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The Kernel of Truth in Judgments of Deceptiveness

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Bond, Charles F; Berry, Diane S; Omar (Atoum), Adnan (1994). The kernel of truth in judgments of deceptiveness. Basic & Applied Social Psychology. Vol. 15(4), 523-534. This article describes an investigation of the relationship between appearance-based impressions of honesty and individuals' willingness to engage in deceptive behaviors. Neutral-expression photographs were taken of 133 study participants, and these photographs were judged by other participants for whether the person looked honest or dishonest. The study participants then were provided with an opportunity to engage in deceptive behavior. Participants who were rated as looking dishonest by the third parties (via the photographs), were more likely to volunteer to participate in research that was described as requiring deception than were participants who were perceived to look honest. The results suggested that naive judgments of deception are more accurate than has been supposed.
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- 101 -
anales de psicología
2001, vol . 17, nº 1 (junio), 101-120
© Copyright 2001: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murci
a
Murcia (España). ISSN: 0212-9728
Is There A Kernel Of Truth In Judgements Of Deceptiveness?
Jaume Masip* and Eugenio Garrido
University of Salamanca
Título: ¿Existe un granito de verdad en juicios sobre el en-
gaño?
Resumen: Este estudio consiste en una réplica ampliada
del trabajo de Bond, Berry y Omar (1994). Ochenta y cinco
estudiantes universitarios cumplimentaron un formulario
para indicar en qué experimentos, de una lista de siete es-
tudios en que tendrían que mentir y dos en que tendrían
que decir la verdad, estarían dispuestos a participar, así co-
mo en qué medida lo estarían. Asimismo, indicaron en es-
calas de siete puntos el grado en que personas que los co-
nocían bien los consideraban veraces o mentirosos, y cuan-
to lo eran en realidad. Además, proporcionaron una foto-
grafía tipo carnet de sus rostros. Estas fotografías se mos-
traron a dos muestras de observadores. La primera juzgó
su honestidad y veracidad. La segunda evaluó su atractivo y
aniñamiento facial. Los resultados muestran que no hubo
relación entre las valoraciones de la honestidad o veracidad
efectuadas por los observadores y la disposición de los par-
ticipantes para colaborar en experimentos que implicaran
engaño. Aunque las autoevaluaciones de sinceridad de los
participantes no correlacionaron con su sinceridad real, sí
lo hicieron las de quienes los conocían bien proporciona-
das por los propios participantes. Ni las autoevaluaciones
de los participantes sobre su sinceridad ni las de personas
próximas a ellos se basaron en la apariencia facial. El atrac-
tivo físico y el aniñamiento facial estaban relacionados
marginalmente entre sí, y no guardaban ninguna relación
con la veracidad real ni percibida. La mayoría de los estu-
diantes estuvieron de acuerdo en participar en la mayor
parte de los experimentos que implicaban engaño, y no ex-
presaron fuertes cuestionamientos éticos contra el acto de
mentir.
Palabras clave: Sinceridad, veracidad, engaño, mentira,
rostro, cara, atractivo, aniñamiento facial.
Abstract: This study is an extended replication of Bond,
Berry and Omar´s (1994) work. Eighty-five undergraduate
students completed a form to indicate in which experi-
ments, from a list of seven deceptive and two truthful stud-
ies, they would be willing to participate, as well as the
strength of their willingness to participate in a 10-point
scale. Also, they reported in 7-point scales to what extent
people who knew them well thought they were truthful or
deceptive, and how truthful or deceptive they were in real-
ity. In addition, participants provided us with a passport-
type photograph of their faces. These photographs were
shown to two samples of observers. The first judged their
honesty and truthfulness. The second assessed their attrac-
tiveness and babyishness. Results show there was no rela-
tion between observers´ honesty or truthfulness ratings
and participants´ willingness to collaborate in deceptive
experimental procedures. Although participants´ self-
reported honesty did not correlate with their actual hon-
esty, close acquaintances´ impressions, as reported by the
participants, did. Neither participants´ self-reported hon-
esty nor close acquaintances´ views were based on targets´
facial appearance. Attractiveness and babyfacedness were
unrelated to real and perceived honesty, and were margin-
ally related to each other. Most of the students agreed to
participate in most of the deceptive experiments, and they
expressed no strong ethical concerns against lying.
Key words: Honesty, truthfulness, deception, face, attrac-
tiveness, babyfacedness, babyshness, kernel of truth.
Throghout history, there seems to have been a
popular belief in the relationship between
physical appearance and personality. This has
been so among both lay people and scientists
alike. Gall and Spurzheim´s phrenology (e.g.,
Fancher, 1988), and Kretschmer (1921) and
Sheldon´s (Sheldon, Stevens, & Tucker, 1940;
Sheldon & Stevens, 1942) somatic typologies
*
Address for correspondence
: Jaume Masip, De-
partment of Social Psychology and Anthropology,
University of Salamanca, Facultad de Psicología, Avda.
de la Merced, 109-131, 37005 Salamanca (Spain).
E-mail: jmasip@gugu.usal.es
are but two examples of scientific attempts to
lay the foundations of these popular beliefs
about the existence of a bond between the
body and the soul. Another similar “pseu-
dopsychology” (Yates, 1967) is physiognomy: “the
practice of trying to judge character and other
psychological qualities by observation of facial
features.” (Alley, 1988, p. 167). There is evi-
dence of physiognomic practices dating from
ancient Greece and ancient China (Caro-
Baroja, 1987; Zebrowitz, 1997), and the physi-
ognomic discipline evolved through the Middle
Ages (e.g., Avicena, Fakhr; see Viguera, 1977),
102
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
the Italian Reinassaince (e.g., della Rocca, 1536;
della Porta, 1644), and, thanks to the contribu-
tions of Lavater (1793; Moreau, 1820), Galton
(1883) and Lombroso (1895), also through the
18
th
and 19
th
centuries (for a detailed history of
physiognomy see Caro-Baroja, 1987).
In general, 20
th
century psychological re-
search does not lend support to the often naïve
claims made by the early physiognomists, al-
though the general public still believes struc-
tural features of the human face strongly reflect
one´s character. In this regard, Alley (1988)
concludes from his review on the topic that
“physiognomy is, with few and nearly negligi-
ble exceptions, an invalid practice, yet consis-
tent facial stereotypes exist such that certain
faces or facial characteristics produce remarka-
bly uniform impressions in perceivers.” (p.
185). Similar conclusions are reached by Bull
and his colleagues in their reviews of research
on the relationship between facial appearance
and criminality (Bull, 1982; Bull & Green,
1982; Bull & McAlpine, 1998). This does not
necessarily imply that personal information
other than one´s psychological traits informa-
tion such as targets´ age, sex, race, identity, fit-
ness, etc. cannot be ascertained from facial
static characteristics such as facial structure,
skin colour or smoothness, etc. (e.g., Bruce &
Young, 1998; Zebrowitz, 1997).
There are, however, a number of recent
studies which show personality judgments
based on targets´ facial appearance are accu-
rate. This has been found for traits such as in-
telligence, extraversion, conscientiousness,
agreeableness, emotional stability, dominance,
etc. (e.g., Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Berry,
1990, 1991a; Borkenau & Liebler, 1993; Kenny,
Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994; Kenny,
Horner, Kashy, & Chu, 1992; Levesque &
Kenny, 1993; Moskowitz, 1990; Zebrowitz,
1997), giving rise to what has come to be
known as
the kernel of truth hypothesis
. Yet, expla-
nations provided by current researchers for
these relationships between appearance and
personality are more plausible and scientifi-
cally-sound than the weird or mystical ones
posed by the ancient physiognomists. An out-
standing example is Zebrowitz´s (1997) inte-
grative model to account for appearance-trait
relations. In this model, it is acknowledged that
biological factors can influence both one´s
physical appearance and one´s personality, as
held by some of the historical authors (e.g.,
Lombroso, 1895; Sheldon et al., 1940). How-
ever, the congruence or incongruence between
facial appearance and personality may be due
to other reasons as well, since the social and
physical environment, psychological character-
istics, and facial appearance influence each
other through several basic psychological and
psychosocial processes such as self-fulfilling
and self-defeating prophecy effects, artifice ef-
fects, Dorian Gray effects, etc. (see Zebrowitz,
1997).
One personal characteristic that has been
targeted by face researchers is honesty. The
foci of interest have been two. First, research-
ers have been trying to ascertain whether some
faces are more often than others judged to be
honest, and the latter are more often than the
former judged to be dishonest. In other words:
are there socially shared stereotypes as to what
honest or dishonest faces look like? Second,
when observers agree as to which faces look
honest and which look deceptive (consensus at
zero acquaintance
), are their perceptions accurate,
that is, are stimulus individuals whose faces
look dishonest really less honest than those
whose faces look honest?
Experimental evidence clearly supports the
first question that some faces are significantly
judged to be honest and some others dishon-
est: the issue of interjudge reliability. High
agreement between observers who rated stimu-
lus persons´ honesty on the basis of facial pho-
tographs has been reported in most studies
(e.g., Berry & Brownlow, 1989; Berry &
McArthur, 1985; Zebrowitz & Monteparne,
1992; Zebrowitz, Monteparne, & Lee, 1993;
Zebrowitz, Voinescu, & Collins, 1996). Ze-
browitz
et al.
(1996) reported that honesty-
rating correlations averaged .68 for male faces
and .78 for female faces.
Mueller, Thompson, and Vogel (1988)
found that, unlike the dishonest faces, the hon-
Kernel of Truth 103
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
est faces were also high on likability, typicality,
and attractiveness. Similarly, other researchers
have also found attractive faces to be perceived
as more honest than unattractive faces. For ex-
ample, Berry and McArthur (1985) showed that
attractiveness had an impact on perceived hon-
esty ratings. McArthur and Apatow (1983-84)
concluded that physical appeal could mediate
the influence of a childlike facial appearance
on impressions of honesty. Berry and
Brownlow (1989) reported that stimulus per-
sons´ attractiveness was positively correlated
with their perceived honesty. Berry (1990) also
found that facial attractiveness predicted im-
pressions of the honesty of photographed peo-
ple. The same author again found attractive-
ness to influence sincerity, a construct includ-
ing warmth, naiveté, straightforwardness, hon-
esty, and kindness (Berry, 1991b). Zebrowitz
and Montepare (1992) reported that, with facial
maturity and smiling held constant, more at-
tractive targets from preschoolers to older
adults tended to be perceived as more honest
than less attractive individuals. Zebrowitz et al.
