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The political economy of small states: Enduring vulnerability?
Review of International Political Economy
... The final point to note about the IPCC's Small Islands sections, is that the explanation of island vulnerability within the IPCC reports changes very little over time. This vulnerability is pre-existing and inherent, due to "inherent physical characteristics" (IPCC WGII 2014, 1616) of islands and also theories of inherent economic vulnerability that rely on economic theories of smallness in particular (Briguglio 1995;Bishop 2012). Alongside these inherent vulnerability, governance and development explanations are given for 'exacerbating' vulnerability. ...
... This developmental argument is supported by an economic literature on the inherent economic vulnerability of small states (Bishop 2012) small island states (Briguglio 1995) and specifically Pacific atoll states (Pollard 1989). Vulnerability is on the one hand an existential condition of smallness: "small states are distinguished by their overriding existential condition: vulnerability" (Bishop 2012, 947). ...
... Teaiwa's use of the language of finitude and limitation is not the same as the scarcity arguments that run through the work of neo-Malthusian populationists. Islanding finitude is not arguing that the good life entails more land or fewer people, as the theorists of island economic vulnerability (Briguglio 1995;Bishop 2012) often state, but instead argues that an understanding of interconnected life within the knowledge of a finite world leads to more care being taken with what is not viewed as endless in supply. It is an approach to finitude that addresses the continental fantasies of endless space and resources. ...
My thesis engages critical feminist theory and Pacific studies literature to explore the concept of vulnerability in climate change politics from a historical and decolonial perspective. My thesis argues that climate change vulnerability is a racialised and gendered concept that builds on historical imaginative geographies that have a colonial history and a paternalistic and developmental politics. This conceptualisation enables First World fantasies of invulnerability, diminishing the importance of climate action and mitigation in particular. This argument is developed through an analysis of how vulnerability has been framed in key sites of climate politics, notably the IPCC and the UNFCCC, the origins of those framings, and their discursive effects. It also engages closely with the discursive strategies of islander discourse through texts including poetry, and satirical short fiction. I also seek to develop a new conceptualisation of vulnerability through the 'islanding' concept, drawing on the work of decolonial island feminists, artists and activists.
... SIDS have by far moved beyond neo-realist or neo-liberal barriers and asymmetries of international climate politics (Grecequet et al., 2017;Hoad, 2015). This view runs against the neo-realist or liberal institutionalists' notion about material weaknesses of small states to influence international systems (Bishop, 2012;Hellmann & Wolf, 1993;Rowlands, 2001;Telbami, 2002;Walt, 1987;Waltz, 1979). This article does not avoid such notions of main or classical IR theories. ...
... International action is often divided and disdained by powerful states. However, despite their weak material properties, SIDS seem to have found their way through international climate negotiations (see Bishop, 2012;Chong & Maass, 2010;Harris, 2009;Hey, 2003;Lee & Smith, 2010;Panke, 2012;Simpson, 2006;UN-OHRLLS, 2011). In this respect, foreign policy responses of SIDS to international action against climate change present a case to reorganize theoretical approaches in IR and foreign policy. ...
... Coalitions can enable states to establish common goals on such complex issues by creating group awareness. This group awareness and understanding(s) can form a group of homogenous actors to pursue a common agenda (Bishop, 2012). Ideas act as coalition builders or coalition magnets (Béland & Cox, 2016;Blyth, 2002). ...
This article is about small island developing states (SIDS) and their role in the United Nations (UN) climate negotiations. It presents a discussion about how a constructivist model of foreign policy analysis and international system design can be used to explain the impact of climate ideas of SIDS on UN climate system. The SIDS have been in the UN climate negotiations since the 1980s, committed to a climate agenda with clear ideas about the challenges they face and the type of solutions they seek from the international policy community. In this respect, this article seeks to explain that climate ideas shared among SIDS have established an intersubjective understanding to promote a compelling common voice at international climate negotiations, which is based on an island vulnerability identity. These ideas have shaped the policy thinking and interests of climate negotiators to design institutional frameworks that have given special consideration to SIDS. It concludes that this observation represents a disproportionate impact of SIDS. Despite the weak material powers for being small islands, their climate agenda has influenced the UN system design to address their concerns.
... While foreign aid and remittances have proven to be unsustainable sources of income for islands (Tisdell 1993), tourism development generates foreign exchange earnings, attracts international investment, increases tax revenues, diversifies exports, and creates new jobs for small island states (Briguglio/Briguglio 1996;Briguglio 2008;Hadjikakou et al. 2014;Kokkranikal et al. 2003;Twining-Ward/Butler 2002). The downside, however, is that it can trigger negative economic and environmental impacts such as economic leakages, high levels of imports, reliance on foreign labor, limited freshwater supply, water pollution, and damage to coral reefs and marine ecosystems of islands (Bishop 2012;Kokkranikal et al. 2003;Twining-Ward/Butler 2002). Other studies point to socio-cultural impacts such as the demonstration effect, reduced social cohesion, erosion of family and traditional morality, and threats to social order due to outside influence from international tourism (Bramwell 2003;Kokkranikal et al. 2003;Robinson et al. 2019). ...
... Many have argued against such a growth fetish of global consumption where tourism kills itself (Diamantis 2000;Higgins-Desbiolles 2010;. However, for islands, these growth issues are compounded because the susceptibility of islands engenders over-reliance on foreign investments (Barrowclough 2007), fierce competition (Buhalis 2000), and increased leakage (Bishop 2012). Other studies suggest socio-cultural issues of loss of traditional lifestyles and social order (Kokkranikal et al. 2003), with much environmental degradation that damages coral reefs and marine flora and fauna (Nesticò/Maselli 2020), as outlined in Table 1. ...
Sustainability influences and is influenced by tourism resources on islands which require suppliers to be proactive in their contribution to sustainable production. However, these tourism suppliers are challenged with a myriad of sustainability issues that paralyzes progress toward sustainable tourism development of island tourism. This study employs the core and peripheral sustainable tourism indicator framework proposed by Agyeiwaah, McKercher, and Suntikul (2017) to illustrate the sustainability issues tourism suppliers contend with. Based on qualitative semi-structured interviews (SSI) with 15 tourism and hospitality suppliers in both private and public sectors on the Greek island of Cephalonia, the results point to the perceived lack of control and powerlessness over the core and peripheral sustainability issues such as poor accessibility, unfair competition, foreign investment dependence, and bureaucracy which need to be addressed for sustainable production. Findings finally point towards a pessimistic and fatalist view of sustainability issues from a supply perspective in Cephalonia. Implications of these findings for island destinations are discussed.
... More importantly, the institutional behaviors and ethics of destination governments and authorities are fundamental to understanding the complexity and dynamics of overtourism, especially within the context of small island societies with strong political ties (Benedict 1967;Bishop 2012). The crux of the over-tourism conundrum and its resolution are well beyond the boundaries of tourism as an industry; they are political by nature and institutional by nurture (Baldacchino 2005;Joppe 2019;Peterson et al. 2017). ...
... By deconstructing over-tourism from an emic island perspective through a politicaleconomic institutional lens (Bishop 2012;Duval 2004), this study addresses the limitations of traditional normative and reductionistic tourism-centric approaches (Daye et al. 2008 Peterson et al. 2017), and conceptualizes over-tourism from a contextualized perspective in which both norms and networks of purpose, power, people, and place take center stage in social construction of tourism development and institutional behaviors (Cloutier et al. 2019;Hall and Williams 2008;Joppe 2019;Richter 1994). ...
The Caribbean is one of the most tourism-intense regions of the world with rising levels of over-tourism, especially in dependent small island tourism economies (SITE). More critically, mounting socio-ecological pressures are compounded by increasing climate change and enduring social vulnerabilities, thereby challenging traditional policies and paradigms of growth and sustainability. Drawing on previous studies of inclusive development and community well-being, this research paper frames and extends the phenomenon of over-tourism from a political economic perspective. Based on a historical account of small island tourism development, an in-depth case study of Aruba is presented. Recognized internationally as the ‘One Happy Island’ and one of the most tourism-dependent small island economies, the findings yield a contextualized understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of over-tourism, and identify the main antecedents and effects of over-tourism. The study discusses the evolving economic disconnectedness, environmental decay, social inequality, and institutional failures. The findings describe the role of institutional capture and policy drift which stem primarily from political as well as market forces, and have resulted in a gradual marginalization of community well-being and agency. The paper proposes an extended conceptualization of over-tourism in small island tourism economies by explicitly recognizing that the crux of the over-tourism conundrum in SITE is political in nature and institutional by nurture. Recommendations are provided for transitioning towards community-driven development by building capabilities and pathways for innovation, internalization, and institutionalization in order to strengthen the resilience of small island tourism development.
... Автор более 20 научных работ и статей. 2 ключевых факторов в определении собственного веса в международных отношениях наравне с «размером» суверенитета, территории, политических (способности государства формировать внешнеполитический консенсус и способности иметь внутреннюю сплоченность) и экономических (размер ВВП и процесс развития) возможностей 5 . Вместе с тем отмечается, что малые страны, воспринимающие себя в качестве значимых акторов международных отношений, могут добиться определенных успехов, в то время как иной подход может вести к реактивной внешней политике 6 . Субъективное понимание «своего места» в глобальной политике подчеркивается также классиком неолиберальной школы Р. Кеохейном, который замечает, что «малая страна -это государство, лидеры которого считают, что оно никогда не сможет, действуя в одиночку или в малой группе, оказать существенное влияние на систему» 7 . ...
Положение малых стран в рамках многополярного мира всегда было неустойчивым, так как отсутствие «разделения труда» в контексте глобального управления (как минимум, в рамках взаимодействия двух геополитических полюсов) способствовало росту угроз и уязвимости этих стран. В современном мире система международных отношений стала более сложной по причине конкуренции не только великих держав, но и появления средних, чей консолидированный потенциал может стать угрозой для мировых лидеров. Малые страны в этом контексте становятся более уязвимыми. Перед Первой и Второй мировыми войнами главными аренами противостояния великих держав становились малые государства, которые не были включены в систему международных отношений. Появление новых государств на осколках одной из сверхдержав эпохи Холодной войны привело к необходимости встроить их в текущий формат глобальных взаимоотношений, однако распад современной системы международных отношений создал конфликтный узел вокруг постсоветского пространства, где главными «жертвами» могут стать малые государства.
... Despite their technological development and established economic base, developed SMS states face strategic constraints and risks given their limited resources, a small marketplace, and increased dependence on foreign trade, compared to greater powers (St. Bernard, 2004;Bishop, 2012;Baldacchino, 2020, pp. 72-73). ...
