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Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies
Abstract
Ideology and its place in the political system of communism were much debated, particularly its impact on the content of policy, including foreign policy. What is clear is that, as in all other features of political life, communist states’ foreign policies were meant to be directed by agents of Marxism-Leninism. The very disparate states of the post-communist world share the legacy of jettisoning that ideology, and whether they have had some partial or extensive historical experience of independent statehood or are engaging in entirely new nation- and state-building, the role of national identity in foreign policy proves significant. Whether this can be seen as a new ideology is a problematic issue that deserves analysis.
... С советских времен в Грузии процветали национальные движения, и распад Советского Союза привел к росту влияния националистических групп... Независимость стала постоянной "пассивной революцией", в которой нет ничего революционного» 7 . Подобные настроения в большей степени характерны для левой части интеллектуального сообщества [6] в силу того, что контроль над дискурсом фактически получили правые, предлагающие свои векторы и траектории интеллектуального развития [21], игнорируя идеи левых критиков, для которых в одинаковой степени неприемлемы неолиберальная экономическая модель и сближение правых с националистами. ...
... Метаморфозы развития и трансформации интеллектуального сообществ [20] в постсоветский период самым тесным образом связаны с общей динамикой изменений в гуманитарных и социальных науках. В то время как в 1950-1975 годы, 6 ...
... Сегодня мы, и смехотворно и позорно заменили эту заповедь смелым выкриком слова "демократия"» 4 . Поэтому понятие «аполитичность» 5 , которое в чрезвычайно политизированной и идеологически мотивированной Грузии 1990-2000-х го дов казалось неуместным и бессмысленным, оказывается все более популярным у молодого поколения интеллектуалов, озабоченных отчуждением власти от общества и опасающихся односторонних политических трансформаций, например -внесения поправок в Конституцию без референдума и их общественного обсуждения 6 . ...
Introduction. The author believes that the relationship between power and intellectuals can range from the active participation of the intelligentsia in politics to the disillusionment of the intellectual community in politics and in the ruling elites. The author analyzes the process in Georgian contexts. It is assumed that politics as a process has ceased to attract public interest, despite a dynamic political life. Purpose. The purpose of the article is to analyze the process of public disillusionment with politics in the modern Georgian intellectual community. Methods. Methodologically, the article is based on the principles of analyzing intellectual communities with the elements of the universal method of historicism and a comparative approach, which make it possible to identify and systematize the main features of the process of depoliticization of Georgian society. Scientific novelty. The author presents a new interpretation of the role of intellectuals in the processes of social disappointment in politics, based on the analysis of original sources in the Georgian language. Results. It is presumed that 1) Georgian intellectual community in the second half of the 2000s began to lose active interest in its own participation in politics; 2) political parties are also forced to acknowledge the crisis of loyalty because the elites and society develop independently, and their interests coincide rarely; 3) culture became an alternative project that attracts civil society more than real politics; 4) the active political participation of the Church assists to the erosion of political culture, forcing intellectuals to become disillusioned with politics, perceived as a clannish and corrupt sphere of activity. Conclusions. It is shown that disillusionment with politics in the second half of the 2000s and the gradual migration of intellectuals to cultural practices replaced the politicization of intellectual communities, which determined the main vectors of Georgian development in the previous period.
... The Western empire had enough experience of bitter nationalism and communism. Nationalism was a powerful ideology in Europe against colonialism since the eighteenth century and later communist ideology became the other threat to Western dominance of the world (Fawn, 2003). The nationalist ideology once unified the two countries in the eighteenth century one was unification of the Germany and Italy in 1970-71. ...
... The second important ideology emerged as a communist ideology in the late eighteenth century. This communist ideology was grave dangerous for Western colonialism and class contradiction ideology was not an ideology to put an end to colonialism but a threat to the existence of the capitalism of the Western power empire that was developed after exploiting the working classes (Fawn, 2003). ...
This research paper discusses Colonial Legacy and Its Impact. It further elaborates Strategies of Colonial Rule, exploring the divide-and-rule tactics employed by the colonial powers and their lasting impact on societal divisions. In addition, it explains the legacy of institutional structures, discussing how colonial governance shaped institutions and political classes, perpetuating societal disparities, post-independence, and continuing social divisions. The study briefly summarizes existing work on identity politics in terms of the us-other concept, as well as how colonial rule formed institutions and political classes, maintaining societal inequities, post-independence, and ongoing social divisions. Colonial ideology have also had a significant impact on the political landscapes of Pakistan and India. The results indicate that, it analyses the enduring effects of colonial ideologies on societal and political landscapes in Pakistan and India. It defines struggles for unity and progress. It defines struggles for unity and progress. In the end, it highlights the challenges faced in overcoming deep-rooted divisions and fostering a cohesive national identity. Apart from that, it highlights the complexities faced by societies in overcoming colonial legacies.
