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Theories of Economic Regulation

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Abstract

Several theories have been advanced to explain the observed pattern of government regulation of the economy. These include the "public interest" theory and several versions, proposed either by political scientists or by economists, of the "interest group" or "capture" theory. This article analyzes those theories. It argues that the public interest theory and the political scientists' versions of the interest group theory are unacceptable in their present form. The economists' version of the interest group theory is discussed at greatest length; its theoretical and empirical foundations are reviewed, and the conclusion is reached that, while promising, the theory requires both more analytical development and new sorts of empirical investigation before it can be accepted as an adequate positive theory of regulation.

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... information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970), the need for disclosure regulations (Posner, 1974;Cooper & Keim, 1983), the reasons behind managers' incentives for more disclosure (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978,1986, and the objective to raise company capital as cheaply as possible (Choi, 1973). Also theoretical explanations seek to distinguish the value or quality of a company's product (Akerlof, 1970;Strong & Walker, 1987). ...
... This theory asserts that accounting regulations are a consequence of public demand for correction of market failures (Posner, 1974), which poses the fundamental point of PIT. Hence there is public demand to form accounting regulations to reduce the general public information disadvantage to maximize social welfare (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). ...
... Interest Group Theory or Capture Theory (Posner, 1974) is the second part of regulatory theory and is complementary to PIT. This theory suggests that individuals compose a group, referred to as interest group, to protect and maximise their own interest by constituting a lobby for various amounts and types of regulation (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). ...
Thesis
p>This thesis proposes a theoretical framework of financial disclosure practice as a step to fill the gap in the theoretical background of financial disclosure research. Codification theory, Dye’s (1986) theory and disclosure transformation theory are proposed in this framework as explanatory theories of the mandatory and voluntary financial disclosure developments in practice. To examine aspects of this proposed framework, this thesis carried out an empirical investigation on the printed and Internet financial disclosure practices in Jordan. This empirical study measures the extent of financial disclosure practices by Jordanian companies before and after the extension of disclosure requirements in 1998, and after the existence of new technology developments in 2000. The study compares the level of printed mandatory, voluntary and overall financial disclosure of 51 Jordanian manufacturing companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in 1997 and 2002, and investigates the relationship between these levels of printed financial disclosure and company characteristics (size, age, profitability, industry type, ownership structure, and auditor size). Also this study examines the level of Internet financial disclosure by Jordanian companies listed on ASE in 2004, and its relationship with printed financial disclosure practices as well as company size. It was found that the overall level of financial disclosure by Jordanian manufacturing companies improved after the introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements in 1998. However, these companies did not fully comply with mandatory disclosure requirements in 1997 and 2002. On the other hand, they disclosed a considerable level of voluntary information in both years, and the mean level of voluntary disclosure increased in 2002. This is considered empirical evidence supporting Dye’s (1986) theory. Also the results reveal a strong association between voluntary disclosure practices in 197 and new mandatory disclosure requirements in 1998, which provides evidence for codification theory. Furthermore, some improvement in the level of compliance with the generic requirements of International Accountancy Standards’ (IAS) financial statements was observed between 1997 and 2002 as a result of an increase in company familiarity with these requirements, although this study provides evidence of IAS-lite in 1997 and 2002. None of the company characteristics were positively associated with mandatory disclosure in 1997, whereas after the developments in 1998 company size, company age and auditor size were positively associated. This result provides strong evidence for Environmental-Cause Theory. Also voluntary disclosure in 1997 was positively associated with company size, profitability, and the natural resources and food and clothing industries. In 2002, foreign ownership appears to have affected the level of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, the current findings provide evidence that Jordanian companies have yet to exploit the full potential of Internet financial disclosure. A positive relationship between printed and Internet financial disclosure was found, which provides evidence for disclosure transformation theory. Finally, company size had a positive impact on the level of Internet financial disclosure.</p
... According to Ogus (2004) this theory validates that regulation is desired for accomplishing combined goals. Posner (1974) considers three components (public interest theory, capture theory, the economic theory of regulation) of theory of regulation, these components attempt to expound the aims of government involvement in markets. This theory assumes the that regulation comes to play when government's objective is geared towards promoting social welfare or addressing severe events which may be organizational failure. ...
... Economic Theory of Regulation: Stigler in 1971 propounded the economic theory of regulation which comprises some elements of both public interest theory and capture theory (Posner, 1974). The principles of capture theory were improved and broadened by Stigler in 1971 to form the theory of economic regulation on the basis of public choice concept. ...
... The principles of capture theory were improved and broadened by Stigler in 1971 to form the theory of economic regulation on the basis of public choice concept. The theory views regulation in the light of demand and supply which administers the allocation of economic good (Posner, 1974) The argument that the supporters of economic regulation theory hold on the demand side, rides on the assumption that industry groups have access to information more than other groups, like politician's and consumers, organizational interests seem dominant in the market (Peltzman, 1976). The economic regulatory model from the side of supply argues that policymakers supply regulation provided that politically effective groups demand is more than its opposition (Rahman, 1992, p. 115). ...
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The not-for-profit organizations (NFPOs) have grown expansively in size and importance in recent years and stakeholders all over the world have come to admit the need for improved accountability and transparency of the NFPOs. The western economies, in particular, are not oblivious of this given the heightened level of regulations of NFPOs in their climes. Nigeria is gradually responding to this reality as evidenced by the recent amendment to the Companies and Allied Matters Act of Nigeria (CAMA 2020) vis-a vis NFPOs operations in Nigeria. Primarily, this study was carried out to review and compare the financial reporting regulations of NFPOs in Nigeria with what is obtainable in the United States of America and United Kingdom. The paper drew upon publicly available research work and archival data, using desk review methodology. The study discovered that different regulatory legislation on financial reporting of NFPOs activities in Nigeria exist as obtainable in the western word but the major drawbacks are lack of implementation and enforcement. Hence, the study concludes that to ensure accountability and transparency, Nigeria government should harmonies the financial reporting related regulatory laws for NFPOs drive enforcement accordingly.
... Source : Verdier (2015) Fondements de la Théorie Politico-contractuelle Zimmerman 1978, Watts and Théorie de l'agence (Jensen and Meckling 1976) Théorie de la réglementation (Posner 1974, Laffont andTirole 1991) Théorie de l'intérêt public (Posner 1974) Théorie de la capture (Laffont and Tirole 1991) être incité à s'approprier des richesses initialement consacrées aux créanciers ou à effectuer un transfert de celles-ci des créanciers vers les actionnaires afin de maximiser leur rémunération propre. ...
... La TPC s'intéresse à la nature des contrats, notamment les contrats de rémunération, régulant les relations entre les différentes parties prenantes et à la vulnérabilité politique des entreprises face aux nouvelles règlementations (Casta and Ramond 2009). La TPC s'appuie sur la théorie de l'agence (Jensen and Meckling 1976;Hill and Jones 1992) et les théories de la réglementation (Posner 1974;Laffont and Tirole 1991). Comme la théorie de l'agence a été présentée précédemment, nous développons désormais les théories de la réglementation. ...
... Les théories de la réglementation se composent de la théorie de l'intérêt public et de la théorie de la capture (« the capture theory ») ou de la théorie des groupes d'intérêt (« interest group theory ») (Posner 1974;Laffont and Tirole 1991). ...
Thesis
Cette étude porte sur le lien entre la responsabilité Sociale des entreprises (RSE) et la gestion du résultat. Le contexte spécifique de l’Europe a rarement été étudié antérieurement dans la littérature. Dans ce contexte, il nous semble que la théorie néo-institutionnelle est pertinente pour expliquer cette relation. Les AD, comme proxy de la gestion du résultat sont calculés à l’aide du modèle empirique de Kothari et al. (2005). Notre échantillon est constitué de 3.760 observations (soient 417 entreprises cotées) dans 12 pays européens. La période s’étend sur 9 ans (2007 à 2015). La performance sociale des entreprises est évaluée à partir d’un score composé de deux dimensions sociale et environnementale. Nous trouvons un lien négatif entre la RSE et la gestion du résultat. Les résultats empiriques confirment l’hypothèse selon laquelle les entreprises cotées socialement responsables sont moins susceptibles de s’engager dans la gestion du résultat en Europe. Ces résultats valent à la fois pour la dimension sociale et la dimension environnementale de la performance sociale.
... Such adverse consequences of inequity can be mitigated by a public policy mandating the disclosure of financial information. Posner (1974) discussed the practice of regulation and regulatory behaviour. Two major competing theories were identified: public interest and capture theories. ...
... The final version of the act approved by the government was even less onerous than the This provides an interesting example of how regulation could be subverted by pressure and influence groups in protecting the interests of those subject to regulation (Ogus, 1994;Posner, 1974). In this case, the prospective management had tried to neutralise the role of religious scholars in the bank, so the management could set the practices that most suited its objectives. ...