In the evolving landscape of international politics, the ascent of small and medium-sized (SMS) states in knowledge industries is notable. As these states, exemplified by Israel, Sweden, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates, harness advanced technological capabilities, their global influence grows. Unlike great powers, SMS states face a heightened risk in developing advanced technology due to limited national resources and the absence of technological redundancies. Our examination of Israel’s experience in the satellite, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence industries serves as a case study demonstrating how an SMS state can establish competitive knowledge sectors. These technologically advanced SMS states attain a status akin to middle powers, challenging conventional perceptions. Analyzing Israel’s commitment to securing these technological fields reveals government intervention aimed at cultivating sustainable knowledge industries and preserving critical knowledge. While diverse motivations drive the technological development of SMS states, their capabilities reshape conventional notions of middle powers and global power distribution.
... Despite higher human development levels across most of the case study cohort, they all have significant economic and environmental vulnerability (see Bishop, 2012). Most are reliant on just one or two economic sectors or industries for large shares of their revenues. ...
The climate crisis is exacerbating debt sustainability challenges in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). With projections of increasing loss and damage in SIDS due to both extreme weather and slow-onset events, these debt problems are likely to continue and intensify.
The main working paper provides useful insights for all stakeholders gathering at the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States (SIDS4) in Antigua and Barbuda from 27 to 30 May 2024 and sets out priorities for financing resilient prosperity in SIDS over the next 10 years. The objective of the study is to understand why levels of debt are particularly high in (some) SIDS, the challenges that this presents, and the different practices and policies that they have adopted to pursue – and attain – debt sustainability.
... Hence, SIDS present commonalities in terms of structural and climate challenges that call for context-specific solutions. Their vulnerability was traditionally defined in economic termsin relation to sudden currency crises or trade shocks -but is now increasingly seen to have critical environmental dimensions (Bishop, 2012). ...
https://odi.org/en/publications/a-fair-share-of-resilience-finance/
... Hence, SIDS present commonalities in terms of structural and climate challenges that call for context-specific solutions. Their vulnerability was traditionally defined in economic termsin relation to sudden currency crises or trade shocks -but is now increasingly seen to have critical environmental dimensions (Bishop, 2012). ...
... The economic and environmental vulnerabilities of small islands states are well documented (Briguglio et al., 2009, Bishop, 2012. Such vulnerabilities, which render the states at risk of being harmed by economic and environmental conditions, stem from intrinsic features of these vulnerable states, and are not usually governance induced. ...
... Climate change is therefore diminished as the source of the problem, as it becomes largely a barrier to development, with solutions to come from finance, and improved governance (Mycoo, 2018(Mycoo, , 2350. This developmental argument is supported by an economic literature on the inherent economic vulnerability of small states (Bishop, 2012) small island states (Briguglio, 1995) and specifically Pacific atoll states (Pollard, 1989). Vulnerability is on the one hand an existential condition of smallness: "small states are distinguished by their overriding existential condition: vulnerability" (Bishop, 2012, 947). ...
The extinction narrative of the ‘sinking island states’ is well known and discussed extensively in the climate change institutions, academic literature, and media accounts of climate change. This article questions the theoretical basis upon which this narrative has developed, asking how it became so embedded in climate change politics, and what implications this narrative has both for islands and for action on climate change. Focussing on the Pacific, this article uses the insights of racial capitalism and critical feminism to historicise the sinking islands extinction narrative. This historical analysis shows that underlying these extinction narratives of doomed islands and islanders is a colonial logic of disposability that has developed over time, shifting to naturalise changing forms of violence and exploitation in the Pacific. This argument has implications for climate change politics where extinction narratives are widespread, including in justice arguments. The racialised and gendered colonial logics that underlie vulnerability discourse means it does not function to strengthen arguments for mitigation, but instead to naturalise the suffering and loss of those deemed vulnerable. Questioning how discourses of vulnerability impact on capitalist accumulations and dispossessions is therefore important, as the solutions to vulnerability are different if it is understood not as inherent, but as an actively reproduced condition that is being resisted by vulnerabilised communities.
... While several streams of scholarship have fruitfully attempted to switch the focus to states on the 'periphery', influence over global politics is still understood to be largely limited to states with market power. To begin with, peripheral states' agency has been cast as reactive, through "resilience" or "resistance" to powerful states' intrusions on their policy space (Bishop, 2012;Scott, 1992). The spotlight has also turned to 'Rising' Powers, whose growing markets give them influence from the same source as the Great Powers, clearly distinct from that of lowerincome countries (Narlikar & Tussie, 2004;Panda, 2017;Vickers, 2013). ...
As Western-led institutions of global governance adapt to global power shifts, the question of which countries dominate, and how, increasingly animates scholarship. Yet while attention has shifted from ‘Great’ to ‘Rising’ Powers, the underlying focus on market power has changed little. In this article, we shift the focus to alternative forms of power that developing countries can wield in global governance, specifically in highly technical transnational negotiations. Reconceptualising the notion of ‘regulatory capacity’, we argue that states can overcome limited market power through socio-technical resources: expertise and professional networks. These resources form the basis through which policy claims become authoritative and they enable emerging state coalitions to influence policy-making. To demonstrate this, we analyse developing countries’ involvement in standard-setting for international corporate taxation. Specifically, we study the newly established G20/OECD Inclusive Framework, an experiment where more than 140 jurisdictions participate in negotiations that were previously the preserve of OECD states. Based on unique attendance data and interviews with dozens of participants, we perform a detailed analysis of specific policy decisions, interrogating the extent and sources of developing countries’ influence. We find that socio-technical resources allow individuals from lower-income countries to achieve narrow yet significant successes, punching above their weight in global governance. © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
... Small size and limited resources and physical isolation mean SIDS capacity for economic growth and economic security can be limited. SIDS usually have small domestic markets, limited ability to develop economies of scale, high costs of imports and transport, inability to influence international prices and uncertainties of supply due to remoteness or insularity (Downes, 1988;Bishop, 2012;. SIDS also often have economies based on sectors that are vulnerable to natural hazards, such as agriculture and tourism. ...
The importance of the role of governance in reducing disaster risk has international recognition from the United Nations’ Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The decentralisation of decision-making has been proposed by scholars as a practice to improve disaster outcomes. However, there is very little research that examines the role of decentralised disaster governance in household disaster experiences. Much of the current disaster experience research tends to use aggregate trend data of numbers of people affected, fatalities and economic loss that reveal high-level changes over time, but provide very little sense of the outcomes for different types of affected households. Studies that focus on household-scale outcomes tend to be one-off studies that do not provide longitudinal evidence of changing household experiences over time. This study fills a gap by researching the historical associations between disaster governance and the lived experiences of households over three decades of disasters.
The research problem is studied through the case study of Samoa, a typical small island developing state. Small island developing states are relevant case studies as they are often physically small and remote, low lying, and resource poor – all of which can affect disaster outcomes. By taking a political ecology approach, the study reveals how power dynamics within communities interact with formal governance systems.
Despite differences between disaster outcomes experienced by all households, this research identified three ‘types’ of households, based predominantly on their primary income source, which had similar experiences. Households with access to formal income and those receiving remittances had improved disaster outcomes between 1990 and 2018. However, subsistence households experienced few improvements in disaster outcomes over this period, continuing to struggle to access income and food after cyclones disrupted their agricultural source of income.
The research finds that while formal decentralised governance arrangements are important at the local scale to support collective action and local scale relief distribution, decentralisation of responsibility often occurs without the complete decentralisation of power and resources. Despite noteworthy reforms in Samoa, the current formal disaster governance arrangements have not improved the disaster outcomes for the most marginalised households. Households with low-income and low social status struggle to access both resources and access to decision-making within villages. For higher-income and more powerful households, improved disaster outcomes are more closely associated with increased national scale economic development as opposed to governance reforms.
I conclude that for governance to improve outcomes, formal decentralisation of responsibility for disaster preparedness, response and recovery may need a concurrent decentralisation of power and resources. However, decentralising power and resources can also be problematic, leading to the concentration of power and resource capture by local elites. The thesis makes recommendations to improve disaster outcomes of all household groups, not just those that are already best placed to recover from disasters.
... Paradoxically, small states were thus found to exercise substantial influence over great powers through alliances and multilateral institutions (Lindell and Persson 1986). A second strand of literature has focused on the role of small states in international political economy and the adjustment strategies they use to adapt to a competitive environment (see Bishop 2012;Jones 2008;Verdun 2013). The arguably most seminal work in this strand of literature is Katzenstein's (1985) study of small states in world markets (see also Katzenstein 2003). ...
This article introduces the special issue on smaller states and their relation to Germany in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). While there has been a mushrooming literature on the role of Germany in EMU, there has been hardly any research on how smaller states interact with EMU’s most powerful member. However, recent developments such as the rise of populism, Brexit, or the emergence of small state coalitions such as the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and the ‘Frugal Four’ give reason to take a closer look at the role of smaller states. Therefore, this special issue gathers the preferences of smaller EMU members, analyses the strategies they use to pursue them vis-à-vis Germany, and investigates the reasons for their choice as well as Germany’s reaction. At a theoretical level, we put forward an analytical framework providing causal propositions on why and how smaller states adopt certain strategies when they act in the shadow of hegemony. At an empirical level, we present the findings of the single contributions. We conclude by discussing the results in the light of our theoretical expectations.
... Paradoxically, small states were thus found to exercise substantial influence over great powers through alliances and multilateral institutions (Lindell & Persson, 1986). Partly based on this work, a second strand of literature has focused on the particular role of small states in international political economy (see Bishop, 2012;Bohle & Jacoby, 2017;Verdun, 2013). The arguably most seminal work in this strand of literature is Katzenstein's (1985; see also 2003) study of small states in world markets. ...
... This is both regrettable and indefensible: there is a ''gigantist" bias in much existing work, yet the Caribbean and Pacificwhich comprise, along with other SIDS, approximately a quarter of the world's countries and are arguably more common than the fewer, larger countries that dominate research agendas-have exceptional trajectories of democratic development and therefore great analytical value (cf. Bishop, 2012;Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015;Sharman, 2017). Experts have regularly lamented the lack of comparative analysis on them, despite them being described similarly as ''natural laboratories" (Reilly, 2002: pp. ...
Party system development is often said to be essential for democratization. But if this is a necessary precondition, why do two of the most successful developing regions in terms of democratization, the Caribbean and the Pacific, which are composed similarly of small (island) developing states, display such extreme divergence in their experiences with party democracy? The former has the most stable and pure two-party systems in the world, while in the latter political parties are either weakly institutionalized or absent. Since both have attitudinally homogenous societies and similar institutions, conventional explanations that highlight the importance of social cleavages and electoral systems cannot explain this difference. Employing the framework of a most similar systems design incorporating twenty-three countries, we challenge dominant assumptions about the causes of party system development (PSD) and subsequent institutionalization (PSI) by focusing on their distinctive post-colonial political-economic settlements. Specifically, we process trace the role of labor movements and their manifestation as political parties and argue that this provides the strongest explanation for why the Caribbean has stable party systems, but the Pacific does not. By emphasizing the importance of pre-existing social organizations for the development of parties, our analysis foregrounds the otherwise largely neglected literature on early European party organization and the role of political economy in PSD.