(1993) showed that, with a few exceptions, at-
tractiveness of white, black, and Korean targets
significantly correlated with white, black, and
Korean judges´ impressions of the targets´
honesty. Zebrowitz
et al.
(1996) found that at-
tractiveness was correlated with perceived hon-
esty at all ages ranging from childhood through
the 50s. When entered in regression analyses,
attractiveness also predicted perceived honesty
at various ages. These results are consistent
with
the attractiveness halo effect
(e.g., Alley &
Hildebrandt, 1988; Berscheid & Walster, 1974;
Langlois, 1986) or the what-is-beautiful-is-good
stereotype (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972).
Not only did Zebrowitz et al. (1996) find an
association between honesty and attractiveness,
but also between honesty and other static facial
characteristics such as symmetry, eye size, and
babyfacedness. This latter construct strongly
correlated with perceived honesty in adult-
hood, puberty, the 30s and the 50s, and pre-
dicted perceived honesty in childhood, puberty,
adolescence, and the 30s with all other vari-
ables controlled. This study is not the only one
which has explored the role of a babyish facial
appearance on perceptions of honesty. Since
the mid 80s, Leslie Zebrowitz, Diane Berry and
their associates have done extensive research
on babyfacedness and how it influences social
perceptions (see reviews by Berry & McArthur,
1986, 1988; Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998;
Zebrowitz, 1997). Impressions of honesty have
usually been measured in their research. Thus,
MacArthur and Apatow (1983-84) manipu-
lated some facial features associated with baby-
facedness in face composites built with a police
Identi-kit. They found that increasing babyish-
ness of faces led to linear increases in the per-
ceived honesty of the stimulus persons. Similar
results were found by Berry and McArthur
(1985) using real photographs of human faces.
Berry and Brownlow (1989), and Berry (1990)
reported significant correlations between
babyfacedness and impressions of honesty.
Berry (1991b) also found facial babyishness to
influence sincerity, a composite of perceived
honesty, straightforwardness, warmth, naiveté,
and kindness. Zebrowitz and Montepare (1992)
discovered that the influence of babyfacedness
upon honesty judgments extended across the
life span, especially among males. Zebrowitz
et
al. (1993) found significant correlations be-
tween the facial babyishness of white, black,
and Korean targets and honesty impressions of
white, black, and Korean observers. In addi-
tion, research conducted by Brownlow (1993;
Brownlow & Zebrowitz, 1990) indicates that
babyfaced individuals are perceived as more
trustworthy than maturefaced individuals. All
these results are consistent with the babyface gen-
eralization effect (e.g., Berry & McArthur, 1986;
Montepare and Zebrowitz, 1998; Zebrowitz,
1997), rooted in McArthur and Baron´s (1983)
ecological theory of social perception.
In summary, observers judging facial pho-
tographs tend to agree on which stimulus per-
sons look honest and which look dishonest.
Attractive faces and babyfaced faces are more
often judged to be honest than those which are
unattractive or maturefaced.
Less attention has been devoted by re-
searchers to the issue of validity, that is, to as-
104
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
certain whether observers´ perceptions of the
honesty of target individuals are accurate. And
not all the results from the few extant studies
coincide in supporting or rejecting the exis-
tence of a kernel of truth in honesty judgments.
On the discomfirmatory side, recent research
by Andreoletti and Zebrowitz (1997, cited by
Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998) has found that
young delinquents which were babyfaced ac-
crued more criminal charges than their mature-
faced fellows. In another study, middle-class
babyfaced boys exhibited more negative behav-
iors, among which was lying, than their mature-
faced peers (Zebrowitz, Collins, & Dutta, 1997;
cited in Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998). Also,
Zebrowitz et al. (1996) failed to find significant
correlations between perceived and real hon-
esty of stimulus persons at any single age.
However, they found that, among males, per-
ceived honesty at earlier ages emerged as a
positive predictor of real honesty in adulthood,
and that correlations between perceived and
real honesty in the later years indicated that
honesty impressions tended to be accurate for
men who had been stable in perceived honesty
across the life span (marginally significant ef-
fect), but not for those who had been unstable
in perceived honesty. However, the reverse
pattern emerged for women: lower levels of
real honesty at earlier ages predicted higher
perceived honesty at later ages, and honesty
impressions of women in their later years
tended to be significantly inaccurate for women
who had been stable in real honesty across the
life span, but not for women unstable in real
honesty. On the supportive side, Berry (1990)
found that ratings of the honesty of a series of
individuals, delivered by judges who did not
know them who looked at their photographs,
were related to classmates´ honesty impres-
sions of those targets after 5 and 9 weeks of
acquaintance. Also, strangers´ photography-
based judgments of warmth (an aggregrate
measure of warmth, kindness, and honesty)
were related to males´ (but not females´) self-
reported warmth and their scores in a Social
Closeness Scale. From these results Berry
(1990) concluded that the “data are consistent
with the proposition that facial appearance may
provide some accurate information about an
individual´s likely behaviors” (p. 352).
Bond, Berry, and Omar (1994) challenged
that conclusion. They argued that neither self-
nor other-descriptions of target individuals
should be used as an independent criterion of
their actual honesty, because physical appear-
ance may have such a strong impact that influ-
ences even the ratings of participants who
know the person being evaluated. Or it may
even be the case that people use their own
physical appearance to infer their traits and atti-
tudes, a proposition which extends Bem´s
(1972) self-perception theory beyond the ob-
servation of behavior to also include the obser-
vation of one´s own appearance as a basis for
making attributions about oneself. However,
Berry (1990) found that attractiveness was the
only facial characteristic related both to photo-
graph-based ratings of warmth and men´s So-
cial Closeness scores, and analyses failed to
support the notion that attractiveness ac-
counted for the relation between observers´
impressions of warmth and these scores. This
does not support Bond et al.´s suggestion that
facial appearance may be used in a similar way
by both, stimulus persons and strangers, to
make inferences about the stimulus persons,
which would lead to an agreement between
self- and strangers´ ratings. Yet we must agree
with Bond et al.´s (1994) contention that be-
havioral measures should be used as the crite-
rion against which to compare strangers´ per-
ceptions of stimulus persons. In other words, if
we are to assess whether strangers´ impressions
of people´s honesty are accurate or not, we
should compare these impressions with those
people´s actual behavior when they have the
choice to act in an honest or a dishonest way.
Two mutually-exclusive hypotheses were
posed by Bond and his colleagues. According
to a social reinforcement model perceptions of hon-
esty would be negatively correlated to actual
honesty. This would be so because honest-
looking persons would rarely be suspected of
devious behaviors, therefore they would be
successful in whatever deception they at-
Kernel of Truth 105
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
tempted, which would be rewarding. This
would perpetuate this behavior and, in turn,
repetition would increase the deceivers´ skill.
The results obtained by Andreoletti and Ze-
browitz (1997) and Zebrowitz, Collins, &
Dutta, (1997, both cited by Montepare and
Zebrowitz, 1998) described earlier lend support
to the social reinforcement model.
An alternative hypothesis was based on a
self-fulfilling prophecy model
, which predicted that
perceptions of honesty would be positively
correlated with actual honesty. This would be
so because, according to this view, honest indi-
viduals would be treated in such a way that
they would become honest, and dishonest in-
dividuals would be treated in a way that would
made them become dishonest (for reviews on
the self-fulfilling prophecy see Cooper &
Good, 1983; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Miller &
Turnbull, 1986; Snyder, 1984). The aforemen-
tioned results obtained by Zebrowitz
et al.
(1996), showing that males´ earlier honesty
predicted later real honesty, and that among
males the relation between perceived and real
honesty at later ages was significant among
those who had been perceived as honest across
their life span, are consistent with this behav-
ioral confirmation effect.
To test their hypotheses Bond
et al.
(1994)
took photographs of 133 undergraduate stu-
dents. Later, these students were provided with
written descriptions of 8 experiments, 6 of
which involved deception, and had to indicate
whether they would be willing to participate in
each of them or not. After that, participants
were provided with an opportunity to write a
deceptive letter addressed to an unknown stu-
dent. Then the researchers combined the seven
deceptive items (six experiments plus the de-
ceptive note) to form a 0 7 scale of willing-
ness to perform deceptive behaviors. Later on,
participants´ pictures were shown to a sample
of 22 observers unacquainted with them, who
judged in a scale the extent to which each per-
son in the photographs looked honest or dis-
honest. A separate group of individuals rated
the faces in terms of their attractiveness and
babyfacedness. Results supported the self-
fulfilling prophecy model: honest-looking indi-
viduals were less likely to volunteer to partici-
pate in deceptive experiments than their dis-
honest-looking fellows. Somewhat surprisingly
neither physical attractiveness nor facial baby-
ishness accounted for these results.
This kind of research may have important
implications in other areas of inquiry. For in-
stance, both Bond et al. (1994) and Zebrowitz et
al.
(1996) explicitly mention the relevance of
their work for the prolific research area of the
detection of deception from nonverbal cues
(for recent reviews on the topic see, e.g., Ek-
man, 1992; Miller and Stiff, 1993; Vrij, 1998,
2000). In 1979, Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall,
Larrace, and Rosenthal found what they
termed a demeanor bias in their senders: some
where consistently judged as honest and some
as deceptive, regardless of whether they lied or
told the truth. The existence of a demeanor
bias has been confirmed by later research con-
ducted by Bond, Kahler, and Paolicelli (1985).
As it is conceptualised by Zuckerman et al.
