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Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory
... Em seu artigo Kantian constructivism in Moral Theory, Rawls (1980) Rawls evidencia que as ideias de pessoa moral e de sociedade bem-ordenada são as duas "concepções-modelos" (model-conceptions) âncoras da justiça como equidade. O objetivo delas é "selecionar os aspectos essenciais da concepção que temos de nós mesmos como pessoas morais e da nossa relação com a sociedade enquanto cidadãos livres e iguais" (Rawls, 1980, p. 520). ...
... É nesse sentido que a justiça como equidade, conforme apresentada na TJ, no artigo Kantian constructivism in Moral Theory (Rawls, 1980) e nos seus primeiros escritos, de um modo geral, pode ser vista como uma doutrina moral abrangente, uma vez que busca nada mais nada menos do que estabelecer as bases para que os indivíduos possam alcançar um acordo em torno do bem comum a eles. Na realidade, o entendimento de Rawls é que a justiça como equidade enquanto um exemplo do construtivismo kantiano pode fazer isso porque ela consegue articular o conteúdo da justiça com uma concepção moral de pessoa, haja vista que ela considera os indivíduos como livres, iguais, racionais e razoáveis. ...
O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que a concepção política da justiça como equidade, do filósofo contemporâneo, John Rawls, implicou em uma superação do construtivismo moral Kantiano por um construtivismo político. Em uma "primeira fase" da justiça como equidade, a pretensão do filósofo era elaborar uma teoria moral da justiça que fosse capaz de contrapor-se ao utilitarismo. Contudo, diante do fato do pluralismo razoável de doutrinas morais, religiosas e filosóficas, que caracteriza as sociedades democráticas modernas, o filósofo avalia que uma concepção de justiça que pretenda ser aceitável e reconhecida por todos os cidadãos não pode fundar-se em uma única doutrina abrangente. O ponto é que a justiça como equidade, enquanto uma teoria moral, mostrou ambiguidades e inconsistências, apresentando como problema central a explicação da estabilidade de uma sociedade bem-ordenada. Com isso, John Rawls buscou revisar sua teoria da justiça como equidade, deslocando a sua fundamentação da esfera da moral para a esfera da política.
... The position taken here is that normative justification can be approached through appeal to moral reasoning structured by impartiality, recognition of equality, and reciprocity as elements of fairness (Baier 1954(Baier , 1958Forst 2012;Rawls 1971Rawls , 1993Rawls , 1999Rawls , 2001Sen 2009). From within this perspective, moral reasoning is discursive and procedural; it involves communication and deliberation with others under specific normative conditions (Rawls 1999;Forst 2012); these normative conditions are comprised of criteria as acceptable restrictions on reasons that parties may appeal to in order to justify the validity of their judgments. ...
... The position taken here is that normative justification can be approached through appeal to moral reasoning structured by impartiality, recognition of equality, and reciprocity as elements of fairness (Baier 1954(Baier , 1958Forst 2012;Rawls 1971Rawls , 1993Rawls , 1999Rawls , 2001Sen 2009). From within this perspective, moral reasoning is discursive and procedural; it involves communication and deliberation with others under specific normative conditions (Rawls 1999;Forst 2012); these normative conditions are comprised of criteria as acceptable restrictions on reasons that parties may appeal to in order to justify the validity of their judgments. The justified acceptability of the judgment is contingent upon the validity of the normative criteria employed. ...
A pdf copy of the article can be accessed at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YD72BXM7WWFHT75G4J9Y/full?target=10.1080/10402659.2024.2416041
In a telegram to prominent Americans on May 23rd, 1946, Albert Einstein made the following statement:
The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe. We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive (cited in Ionno Butcher 2005, 12; Times 1946).
Here Einstein was pointing to the emerging existential threat unleashed by the development of atomic weapons, a threat that was greatly magnified with the development of thermo-nuclear weapons, and importantly articulating the need for a transformation in our mode of thinking. This issue remains with us and has been heightened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its justification. Regarding this manner of thinking, The Russell-Einstein Manifesto published on July 9, 1955, stated the following:
We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt. … we want you, if you can, to set aside such feelings and consider yourselves only as members of a biological species which has had a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can desire … We appeal, as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest … (Russell and Einstein 1955).
In a letter to Einstein exploring the possibility of drafting the manifesto Russell wrote:
In any attempt to avoid atomic war the strictest neutrality is to be observed… Everything must be said from the point of view of mankind, not of this or that group… (cited in Ionno Butcher 2005, 13).
The purpose of this paper is to interpret and further articulate the nature of the above proposed manner of thinking as a mode of moral thought in response to the existential risk of nuclear conflict, a risk that has been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine justified by its underlying thinking in the form of the Putin Doctrine, and to suggest the need for and the method of educating global citizens as a way to minimize that risk.