... Tourism generates 25% of the Madeira region wealth in terms of GDP and provides more than 15% of the total jobs (CCIM, 2015;SRETC, 2017). However, beach systems are particularly vulnerable to direct human interferences, as well as to changes in the patterns of oceanographic forcing, such as wave regime, including extreme events, and sea level, that respond to climate change (Briguglio et al., 2009;Bishop, 2012;Wong et al., 2014;Nicholls et al., 2007;Nurse et al., 2014). ...
Beach erosion poses significant threat to small island economies which are generally highly dependent on coastal tourism. This work investigates the evolution of the low‐lying sandy coast of Boa Vista through an integrated characterization of coastline and shoreline indicators (over the past four decades) based on aerial imagery. It was found that tandem use of the two indicators was important to obtain a reliable perspective of the Boa Vista low‐lying coastal evolution across a wide range of coastal environments. Results indicate that between 1968 and 2010 the coast was relatively stable, although some spatial variability was recognized. The largest changes were observed at the tips of embayed beaches and a clear coastal progradation was found at the southern (downwind) coastal sectors. Coastal evolution has been dominated by sediment budget and the results put in evidence the sedimentary connections between the beaches across the island, either through bypass and overpass processes. Findings show that understanding coastal evolution at low‐lying islands should be supported on island‐scale observations, being the only scale capable to capture the sedimentary connections between beach systems, that often control coastal evolution.
... Tourism generates 25% of the Madeira region wealth in terms of GDP and provides more than 15% of the total jobs (CCIM, 2015;SRETC, 2017). However, beach systems are particularly vulnerable to direct human interferences, as well as to changes in the patterns of oceanographic forcing, such as wave regime, including extreme events, and sea level, that respond to climate change (Briguglio et al., 2009;Bishop, 2012;Wong et al., 2014;Nicholls et al., 2007;Nurse et al., 2014). ...
Sustainable management of insular beaches, that are critical to tourism-based economies, depends on sound
understanding of coastal evolution drivers. However, interconnections among geological, oceanographical,
biological and human key-drivers of coastal change, operating at relevant spatial and temporal scales, remains
poorly understood.
This work aims at understanding and quantifying the main drivers of insular beaches evolution using a
past-to-future sediment budget approach, and to address future coastal impacts raised by anthropogenic interventions
and climate change. This approach was developed in Porto Santo's beach from the early 20th century
to the middle 21st century.
Results show that anthropic activities undertaken during the late 20th century perturbed the existing
long-term (natural) coastal stability. They caused significant reduction of the main sediment source (river sediment
yield) and increased sediment sinks (e.g. sediment extraction from beach, harbour sedimentation). Altogether,
this resulted in the onset of an erosive trend that persists until present. Projecting patterns of coastal
change into the forthcoming decades strongly depends on sediment management strategies. We show that the
adoption of a neutral strategy (i.e. compensating for anthropogenic-induced losses with beach nourishment)
will not be enough to cease beach erosion, given the negative impacts related to acceleration of future sea
level rise. Still, maintenance of the socioeconomic values of Porto Santo's beach can be achieved by triggering
positive anthropic influences on its sediment budget. The past-to-future sediment budget approach proposed
herein provided a unified perspective on the evolution of the main drivers of coastal change and simultaneously
offers foundations for adaptations strategies aiming at increasing sustainability of insular beaches.
... e general starting point for this scholarship lies in an observation about their vulnerability: that smallness (variously defined) begets a precarious vulnerable position (variously defined) in world politics, but that there are also di ering reactions and responses to this vulnerability. 18 is is particularly true in the case of small island states, where research has highlighted the particular economic and governance challenges arising from being a small island: the tyranny of distance, reliance on air and sea transport for the movement of goods and people, the existential challenges posed by climate change, and so forth. ...
Small island states are typically portrayed as vulnerable and insignificant actors in international affairs. This article traces the emerging self-identification of "large ocean states" that these small island states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are now employing, juxtaposing their miniscule landmass and populations with the possession of sovereign authority over large swathes of the world's oceans. Such authority is increasingly being exercised in the context of biodiversity conservation through expanding marine protected areas (an element of both the Sustainable Development Goals and the Aichi Targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity) as an expression of "ecological responsibility." This new exercise of green sovereignty reinforces state control over spaces previously governed only at a distance, but control made possible only through compromises with nonstate actors to fund, monitor, and govern these MPAs.
... The economic and environmental vulnerabilities of small islands states are well documented (Briguglio et al., 2009, Bishop, 2012. Such vulnerabilities, which render the states at risk of being harmed by economic and environmental conditions, stem from intrinsic features of these vulnerable states, and are not usually governance induced. ...
Executive Summary
Current and future climate-related drivers of risk for small islands during the 21st century include sea level rise (SLR), tropical and extratropical cyclones, increasing air and sea surface temperatures, and changing rainfall patterns (high confidence; robust evidence, high agreement). {WGI AR5 Chapter 14; Table 29-1} Current impacts associated with these changes confirm findings reported on small islands from the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) and previous IPCC assessments. The future risks associated with these drivers include loss of adaptive capacity {29.6.2.1, 29.6.2.3} and ecosystem services critical to lives and livelihoods in small islands. {29.3.1-3} SLR poses one of the most widely recognized climate change threats to low-lying coastal areas on islands and atolls (high
confidence; robust evidence, high agreement). {29.3.1} It is virtually certain that global mean SLR rates are accelerating. {WGI AR5 13.2.2.1} Projected increases to the year 2100 (RCP4.5: 0.35 m to 0.70 m) {WGI AR5 13.5.1; Table 29-1} superimposed on extreme sea level events (e.g., swell waves, storm surges, El Niño-Southern Oscillation) present severe sea flood and erosion risks for low-lying coastal areas and atoll islands (high confidence). Likewise, there is high confidence that wave over-wash of seawater will degrade fresh groundwater resources {29.3.2} and that sea surface temperature rise will result in increased coral bleaching and reef degradation. {29.3.1.2} Given the dependence of island communities on coral reef ecosystems for a range of services including coastal protection, subsistence fisheries, and tourism, there is high confidence that coral reef ecosystem degradation will negatively impact island communities and livelihoods.
... Briguglio et al. (2009) termed this reality "the Singapore Paradox" referring to the seeming contradiction that a very vulnerable small country could actually be very successful economically. Bishop (2012), overviewing the different stances regarding the vulnerability hypothesis, contends that small states can and do engage in a range of productive and highly profitable activities. Yet this does not alter the fundamental fact that they still remain intrinsically vulnerable. ...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to revise, update and extend the economic vulnerability and economic resilience indices, where economic vulnerability is associated with inherent exposure to external shocks and economic resilience with policies that enable a country to minimize or withstand the negative effects of such shocks. This study also proposes a revised vulnerability/resilience framework to assess the risk of a country being harmed by external economic shocks.
Design/methodology/approach
The methodology used in the study involves defining economic vulnerability in terms of inherent features of an economy and defining economic resilience in terms of policy-induced changes, and then devising measureable indices to measure such vulnerability and resilience across countries. The exercise required the examination of various global indices to assess their suitability, in terms of relevance and country coverage, for measuring the vulnerability index and the resilience index and the components of the two indices.
Findings
The main finding of the study is that a number highly vulnerable states, including economically successful small island economies, emerged with high resilience scores, suggesting that they adopt policies that enable them to withstand the harmful effects of external shocks. This possibly explains why these states register relatively high GDP per capita, in spite of their high exposure to shocks. On the other hand, a number of countries, mostly large and poor developing countries, that are not highly exposed to external shocks due to their limited dependence on external trade, emerged with a low degree of policy-induced economic resilience.
Research limitations/implications
The study utilized global indicators which sometimes had missing data and these had to be filled in using approximations based on assumptions, and alternative assumption could have produced a different approximations. In addition the classification of countries in terms of the vulnerability and resilience nexus depended highly on many underpinning assumptions, including the definitions and the measurement of the components, the weighting schemes and the thresholds used. It is likely that alternative assumptions would yield alternative classifications.
Practical implications
An important practical implication of this study is that highly economically vulnerable states can reduce the harmful effects of external economic shocks if they adopt policies that lead to resilience building. On the other hand, countries that are not highly exposed to external shocks, can render themselves economically unstable due to their weak economic, social and environmental governance.
Social implications
This study considers social development and cohesion as one of the pillars of resilience building. The implication of this approach is that social governance, leading to improvements in the education and health of the population could reduce the harm arising from a country’s exposure to external shocks. This is because social governance affects the extent to which relations within a society are properly developed, enabling an effective functioning of the economic apparatus without the hindrance of civil unrest.
Originality/value
This study has extended previous work on the vulnerability and resilience framework, to include almost all countries of the world, using updated data, and has revised the resilience index to include environmental governance. It has also redefined market flexibility to allow for the downsides of excessive financial riskiness. The revision of vulnerability and resilience indices in the light of new data and their interaction showed more convincingly that economies that are highly economically vulnerable could still register economic success as a result of resilience-conducive policies associated with good economic, political, social and environmental governance.
... The significance that is often placed on so-called 'binding constraints'' on institutional development means that both analysts who fall either in the scale neutral or scale-sensitive ends of the analytical spectrum of SIDS have left a gaping hole in accounting for patterns of institution building derived from the real experiences within and across various countries. As rightly observed by scholars such as Bishop (2012), Goldsmith (2005), and Lee and Smith (2010), the analytical approach to SIDS suffers from an obsession with vulnerability, which tends to frame small states as a problem and fails to capture the incredible agency of different societies. Consequently, what we know about institutional performance in SIDS is often sketchy and inconclusive. ...
The question of institutional reform in small island developing states (SIDS) has so far attracted two general perspectives. The predominant approach prescribes neo-Weberian principles such as de-politicisation, neutrality, ‘professionalism', continuity and anonymity, and rational-bureaucratic structures. Critics highlight contextual specificities and maintain that Weberian principles are not plausible amid key constraints in SIDS including low human and logistical capacity, pervasive inter-personal and cross-cutting relations, and difficulty in attaining anonymity in public affairs. This debate remains largely intuitive, without the requisite empirical insights about the peculiar institutional trajectories and incentive structures driving change and continuity within SIDS. This paper provides a critical examination of the enduring quagmire of institutional development in SIDS based on a comprehensive account of the experience of Tuvalu.
... A number of studies have documented the degree of economic and environmental vulnerabilities of small islands states (Briguglio et al., 2009;Bishop, 2012) including that related to food security. While subsistence agriculture has shown to be a basic necessity of food to islanders, agricultural activities are severely constrained by the smallness and insularity which deprive islands from any comparative cost advantage in a rapidly globalizing world. ...