(1979), that bias would depend on some inter-
nal characteristics influencing the sender´s per-
ceptible demeanor which, in turn, would deter-
mine observer´s ratings. Indeed, some authors
have tried to see the influence of some person-
ality traits and social skills of the sender upon
the observers´ credibility judgments (e.g., Geis
& Moon, 1981; Miller, deTurck, & Kalbfleisch,
1983; Riggio & Friedman, 1983; Riggio,
Tucker, & Widaman, 1987; Riggio, Tucker, &
Throckmorton, 1987; Vrij, 1992; Vrij &
Winkel, 1993), assuming that these traits influ-
ence in some way the behavior displayed by the
communicator (for empirical tests of this as-
sumption see Riggio, Tucker, & Widaman,
1987; Vrij, Akehurst, & Morris, 1997). How-
ever, as suggested by Bond et al. (1994), Bond
and Robinson (1988), and Zebrowitz et al.,
(1996), it may be the case that these biases
originate in static facial characteristics that
would bestow on the individual “an innocent-
or guilty-looking visage” (Bond & Robinson,
1988, p. 304). In this case, the biased judg-
ments of credibility would depend directly
upon the sender´s appearance, instead of de-
106
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
pending on some personality traits or social
skills which would influence behavior. This hy-
pothesis was recently tested by Masip, Garrido,
and Herrero (1999, Study 2), who failed to find
support for it, probably because, as they them-
selves acknowledged, the faces they used were
not chosen on the basis of differences in at-
tractiveness, facial maturity, or perceived age.
This paper is a replication of the study
conducted by Bond
et al.
(1994). Replications
are necessary before drawing strong conclu-
sions from experimental results. In addition,
cross-cultural confirmation of findings ob-
tained with North American samples is needed
before such findings be generalised to people
from other countries. In this regard, we used
Spanish participants both as stimulus persons
and as judges who had to rate targets´ faces in
a series of dimensions. Finally, our procedure
does not coincide exactly with that of Bond
et
al.
, as we introduced some minor modifications
in order to improve upon the original proce-
dure. A first modification consisted in the fol-
lowing: as in the original study, respondents
were asked whether they would participate in
the experiments or not; but, in addition, those
who said they would were required to indicate
on a scale the strength of their willingness to
participate. This would provide us with a more
fine-grained measure of participants´ readiness
to perform the deceptive experimental tasks
described in the forms. Second, in order to
take into account participants´ willingness to
collaborate in the nondeceptive experiments in
addition to their readiness to collaborate in the
deceptive ones, a new dependent measure was
considered which consisted of the combination
of the seven deceptive items (range 0 – 7) minus
the combination of the two truthful items
(range 0 2; final range: -2 7). (See method
section).
Third, for the same reason that respon-
dents´ willingness to participate in the nonde-
ceptive experiments was substracted from their
willingness to take part in the deceptive ones,
ratings of the strength to do so had to be sub-
stracted as well. In this way a new dependent
variable was created.
Fourth: In order to prevent participants´
compliance or noncompliance with the re-
quirement to write the deceptive letter due ei-
ther to normative (e.g., Asch, 1951; Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955; Moulton, Blake, & Olmstead,
1956) or informational (e.g., Sheriff, 1936;
Rohrer, Baron, Hoffman, & Swander, 1954)
social influence, an additional requirement was
added for those participants who did not want
to write the letter they were required to write
the reasons for their decision. That is, since we
planned to collect the data in a classroom with
a large number of students filling in the form at
the same time, maybe some of them would
write (or would not write) the letter because
they would see other students doing so (or not
doing so). By asking respondents either to
write the letter or express the reasons why they
chose not to, we would have all participants
writing something. Any of them could see his
or her companion writing, but he or she would
be unable to know whether it was the letter or
the reasoning his or her refusal to word it. An
additional, although crucial, benefit would be
that we could examine the reasons given by
noncompliant participants: Did they refuse to
write the letter, as Bond et al. assumed, for
ethical reasons? Or were there reasons other
than ethical concerns for them not to write it?
Fifth, in addition to the honest / dishonest
scale judges in the study done by Bond
et al.
completed, a deceptive / truthful scale was
completed by our respondents
1
.
1
This scale was included because the meaning of the Eng-
lish word
honesty
is not exactly the same as that of its
Spanish equivalent. According to The Concise Oxford
Dictionary,
honesty
is “1. being honest. 2. truthfulness.”,
and honest means “1. fair and just in character or behav-
iour, not cheating or stealing.” but also “...2. free of de-
ceit and untruthfulness, sincere.” Thus, the English word
honesty is very close to the words truthfulness, sincerity or ve-
racity. This is not so for the Spanish word for honesty,
namely “honestidad”. The Dictionary of the Real Acade-
mia Española de la Lengua defines it as “quality of being
honest”, and defines
honest
(“
honesto
”) as “1. Decent or
decorous. 2. Modest or shameful. 3. Reasonable, fair. 4.
Upright.” Thus, the Spanish word for
honesty
is farther
from veracity or truthfulness than its English counter-
part, being closer to a general quality of character
indicating uprightness. To properly measure Spanish
observers´ impressions of participants´ truthfulness, a
Kernel of Truth 107
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
Finally, two additional scales were included
in the questionnaire where participants had to
indicate their willingness to participate in the
experimental procedures: they were asked to
indicate in a 1 (truthful) to 7 (deceptive) scale:
(a) to what extent people who knew them well
(i.e., their family or their flatmates) thought
they were truthful or deceptive, and (b) to what
extent they actually were truthful or deceptive
individuals. This would permit us to examine a
series of questions. First: if, as could be ex-
pected in view of Bond et al.´s results, we
found support for a self-fulfilling prophecy
model, this conclusion would be strengthened
if in addition participants´ perceptions of oth-
ers´ views of their honesty were correlated with
their self-reports. Second: as said above, some
researchers (e.g., Berry, 1990) used self-reports
or acquainted others´ opinions as criteria
against which to compare observers´ photo-
graph-based impressions. However, the ques-
tion remains as to how valid these criteria are.
That is, to what extent individuals who say they
are honest or dishonest are actually so? Simi-
larly, to what extent are actually honest or dis-
honest those individuals whose friends or rela-
tives say they are so? We could assess this by
calculating the correlations between partici-
pants´ self-ratings of honesty and close ac-
quaintances´ views of their honesty (as re-
ported by the participants) on the one hand,
and participants´ actual honesty (i.e., their will-
ingness to participate in the deceptive studies)
on the other. Third, are Bond et al. (1994) right
when they contend that close acquaintances´
impressions as well as participants´ self-
evaluations may be influenced by targets´ facial
appearance? This could be tested by examining
the correlations between participants´ self-
ratings of honesty and close acquaintance
views of their honesty (as reported by the par-
ticipants) on the one hand, and observers´ pho-
tograph-based impressions on the other.
In summary, the aims of the present study
were the following: first, to measure observers´
ers´ impressions of participants´ truthfulness, a truthful-
ness / deceptiveness scale had to be used.
agreement in their photograph-based impres-
sions of others as honest or dishonest (the reli-
ability question); second, to test whether these
impressions are accurate or not (the validity
question) a positive correlation between per-
ceived and real honesty would support the self-
fulfilling prophecy model, a negative correla-
tion would support the social reinforcement
model, neither model would be supported if no
correlations between real and perceived hon-
esty emerged; third, to explore the role of at-
tractiveness and facial babyishness on per-
ceived and real honesty, as well as on their rela-
tion; fourth, to examine the accuracy of par-
ticipants´ self-reports of their honesty as well
as close acquaintances´ views of targets´ hon-
esty (as reported by the participants); fifth, to
explore whether acquaintances´ and partici-
pants´ self-reports are based upon participants´
facial appearance or not. In addition, correla-
tions among facial maturity and attractiveness
were calculated in order to investigate whether
they were independent or not. Also, our data
permitted us to assess to what extent under-
graduates have reservations about lying.
Method
Overview
Participants (undergraduate students) were
asked to complete a questionnaire where eight
experiments were described. Six of them re-
quired that participants engaged in deceptive
behaviors. They had to indicate what experi-
ments they would be willing to participate in as
research assistants. In addition, they were given
the opportunity to write a deceptive note.
These procedures enabled us to measure re-
spondents´ willingness to engage in deceptive
behaviors. Later on, participants gave us their
module cards, which included a facial photo-
graph of them. These pictures were scanned
and shown with a PowerPoint presentation to
two samples of observers who were unac-
quainted with the stimulus persons. The first
sample of observers rated participants´ honest-
or dishonest-looking appearance, as well as
108
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
whether they looked truthful or deceptive. The
second sample rated participants´ facial attrac-
tiveness and facial maturity.
Participants
Participants were psychology students at a
Spanish university who were taking the module
“Psychology and Law”. As we shall see later,
they were required to complete a questionnaire
as well as to hand over their module cards,
which included personal information and a
photograph of the card holder, to the module
lecturer.
The final number of questionnaires com-
pleted by the students was 105, of which 15
were useless because the students who had
filled them in had not handed over their mod-
ule cards (hence, no photograph of them was
available). One further questionnaire was re-
jected because the corresponding photograph
was a useless black-and-white photocopy of the
original picture. Thus, 89 questionnaires were
left.
The number of students who gave us their
module cards was 97. The black-and-white
photocopy mentioned above was excluded, as
were seven further pictures of participants who
had not handed over the completed question-
naires. Of these seven pictures, four were later
included in the PowerPoint presentation as
practice items. However, the useful pictures in
that presentation were 89. Later, four of them
were excluded from analyses, since the corre-
sponding participants had left unchecked some
items from the questionnaire.
Thus, the final number of participants was
85 (80 females and five males
2
; age range: 20
26 years, M = 21.46).
2
No gender differences were found by Bond
et al.
(1994),
thus no effort was made to select a sample with the same
amount of males and females in it. In any case, caution is
warranted before generalizing our results to male popula-
tions.