A pdf copy of the article can be accessed at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YD72BXM7WWFHT75G4J9Y/full?target=10.1080/10402659.2024.2416041
... 143 While discussing the perspective of the person in Islam and liberal democracy it's quite difficult to say that both would be compatible because in liberalism freedom of a person is to realise the capacity of one's choice although this deliberation of choice is guided by the individual's rational interest. 144 While if we take an example of Islamists like Qutb, the perspective of personality is based on the premise of the command of God, the deliberation is based on the mastery of God's choice. 145 Accordingly, it is illustrated that both traditions have a clear/consolidated incompatibility of the sovereign's choice. ...
... A key aspect of socially just schooling then, should be to prepare students for a productive participation within the market. This model fits a Kantian view of morality where fairness is seen through aspects of access, allocation and opportunity (Rawls, 1980). The recognitive/representational claim/function of justice, however, highlights the conditions in which one gets to flourish, rather than merely receiving an equal treatment. ...
Contemporary discourses of educational philanthropy highlight the increasing role that benefactors play in shaping schools' policy and practice. In Australia, there have been growing ethical concerns about the model of school funding and the attention it attracts from billionaire edu-philanthropists to support faith-based private schools as highly exclusionary forms of schooling. Utilising 'small d' discourse analysis and Nancy Fraser's theory of justice, we draw on focus group and interviews conducted with leading Australian edu-philanthropists, alongside observations of social media platforms, to identify the ethical discourses surrounding edu-philanthropic justice in such schools. Discourses revealed paradoxes of (i) fairness extending access to exclusionary forms of schooling; (ii) identity-preventing disadvantaged students from experiencing identity-based rejection in schools supposedly designed to meet their needs; and (iii) welfare-fulfilling this right in a quasi-education market, though, consequently, diminishing the welfare state's responsibilities. This new knowledge advances discussions on edu-philanthropy, educational ethics, and school choice.
... Constructivism as a theoretical approach within Anglophone moral and political philosophy goes back at least to John Rawls' seminal contributions (Rawls 1980). However, Rawls applied constructivism in a rather restricted form, with the clear ambition of coming up with general principles of justice for contemporary Western democracies. ...
This paper is a defence of the view that, contrary to a recent trend in the literature, there is a distinctively political kind of normativity. Four steps are taken to establish that conclusion. First, I introduce a constructivist methodology for practical philosophy, one that is focused on the problem-solving nature of normative concepts. Second, I propose to understand the political as constituted by political problems, that is, by problems that concern members of a collective as members of that collective. Third, I claim that there is a kind of collective obligations, which I call political collective obligations, that do not provide direct and clear action guidance to those subject to them, but that are rather best conceived of as thin obligations. Such thin obligations stemming from properly conceived political problems constitute a distinctive kind of normativity, the normativity of politics. Because political collective obligations typically lack action guidance, what they mandate is that each obliged agent contribute their share to what they normatively regard as the best collective solution to the political problem. The paper concludes with some considerations about the so-called inefficacy problem in light of the previously established conclusions.
... The issues of justice, social equality, and welfare are central to Rawls's (1971Rawls's ( , 1977Rawls's ( , 1980Rawls's ( , 1999Rawls's ( , 2001Rawls's ( , 2005 highly influential work. Rawls (1971Rawls ( , 2001) developed a framework for establishing and maintaining a well-ordered society by creating a distributive system of social goods that emphasizes fairness over absolute equity. ...
Despite crowdfunding platforms’ growing involvement in financing welfare, related ethical issues have received little scholarly attention. To address this gap, we focus on GoFundMe, the leading welfare crowdfunding platform in the US, to examine whether it facilitates the establishment of a just society that democratizes access to funding. Informed by Rawls’s ethics, we conduct a comprehensive analysis, arguing that GoFundMe’s modus operandi merits criticism. We advance three interrelated arguments for why GoFundMe is morally problematic. First, it distributes information and primary goods unfairly, perpetuating inequalities that disadvantage the most vulnerable. Second, it uses narratives that may distract public attention from systemic flaws in welfare provision, potentially reducing social pressure for institutional reform. Third, its emphasis on individual choice and responsibility may contribute to momentum for neoliberal policymaking. We show why scholars, policymakers, and platforms should engage in debate about regulating welfare crowdfunding activities to improve their ethicality.
... 5 For recent accounts of normative reasons on these lines, see Setiya(2014), Way (2017), and Asarnow (2017). 6 See Rawls (1980). Korsgaard (1996 and distinguishes between substantive and procedural realism, and aligns metaethical constructivism with the latter. ...
Since the 1990s, meta-ethical constructivism has established itself as a serious contender in debates about the nature and sources of practical normativity. Roughly, constructivism’s core idea is that practical normativity or normative reasons neither exist independently of what we think and do, nor in virtue of the fact that we want and intend things, but because we engage in some distinctive sort of activity. How exactly to characterize that activity, and how to distinguish constructivism from its main rivals, are, however, contested issues. In this paper, I will suggest that constructivism in meta-ethics is best understood as explaining practical reasons through the possession and habitual exercise of the capacity of practical reason. This characterization offers a neat way of understanding what is at issue between constructivism and its rivals, realism and subjectivism, as well as the differences between important varieties of constructivism. It also promises to help resolve some important problems critics have pointed out for constructivism.