Thesis
p>This thesis studies the accounting and reporting practices of Islamic banking in Jordan. It aims to provide a set of explanations for different measurement and reporting policies in these banks, and to identify the role of religion, among other factors, that have affected the choices of accounting and reporting practices and regulations for Islamic banking. This includes the study of the effect of religion and secular factors on the perceptions of the need for special accounting practices, such as standards of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). The research was accomplished by undertaking an interpretative case study of the accounting and reporting practices of the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) over a period of 24 years; JIB has constituted Islamic banking in Jordan for most of the period covered in this study. It was found that religious considerations highly affected the choice of accounting measurement rules and regulations at the establishment stage of JIB. However, it was found that at a later stage, governmental regulations and commonly accepted practices have had most obvious effects on the evolution of accounting and reporting. It is argued that being exposed to a high secular environment had a large effect on the accounting practices of JIB and the regulatory behaviour towards the bank. It is also argued that the adoption of AAOIFI standards in 2001 in Jordan was mainly the result of result of pressure within JIB to achieve its objectives, most importantly, presenting the Islamic status of the bank. However, the adoption of AAOIFI standards led to an enhanced level of disclosure by Islamic banks in Jordan. Regarding the need for special accounting practices, it is argued that Islamic religion affects the constructions of and perceptions about major transactions undertaken by JIB; however, for some transactions, as practised and perceived in JIB, this does not necessarily imply the need for different accounting treatments. Thus, conventional accounting standards such as International Accounting Standards would be relevant to deal with these transactions as practised and perceived in JIB. This is mainly due to highly secular effect on JIB practices. However, this is not to rule out the need for special accounting standards such as AAOIFI. It is argued that for some other transactions, AAOIFI standards are better able to deal with them in the way they are practised and perceived in JIB, and the adoption of these standards would reduce the agency problem associated with investment deposits in JIB.</p
... Regülasyonları iktisat literatüründe iktisadi ve sosyal olmak üzere iki grupta inceleyen; iktisadi, sosyal ve idari olmak üzere üç grupta inceleyen; idari yerine süreç regülasyonu olarak adlandırıp inceleyen çalışmalar mevcuttur. Devletin ülke ekonomisinin istikrarını sağlamak, piyasada ortaya çıkan dengesizlikleri gidermek gibi amaçlarla ekonomiye yaptığı her türlü düzenleyici önlemler ve müdahaleler olarak tanımlanabilen iktisadi (ya da ekonomik) regülasyonları Posner (1974) fiyatlar, piyasaya giriş-çıkış ve diğer iktisadi faaliyetler üzerine getirilen yasal ve idari kontroller olarak tanımlarken Hertog (1999) ise sosyo-ekonomik iktisadi hedeflere ulaşmak için yasal araçların kullanılması olarak ifade etmektedir. Sosyal regülasyon, "sağlık, güvenlik, çevre ve sosyal birliktelik gibi değerleri korumaya yönelik olarak yapılan düzenlemeler" dir (OECD, 1995: 7). ...
... Literatüre A. C. Pigou tarafından kazandırılan Kamu Yararı Teorisi, pozitif teori olarak normatif bir analiz şeklinde de adlandırılmaktadır. Kıt kaynakların hem bireysel hem de toplumsal açıdan en etkin şekilde tahsisini amaçlayan teori, temelde iki varsayıma dayanmaktadır: bu varsayımlardan ilki ekonomik piyasaların müdahale edilmediğinde kırılgan ve etkinlikten uzak bir çalışma eğiliminde olacağı iken ikincisi devletin uyguladığı regülasyonların neredeyse hiç maliyet gerektirmemesidir (Posner, 1974;Uslu ve Tufaner, 2015). Kamu Yararı Teorisi'ne göre regülasyon, piyasa dengesinin Pareto optimal 5 durumlara ulaşmayı engelleyen unsurlarını ortadan kaldırmak ve Pareto optimal duruma yakınlaşmasını sağlamak için ana kuramsal araç olarak hükümet emirlerinin rekabetin yerini açıkça alması durumu olarak tanımlanabilmektedir (Tokatlıoğlu, 2003a (Çevik ve Demir, 2005). ...
... For instance, prior literature has suggested that the public interest theory can explain the demand for accounting and auditing regulation (e.g. Posner, 1974). Under the public interest theory, regulators are benevolent in the sense of making decisions that are socially efficient (Gipper et al., 2013). ...
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This study examines how interest groups have reacted to the suggested increase in the audit exemption thresholds in Finland. The results suggest that the lobbying opponents objected to the increase because of the benefits gained from the auditing of financial statements. Considerable reliance is placed on the audited accounts of Finnish small firms in maintaining societal functionality. Hence, the results are supported by the public interest theory. In contrast, the comment letters that supported the increase highlighted the need to follow international trends. The findings of the lobbying behaviour suggest that the interest groups collected information and strategically transferred it to the ministry with the objective of influencing the regulatory outcome. To conclude, this study contributes to a more detailed understanding of the role that the key arguments both for and against the proposed regulatory change played in the case of increasing the audit exemption thresholds. Finally, this study joins existing lobbying literature and contributes to this stream of research by shedding light on the importance of the argumentation strategies used in the Finnish case.
... Para Lima (2015), essas falhas podem ocorrer por diversos fatores, dentre os quais, a exis- O debate norte-americano envolveu destacados autores, como Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1989), Sunstein (1987), Rose-Ackerman (1988) e Mashaw (1995), mostrando que a regulação econômica é um tema controverso, que pode trazer custos relevantes após sua implementação, dada a existência de falhas de governo, bem como de outros interesses envolvidos entre regulados, reguladores e demais membros da sociedade, afetados pelas medidas impostas. Assim, medidas tomadas pelos reguladores podem acabar favorecendo a concentração econômica e a rentabilidade de grandes players de uma determinada indústria, em detrimento da sociedade. ...
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O artigo objetiva identificar o papel da regulação governamental para a rentabilidade e a estrutura de mercado das instituições financeiras. Para tanto, são estimados modelos de dados em painel, envolvendo todos os bancos que operaram com carteira comercial entre 2000 e 2017. Os resultados apontam que as variáveis diretamente relacionadas à regulação não são estatisticamente significati-vas para o desempenho bancário. Nesse contexto, revelam-se significativas para a rentabilidade ban-cária as variáveis relacionadas à concentração bancária e à eficiência das firmas do setor. Em relação à estrutura de mercado, as variáveis relacionadas à regulação, como a "participação do volume de crédito direcionado" e "as regulações relevantes", com potencial para geração de barreiras à entrada, são estatisticamente significativas, impactando positivamente os níveis de concentração do setor. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que, apesar de não afetar diretamente a rentabilidade do setor, a regulação interfere indiretamente nesse aspecto, ao contribuir para maior concentração do mercado.
... The public interest theory of regulatory reforms has two main philosophies. The first, embraced by Stigler [18] and Posner [19] explains that regulation aims at the protection and benefit of the public as a whole. The second, established by subsequent academics, defines it as a framework of ideas which suggests that economic regulation should be imposed to maximize social welfare when the market fails. ...
... Diffuse interests have therefore traditionally been considered as politically weak. Olson's view was echoed in the Chicago School "capture" theories of regulation and applied to regulatory behavior by Stigler (1971), Posner (1974) and Peltzman (1989) who argued that interests of small groups (producer groups) consistently prevail over interests of large groups (consumers as voters) with more diffuse interests. ...
Thesis
The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2008. Policymakers in the EU and the US set ambitious reform efforts in motion to better protect consumers of financial services. Decisions to reform credit regulations marked the end of highly politicized reform debates in the US Congress as well as in the European Parliament, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of reforms would normally have been considered to be much weaker than their opponents. Paradoxically, a poorly-resourced civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent regulatory change. What, then, explains that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors?
... Since the introduction of incentive-based regulation in the UK and other countries, the portfolio of regulatory mechanisms has expanded, and while the initial 8 Many references concerning the traditional approach to regulation and also its more recent evolution are available; see, among the many: Joskow (1974), Posner (1974), Braeutigam (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), Armstrong and Sappington (2005), and Joskow (2006). 9 Thus in the UK, in the last phase of the transmission pricing review (2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012), the regulatory Authority took certain specific steps designed to acquire information. ...
... However, these analyses overlook the power dynamics of stakeholder intervention, which tend to produce outcomes significantly different from the optimal policy. This chapter analyzes the policy process of the Mexican pilot ETS relying on the literature of the political economy of regulation (Stigler 1971;Posner 1974Posner , 2013Grossman andHelpman 1994, 2001). Since Stigler's pioneering work, The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971), academics have used terms like "regulatory capture" to evidence that policies are more than a tool to resolve market failures and that, in fact, the policymaking process does not necessarily yield optimal results due to the influence of business groups that have high stakes in regulation and seek to create or maintain competitive advantages. ...
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In the area of international policy to mitigate climate change, the forest has been important in achieving the objectives of liable countries. The Emissions Trading System in New Zealand (NZ ETS) is the only case of an ETS integrating forestry as a mandatory actor. This is the result of prolonged political discussions and the characteristics of New Zealand forestry. Forest landowners are liable to surrender allowances for deforestation and can potentially receive allowances for the level of carbon sequestered. This scheme created new opportunities for forestry activities and impacted the decision-making trade-offs related to land-use changes. In Mexico, the implementation of an Emissions Trading System in 2020 is evidence of the country’s commitment to controlling domestic emissions under the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, for now, the forestry sector is not involved as a liable actor. It is possible to envision the integration of the forest sector because of the extensive forest cover in the country, which provides a livelihood for a large part of the population. Mexico has the experience and institutional framework to integrate forestry into national emission accounting and carbon forest projects in the voluntary market. The potential impacts of this integration are both positive and negative. Environmental impacts are positive because forest areas can help mitigate emissions, but intensive carbon farming disrupts native forests and biodiversity. The economic impacts would be highly favorable for forest landowners if market volatility were controlled, but there is a potential loss of public revenue for the State. Finally, carbon forestry has the potential to cause conflict between economic sectors involved in land use and among participating communities.