... -Dünya politikasına çok az seviyede katılım göstermeleri, -Dış politika konuları çok dar alanda bulunmaları, -Dış politika davranışlarının sadece yakın çevrelerine yönelik olmaları, -Askeri dış politika araçları yerine diplomatik ve ekonomik dış politika araçlarını kullanmaları, -Uluslararası hukuk, uluslararası rejimler, uluslararası ilkelere vurgu yaparak etik değerler odaklı dış politika uygulamaları, -Çok uluslu uluslararası kuruluş ve antlaşmalara mümkün olan her durumda katılmaları, -Tarafsız pozisyonlar seçmeleri, -Büyük güçlerin koruma, ortaklık ve kaynaklarına bağımlı olmaları, -Diğer ülkelerle çatışmadan kaçınmaları ve işbirliğini amaçlamaları, -Fiziksel ve politik güvenlik ve ulus devletin bekası için dış politika araçlarını sınırsız şekilde kullanmaları (Hey, 2003, s. 5 (Fawn, 2003). ...
Giriş
Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Soğuk Savaş
sonunda 1990’lı yıllarda bağımsız oldukların-
da bu bölgeye yönelik Rusya ve Çin yanın-
da Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ilk kez dış ve
güvenlik politikaları oluşturmaya başlamıştır.
11 Eylül Terör Saldırıları öncesinde ABD dış
ve güvenlik politikası daha çok jeo-ekono-
mik ve enerji politikaları üzerinden yürütül-
müştür. Washington yönetimi beş Orta Asya
Cumhuriyeti’nin bağımsızlığı ve egemenli-
ğine vurgu yaparken öte yandan demokrasi,
hukukun üstünlüğü, insan hakları ve serbest
pazar ekonomisinin yerleşmesine dönük po-
litikalar izlemiştir. 11 Eylül sonrası Küresel
Terörle Mücadele politikası gereği, Washin-
gton’un güvenlik öncelikleri yüzünden özel-
likle Afganistan’daki askeri müdahalesi sonu-
cu Kırgızistan gibi ülkelere dönük politikası
yüz seksen derece değişmiştir. İyi yönetişim
konuları yerine ABD lojistik askeri üsleri ve
terörizmle mücadele amacıyla Kuzey Dağıtım
Ağı’nı 2009’da hayata geçirmesinin ardından
Özbekistan ve Kırgızistan’da Amerikan as-
keri üsleri kurulması yanında beş Orta Asya
Cumhuriyeti değişik derecelerde Amerika ile
... It can be argued that there was a cognitive effort to connect the ideological narrative against Communism with the fight against the Macedonians and to dehumanize the outgroup by revealing the negative characteristics of the "others" that seemed to challenge the neutral-positive characteristics of the ingroup. In the examined case, the outgroup (Macedonians) seemed to be a part of a dehumanization process that could lead to the justification of extreme actions, such as pogroms (Van Dijk, 2000;George, 2020;Fawn, 2003). ...
The study examined through ideological discourse analysis (IDA) 38 widely spread disinformation-laced news stories (or “fake news”) regarding the Macedonian Name Dispute (MND) and the “Prespes Agreement” in the years 2018 and 2019. The paper explores the ideological narratives and constructions disseminated through the disinformation-laced news stories during these 2 years. Therefore, the study expands the relevant literature regarding democracy, disinformation, and hate campaigns by examining the ideological narratives and constructions disseminated through the disinformation-laced news stories during that two-years-period. The findings showed that those news stories were successfully weaponized and resulted in empowering identity characteristics and ideological narratives through the distancing method (us vs them), the alienation with elements of dramatization (e.g. territorial loss of the Greek Macedonia due to the “Prespes Agreement”), and the sense of victimization and dehumanization that demanded emergency actions to protect the ingroup (Greece) from the outgroup (North Macedonia and its Greek assistants).
The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of the ideological component of government cabinets in Eastern European countries (in 1991–2014). The author analyzed the essence of the phenomenon of political ideology and party polarization, singled out and verified the families of ideological parties as a component of cabinet activity across Eastern European countries, determined how party and non-party governments correspond with ideological determinants of parliamentary parties that support them.