... A broader conceptual framework such as sovereignty and security, as well as immigration policies that include ideological, security, legal, political, economic, social, and cultural interests. According to Rawls (1980), the principle of immigration inspection within the framework of public service includes morals and laws in public authority based on the principles of constructivism, formality, positivism, and provisions for the application of law. The inspection perspective must be viewed from the concept of human rights, state sovereignty, border law enforcement, aspects of international law, and the application of information systems. ...
This study enhances the understanding of the function of state security in immigration services. The perspective of state security in national development offers a solution to the current reality of implementing public policy in immigration, which requires a transformation through a more suitable and ideal approach for each immigration officer. One aspect of this study involves strengthening an in-depth interpretation to address and understand the evolving policies, aiming to achieve complex policy objectives. This phenomenon is closely related to the fact that current government policies tend to focus on public services that prioritize public satisfaction. While community demands are urgent for the Indonesian government, implementing public services in the field of immigration involves different dimensional aspects compared to other public services. The main reason is that current immigration issues are becoming increasingly complex, necessitating the adaptation of new approaches. It is crucial to manage the complexity and diversity of factors involved in the immigration service policy process, particularly concerning state security in travel document/passport services, immigration documents, and examinations at immigration checkpoints at state borders.
... 143 While discussing the perspective of the person in Islam and liberal democracy it's quite difficult to say that both would be compatible because in liberalism freedom of a person is to realise the capacity of one's choice although this deliberation of choice is guided by the individual's rational interest. 144 While if we take an example of Islamists like Qutb, the perspective of personality is based on the premise of the command of God, the deliberation is based on the mastery of God's choice. 145 Accordingly, it is illustrated that both traditions have a clear/consolidated incompatibility of the sovereign's choice. ...
Exploring the debate between Islamic and secular laws from the perspective of Islamists, this article suggests a way of rethinking the relationship between popular sovereignty and God’s sovereignty in the modern world. There has been a conundrum of calls for reform in Islamic law based on democratic principles in the contemporary world. Comparing the role of morality in Islamic and secular legal systems, highlighting their differences in the foundations and principles of morality in both systems, this article primarily argues that morality is essential for law in both systems. However, the examination of the issue of sovereignty, whether it belongs to the people or to God, explains why Islamists reject Western-inspired reforms in Islamic law. The article examines the principles of Islamic law and the concepts of fitrah (innate disposition) and deism to highlight the fundamental differences in
sovereignty between the two systems. While the article acknowledges that Islam does not oppose democracy, it reflects on the Islamists’ contention that some modern democratic values are incompatible with Islamic law. It emphasises that arguments on morality should be basedon Islamic law (Sharia’h), which is derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah and provides its own criteria for reform. In conclusion, the article stresses on the inherent conflicts between modern democratic values and Islamic law, and the need for independent and internally guided reform within the Islamic legal system which remains faithful to Islamic principles and free from conceptions strange to it.
... Consistent with a constructivist ontology, constructivist ethics proceeds from the premise that "moral principles or judgements that are true or whose authority must be recognized, are produced, one way or another, by human minds" (Maclure, 2020, p. 379). In contrast to the claim underlying realist ontologies and realist meta-ethics that mind-independent ethical evaluations are possible in a world that can be discovered 'out there,' constructivism contests that all ethical positions are mind-dependent since the world seemingly 'out there' is inseparable from the world we construct 'in our minds' (Engel, 2022;Rawls, 1980;Street, 2010). In the words of philosopher Sharon Street, "What is valuable is mind-dependent in the sense that values are not found outside of the lives and perspectives of valuing creatures; the experience or process of valuing is fundamental or basic" and "value is something conferred upon the world by valuing creatures, and it enters and exits the world with them" (Street, 2012, p. 40). ...
Despite the appeal of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ as an ethical ideal for businesses to pursue, applying this utilitarian principle in practice proves challenging. This is not least due to fundamental disagreements as to what constitutes the ‘greatest good.’ For example, the concept of ‘wellbeing’ now commonly proposed as a way of apprehending the greatest good is itself subject to widely varying interpretations. Drawing on an in-depth qualitative study of 64 managers in different sectors and country contexts, we explore this variation through the lens of constructivist ethics, asking how and why managers systematically differ in their ethical meaning-making around wellbeing. Our theorizing advances constructivist ethics by relating these differences to developmental stages identified in constructivist psychology, finding that systematic variations in ethical meaning-making are shaped by differences in actors’ capacities to process complexity. Our analysis reveals that managers’ ethical meaning-making about wellbeing is subjective, socially constructed, dynamic, and evolutionary, progressing in stages that we differentiate with a novel concept of ‘subjective wellbeing complexity.’ We contribute to practice by discussing how managers’ ability to work with more complex conceptions of wellbeing can be purposefully enhanced through stage-by-stage capacity-building in the form of ‘vertical development.’
... Miller seems to point out this fact when he argues that there are social facts, that is, facts that are possible only because there are beings capable of symbolic interactions. Moral constructivism is one of the moral positions that acknowledge the possibility of a type of cognitivism that is essentially minddependent (Rawls, 1980;Korsgaard, 2008). Therefore, there are more ontological possibilities than Pitt allows. ...