Paper can be viewed here: http://authors.elsevier.com/a/1SAPw47-DZc9Jz
In this study we report the results obtained from an island-wide survey aimed at researching an under-emphasized key feature of climate change adaptation – namely willingness to adapt on the basis of the perceptions and beliefs held by the Gozitan livestock and crop farmers. Some of the main objectives of this study included the: (1) determination of whether the current perception is in line with the observed climatic changes at the local scale, and (2) identification of the typology of these farmers, together with those factors that affect both skepticism and acceptance of climate change. This study provided an important first step in the objective validation of local farmers’ perceptions of climate change, as well as in the development of a comprehensive understanding of their attitude, beliefs, willingness and capacity to adjust their practices in response to climate change. The results pointed to several important conclusions that can be used to inform research, outreach strategies and policy formulation, targeting the Gozitan farming sector to adapt to climate change without delay. The forgoing analysis showed a dire need for more information both on impacts and risks, as well as on ways how to introduce new farming techniques and practices.
... The economic and environmental vulnerabilities of small islands states are well documented (Briguglio et al., 2009, Bishop, 2012. Such vulnerabilities, which render the states at risk of being harmed by economic and environmental conditions, stem from intrinsic features of these vulnerable states, and are not usually governance induced. ...
It has long been recognized that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from small islands are negligible in relation to global emissions, but that the threats of climate change and sea level rise (SLR) to small islands are very real. Indeed, it has been suggested that the very existence of some atoll nations is threatened by rising sea levels associated with global warming. Although such scenarios are not applicable to all small island nations, there is no doubt that on the whole the impacts of climate change on small islands will have serious negative effects especially on socioeconomic conditions and biophysical resources—although impacts may be reduced through effective adaptation measures.
The small islands considered in this chapter are principally sovereign states and territories located within the tropics of the southern and western Pacific Ocean, central and western Indian Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the eastern Atlantic off the coast of West Africa, as well as in the more temperate Mediterranean Sea. Although these small islands nations are by no means homogeneous politically, socially, or culturally, or in terms of physical size and character or economic development, there has been a tendency to generalize about the potential impacts on small islands and their adaptive capacity.
In this chapter we attempt to strike a balance between identifying the differences between small islands and at the same time recognizing that small islands tend to share a number of common characteristics that have distinguished them as a particular group in international affairs. Also in this chapter we reiterate some of the frequently voiced
and key concerns relating to climate change impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation while emphasizing a number of additional themes that have emerged in the literature on small islands since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). These include the relationship among climate
change policy, activities, and development issues; externally generated transboundary impacts; and the implications of risk in relation to adaptation and the adaptive capacity of small island nations.
... The other major strand of this literature examines the performance of small states in international affairs. While some works, such as those contributing to debates in political economy (Campbell & Hall, 2009;Katzenstein, 1985Katzenstein, , 2003Ken, 2007;Remmer, 2010;Siddiqui, 2010;Verdun, 2013) have concentrated on the governance characteristics of small states which facilitate their successful performance in global markets, others (Bishop, 2012;Katzenstein, 1985) have addressed the vulnerability of small states to external shocks, especially in terms of climate change and other environmental threats (Briguglio, Cordina, Vella, & Vigilance, 2010). These two characteristicsthe recognized importance of small states in regional governance systems and small state vulnerability to environmental threatshighlight the relevance of small states for TWM debates. ...
In general, studies on regional integration and transboundary water management (TWM) focus on the relationships between large states. Instead, this paper analyses TWM in relation to two cross-border cases involving small states: Germany–Luxembourg and Mexico–Belize. Small states are significant due to their presumed adherence to regional governance and vulnerability to external shocks, especially those of climate change and environmental threats. Specifically, the article asks: How well do small states implement regional water governance models, especially in cross-border contexts? It concludes that the interpersonal bargaining and consensus-building that characterizes small state governance limits effective TWM.
The viability of small island developing states (SIDS) is threatened by three distinct processes – a backlash against globalisation; rising geopolitical competition between powers; and accelerating climate change – which are pulling at the threads binding the liberal international order together. We suggest that this order has been kinder to SIDS than is often acknowledged because its underpinning norms – sovereign equality, non-interference, and right to development – are inherently permissive and thus provide SIDS with choices rather than imperatives. Their leaders should fight for the continuation and enhancement of that order rather than be seduced by alternatives. We provide a rationale for and examples of policies to achieve this, including reforms to the way ODA is measured, debt restructured, climate finance allocated, and global governance organised. These enhancements represent the most plausible pathway for SIDS in a period of significant global upheaval. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Este artículo analiza la trayectoria de Ecuador como pequeño estado dentro del proceso de negociación interregional, para la suscripción de un Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes entre la Unión Europea (UE) y la Comunidad Andina (CAN). Considera algunos factores infl uyentes que moldearon esta relación interregional, particularmente el poder de negociación de Ecuador frente a la UE, el cual revela la influencia que el país ejerció en dicha negociación. Además, discute algunas de las dimensiones de la pequeñez de Ecuador y las variaciones del inter-regionalismo. Finalmente, y a manera de conclusión, el artículo ofrece algunos hallazgos y comentarios.
Throughout a 35-year period, the Armenian economy has withstood numerous crises and political shocks, including the Spitak earthquake, the fi rst Karabakh war, a decline in GDP by over 50 %, transport blockades, and the 2008 economic crisis. The aftermath of the 2020 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh introduced new risks and drastically altered the country’s development and economic conditions. Despite the broader context of international confrontation, which has spilled over into military conflict in Ukraine, the Armenian economy has created possibilities for growth under geopolitical uncertainty. In the short-term perspective, these developments have had a positive impact on economic growth in 2022. However, the continuity of such impact on the Armenian economy depends on the government’s concrete approaches and further existence of current conditions. The article aims to explore the interrelationship between Armenia’s foreign policy and economy in the context of global and regional changes. The policy of the Armenian government is considered through the prism of the main features of the notion “small state,” with particular attention paid to the logic of changes in foreign policy throughout the entire period of independence. By utilizing large-scale statistical data, the article presents the causes of the radical growth of Armenia’s GDP in 2022 while simultaneously analyzing its structure. The development of the country’s energetic system is presented as an illustration of the establishment of a separate field that combines export possibilities, investment potential, and risk formation. The article also covers the reasons for the relative stability of the Armenian economy under the background threat of military escalation.
Does Blue Ocean become the perfect mantra for reaching desired developmental goals? Blue Economy is an essential sustainable development framework for coastal and island states who rely on the ocean and marine resources as a source of livelihood. The concept of a Blue Economy merges economic development and conservation for coastal and island states. The Seychelles and Mauritius are two Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Western Indian Ocean, faced with economic development and conservation dilemmas. Identifying and understanding the challenges and limitations of Blue Economy for SIDS are required to understand the vulnerability of those nations, which is essential to the future outcomes of sustainable development in the Seychelles and Mauritius. Adopting library research methods and online focus group conversations with different stakeholders in both countries, and over two years, during pre-and post-Covid lockdown periods, provide this paper with fascinating findings. Further identification and understanding of vulnerability, overcoming challenge and paradox of Blue Economic ideals in these two cases of SDIS refine the authors’ scepticism upon the myth of the SDG. The authors’ preliminary findings explain the difficulty of the Covid-19 pandemic in allowing both states to realise their SDG targets.
This chapter lays out the theoretical and methodological framework of the book. The first section briefly reviews the comparative public policy literature in terms of policy conception, case selection, and mode of explanation. This is followed by a typology of economic policy paradigms in their international, microeconomic, and macroeconomic aspects, which all emerged as alternatives to the classical liberal orthodoxy. The third section offers an explanation of the cross-national variation in responses by highlighting the role of ruling ideas and strategies about business, labour, and agrarian interests while, at the same time, recognizing the world-historical and national-structural limitations on policy choice. The last section substantiates the selection of country cases representing the cross-national policy variation.
The issues discussed in the paper are very relevant, which is due to the spread of Covid pandemic
challenges in the Economy of Georgia, both at macro and regional levels.
It is already clear that the pandemic has not been limited to an increase in morbidity and
mortality rates, but also has had a severe negative impact on the development of the economy
as a whole. In terms of massive lockdowns and quarantine measures, a number of sectors of the
economy have suffered heavy losses, the companies in tourism, transport, public catering, entertainment
and leisure industries, and the oil sector have particularly been affected. Amid a sharp
decline in economic development, the world economy has been into a deep recession. The level
of economic stagnation directly correlates with the extent of the restrictions introduced. Naturally,
the current situation in the world has affected the Georgian economy accordingly.
ნაშრომი წარმოადგენს ქუთაისის უნივერსიტეტში შიდა სამეცნიერო-კვლევითი პროექტის „საქართველოს რეგიონების ეკონომიკური განვითარების კვლევა COVID-19-ის პირობებში“ ძირითად ნაწილს.
კვლევა განხორციელდა 2021 წლის პირველ ნახევარში ქუთაისის უნივერსიტეტის სოციალურ მეცნიერებათა, ბიზნესის და სამართლის ფაკულტეტზე.
ნაშრომი განხილულია და რეკომენდებულია გამოსაცემად ქუთაისის უნივერსიტეტის ეკონომიკის და ბიზნესის ფაკულტეტის საბჭოს სხდომის (ოქმი №ს2-21, 13.08.2021) გადაწყვეტილებით.
The policy significance of climate change was realised by the international community in the 1980s. As some of the countries most affected by climate change, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have influenced the United Nations (UN) climate negotiations from the very beginning. This chapter analyses the climate foreign policy purposes of SIDS and their early impacts on the UN climate governance system. It is argued that, despite their weak material capabilities to shape international affairs, SIDS have made a notable and disproportionate impact on the UN climate negotiations to address their special case. Using constructivist approach to foreign policy analysis, this chapter explains how the ideas about common but differentiated responsibilities promoted in international climate negotiations have shaped SIDS’ climate agenda during pre-and post-UNFCCC negotiations in driving climate governance for them. It is argued that an understanding of this disproportionate impact helps to better understand present and future trends in SIDS climate politics.
International development country classifications are important for achieving development goals by directing differential support to a group of countries facing common development constraints. The small island developing States (SIDS) classification is a widely used country classification supporting developing island nations. Some nations are now self-identifying as “large ocean states” (LOS), citing the central role of the ocean for their development. Here we show the need for a new ocean-based LOS country classification by highlighting important limitations of current classifications. We analyze this further by enumerating 15 nations self-identifying as LOS since 2001 in official UN statements, most often citing ocean-based economy, size of ocean territory, and vulnerability to climate change as evidence. An ocean-based LOS classification, which requires further research to fully define, would complement existing classifications by targeting countries that disproportionately rely on the ocean to achieve sustainable development priorities, including the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
წინამდებარე ნაშრომი არის თანამედროვე პირობებში რეგიონული განვითარების ანალიზის და რეგიონული ეკონომიკური პოლიტიკის თეორიული და პრაქტიკული რაკურსით გააზრების მცდელობა. ნაშრომში წარმოდგენილია რეგიონული ეკონომიკური პოლიტიკის საკვანძო საკითხები: ტერიტორიული ეკონომიკური განვითარების დაგეგმვისადმი მიდგომები, ფისკალური დეცენტრალიზაციის გამოწვე-
ვები, რეგიონული უთანაბრობები და ტერიტორიული განვითარება, რეგიონების რანჟირებისადმი დამოკიდებულება, ტერიტორიული ერთეულების ეკონომიკური საქმიანობა COVID-19-ის პირობებში, ასევე ეკონომიკური დიპლმატიის რეგიონული შესაძლებლობები. წარმოდგენილი ნაშრომის სასწავლო პროცესში ჩართვის მიზნით,
ყოველი თავის ბოლოში მითითებულია გამოყენებული ლიტერატურის სია.
ntroduction
Considering the harmful and destabilizing effects of crises and shocks on the business environment, in this study, using panel models and using the annual data of the Scandinavian and MENA countries for the period 2016-2010, the effect of economic resistance indices along with other macroeconomic variables on the business environment index is examined. By implementing strategies to maximize their country's resistance to shocks, they strive to provide the path and pattern of sustainable economic growth and development with the least strain.