Автор анализирует противоречия между светским и церковным сегментом современного грузинского общества в контекстах конфликта элит. Целью статьи является анализ конфликта между светскими и несветскими элитами Грузии. Предполагается, что грузинское гражданское общество в 1990 – 2010-е годы успело консолидироваться и стало важным фактором культурной и социальной жизни. Грузинские интеллектуалы предпочитают использовать светские модели культурной и социальной коммуникации. Несмотря на процессы секуляризации и развития гражданского общества, Церковь сохранила свое политическое влияние. Предполагается, что представители Церкви в Грузии формируют несветские культурные и интеллектуальные элиты. Отношения между светскими и духовными интеллектуалами в современной Грузии могут быть определены как напряженные и конфронтационные. Показано, что нецерковные интеллектуалы активно поддерживают и продвигают ценности секулярного общества, критикуя Церковь за ее консерватизм. В статье анализируются основные направления критики Церкви. Автор полагает, что критика Церкви в современном конфликте элит политизирована и идеологизирована. Автор полагает, что светские интеллектуалы формируют негативный образ Церкви как архаичного и консервативного института, обвиняя иераохов в коррупции и нарушении норм христианской этики. Критика Церкви стала важным сегментом современной грузинской интеллектуальной ситуации. Антиклерикальные нарративы столь широко рапсротранены и влиятельны, что они могут быть определены как изобретенная традиция современного грузинского гражданского национализма. Перспективы развития отношений между светскими интеллектуалами и Церковью остаются неопределенными. Автор полагает, что нельзя исключать дальнейшую радикализацию светских интеллектуальных сообществ, так как общий проевропейский и прозападный политический курс политических элит содействует фрагментации грузинского общества и росту противоречий между светскими радикальными и консервативными церковными элитами.
One of the salient features of the recent populist turn in Europe has been a redefinition of the European. Traditionally, (far) right-wing parties defined themselves as Eurosceptic and focused on national identity. Increasingly, however, they have referred to pan-European heritage, although against the mainstream conceptualization of it. The article looks at the case of Hungary and the image of Europe constructed by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whose rhetoric has become a key reference point for other European populist movements. The past decade his government has witnessed, on the one hand, a tendency to redefine what is European against the dominant and institutionalized interpretations, and, on the other, an attempt to single-out the concept of Central Europe as the locus for maintaining and nurturing European values in contrast to perceived Western decline. This paper examines this discourse through a close reading of major speeches delivered by Orbán on the anniversaries of historical events. Analysis of these speeches reveals the ideological foundations of his political project and presents historical and philosophical interpretations of the European political situation. It seeks to identify how Orbán’s discourse evolved across time, by putting the speeches about the past into the present political context.
Foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in post-Soviet decades have been prominent for their continuity and consistency. Since identity is usually considered as one of the major factors of consistency and continuity of politics, the goal was set to examine the role of different identity factors in formation of foreign policies of the three Baltic states in the period from international recognition of their independence in August 1991 to the Ukrainian Crisis of spring 2014 in European politics. The analysis of literature and sources suggests some assumptions on how identity-related factors influenced foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, They could be summarized in a hypothesis that making of the Baltic foreign policies was deeply influenced by “ethnocratic” nature of political regimes, establishedin Baltic states, ideological constructs based on their historical memories and memory politics as well as geopolitical identities of being “small states” and being influenced by the “Baltic unity” idea. Examining of these assumptions allows to conclude that effects of some identity factors, like ethnic identities, are often overestimated, while others really played very important, sometimes decisive, role in developments of major foreign policy vectors of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.The deterioration of their relations with Russia in the period under review was largelydetermined by ideological constructs of legal state continuity and Soviet occupation deeply rooted in the XX century historical memories of Baltic states. While Western vectors of their foreign policies and first of all their relations with the USA developed in line with the logic of securitization based on self-perception of Baltic political elites of being “small states”.
Iran has been considered by the Georgian authorities as an important country in the
strategic ocean of the Gulf and Caspian Sea energy after independence. The regional and
trans-regional powers continues to play an important role in relations between the two
countries. The barriers to the expansion of relations between the two countries are also
affected by the type of economy and internal structures. Nevertheless, Georgia as a separate republic from the Soviet Union, while acting in the West Square, still has limited
relations with Iran. Relations between Iran and Georgia began with the collapse of the
USSR and in that time have experienced a lot of hesitation. Iran has one of the first
countries to recognize the independence of Georgia. Political contacts and economic
relations between Iran and Georgia in the 22 years is not very active. Side tried to
maintain communication, primarily focusing on their geographical proximity. Tehran and
Tbilisi have not yet reached the implementation of major economic projects, but the
mutual desire to breakthrough results still present. Iran and Georgia in recent years
managed to mitigate some apprehension to each other, which is determined by closely
involving Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration schemes. Aggravating moment to establish
trust between the two countries were close ties between Georgia and Israel. Particularly
alarmed Iran close military-technical cooperation Tbilisi and Tel Aviv. Iranian-Georgian
relations have not escaped the impact of regional and trans-regional powers. The coming
to power in Georgia party "United National Movement" headed by Mikhail Saakashvili
did not contribute to the rapprochement of Tbilisi and Tehran. At the same close ties U.S.
and Georgia, among which in January 2009 was signed Strategic Partnership Charter,
were not insurmountable irritant to Iran. In contrast, the Georgian authorities Marshall
line on close relations with the West viewed Tehran in a pragmatic manner. Georgia
could become a mediator between Iran and the West, primarily in the economic sphere.