This paper criticizes the thesis of the neutrality of moral values of artifacts, and makes the case for a proposal known as Value Sensitive Design, which states that moral values must be considered in the construction and analysis of artifacts. First, (1) we will present the best defense of the thesis of the neutrality of moral values of artifacts, made by Joseph Pitt. In the following, (2) we will criticize each of the arguments presented by Pitt in favor of the neutrality thesis. Finally, (3) we will consider the Value Sensitive Design proposal presented by Ibo van de Poel and Peter Kroes and explain how it would be suitable for a critique of the values and moral issues that artifacts can represent.
... Rawls (1980Rawls ( , 1999a.3 The method of J.J. Rousseau's "social contract theory," which attempted to directly connect the real individual with the ideal system, was rearranged topologically, so to speak, by the method of Kant's reasoning based on practical reason(Neal, 1987;Shionoya, 1984).4 ...
Building on Rawls’s philosophy of contingency and Sen’s normative economics, this chapter seeks a theory of justice that incorporates the hard cases from the beginning. Furthermore, it tries to reconstruct the value assumptions of liberalism, taking the concept of dignity as a clue. The disparity in status between the right to work and the right to well-being and the disregard of the utilization ability to use the rights to liberties are criticized. Furthermore, based on Rawls’ philosophy of contingency and Sen's normative economics, the logic of “public reciprocity,” which incorporates both hard and normal cases, will be explored. Finally, while standing on the inviolability and incomparability of the dignity inherent in the individual, this chapter sought a logic in the capability approach to denounce actions that violate the obligation to respect dignity and to measure the damage for compensations. The discussion here indicates the possibility of a contribution of economics to the theory of value in a new way completely different from the price theory, which helps us to envision the future of the welfare state.
... These two together constitute a "moral person." (Rawls, 1980(Rawls, /1999b In the original position under the veil of ignorance, the scope of those who participate in the formulation of principles of justice is limited to "normal individuals," who understand the formal conditions that the principle of justice must meet. ...
The first purpose of this chapter is to examine dignity from a perspective of economic philosophy and theories of justice. Specifically, I will analyze the following three conceptual distinctions that have been controversial related to dignity (Sects. 3–5). They are (1) “price” versus “dignity;” (2) “individual dignity” versus “human dignity;” and (3) “equality of human rights” versus “respect for dignity.” The second and more important purpose of this chapter is to use the concept of dignity to illuminate certain conundrums that liberalism has left behind and to reexamine the reach and limits of liberalism. Thus, this paper explores theoretical possibilities of the concept of dignity based on relevant literature. Section 2 introduces the concept of dignity in John Rawls’ theory of justice. Section 6 reviews relevant literature on the attempts to critically develop the concept of dignity in Rawls’ theory of justice.
“From my perspective, it is just that soul and spirit, with all their dignity and human scale, are now so complex and unique states of an organism…. And this is of course the difficult job, is it not: to move the spirit from its nowhere pedestal to a somewhere place, while preserving its dignity and importance, to recognize its humble origins and vulnerability, and yet still call upon its guidance (Damasio, 2005).”
... Binmore understands that the game of morals is to fix these adverse equilibria. Rawls' (1980) veil of ignorance is an example of what Binmore calls the game of morals. Here, players have no knowledge of their specific circumstances, and thus they choose as if they could be any person, with the purpose of finding moral norms that would ensure a better equilibrium for everyone in the game of life. ...
This paper explores Kant’s concept of dignity to claim that animals deserve moral consideration. The central notion in the paper is of that of “moral game,” a hypothetical scenario that illustrates our obligations to cooperate with rational agents and the natural world. This game displays how rational agents can collaborate with non-rational animals despite their inability to engage in reciprocal legislation. From reflection on what this game shows and by introducing a notion of “deep dignity,” I argue that rational beings have a duty to respect the moral status of non-human creatures through indirect moral rights.
This article intends to specify the notion of ethical constructivism as it appears in John Rawls' philosophy. To achieve this intent, this research progresses in the conceptual determination of the idea of ethical constructivism from a general methodological perspective, to later link the general theory elements to the proposal of justice as fairness. The article continues briefly describing the shift of Rawls' proposal from Kant's constructivism to a political one. It finishes with a critical consideration of Rawls' strategy.
United Nations documents establish dignity as the cornerstone of human rights, asserting that these rights “stem from the inherent dignity of the human person,” as articulated in the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Within this context, human dignity is viewed as an intrinsic value inherent in every human being, serving as the foundation for the moral obligation to respect one another. While many scholars turn to Immanuel Kant for a philosophical analysis and validation of this concept, there is a question of consensus among Kantian scholars on this interpretation. This article aims to explore how two perspectives, both claiming Kantian paternity – the Dignity approach and Kantian constructivism – arrive at differing conclusions regarding the foundational nature of human rights. I will focus respectively on Luigi Caranti’s Dignity approach and Oliver Sensen’s constructivist reading, to show how the two frameworks deploy different conceptions on how dignity can truly ground human rights. In the end, I will also suggest a potential common ground between the two perspectives.