Procedure
Actual honesty and facial photographs. On arriv-
ing at the lecture room at the beginning of the
academic term, those undergraduate students
of psychology who were taking the module
“Psychology and Law” were told they had to
participate as research assistants in two of our
deception detection experiments. A question-
naire with written descriptions of 8 studies was
given to them. They were required to indicate
whether they were willing to collaborate in
each study or not by checking the yes or the no
square which appeared after each experimental
procedure description in the questionnaire. In
addition, those who indicated they agreed to
take part in a specific study had to indicate on a
scale ranging from 1 to 10 the extent to which
they were willing to participate. Six of the ex-
periments in the questionnaire involved decep-
tion, whereas two of them did not. Descrip-
tions of the experimental procedures were
taken from Bond et al.´s (1994) paper. Those
involving deception required from participants
to falsely promise a reward to another person,
to feign pain, to give another student false
feedback about his or her results in a personal-
ity test, to simulate suffering from a mental ill-
ness, to concoct answers to impossible ques-
tions, or to falsely tell a student suffering from
speech anxiety that he or she would have to
give a public speech. Procedures not involving
deception required students to make personal-
ity judgments based upon nonverbal behaviors
or to deliver experimental instructions in a
memory experiment. Participants were asked to
agree to participate in at least two experiments
otherwise we would have run the risk that
most students refused to participate in any
study, either deceptive or not. However, they
were encouraged to agree to as many studies as
possible to facilitate scheduling. They were no-
tified in advance that most experiments re-
quired deceiving someone else but that, in case
they had reservations about lying, some of the
studies did not involve deceptive practices.
Using a procedure similar to Bond
et al.
´s
(1994), we provided participants with an addi-
Kernel of Truth 109
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
tional opportunity to engage in deceptive be-
havior. They were falsely told that the univer-
sity had started up a new “matchmaking” ser-
vice. With this aim in view, some students had
purportedly described themselves while being
video recorded so that, later on, these video
tapes could be shown to other students who
were looking for someone to date. We asked
our participants to act as if they had watched
the original tapes and to write a deceptive letter
saying they wanted to have a date with a person
in one of these tapes. This letter would osten-
sibly be given to a user of the video dating ser-
vice, and whether he or she believed its content
would be assessed. Participants in our study
were told we were interested in studying
whether they were able to deceive the clients of
this new university dating service. It was
stressed that they had no obligation to write
the deceptive letter, but if they chose not to
they had to write down their reasons for not
wanting to participate. All participants were
provided a sheet of paper to write either the
deceptive note or their reasons for not writing
it.
Finally, participants had to indicate on two
7-point scales which were included in the ques-
tionnaires to what extent close acquaintances
thought they were truthful (1) or deceptive (7),
and how truthful (1) or deceptive (7) they were
in reality. Students were told this was an impor-
tant control variable to be taken into account
when considering their potential ability to de-
ceive participants in the deceptive experimental
procedures.
The whole data collection session was car-
ried out twice, since students of two classes
participated (allocation of students to one or
the other class is based upon an alphabetic cri-
terion). After all students had finished their
tasks the questionnaires were collected and par-
ticipants were thanked. A large group of stu-
dents who did not attend the lectures where
data were collected asked us individually to give
them the forms so that they could complete
them at home. We gave them blank forms they
completed before returning them. The number
of students in class A was 37, 16 attended class
B, and 32 filled in the forms at home. One-way
analyses of variance were conducted to check
whether students´ willingness to perform de-
ceptive behaviors varied as a function of their
group (A, B, or home). No significant effects
emerged, therefore this variable was not taken
into account in subsequent analyses
3
.
At the beginning of the semester students
at our university must hand in the module
cards to their lecturers. These are cards where
personal information on the student (gender,
date of birth, postal address, telephone num-
ber, etc.) is provided, along with a passport-
type color photograph of the card holder. Each
lecturer must receive a card from each student
taking his or her module. Lecturers may use the
back side of the cards to write notes about the
students´ performance, lecture attendance, or
whatever. Receiving the cards from those who
were taking our module on psychology and law
would allow us to easily obtain facial photo-
graphs of our experimental participants.
After all students had given their forms
back and the module cards had been collected,
the participants were debriefed during a lecture
on social perception of faces and its implica-
tions for legal procedures. In that lecture, the
background of the study was described in de-
tail. In addition, participants were asked to give
us their permission to show their photographs
to other students that would rate their honesty,
3
As we shall see later, four measures of participants´ real
honesty were used in this study: (a) number of deceptive
experiments participants were willing to participate in,
(b) this amount minus the number of truthful experi-
ments participants agreed to take part in, (c) a quantita-
tive measure of participants´ willingness to participate in
the deceptive studies, and (d) this measure minus stu-
dents´ willingness to collaborate in the nondeceptive
procedures. Respondents´ group (class A, class B, home)
was introduced in four univariate analyses of variance
which were performed on the four actual honesty meas-
ures. Results were, respectively, F (2, 82) = .41, p = .667;
F
(2, 82) = .10,
p
= .902;
F
(2, 82) = .39,
p
= .680;
F
(2,
82) = .10,
p
= .909. Two similar analyses were performed
on students´ notions of others´ views of their truthful-
ness, and their own truthfulness ratings. Results indi-
cated that the participants´ group had no influence on
these two variables either; respectively:
F
(2, 76) = 1.01,
p
= .370;
F
(2, 76) = .49,
p
= .616.
110
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
truthfulness, attractiveness, and facial maturity.
None of the participants refused.
Observers´ impressions of targets´ faces. All the
photographs were scanned by a research assis-
tant and included in a PowerPoint presenta-
tion. Eighty-nine stimulus-person photographs
plus four practice pictures were in the presenta-
tion. Each photograph was shown for 6 sec-
onds (Bond
et al.
, 1994), and observers had 6
further seconds between one photograph and
the next to check the scales by which pictures
were to be evaluated. A sound (Microsoft´s
“Clic.wav”) could be heard as a photograph
appeared on screen, and a different one (Mi-
crosoft´s “Sports-Bip.wav”) as it disappeared.
The sounds were included so that if partici-
pants were not looking at the screen, but were
completing the scales, they would know the
next slide was being projected. All pictures had
a size of 142 X 226 pixels and appeared in the
center of the screen. The rest of the screen was
dark. Each picture was accompained by a writ-
ten verbal label: “Photo number X”, which ap-
peared above it. After each photograph was
shown, a black screen with the message “Please
assess this photograph” was visible during the
6 seconds participants had to check the scales
for each picture.
Twenty-four undergraduate students of
criminology at the faculty of law (three did not
report their age or gender, 18 of the remaining
students were females and three were males
4
;
age range: 18 26, M = 21.14) were shown the
presentation and had to rate the truthfulness
and honesty of the persons in the photographs.
4
An equal number of males and females with similar
background characteristics was not available at the time
data were collected. Although similar number of male
and female observers have been used in extant research
on babyfacedness and honesty impressions, in general
researchers have not reported whether raters´ gender dif-
ferences had any effect on the dependent measures.
Berry (1991b) did introduce sex of judges as one of the
factors in an analysis of variance examining perceived
sincerity. She did not report any main effect or interac-
tion where that variable was involved. In any case, we
think caution is warranted before generalizing our results
to male observers´ populations.
For this purpose, they received a questionnaire
with two bipolar scales, ranging from 1 to 7,
for each photograph. Endpoints were labelled
“truthful” (1) and “deceptive” (7) in one scale,
and “honest” (1) and “dishonest” (7) in the
other. After looking at each photograph for six
seconds observers had six further seconds to
assess the stimulus person by checking the ap-
propriate rating on the scale. Observers were
informed of the procedure, and then they were
shown four practice items which they had to
evaluate. Then the presentation was stopped
and participants were asked whether they had
had any problem in rating the pictures, and
whether they could clearly see the slides and
hear the sounds. Also, they were invited to ask
any question regarding the procedure. No
questions were asked, therefore the experimen-
tal session began. A countdown sequence of
slides showing numbers from 5 to 1 at a rate of
one per second was shown before the first ex-
perimental photograph was projected. This was
done to ensure observers would be ready when
the first photograph appeared. The presenta-
tion was projected on a screen in front of the
students in a classroom at the faculty of law.
After the presentation was over, students were
thanked and debriefed while being given a lec-
ture on social perception of faces and its legal
implications.
Exactly the same procedure was used with
another group of 18 students, taken from the
same population and with similar age and gen-
der composition. However, this second sample
did not judge stimulus persons´ honesty and
truthfulness, but their attractiveness and baby-
facedness. In order for them to be capable of
judging facial maturity, prior to the experimen-
tal session they attended a 20-minute lecture
about the physical features of babyish faces and
those of mature faces. No mention was made
during this lecture of the attributional and so-
cial consequences of having a babyish or a ma-
ture face this information was provided dur-
ing the debriefing session. After that initial lec-
ture they completed the experimental task.
It was supposed observers from both
groups were unacquainted with the stimulus
Kernel of Truth 111
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
persons. However, they were instructed that in
case they recognized someone they were to
leave the scales where that person had to be
evaluated unchecked. For this reason, or due to
any other reason, one respondent did not rate
the attractiveness and babyfacedness of four
stimulus-persons, and another left one attrac-
tiveness scale and two babyfacedness scales
unchecked. These empty cells were filled in
with the mean value of the other respondents´
ratings of the specific faces. The same strategy
was used to complete two missing ratings of
the veracity scales and two others of the hon-
esty scales.
Results
After all data had been collected we noticed
that four respondents had left some scales un-
checked where they should have indicated
whether they were willing to participate or not
in the experiments which were described.
These participants were excluded from the
sample, and all analyses were performed on the
remaining 85. (See the “participants” section).
Descriptive analyses
Participants. On average, participants were
willing to participate in 4.40 (SD = 1.46) de-
ceptive experiments (range: 0 7, i.e., 6 decep-
tive experiments plus the deceptive letter). This
figure is somewhat higher than Bond et al.´s
(1994) 3.95. The difference may be due to the
fact that, unlike Bond and his colleagues, we
required our participants to agree to participate
in at least two experiments, either deceptive or
nondeceptive. Most respondents agreed to par-
ticipate in four (N = 25, 29.40 % of partici-
pants) or five (
N
= 25, 29.40 % of participants)
deceptive procedures.
The number of truthful experiments stu-
dents were willing to participate in was sub-
stracted from the number of deceptive experi-
ments they agreed to collaborate in. We then
had a scale ranging from –2 to 7. The average
rating of participants in this scale was
M
=
2.67,
SD
= 1.56. Most observers had a rating
of 3 (N = 31, 36.5 % of participants). None
had a value of 7.
