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Long Range Planning 37 (2004) 435–457
LRPlong range planning
www.lrpjournal.com
Business Continuity
Management: time for a strategic
role?
Brahim Herbane, Dominic Elliott and Ethne
´M. Swartz
Against a background of increasing threats, business continuity management (BCM) has
emerged in many industries as a systematic process to counter the effects of crises and
interruptions, although its potential to play a more strategic role is still largely under-
explored. This article examines the organisational antecedents of BCM and develops a
conceptual approach to posit that BCM, in actively ensuring operational continuity, has a role
in preserving competitive advantage. Such value preservation is central to the business
continuity/business strategy relationship, and gives rise to the central purpose of the paper;
to discuss whether firms’ BCM can be seen as strategic rather than purely functional.
If so, what form does such provision take in terms of planning, organisation and culture?
Evidence from six UK-based financial services firms illustrates differing approaches to business
continuity, with two firms showing BCM provision more clearly aligned towards a mission-
critical strategic role. Practical precepts for implementation are presented, together with a
diagnostic drawing attention to the key determinants of enhanced value preservation.
Q2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
As individuals we aim to prevent or minimise damage or loss of our personal property by tak-
ing a mixture of measures including physical security, alarms, adequate insurance cover, as well
as adopting vigilance and caution. We may also have emergency telephone numbers at hand
for such services as plumbing and roofing. In essence, we anticipate threats to our possessions
(both deliberate and accidental) and make provision to meet these threats should they arise.
Planning is combined with ongoing changes to lifestyle stances to minimise impact and losses.
In an organisational context, business continuity management (BCM) has evolved into a
process that identifies an organisation’s exposure to internal and external threats and synthe-
sises hard and soft assets to provide effective prevention and recovery. Essential to the success
of BCM is a thorough understanding of the wide range of threats (internal and external) and a
recognition that an effective response will be determined by employees’ behaviour during the
0024-6301/$ - see front matter #2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2004.07.011
business recovery process (see Exhibit 1). Business-process experts should ideally be involved
and take ownership of and responsibility for business continuity activities under the coordinat-
ing umbrella of a central BCM team. Organisations which can recover quickly and thoroughly
from crises will sustain little damage to their competitive position. If an organisation is unable
to recover quickly, or if it is perceived by stakeholders to have managed the recovery process
ineffectively, the effects on its reputation may outlast direct effects of the crisis.
While strategic planners have focussed on how organisations can improve organisational
performance by having a clear understanding of their competitive, political and organisational
environments, planned responses to occurrences which might interrupt normal operations and
threaten the survival of their business have been more fragmented. We propose that BCM has
the potential to play a more integrated, strategic role, and ask whether and how this might be
Exhibit 1. Business continuity in action
Morgan Stanley’s response to the September 11th attacks is an example of the benefits
and limitations of business continuity planning. The company’s approach took a socio-
technical view that was not simply about computer systems recovery, and their organis-
ation-wide philosophy demonstrated both ongoing organisational learning and adap-
tation before and during the crisis.
Continuous training following the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing meant that most
of the company’s 3,700 employees survived the evacuation of the south tower in 2001.
Having achieved this first goal in the chaotic aftermath of the evacuation, the company
proceeded to re-establish contact with its dispersed employees using house calls, public
broadcasts and one of its own call centres located in Arizona. Within three days nearly all
the staff based in the south tower had been located. Simultaneously (but not preceding
staff contact activities) Morgan Stanley set out to recover its operations at alternative
facilities, but not those that were originally designated which were also in the inaccessible
lower Manhattan area. Recognising the differences in strategic importance between
business units, operations and facilities, a temporary recovery centre was established
in Brooklyn until the first recovery centre could be accessed. By Friday morning, testing
activities were in progress and the recovery—both physical and emotional—was
under way.
1
Other firms similarly affected drew on emerging processes in creative ways to reduce
the impact and loss from the denial of access scenario which affected hundreds of firms
on the day. Over half of Lehman Brothers’staff worked from home in the immediate
aftermath as result of the previous roll out of an extensive remote access programme. One
of its senior managers commented that ‘crisis adaptability is the key to continuity’.
2
For most organisations, people and processes are inseparable. The Senior Vice President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Christopher McCurdy) commented that existing
models of contingency planning in which single-site technical crises are considered should
no longer be the order of the day: instead, the priority should be the loss or lack of access to
staff.
3
Without them, nothing can be recovered, restored or retrieved. In the most severe of
crises—theworst-casescenario—physical survival is an indicator of the performance.
Business continuity processes are more vital than ever. Organisations such as Morgan Stanley
and Lehman Brothers have recognised that the creative and flexible use of their resources
supersedes the value gained from mimicking emergency plans. Such an approach requires
ongoing commitment and leadership, the foundations of which are provided by adopting a
business continuity management approach.
436 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
fulfilled. Our review of financial service firms indicates that, while not all firms have reached
this ideal state, they are clearly making changes towards further value creation and capability
development through BCM, and, taken together, demonstrate some of the important steps
necessary for the organisational journey towards an approach that could be termed strategic.
This article is organised into two sections. In the first part, we consider the origins and
development of BCM and posit its potential to play a strategic role in organisations. This
section focuses on how BCM has evolved along with a four-point conceptualisation of a poss-
ible strategic role for BCM. The second section uses evidence from organisations in the UK
financial services industry to identify the extent to which organisations exhibit a strategic
orientation in their business continuity practices. Bringing our conceptual and case analyses
together for synthesis, we recommend lessons to be learnt for organisations starting or pro-
ceeding on the journey towards improved resilience to crises
Genesis of a strategic role—initial considerations
Our initial proposal for BCM to be considered as strategic is that BCM offers organisations an
approach by which to improve the continuity of operations in the event of a crisis or disaster.
Without this organisational capability in place, the strategic dimensions of competitive advan-
tage may not have a secure platform to generate further value. Concepts such as tacitness, com-
plexity and specificity are associated with the idea of path dependency and the historical
dimensions of resource development within organisations, which reflect a resource-based view
of capabilities and competitive advantage.
4
Without operational continuity, the development
of mission-critical resources can be jeopardised as organisations race to isolate their competi-
tive advantages from imitation. Furthermore, seeking competitive advantages in the face of
known vulnerabilities that threaten the reputation, solvency or survival of the organisation, raises
the question of whether senior managers have adopted the long-term, company wide perspec-
tive that is at the core of good strategic management practice.
In terms of a competitive advantage hypothesis in which superior performance (the depen-
dent variable) stems from competitive advantages (independent variables) that include, inter
alia,firm resources and routines, factor market conditions, and industry structure,
5
one might
logically add an ability to preserve value that has been created. Operational continuity thus
helps to preserve value. The capability of an organisation to resist crises or to recover quickly
and minimise the impact of loss is what we term value preservation. Value preservation is a
background capability (comprising of business continuity resources, processes, routines and
know-how) that is underpinned by BCM and provides an improved operational stability in
which the competitive advantages achieved through the implementation of strategic initiatives
can flourish. We are not suggesting that BCM necessarily leads to competitive advantage—but
without BCM the risk exposure of the organisation may well be heightened. Therefore, its
potential contribution to the organisation is that of value preservation.
[BCM’s] potential contribution to the firm is that of value preservation.