O objetivo desse artigo é enfocar a ideia de razão pública de John Rawls, enquanto a principal novidade de sua concepção política da justiça como equidade. Com essa ideia, o filósofo abre possibilidades para que a sua concepção política da justiça como equidade assegure a "reconciliação" entre as diferentes doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis, porém, incompatíveis entre si. Rawls define a razão pública como a maneira como uma sociedade política formula seus planos e toma suas decisões, segundo uma ordem de prioridade. Mas a razão pública é também a capacidade que a sociedade política tem de agir dessa maneira. Com isso, a razão pública é vista como uma faculdade intelectual e moral que está enraizada nas capacidades de seus cidadãos. Buscamos desenvolver este artigo apresentando, primeiramente, a visão de John Rawls acerca da razão pública e as novidades advindas desse conceito no contexto de uma concepção política da justiça. Em seguida, indicamos qual é o objeto e o conteúdo da razão pública de Rawls, bem como quais as suas diferenças em relação a razão não-pública. Na sequência, abordamos como Rawls enfrentou as dificuldades e as críticas feitas à ideia de razão pública.
Após sua publicação em 1971, Uma teoria da justiça de John Rawls reuniu em torno de si grande debate. Eric Weil publicou sua Filosofia política quinze anos antes da obra de Rawls, em 1956. Ambos utilizam termos como comunidade, sociedade, racional e razoável, com significados próprios. O objetivo do presente artigo é ampliar o debate em torno da obra de Rawls realizando um paralelo com Eric Weil, utilizando os conceitos mencionados. O paralelo leva em conta também o conceito weiliano de violência, incontornável para a definição do autor do que ele entende por razoável. O conceito weiliano de violência pode fornecer então uma crítica à noção rawlsiana de senso de justiça, limites do juízo e a própria noção de razoável adotada pelo filósofo. Ao final, aponta-se uma possível resposta que o pensamento de Rawls oferece à violência weiliana.
Este trabajo tiene como finalidad analizar la obra de John Rawls, repensar la cuestión del contractualismo e intentar esbozar una conclusión tendiente a reforzar la idea de que se puede trabajar en función de un acuerdo social. Se trata especialmente especialmente el primer texto de Rawls, Teoría de la Justicia. Se presentan algunas críticas que surgen dentro de los que se autodenominan rawlsianos: Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum y Norman Daniels.
This paper analyses the nature of ethical concepts, views, and theories and inquires in particular to what extent they may be considered religious. The analysis is not limited to the religious aspects of specific religious worldviews (such as Christianity). The concepts ‘good’ and ‘dignity’ are examined as representative examples. This is a meta‐ethical issue, which may profitably be explored by examining the positions of representatives of moral realism, noncognitivism and ethical constructivism. The practical consequences of this inquiry are also discussed; to that end, the meaning of ‘self‐interest’ is explored, and two varieties are introduced, namely, direct and indirect self‐interest.
Dignity in the context of work organisations has been explored by a range of scholars globally, yet the potential of this interdisciplinary concept is overwhelmed by our commitment to outdated philosophies and the narrow paradigmatic concerns of academic subdisciplines. Bringing together the work of sociologists, philosophers, political theorists, and a wide selection of business and management scholarship, this book highlights areas in which ‘workplace’ dignity needs a rethink.
Starting with the foundational philosophical assumptions, this book challenges a deontological ethic and a simple atomistic view of persons. A specific thesis of dignity as emergent from social performance is presented which is informed by symbolic interactionism, actor-network theory, and liberal and feminist philosophy.
With organisational examples throughout, this radical rethink has serious implications not only for the study of dignity in the context of contemporary work activity but also respecifies how we think about our obligations to ourselves and others in networks of relations.
In this article I attempt to explain Kant’s notoriously obscure argument for the principle that every rational being should be treated as an “end,” and not merely as a means. I take my lead from the appearance in the argument of terms and ideas that he uses earlier in the Groundwork to express two distinctive features of moral value and to make a related claim about how moral value is achieved. I argue that, of the candidates for the “end” of moral action that Kant considers, only rational beings instantiate both of these features and satisfy the related claim. I also argue that these features and this claim explain why no other candidates need be considered and why moral actions must have an “end” at all. Thus I show that these features and this claim resolve the puzzles posed by Kant’s own argument and make sense of some of the remarks that he makes in it.
Rousseau y Rawls son dos de los filósofos políticos más relevantes de la tradición occidental moderna, tanto por sus innovadoras obras como por el debate que han generado con sus reflexiones complejas sobre la forma más justa de organizar nuestras sociedades. Con marcadas diferencias, han tenido claras similitudes que les conectan como pensadores singulares y atractivos que han legado dos de las obras más relevantes de la filosofía política de todos los tiempos. Reflexionando en contextos muy diferentes, ambos han sido profundamente admirados y profusamente criticados, son protagonistas imprescindibles para comprender y comprendernos como sujetos políticos que compartieron la persistente inquietud intelectual de pensar la manera mejor de organizar las instituciones sociales para permitir sociedades más justas. El presente artículo pretende visibilizar los rastros y el impacto de Rousseau en las reflexiones rawlsianas, tratando de comprender en cuánto y en qué pudo haber influido en ellas.