Table 1 shows the number of participants
who agreed or disagreed to take part in the
studies. It is apparent that most students
agreed to participate in most experimental pro-
cedures, either truthful or deceptive. Excep-
tions were simulating pain, where most stu-
dents disagreed,
χ
2
(1)
= 23.82, p = .000, and
feigning suffering from a mental illness, where
no significant differences emerged between the
number of students willing to participate and
those who did not want to participate
χ
2
(1)
=
2.65,
p
= .104. The right column of Table 1 in-
cludes the proportion of participants who
agreed to collaborate in each procedure. A one-
way ANOVA on these results, where experi-
ment was included as the factor, showed some
studies were chosen more often than others, F
(8, 764) = 24.70, p = .000. As we expected, the
most frequently chosen experiment to partici-
pate in was a nondeceptive one, namely, the
memory experiment. No significant differences
were found between participants´ willingness
to collaborate in this study and their willingness
to participate in the other nondeceptive proce-
dure (social judgment experiment), as shown
by the post-hoc Scheffé test (p = .990). Also,
it is somewhat surprising that students´ ten-
dency to agree to participate in a number of
deceptive experiments (false feedback, bogus
reward, rigged contest, and public speech) did
not differ significantly from their tendency to
agree to take part in the nondeceptive proce-
dures.
As stated above, in addition to asking par-
ticipants to indicate whether they would be
willing to participate in each experimental pro-
cedure or not, we also asked those who said
they would to indicate
the extent
to which they
would agree to participate, on a continuous
scale ranging from 1 (not very much) to 10
(very much). When introducing the data in the
computer 0 values were introduced in this vari-
able for those who indicated they would
not
participate in a given study. Participants´ rat-
ings for the deceptive experiments were added
112
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
up, and the final value was divided by 10. We
then had a scale ranging from 0 to 6 (not 7,
since no scale was provided for the deceptive
letter experiment) where 0 meant the respon-
dent was not willing at all to participate in the
deceptive experiment and 6 meant he or she
was completely willing to do so. Participants´
mean rating in this scale was M = 2.51, SD =
1.10, range: 0.00 5.10. This seems to indicate
that, although participants were willing to par-
ticipate in much of the deceptive procedures
(4.40 out of 7, as said before), their desire to do
so was not particularly strong (2.51 in a scale
from 0 to 6).
Table 1
: Frequencies of participants who agreed or disagreed to participate in each experiment, chi-square analyses,
and proportion of those who agreed.
Number of participants
(percentage)
Chi-square analyses
Agreed Disagreed Chi-square
value
p
Proportion of re-
spondents who
agreed*
Memory
(no deception)
77 (90.6) 8 (9.4) 56.01 .000 .91
a
False feedback 72 (84.7) 13 (15.3) 40.95 .000 .85
ab
Bogus reward 71 (83.5) 14 (16.5) 38.22 .000 .84
ab
Social judgment
(no deception)
70 (82.4) 15 (17.6) 35.59 .000 .82
ab
Rigged contest 66 (77.6) 19 (22.4) 25.99 .000 .78
ab
Public speech 56 (65.9) 29 (31.4) 8.58 .003 .66
abc
Letter 54 (63.5) 31 (36.5) 6.22 .013 .64
bc
Mental illness 35 (41.2) 50 (58.8) 2.65 ns .41
cd
Pain simulation 20 (23.5) 65 (76.5) 23.82 .000 .24
d
* Only means with a different superscript are different at p < .05. Post-hoc Schef tests were used to check which val-
ues were significantly different from each other.
In order to also take into account respon-
dents´ strength of their willingness to partici-
pate in the nondeceptive experiments, their rat-
ings in the scales of the nondeceptive studies
were added up, the final value was divided by
10, and the resulting value was subtracted from
respondents´ desire to participate in the decep-
tive procedures (see previous paragraph). The
resulting scale could theoretically range from –
2 to 6. Participants´ mean value in this scale
was M = 1.17, SD = 1.28, range: -2.00 5.00.
In fact, all four measures (i.e., number of
deceptive experiments participants agreed to
participate in, number of deceptive experi-
ments participants agreed to participate in mi-
nus the number of truthful studies they agreed
to participate in, respondents´ degree of will-
ingness to participate in the deceptive experi-
ments, and their degree of willingness to par-
ticipate in the deceptive experiments minus
their degree of willingness to participate in the
truthful) were highly correlated (Pearson corre-
lations ranged between .76 and .95, all
p
s =
.000).
Observers. Interjudge reliabilities were calcu-
lated for observers´ impressions. Alphas were
.78 for truthfulness, .76 for honesty, .91 for at-
tractiveness, and .87 for babyfacedness. Since
interjudge agreement for these four variables
was high, the mean rating each stimulus person
received on each of them was calculated.
Attractiveness and facial babyishness
showed a marginally significant correlation,
r
=
.19, p = .082. This may be due to the fact that
almost all the photographs depicted women,
and women are in general more babyfaced than
men. Since prototypical faces are normally
Kernel of Truth 113
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
judged as more attractive than the non-
prototypical (e.g., Langlois & Roggman, 1990),
it is reasonable that babyfaced female faces be
considered as more attractive than less babyish
female faces.
A highly significant positive correlation was
found between perceived honesty and truthful-
ness, r = .95, p = .000. This indicates that indi-
viduals whose character in general is perceived
negatively (see footnote 1) are also though to
be deceptive, while those who are considered
to be upright are also regarded as truthful per-
sons. No other correlation was significant: the
relation between attractiveness and perceived
truthfulness was r = .09, p = .431; the correla-
tion between attractiveness and honesty im-
pressions was r = .04, p = .709; the relationship
between facial babyishness and impressions of
truthfulness was
r
= .10,
p
= .384; and facial
babyishness correlation with perceived honesty
was
r
= .08,
p
= .463.
Main Analyses
Accuracy of observers´ impressions. In order to
test whether honesty impressions based on fa-
cial photographs were accurate or not, correla-
tions between observers´ ratings of stimulus
persons´ honesty and the actual honesty of
those stimulus persons were calculated. As
stated above, we had four measures of real
honesty: (a) number of deceptive experiments
participants were willing to participate in (this
was Bond et al.´s main variable), (b) this num-
ber minus the number of truthful experiments
participants agreed to take part in, (c) a quanti-
tative measure of participants´ willingness to
participate in the deceptive studies, and (d) this
measure minus students´ willingness to col-
laborate in the nondeceptive procedures. Al-
though, as we have said, all four variables were
strongly correlated, separate analyses were
conducted for each. The correlation of honesty
impressions with the first real honesty measure
was r = .06, p = .603, its correlation with the
second measure was r = .08, p = .460, with the
third measure
r
= .01,
p
= .965, and with the
fourth actual honesty measure r = .06, p =
.614. In summary: it seems observers´ impres-
sions of targets´ honesty had little to do with
their real honesty. Results do not support ei-
ther the self-fulfilling prophecy model nor the
social reinforcement model.
Participants were asked whether they would
lie or not. But honesty, as explained above (see
footnote 1), is for Spaniards something more
vague and general than the tendency not to lie
or cheat. Although , as described earlier, ob-
servers´ ratings of target individuals´ honesty
and truthfulness were strongly correlated, a
more proper test of our prediction of a consis-
tent relationship between observers´ impres-
sions and students´ willingnesss to lie should
involve calculating the correlations between
observers´ truthfulness impressions of partici-
pants and the real honesty of these participants
(i.e., their willingness to
lie
in the context of
collaborating in experimental procedures).
These analyses were performed. The correla-
tion of observers´ impressions of target par-
ticipants´ truthfulness with our first real hon-
esty measure was r = .07, p = .514, its correla-
tion with the second measure was r = .10, p =
.354, and its correlation with the third measure
was
r
= .03,
p
= .781, while with the fourth
measure the correlation was r = .08, p = .449.
In summary: Observers´ impressions of the
honesty of target participants´ honesty and
truthfulness based on their facial photographs
was unrelated to those participants´ willingness
to engage in deceptive practices.
Participants´ self-ratings of truthfulness.
Partici-
pants were asked to indicate, according to two
scales ranging from 1 (truthful) to 7 (decep-
tive), to what extent close acquaintances
thought they were truthful or deceptive, and to
what extent they were actually truthful or de-
ceptive. These two measures were strongly cor-
related, r = .60, p = .000, showing that people´s
self-perceptions of their truthfulness is in line
with how they think others view them. Had we
found support for a self-fulfilling prophecy
model, this result would have strengthened that
support.
114
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
We also measured whether participants´
notions of their own truthfulness were accu-
rate. In order to do so, correlations were com-
puted between participants´ self-ratings of
truthfulness and the four measures of their real
honesty. The correlation with the first actual
honesty measure was r = .19, p = .09, with the
second measure r = .17, p = .142, with the
third r = .04, p = .702, and with the fourth r =
.07,
p
= .525. That is: observers´ self-views
about their truthfulness do not coincide with
their real tendency to lie, especially when cor-
rections for their tendency to tell the truth are
introduced, and fine-grained quantitative scales
of their willingness to deceive are used. This
questions researchers´ use of self-reports as an
independent measure of participants´ real hon-
esty against which to compare observers´ im-
pressions. Instead, others´ perceptions seem to
be more useful: correlations of close acquaint-
ances´ views of participants according to par-
ticipants´ reports of these views with stu-
dents´ actual honesty were calculated. All four
correlations were statistically significant: The
relationship of others´ views about stimulus
persons´ truthfulness with the first actual truth-
fulness measure was
r
= .28,
p
= .01, its rela-
tion with the second measure was
r
= .31,
p
=
.005, with the third measure it was
r
= .22,
p
=
.049, and with the fourth r = .26, p = .022.
Thus, close acquaintances´ views of the par-
ticipants´ truthfulness, as perceived by the par-
ticipants themselves, are fairly accurate.
Bond
et al.
(1994) suggested that both close
acquaintances´ ratings of stimulus persons´
honesty and these stimulus persons´ self-
ratings of honesty could be influenced by tar-
gets´ facial appearance. In order to test this, a
series of correlations were calculated. The first
was that between participants´ self ratings of
truthfulness and photograph-based impres-
sions of honesty. This correlation was not sig-
nificant:
r
= .15,
p
= .188. Second, the correla-
tion between perticipants´ self ratings of truth-
fulness and photograph-based impressions of
truthfulness was calculated. This correlation
was not significant either:
r
= .12,
p
= .288.
