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Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans
... This perspective resonates with recent work on partisanship in relation to the use of force (Rathbun 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009). A different line of reasoning centres on national legislatures and their authority in security policy. ...
... Schmidt 1996; Allan and Scruggs 2004). In recent years a number of studies have enlarged the scope of partisan influence analysis to the field of security studies, reporting systematic differences between left and right parties on substantive questions regarding the use of force (Palmer et al. 2004; Rathbun 2004; 2007; Schuster and Maier 2006; Arena and Palmer 2009). ...
... My conception of partisanship in security policy follows the approach suggested by Rathbun (2004), who distinguishes three substantive areas of divergence among ideal-typical parties of the left and the right. Accordingly, parties differ in their definitions and evaluations of (a) the national interest, (b) the appropriateness of military force, and (c) the role of multilateralism in international politics. ...
This paper seeks to identify sources of institutional and political variation among democracies to account for observable differences in conflict behavior. After briefly revisiting the debate on democracy and war, the paper provides a fuzzy-set analysis of thirty democracies’ military participation in the Iraq War. Prior studies have identified institutional and partisan differences as potential explanatory factors for the observed variance. The interaction of institutions and partisanship, however, has gone largely unobserved. I argue that these factors require to be analyzed in conjunction: institutional constraints presume actors that fulfil their role as veto players to the executive. Likewise, partisan politics is embedded in institutional frames that enable or constrain decision-making. Hence I suggest a comparative approach that combines these factors to explain why some democracies joined the ad hoc coalition against Iraq and others did not. To investigate the interaction between institutions, partisanship and war participation I apply fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The analysis reveals, for instance, that the conjunction of right-of-center governments with an absence of both parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions was sufficient for participation in the Iraq War. In turn, for countries in which the constitution requires parliamentary approval of military deployments, the distribution of preferences within the legislature proved to be decisive for military participation or nonparticipation.
... This perspective resonates with recent work on partisanship in relation to the use of force (Rathbun 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009). A different line of reasoning centres on national legislatures and their authority in security policy. ...
... Schmidt 1996; Allan and Scruggs 2004). In recent years a number of studies have enlarged the scope of partisan influence analysis to the field of security studies, reporting systematic differences between left and right parties on substantive questions regarding the use of force (Palmer et al. 2004; Rathbun 2004, 2007; Schuster and Maier 2006; Arena and Palmer 2009). Partisan arguments conceive of parties as 'policy-seekers' that aim to implement policy in line with their ideological preferences. ...
... My conception of partisanship in security policy follows the approach suggested by Rathbun (2004), who distinguishes three substantive areas of divergence among ideal-typical parties of the left and the right. Accordingly, parties differ in their definitions and evaluations of (a) the national interest, (b) the appropriateness of military force, and (c) the role of multilateralism in international politics. ...
This paper seeks to explain democracies’ military participation in the Iraq War. Prior studies have identified institutional and partisan differences as potential explanatory factors for the observed variance. The interaction of institutions and partisanship, however, has gone largely unobserved. I argue that these factors must be analysed in conjunction: institutional constraints presume actors that fulfil their role as veto players to the executive. Likewise, partisan politics is embedded in institutional frames that enable or constrain decision-making. Hence I suggest a comparative approach that combines these factors to explain why some democracies joined the ad hoc coalition against Iraq and others did not. To investigate the interaction between institutions, partisanship and war participation I apply fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The analysis reveals that the conjunction of right-of-centre governments with an absence of both parliamentary veto rights and constitutional restrictions was sufficient for participation in the Iraq War. In turn, for countries where the constitution requires parliamentary approval of military deployments, the distribution of preferences within the legislature proved to be decisive for military participation or non-participation.
... Using governmental power, they convert these policy objectives and proposals into concrete policy outcomes. Scholars have shown that political parties tend to inject their partisan biases in various governmental actions not only at the domestic level but also at the international level, like humanitarian interventions, trade and exchange rates (Rathbun, 2004; Simmons, 1994; Verdier, 1994). Likewise, I expect that political parties add their partisan biases and programmatic orientations related to the process and substantive outcome of international rule making into the international compliance patterns of governments that they compose. ...
... Furthermore, decisions to deploy the German armed forces are usually examined from a structural vantage point, such as role theory (e.g., Harnisch and Maull 2001) or strategic culture (e.g., Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006). The actors who actually take the decision usually receive little attention (for exceptions see Rathbun 2004; Malici 2006). This holds particularly true for the impact of the actors' organizational interests on their preference formation and the eventual decision of the government as a whole. ...
This paper aims at enhancing the explanatory power of the governmental politics model (GPM) and contributing to the discussion on theoretical integration in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Specifically, the paper addresses the GPM's lack of clarity concerning the formation of decision makers' policy preferences. It argues that the GPM's core proposition in this respect, which is neatly, albeit imperfectly, summarized in the aphorism "Where you stand depends on where you sit", can be operationalized by integrating the substantive claims of the proposition into the two-stage process of the poliheuristic theory of decision making (PH). This is accomplished through the introduction of a "noncompensatory organizational loss aversion variable" in the first stage of PH, according to which decision makers discard all options that are unacceptable for their organization irrespective of their benefits on other decision dimensions. In the second stage of the preference formation process, the decision makers scrutinize the remaining options more thoroughly against several decision dimensions, including organizational interests. This paper uses Germany's decision to participate in EUFOR RD Congo, a military operation of the European Union (EU) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to illustrate the explanatory power of the revised GPM.
This article examines the conditions under which the United States foreign military bases become a contentious political issue in democratic base-hosting countries. Democratic consolidation, and in particular the institutionalization of the party system, reduces the incentives for political elites to mobilize domestic political support in opposition to foreign military presence. In the Spanish case, changes in the pattern of party competition explain why the basing issue was particularly contentious in domestic politics from 1981 to 1988, despite long-standing and profound public opposition to the use of the bases by the United States, and most recently in the 2003 Iraq campaign. Neither a public opinion explanation, focusing on anti-Americanism, nor a security-based explanation, focusing on the nature of bilateral security relations, can explain these same trends. The argument illuminates long-neglected important interactions in emerging democracies between party system dynamics and foreign policy positions and has important implications for determining the domestic political conditions under which overseas democratic countries will contest United States security hegemony.
American military, diplomatic, and humanitarian personnel participate in peacekeeping efforts around the world. Now in the fifth revised edition, "Peacekeeping: A Selected Bibliography" is meant to provide a starting place for research on peacekeeping's expanding role in world affairs. It lists references for readings about peacekeeping in general, highlights special issues and concerns, and addresses past and present operations in the following areas: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Central and South America, Europe, Russia and the New Independent States, and the Middle East. With the exception of some important older titles, most of the books, documents, articles, and online resources are dated 2004 to the present. Resources listed in this bibliography are all available in the USAWC Library. For your convenience, we have added library call numbers, Internet addresses, or database links at the end of each entry. Web sites were accessed June 2009. For other closely related information, researchers should refer to the Library's "Post Conflict Reconstruction: A Selected Bibliography," compiled in January 2007, as well as the "Additional Resources" section within this bibliography. This bibliography and others, compiled by our research librarians, are available online through the Library's home page at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibliographies.htm>.
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