... Não obstante, os governantes que controlam a política regulatória podem tomar decisões de acordo com interesses comerciais ou políticos que bene ciem grupos que dominam o setor industrial daquela agência reguladora, e dessa forma, não priorizar o interesse público (Peltzman, 1976). Nesse contexto, o Estado possui poder coercitivo para alocar recursos, além de efetuar a regulação econômica e de policiar cartéis em diversos setores da economia (Posner, 1974). Assim, conforme Bagnoli (2011) "A importância da regulação como forma do Estado intervir no âmbito econômico para promover os valores sociais, estaria relacionada com a evolução e transformação do Estado de Bem Estar Social para um Estado Regulador" (p. ...
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The study takes an economic, political and institutional approach to oil and gas exploration and production in Brazil from the precursor explorations that took place in the Brasil Império to the discovery of pre-salt layer. The conjunction of three recent episodes (the severe economic recession of 2015-16, the fall in oil prices and Operation Lava-Jato) have produced serious instabilities in the oil sector. However, changes in the regulatory framework since 2018 and the reduction of the State’s presence in the economy leveraged investments in the sector that will contribute to finance the country’s economic growth. Also, the oil sector in Brazil still has a lot to grow, since less than 5% of the sedimentary area is contracted.
... Based on the economic theories of regulation, government intervention via regulation and supervision is predicted to provide two conflicting outcomes (Posner, 1974;Barth et al., 2006;2013). Beck et al. (2006) discussed official supervision under two alternative theories: Public Interest and Private Interest hypotheses. ...
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The recurring crises have evidenced poor liquidity risk management and ineffective regulation in banking. Consequently, banking regulations have undergone continuous reforms to bolster stability in the banking system. Nonetheless, theoretical and empirical evidence provide conflicting results that warrant comprehensive research, particularly for emerging Islamic banking. This study examines the role of banking regulation on the liquidity risk of 245 conventional banks and 68 Islamic banks from selected 14 Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) from 2000 to 2017 utilising the dynamic panel GMM (generalized method of moments) technique. We measure liquidity risk using the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and the total financing-to-total deposits and short-term funding (LDEP). Meanwhile, the regulatory measures are asset restriction (AR), private monitoring (PM), supervisory power (SP) and capital requirements (CR). The findings suggest that regulation has a limited impact on bank liquidity risk. The CR supports the value creation of regulation through the reduction in banks’ liquidity risks, while PM and SP are agency costs of regulation that lead to higher liquidity risks. The impact of CR is lower on liquidity risk in Islamic banking than conventional ones, probably due to limited Islamic liquidity risk management facilities. Thus, regulators should strengthen Islamic liquidity risk instruments and markets to facilitate Islamic banking growth.
... Folge ist die Ablehnung jedweder Form von Regulierung im Sinne des Gemeinwohls. Selbst die Regulierung, die zur Korrektur negativer externer Effekte -wie die Regulierung von Umwelt-und Verbraucherschutz oder Lebensmittelsicherheit -erdacht wurde, wird schnell vereitelt, um Partikularinteressen zu dienen (Stigler 1971;Posner 1974;Peltzman 1976). Daher ist die Vorstellung von einer guten Regulierung sinnlos oder um William Niskanen zu zitieren: "Good regulation is no regulation." 1 Wenn also Politiker nicht durch private Interessen aufgehalten werden, dann werden eigennützige Bürokraten von ihnen gefangen genommen. ...
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Die Regulierungstheorie kreist um zwei Fragen: Welche Rolle spielen die betroffenen Interessengruppen in der regulativen Politik und der Regulierungsverwaltung und inwieweit wägt die Regulierungsverwaltung zwischen dem Interesse des Gemeinwohls und den regulierten Interessen innerhalb des privaten Sektors ab? Dieser Artikel vergleicht drei Theorien – die klassische Public Interest-Theorie, die Capture-Theorie und die moderne Credible Commitment-Theorie. Die ihnen zugrundeliegende Logik und Annahmen werden herausgearbeitet und die empirische Reichweite jeder Theorie aufgezeigt. Zu guter Letzt wird noch auf der Grundlage bestehender Untersuchungen herausgearbeitet, ob es Belege für diese Theorien gibt. Der Artikel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass alle höchstrelevante Themen angehen, allerdings in einem stark politisierten Umfeld. Interessant ist die Beobachtung, dass diese Politisierung Veränderungen und Reformen zwar nicht im Wege gestanden ist. Das Veränderungsmuster ist jedoch nicht den Mustern gefolgt, die von der Capture- und Credible Commitment-Theorie vorgeschlagen wurden. Dieser Artikel trägt daher zur Rehabilitierung der klassischen Public Interest-Theorie bei, wenn auch in einer moderaten und verbesserten Form.
... 375-80) criticize it being a hypothesis or statement about empirical regularities rather than a theory. Both theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that regulation is not positively correlated with existence of externalities or monopoly (Posner 1974). Instead, the empirical evidence tends to support that regulation is in favor of producers rather than consumers. ...
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Based on Becker, Kane, Niskanen, and Peltzman's ideas, we develop a model to explain why deposit insurance is adopted even though policymakers are aware of its pitfalls in both theory and practice. In our model, the regulator acts as both a bureaucrat and an entrepreneur to maximize his self-interest through administering a deposit insurance scheme. The theory postulates that adoption of deposit insurance is more likely under the following conditions: the scheme is (i) publicly administered and (ii) privately funded, with (iii) non-risk rated insurance premium and (iv) compulsory membership; and there is (v) a larger deposit market with (vi) at least two groups of banks (good vs. bad), (vii) lower government ownership of banks, and (viii) higher economic freedom, such that one group exerts its political influence and gains from deposit insurance. Empirically our theory is supported by the stylized facts, crosscountry binary-choice regression results and a case study of Canada.
... Por su lado, los teóricos de la elección pública de Virginia critican a los teóricos de Chicago por su desconsideración de las ineficiencias de la regulación. En contrapartida, los marxistas entienden que la regulación económica no se trata de interés público, si no que se trata de un proceso por el cual grupos de interés buscan promocionar sus intereses (privados), asumiendo varias formas distintas (Posner, 1974). ...
... Por su lado, los teóricos de la elección pública de Virginia critican a los teóricos de Chicago por su desconsideración de las ineficiencias de la regulación. En contrapartida, los marxistas entienden que la regulación económica no se trata de interés público, si no que se trata de un proceso por el cual grupos de interés buscan promocionar sus intereses (privados), asumiendo varias formas distintas (Posner, 1974). ...
... Por su lado, los teóricos de la elección pública de Virginia critican a los teóricos de Chicago por su desconsideración de las ineficiencias de la regulación. En contrapartida, los marxistas entienden que la regulación económica no se trata de interés público, si no que se trata de un proceso por el cual grupos de interés buscan promocionar sus intereses (privados), asumiendo varias formas distintas (Posner, 1974). ...
... Alternatively, strategic allocation could be a response to lobbying on the part of special interest groups or other agglomerations of voters. There is an enormous amount of literature on the role of special interest groups, lobbying, and regulatory capture (see, for instance, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005;Becker and Stigler, 1974;Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003;Grossman and Helpman 2001;Leung et al, 2006;Peltzman, 1976;Posner, 1974, Stigler, 1971). ...
Article
This paper tests for evidence of political manipulation in the allocation of subsidized mortgage loans in Mexico during the 1990’s. First, I develop a baseline model of loan allocation across states as a function of housing need, eligibility for lending programs, and administrative capacity to deliver housing. Then, I add measures of political competitiveness to the model. Empirical results suggest that the two largest lenders generally allocated loans according to their eligibility criteria, granting more loans to states with more income- and employment-eligible households and poorer quality housing. Tests for political manipulation suggest that more loans were, in fact, granted in federal election years and in states where the ruling party did not perform well in the previous election. However, the numbers lack statistical significance. As a result, it can be assumed that political motivation played a relatively small role in the allocation of loans.
... 1 Within public administration scholarship, such private interest perspectives (and the related economic theory of regulation (Posner, 1974)) are often included in public choice theory (Mueller, 2003), and the overlap with the public choice perspectives on regulation discussed above is obvious. However, 'regulatory capture' is such a dominant explanatory mechanism in the regulatory governance literature that I deal with it here as a difference in kind rather than a difference in degree. 2 Of course, small coalitions of opponents can also join forces, as is, for instance, explained by the 'bootleggers and baptists' theory, which builds on repeated observations of regulatory opposition by a group or groups that disputes the purpose or aim of, or need for, a regulatory intervention and is supported by a group or groups that will profit from that regulatory intervention not being introduced (Yandle, 2011). ...