Increasingly, echoing some well established concepts in the field of strategic management, it
becomes possible to see business continuity as having a strategic role. Where a number of orga-
nisations are affected by the same incident, those with more effective recovery and restoration
practices will emerge with a recovery advantage, which not only underpins the quicker resto-
ration of operations and activities, but also actively militates against the threat of impaired
reputation in the post-crisis phase.
6
BCM is not simply a functional process with a limited remit and impact. Instead, it can be
considered as a capability (i.e. a mix of routines and skills that is observable but not necessarily
tangible or transferable) that underpins organisational development in complex environments.
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 437
Next, we consider some antecedent approaches and how BCM differs from competing
approaches to the improvement of crisis resilience.
Antecedents and influences upon BCM
The field of crisis management theory points towards a strategic role for the capability to resist
and recover from crises. Crisis management (CM) can be considered the roots of BCM, estab-
lishing its core assumptions. Disaster recovery planning (DRP) can be considered to be a less
socio-technical predecessor to BCM: the differences between them highlight how approaches
to planning for crisis recovery have developed in recent decades.
7
Mitroff et al. have suggested that, since crisis management is a process in which an organis-
ation engages with its environment (thereby having an impact across its many parts and affect-
ing a complex collection of stakeholders), such a process ought to be regarded as strategic in its
nature.
8
Furthermore, they point to another similarity between BCM and strategy, in that cri-
sis-related decisions are taken by senior managers and may be incremental in nature. Preble
also characterises the crisis management process in a manner which resembles that of a stra-
tegic planning process. First there is an initiation of a planning process followed by an organis-
ation and environmental analysis (risk assessment) and the subsequent development of plans
for prevention, back-up and recovery. The next step involves documentation, implementation
and periodic reviews. Such a process is not dissimilar to a process involving goal setting, analy-
sis and selection and implementation of strategy. Where crisis management and strategic man-
agement complement each other, is that the former enhances the organisation’s‘defensive
capability’against crises, whilst the latter augments ‘offensive capabilities’in respect of the
competitive environment.
9
Richardson offers a further rationale for crisis management and
strategy to share a common purpose, as crises ‘are incidents which threaten the strategic goals of
organisations’. Furthermore, it is argued that an organisation’s strategies should deliberately set
out to avoid crises by adopting a long-term, stakeholder driven process of collaboration.
10
BCM has developed into a socio-technical (often organisation-wide) approach to crisis and
risk management. In both theory and practice, BCM draws upon both CM and DRP approa-
ches. These alternatives differ in the emphasis they place upon the three basic stages of a crisis:
pre-crisis, trans-crisis and post-crisis. The disaster recovery planning approach (with its infor-
mation technology focus) emphasises recovery over prevention (since the causes of crisis are
perceived to be beyond the control of individuals and organisations).
11
DRP has traditionally
been oriented towards information technology failures and natural disasters. In contrast, the
crisis management approach is more akin to BCM, positing that a crisis incubates during a
pre-crisis period/phase, awaiting a triggering event to transform the latent crisis into an active
one. Indeed, given that organisations’systems are both complex and coupled, some crisis man-
agement theorists have described accidents as being ‘normal’.
12
Although, strictly speaking, this
notion of the normality of accidents corresponds with a presumed inevitability of crisis that
cannot be prevented by human intervention, a more appropriate view is that if there is an
expectation that crises will not happen then there will be little effort to put prevention or
recovery measures into place. The incubation of a crisis has, in contrast to the ‘normal-acci-
dent’perspective, been attributed to sloppy management avoiding or ignoring warning sig-
nals.
13
An acceptance of the normality of accidents leads to a further, inevitable, conclusion:
that a remedy or solution is infinitely preferable (hence the need for BCM as advocated in this
article). Although clear distinctions may not easily be drawn, BCM tends to be business-centric
(the organisation, customers, suppliers, etc.) whilst crisis management tends to be socio-
centric (government, public bodies, local community, etc). Each has associated techniques for
the risk analysis and planning, although, increasingly, the terms ‘continuity management’and
‘crisis management’are becoming interchangeable.
The vulnerability of individuals or organisations does not automatically change with such
realisations—knowing that one is vulnerable does not make one more or less vulnerable.
438 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
Instead, we find that, if we look at the propensity for crisis in a system, we can identify how a
crisis may be being incubated or hidden, rather than merely responding to the crisis event,
which is effectively a DRP approach. Sharp makes a useful distinction between DRP and BCM
when he notes that ‘[Disaster recovery] of computer systems [is] simply part of the technical
implementation of the overall business strategy. Unlike disaster recovery planning, business conti-
nuity is about anticipating failures and taking planned and rehearsed steps to protect the business
and its stakeholders’ interests. It is about co-ordinating and integrating all the planning processes
across departments and presenting a confident image to the outside world.
14
Next, we propose the
case for BCM to be considered as strategic, following which we examine our proposition using
case evidence.
Business continuity management as a strategic precursor
For commercial organisations, the adjective ‘strategic’evokes the idea of a long-term competi-
tive advantage. BCM is not only wholly compatible with this view but (as we discussed above)
it is also a strategic precursor since a threat to the advantage (due to lack of crisis resilience)
threatens the continuity of operations over a prolonged period. And just as planning is con-
sidered strategic when it facilitates the long-term development of competitive advantages, it
can be argued that BC management which readies an organisation to preserve value derived
from competitive advantage is also strategic.
Figure 1 distinguishes between different approaches to crisis management and business con-
tinuity preparations according to whether the scope of the activity is designed to address tech-
nical or socio-technical crisis, and according to whether the activity is potentially strategic in
nature. A strategic orientation, for our purposes, is defined as an approach that is business-
driven, based on a combination of planning and management, and potentially leads to long-
term value creation and organisational advantage. Accordingly, we see that an organisation
with a technical operational focus only has little more than the ability to respond to a crisis, as
opposed to anticipating and limiting losses.
Where an organisation follows either a route towards planning for technical interruptions
across the organisation (DR planning) or for socio-technical interruptions across the organis-
ation (BC planning),
15
organisations are taking one step toward the goal of BCM which is not
Figure 1. Typology of continuity approaches.
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 439
only strategic in orientation, (with the attendant potential benefits as signposted above) but
also ready to address a wider set of crises than those arising from an IT or facilities interrup-
tion alone. Whilst BCP and DRP are not strategic in nature, it does not preclude the possibility
that an organisation can develop its DRP provisions into those more closely resembling BCM.
In addition to the general parallels between strategic management and continuity manage-
ment outlined above (in terms of planning processes, capability development and socio-techni-
cal approaches), a number of addition facets evoke the possible convergence between the two
disciplines (thereby suggesting the proposition of a strategic role for BCM). These include:
.Speed—a critical determinant of recovery advantage;
.Configuration resilience—the reduction of supply chain and business network vulnerability;
.Obligation—regulatory and legislative drivers; and
.Embeddedness—achieved over time and necessary to make a transition from planning to
management.
Speed
The concept of time as a source of organisational advantage is long held in the strategic man-
agement field, and the ability of an organisation to achieve an objective more quickly than riv-
als, whether this be the reduction of lead time, time-to-market, production cycle time, or
imitation time, has long been considered to be a source of competitive advantage
16
Equally
valid is the ability to recover more quickly than rivals who face the same crisis or interruption.