Thus, it seems people do not base their self-
views about how honest or dishonest they are
on their honest- or dishonest-looking facial ap-
pearance. Does their facial attractiveness or
babyishness have an influence on participants´
self-view as honest or deceptive persons? Since
no significant correlations were found between
attractiveness and babyfacedness on the one
side and perceived honesty and perceived
truthfulness on the other, no significant corre-
lations bertween self-perceived truthfulnes and
self-perceived honesty were expected. And, in
fact, they were not found: correlations were r =
.02, p = .877 for the association between self-
reported truthfulness and attractiveness, and
r
= .06,
p
= .614 for the association between
self-reported truthfulness and babyfacedness.
Next, the correlation between participants´
reports on the extent to which close acquaint-
ances viewed them as being honest or decep-
tive and photograph-based impressions of their
honesty and truthfulness were calculated. Val-
ues were, respectively, r = .15, p = .198, and r
= .16, p = .157. Thus, it seems stimulus per-
sons´ close acquaintances do not base their
views about how honest or dishonest targets
are on targets´ honest- or dishonest-looking fa-
cial appearance. Does stimulus people´s facial
attractiveness or babyishness have an influence
on acquaintances´ perceptions of their honesty
or deceptiveness? It does not: the correlation
between acquaintances´ ratings of targets´
truthfulness and their facial attractiveness was
r
= .10,
p
= .361; the correlation between ac-
quaintances´ ratings of stimulus persons´ truth-
fulness and their facial babyishness was
r
=
.034,
p
= .767. Probably, as acquaintances´
ratings of stimulus persons´ honesty are accu-
rate and do not correlate with photograph-
based impressions of their honesty, truthful-
ness, attractiveness or babyfacedness, they do
not base their impressions on targets´ facial
appearance, but on their actual behavior. In
line with this, correlations between attractive-
ness and actual honesty were in general non-
significant (for the four honesty measures, in
order:
r
= .16,
p
= .151;
r
= .22,
p
= .046;
r
=
.09,
p
= .437;
r
= .15,
p
= .161), as were correla-
tions between babyfacedness and actual hon-
Kernel of Truth 115
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
esty (r = .07, p = .514; r = .07, p = .556; r =
.03, p = .822; r = .03, p = .815).
Additional analyses
In addition to indicate whether they would
participate in a series of deceptive experiments,
participants were given the oportunity of en-
gaging in a deceptive behavior at that very
moment. This behavior was writing a deceptive
note to an unknown person asking him or her
for a date. It was assumed that participants´ re-
jection to write the deceptive note would be
based on ethical reservations about lying.
However, as we asked participants who were
not willing to write the letter to express instead
their reasons for not doing so, we could exam-
ine whether our assumptions about their ethi-
cal concerns were right or not.
Out of 85 respondents 54 wrote the letter
and 31 did not. Among these, three gave no
reasons for not writing the deceptive note, 19
gave one reason, and nine gave two reasons.
The most frequently mentioned reason for not
writing the letter had little to do with ethical
concerns: it was participants´ perceptions of
their lying ability or, in other words, their per-
ceived self-efficacy for lying, which was men-
tioned by 22 participants. Only 11 respondents
argued they did not write the letter because
they had ethical reservations about lying. Four
respondents also gave reasons other than low
perceptions of self-efficacy or ethical concerns.
These results question Bond et al.´s, as well as
our own implicit assumption that respondents
who did not write the letter did not do so be-
cause they thought lying was wrong or im-
moral. And this indicates that, perhaps, the ac-
tual-honesty measure used by Bond et al. (1994)
(number of deceptive experiments participants
were willing to participate in, including the let-
ter) as well as those honesty measures used in
the present study which include the letter (i.e.,
number of deceptive experiments participants
were willing to participate in, including the let-
ter, and this very measure minus the number of
truthful experiments participants agreed to par-
ticipate in), are not valid enough, because par-
ticipants may be dishonest and yet may not
write the letter because they feel they are not
good at lying. For this reason, the most valid
measures of actual honesty of the present study
are those which do not involve the writing-
letter data, that is, the measures of participants´
degree of willingness to engage in deceptive
behaviors as expressed in the quantitative
scales, or these measures minus participants
degree of willingness to participate in the hon-
est experiments. These two measures have the
additional advantage of being more fine-
grained than the others, since here respondents
did not give merely dichotomic responses but
expressed their willingness to participate in 10-
point quantitative scales. However, as de-
scribed above, results were very similar regard-
less of the real honesty measure which was
taken. This is why we have included results ob-
tained with all four in the present report, in-
stead of only the results obtained with the two
which seem to be most valid.
Discussion
Although, in line with previous research, we
have found observers tend to agree in their
perceptions of others as honest or dishonest,
we found that these perceptions were inaccu-
rate. Observers´ impressions of participants´
honesty as evaluated on an honest / dishonest
scale as well as on a truthful / deceptive scale
were unrelated to participants´ willingness to
perform deceptive behaviors, regardless of
whether such willingness was measured by
considering the total number of deceptive stud-
ies participants accepted to participate in (sub-
stracting or not the amount of nondeceptive
experiments participants agreed to take part in)
or by taking into account the strength of the
participants´ willingness to participate in the
experiments, as measured on a 10-point
continuous scale (substracting or not the
strength of their willingness to collaborate in
the nondeceptive studies). No support was
found neither for the self-fulfilling prophecy
model nor for the social reinforcement model:
there was no relation between facial appearance
and willingness to deceive. As described in the
116
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
ingness to deceive. As described in the intro-
duction to the present paper, previous research
results are contradictory in their answers to
Berry and Brownlow´s (1989) question as to
whether physiognomists were right. However,
since the most essential aspects of Bond
et al.
´s
(1994) experimental procedure were closely
mirrored in our study it is surprising that our
results do not confirm theirs. An explanation
which could account for this discrepancy con-
cerns cultural differences: maybe facial stereo-
types are accurate among North American col-
lege students and inaccurate among Southern
European undergraduates. This could be based
on social practices which would put in motion
a self-fulfilling-prophecy process among
Americans, but not among Spaniards, but re-
search is needed to test this tentative explana-
tion. In any case, these considerations stress
the importance of doing cross-cultural research
both in the nonverbal detection of deceit (e.g.,
Bond, Omar, Mahmoud, & Bonser, 1990;
Bond, Omar, Pitre, Lashley, Skaggs, & Kirk,
1992; Cody, Lee, & Chao, 1989; see also Ek-
man, 1997, and Znakov, 1997) and in the social
perception of faces (e.g., Keating, Mazur, &
Segall, 1981; Zebrowitz, Montepare, & Lee,
1993). In any case, we think strong conclusions
should not be drawn either from our results
nor from Bond et al.´s until more research on
the accuracy of honesty impressions based on
facial photographs has been conducted both in
the USA and in European countries.
Not only were correlations between hon-
esty impressions and real honesty nonsignifi-
cant, but the same was true for correlations be-
tween facial babyishness or attractiveness and
real honesty as well. This means that psychoso-
cial processess analogous to those predicted to
play a role in the relation between photograph-
based honesty impressions and actual honesty
(i.e., social reinforcement processes or self-
fulfilling prophecy processes) are not in opera-
tion concerning babyfacedness or attractive-
ness either. For example, in the same way it
was suggested honest-looking individuals
would not be suspected of devious behaviors,
therefore they would succeed when deceiving,
which would in turn be rewarding making
them deceive again and again (the social rein-
forcement model), it could also have been sug-
gested that, similarly, attractive individuals, on
the basis of the attractiveness halo effect,
would rarely be suspected of devious acts, thus
suceeding at deceiving others, which would be
gratifying making them behave in a similar way
again and again. Our data, however, refute any
possible hypothesis concerning a link between
attractiveness or babyfacedness and actual
honesty.
Also apparently discrepant with the bulk of
previous research was our finding of no rela-
tionships between neither attractiveness nor
babyfacedness and photograph-based honesty
impressions. Despite the fact that, as explained
in the introduction, most studies have found
that targets´ facial babyishness and attractive-
ness have an influence upon how honest they
are considered to be by unacquainted observ-
ers, some exceptions have also been found. For
example, Zebrowitz and Montepare (1992)
found that, for female targets, correlations be-
tween babyfacedness and honesty impressions
were not significant for 5
th
graders, 8
th
graders,
and young adults. Also among women, attrac-
tiveness was unrelated to honesty impressions
at preschool ages, 5
th
grade, 8
th
grade, and
young adulthood. If we consider that almost all
of our stimulus persons were young adult fe-
males (there were only five men in the sample),
our results are in line with those of Zebrowitz
and Montepare (1992).
Two interesting questions examined in the
present investigation are how accurate target
self-evaluations of honesty are, as well as how
accurate acquainted others´ assessments are.
These questions are important because in some
previous studies (e.g., Berry, 1990) self-ratings
and close acquaintances´ impressions were
used as the independent criteria against which
to compare observers´ photograph-based rat-
ings. Our results showed that self-reports on
one´s own honesty are not valid measures of
participants´ actual honesty, understanding ac-
tual honesty as the willingness not to engage in
deceptive behaviors. Close acquaintances´
Kernel of Truth 117
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
views, as reported by the participants, are in-
deed more valid, since they significantly corre-
lated with our four measures of real honesty.
Probably acquaintances´ perceptions are right
because they are based on the observation of
participants´ actual behavior in their daily life,
not on the participants´ facial appearance. In-
deed, when acquaintances´ views of targets´
truthfulness were correlated with photograph-
based honesty impressions no significant asso-
ciations were revealed. Similarly, observers´
self-reported truthfulness was also independent
from unacquainted observers´ honesty impres-
sions. This indicates that facial stereotypes are
not strong enough to influence either self-
perceptions or close acquaintances´. However,
we must admit that participants´ reports of
close acquaintances´ views may be inaccurate.