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How much politics goes into the development, implementation, evaluation, and reform of regulation? This question has been at the forefront of regulatory scholarship for over four decades. The current chapter maps how scholars of public administration in general and regulatory scholars in particular have theorized the politics of regulation. It first reflects on three of the major theories about the need for regulation: economic perspectives, public interest perspectives, and institutional perspectives. In the slipstream of these theories, regulatory models have for long build on the understanding that either deterrence, intrinsic motivations, or information provision are the best way to achieve compliance with regulation. The second part of the chapter engages with more recent regulatory reforms. These have begun to mix incentives (resulting in models such as Responsive Regulation and Smart Regulation) and have started to embrace insights from behavioural economics (resulting in models such as Nudging). This all to develop regulatory interventions that are more tailored to the characteristics of the individuals and organizations they target. Recent regulatory reforms have also begun to embrace non-governmental individuals and organizations as essential parts of regulatory regimes (resulting in theorizing on co-regulation and regulatory intermediaries), as well as question the need for a (politics of) regulation of regulation (resulting in theorizing on agencification, meta-regulation, and regulatory stewardship).
... On the other hand, unlike these two theories the economic regulation theory (Entrenchment hypothesis) deliberate that the leader has an dynamic behavior. Therefore, this theory stems from the reflection that monitoring mechanisms and incentives are not always the optimal way to constrain the opportunistic behavior (Posner, 1974). Entrenchment hypothesis claim that leaders try to make their replacement costly for their firms which will provide them more discretion power. ...
Article
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This study emphasizes the substantial of researching the interaction effect of using executive compensation, audit quality and ownership concentration over the aggressive managerial behaviour in essentially unfamiliar, emerging market and non-Western. The study analyses data for a sample of 912 observations covered the non-financial firms listed in ASE during the period from 2009 until 2016. To afford indication on this topic, panel data analysis is used with taken into consideration conducting two models to determine the variable effects with and without the interaction effect. The robust results of the random effect logistic regression document that executive compensation of non-financial firms plays an effective role to alignment the interests of the contracting parties thus minimize aggressive practices of discretionary accruals. Firms with high level of executive compensations are engaged with high quality of financial reporting. Also, all audit quality parameters provide a negative association with Agg.EM. Thus, firms with high audit quality have low aggressive discretionary accruals practices. Regarding to the interaction effect, results also show that the monitoring role of external auditor services provided by Big4 firms is positively moderated in firms with high ownership concentration. This proves that the auditing firm type in firms with high concentration is unlikely to be effective. The findings indicate that the type of audit firms become as a legal fiction when the central agency problem is existed. While, the quality of auditing services with high fees or the auditor opinion unaffected by the majority of shareholders attitudes since the majority of shareholders avoid to selecting auditor who not agree with them.
... On the one hand, agents compete in the political arena, seeking to shape regulatory initiatives and to satisfy the interests of particular groups (a 'private interest approach' : Posner 1974;Stigler 1971); on the other hand, the overall budgeting process remains a 'public' process, aiming to satisfy the 'public interest' and meaning that it should lead governments to allocate resources efficiently and serve the entire society (a 'public interest approach'). It is essential for politicians to provide adequate services to citizens (the 'pressure of competition axiom'; Cohen, Bisogno, and Malkogianni 2019) and foster their engagement. ...
Article
This study investigates if and to what extent budget transparency is affected by e-government initiatives and e-participation. Using a sample of 97 countries for the years 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, and 2017, empirical find- ings showed that the hypothesized relationships do exist. These results suggest that interpreting budgeting in terms of mere compliance with laws and regulations is insufficient in the current digital era, and a public value framework is needed. Considering the different roles played by the budget, the accountability dimension seems vital for facilitating the greater involvement of citizens. Free, but limited number of downloads are available here: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/TEG5QTDYJWMVCMSF6WUN/full?target=10.1080/10967494.2022.2042437
... La théorie politico-contractuelle de la comptabilité, développée par Watts et Zimmerman (1978), propose un cadre explicatif à la gestion des résultats. Cette théorie repose, d'une part, sur le modèle positif d'agence introduit par Jensen et Meckling (1976), et d'autre part, sur la théorie de la réglementation (Posner, 1974). Selon Watts et Zimmerman, les choix comptables d'une entreprise s'expliquent par les relations d'agence (la relation dirigeant-actionnaire, par exemple) et la crainte de nouvelles réglementations (lois anti-trust, fiscalité…). ...
Thesis
Two decades after the publication of the first code of governance (CG) in France (report Viénot 1), public debate on the effectiveness and the content of CG remains a hot topic. The impact of the CG and the importance of the proposed recommendations by the publication of CG are widely treated internationally but empirical studies addressing the French context, does not provide enough answers to several fundamental questions related to the institutionalization of CG in France. These questions include the improvement of compliance with the Code over time, the impact of applying the comply or explain (AOE) principle established by DDAC low in 2008 on this compliance and the effect of the compliance with the code on managerial practices.Thus, in view to complete this gap in the literature and to participate in enriching the debate concerning the effectiveness of CG in the French context, we conducted this work which consists of three trials covering the 2006-2013 period and covering companies listed in the SBF 120. The main goals of our research are to study the evolution and the determinants of compliance with CG as well as the impact of compliance on two fundamental objectives of the CG development (quality of financial informations measured by the earnings management and financial performance).The results of the study show that the SBF 120 listed companies have strengthened their compliance with the code over time, particularly following the enforcement of DDAC low. In addition, our studies show many benefits of institutionalizing the CG in terms of quality of financial information measured by the earnings management and and economic performance.However, the CG institutionalization strategy in France which is supported by several influential economic agents as the AMF, the AFEP and MEDEF does not seem to successfully achieve the valorisation target by investors. In fact, inefficiency of some CG recommendations such as recommendations concerning executive compensation is disclosed in our study. Finally, these results led us to propose several ways to improve the content and the effectiveness of the French CG.
... In this paper, we study politics as a selection mechanism to assess the efficiency properties of political decision-making within democratic societies. In addition to Alchian (1950), we draw on the work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Posner (1974), Becker (1983), Tollison (1988 and Wittman (1989) by focusing on the role of interest groups and, in particular, the decisions of those groups to enter politics. For any policy that exists, potential groups of individuals have the option of entering the political sphere and bearing the cost of changing the policy. ...
Article
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Politics, like any social system, involves selection mechanisms. This paper presents a model of politics as an evolutionary process. Our model yields three main results. First, the political process selects for efficient policies in the long run. We call that attribute asymptotic efficiency. Second, bargaining amongst interest groups bounds the inefficiencies that can exist in the short run. Potential inefficiency declines when organizing interest groups becomes less costly. Finally, policies that appear to be inefficient in a static analysis can be efficient once economists consider the dynamic nature of political decisions. We argue that viewing the political process as a selection mechanism allows political economists to use efficiency as a criterion for positive economic analysis. In our approach, applied political economy involves looking for relevant costs that make the policy efficient. However, our approach does not rob political economists of the ability to make meaningful normative statements; it only constrains the type of statements made.
... A escola que ficou conhecida por reunir textos que geraram a chamada "teoria econômica da regulação", estabelece como hipótese central que políticos são agentes racionais, e que, portanto, buscam ampliar seu poder, beneficiando grupos de interesse (STIGLER, 1971;POSNER, 1974;PELTZMAN et al, 1989;FIANI, 2004). O termo captura tem sido associado a esta "escola" para conceituar estudos que analisam a relação entre agentes políticos e indústrias reguladas de forma a demonstrar que indústrias reguladas tem força (econômica e social) para exigir que agentes políticos estabeleçam políticas regulatórias favoráveis aos regulados. ...
Article
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Esse artigo avalia a relação entre o comportamento político e regulação econômica a partir da análise de saliência das proposições econômicas apresentadas no Congresso Nacional entre 1996-2020. Construímos um banco de dados original para analisar como os congressistas buscam regular setores do mercado econômico e quais os principais tipos de política regulatória adotados pelos congressistas. Os estudos sobre regulação têm crescido e ganhado lentes teóricas importantes para a análise crítica de tais fenômenos. A análise do impacto do comportamento político sobre resultados regulatórios ainda tem sido pouco estudada, embora o fenômeno seja frequentemente ressaltado. Nossos achados demonstram que o Congresso brasileiro ao longo de toda a redemocratização disputou basicamente dois eixos de política regulatória na área econômica: políticas de regulação fiscal e políticas de regulação de investimentos para aquecimento de demanda em setores privados (desenvolvimentista). Por outro lado, a temática de regulação local, que tem relação com setores específicos da economia demonstrou-se dispersa em partidos médios, o que denota que há pouco espaço institucional para esse tipo de regulação. ABSTRACT This article assesses the relationship between political behavior and economic regulation based on the salience analysis of the economic proposals presented at the National Congress between 1996-2020. We built an original database to analyze how Congressmen seek to regulate sectors of the economic market and what are the main types of regulatory policy adopted by Congressmen. Regulatory studies have grown and gained important theoretical lenses for the critical analysis of such phenomena. The analysis of the impact of political behavior on regulatory results has still been poorly studied, although the phenomenon is frequently highlighted. Our findings demonstrate that the Brazilian Congress throughout the entire re-democratization basically disputed two axes of regulatory policy in the economic area: fiscal regulation policies and investment regulation policies to increase demand in private sectors (developmentalist). These findings open space for a broad research agenda since the party in government and the way in which political competition is designed is very important to explain the country's regulatory framework. Palavras-chave: Regulação econômica; Comportamento político; Governança e regulação; Teoria da regulação. Análises de saliência.