In the event of a crisis or interruption to business operations, such as where two or more
firms suffer from the same power outage, the ability to relocate and restore systems, people and
data will affect the race for resumed operations. Those organisations that are better able to
recover quickly will have to endure less (if any) time turning away new customers, delaying
transactions with existing ones and facing the inherent loss of goodwill that develops as a firm
is perceived as slower to recover than others. Similarly, an organisation may find itself losing
ground to imitators once its product has been compromised.
organisations able to recover quickly will [avoid] turning away
customers, delaying transactions and loss of goodwill.
The speed of recovery is the surface exposure of a more profound capability in the form of
organisational alertness (prior, deep knowledge, notification, invocation and emergency team
procedures) and preparedness (alternative sites, well exercised plans, resource redundancy).
Speed, expressed as the reduction of process lead-time, preserves value on each occasion that
an emergency response is required, thereby reducing the length of discontinuity periods while
the organisation recovers from interruption. Over a longer period of time, an organisation’s
alertness underpins the development and maintenance of competitive advantages. Thus whilst
there may only be an occasional need (varying between organisations and between industries)
to deploy business continuity plans, the underlying capabilities which facilitate responsiveness
also influence the organisation’s preparedness and resilience. Speed of recovery or appropriate
response may also contribute to limit negative impacts on an organisation’s reputation.
A note of caution needs to be sounded, however: despite the requirement for speed, a thor-
ough recovery is preferable to one which merely patches over the damage caused by the inci-
dent. For instance, an e-tailer may be able to restore order-taking operations within a few
hours of an interruption, but if stock information is incorrect (due to inaccuracies in restoring
data), a new set of problems will arise when clients find their orders delayed or incorrect.
440 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
Configuration resilience
Long-term sources of competitive advantage are vulnerable if organisations are ill prepared to
deal with major operational interruptions. Although the avoidance of crises through well
developed and tested business continuity provisions is a starting point, since organisations do
not operate in isolation, it is the capability of an organisation to resist crises when those
around it (or within its extended supply chain) encounter difficulties that is increasingly vital
in stockless, high volume and rapid transaction supply chains.
Business risk can take many forms, not least those traditionally associated with insurance.
However, a further view of risk is that of a heightened vulnerability/exposure to interruptions
arising from the configuration of the organisation’s supply chain. For instance, a legal dispute
in 2002 between Land Rover and one of its chassis component suppliers UPF-Thompson
threatened production of its Discovery model, affecting some 1,400 employees directly, and
around 10,000 indirectly
17
This stark case exemplifies the vulnerability to interruption that
organisations face where they have chosen a single supplier rather than adopting the parallel or
multiple sourcing approach essential to strategic procurement
18
And as the English Football
League discovered in the same year when its main TV rights customer collapsed, the down-
stream supply chains are not simply a domain for trade, but may also be a potential source of
threats. Such purchasing decisions are strategic: and so are their implications for the organis-
ation should a crisis arise.
Equally important in the event of a crisis is the use of support services (such as data salvage,
data restoration, telecommunications, staff counselling, emergency accommodation, etc.) from
recovery suppliers, who may not necessarily be a firm’s normal operating suppliers. Clearly such
a supplier (for instance of hot site user workspace facilities) must be chosen with care—they
may have little day-to-day contact with a client organisation but, in the event of a crisis, will
become the focus of company attention and reliance, and key to its ability to achieve a satisfac-
tory recovery (both in terms of quality and time). Without the adoption of a strategic mindset
for business continuity (and thus for supplier identification), one might only discover the stra-
tegic importance of such a supplier when it’s too late!
Once again, the outward signs of successful configuration resilience might only be appreci-
ated periodically in the event of a crisis that is mitigated quickly and without delay to oper-
ational supply chain. But BCM will still be delivering value preservation in the forms of
increased resistance to crises and higher reliability configurations.
Obligation—regulation and legislation
Value preservation within organisations is increasingly a concern for external parties such as
regulators and legislators who consequently oblige many organisations to introduce business
continuity provisions.
While such external drivers have elevated BCM to a higher level of importance within the
corporate governance agenda, they have also challenged organisations to examine whether
their response should be merely to comply with minimum necessary requirements or to adopt
what we would term a more strategic approach, to exceed minimum requirements in favour of
leveraging their BCM capabilities further. Just as good strategic planners will pay attention to
changes in their competitive environments—and in some cases attempt to shape it—there is
scope for business continuity managers to move beyond the legal or regulatory pull factors of
national, industry or technology obligation. However, since these pull factors provide the ana-
lytical baseline for planners, they merit identification.
State responses to natural disasters or terrorism highlight the need to
address potential responses to business interruptions.
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 441
At a national level, the understanding of the inescapable links between business and risk
takes various forms. State responses to natural disasters or acts of terrorism have highlighted
the need for organisations to address their potential responses to business interruptions.
19
Fur-
thermore, business continuity is echoed in further developments that have taken place in the
arena of corporate governance. Recent initiatives in corporate governance such as Turnbull’s
1999 Guidance for Directors on Internal Controls for Risk Management (UK) identify four
broad categories of risk (business, financial, compliance and operational), and highlights the
need not only for clear totemic and practical links between the senior management and the
management of risks to preserve value, but also the long-term commitments that are necessary
to achieve them. (An organisation’s need to mitigate so many levels of risk supports the case
for the embeddedness of its BCM process beyond planning and into management (see below)).
The role of the state in requiring organisations to pursue risk reduction is not new. The US
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977), in which corporate managers would be held liable for
the protection of corporate assets, is often cited as a primary driver of business continuity in
the US whilst, more recently, Presidential Decision Directive 67 (PDD67) has required US Fed-
eral Agencies to put in place provisions for the ‘continuity of operations’(a public sector syn-
onym for business continuity)
20
.
At an industry level, the financial services industry is recognised to be at the forefront of
business continuity practice. This is hardly surprising, given the highly regulated nature of day-
to-day activities which require technical disaster recovery preparations to be ever-available.
21
Finance organisations have long demonstrated an ability to extend the state of the art and lead
where other industries follow. This volition is driven by the sector’s reliance on Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT), the clustered nature of location (e.g., finance ‘capi-
tals’), and its attractiveness as a target for individual and organised crime as well as for terrorist
groups. This clearly demonstrates the context-dependent nature of the drivers for BCM.
Nevertheless, the potential to purposefully exceed generic levels of competence at an industry
level exists, as is shown in this study.
Within technologies—in particular ICT—external drivers for business continuity provision
are increasing: the ISO 17799 standard contains recommended practices for business conti-
nuity, IT security and data back-up, while (at an operational level) the Australian/New Zealand
4360 standard has set down the first generic risk management standards in the world. The gen-
eric competencies which follow such standards are likely to become qualifying rather than win-
ning criteria as stakeholders come to expect more coordinated and proactive approaches to
value preservation.
For those organisations operating in contexts of high obligation towards business continuity,
BCM can be seen in the strategic role of extending value preservation to a wider set of stake-
holders. In their turn organisations in less mature industries—in terms of continuity obliga-
tions—have an opportunity to differentiate through the mimetic adoption of processes and
practices from elsewhere. Each level of obligation, whether national, industry or technological,
provides an opportunity for mere compliance or for exceeding prevailing norms to identify
greater possibilities for value preservation.