The question is: How regional and trans-regional powers influenced Iran-Georgia
relations. The hypothesis is that foreign elements have had a negative impact on the
expansion of cooperation between the two countries. The results show that Iran's
extensive cooperation with Russia, on the one hand, and Georgia's extensive cooperation
with the West, especially the United States, are the main obstacle to further developing
relations between the two countries.
After the turmoil following the collapse of Soviet power, post-Communist Russia has emerged as an assertively independent force in international affairs. Meanwhile, an intense debate has been underway in Moscow about Russia's national interests and foreign policy priorities. Domestic political conflicts and the close ties with former Soviet partner states have made internal factors particularly particularly important in shaping Russian foreign policy. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy is the first systematic analysis of the domestic political forces which condition the international behaviour of the new Russian state. Four leading specialists examine in turn the areas of foreign policy thinking and debate, how policy is made, the public politics of foreign policy and the role of the military. They explore the changing domestic alignments associated with recent shifts in Russian foreign policy, focusing on the roles played by institutions such as the Security Council and the legislature, by military groupings and by emerging economic interests. The authors throw new light on the domestic foundations of Moscow's more assertive and sef-reliant stance.
These studies cover a range of topics - market reforms, social justice, ecology, nationalism, new political parties and more - that are at the centre of the revolutionary changes under way in the former Soviet bloc. The breadth of this book's subject matter is complemented by the variety of methods and approaches that it features: historical interpretation, linguist analysis, statistical analysis and political sociology. The result is a genuinely inter disciplinary treatment of this important topic.
Does ideology matter in the Soviet Union? This is a question that naturally comes to mind when reviewing the preceding chapters. In a basic sense, ideology clearly matters inasmuch as it figures importantly in Soviet political life.1 The Soviet party continues to devote considerable resources to keeping ideology visible and conveying its content to a mass domestic and international audience. But visibility is not what most have in mind when asking whether ideology matters. What is really meant is: does it make a difference, and if so, how great a difference? Who believes in what elements of the ideology and, perhaps most pertinent, what role does it play in politics? The central concern of most posing such questions is the effect of ideology on the making of Soviet policy at home and abroad.
Is America still Number 1? A leading scholar of international politics and former State Department official takes issue with Paul Kennedy and others and clearly demonstrates that the United States is still the dominant world power, with no challenger in sight. But analogies about decline only divert policy makers from creating effective strategies for the future, says Nye. The nature of power has changed. The real-and unprecedented-challenge is managing the transition to growing global interdependence.
Well-removed from the clash of opposing social systems on the grand stage of history, the relentless progress of ‘developed socialism’ towards the communist future and the other epic themes of official Soviet ideology is an identifiable component in the creed of the party-state which is confined to much more modest matters. Its project involves immediate, palpable improvements in the everyday lives of Soviet citizens: its concern is more with the availability of such things as kitchen utensils or housing space than with the millenarian visions associated with ‘the construction of communism’.
For the last forty years, I have been a student of Engels and Marx, their ideas and theories, and how others have interpreted and sought to apply them. What originally attracted me to this study was, among other things, the fact that, in the United States in the period immediately following the Second World War, Marxism and its various transformations were not considered worthy of systematic exploration. My professors sought to convince me that Marx had made no significant or lasting contributions to any branch of theory and that, at best, one might study his writings as examples of the aberration of the human spirit. None the less I set out, very much without guidance and therefore in a rather haphazard fashion, to explore this body of theory, both in its original form and as transformed by Lenin. I discovered a system of thought expressed in language rather different from that used by my teachers, but very much worth studying. My writings in this field have always been a conscious attempt at translating this language, trying to communicate its meaning to the uninitiated, taking these ideas seriously, and making sense out of them. I have done this not only because Marx, Engels, Lenin and other contributors convey important insights and thus can teach us much about ourselves, but also because these ideas, in turn, have, become historic forces, impulses, guides, or constraints to action. The term ideology seems to me to carry the implication that ideas should be studied in their relatedness to action.
The vigorous debate about Soviet ideology that took place in the 1960s was followed by a reaction in which many of the participants who were not Marxists abandoned a discussion in terms of ideology for one in terms of political culture. The impulse was given not so much by the difficulties of pinning down a highly volatile concept: this was a time when people were beginning to seek explanations for the evident differences between societies ruled by communist parties. Accustomed to a discourse in which ideology as presented as one of the factors that linked those societies, commentators on the communist scene, not unnaturally, looked to culture as a factor of differentation.
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics: Erratum - Volume 52 Issue 1 - Andrew Moravcsik