... Fungsi regulasi merupakan fungsi pemerintahan tersendiri. Sebuah teori regulasi terkenal adalah yang dikembangkan oleh Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), dan Peltzman (1976). ...
Book
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Buku ini menarik karena ekonomi merupakan topik yang sangat dekat dengan kehidupan kita. Ekonomi berlaku pada semua individu, baik pada orang perorang atau pada perusahaan dan pemerintah. Ekonomi juga mengalami perubahan karena di pengaruhi oleh faktor budaya, hukum, sejarah, geografi, dan faktor-faktor lainnya dapat memberi dampak pada kondisi ekonomi pada suatu wilayah atau negara, maka tidak ada perekonomian yang sama di suatu negara dengan negara lainnya Semoga buku ini dapat menjadi acuan untuk pengembangan ilmu ekonomi di Indonesia Tidak ada gading yang tak retak. Maka mohon saran dan masukan. Diucapkan terimakasih pada fihak yang banyak mendukung terbitnya buku ini yaitu Yayasan kita Menuli
... Literatürde regülasyon üzerine yapılan ilk çalışmalar (Stigler & Friedland, 1962;Demsetz, 1968;Stigler, 1971;Posner, 1974;Peltzman, 1976), bir piyasa başarısızlığı olan doğal tekellere karşı uygulanabilecek regülasyonlar konusunda yapılmıştır. Bunun dışında Pigou (1922), Dahlman (1979), Bushee & Leuz (2005) vb. ...
Article
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ÖZET Piyasalar kendi haline bırakıldığında, her zaman düzgün çalışmayabilir ve o piyasadan beklenen amaçlar gerçekleşmeyebilir. Piyasa başarısızlığı anlamına gelen bu durum ise devletin ilgili piyasaya müdahalesini gerektirir. Devletler, son 50 yıllık dönemde piyasalara doğrudan müdahale etmek yerine, piyasaları regüle etmeyi tercih etmektedir. Devletler, genellikle stratejik öneme sahip olan sektörlerde regülasyon yapar. Sigorta sektörü de bu sektörlerden biridir. Otomobil sigortası, hayat sigortası branşından sonra sigorta sektöründeki en önemli branştır. Bu çalışmada, otomobil sigortasında son on yıllık dönemde yapılan regülasyonların sektöre etkisi incelenmiştir. Yapılan karşılaştırmalı analizlerden elde edilen bulgulara göre, yapılan regülasyonlar hem araç sahiplerini korumakta hem de sektördeki kârlılık oranlarına olumlu katkı sağlamaktadır. ABSTRACT When the markets are left to themselves, they may not always function correctly, and the objectives expected from that market may not be realized. This situation requires the state's intervention in the relevant market, which means market failure. States prefer to regulate the markets instead of directly intervening in the markets in the last 50 years. States often regulate sectors of strategic importance. The insurance sector is one of these sectors. After the life insurance branch, automobile insurance is the most critical branch in the insurance sector. This study examined the effects of the regulations made in the last ten years in automobile insurance on the sector. According to the findings obtained from the comparative analysis, the regulations made both protect automobile owners and contribute positively to the profitability rates in the sector.
... Ainda segundo a Almeida e França (2021), a literatura analisa a teoria da regulação sobre três aspectos: (i) Teoria do Interesse Público (TIP): sob a ótica da TIP, a regulação é positiva, pois enfrenta as falhas de mercado e tem como princípio o interesse público; (ii) Teoria da Captura: tem uma visão negativa da regulação, segundo Kothari et al. (2010) a teoria coloca os reguladores como maximizadores de sua utilidade, envolvendo acordos políticos que nem sempre visam o interesse público, devendo, assim, ser comparado o custo do possível oportunismo do regulador com o custo da falha do mercado para analisar a conveniência da regulação; (iii) Teoria Econômica: é um equilíbrio entre a TIP e a teoria da captura, colocando que a ideologia política interfere na forma de regular, portanto, também como a pressão de diversos grupos de interesse. Posner (1974) coloca que diante da teoria econômica a regulação pode ser vista como um bem econômico, o qual é gerida pela lei da oferta e da demanda. A teoria da regulação é importante nesse trabalho, pois contribuiu para entender, de acordo com a regulamentação pela Instrução da CVM n° 588 de 13 de julho de 2017, como o regulador atende ao interesse público como defendido na TIP ou se é possível visualizar a presença de fatores que tendem a favorecer um grupo em detrimento de outro como preconizado pela teoria econômica. ...
Conference Paper
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O Crowdfunding é uma modalidade de financiamento que tem crescido muito no Brasil, sendo praticado em todo mundo nas modalidades como: doação, recompensa, empréstimo e investimento. A finalidade das campanhas podem ser diversas, desde ajudar com doações, apoiar um artista ou até mesmo investir em empresas inovadoras. O objetivo dessa pesquisa é analisar a regulação do mercado de Crowdfunding de investimento no Brasil quanto ao alinhamento do interesse público. Ante isso, a metodologia do estudo se inspirou na técnica de análise de conteúdo, assim, foram utilizadas categorias a priori de fatores que influenciam no sucesso das campanhas de Crowdfunding, procurando verificar a observância desses fatores na Instrução da CVM n° 588 de 13 de julho de 2017. Com isso, utilizando como subsídio teórico a Teoria da Agência e a Teoria da Regulação Contábil, verificou-se que a regulação do setor tem atendido ao interesse público. Essa conclusão se baseia tendo em vista a norma abranger a maior parte dos fatores que influenciam no sucesso das campanhas; ao trazer maior segurança ao investidor pela presença de atributos que podem evitar relevantes falhas de mercado e ao diminuir o conflito entre os agentes por reduzir a assimetria informacional e favorecer a comunicação entre investidores e a empresa. Apesar disso, verifica-se limitações na norma, como na categoria de "Liquidez", visto que ainda não se tem um mercado secundário regulamentado para se negociar os valores mobiliários de investimentos por Crowdfunding, sendo isso um fator negativo para os investidores. Palavras-chave: Crowdfunding. Regulação. CVM. Investimento. Financiamento Coletivo.
... Public interest theory is developed within the field of public policy and originates from economics. It states that government intervention is a response to public demand for regulation and posits that regulation is in the public interest (Posner, 1974). Under this theory, regulation is demanded by governments, agencies, and other regulatory bodies that have the power to compel it, in order to protect the public at large (Stigler, 1971). ...
Article
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Nonprofit accountability research has garnered much attention in recent years, greatly expanding our understanding of the field. Yet, this focus has resulted in a complex and oftentimes fragmented body of research, which has made it difficult to navigate and effectively study nonprofit accountability. To address this concern, this article uses characteristics of accountability and articulates the dynamic interaction between the various accountability dichotomies found in the literature through a theory-based typology. In summary, this article argues that a narrow conception of accountability, focused on resource dependence, public interest and agency theories, can be seen as a functional process (“how”) to meet the imposed requirements (“for what”) of upward principals (“to whom”). In contrast, a broad conception of accountability, focused on stewardship, democratic, and stakeholder theories, can be seen as a strategic process (“how”) to provide information that is based on felt responsibility (“for what”) to downward stakeholders (“to whom”).
... Economic regulation is defined by a standard and applies to a whole range of issues relating to the conduct of business. It includes control over various aspects of the business [29]. Economic regulation includes the policies of the regulator in which it uses policy instruments. ...
Article
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The research problem addressed in this article concerns the formation of a business model in an energy company as a consequence of the European Green Deal. The paper seeks answers to three questions: (1) What is the significance of the European Green Deal for the business model of the examined energy company? (2) Which elements of the business model of the studied energy company take the form of sustainable ones? (3) In what direction is the business model of the analysed energy company evolving? The subject of the study is the business model of the Tauron Capital Group. The business model is analysed in the context of the requirements for climate protection formulated in the European Green Deal. A single case study was used. As a result of the study, two research statements were adopted: (1) Economic regulations in the area of the European Green Deal lead to changes in the business model of the examined energy company. (2) The examined energy company through the implementation of sustainable business practices aims to achieve sustainable production. The current activities of the Tauron Capital Group are focused on improving energy efficiency, circular economy principles and renewable energy sources.
... • Umidade relativa do ar média; e (33), a temperatura no início da ponta (18h), considerando que ≫ , é dada por (34). ...
Thesis
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The thesis presents a model of dinamic and locational distribution tariffs, applied to distributed energy resources.
... The rules may be stipulated by a contract or legislation [38,39]. Theory of economic regulation postulates that institutional oversight could remedy this market failure through the imposition of rules backed by penalties (or rewards) to modify the behaviour of actors in the industry [40]. The regulator is charged to balance the interest of all market participants, safeguarding the high sunk costs of investors, and protecting consumers from monopoly exploitation. ...