Embeddedness
The fourth dimension that influences the potential for a strategic role is the extent to which
BCM processes become embedded. This transition arises when strategic thinking and partici-
pation in the business continuity process is not only evidenced among the top management
team, but also manifests itself throughout the organisation. BCM is then not merely ‘a plan’
but constitutes the organisational processes of leadership, commitment to which may be seen
operating at individual and group levels. As this process becomes ongoing, BCM is more likely
to become aligned with strategic initiatives within the organisation, and as the organisation
grows and changes, so does its recovery planning. While embeddedness does not immediately
442 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
lead to the attainment of an advantage, its reorientation as a strategic matter supports
improved value preservation.
As an antecedent to BCM, DRP was a process dedicated to the creation of a plan, char-
acterised as reactive and concerned with hardware and facilities and focused with functionally
isolated organisational structures. The purpose of such planning is to protect core computing
operations rather than to adopt a macro-organisation stance. Whilst containing more than
adequate detail for technical recovery, such an approach may take too little account of people
and communications issues: thus when an emergency plan is invoked (or tested) it will be seen
to have inadequately accounted for the variations of authentic human behaviour.
22
Managing
behaviour (rather than prescribing it in the form of a plan) is a difficult balance to achieve,
especially under conditions of a crisis. Whilst simulations and testing are beneficial, organisa-
tions cannot (for reasons of cost and stress upon their employees) always undertake the most
realistic forms of training. The dangers of taking the search for realism too far were dramati-
cally illustrated in the ‘fatal’Nairobi Airport ‘air crash’in August 2002, when what was repor-
ted round the world as a genuine incident later transpired to be an exercise designed to the test
the response of the emergency services.
23
For business continuity to succeed in a genuine
emergency, it is the combination of managing the process of recovery as the incident unfolds
(revealing surprises and complexities for staff and management to address) with the established
plans that will make for an effective recovery. This is evidenced by the increasing appearance of
incident management and command and control practices drawn from the emergency services
in the BC provisions of private organisations.
24
The combination of effective plans coupled
with flexibility, creativity and adaptation, is a necessary characteristic of both strategic plan-
ning and business continuity. Whilst in both there is uncertainty of outcome (in the latter,
unexpectedness is inherent) the necessary tension between deliberate and emergent processes
from the former still remains.
An embedded process is an essential condition that transforms BC Planning into BC Man-
agement, and it is the latter that has the potential to exhibit a strategic role. If the process is not
embedded, it cannot contribute to the long-term strategic goals of an enterprise, and will only
offer episodic manifestations of high quality BC responses: consistent manifestation assumes
that it is embedded.
If the BCM process is not embedded, it cannot contribute to the long-
term strategic goals of an enterprise.
Thus far our discussion has posited that there is the possibility for BCM to offer a greater
contribution to organisations, and one which could be seen as strategic. It is therefore oppor-
tune to examine, from an empirical perspective, whether firms have in place BCM processes
which are strategically oriented—and if so, what form do they take in terms of organisation,
planning and culture.
Methodology
Validation through empirical observation of what occurs within organisations, and this
necessitates a framework for data collection and analysis. We have highlighted four factors
that could affect whether BCM could play a strategic role in the preservation of competitive
advantages: speed, configuration resilience, embeddedness and obligation (external drivers).
With the exception of external drivers (which are observable at an industry or national level),
the three other factors could potentially be observed in organisations’continuity practices. The
research team concluded that case-based observational and semi-structured interview data
focussing upon four critical areas would be used to identify the approach taken by the organis-
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 443
ation to deal with business interruptions and determine whether this amounted to a ‘strategic
BCM’. The four dimensions below represented the general structure of the research interviews:
.Human resources and responsibilities;
.Business continuity planning and processes;
.Communications and structure; and
.Attitudes toward business continuity and ownership of the process.
Six UK-based financial services organisations were chosen to provide a basis for the examin-
ation of four process dimensions which characterise their continuity practices. The choice of
the UK financial industry for our sample was based on a twofold rationale. First, as noted ear-
lier, the industry has a long history of business continuity practice and has indicated the poten-
tial for BCM to have a strategic role. Secondly, the researchers were familiar with the sector
and, importantly in methodological terms, had access to organisations for data collection. In
our experience, firms often express initial reluctance to participate in studies dealing with busi-
ness continuity, since the subject under discussion is highly sensitive (particularly if no
adequate plan exists within the firm). It is therefore absolutely imperative that participants
cannot be identified nor any data associated with the participants be identified, and for this
reason organisations are referred to in the research report only by pseudonyms. While all the
firms are from the same sector and facing similar business conditions, the findings show their
operations are by no means homogenous.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with continuity managers and members of their
headquarter teams—all with operational responsibility for the BCM process—from six finance
organisations, (two insurance companies and four banks), selected from the Finance Sector
User Group member list of Survive.
25
Two members of the research team were present at each
interview, one actually conducting the interview, while the second ensured that interviewer
bias was reduced by checking that all questions had been covered in sufficient detail to enable
comparisons within the sample. The tape-recorded interviews were transcribed and respon-
dents consulted for verification purposes. The principles of grounded theory were used to
guide data analysis. Interview data was analysed, classified, and coded by three researchers with
experience in content analysis, using the interview schedule as a template, together with related
documents.
The research is clearly limited in its generalisability given the small sample in what was only
intended as an exploratory study. As Bryman notes, ‘case studies should be evaluated in terms of
the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that are generated. The aim is not to infer the findings
from a sample or population, but to engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance.
26
Like all other research, the work is also subject to limitations in its validity and reliability, but
the aim of the research was not to generate ‘objective’knowledge per se, but to examine the
under-researched area of BCM and question its normal definition as ‘non-strategic’
The composition and background of the BC team [governs] its scope of
activities and...its potential to behave strategically.
Empirical findings
Human resources and responsibilities
The composition and background of the BC team is an important determinant of its scope of
activities and indicates its potential to behave strategically. Respondents were drawn from a
444 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
wide range of business backgrounds, with IT the focus in two and identified in a third. (The
backgrounds of business continuity personnel interviewed for this study along with the pseu-
donyms used to refer to respondent organisations in the study are shown in Table 1.) Two
organisations (Celtbank, Ambank) took a multi-functional view, which held that business con-
tinuity managers should be drawn from business rather than technical IT areas. The Ambank
respondent told us that they felt leadership of the BC process by an IT specialist would have
resulted in an emphasis on technical aspects. They felt this would create cognitive blinkers
which would impede the search for potential problems and solutions, and adversely affecting
configuration resilience by hindering the dissemination of the BC process across all functional
areas: these feelings were echoed at Celtbank and Usbank.
In the four organisations whose teams were not dominated by members with an IT back-
ground (USbank, UKinsco, Celtbank and Ambank), previous experience of business process
reviews and internal strategic audits were identified by team members as an important strength
in their business continuity processes, since such analyses would reveal the human and stra-
tegic consequences of a crisis. A clear understanding of competitive and strategic analysis was
also considered essential in the composition of the business continuity team. USbank, Celtbank
and Ambank signalled a broad scope of activity (Figure 1) through the decisions of senior
managers to delegate responsibility for business continuity to a multi-skilled team. Such an
approach to the selection and composition of the BC team reflects a more holistic remit for
BCM. In contrast, the remaining three organisations considered business continuity to be an
IT task undertaken by suitably qualified staff.