Moral autonomy might seem to harbor inconsistency. Whereas nomos suggests that moral laws are grounded in our essence or nature (and thus are not up to us), autos suggests that they are grounded in some free act of self-legislation or prescription (and thus are up to us). Latter-day Kantians often respond by compromising on autonomy, deflating either nomos or autos . This investigation reconstructs how Christian Wolff, Kant’s great rationalist predecessor, already forged a path for embracing autonomy without compromise. His reconciliation, I argue, rests on distinguishing different respects in which moral laws stand in need of grounding. I further unravel why no parallel reconciliation is found in Kant. This, I conclude, still leaves open that Kant may similarly seek to embrace autonomy without compromise.
Esta investigación aborda la pregunta: ¿Puede el concepto contemporáneo de “conciencia fenoménica”, según se expone en los trabajos de Indregard (2018) y Longuenesse (2023), ser una herramienta conceptual para explicar ciertos usos del término “conciencia” en el pensamiento de Kant, tal como lo destaca la literatura secundaria? La hipótesis principal sostiene que dicho concepto no puede integrarse adecuadamente en el marco conceptual kantiano debido a dificultades textuales y sistemáticas. Se destacan las dificultades de vincular la conciencia con la sensación, la implicación de una brecha explicativa y la relación con el problema mente-cuerpo. Sin embargo, la propuesta busca ir más allá de la revisión crítica de la literatura secundaria. También se pretende examinar la naturaleza del ejercicio realizado por Indregard y Longuenesse, y evaluar si los supuestos introducidos en el pensamiento de Kant podrían ser aceptados en este marco conceptual. Con ello, se mostrará que la posición de Kant proporciona algunas claves para replantear los supuestos contemporáneos mediante los cuales la conciencia se sitúa en el contexto de un problema.
El presente trabajo busca iluminar los conceptos kantianos de reino de los fines y de uso público de la razón en términos constructivistas, a fin. De explorar la estructura normativa de la esfera pública y de la sociedad civil. Esta lectura incluirá la clave de democratización desarrollada por Tilly y Tarrow y del intercambio de razones, desarrollado por Forst, a fin de ver cómo la esfera pública y la sociedad civil traspasa los límites del estado nación y pueden ser trasnacionales, a la vez de eludir la deriva populista. Para ello, iniciaremos desarrollando una interpretación de la moral kantiana en clave constructivista, para pasar a revisar, en esa línea, el concepto del reino de fines y el de uso público de la razón, para terminar, desarrollando el concepto de una sociedad civil cosmopolita.
The aim of the study is to provide a philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the Government of Nigeria at all levels, as a bare minimum of what social justice and respect for human dignity requires. The objectives are to identify an approach that recognizes and promotes the idea of human dignity and inviolability of human person; to evaluate Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a foundation for women’s rights and gender justice, and contrast it with extant frameworks in the search for social justice while proposing capabilities approach as a framework in drafting laws and framing public policy which promote women rights and gender justice.
This chapter presents key arguments made in my book, The Disabled Contract: Severe Intellectual Disability, Justice and Morality. It examines how people with severe intellectual disabilities (PSID) fare within the social contract tradition. More specifically, it contends that even strategies that attempt to integrate disability within the realm of contractual justice and morality are not entirely successful. These strategies cannot ground a robust moral status for PSID; or, if they do so, it is at the cost of making this status merely derivative or contingent. The failure of social contract theory to bring PSID within its purview is significant. At best, it reveals a gap that should impel moral and political theorists to give fiduciary and caring ideals due weight next to contractual ideals. At worst, the tradition is not only incomplete, but necessarily creates and oppresses the “disabled subject.”
This book brings together leaders in the fields of animal ethics, politics, social philosophy, world religions, and the law to explore the possibilities of solidarity between humans and other animals. ‘Solidarity’ is central in social justice movements, but its place in animal protection has not been systematically explored. While animal scholars have concentrated on concepts like ‘justice’, ‘agency’, ‘representation’, etc., only few have talked about ‘solidarity’. Nine chapters by known voices in the field of animal studies, a substantial introduction by the editors, as well as a foreword and afterword by solidarity scholars show that this debate is long overdue.
How is someone who seeks a reflective equilibrium to respond upon learning that others disagree with her? Regrettably, not much attention has been devoted to that question despite the extensive general discussion about the epistemic significance of disagreement that has taken place in recent years. This paper helps fill the lacuna by exploring possible connections between the relevant bodies of literature. More specifically, I claim that how users of the method of reflective equilibrium should respond to disagreement is crucial to the assessment of the method. According to a common objection, it is flawed because it may lead competent and rational inquirers to arrive at widely divergent and inconsistent equilibria. What I argue is that defensible assumptions about the significance of disagreement permit an advocate of the method to resist that objection.
