and it became difficult for India to adjust to new
realities where reiigious, and not ideological, factors began to govern
regional poLicies"
Discussing the security dimension, Mudiam provides a detailed
discussion of the various Middle East military alliances and their
impact upon India. The discussion covers Pakistan's security cooper-
ation with Iran and SaudiArabia as well as the "Islamic" bomb. Even
though their impact on Pakistaru military strength was limited, these
alliances succeeded in drawing widespread attention in India. The
author is correct in arguing that it was only after the 1973 oil crisis,
Digest of haiilte East Stu[ies 69
that economic relations took concrete shape and substance. Since
then, developments such as the escalating cost of petroleum imports,
a steady growthoflabor exports, and anincreasingmarketpotential
have provided a strong economic basis for India's pro-Arab policy. The
Middle East plays an important role in India's external trade; the
converse is not true. Unfortunately, in providing various economic
data to substantiate his arguments, the author has not followed a
uniform pattern, and most of the data deals with only a few years
during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
While it is correct that both media and opposition parties were
highly critical of India's policy towards Israel, one cannot ignore the
underlying motives and rationale. Over the ye ars, through its Consu-
Iate in Bombay (now Mumbai), Israelhas invested considerable effort
in cultivating the media and intellectuais. It facilitated, organized,
and at times financially supported numerous visits to Israel. In this
way, the Indian inteiligentsia have developed abetter understanding
of and a soft corner towards the Jewish State. Similarly for the
Opposition, the issue of normalization largely remained a useful tool
to embarrass the Congressional governments. During the June war,
this was exasperated by the smallparliamentary majority that Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi enjoyed.
Discussing India's policy towards the PLO, the author correctly
argues that its "firm support to the PLO enhanced India's general
standing in the region and was a positive factor in improving India's
bilateral relations with the Arab states" (p.197). Or its "firm and
consistent support ofthe Palestinian cause has beenjust and can be
justified on moral as well as practical grounds" (p.198). Elsewhere,
however, his treatmentoflndia's Middle Eastpolicy is largely confi.ned
to India's'pre-occup ation with Nasser' and its ne gative imp acts upon
India's bilateral relations with other key players.
The work, however, suffers from one serious drawback which
significantly undermines its final product. In studying India's policy,
the author has singularly excluded any archival materials on the
subject. It has been the experience of the reviewer that the National
Archives of India do not strictiy adhere to the 30-year ru1e. For one
reason or another, a number of crucial and sensitive materials are not
available to researchers. Yet the substantial amount of Ministry of
ExternalAffairs files and d.ocuments currently available for research
should have enabled a better appreciation of the subtleties and
nuances of Indian policy. India and the Middle East is a modified
version of author's doctoral thesis submitf,ed to the University of
London. The possibility ofwriting a doctoral thesisinthe Westwithout
70 QO9ylq,S
laboring in the archives is rather disturbing.
Likewise, the author has been extremely economical with the
parliamentary debates and other primary works such as memoirs and
autobiographies. For instance, until his demise in 1964, India's first
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehrupromoted an annual debate in the
parliamentonthe international situation. Portraying a broadpicture
of the international environment, he articulated India's interests,
options and priorities. Very often the pohticai Ieadership over-estrmat-
ed India's international position and influence. Aii that Nehru had
said and done were not accurate or excellent, and some of his actions
evenproyedto be damagingfor India. However, far from being frenzied
aberrations, they evolved in the course ofa certain historical and socio-
politicai background. In his obsession with refuting Nehru, Mudiam
concedes his inability and unwillingness to understand and analyze
the reasons behind India's anti-colonral and anti-imperialist outlook.
Extensive reliance on newspaper and other secondary sources has
inhibitedthe author from adequately understanding the evolution of
Indianpolicy.
As a result, on a number of occasions, the author expresses his
bewilderment at India's position on a particular issue. At times,
instead of analyzing and understanding the Indian policy, the author
indulges in prescriptions and sermonizing. In his introduction, the
author writes that the constancy of India's Middle East policy "is more
an outcome of lack of imagination and an absence of subtlety and
sensitivity on the part of the Indian political elite than of any
unwavering commitment on its part to any highprinciples and ideals"
(p. viii). Had hebotheredtoexamine the primary andotherpubiished
materials more carefully, he wouldhave understoodthe complexities
of foreign-policy making and the diverse undercurrents.
Careful examination of the debates in India would clearly dispute
his assertion that King "FeisaI came up with the idea of inviting India"
to the Rabatlslamic conference in 1969 (p.91). Even onthe crucial and
controversial issue of recognition of Israel, there was no unanimity in
the establishrnentofforeignpolicy. Important diplomats such as K. M.
Panikkar and K. P. S. Menon were at odds with Nehru's reluctance
towards the Jewish State. Likewise, C. S. Jha, India's Foreign
Secretary during the June war, regrets that New Delhi could have
exerted pressure upon Nasser and warned him against giving Israel
a'pretext'for going to war.2
Following conventional wisdom, Mudiam argues that in June
1948 Israel requested India's recognition. However, according to
materials currently available on the subject, the request was made on
aigest of tuliilte f,ast Stulies 71
17 May or four days after the formation of Israel. Contrary to the
available data both in Indian and Israeli archives, the author vainly
argues that the question of "difficulties of finance and personnell' never
influenced India's decision on diplomatic relations (p.161). Likewise,
he erroneously argues that "Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett"
made a "secret visit" to India in 1956 (p.161). The visit of the former
Israeli Prime Minister was widely reported in the Indian media. On
numerous occasions, he refers to the burning of the AIAqsa mosque.
Index is noticeably absent.
Given the limited inlluence it wields in the Middle East, one might
agree with the author that India's Middle East policy was "confused,
ad hoc and ineffectuali'(p.vii). However, one has to wait for a more
comprehensive and detailed analysis of India's Midd1e Eastpolicy.
Notes
1 Richard E. Ward, India's Pro-Arab Policy: A Study in Continuity,
(NewYork,1992).
2 C. S. Jha, From Bandung to Tashkent : Glimpses of India's Foreign
Policy, (IVladras : 1983), pp. 308-9.
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