A further observation made about human resources and responsibilities was the absence of
an explicit role for legal affairs and compliance-based know-how within teams. With the
exception of Ambank, all others relied on such expertise being brought into the team rather
than residing permanently (or semi-permanently through secondment) within the BC team.
Given the increasing obligations of organisations through legislation and regulation, such an
omission is an important impediment to the improvement of value preservation processes.
Business continuity planning and process
Several approaches to planning emerged from our case study organisations. The first approach
distinguished sharply between the ‘disaster recovery’and ‘business dimensions’of the business
continuity process in favour of the latter as the dominant focus. In Celtbank and Ambank
these processes were clearly separated, with business continuity existing almost as a ‘meta-
department’which retained an overview of IT disaster recovery planning (i.e. DRP was a sub-
ordinate activity to Business Continuity activities). At Ambank, business continuity was the
umbrella for two types of planning which varied according to severity and type of failure,
rather than making a distinction between types of resource (IT, facilities, etc.). Disaster
Table 1. Key to respondents and teams
Name/pseudonym Number
of staff
Age of team Qualifications and background of team
USBANK Three Since 1994 Banking, strategy and IT experience
UKINSCO Two Since 1989 Organisation and methods, business analysis
CELTBANK Five Since 1992 Internal consultancy, organisation and methods, total quality
management
AMBANK Three Since 1987 Accounting, sales/marketing, internal auditing
LONBANK Three Since 1989 IT and facilities management
EUROINS Three Since 1990 IT management and contingency planning
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 445
recovery planning dealt with the ‘worst-case’scenarios whilst contingency planning dealt
within specific incidents within the organisation.
A second approach used planning to provide a contingency for the recovery of specific facili-
ties. Although the aim was to enable the business to continue operations in a functional rather
than cross-functional way (i.e. several business activities simultaneously), at USbank and Lon-
bank this was restricted to IT disaster recovery planning alone. By contrast, UKinsco and Euro-
ins used planning to achieve facility restoration, concentrating on those facilities in their
possession rather than the business activities they would need to restore (which might span
several facilities). Those organisations which exhibited a DRP approach (USbank and Lon-
bank) limited their planning to a technology focus. Plans were researched and prepared (in
their entirety) by the continuity team and no wider participation in the planning process was
sought. The broader scope of business continuity evident at Celtbank and Ambank fits with
what has been associated with leading practice within the UK finance sector.
27
Such leading
practice organisations recognised that business continuity should be tailored to the needs of
particular functions or product markets, rather than be offered as a generic solution to all,
reflecting the context-dependent nature of planning that we noted in our conceptual presen-
tation. This was evident at Celtbank, where a variety of criteria was used to rank their product
markets and subsidiaries according to ‘their risk in terms of location, their amount of security,
technology exposure, revenue flows, and their value in a strategic sense.’(Celtbank’s BC Man-
ager). Here we can observe an organisation seeking to preserve value by identifying areas of
risk throughout the product and property portfolio. Whilst UKinsco and Euroins were largely
concerned with the integrity of their systems, with continuity efforts that were hardware
focused and internal (an example of internal resilience), at Celtbank and Ambank the scope
incorporated internal, external, hardware and software elements, and evidenced a key concern
for protecting the interests of their customers (configuration resilience).
In addition, further examination of Celtbank and Ambank’s planning approach and pro-
cesses revealed the intention to develop a more strategic role for their business continuity
activities. In these organisations, business continuity did not deal with units (departments, sec-
tions of divisions) in isolation, but actively sought to identify the strategic significance of
different units and key linkages both within and beyond their organisational boundaries, seek-
ing to improve their configuration resilience by identifying links, threats, vulnerabilities and
impacts along the supply chain. In contrast to the other four organisations in this study, they
involved corporate customers in the business continuity review process, and business
continuity issues were also considered during the development of new products. For example,
Celtbank’s evaluation of a new stock exchange system involved the business continuity team,
both to advise on technical and recovery issues and solutions that might be incorporated at the
design stage of the project, and to consider explicitly the strategic implications for the organis-
ation were the new system to fail. At the same time, the speed of recovery and its implications
for the company’s competitive advantage were brought to the forefront of the BC agenda.
Four of the respondent organisations (Euroins, UKinsco, Celtbank and Ambank) indicated
that they had adopted a variety of strategic planning tools to aid their understanding of them-
selves and the markets in which they operated. Three—UKinsco, Celtbank and Ambank—
reported the use of value chain analysis to help identify the linkages between their various
primary and support activities. The use of this analytical framework within a BC context
demonstrates an understanding of the relationship between value creation through strategic
planning and value preservation through BCM. Respondents suggested that understanding this
relationship was a key determinant of the effectiveness of any such process. Celtbank and
Ambank reported that they were able to relate and direct the resources invested in business
continuity to strategic initiatives and, therefore, to demonstrate that they had extracted value
from the business continuity process. Ambank’s BC manager reported that the bank had suc-
ceeded in attracting new corporate clients due to their ability to demonstrate competence in
business recovery. This success in demonstrating configuration resilience, the respondent
446 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
added, was invaluable in encouraging the bank’s employees to see business continuity activities
as more than simply a ‘negative administrative task’, but as something which actively con-
tributed to revenue creation. A secondary benefit of a more strategically oriented BCM focus is
that a thorough analysis of the organisation’s value system can aid the process of prioritising
which processes and resources are most fundamental and need to be restored first. This is not
dissimilar to the results of Business Impact Analysis, one of the most popular tools used by BC
planners (including respondents at Celtbank and Ambank).
commitment to BC [was] part of appraisal system for middle
managers...and seen as an integral and ongoing part of daily
routines.
Communications and structure
Organisations seeking to embed the BC process can utilise a combination of means to com-
municate its relevance, including training sessions, awareness raising exercises and ongoing
communication tailored to meet the needs of their target groups. These measures also signal
the extent to which BC is a one-off process, or is embedded and on-going. For example,
Ambank’s continuity team took the trouble to understand the operations of diverse business
processes and departments and their practices and subcultures in order to tailor training and
communications to their individual departments’needs. They believed this would improve
the effectiveness of training, documentation and presentations. A commitment to BC also
formed part of the appraisal system for middle managers, and was seen as far more than simply
preparing plans but to be about business continuity as an integral and ongoing part of daily
routines. At Celtbank and Ambank the BC teams have a clear position in the hierarchy, report-
ing to senior management, and supporting structure which enhance their multi-disciplinary
focus and know-how. The absence or ambiguity of formal structures in the others indicated
the presence of a rigid, function-based disaster recovery planning approach rather than a trans-
functional (more strategic) form of management.
In order to establish permanent communications and structural arrangements, Celtbank and
Ambank had developed systems of formal departmental co-ordinators to complement the
business continuity team, whilst other respondents (USbank, Euroins) had only a voluntary
co-ordination scheme in place. The role of the co-ordinators was to aid the collection of rel-
evant data and to disseminate information throughout the organisation. Respondents reported
that this appeared to have worked with varying degrees of success, with the greatest success
enjoyed by those organisations (Celtbank, Ambank) with formal coordinators and where line
managers were responsible for business continuity in their own areas, enabling them to take
some ownership of the BC process. These formal coordinators functioned as an active and
ongoing nexus between the head-office based business continuity team and operating func-
tions, business-processes and departments. In contrast, voluntary involvement was over-reliant
upon goodwill (which could be abused or exhausted) and led to a more fragmented involve-
ment and participation by coordinators. This also signalled that BC activities were not
considered to be strategically important.