Theoretical Foundations
In the 1990s, the importance of "business environment" as a link between micro and macroeconomics space was raised in economic literature. The Index of Improvement or Ease of Business environment, due to the nature of its formation, has a new and unique approach that has been put on the World Bank's agenda since 2003 under the title of ease of doing business index. De Soto (2000) has been involved in designing the concept of the business environment and policymaking to remove barriers in the way of the private sector as the main strategy of economic development above all economists. The business environment is an influencing factor on the performance of firms that managers or owners of firms strive to improve.
Review of literature
Economic resistance including economic growth and improvement of the business environment is a topic that has been studied in recent years, on both national and international levels. This section discusses some of these studies.
In a paper using a computable general equilibrium model, Rose (2004), studied the economic resistance of water in Portland, Oregon against simulated earthquakes with a default of 6.1 Richter and water cut-off for 3 to 9 weeks before and after the study period. The existence of a price mechanism under critical circumstances can increase economic resilience.
Briguglio et al. (2008) in a study using a systematic model and a composite index analyzed economic resilience and economic vulnerability of 86 countries to the financial crisis in the period of 2001-2003. Based on the two components of intrinsic vulnerability and level of resilience, countries are divided into four categories: 1- worst (high intrinsic vulnerability and low resilience) 2- best (low intrinsic vulnerability and high resilience). 3- self-made (high intrinsic vulnerability and high resilience) and 4- spoiled boy (low intrinsic vulnerability and low resilience). Pakistan and Bangladesh have low vulnerability and resilience. Costa Rica, Estonia, Malaysia, and China are self-made. Developed countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and Germany have a low intrinsic vulnerability and high resilience (best).
Methodology and results
This study examines the impact of economic resistance on the business environment for the two groups of MENA and Scandinavia over the period 2010-2016 using a panel data model with the software Eviews8. To this end, we first introduce the panel data model. Panel data is a dataset that observes observations by a number of cross-sectional variables (i) over a given time period (t).
In this study, after performing the Unit Root Test and other tests, the model of self-explanation with wide interval (ARDL) and estimation of short-term and long-term coefficients using the integrated group method (PMG) has been used.
Conclusion and suggestions
The present study examines the impact of economic resistance on the business environment based on Briguglio et al. (2008)'s model of economic resilience using a panel data model for Scandinavian and Mina countries during 2016–2010.
The results of this study showed that both groups of Scandinavian and MENA economic resilience index have a positive and significant effect on the business environment index. In Scandinavia and MENA, GFCF and Inflation Rate (IF) have a positive and significant effect on the business index. Foreign Investment (FDI) and Per capita Production (IG) have a positive and significant effect on MENA. But for the Scandinavian countries, it has no significant effect on the business index (DB).
According to the results of research in the countries under study, it is necessary to consider the following to improve the business environment, especially for productive economic sectors (industrial and agricultural):
Improving the resilience of the national economy by improving the efficiency of the government's financial system and monetary system;
Applying the component of economic resistance, extroversion approach by increasing the diversity of export goods and trade parties of the target countries; Reducing government deficit by less harmful methods
The focus of creating productive employment in economic programs;
Taxation of large incomes of unproductive sectors;
Lack of reliance on exogenous variables to provide national resources such as oil revenues;
Proper use of domestic financial capital by improving the business environment;
In this introduction to the collection, we explain its focus on non-Western small states. While the terms ‘non-Western’ and ‘small states’ are problematic – we discuss these problems here – the smallness and non-Westerness of the states studied by the contributing authors set them apart in a way that has attracted little academic attention so far. They allow them to operate with fewer normative and practical constraints than their bigger, Western counterparts; offer them a wide range of (often historically forged) political ties; and force them to draw on a diversity of approaches and strategic thinking, and a creativity, that they are too rarely credited for. Non-Western small states, rather than being mere survivors constrained to the world’s periphery, are better understood as activist states intent on existing. The collection offers a range of analytical keys to make sense of these states and their role in the international scene.
This paper considers the ethical and methodological concerns related to undertaking qualitative research on forced migration in small island developing states (SIDS). It is based on reflections on the first stages of a qualitative research project, which seeks to examine the impact of the current Venezuelan migration crisis on SIDS in the states that were colonized by the Dutch and English (Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad and Tobago). This paper discusses how culture, domestic politics and the geo-political environments of SIDS influences the negotiation and conduct of interviews with experts (government and non-governmental officials working in immigration and foreign policy). In discussing the effects of scale in the conduct of research into forced migration, the author also draws on her experience conducting doctoral research on undocumented migration in another SIDS, Barbados. Using a small states lens thus enables critical reflection, on the part of the researcher, towards adopting a flexible strategy to ensure appropriate ethical and methodological approaches. The research affirms debates in the literature on undertaking sensitive research with qualitative methodologies. It points out that the challenges related to elite participation in research on sensitive topics are exacerbated by a i e. The a e h c ib e a e e gi g dia g e ega di g e ea ch i a c ec ed c i ie. I addi i , he a e eigh he e i f de aki g research in the Caribbean, an under-researched setting, where policy decisions/actions vis-à-vis emerging migration crises, are being taken without clear evidence of support from data and research. It thus sheds light on this region of the world where increasing public attention is now being paid to forced migration (and displacement), signifying the need for robust methodologies of investigation.
For decades, the world's smallest states – the structurally weakest members of the multilateral system – have been considered incapable of influencing international organisations (IOs). So, why has the label small state risen to prominence over the last two decades and become institutionalised as a formal grouping in multiple IOs? Drawing on more than eighty in-depth interviews, we explain the rise of Small Island Developing States in the United Nations system, the expansion of their agenda to the Small and Vulnerable Economies group at the World Trade Organization, and then to other IOs. The adoption of the labels is evidence of small state norm diffusion. We identify the competent performance of vulnerability within multilateral settings as the key to explaining this norm emergence and diffusion. The lesson is that diffusion ‘from below’ is not always driven by a desire to increase rank. In this case small states have gained benefits by maintaining a lowly position in a hierarchy in which large is stronger than small.
This chapter juxtaposes the experiences of Trinidad and Tobago, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten in the wake of global economic shocks. The political and policy trajectory of these territories have varied implications for their ability to manoeuvre the swiftly changing global economy. For Trinidad and Tobago whose economic development has been primarily based on the hydrocarbon industry and Curaçao and Sint Maarten whose growth and development has been traditionally based on tourism, it is imperative to explore the possibilities for diversification. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, crucial economic areas in these territories have experienced a steady decline, yet, almost a decade later, they are seemingly still grappling to rebound and reorient their policy priorities. As a new decade approaches since the global financial crisis, it is important for these territories to acknowledge the shifting dynamics in the global economy and adopt creative response mechanisms to ensure their survival.
The unequal participation of member states in IOs is said to undermine IOs’ legitimacy as global actors. Existing scholarship typically makes this assessment by reference to a combination of input – the interests IOs serve – and output – the decisions they take – factors. Not enough attention is paid to how IOs have responded to these concerns. We argue that IOs have used the participation of small states, a membership typically ignored by most studies, as an important means of generating what Vivian Schmidt calls ‘throughput’ legitimacy for their operations. We organize our analysis of ‘throughput’ legitimacy in IOs around four institutional mechanisms – 1. agenda setting; 2. leadership (s)election; 3. management and operation; and 4. service delivery – in which all states seek to exert an influence. What emerges is an account of IOs seeking to balance ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ by way of ‘throughputs’. We conclude by arguing for an expanded focus on the means by which IOs generate ‘throughput’ legitimacy in future research.
This article uses small states scholarship to map North Korea’s evolution from a post-colonial small state to a system-influencing state due to its nuclear weapons programme. The framework allows for contributions to: (1) The DPRK literature which in some parts has suggested the future collapse of the state, (2) The small states literature that suggests they can only survive if they integrate larger political and/or economic units, (3) The mainstream IR literature and its dominant realist streak that considers great powers and their will as the main drivers in contemporary world politics.
[The article is available to download free with Open Access here http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2017.136801]
Treating the threat of climate change in the Caribbean as a case study instructive for responses globally, this article examines the social and political relations of climate change. It argues for an analysis taking into account the ways in which the histories of imperialism and colonialism have shaped contemporary global ‘development’ pathways. The article charts how Caribbean vulnerability to temperature rises of more than 1.5°C of warming comprise an existential threat structured by contemporary social relations that are imperialist in character. Hope can be taken from a politics of climate justice which acknowledges the climate debts owed to the region.
[The article is available to download free with Open Access here http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2017.136801]
This article departs from the puzzling observation that of the five littoral arctic states the Danish realm has been the most consistent backer in China’s quest to gain observer status in the Arctic Council. Small states are generally assumed to adapt to changes in the international system such as spatial re-configurations and alterations in the distribution of capabilities. Yet Denmark’s enabling role in relation to China seems to contravene that assumption. Why would a small state invite one of the world’s leading powers to enter its regional domain while its principle allies and regional partners – including USA and Canada – were still indecisive or outright hesitant? This article explores three possible explanations for the Danish support for China: 1) a domestic politics explanation featuring strategic use of discourse to entice Chinese investments in Arctic mineral extraction. 2) a securitisation explanation suggesting that unease with growing Canadian securitisation of Arctic issues has prompted courting China as a balancing act. 3) a foreign policy identity explanation focussing on the normative desire to enmeshment China into a liberal Arctic order.
This article embeds the small state experiences in East Central Europe into the broader comparative political economy literature. These broader debates have developed three propositions—one about the need for liberal orthodoxy in small, vulnerable states, a second about special forms of comparative advantage such small states might develop, and the third about the capacities of small states to adapt through consultation and compensation. We demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of each in East Central Europe, and we then analyze a key scope condition for small states’ successful adaptation, namely the buffering function from the international system. Existing literature overemphasizes the impact of domestic strategies and downplays the contribution of the international system when accounting for small states’ successes (and failures) in recovering after major shocks. Only when domestic strategies are supported (rather than undercut) by external factors can small states recover and adapt.