Article
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Electricity sector reforms have transformed the structure and organization of the sector worldwide. While outcomes of reforms in developed and developing countries have been extensively examined, there is limited analysis of the reforms in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This paper analyses the performance of electricity sector reforms in 37 SSA countries between 2000 and 2017. We use a stochastic frontier analysis approach to estimate a multi-input multi-output distance function to assess the impact of reform steps and institutional features on indicators of investment and technical efficiency. Results indicate a positive correlation between reforms and installed generation capacity per capita, plant load factor, and technical network losses. The presence of an electricity law, sector regulator, vertical unbundling, and private participation in the management of assets were positively correlated with reform performance. Perceptions of non-violent institutional features such as corruption, regulatory quality and governance effectiveness do not seem to have had a significant effect, but perceptions of political stability, violence, and terrorism influenced reform outcomes. We conclude that a workable reform in SSA involves vertical unbundling with an electricity law, a regulator, and private ownership and management of assets where feasible. However, positive outcomes go hand in hand with higher technical network energy losses which indicates higher investment in the generation segment than in the network segment. Hence, emphasis should be placed on decoupling the energy losses from power generation.
... Fungsi regulasi merupakan fungsi pemerintahan tersendiri. Sebuah teori regulasi terkenal adalah yang dikembangkan oleh Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), dan Peltzman (1976). ...
Book
Buku ini menarik karena ekonomi merupakan topik yang sangat dekat dengan kehidupan kita. Ekonomi berlaku pada semua individu, baik pada orang perorang atau pada perusahaan dan pemerintah. Ekonomi juga mengalami perubahan karena di pengaruhi oleh faktor budaya, hukum, sejarah, geografi, dan faktor-faktor lainnya dapat memberi dampak pada kondisi ekonomi pada suatu wilayah atau negara, maka tidak ada perekonomian yang sama di suatu negara dengan negara lainnya. Secara lengkap buku ini membahas: Bab 1 Pengertian dan Fungsi Ekonomi Bab 2 Peran Pemerintah Dalam Bidang Ekonomi Bab 3 Konsep Permintaan dan Penawaran Bab 4 Konsep Elastisitas Bab 5 Perilaku Konsumen, Produsen, Dan Efisiensi Pasar Bab 6 Keseimbangan Perusahaan Bab 7 Konsep Biaya Produksi Bab 8 Struktur Pasar Bab 9 Pendapatan Nasional Bab 10 Ekonomi Pembangunan Bab 11 Uang dan Lembaga Keuangan Bab 12 Bank Sentral, Kebijakan Moneter, dan Kebijakan Fiskal Bab 13 Nilai Tukar Bab 14 Pengangguran dan Inflasi Bab 15 Pertumbuhan Ekonomi dan Konsep Ekonomi Digital
Chapter
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This chapter deals with a fact that has been largely neglected up to this point: the insurance industry is one of the most tightly regulated. The arguments proffered for justifying this regulation are reviewed in Sect. 9.1, which also introduces the distinction between two types of insurance regulation. Section 9.2 outlines three theories of regulation designed to explain the changing intensity of insurance regulation and some of its consequences. Empirical evidence regarding the effects of regulation on the industry and consumers is presented in Sect. 9.3. Finally, Sect. 9.4 contains a discussion of recent trends in insurance regulation.
Article
Purpose In this paper, the authors examine the association between the banking regulatory regime and the quality of bank earnings. We further investigate whether the banking agency regulatory characteristics moderate the association between banking regulation and earnings quality. Design/methodology/approach Using panel data spanning 29 years over the period 1991 to 2019, the authors model bank earnings quality as a function of scores for banking regulation for 170 banks in the East African region using both the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation methods. Findings The results, which are robust for endogeneity among other checks, reveal a positive impact of bank regulatory mechanisms on the quality of bank earnings. The authors further establish differential impact of specific regulatory mechanisms, with some contributing positively toward earnings management while others contributing negatively toward earnings management. The differential impacts of banking regulation on earnings quality are also manifested in the country-level analyses. Research limitations/implications First, the study utilises a mix of bank-specific, country-specific as well as economy-specific variables in one dataset. Second, the authors utilise survey-based data using the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys (BRSS) for the periods 1999 to 2019. The authors assume that the bank regulatory mechanisms in place pre-1999 are close to the mechanisms in place as per the 1999 BRSS. Given limitations in data availability, the authors are not able to control for banks engaging in multiple activities such as insurance, underwriting of securities, FinTechs, among others. Practical implications The results are useful in bridging the gap between theory and practice regarding the expected effect of strict banking regulations on the quality of earnings in Eastern African Banks. For the positive impact of banking regulation on bank earnings quality to be felt, the institutional, social and environmental specificities of the five selected countries need to be adequately developed and taken into consideration. Originality/value This study is perhaps the first to utilise a large dataset of commercial banks from countries in a developing region characterised by relatively lower enforcement and dynamism in the banking regulation. Further, in-depth studies on the association between banking regulation and earnings quality remain sparse.
Article
Credible commitments are the most important condition for contracts sustainability. The effects and ways of ensuring the commitments credibility are discussed in the new institutional economics and game theory. At the same time, there is a number of unresolved issues related to the microeconomic aspects of obligations’ reliability in contracts regarding specific resources. The article delves into various approaches to determining credible commitments in contractual relations at the micro level in the context of bilateral (multilateral) opportunism. The methodological basis of the study is the transaction costs economics. The paper shows the limitations of the compensation approach in modeling credible liabilities and explains the importance of relational credible commitments for ensuring sustainability and effectiveness of contracts. The author proposes an extended model of hostages in contracts using specific resources as a way of solving the “ugly princess” problem. Based on the specification of the temporal structure of contracting, we develop a game-theoretic model that takes into account the possibilities of opportunism on the part of both the pledger and the pledgee as an investor in specific assets. The study demonstrates the consequences of the wrong hostage chosen, as well as the characteristics of the interaction equilibrium due to the correct choice of it with an indication of the residual opportunism problem. The research provides a rationale why the promisee and the potential purchaser of full rights to an asset acting as a hostage are not always the same actor. The approaches to dealing with credible commitments in the context of renegotiations and multilateral contracts are outlined. The research results can serve as a basis for designing contracts requiring reciprocal collateral.
Thesis
Cette thèse analyse la production de la réglementation financière dans l’Union européenne aprèsla crise de 2007-2008. Elle repose sur une étude globale des réformes financières introduites dans l’UE entremars 2009 et novembre 2014 (n=51), ainsi que sur deux études de cas portant sur la proposition de taxe surles transactions financières (TTF) et la proposition de réforme structurelle du secteur bancaire. Notre thèsemontre que la crise financière mondiale n’a pas conduit, à l’échelle européenne, à une remise en cause dunéolibéralisme réglementaire. On observe cependant, dans les différentes réformes étudiées, undéplacement de l’approche réglementaire anglo-saxonne, favorable à l’autorégulation du secteur financier,vers une approche ordolibérale reposant notamment sur des exigences de transparence et de gouvernanceafin d’assurer des conditions « saines » de concurrence. La crise a par ailleurs conduit à la mise à l’agenda dedeux mesures de rupture, la TTF et la séparation des activités bancaires. Notre recherche met cependant enévidence le pouvoir structurel mobilisé par les grandes banques universelles afin d’obtenir l’abandon ou lamise en suspens des deux mesures. Ce pouvoir structurel est fondé institutionnellement à l’échelleeuropéenne et à l’échelle nationale.
Article
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Recently welfare economists and international political economy scholars have increasingly discussed how the corporations seek profits by corroding policies that tackle tax avoidance and undermine public interest. This article contributes to these discussions on so-called regulatory captures in the global wealth chains by providing a comprehensive case study on anti-tax avoidance legislative processes in Finland. The author analyzes the statements that various stakeholders provided during several phases of enacting the interest deduction limitation rule that targets so-called thin capitalization arrangements. Because of this specific research material, the author is able to undertake a nuanced analysis in describing how and whose statements made the difference from the draft version of legislation to the final wording of the law. The evidence suggests corporate interest groups and tax advisory firms influenced the content of the rule as notable tax base eroding loopholes have been included in the Finnish anti-tax avoidance rule. The author also assesses remedies of regulatory captures.
Chapter
The chapter examines the multiplicity of contemporary management ideas and public sector reform initiatives and movements at the national level in Westminster polities over the latter part of the twentieth century and the early part of the twenty-first century to determine their impact on, and what might constitute, public administration in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The polities covered are the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, New Zealand (NZ) and Australia. The reforms cover the period from the beginning of the adoption of a new public sector management paradigm in the early 1980s up until 2010.
Article
The economic crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic prompted governments to issue several relief mechanisms to hold up companies and workers. This study analyzes how accounting information and regulation can support policymakers in the wake of a systemic crisis. Based on an accounting-based framework and readily available data from financial statements, it forecasts the impact of the crisis in terms of losses, equity depletion, and corporate defaults, absent government intervention. Next, it quantifies the costs and effects of five relief mechanisms in alleviating the risk of generalized corporate bankruptcies. The effects of the health pandemic and relief mechanisms on profitability and equity shortfalls are estimated for a sample of 586,076 privately held Italian firms. The findings indicate that the number of companies facing bankruptcy risk would increase from 65,463 (11% of the population) in 2019 to 153,681 (26%) in 2020, absent any government intervention. Altogether, these firms employ 1.4 million employees and have a total exposure to the financial industry equal to € 68 billion in loans. Next, we assess the effects of relief mechanisms introduced by the Italian government to support corporations, whose aggregate costs reach € 49.33 billion in 2020, and find that the interventions ‘rescue’ about 43,000 firms otherwise in default. Finally, the study adds to the debate on the role of accounting regulation in the wake of a systemic crisis by (a) discussing the effects of temporary changes to accounting rules on the informativeness and transparency of financial statements, and (b) suggesting alternative ways to modify accounting rules to safeguard corporate survival without compromising the informativeness of financial statements once the crisis reaches a halt.