Attitudes and ownership
The structural arrangements identified above were also reinforced by control and rewards sys-
tems which shaped and determined attitudes towards BC activities and the ownership of
responsibilities and outcomes within the process (such as the plan itself). At Celtbank and
Ambank, line managers were given formal responsibility for continuity management and plans
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 447
within their units with continuity targets negotiated and set during their annual appraisals. To
complement these formal provisions, informal peer pressure prevailed in which line managers
monitored the development of continuity initiatives. The ongoing failure of any manager to
contribute to continuity management was seen as a betrayal of collective responsibility and the
commitment shown by those who had already invested their time and resources. Celtbank and
Ambank reported this as a powerful control mechanism in engendering an organisation-wide
rather than parochial outlook. In contrast, appraisal systems were not used at all at Usbank,
and little attempt at evaluation was evident.
Assumptions concerning the nature of crises were revealed, in part, by the reported stimulus
for developing the continuity process. The two US based organisations of our survey reported
the important role of Federal Law and wider obligations highlighted earlier. For USbank com-
pliance with the law was seen as an end itself. However, for Ambank, although the trigger had
been legal requirements (obligation), the incentive to develop continuity practice came in the
form of the business’s own strategy and mission critical activities. Nevertheless, Ambank and
USbank highlight how geographical and regulatory antecedents drive the core need for busi-
ness continuity provisions.
Without exception, the four European organisations identified the threat of terrorism as the
key stimulus for initiating BC activities. For UKinsco, Lonbank and Euroins, the perception of
continuity management as a contingency against potential terrorist activity appeared to have
led to little alteration in their provision (which was still primarily concerned with IT and facili-
ties recovery) despite the possibility of gaining a recovery advantage by more successfully react-
ing to a terrorist event which threatened both them and their competitors. For Celtbank,
although the threat of terrorism had been the starting point for the introduction of business
continuity, the process had highlighted the interdependencies and vulnerabilities of the bank’s
supply chain. As with Ambank, business continuity activities had evolved which resembled,
supported and were driven by their organisation’s strategies. This contrasted sharply with prac-
tice found elsewhere: for example, USbank reported a complete failure to enlist the partici-
pation of key staff in the continuity process, since they did not consider business continuity
activities to be their responsibility, and the USbank continuity team produced plans without
any input from line managers. The resulting plans were prepared to meet the obligations of
regulatory requirements and reflected the dominant self-interest of functions along with the
absence of formal BC roles beyond the team based at corporate headquarters.
Analysis—time for a strategic role?
The case data offers a revealing if mixed picture of continuity practices in the UK financial ser-
vices sector. Earlier in the paper we proposed that BCM had the potential to contribute to stra-
tegic value preservation along the dimensions of speed (recovery advantage), configuration
resilience, embeddedness and a superior response to external obligations. These dimensions
help to differentiate between a ‘standard’approach and an approach to BCM that could be
termed ‘strategically oriented’. There are two steps to such an approach; the first step involves
robust organisational systems, practices and attitudes that resemble BCM, while the second
step involves a shift from standard business to a strategic continuity management approach.
Let us consider the first step.
Differences in practices—some clear leaders
At the time of the study, the concerns of Ambank and Celtbank lay very much with the preser-
vation of value through the business continuity process. The delegation of responsibility to line
managers and the use of coordinators also fit with this broader view. There is also evidence
that their orientations had evolved from more limited approaches triggered by Federal require-
ments in one case and the threat of terrorism in the other. As the only two organisations con-
sistently exhibiting some characteristics of a strong strategic orientation, it is interesting to
note that responsibility for continuity management had originally been placed within an IT
448 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
department, implying its scope was initially considered to be technological. However, it was
evident that cultural change had occurred, from a position of relative disinterest amongst
employees to one in which the majority of line managers were fully committed to the process.
This reorientation of continuity activities was not an overnight endeavour—it required man-
agers to link, leverage and lead their resources in more imaginative and less parochial ways.
These differences in approach are highlighted in Table 2, which provides a summary of our
findings according to the four process dimensions of human resources and responsibilities; BC
planning and process; communications and structure; and attitudes and ownership, and high-
lights where and how each organisation reflects the differing approaches of disaster recovery
planning, business continuity planning or BCM approaches.
Whilst Celtbank and Ambank are similar in terms of the four groups of characteristics in
Table 2 that indicate a BCM approach, the picture is less clear with the other organisations
within the DR planning and BC planning approaches. UKinsco and Euroins both exhibited
traits largely consistent with a BC planning approach. Their shortcomings (as far as achieving a
strategic orientation are concerned) arose in their rigid structures, and the (perhaps resultant)
lack of ownership of the BC process.
If BCM has evolved relatively quickly at Celtbank and Ambank, the slower pace of develop-
ment elsewhere highlights the task at hand for organisations that are setting out on, or are part
way into, the development of continuity processes. For example, although USbank and
Lonbank appear most frequently in the DRP column of Table 2 they exhibit some limited
characteristics of the BC planning mindset. The reverse is true in the cases of UKinsco and
Euroins. The evolution of practices is not necessarily straightforward and few firms excel in
configuring all four dimensions of continuity practice in their most effective form in parallel. A
comparative snapshot of the six organisation’s continuity approaches can be seen in Figure 2
where the continuity approach level (whether DRP, BCP or BCM) of the individual process
dimensions are mapped to highlight a number of differences that are germane to our central
questions of whether firms’BCM structures can be said to be strategically oriented and if
so, what organisational, planning and cultural form does such provision take. Four of the six
firms’continuity approaches have all process dimensions at the same overall level, although
only two have achieved a standard BCM approach. Figure 2 also illustrates the more irregular
approaches of the other two organisations. UKinsco has developed reasonably sophisticated
planning processes that consider more than merely IT disaster recovery scenarios, whereas the
supporting formal and informal infrastructures reflect this antecedent and lag somewhat
behind. The danger with UKinsco’s configuration is that planning activities may seek to
address continuity issues that fall beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility that is
assigned to DRP. Such planning will be futile if the remaining process dimensions impede its
implementation.
Conversely, USbank has far exceeded the DRP it has in place with its human resources pro-
vision. It has a talented and multi-skilled central team in place, but their remit is narrow and
isolated. This narrow focus of activities (hence the restriction of planning to disaster recovery)
has constricted the exposure of the company’s wider workforce to continuity issues, and there
has been too much focus upon gaining the commitment of the central team. Consequently, it
is no great surprise to find that there is little commitment to continuity issues, and processes
beyond the central team. Such advancement in one dimension may prove to be short-lived if
others lag behind, and the priorities for change at USbank should focus on those dimensions
which retain a DRP focus and militate against value preservation being more widely achieved.
Planning and process activities need to be expanded to include non-IT resources, and attitudes
and ownership developed to ensure ongoing commitment from the wider functions. The
central staff’s commitment to the ongoing management of the process is the major resource in
this endeavour.