That is, participants may be unaware of how
truthful or deceptive their friends and family
think they are. This is unlikely, since in that
case no explanation would be available to ac-
count for the significant correlations between
participants´ reports on how truthful others
consider they are and their real honesty; how-
ever, future research should replicate this find-
ing by correlating participants´ behavioral
measures of honesty with ratings provided by
the close acquaintances themselves.
An additional objective of the present study
was to examine whether facial babyishness and
attractiveness were independent from each
other. Although Berry (1991b), in an excellent
study where a large sample of facial photo-
graphs was used, found evidence that attrac-
tiveness and babyfacedness were independent
dimensions, our data revealed a marginally sig-
nificant association between facial babyishness
and attractiveness. Almost all our stimulus
people were women. In general, women are
more babyfaced than men (Enlow, 1982), and
research shows that gender-prototypical facial
features are perceived as more attractive than
the gender-discrepant (e.g., Langlois &
Roggman, 1990; Zebrowitz, 1997; see however
Perrett, May, & Yoshikawa, 1994; Wheeler,
cited in Berry, 1991b). This suggests that posi-
tive correlations between babyfacedness and at-
tractiveness should be found for women, and
this is what our data reveal, although the ten-
dency does not reach the .05 significance level.
Also, it would be reasonable to expect negative
correlations between males´ facial babyishness
and their attractiveness. Since we had only five
males in the sample of stimulus persons we
could not test this prediction.
Finally, we looked at students´ tendency to
deceive or their reservations about lying. Most
students were willing to participate in most ex-
perimental procedures, either truthful or
deceptive. In fact, there were no significant dif-
ferences between the proportion of partici-
pants who agreed to collaborate in either of the
two nondeceptive experimental procedures and
those who agreed to participate in a number of
deceptive studies, namely the false feedback,
bogus reward, rigged contest, and public
speech experiments. Actually, the students
were willing to participate in 4.40 out of 7 de-
ceptive studies although, fortunately, the
strength of their willingness to do so was mod-
erate (2.51 in a 0 6 scale). Although our re-
quirement to accept to collaborate in at least
two studies could have somewhat increased
these figures (although participants could have
chosen the two nondeceptive studies), it is sur-
prising that as many as a 63.5 % of the students
wrote the deceptive letter, though it was em-
phasized that they could freely choose not to
do so and, indeed, the emotional consequences
for the recipient of the letter could be devastat-
ing if he or she discovered the deception. In
addition, the reason most frequently mentioned
by those who did not write the letter was that
they considered they were not skilled enough
to lie convincingly only a few argued they
considered deception unethical, or possibly
damaging for the recipient. This indicates that
our students do not have very stringent moral
standards. It seems the main reason why some
of them did not write the deceptive note was
their perception of low self-efficacy for lying in
that situation. Otherwise, they would have lied.
Our results are in line with other studies exam-
ining the role of self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura,
1977, 1997) in the performance of socially rep-
118
Jaume Masip y Eugenio Garrido
anales de psicología, 2001, vol. 17, nº 1 (junio)
rehensible acts. For example, recent research
conducted by Garrido (2000) indicates that
perceptions of self-efficacy for engaging in de-
linquent behavior are a strong predictor of de-
linquency.
As said earlier, research on social percep-
tion of faces is relevant for other areas of in-
quiry, such as deception detection research. It
has been suggested facial stereotypes could ac-
count for the demeanor bias (e.g., Bond
et al.
,
1994; Masip et al., 1999; Zebrowitz et al., 1996).
However, observers´ agreement as to which
individuals look honest and which look dis-
honest (regardless of the accuracy of those
stereotypes) may not be necessarily reflected in
real decisions made in specific situations. That
is to say, the fact that face A is considered by
everybody to be dishonest, and face B is con-
sidered by everybody to be honest, does not
imply that the same statement (a given state-
ment) will be judged as deceptive when attrib-
uted to face A and as truthful when attributed
to face B. Scholars ask research participants to
judge photographs in terms of a series of per-
sonality dimensions (e.g., honesty), and clear
tendencies (e.g., that there is consensus in con-
sidering face A as dishonest and face B as hon-
est) are found. But actually, when other infor-
mation is available, when people are not asked
to judge the person (i.e., "is he/she honest or
deceptive?") but his or her behavior (i.e., "is this
statement [delivered by that person] truthful or
deceptive?"), is person A judged to be decep-
tive more often than person B, and person B
judged to be truthful more often than person
A? If so, and if social stereotypes are not accu-
rate, the issue would be worrisome, because
then wrong impressions based on someone´s
facial appearance would make us behave in a
given way towards that person (e.g., consider-
ing he or she is lying regardless of what he or
she says the demeanor bias), and our behav-
ior could have serious consequences for him or
her (e.g., he or she being acquitted or con-
demned in court if we are jurors). Ongoing re-
search is examining these questions.
Acknowledgements
The authors are very grateful to Gema Martín and Ana
María Calvo, who participated as research assistants in this
study. The research reported here was supported by the
Junta de Castilla y León, Programa de Apoyo a Proyectos de Investi-
gación, Ref. SA52/00B.
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(Artículo recibido: 29-12-2000, aceptado: 25-5-2001)
... Another explanation, according to selffulfilling prophecy accounts, is that long-term effects of being evaluated on the basis of one's facial appearance may encourage behaviours that increase the accuracy of that initial impression. For example, looking honest might encourage others to engage in trusting behaviours with that person, and thus encourage that person to act more honestly (Bond et al., 1994;Zebrowitz et al., 1996). Regardless of the underlying mechanism, these accounts suggest a link between facial appearance and behaviour. ...
... In typical accuracy studies, participants form impressions from a single standardized image of a stranger's face, and this impression is compared with actual reports of personality or behaviour (e.g. Bond et al., 1994;Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009;Foo et al., 2019;Haselhuhn & Wong, 2011;Kleisner, Chvátalová, & Flegr, 2014;Li et al., 2017;Stillman, Maner, & Baumeister, 2010;Stirrat & Perrett, 2010;Zebrowitz et al., 2002;Zebrowitz & Rhodes, 2004). Almost nothing is known about the accuracy of impressions across different images containing natural variability in one's appearance. ...
... Furthermore, in light of growing evidence for a degree of accuracy in impressions of adults' faces (e.g. Bond et al., 1994;Foo et al., 2019;Slepian & Ames, 2016;Stirrat & Perrett, 2010) it was possible these impressions would show some degree of accuracy. ...
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Lay wisdom warns against “judging a book by its cover”. However, facial first impressions influence people’s behaviour towards others, so it is critical that we understand whether these impressions are at all accurate. Understanding impressions of children’s faces is particularly important because these impressions can have social consequences during a crucial time of development. Here, we examined the accuracy of two traits that capture the most variance in impressions of children’s faces, niceness and shyness. We collected face images and parental reports of actual niceness/shyness for 86 children (4-11 years old). Different images of the same person can lead to different impressions, and so we employed a novel approach by obtaining impressions from five images of each child. These images were ambient, representing the natural variability in faces. Adult strangers rated the faces for niceness (Study 1) or shyness (Study 2). Niceness impressions were modestly accurate for different images of the same child, regardless of whether these images were presented individually or simultaneously as a group. Shyness impressions were not accurate, either for images presented individually or as a group. Together, these results demonstrate modest accuracy in adults’ impressions of niceness, but not shyness, from children’s faces. Furthermore, our results reveal that this accuracy can be captured by images which contain natural face variability, and holds across different images of the same child’s face. These results invite future research into the cues and causal mechanisms underlying this link between facial impressions of niceness and nice behaviour in children.
... Some of the reviewed studies observe mature appearance to trait mappings in children as young as 3 (Ewing et al., 2019); and there is evidence that even seven-month-old infants show differential brain responses to faces varying in trustworthiness (Jessen & Grossmann, 2019). While trust impressions from faces are not always accurate, our impression formation system is likely built on an adaptive readiness to make judgements based on visual information gleaned from faces, which evolutionarily, revealed more proximate cues to others' intentions (Bond, Berry, & Omar, 1994;Kramer & Ward, 2010;Leivers et al., 2015). This heuristic system is especially important given environmental selection pressures that required us to quickly and efficiently determine whether those we interact with pose a threat to our survival (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008;Zebrowitz & Zhang, 2009). ...
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... An interesting feature of adults' facial impressions is that they are sometimes (very) modestly accurate (but see Rule et al., 2013). For example, adults' impressions of honesty (Bond, Berry, & Omar, 1994;Verplaetse, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007), health (Kramer & Ward, 2006), and sexual unfaithfulness (Leivers, Simmons, & Rhodes, 2015;Rhodes, Morley, & Simmons, 2013) from other adults' faces show above-chance accuracy. This evidence suggests that there may be some valid signals of character in faces, and that adults are sensitive to these cues. ...
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Adults teach children not to "judge a book by its cover." However, adults make rapid judgments of character from a glance at a child's face. These impressions can be modestly accurate, suggesting that adults may be sensitive to valid signals of character in children's faces. However, it is not clear whether such sensitivity requires decades of social experience, in line with the development of other face-processing abilities (e.g., facial emotion recognition), or whether this sensitivity emerges relatively early, in childhood. An important theoretical question therefore, is whether or not children's impressions are at all accurate. Here, we examined the accuracy in children's impressions of niceness and shyness from children's faces. Children (aged 7-12 years, ∼90% Caucasian) and adults rated 84 unfamiliar children's faces (aged 4-11 years, 48 female, ∼80% Caucasian) for niceness (Study 1) or shyness (Study 2). To measure accuracy, we correlated facial impressions with parental responses to well-established questionnaires about the actual niceness/shyness of those children in the images. Overall, children and adults formed highly similar niceness (r = .94) and shyness (r = .84) impressions. Children also showed mature impression accuracy: Children and adults formed modestly accurate niceness impressions, across different images of the same child's face. Neither children nor adults showed evidence for accurate shyness impressions. Together, these results suggest that children's impressions are relatively mature by middle childhood. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that any mechanisms driving accurate niceness impressions are in place by 7 years, and potentially before. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
... As pessoas conseguem, com base nas características globais da face, realizar julgamentos rápidos acerca dos outros, com impacto na tomada de decisão em diversos domínios, isto é: -credibilidade, ou seja, se a pessoa, num dado momento, tem boas intenções (ex., Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004;Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006;Hassin & Trope, 2000;Todorov, Manish & Oosterhof, 2009); -visão política (ex., Rule & Ambady, 2010;Samochowiec, Wänke, & Fiedler, 2010); -competência (política) (ex., Ballew & Todorov, 2007;Laustsen, 2014;Lenz & Lawson, 2011); -probabilidade de ganhar uma eleição (ex., Ballew & Todorov, 2007;Lenz & Lawson, 2011;Olivola & Todorov, 2010); -honestidade (ex., Bond, Berry, & Omar, 1994); -personalidade (ex., Borkenau et al., 2009) -comportamento criminal (ex., Porter et al., 2008;Valla, Ceci, & Williams, 2011), -veredito de culpado em tribunal, mesmo quando existe pouca evidência de culpabilidade (ex., Dumas & Testé, 2006;Porter, ten Brinke, & Gustaw, 2010). ...