Book
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Canada ranks highly among the developed countries that have provided government support to the fossil fuel sector, but this situation is changing. To address the climate emergency, Canada has legally committed to achieving net-zero carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050. How our federal, provincial, and territorial governments spend public dollars to meet this net-zero target is critically important as Canada finances its recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. This report serves as a source of information to guide Canadian policymakers, business leaders, pension fiduciaries, and civil society members in their efforts to align fossil fuel subsidies with the country’s net-zero policy targets. It includes recent information on our government’s international policy commitments at the United Nations sponsored Twenty-Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP 26) that held from October to November 2021, federal ministerial mandates in December 2021 and other national responses as of February 2022 and forecasts other implications in Canada. The author finds that Canada has federal, provincial, and territorial subsidies, but governments do not report enough data. However, based on recent data from governments and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the leading research organization analysing data on fossil fuel subsidies in Canada, there is a conservative estimate: the combined federal, provincial, and territorial fossil fuel subsidies in Canada total at least $4.8 billion annually in 2018 and 2019, and most were given by provincial and territorial governments. Federal subsidies tend to take the form of grants, but provincial and territorial subsidies are often from tax programs such as waivers and breaks as well as uncollected or under-collected resource rents or royalties. From the available data, we see some patterns of fossil fuel subsidies in Canada. The federal government gives more subsidies to producers than consumers to incentivize the extraction of fossil fuels and/or reduce their emissions, and some subsidies have recently shifted focus from exploration to infrastructure development for production and export of Canadian fuels abroad. Subsidies that reduce emissions make oil, gas, coal, and fossil fuel products less GHG intensive and/or expand natural gas production to reduce the reliance on oil. Many provincial and territorial governments give consumption subsidies, although provinces such as Alberta and British Columbia have significant production subsidies as well. Consumption subsidies include tax exemptions for the use of fossil fuels such as gasoline, coal, natural gas, diesel, and propane. Given Canada’s race to net-zero, these federal, provincial, and territorial subsidies now have more negative than positive implications for Canadian society. The report classifies and discusses four governance implications: government transparency, climate policy effectiveness, climate justice, and risk exposure. While government transparency and some aspects of climate policy effectiveness and climate justice are better known, the risk exposure of companies, investments and fiduciaries have hardly been acknowledged. The report contributes on these four implications. First, Canadian governments across levels do not report fossil fuel subsidies transparently to enable companies, financial institutions, and Canadian civil society members to adequately evaluate the costs and benefits. We do not fully understand how governments spend public dollars in subsidies. Second, some fossil fuel subsidies cause more global warming and climate change, while others aim to reduce GHG emissions by promoting the use of low-carbon technologies such as renewable energy, energy efficiency and, controversially, carbon capture and storage. Fossil fuel subsidies therefore have two major implications for climate policy: the impact on GHG emissions reduction and on the finance of low-carbon technologies. How fast and well Canada transitions is at stake. Third, fossil fuel subsidies disproportionately impact societal stakeholders that are most vulnerable to policies, corporate actions, and investment decisions in the fossil fuel industry. Canadian society, especially low-income people and communities who bear the consequences of the social externalities of subsidies, workers and communities relying on the fossil fuel economy, and Indigenous Peoples and communities suffering the consequences of oil extraction, are impacted. Fourth, businesses, investments and governments are increasingly exposed to risks in the race to net-zero. Government of Canada has signed the COP 26 Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition and the Glasgow Climate Pact. In doing so, Canada commits to ending new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022 and diverting funding to clean energy and phasing out some fossil fuel subsidies by 2023. Canadian developments to implement these latest policy commitments increase corporate and investment risk exposure, and governments can expect more litigation checking their policies and other actions. Given these far-reaching implications, the report offers extensive recommendations to support Canada’s fossil fuel subsidy reforms. Because governments have the most important role to play in reforming subsidies, most of the ideas seek to help them enhance information, promote policy targets, enable stakeholder evaluation, address vulnerabilities, and limit exposure to litigation risks. Governments at both federal and provincial/territorial levels should: adopt the Auditor General of Canada’s definition of subsidy for government direct and indirect support given to the fossil fuel industry, in line with international best practice; prepare and release detailed periodic inventories of subsidies, identifying those that are inefficient; provide information on subsidies supporting net-zero GHG emissions; report annually on risk management measures; review and revise tax, royalty and other legislation and policies relating to fossil fuel subsidies; and frame energy subsidies, including renewables and other sources to benefit from a shift from fossil fuel to alternative sustainable energy subsidies, with the concept of climate justice. The fossil fuel subsidy phase-out should specifically include collaboration at all levels of government to protect workers and communities dependent on the oil and gas sector by developing a pan-Canadian just transition program that retrains fossil fuel workers, integrates fossil fuel-dependent communities into new low-carbon economic activity, and partners with Indigenous Peoples in the transition to net-zero. These recommendations for governments can guide business involvement in Canadian policy, but the report also offers ideas for corporate and investment fiduciaries to mitigate their subsidy risk exposure in Canada’s transition. Corporate and investment fiduciaries should deliberate on the risks of fossil fuel subsidies and opportunities related to low-carbon transition through engagement, planning, disclosure processes, and risk management. Additionally, the report makes recommendations for civil society members, acknowledging how their actions could impact business, investment, and fiduciaries. Indigenous Peoples, fossil fuel workers, and other vulnerable groups have the immediate opportunity to question fossil fuel subsidies through engagement with governments and pension funds, climate litigation and, in the medium term, by orchestrating actions that support the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies.
Chapter
The chapter argues that the design of carbon pricing policies takes place as a sequential, negotiated process whereby specific constituencies have privileged access to shape policy design because they have high stakes in regulations. These groups, identified ex ante based on the political economy of regulation and a stakeholder approach, exhibit two characteristics: first, they are high-interest actors, as a change in the status quo would impose concentrated costs on them; second, they are high-power actors, since their resources and participation in the national economy make them a critical sector. Using theory-guided process tracing and the policy stages heuristics framework, the empirical analysis explores the policymaking process of the Mexican pilot emission trading system and discusses key features of its design.
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Although franchise chains are increasingly committed to environmental, social, and societal transitions, only a few researchers have focused on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the specific case of franchising. The aim of our paper is to discuss the specificities and challenges of CSR in franchising, explore how franchisors report on their sustainable practices, and emphasize subsequent directions for future research. In order to do so, we focus on the Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) practices of twenty-two retail and service franchisors operating in the French market where regulations of non-financial information disclosures exist for large companies. Our findings show that these franchisors disclose rich and diversified information about their CSR activities. However, franchisors’ disclosures can vary significantly, especially depending on their chain size and whether they are subject to reporting regulations. Our research contributes to the literature on CSR in franchise chains, as well as the practice.
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The rapid development of science and technology creates sharp conflicts between interest groups and government delays in regulation. This study explores how interest groups affect government delays in regulation, considering the influence of interest groups as a fundamental cause of conflicts related to new technology development. As an analytical frame, we adopted Robert Putnam (1988)'s two-level game model, which analyzes negotiations between countries in international politics. Using the Korean regulatory sandbox as a case study, we explored how interest groups affect government delays in regulation. The regulatory sandbox is designed to preemptively test new technology that existing laws and systems did not expect in the real market and improve regulatory measures based on the results. This research placed emphasis on shedding light on the mechanism of how interest groups influence inter-ministerial regulatory policy negotiations within governments, an area previously unexplored. Through this, the characteristics of inter-ministerial new technology in negotiations have been conceptualized into ten new propositions. Using these propositions, it was confirmed that negotiation outcomes were dictated by four typologies: ‘mutual cooperation’, ‘active acceptance for new technology’, ‘passive acceptance for new technology’, and ‘adversarial opposition type’.
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Platform businesses formed new types of economic activities based on information and communication technology. Although governments encourage these businesses, they create challenges in the economic environment that indicate a failure in the efficiency of market mechanism and economic laws, especially Competition Law. This study aims to clarify the effects of business platform features on the Competition law and its Authority. For this purpose, a selected list of (anti) competition cases in Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (Brics), and Iran has been selected based on a multi-case study. The results show five characteristics of platform businesses age, including a) two-sided markets and network effect b) access instead of ownership c) revenue model and pricing d) innovation in business model and new economic segmentation, and e) data, its ownership, and privacy affect the three instances of the cartel, abuse dominance, and merger principles; Such as new examples of horizontal contracts, hub role-playing, vertical contracts (cartel/collusion), self-preferences, discrimination, denial of access through gateways, exploitation, assimilation of goods and services and aggressive/predatory pricing (abuse dominance) and changing corporate turnover and market structure (Merger). Second, these characteristics affect how the relevant market is defined (relevant product and relevant geography) and recognize the apparent market power. In addition, this study highlights the importance of designing a competition law authority concerning the sectoral regulator.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended utilizing mobile money to minimize the transmission of the COVID-19 virus through contactless and cashless activities wherever feasible. The Bank of Zambia (BOZ) responded on March 30, 2020, with mitigating measures that allowed for the use of mobile money services to mitigate the pandemic's negative economic. The regulations sparked complaints from mobile money agents, who claimed that the implementation had harmed their business operations. The major goals of this study were to determine the extent of the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on Cairo Road's mobile money agents. An empirical evaluation was used to assess the pandemic's impact on the agent's business, which addressed the research gaps that this study attempted to fill. A targeted group of 148 agents on Cairo Road was surveyed using an exploratory method and structured closed ended questions. Primary data was collected via a structured survey that included nominal scale yes or no check boxes and a mix of responses on a Likert 5-point scale. The Taro Yamane statistical approach was used to calculate the sample size of 107 agents and to draw generalized inferences and conclusions for this population. For the 40 research questions in the questionnaire, a reliability analysis was performed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Descriptive statistical analysis was used to produce more meaningful data. Inference statistical analysis used a research hypothesis to test data to reach conclusions about the variable associations. The study found that the COVID-19 epidemic had a negative impact on the operations of mobile money agents on Cairo Road, where business was better before the pandemic. The decrease in business performance is attributed to the reduction on fees which also reduced the sales revenue which sustains business operations. The availability of float did not boost the number of customer base as customer transactions depended on the availability of cash as well. Some customers would prefer to wait for the agent to find float by borrowing from another agent whereas others would go to transact with another agent. There was more savings than spending done due to the uncertainties during the pandemic.