The example of USbank shows the problems of developing some dimensions so that they
far exceed others. The visualisation of process dimensions shown in Figure 2 offers a useful
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 449
Table 2. Summary of evidence
Disaster Recovery
Planning
Business Continuity
Planning
Business Continuity
Management
Human resources and
Responsibilities
Solely IT members:
.UKINSCO
.LONBANK
IT leads business continuity
team:
.EUROINS
Business team leads BC team:
.USBANK
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
BC planning and Process Scope limited to
technology:
.USBANK
.LONBANK
Scope concerned with all
facilities and hardware:
.UKINSCO
.EUROINS
Scope includes supply chain:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
Plans prepared by
continuity team alone:
.USBANK
.LONBANK
Plans prepared by conti-
nuity team within business
unit (BU):
.UKINSCO
.EUROINS
Plans prepared by BU and BC
team:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
Involvement in new product
development:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
Communications
and Structure
Formal lines only:
.UKINSCO
.LONBANK
.EUROINS
Formal lines monitored
through internal audit:
.USBANK
Combines formal and informal
means:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
No co-ordinators:
.UKINSCO
.LONBANK
Informal co-ordinators
across organisation:
.USBANK
.EUROINS
Varied media:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
Formal co-ordinators:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
Attitudes and Ownership ‘Not my job’attitude:
.USBANK
‘Tick box’approach:
.UKINSCO
.LONBANK
.EUROINS
Maintain competitive advantage
through BC:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
Functional self interest:
.USBANK
.UKINSCO
.LONBANK
.EUROINS
Peer pressure used:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
Collegiality is deemed essential:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
No appraisal system:
.USBANK
.UKINSCO
.LONBANK
.EUROINS
Formal appraisals used:
.CELTBANK
.AMBANK
450 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
diagnostic to identify and focus upon specific process dimensions in which an organisation is
falling behind.
Shifting the approach
The second step toward seeing continuity management as a strategic entity is the integration of
BCM with strategic planning. From the sample of organisations in this study, it is clear that
(unlike DRP and BCP) BCM presents the greatest potential for value preservation, since it puts
into place planning approaches, structures and skills which are multi-functional, proactive, and
organisation-wide. As a foundation for value preservation, two of our respondents—Celtbank
and Ambank—have BCM structures in place which we would argue have the potential to be
regarded as a truly strategic activity. But although their BCM practice has been successfully
standardised across four organisational dimensions, they have only partially realised some of
its strategic benefits. These include some limited links between BCM and new product devel-
opment, supply chain resilience and the adoption of practices designed to engender an ongoing
climate of caution, commitment and confidence. Indeed, these organisations have yet to dem-
onstrate substantive benefits from their investments: however, in relation to their con-
temporaries in this study, they have the basic structures in place and the desire to develop a
greater strategic contribution for BCM. For them, continuity processes are no longer designed
to be palliative, but to improve resilience. The remaining respondents have neither achieved
the requisite standard BCM practices nor sought the benefits of speed, configuration resilience
or embeddedness. However, involvement in this research will have helped identify the path via
developing standardised activities towards full strategic orientation for their BCM processes.
Figure 2. Continuity diagnostic.
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 451
[For the leaders] continuity processes are no longer designed to be
palliative, but to improve resilience.
Discussion
Our case study companies provide an insight into the resource configurations of firms with
differing levels of business continuity provisions in place. Differences in the organisational
design dimensions of HR and responsibilities, BC planning processes, communications and
structures, and attitudes and ownership denote the extent to which each firm has moved from
functional, reactive and IT driven approaches towards a proactive, organisation-wide, and
socio-technical attitude.
The differences in the approaches seen in these cases illustrate a journey that is of wider
interest to organisations seeking to enhance value preservation. Our discussion considers the
wider impact of this evidence for organisations aiming to introduce or enhance BCM practices,
and we then broaden our evaluation to consider how our findings are relevant beyond the
financial services context.
Our analysis of the data provides support for the main purpose of the paper: to suggest that
a greater strategic role though value preservation is both an attractive theoretical proposition
and an achievable reality. A key finding is evidence of a desire to improve recovery speed and
advantage, resilience of supply chain configurations, embeddedness of planning and manage-
ment processes and an orientation beyond regulatory and legal obligations. It is the organisa-
tions that have reached BCM status in terms of the four process dimensions which offer useful
exemplars of how firms both in and beyond the finance sector might usefully set about enhanc-
ing their activities, while the others, while they differ in terms of process dimensions and value
preservation, demonstrate continuity provision at intermediate states of development.
Table 3 offers a configuration for BCM which, while idealised, is nevertheless worth aiming
for. It identifies a number of precepts which managers can compare to their current BC prac-
tices and seek to implement within further BC initiatives, as well as highlighting six key attri-
butes for firms seeking a greater strategic contribution from BCM:
.Leadership—to symbolise the importance assigned to BCM by senior management;
.Partnership coordination—to reflect the coupled, complex nature of organisations’supply
chains;
.Longevity—to prevent business continuity from being regarded as a temporary project;
.Ownership—to engender commitment and responsibility to the process;
.Understanding—to facilitate greater insight into the strategic implications of a business cri-
sis, and
.Management infrastructure—to generate links and support communicative working
between the BC and functional management teams.
Once these foundations are in place, companies need to ensure that there are explicit links
between strategic planning, new product/service development and business continuity plan-
ning. They should envisage how any new strategy could effect, or be affected by, a business
interruption. The implications of the interruption should be considered from financial, legal,
regulatory, supply chain and reputation perspectives, and the likely response to worst-case sce-
narios examined. How could advantage could be lost if the company had to invoke its conti-
nuity plans at a critical point in the implementation of a new strategy? As risk mitigation,
prevention is always better than protection: but protection that reflects an understanding of
the strategic implications of a threat is a worthwhile second line of defence. In essence, value
452 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
preservation is a second order organisational advantage that may underpin the continuity of
the resources from which competitive advantages originate.
Although our case study organisations have all had continuity teams in place for at least 10
years, substantial differences between them still remain. Our findings suggests that those orga-
nisations which appreciate the value of a strategic approach have developed business conti-
nuity provisions that differ greatly from the rather more functional and technical provisions of
their peers. Thus, a final necessary dimension is an understanding and desire to make the pro-
cess more strategic.
value preservation is a second order organisational advantage
underpinning the continuity of resources from which competitive
advantages originate.
In both theoretical and practical forms, BCM has the potential to play a strategic role in
helping firms gain increased resilience against crisis events and business interruptions. The
leading exponents of BCM in this study show encouraging signs of a strategic approach to con-
tinuity management. Managing BCM alongside (and along similar lines to) strategic planning
represents a development of traditional crisis management and disaster recovery planning.
Furthermore, we recommend that managers use our study as an aide memoir to consider whe-
ther they have put into place the conditions for business continuity to blossom into its most
strategic form—as a management process in which business process experts have ownership,
rather than merely a rigid planned response to crises. The four key process dimensions (HR
and responsibilities, planning and process, communications and structure, and attitudes and
ownership) have been found to distinguish between organisations’approaches to dealing with
business interruptions. This diagnostic (coupled with our precepts in Table 3) highlights the
priorities for action in organisations that have yet to achieve balanced BCM processes.
Table 3. Is your business continuity provision strategically configured?
BCM dimension Precepts necessary for a strategic role
Human Resources and
Responsibilities
Ensure that the BC team is led by business managers rather than technical/specialist man-
agers—leadership rather than domination is necessary.
BC Planning and
Processes
Include strategic partnerships beyond the organisation’s boundaries.