Desde la publicación de A Theory of Justice ha habido serias discusiones en cuanto al modelo metodológico empleado por Rawls. Una de ellas ha sido determinar cuál es la posición metaética a la que él suscribe, pues la complejidad del modelo metodológico de su teoría permite interpretar el acercamiento a diferentes concepciones metaéticas. Por ejemplo, algunos entienden que Rawls es un constructivista moral (Nino, 1988) otros, en cambio, que se acerca a una postura escepticista (Barbarosch, 2007). Frente a esta divergencia de posturas, el propósito del presente trabajo es realizar un estudio de la obra rawlsiana con el objeto de descifrar qué postura metaética subyace en la teoría del profesor de Harvard.
This article analyses the relevance of the ethics of solidarity for unpaid care and discusses its implications for public health policy. It combines philosophical and health-policy-oriented methodologies and claims that solidarity obliges us not only to care for the most vulnerable populations but also to care with those who care. Both draw attention to the work of carers, who, despite their indispensable contribution, are notoriously invisible to healthcare systems. The article argues for their threefold recognition: as partners in healthcare provision; as co-citizens and employees with special needs; and as a potentially vulnerable population themselves.
The volume includes a series of reflections – with a marked interdisciplinary character – on the current legal status of the principle of solidarity. In each of the contributions included in the book the authors investigate, based on different perspectives, whether the principle of solidarity today influences the relations occurring among the members of the different human communities, and, consequently, whether and to what extent the relevant legal orders give concrete realization to the value of solidarity. The theme of solidarity is in particular addressed under the perspectives of its interconnection with the social contract, of the fiscal aspect, as well as of international law, with a special focus on human rights.
European Enlightenment philosophy (seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy) led to democratic revolutions and ultimately commercial and economic reforms. At the apex of this era, Immanuel Kant offered his categorical imperative as a process that reflects common thinking about methods for deriving practical moral maxims and duties. This process is shown here as relevant for managerial leadership and business efficiency. The role of reflective thought in establishing and maintaining these maxims is emphasized. The categorization of these maxims into their associated perfect and imperfect duties is reviewed so that absolute prohibitions (perfect duties) can be understood as distinctly different from those volitional duties (imperfect duties) that pursue wide objectives but with practical limitations. This latter category is shown to be particularly germane to effective modern management.
The “specialness” of our involvements in environmental organizations results from our pursuit of collective imperfect duty. This is reviewed here where these involvements are explained as necessary for society’s processes of environmental decisions to be “fair and reasoned.” As inputs to these processes, the inspirational aspects of the “sacredness of nature,” as expressed in the classic American environmental literature of Emerson, Thoreau, Muir, Leopold, and Douglas, are examined as a motivating foundation for natural preservation in the public domain. These inspirational and sacred aspects support the notion of the “intrinsic value of nature.” Our vision of what could be for our restored environmental assets, as offered by our environmental organizations and government agencies, is the key element of our reasoned collective discourse that ultimately leads to restorations.
The various biases that might inhibit our reasoned business-related environmental discourse are reviewed. In addition, since our reasoned social discourse with respect to environmental policies can interrupt, and is often interrupted by, the obfuscations of business, two examples of attempted obfuscation are reviewed here: the coal industry’s rhetoric of “clean coal” and agriculture’s rhetoric concerning “concentrated animal feeding operations.” The example of the North Atlantic Fishery depletion is also reviewed. The classic Storm King legal precedent is also reviewed to provide an example of non-servile citizen involvement in environmental restoration.
Through compensation arrangements, corporate managers are typically bonded to the interests of shareholders. As a result, managers have a conflict of interest in paternalistically deciding the compensations to and opportunities for other nonowner stakeholders (employees, suppliers, and some others). An appropriate normative stakeholder theory should therefore center on notions of fair negotiations with these stakeholders where management openly acts as the agents of the shareholders. These resulting management agreements might therefore be viewed as resulting from fair bargaining. Consequently, an applicable set of Kantian-derived rules for fair negotiations are posed here. Their appropriateness to both indirect market-based negotiation and also direct negotiation with stakeholders is examined.
This paper aims to reconstruct Kant’s derivation of the formula of the categorical imperative from its mere concept with the help of the resources of Searle’s and Vanderveken’s illocutionary logic. The main exegetical hypothesis is that the derivation envisaged by Kant consists in deriving the formula from the success conditions of categorical imperatives. These conditions, which are analogous to the success conditions of ordinary orders, contain restrictions for the successful construction of a system of moral laws that determine what the content of the categorical imperative must be.
Cet article vise à montrer que la critique de Rawls qui en fait un penseur ignorant les formes concrètes de la vie morale passe à côté d’une dimension longtemps négligée de son approche de la justice. Lecteur des Philosophical Investigations de Wittgenstein à leur parution en 1953, Rawls fit un usage original de la notion de « forme de vie » ( Lebensform ) avant de chercher à articuler cette notion préthéorique avec sa théorie de la justice. L’une des questions qui se posèrent à lui à la suite de sa lecture des Philosophical Investigations concernait la relation entre les capacités naturelles liées à une certaine forme biologique, celle de la vie humaine, et les jugements moraux dont les êtres humains sont capables. Il s’agit ici d’essayer de comprendre en quoi cette relation concerne, en général, le statut du « théorique » chez Rawls, et, en particulier, le sens de la justice et son rapport à ce que notre « forme de vie » a de spécifique.