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Concluding a three-part paper, Judge Friendly turns his inquiry concerning the relationship of an agency's definitions of standards to its effectiveness in administering a congressional mandate upon the ICC's use of its power to set minimum rates. He charts the vacillating course taken by the Commission in utilizing the power, especially with respect to rivalries between different forms of transportation, and concludes that regulation of transport competition could have been substantially improved through better elaboration of the governing directives by the Commission, or, failing this, by Congress, Then, with the background of the case histories he has examined, the author advances proposals for improving the definitional process, analyzing in turn the roles of the agencies, the Chief Executive, and the Congress.
Book
An attempt is made in this book to effect a major change, rather than merely a marginal modification in the trend of current practice and thought on water-supply problems. Since publication of the first edition of this book in 1960, the authors have reexamined water developments in their two major case-study areas: New York City and southern California. The evaluations and recommendations of the authors from the original book are further discussed here in twelve chapters: The Water Problem; Our Water Resources; The Present Picture; The Economics of Utilization of Existing Water Supplies; Criticisms of Market Allocations; The Political Allocation Process; Municipal Water Rates; Investment in Additional Water Supplies; The Practical Logic of Investment Efficiency Calculations;Technological Features and Costs of Alternative Supplies of Water; Water Law: Government Discretion or Property Rights; New York's ''Water Crisis'': Case Study of a Crucial Decision; Water for Southern California: Case Study of an Arid Region; and Some Controversial Conclusions and Their Implications. (MCW)
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1972. Includes bibliographical references (p. 60-61). Microfilm.
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The 1962 drug amendments seek to prevent wasted expenditure stimulated by exaggerated claims for effectiveness of new drugs by requiring premarketing approval of all new drug claims by the Food and Drug Administration. The compliance costs are shown to have engendered a marked reduction in drug innovation. Consumer surplus analysis is then adapted and supplemented with "expert" drug evaluations to estimate the relevant benefits and costs. The main finding is that benefits forgone on effective new drugs exceed greatly the waste avoided on ineffective drugs. The estimated net impact is equivalent to a 5-10 percent tax on drug purchases.
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The development of cable television has been subjected to a comprehensive and complex array of federal, state, and local regulations; and many new proposals for regulation are being discussed. This paper attempts a critique of the emerging pattern of regulation. The author analyzes the major policy choices and concludes that only limited regulation can be justified. He proposes a new federal statute that would carefully delimit the respective roles of federal, state, and municipal regulators of cable television.
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The potential usex of public resources and powers to improve the economic stuius of economic groups (such as industries and occupations) are analyzed to provide a scheme of the demand for regulation. The characteristics of the political process which allow relatively small groups to obtain such regulation is then sketched lo provide elemenls of a theory of supply of regulation. A variety of empirical evidence and illustration is also presented. W The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries. That political juggernaut, the petroleum industry, is an immense consumer of political benefits, and simultaneously the underwriters of marine insurance have their more modest repast. The central tasks of the theory of economic regulation are to explain who will receive the
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Students of the regulated industries often assume that regulation is designed either to approximate the results of competition or to protect the regulated firms from competition. But neither view explains adequately a number of important phenomena of regulation and regulated industries. Foremost among them is the prevalence of "internal subsidies," whereby unremunerative services are provided, sometimes indefinitely, out of the profits from other services. To understand this phenomena, we must assign another important purpose to regulation: we can call it "taxation by regulation." The purpose of this paper is to explore the dimension of the regulatory process, to demonstrate that it explains some otherwise perplexing features of the process and the industries subject to it, and to compare it with other methods of public finance.
What Do Regulatory Commissions Maximize?" Unpub-lished manuscript
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ECKERT, R. D. "What Do Regulatory Commissions Maximize?" Unpub-lished manuscript, University of Southern California, 1972.
Public vs Private Ownership: Consequences and De-terminants of Local Transit Systems Unpublished manuscript, Uni-versity of Chicago Graduate School of Business
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PASHIGIAN, B. P. "Public vs. Private Ownership: Consequences and De-terminants of Local Transit Systems." Unpublished manuscript, Uni-versity of Chicago Graduate School of Business, October 1973.
The Oil Inmpor t Qles-tioli
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CABINET TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROL. The Oil Inmpor t Qles-tioli. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
Interest Groups in Administration
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LEISERSON, A. "Interest Groups in Administration" in F. Morstein Marx, ed., Elemenits of Putblic Administration, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946.
Intter-est Grouips in Anmer-ican Society
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ZIEGLER, H. Intter-est Grouips in Anmer-ican Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 358 / RICHARD A. POSNER This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:41:47 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
357 This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:41:47 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 43. AND FRIEDLAND, CWhat Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity
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THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION / 357 This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:41:47 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 43. AND FRIEDLAND, C. "What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity." Jolurnal of Lawv and Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (October 1962), pp. 1-16.
The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest Puiblic Adininistra-tion and Policy: Selected Essavs
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HUNTINGTON, S. P. "The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest" in P. Woll. ed., Puiblic Adininistra-tion and Policy: Selected Essavs, New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
The Behavior of Administrative AgenciesNatural Monopoly and Its RegulationOligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested ApproachReflections on Consumerism Regutlationi of Advertisin-g bv the FTCA Statistical Study of Antitrust EnforcementTaxation by Regulation
  • R A Posner
POSNER, R. A. "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry." The Bell Jouernlal of Economics anid Management Scietnce, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 98-129. 33.. "The Behavior of Administrative Agencies." Jouirnal of Legal Stutdies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1972). pp. 305-323. 34.. Economic Analvsis of Law. New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1973. 35.. "Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation." Staniford Law Review, Vol. 21 (February 1969), pp. 548-643. 36.. "Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach." Stanford Law Review, Vol. 21 (June 1969), pp. 1562-1575. 37.. "Reflections on Consumerism." Unliversity of Chiicago Law Schiool Records, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring 1973), pp. 19-25. 38.. Regutlationi of Advertisin-g bv the FTC. American Enterprise Institute, November 1973. 39.. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement." Jouernlal of Law anid Econtomics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (October 1970), pp. 365-419. 40.. "Taxation by Regulation." The Bell Jouirnial of Econiomics anid Managemenit Scienice, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1971), pp. 22-50.
Reguilatinig Buisiniess by I,idepenidenzt Co0inmission2. Prince-ton
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The Govermlinentt Process: Political lItterests and Piublic Opinion
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TRUMAN, D. B. The Govermlinentt Process: Political lItterests and Piublic Opinion. New York: Knopf, 1951.
Entry in Commercial Banking Jolurn-al of Lawt anid Eco-niomicsAn Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments
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PELTZMAN, S. "Entry in Commercial Banking." Jolurn-al of Lawt anid Eco-niomics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (October 1966), pp. 11-50. 31.. "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments." Joulrnlal of Political Econiomy, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September-October 1973), pp. 1049-1091.
The Politics of Regutlation
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WILSON, J. The Politics of Regutlation. Washington, D.C.: The Brook-ings Institution, forthcoming.
Puiblic Adtiniistrationi an1d the Public Interest
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HERRING, E. P. Puiblic Adtiniistrationi an1d the Public Interest. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936.
The Calculiis of Conisentt
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BUCHANAN, J. AND TULLOCK, G. The Calculiis of Conisentt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962.
Administrative Law Treatise (1958) and 1970 supplement thereto; Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards
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Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) and 1970 supplement thereto; Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards (1962).
The Politics of Regulation 8 (Brookings Institution, forthcoming)
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The Economic Effects of Regulation: The Trunk—Line Railroad Cartels and the Interstate Commerce Commission Before
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For an attempt to marshal empirical support for the theory see Jordan's article on producer protection, supra note 3. Stigler, it should be noted, builds on earlier work by economists on the political system See James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent The Logic of Collective Action
  • Jr
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Management Sd. 3 (1971). For an attempt to marshal empirical support for the theory see Jordan's article on producer protection, supra note 3. Stigler, it should be noted, builds on earlier work by economists on the political system See James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (1965).