Planning undertaken by functions/business units with coordination supplied by the BC
team to improve ownership of plans.
New products and services considered within BC plans to add longevity to provisions.
Communications and
Structure
Use formal and informal communications management infrastructure to disseminate mes-
sages about BCM’s importance.
Tailor choice and use of media to improve the trajectory and understanding of BCM
related communications.
Appoint formal coordinators to underpin communications endeavours across the organis-
ation and augment longevity.
Attitudes and
Ownership
Functions and departments must have (part) ownership of the planning process coupled
with formal appraisals.
Functions and departments must have an understanding of how crises and interruptions
can threaten the organisation’s operations and advantages.
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 453
Derived from disaster recovery and crisis and risk management, BCM has evolved to
encompass a wider constituency of participants, threats, techniques and responses. Our case
organisations study show the differing degrees to which the BCM constituency has been
widened and the change from a functionally isolated approach to one which can yield wider
benefits in terms of better recovery and value preservation. Although our study is based in the
financial services industry, which has been obliged by legislators and regulators to implement
business continuity, our findings are relevant to other sectors. Other research has reported on
BCM in vehicle breakdown services, gas suppliers, water utilities, supermarkets and local
authorities. Despite their operational differences, all of the companies have characteristics that
are aligned with those of our study. First, they recognise that in the face of internal and exter-
nal threats to the continuity of operations, a socio-technical approach (beyond mere IT disas-
ter recovery) is vital to improve business recovery from crises. Secondly, the organisations have
explicitly linked BCM to strategically important dimensions of their operations. The vehicle
breakdown recovery firm (involved in assisting its customers to recover from crises) needs to
be resilient, since its image, marketing and operations would be damaged by an inability to
respond to a crisis itself. The gas supplier recognised that its head office building was vital to
the operational coordination of sales and distribution operations. The water utility company
reflected its important role in health and sanitation by adopting a stakeholder-driven approach
to BCM which involved the prioritisation of the most vulnerable stakeholder groups. A charac-
teristic of all these firms is the high degree of consumer dependence on their products or ser-
vices, which underline the necessity for them to enhance their provisions for dealing with
unplanned interruptions and crises.
28
We believe that BCM has a potential value not only in the financial services sector, with its
high levels of ICT coupling and complexity, but for any organisation that would benefit from a
socio-technical, organisation-wide, strategically–cognisant approach to crisis management.
Indeed, any organisation that cannot afford to experience business interruptions and losses
needs to have BCM in place.
Conclusion
In developing a conceptual proposition for BCM to be regarded as having a strategic role we
asked whether firms had strategically oriented BCM in place and, if so, what form this would
take in terms of organisation, planning and culture. Our analysis offers a synthesis of both con-
cepts and practice to highlight how and why organisations should adopt, integrate and
enhance systems to preserve value, whilst other organisational resources concentrate on the
creation of value through competitive advantages. In so doing we have seen the possibility of a
role for BCM that can be more integrated with the more conventional strategic activities of a
firm.
This study represents an initial examination of the potential for a strategic role, but further
study is required, in particular into firms in other sectors. Through the additional clarity of
insight allowed by our data collection we have observed some convergence of business conti-
nuity and strategic approaches in terms of providing organisations with an integrated defensive
and offensive capability towards their competitive environments. We believe that this will
increasingly represent the norm in the future as greater attention is given to how organisations
respond to crises and business interruptions. With events such as the start of the new millen-
nium, terrorist attacks, corporate financial scandals, hi-tech crime and changing weather pat-
terns, today’sfirms require a coherent and well-resourced response which is predetermined
and integrated, but also flexible and manageable.
Organisations in this study with leading practices had multi-disciplinary/multi-functional
teams, a wide scope of coverage to include supply chain interruptions, involvement in new
product development and shared authorship and ownership of plans with business units. Sup-
porting this orientation, our leading exemplars had introduced formal coordinators across the
454 Business Continuity Management: time for a strategic role?
organisation and used a variety of communications mechanisms. Coupled with a mindset that
emphasises the importance of partnership and strategic awareness, this approach to business
continuity presents an approach against which incumbent managers can assess their perform-
ance and identify scope for further improvement. Our diagnostic and the identification of pre-
cepts in the form of leadership, partnership coordination, longevity, ownership and
understanding, and management infrastructure provide further guidance in these endeavours.
For senior managers, our study ought to prompt an examination of business continuity in the
context of value preservation, for without the continuity of operations, the pursuit and susten-
ance of competitive advantage could be undermined. Senior managers should ask
whether there is the scope and opportunity to integrate their business continuity resources fur-
ther to generate the potential for more enhanced value preservation.
With the new millennium, terrorist attacks, corporate financial
scandals, hi-tech crime and changing weather patterns, firms require a
coherent, well-resourced response...predetermined and integrated, but
also flexible and manageable.
As business continuity becomes more of a mainstream operational reality, strategy research-
ers should be more attuned to its existence and its cross-functional impact in terms of plan-
ning, organisational learning and technological dependencies. Herein lies an opportunity to
understand some of the underlying dynamics of organisational behaviour, as organisations
prepare for the worst whilst planning for the best. Furthermore, researchers should also be
more attuned to the efforts of senior managers to introduce continuity management as part of
their new strategies and their attempts to deal with uncertainty. Such patterns of development
can be observed within the framework proposed in this paper (Figure 1). The uncertainty of
the competitive, legislative and social worlds around us demands flexible strategic thinking
about business continuity: when things go wrong, those better able to think, act and adapt to
business interruptions will have demonstrated the value of superior BCM.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Professor Charles Baden-Fuller and the
two anonymous referees whose valuable comments have helped enhance the manuscript.
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Biographies
Dr Brahim Herbane is Principal Lecturer in Strategic and Continuity Management at Leicester Business School (De
Montfort University). His research work currently focuses on resource-based approaches to strategic management
and organisational advantage, and the application of strategic perspectives on business continuity methodologies for
crisis management. He is Reviews Editor for Risk Management—An International Journal, and has recently pub-
lished ‘Business Continuity—A Crisis Management Approach’with Elliott and Swartz. (Routledge) Leicester Busi-
ness School, De Montfort University, The Gateway, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK. Tel.: +44-116-255-1551; fax: +44-116-
250-6331. Email: bhcor@dmu.ac.uk
Dominic Elliott is Paul Roy Professor of Business Continuity and Strategic Management at the University of Liver-
pool Management School. His current research projects include an examination of how organisations within the
retail and finance sectors prepare for adverse events, a longitudinal study of the demerger of a large Chemical firm
and an examination of how organisations learn from crises and a study of corporate crisis communications strate-
gies. He is Editor of Risk Management—An International Journal. University of Liverpool Management School,
Chatham Building, Chatham Street, Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK. Email: d.elliott@liverpool.ac.uk
Dr Ethne
´M. Swartz is Assistant Professor of Management at the Silberman College of Business, Fairleigh Dickinson
University, Madison, New Jersey. She has published and taught in the fields of crisis and continuity management,
entrepreneurship and strategic management and consulted with organizations in the UK, South Africa and North
America. She is on the editorial board of Risk Management—An International Journal. Fairleigh Dickinson Univer-
sity, 285 Madison Avenue (M-RI0-01), Madison, NJ 07940, USA. Email: swartz@fdu.edu
Long Range Planning, vol 37 2004 457