Since the end of the Second World War the map of the Americas has changed dramatically. Not only were many former European colonies turned into sovereign states, there was also an ongoing process of region-making recognizable throughout the hemisphere and obvious through the establishment of several regional agreements. The emergence of political and economic regional integration blocs is a very timely topic analyzed by scholars in many disciplines worldwide. This book looks at remapping the recent trends in region-making throughout the Americas in a way that hasn't been at the center of academic analyses so far. While examining these regionalisation tendencies with a historical background in mind, the authors also answer fundamental questions such as: What influences does globalization have on region-making, both on normative regionalism plans as well as on actual economic, political, cultural, military and social regionalization processes driven by state and non-state actors? What ideas or interests lead states in the Americas to cooperate or compete with one another and how is this power distributed? How do these regional agreements affect trade relations and have there been trade barriers set up to protect national economies? What agreements exist or have existed and how did they change with regard to contents and for what reason? The book informs academic as well as non-academic audiences about regional developments in the Americas, in particular those dating back to the last twenty years. Beyond the primary purpose of summarizing the hemisphere's recent trends, the book also brings clarification in a detailed but easy to understand way about timely issues regarding the institutionalisation, or lack thereof, of the plethora of regional and sub-regional bodies that have emerged in this hemisphere over the past couple of decades. © W. Andy Knight, Julián Castro-Rea, Hamid Ghany and the contributors 2014. All rights reserved.
The aims of this article are the identification of the objectives of small states for participation in international sport and investing in elite sport and the analysis of the strategies that small states adopt to maximize their ability to achieve their sport and non-sport objectives. The article discusses the problem of the definition of smallness and explores objective, relative and subjective definitions. There follows an analysis of the characteristics of vulnerability and capacity in relation to strategy development and a review of the utility of international relations theory for the analysis of small states. The article continues with the identification of five possible strategies that might be adopted by small states (independent/autonomous, isomorphist/imitative, isolationist, collective and camp follower) and the resources needed to operationalize the strategies. Following a brief review of the examples of Singapore and Ireland, the article concludes that the scope for the adoption of independent strategies is likely to narrow given the global ambitions of international federations and the International Olympic Committee. The conclusion also considers the prospects for stimulating research in the area of small state sport policy and argues that the prospects are not good.
Small states, often island or enclaves, frequently make news headlines because of their economic or political instabilities: the ‘failed state’ of the Solomon Islands, the imminent collapse of Nauru, the crisis of East Timor, and ethnic tensions and coups in Fiji are but recent examples. Small jurisdictions are also sometimes accused of being ‘modern day pirates’, bent on distorting international financial rules or operating on the margins of the financial system by creating offshore financial centres (OFCs) and attracting ‘unscrupulous’ sources of funds (Economist, 2007). Aside from these examples, however, there are many other small developing states that have made a successful transition to modernity, with quite envious standards of living and decent quality of life.
In The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (1972: 402) highlights the effects of the general weakness of smaller states vis-à-vis larger, more powerful ones in a key passage where the Athenians remind the Melians that:
you know as well as we do that, as the world goes, right is only in question between equals in power. Meanwhile, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
The aim of this chapter is three-fold: it challenges over-determined, hegemonic accounts on the rise of offshore financial centres (OFCs); it seeks to establish the co-constitutive role of OFCs in shaping the cultural habitus of ‘financialisation’; and it begins to account for the growth and resilience of Caribbean OFCs, tracing their roots/routes back to the development of institutionalised finance and public credit in England (circa 1670). This discussion calls into question the uncontested assumption that many of the problems of regulating the international financial system stem from the growth of OFCs. This assumption is at the heart of measures aimed at combating tax avoidance and evasion, tracking terrorist finance, and revising banking confidentiality principles. It animates the constructed category of the Caribbean or Pacific ‘tax or asset haven’, and can be located within the literature on the OFC phenomenon as either complex or fascinating when not posing problems of legitimacy. I treat the thrust for global financial re-regulation as part of the dilemma of neoliberalism: the pressures to further consecrate capital mobility world-wide continually run up against the limitations of the primary political unit (the nation-state) and arrangements for global governance structures that lack political legitimacy and accountability. But I attend to the broader knowledge produced on global financial flows as largely mired in silences and premature closures over the question of OFCs and their general resilience.
How do small states use international organisations to manage the consequences of exogenous shocks? This article examines this question through exploring how small states negotiate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for crisis management support during a period of ‘disaster capitalism’. Focusing on the case of Iceland, the article argues that while small states can potentially build scale economies in specialist sectors such as banking, the risks inherent in rapid financial expansion greatly increase their vulnerability to external shocks. In such circumstances, small states are likely to struggle to level the playing field in their attempts to negotiate the constraints and opportunities provided by engagement with the IMF during international crises, when they face higher stakes compared with larger economies and have a narrower policy choice set at their disposal.
The idea that a microstate such as Trinidad and Tobago can possess and use ‘power,’ a trait generally associated with a high level of military and economic capability, would appear to a traditional realist to be absurd. This is largely because power is still seen as exercised at the global systemic level or at regional levels that are globally significant. However, small states generally focus their foreign policies on smaller circles, primarily neighbours and dominant bilateral partners. By moving the power analysis (back) to the state (foreign policy) level, extending the definition of ‘power’ to include status (‘position’) and actual attempts to get others to adopt an influencer's preferences, and employing the newer views of power as soft and smart, this article argues that even very small states can exercise power within limited domains as long as they possess certain capabilities (in this case, energy resources) and are ready to seize available opportunities. The evidence shows, however, that the results of these attempts are still mixed, limited primarily by perceptual constraints on the part of both the small-state influencer and the target influencee.
The following article examines the position of small states in the global politics of trade and development. It does so by focusing specifically on the issue of multilateral trade liberalization and the attendant distributional consequences that this process is said to herald for small states. Drawing on historical intuitionalist insights, but couched in the specific empirical setting of the recent liberalization of the textiles and clothing sector, the article eschews the naturalistic and economically determinist language that often accompanies discussions of small states, and instead seeks to draw attention to the role of policy regimes in shaping the timing, form and the economic consequences of trade reform. Although it is often asserted that the problems of adjusting to freer trade for smaller, developing countries are due to ‘natural’ variables such as small population size, poor factor endowments and weak infrastructural capacities, what the paper shows is that some of the underlying factors shaping vulnerability — such as dependence on preferential trade and the lack of export diversification — may be more amiable to political and institutional influence than is commonly assumed. Hence, the nature and severity of the impact of economic liberalization on small, preference-dependent, developing countries should be understood as a contingent, rather than an inevitable, outcome of global economic change.
On 15 October 2008, CARIFORUM became the first region among the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries to sign a ‘full’ Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). Although the EPA process has generated widespread critical commentary, few analysts have stopped to consider the motives of individual ACP countries and regions in their approach to the talks. In this article we consider the question of motives in relation to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. Specifically, it asks why did CARIFORUM feel it necessary or desirable to sign a ‘full’ EPA, containing numerous provisions not actually mandated by the WTO, when the rest of the ACP was content to sign far less ambitious ‘goods only’ interim agreements? In order to address this question, the article goes beyond the extant EU-ACP trade literature to build on wider international political economy (IPE) scholarship, which has analysed the actions of developing countries in relation to a whole range of ‘WTO-plus’ North–South regional and bilateral FTAs. On this basis, the article stands back from the complex details of the agreement to analyse its wider significance, especially in terms of the presumed trade-off between the immediate economic benefits of improved and more secure market access, against the longer term costs of sacrificing the regulatory autonomy, or policy space, deemed necessary to pursue the type of trade and industrial policies deployed successfully in the past by both developed and (some) developing countries. Put simply, the article seeks to ascertain why ultimately CARIFORUM signed an agreement, what it gained from the negotiations and at what cost.
Many scholarly analyses of small economies over the past two decades have been premised on the implicit understanding that a state's small population size, compounded by such factors as islandness and remoteness from markets, is to blame for an inherent and unavoidable economic vulnerability. The article critiques the core features of this approach, and proposes in turn to discuss and profile the development trajectories of small economies from the vantage point of the strategic flexibility used by small states (at multiple levels as individuals, household units, corporate entities and complete jurisdictions) in seeking to exploit opportunities and maximize economic gains in a turbulent and dynamic external environment with which they must engage. Keeping alive a portfolio of skills and revenue streams enables these actors to migrate inter-sectorally as well as trans-nationally.
In this paper, economic vulnerability is defined as the exposure of an economy to exogenous shocks, arising out of economic openness, while economic resilience is defined as the policy-induced ability of an economy to withstand or recover from the effects of such shocks. The paper briefly reviews the work already carried out on economic vulnerability and extends the research towards the development of a conceptual and methodological framework for the definition and measurement of economic resilience. Towards this end, the paper proposes an index of economic resilience gauging the adequacy of policy in four broad areas, namely macroeconomic stability, microeconomic market efficiency, good governance and social development. The analysis of economic resilience explains how small economies can attain a relatively high level of gross domestic product per capita if they adopt appropriate policy stances. In other words, the relatively good economic performance of a number of small states is not because, but in spite of, their small size and inherent economic vulnerability. The results of this study can be used as a tool towards the formulation of policies aimed at overcoming the adverse consequences of economic vulnerability.
This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights (IPR). The first part of this paper introduces different patent policy instruments and reviews their effects on R&D and economic growth. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection as well as empirical evidence on the effects of patent rights. Then, the second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. In summary, this paper draws the following conclusions from the literature. Firstly, different patent policy instruments have different effects on R&D and growth. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing countries. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeoff the social benefits of enhanced innovation against the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.
Small state diplomacy is increasingly relevant to multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is because small developing states have come to play an increasingly active and vociferous part in WTO negotiations, especially during the current Doha Round of talks. Indeed, developing country activism has been a major factor in the ongoing delay in concluding the Doha Round.1 Several of the very active developing countries are small states. This suggests that small states are now beginning to play a key role in WTO negotiations and contrasts with the conclusions of a recent study of small states in the WTO which claims they remain marginal, vulnerable and weak (Grynberg, 2006).
This chapter presents a case study of small state diplomacy with an exploration of the confrontation between small states hosting offshore financial centres (OFCs), and the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) over its ‘harmful tax competition’ project.1 In this analysis, diplomacy is understood as a relationship between states involving dialogue and negotiation (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 129). Diplomacy is, in the words of Martin Wight (1986: 113), ‘the system and the art of communication between powers’. With this quotation it is worth noting for the context of the following analysis that his posthumous text was titled Power Politics. While the analytical approach within this chapter does not follow the realist perspective of Wight, state power and the relationships of power between states nonetheless are central to this analysis.
As this book amply shows, small states continue to interest us, but they also continue to puzzle us. We know that more small states exist than ever before and that most seem to survive while some indeed do prosper. But we also know that there is still no agreed definition of what constitutes a small state and certainly no sharp dichotomy between a small and a large state. It may actually be the case that no firm category of analysis will ever be carved out in this field of study. Even if this is so, it does not mean of course that we should abandon the study of how seemingly small states behave in different spheres of action and at different times. In fact, we need to recognise the multiple natures of the small state phenomenon and focus on their variations in practice. This book, thus, does well to address the ‘diplomacies’ of small states, for there is no typical or characteristic diplomacy of a small state to identify and explain.