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Reconhecer emoções é um recurso crucial no contexto jurídico. Cada vez mais se ouve falar da importância desta área do conhecimento, mas será que conseguimos distinguir as suas oportunidades reais, baseadas na ciência, daquilo que por vezes vimos em determinadas séries televisivas e publicações de entretenimento? A título de exemplo, refira-se a ideia errónea, amplamente disseminada, de que 93% do processo de comunicação é não-verbal, nos pode conduzir a dar uma ênfase excessiva a esta em detrimento da comunicação verbal (Lapakko, 1997, 2007). No decorrer de um julgamento, o foco excessivo no comportamento das testemunhas, arguidos, etc., em sacrifício da linguagem verbal, é naturalmente inadequado. A regra dos 7%, 38%, 55%, para as palavras, voz e comportamento não-verbal, respetivamente, pode fazer algum sentido, mas apenas e quando as pessoas estão a falar acerca de emoções e quando não existe congruência entre o que é dito e aquilo que o corpo manifesta (Mehrabian & Wiener, 1967; Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967). Outro dos mitos que existe em matéria de reconhecimento emocional é o de que desviar o olhar é um sinal de mentira. Não existe evidência científica que suporte tal correlação. Trata-se de um mito. Dos 24 estudos científicos revistos, apenas um não rejeitava esta hipótese (Bond, Omar, Mahmoud, & Bonser, 1990). Na sequência, parece relevante para os autores partilharem as vantagens e as limitações do reconhecimento emocional em ambiente jurídico, com base naquilo que a ciência tem vindo a descobrir nesta área do conhecimento, dado que os mitos nesta área podem trazer consequências graves para o apuramento da verdade (Navarro, 2010). O desenvolvimento da descodificação emocional, através da face, do corpo e da voz, pode ajudar advogados e decisores a compreenderem melhor aquilo que as pessoas sentem, para além daquilo que dizem, como é o caso dos arguidos, das testemunhas, etc. Por outro lado, estarmos mais conscientes da nossa comunicação não-verbal, e como esta pode estar a ser percecionada pelos outros, também se assume como uma vantagem fundamental na barra do tribunal. A comunicação não-verbal representa uma parte relevante do processo de comunicação e a face, em concreto, é um meio através do qual as pessoas procuram naturalmente colher informação acerca do estado emocional do outro. No entanto, nem sempre é fácil compreender a realidade emocional do outro através da face. A título de exemplo, o reconhecimento das Microexpressões Faciais (ex., Ekman, Hager, & Friesen, 1981; Frank & Ekman, 1993, 1997; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008) pode ser extremamente relevante para advogados, juízes, procuradores e jurados, dado que estas se constituem como sinais prováveis de emoções que o outro está a tentar conter ou mascarar (ex., Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). No entanto, por estas ocorrerem muito rapidamente, nem sempre é fácil observá-las e formação adequada é necessária nesta área do conhecimento. Porém, não só a face é relevante para melhor se compreender o comportamento humano no ambiente jurídico. Os gestos, a forma como a pessoa se movimenta, o vestuário, etc., são ingredientes fundamentais para mais eficazmente aferirmos aquilo que o outro sente em cada momento. Os principais objetivos deste capítulo são: a) em que medida os julgamentos rápidos influenciam as decisões de âmbito jurídico; b) o comportamento não-verbal e o reconhecimento emocional; c) o papel da inteligência artificial (IA) no reconhecimento facial e emocional; d) a avaliação da credibilidade.
... Whereas early studies examined relationships between isolated facial features and personality (e.g., eye size and impulsiveness, Cleeton & Knight, 1924), similar results were found throughout most of the 1900s (Alley, 1988). Many studies have now shown that perceptions of personality drawn from single face images, short videotapes, or very brief personal encounters align with the target's self-reported personality (Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995;Berry, 1990;Bond Jr., Berry, & Omar, 1994;Borkenau & Liebler, 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b. Roy (2003) even considered physiognomy as an art and pseudoscience. ...
... 의해 규정된다고 본다 (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 (Todorov et al., 2009;Willis & Todorov, 2006), 얼굴을 통한 추론은 다양한 영역에서의 사회적 판단에 영향을 미치고 있 다 (Antonakis & Delgas, 2009;Blair et al., 2004;Duarte et al., 2012;Eberhardt et al., 2006;Graham et al., 2017;Little et al., 2007;Rezlescu et al., 2012;Rule & Ambady, 2009;Todorov et al., 2005;Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991). 일부 연구들은 얼굴로부터 유추한 내적 속성이 그 사람의 실제 모습과 관련된다는 결과들을 보여주었다 (Bond et al., 1994;Lin et al., 2018;Porter et al., 2008;Samochowiec et al., 2010;Valla et al., 2011). 반면, 얼굴을 통한 추론과 판단이 결코 정확하지 않다는 결과들 또한 다수 확인 되었으며 (Graham et al. 2017;Rule et al., 2013;Zebrowitz et al., 1998;Zebrowitz et al., 1996), 실 제로는 얼굴 정보에 지나치게 의존하는 것이 잘못된 선택과 판단으로 이어지는 경우가 많 았다 (Olivola & Todorov, 2010;Todorov, 2017;Todorov et al., 2015). ...
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Men and women (20 each) were videotaped while describing someone they liked, someone they disliked, someone they were ambivalent about, someone they were indifferent about, someone they liked as though they disliked him or her, and someone they disliked as though they liked him or her. Accuracy at detecting that some deception had occurred was far greater than accuracy at detecting the true underlying affect, and Ss who were good at detecting that deception was occurring were not particularly skilled at reading the speakers' underlying affects. However, Ss whose deception attempts were more easily detected by others also had their underlying affects read more easily. Speakers whose lies were seen more readily by men also had their lies seen more readily by women, and observers better able to see the underlying affects of women were better able to see the underlying affects of men. Skill at lying successfully was unrelated to skill at catching others in their lies. A histrionic strategy (hamming) was very effective in deceiving others, and this strategy was employed more by more Machiavellian Ss, who also tended to get caught less often in their lies. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
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Presents an integrative theoretical framework to explain and to predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment. This theory states that psychological procedures, whatever their form, alter the level and strength of self-efficacy. It is hypothesized that expectations of personal efficacy determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences. Persistence in activities that are subjectively threatening but in fact relatively safe produces, through experiences of mastery, further enhancement of self-efficacy and corresponding reductions in defensive behavior. In the proposed model, expectations of personal efficacy are derived from 4 principal sources of information: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. Factors influencing the cognitive processing of efficacy information arise from enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotive sources. The differential power of diverse therapeutic procedures is analyzed in terms of the postulated cognitive mechanism of operation. Findings are reported from microanalyses of enactive, vicarious, and emotive modes of treatment that support the hypothesized relationship between perceived self-efficacy and behavioral changes. (21/2 p ref)
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Four questions were addressed concerning perceptions of babyfaced individuals from infancy to older adulthood: (a) Do perceivers make reliable babyface judgments at each age; (b) does a babyface have the same effects on trait impressions at each age; (c) are the effects of a babyface independent of the effects of attractiveness; and (d) what facial maturity features are associated with babyface ratings, and do these features predict trait impressions? Ratings of portrait photographs revealed that perceivers reliably detect variations in babyfaceness across the life span. Facial measurements revealed that large eyes, a round face, thin eyebrows, and a small nose bridge characterized a babyface. Trait impressions showed a babyface overgeneralization effect at each age: Babyfaced individuals were perceived to have more childlike traits than their maturefaced peers, and this effect was independent of attractiveness.
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This chapter discusses physical attractiveness in social interactions. Physical attractiveness is, in many ways, a homely variable. The physical attractiveness variable is unpretentious for at least two reasons. First, it is unlikely that it will be found to be orthogonal to other dimensions, primarily intelligence, socioeconomic status, and perhaps genetically determined behavioral predispositions associated with morphological characteristics. Second, it seems highly unlikely that physical attractiveness will ever form the core concept of a psychological theory, even a much needed social perceptual theory, which will illuminate the way to useful and interesting predictions about social relationships. The chapter focuses on recent social psychological evidence, which suggests that even esthetic attractiveness may be a useful dimension for understanding certain social phenomena, and, perhaps, for illuminating some personality and developmental puzzles as well. Perception of the physical attractiveness level of another appears to be influenceable by the affective and experiential relationship between the evaluator and the person whose physical attractiveness level is to be judged, as well as by factors unique to the evaluator and the setting in which evaluations are made, although none of these factors have been the subject of much study. The impact of physical attractiveness upon the individual has been highlighted in the chapter.
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Reliability, content, and homogeneity of own- and other-race impressions were assessed: U.S. White, US. Black, and Korean students rated faces of White, Black, or Korean men. High intraracial reliabilities revealed that people of 1 race showed equally high agreement regarding the traits of own- and other-race faces. Racially universal appearance stereotypes-the attractiveness halo effect and the babyface overgeneralization effect-contributed substantially to interracial agreement, which was only marginally lower than intraracial agreement. Moreover, similar attention to variations in appearance yielded similar degrees of own- and other-race trait differentiation. When own- and other-race differences in the differentiation of faces on babyfaceness were statistically controlled, differences in trait differentiation were eliminated. Despite the individuated impressions of other-race faces, certain racial stereotypes persisted.