Capacidad negocial de personas mayores de 18 años con discapacidades intelectuales y psicosociales en Colombia Legal capacity of people over 18 years with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities in Colombia Resumen El objetivo de este artículo es analizar el ejercicio de la capacidad negocial de per-sonas mayores de 18 años con discapacidades intelectuales y psicosociales en Colombia, a partir de la Ley 1996 de 2019, con el fin de plantear algunas recomen-daciones a tener en cuenta al momento de realizar los ajustes razonables y definir los apoyos para la toma de decisiones, que atiendan tanto al modelo social de discapacidad y al enfoque de derechos humanos, como también a la autonomía pri-vada. Mediante un análisis de contenido documental y de comparación normativa se presentan algunos aspectos que se deberían observar en los ámbitos personal, interrelacional y estructural, para maximizar el ejercicio de la capacidad negocial de las personas con discapacidades, y para hacer efectivos los principios de autono-mía, dignidad humana y diversidad. Palabras clave Discapacidad, modelo social de discapacidad, enfoque de derechos humanos, ca-pacidad negocial, Ley 1996 de 2019. Abstract This article aims to analyze the exercise of the legal capacity of people over 18 years with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities in Colombia, based on Law 1996 of 2019, in order to propose some recommendations to consider when making reasonable adjustments and define the supports for decision-making, that address both the social model of disability and the human rights approach, as well as the private autonomy. Through an analysis of documentary content and normative comparison, this paper presents some aspects that should be considered in the personal, interrelation and structural spheres, to maximize the exercise of the legal capacity of people with disabilities, and to make effective the principles of autonomy, human dignity and diversity.
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar el ejercicio de la capacidad negocial de personas mayores de 18 años con discapacidades intelectuales y psicosociales en Colombia, a partir de la Ley 1996 de 2019, con el fin de plantear algunas recomendaciones a tener en cuenta al momento de realizar los ajustes razonables y definir los apoyos para la toma de decisiones, que atiendan tanto al modelo social de discapacidad y al enfoque de derechos humanos, como también a la autonomía privada. Mediante un análisis de contenido documental y de comparación normativa se presentan algunos aspectos que se deberían observar en los ámbitos personal, interrelacional y estructural, para maximizar el ejercicio de la capacidad negocial de las personas con discapacidades, y para hacer efectivos los principios de autonomía, dignidad humana y diversidad.
The pdf comprises excerpts from the book "Why Human Rights? A Philosophical Guide" (Routledge, 2024). This book addresses universal human rights as moral mandates – rights to justice that all persons have by virtue of their humanity alone. These are not the legal rights of statutes and treaties, but moral rights of the kind Gandhi, King, and Mandela invoked to oppose unjust laws. All such rights presuppose three claims: (1) that some duties of justice apply universally, (2) that all human beings have equal moral significance, and (3) that states must protect or serve certain individual interests regardless of the societal impact of doing so. ¶ Can these three premises be justified? Is the human equality claim, for example, rationally supportable, or is it no less faith-based than hierarchical doctrines like caste? This book explores the case for these foundational claims along with other philosophical controversies pertaining to human rights. Because these issues lie at the heart of moral and political philosophy, readers will also obtain a broad appreciation of these disciplines and their leading theorists, including Mill, Kant, Rawls, Sandel, Nozick, Rorty, and many others. Written in concise, jargon-free language, this book presents a high-relief map of the philosophical issues surrounding human rights.
Classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world, according to which there are elementary facts and compound facts, which are logical combinations of these elementary facts. Sentences are true if they correspond to, in last instance, the elementary facts in the world. This world view has no place for rules, which exist as individuals in the world, and which create relations between the most elementary facts. As a result, classical logic is not suitable to deal with rules, and is therefore unsuitable to deal with legal reasoning. A logic that is more suitable should take into account that law is a part of social reality, in particular a part that consists of constructivist facts, and that rules play a central role in law. This article gives a superficial description of how social reality exists and of the place of law and legal rules in it. It uses this description to argue that traditional techniques to reason with and about legal rules provide a better logic for law than classical logic. These techniques can be accommodated in a logic that treats rules as logical individuals.
The method of case analysis for examining the operations
of the Viber channel of Mariupol citizens during and after the siege of the city was applied
in this article. A relational content analysis of text messages and meta-data of the channel
were conducted. The resulting empirical material was conceptualized in the logic
of thematization of basic models of democracy and their criticism. The Viber channel media
community during wartime was considered in the context of the concepts of the natural state
and the social contract. A special place is occupied by the optics of the diversity of forms
of “grassroots democracy” and their localization. In terms of “networks of trust” in the context
of the opposition of “democratization–de-democratization” (Charles Tilly) and the search
for a “deliberation sense of community” (Joseph Bessette). The non-political nature
of grassroots movements of media communities and their homology to the decentralization
reform in Ukraine are emphasized.
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