Antigua has many of the structural characteristics of a vulnerable country. As a small island state in the Eastern Caribbean, with a population of approximately 68 000 people, Antigua remains overshadowed by its larger regional neighbours — Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago — never mind the major global powers. In economic character Antigua lost its traditional export industry (sugar) decades ago. Although boasting 365 beaches, Antigua has not built up a mass tourism industry. Moreover, its susceptibility to severe hurricanes serves as an obstacle to doing so. In political/diplomatic terms, Antigua has been held back by the image of corruption, which has been the result of the rule of a family dynasty (the Birds) for most of its post-independence existence.
The study of small states in international relations has evolved from explaining anomalies, puzzles, and residual activity in the international system of states, to engaging some of the most important issues in the study of international political economy, international security, and international society. From the postwar contributions of Annette Baker Fox, and the paradoxes of small state power identified by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and David Vital; the effects on international agenda-setting of coalitions of small states; and the capacity for small states to play a role in regional governance structures, to the "social power" of small states seeking to influence international norm selection and recent studies of identity and reputation by Iver Neumann and Jon Mercer, the literature on small states oaers valuable insights to the study of power in international politics. The lessons from Lilliput, as the scholars assembled in this volume attest to, have moved the study of the small from the periphery to the center in the study of international relations. First wave theorists established why it is relevant to shift attention away from large states to other less prominent areas of the international system. These scholars were less concerned with how small states defy expectations of great power theories than with getting these states on the intellectual map of international relations theorizing. Once on the map, second-wave theorists put forward alternative theoretical arguments for small state agency. Third- And fourth-wave theorists no longer question the relevance of small states in the international system and are further refining arguments concerning relative capacities of small states, reputation and image in international relations, and the role of small states as global agendasetters. The classic contributions to these waves of theorizing are reviewed in this chapter as a reminder of how far small state theorizing has come, and where it is headed. For many scholars, The Power of Small States (1959) is the classic com- parison of small states, and one of the early contributions to what we now refer to as the international relations literature on small states. Although the starting point of the study is the explanation of how a group of five small states (Turkey, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, and Spain) resisted great power belligerence, the underlying assumptions of the study are pessimistic: small states should not be able to resist more powerful states. The study, which focuses on the decision-making of small state leaders and the pressures of great power politics, is informed by the principles of the Realist School of International Relations. The author does, however, open the possibility of opportune moments in great power politics when small states can exploit the structure of the system, and/or influence the calculations of larger powers. And even if they fail to play this role, the idea of the relative capacity of the small state is introduced in the European context. According to Annette Baker Fox, "the continued existence and, indeed, startling increase in the number of small states may seem paradoxical in the age of superpowers and the drastically altered ratio of military strength between them and the rest of the world. It is well known that the ability to use violence does not alone determine the course of world politics. Some of the other determinants can be observed with exceptional clarity in the diplomacy of the small powers which were striving to stay out of World War II." Subsequent comparisons shifted away from the diplomatic maneuvers of small state leaders against superior military might, to the paradox of how small states succeed in the international political economy. Again, the assumption is pessimistic: small states are "price takers" and inherit the rules of the game. The odds are against smaller economies, yet economic performance indicators are impressive. In some contributions, small states outperform larger states; whereas in other contributions, small states are embedded in hierarchies within which few options exist. The larger, more powerful states in the international system increasingly share the global challenges of "smallness" as suggested in Peter Katzenstein's 1985 volume, Small States in World Markets. Although Katzenstein's analysis focused on how governments develop strategies to cope with enhanced market competition, the rapid revival of European integration engages both small and large states in the EU, and in the international political economy. International terrorist threats have elevated the successes of some small states (i.e., Iceland) in developing technological solutions to monitoring criminal activity at airports and border crossings. New security threats, such as threats to human security associated with an environmental catastrophe, require learning from societies where a concerted commitment to environmentalism is in place. In many issue areas following the end of the Cold War, hegemons are responding to a global agenda, as opposed to establishing the rules of the game, as we witnessed in the establishment of the post-World War II regimes governing the world economy-from Bretton Woods to GATT. Some small states become the "tail that wags the dog," in issue-areas such as global whaling policy. Not all small states are perceived as important to the study of international relations. In fact, the field is "Euro-centric," reflecting the pathdependent development of a unique group of well-situated states in the international division of labor.2 Yet even within the periphery, some small states can and do "break out" of the cycle of dependence and provide examples of Lilliputian success. Learning from the capacity to influence even when the odds are against another party is an enduring lesson for students of international relations. As are the limits of the most powerful actors of the system, who are constrained by their size, institutions, or policy legacies in intervening abroad; or tracking down terrorists who threaten the security of U.S. airspace. The inversion of power (strong is weak; weak becomes strong) is a fascinating dimension of international study. This book compiles some of the major scholarly contributions to the study of small states in world politics. Inevitably, important voices have not been heard, and authors who have written on the role of small states have received only a footnote. It is not the intent of the editors of this collection to provide an overview of every word written on the subject, but rather to share with our students and colleagues those contributions we have found to be compelling in our study and teaching of alternative approaches to international relations. Two Europeans and two Americans edited this collection, with an effort to incorporate both sides of the Atlantic in developing our list. Theoretical developments in the field of international relations provide new opportunities for small state theorizing. For example, constructivist approaches to international relations encourage a broader conception of power to include what a state perceives its power to be. By incorporating non-objective measures of power, this approach (not by intent, but by effect) expands the scope of legitimate topics for investigation in international relations. Recognizing how and why states pursue national interest and national identity in world politics, and the role of reputation in international society, has engaged scholars researching both small and large states. What are the enduring lessons from the small state literature? In conclusion, we outline a few of the important insights suggested by this burgeoning literature. Copyright
The aim of this case study is to explain why Iceland has changed its international approach and become a more active player in the international arena since the mid- and late 1990s. Iceland’s increased activity in the international system is explained by five interrelated features: a redefinition of interests; greater economic resources; greater administrative resources; a change of perception and preference by a large part of the Icelandic political elite; and an external pressure reflecting the view of international actors. All these features have led to a policy change at the domestic level. There has been a move away from an international approach built on historical bilateral relations, with a narrow focus on the concrete economic advantages to be gained from all overseas activity, to an approach based on more broadly defined interests and increased international activity within multilateral organisations. Accordingly, Iceland is moving out of Keohane’s ‘system-ineffectual’ category, that is, being a state which simply adjusts to the international system and cannot change it. Recently, Iceland can be regarded as belonging to Keohane’s ‘system-affecting’ category, that is, being a state that cannot influence the international system on its own but can do so together with other states (Keohane, 1969: 295–6).
Serving Whose Interests? explores the political economy of trade in services agreements from a critical legal perspective. The controversy surrounding the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and its variants at the regional and bilateral levels can, it is argued, be seen as a clash between two paradigms. For most of the twentieth century, under welfare states and state socialism, these services were viewed from a local and national perspective as embodying a mix of economic, social and cultural dimensions and were managed by the state through strong regulation and direct ownership and delivery. That socially based and state-centred approach has been progressively displaced since the 1980s through neoliberal policies of privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation, the transnationalisation of finance and production, and new technologies. The internationalisation of services markets has thus become a driver of contemporary capitalism. The explicit aim of 'trade in services' agreements is to lock in national regulations and policies that enhance the profitability of international services markets. They are exclusively the tools of contemporary global capitalism, yet are represented as the new pathway for development. It is argued here, however, that there is a fundamental contradiction between the global market model and the intrinsically social nature of services, whether they are social services like education, media and midwifery, or inputs to capitalist production such as finance, transport, energy, and telecommunications. This book examines and draws out these tensions and contradictions through a combination of theoretical analysis and a series of truly global case studies that include the market in internet gambling, education, pensions, electricity privatisation, supermarkets, tourism, oil, culture, temporary migrants, private finance initiatives and call centres. The product of extensive research by an internationally renowned expert in the area, yet written in an accessible manner, Serving Whose Interests? combines a technical and political analysis that will be of interest to informed trade specialists, academics and students working in the areas of international trade and international trade law, and others with interests in the organisation and regulation of the global economy.
In the 1970s and 1980s, it is often said, the rate of economic change is accelerating while the capacity for political adjustment is shrinking. Throughout the advanced industrial world this divergence has become both a rallying cry for conservatives demanding fewer state intrusions in the market and a challenge to liberals seeking more eaective state intervention. In the case of the small European states, this book has argued, economic flexibility and political stability are mutually contingent. The corporatist strain in the evolution of modern capitalism no longer yields readily to interpretations based on such established dichotomies as market and plan, private and public, efficiency and equity, Right and Left. Under conditions of increasing vulnerability and openness, the large industrial states are groping toward workable solutions for the economic predicaments of the 1980s. The incremental, reactive policy of the small European states and a stable politics that can adjust to economic change provide a point of orientation that is both helpful and hopeful. Students of the international political economy are undecided whether the most important development of the 1970s lay in the predictable growth or the astonishing containment of protectionism. Similarly, students of domestic politics focus their attention both on the cartelization of politics in the hands of party, group, and bureaucratic elites and on the challenge that new social movements pose to established institutions. In analyzing the democratic corporatism of the small European states this book dissents from the view that capitalism is being driven by structural crisis toward collapse, nor does it support the view that capitalism is being resurrected by the vigors of market competition. Contradictions are inherent in all forms of political and economic domination. But democratic corporatism has been able to tolerate contradictions because of its accommodation rather than resistance to market competition and because of its inclusion of all significant actors in the decision-making process. Copyright
In the 1970s and 1980s, it is often said, the rate of economic change is accelerating while the capacity for political adjustment is shrinking. Throughout the advanced industrial world this divergence has become both a rallying cry for conservatives demanding fewer state intrusions in the market and a challenge to liberals seeking more eaective state intervention. In the case of the small European states, this book has argued, economic flexibility and political stability are mutually contingent. The corporatist strain in the evolution of modern capitalism no longer yields readily to interpretations based on such established dichotomies as market and plan, private and public, efficiency and equity, Right and Left. Under conditions of increasing vulnerability and openness, the large industrial states are groping toward workable solutions for the economic predicaments of the 1980s. The incremental, reactive policy of the small European states and a stable politics that can adjust to economic change provide a point of orientation that is both helpful and hopeful. Students of the international political economy are undecided whether the most important development of the 1970s lay in the predictable growth or the astonishing containment of protectionism. Similarly, students of domestic politics focus their attention both on the cartelization of politics in the hands of party, group, and bureaucratic elites and on the challenge that new social movements pose to established institutions. In analyzing the democratic corporatism of the small European states this book dissents from the view that capitalism is being driven by structural crisis toward collapse, nor does it support the view that capitalism is being resurrected by the vigors of market competition. Contradictions are inherent in all forms of political and economic domination. But democratic corporatism has been able to tolerate contradictions because of its accommodation rather than resistance to market competition and because of its inclusion of all significant actors in the decision-making process. Copyright
In recent years there has been considerable research attention directed at understanding the economic performance of sovereign very small states, many of which are also islands. This paper reviews the theoretical and conceptual arguments concerning the different challenges which small states and island economies face within an increasingly globalised system. The empirical evidence drawn from previous research by the authors stands in direct contrast to the theoretical literature. Very small states are shown to have performed generally very well and their economic performance is as good as, and often better, than that of larger states. Interestingly, whether a very small state is an island or not appears to have virtually no influence upon subsequent economic performance. The paper concludes with a comparison of very small states and non-sovereign island economies within Western Europe. Sovereign small states (whether islands or not) generally perform better than their non-sovereign island counterparts in Western Europe. The pattern is not, however, a uniform one. Some non-sovereign islands in Western Europe, particularly those able to develop summer vacation tourism activity have performed well.
The hurricanes of the last few weeks in the Caribbean have reinforced in my mind a growing sense that Caribbean states may be more and more facing a challenge of existential threats. (I prefer this idea to the discourse of 'failed states', which I find rather obnoxious and patronising; being associated with a political agenda of 'humanitarian interventionism' and the contemporary incarnation of the doctrine of imperial responsibility.) By existential threats I mean systemic challenges to the viability of our states as functioning socio-economic-ecological-political systems; due to the intersection of climatic, economic, social and political developments. On Saturday 30 October the entire banana crop of St Vincent, the main export industry, was wiped out in the space of one afternoon. St Lucia and Barbados also suffered major economic damage; Tobago and Dominica were also affected. At the time of writing this, the weather system responsible is expected eventually to veer northwards and deal what will be another lethal blow to Haiti, where over one million people are living with only tented shelters to protect them as a result of the January earthquake. Another major human catastrophe may be unfolding before our very eyes, which we seem impotent to prevent. On the other hand, if the weather system stays on a westward course, it will deal further blows to Jamaica, which has not yet recovered from Tropical storm Nicole (J$20 billion damage), and probably Belize, which is still recovering from hurricane Richard. 30 years ago, one expected to deal with major disasters of this kind, say, once every ten years. Nowadays, most islands expect at least one, and possibly two or three, every year. In other words this now has to be seen as a permanent, recurring phenomenon or integral feature of Caribbean development.
The usefulness of the concept of “small states” as an analytical tool is discussed in a review of books by Edward Azar and Marshall Singer. The size of states has both domestic and international ramifications. Authors who use the concept of “small states” struggle with the problem of defining it. Such definitions can be clear and unambiguous but arbitrary at the same time; more sophisticated definitions are also more ambiguous and difficult to apply to concrete cases. Inquiry into the role of small states in international politics is shown to be still in a very elementary stage. Although there does of course exist a continuum of size of states in international relations, small states form too broad a category for purposes of analysis.
Promising scholarship in international relations is challenging existing approaches by positing the independent effect of `norms' in world politics. This article identifies `Scandinavia' (in its broadest conception, including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland) as a group of militarily weak, economically dependent, small states that deliberately act as `norm entrepreneurs' in global eco-politics, conflict resolution, and the provision of aid. Scandinavia's role in world politics today is to provide alternative models of engagement — referred to here as the exercise of `social power'.
There has been a shift in many developing countries, particularly Small Island Developing States (SIDS), towards tourism as the centrepiece of their development strategy. This occurs in the context of narrowing developmental options occasioned by the end of preferential access to metropolitan markets for agriculture and the attendant decline of the primary sector. This article draws on evidence from two case studies from the microstates of the Eastern Caribbean – St Lucia and St Vincent – and discusses the implications of their respective approaches and the ambiguous nature of tourism as a development strategy.
This article supports growing calls to ‘take small states seriously’ in the international political economy but questions prevailing interpretations that ‘smallness’ entails inherent qualities that create unique constraints on, and opportunities for, small states. Instead, we argue that discourses surrounding the ‘inherent vulnerability’ of small states, especially developing and less-developed states, may produce the very outcomes that are attributed to state size itself. By presenting small states as a problem to be solved, vulnerability discourses divert attention away from the existence of unequal power structures that, far from being the natural result of smallness, are in fact contingent and politically contested. The article then explores these themes empirically through discussion of small developing and less-developed states in the Commonwealth and the World Trade Organization (WTO), considering in particular how smallness has variously been articulated in terms of what small states either cannot or will not do.
Bananas were the basis of the political economy of Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent during the 40 or so years from their
establishment as a crop in the 1950s to the beginning of their decline in the 1990s. Because of successive shifts in European
Union policy and successful challenges within the World Trade Organization to the protectionist regime that banana production
in these islands enjoyed throughout this period, these three small Eastern Caribbean countries are being pushed inexorably
into the “post-banana” era. Their efforts to find a new niche within the global political economy are being led in each case
by new, modernizing, labor party governments that won elections and came into office during a brief four-year period between
1997 and 2001. Each government faces the same broad development challenge, but employs different resources, leadership skills,
and political style. At the same time, each can be said to be pursuing what is best described as a kind of “managerial populist”
development. The range of development options faced by these islands is narrow in the extreme, but they have shown that they
can still exercise some limited room to move forward into the post-banana era.
Climate change will affect security of individuals and populations as well as the security of states. The article reviews evidence on the scope and nature of the climate change challenge; reviews how these impacts manifest themselves in insecurity at diverse scales; and examines evidence on the political economy of adaptation responses to these impacts. I argue that climate security has been framed in public and policy debate over climate change such that climate change impacts are a threat to nation states in terms of their interests, their economies and their borders. This framing crowds out, subverts and constrains framing in terms of human-well being. I suggest that human security provides a broader and more encompassing notion of climate security than that focussed on security of states. Here, climate security focuses on the idea of freedom from harm and fear of individuals and communities and the capability to adapt to any imposed harm. From that human security perspective, the central analytical issues become those of vulnerability, adaptation and justice.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization charged with the responsibility to observe governance experiments to enhance institutional competitiveness in its member states. While the IMF's role in propagating certain forms of institutional competitiveness in developing economies is commonly discussed, less emphasis has been placed on how the IMF seeks to transfer policy knowledge, and to learn from, the governance of institutional competitiveness in its developed Western member states. This article provides a corrective by providing an analysis of IMF staff and Executive Board advice on taxation and monetary reform to two ‘coordinated’ market economies, Denmark and Sweden, and two ‘liberal’ market economies, Australia and New Zealand, from 1975 to 2004. The article traces how IMF staff and Executive Board advice compares with actual changes to taxation and monetary regimes in these four small open economies. In sum, this article explores the notion that the IMF is an ‘experimentalist governance’ organization that seeks to build its comparative knowledge of policy reform, providing a contrast with the common depiction of the IMF as an institution that dictates ‘neoliberal’ policy homogeneity.
This article examines the literature on small states from the related disciplines of international economics and international politics. By accident and design there is no generally agreed definition and characterisation of small states, although those advanced by the Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank are most satisfactory. The role of the Commonwealth as a champion of small states is examined. Particular attention is paid to the concept of vulnerability and the challenges and opportunities to small states in a globalised world.
There are 45 states with a population of around one million or less, 36 of which are in the developing world. They are often overlooked and very little has been written about their security. After reviewing the debate on the definition of a small state, five distinctive characteristics most small Third World states hold in common are identified: openness, islandness or enclaveness, resilience, weakness and dependence. Each of these characteristics is examined and their specific security implications discussed. Finally, the vulnerability of small states in the current international system is considered. While small Third World states have much in common their strategies for survival will be different and depend above all on the regional context.
Many small island developing states (SIDS) face special disadvantages associated with small size, insularity, remoteness and proneness to natural disasters. These factors render the economies of these states very vulnerable to forces outside their control — a condition which sometimes threatens their very economic viability. The GDP or GNP per capita of these states often conceals this reality. In this paper the major vulnerabilities faced by SIDS are discussed and when possible quantified in the form of an index. An attempt is also made to construct a composite index of vulnerability.
The paper describes the characteristics of small economies, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages arising from these characteristics. It is shown that small economies by their very nature tend to be less diversified and to have relatively high foreign trade risks. In spite of these drawbacks, a number of small economies have achieved high rates of economic growth. Some reasons given to explain this success are the relatively small size of the agricultural sector, concentration on labor-intensive exports, and sociological and psychological factors such as the ability to respond in a flexible manner to changes. The paper ends with a discussion on whether the drawbacks of small size can be overcome by economic integration. It is argued that the experience in this regard is disappointing.
The paper discusses the concept of “sustainability” and puts forward the argument that conventional notions of what constitutes economic development cannot be applied mechanistically to the very small island economies of the Pacific. In practice, what matters is whether the entitlement of island communities to rent incomes remains sustainable. This in turn requires that labor access to the modern capitalist economies of the region continues or is opened up and that the major regional powers continue to subsidize consumption levels in the small island countries unless or until those countries achieve a satisfactory level of rent income. Both of these conditions hinge upon the long-run political commitment of aid-donor governments to the welfare of island communities and on the skills of island politicians and officials in negotiating and maneuvering for access to aid funds from competing donors.
The research has analyzed whether the special characteristics of smaller states (strong corporatism and concentrated economic interests, according to Katzenstein) impact their approach in the decision-making process of the EU in the areas of the CAP and the Regional Policy. The empirical evidence established in this research supports the main hypothesis. The behavior of smaller states can be distinguished from the behavior of the larger states. Smaller states have a diaerent approach towards the Commission and their negotiating tactics diaer from the negotiating tactics of the larger states in the Council of Ministers, the European Council, and in bilateral negotiations with the Commission. This difference in behavior between the smaller and larger states can be explained by the small administrations, their characteristics and diaerent range of interests of the smaller states. Smaller states are forced to prioritize between the sectors of these two policy areas because of their small administrations. They do not have enough staa, expertise, or other resources to follow all negotiations. As a result, they become reactive in many sectors. However, they are proactive in their most important sectors. This is because they use the special characteristics of their administrations, such as informality, flexible decision-making, greater room of maneuver for their officials, guidelines given to negotiators rather than instructions, and the greater role of Permanent Representatives in domestic policy-making to ease their workload and to operate within the decision-making process of the CAP and the Regional Policy. They can also prioritize between sectors without damaging their interests because they have a narrower range of interests in those policy areas than the larger states. Copyright
The article reviews the EU's development policy in relation to the Caribbean members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. It considers the particular challenges faced by these small economies before assessing their trade and aid relationship with the EU. The article evaluates both the regional assistance programme and the particular experiences of Guyana and Jamaica. Both countries are singled out because of the breadth and depth of their aid relationship with the EU. Finally, the article provides an analysis of EU aid policy within the context of EU-Caribbean relations more generally. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, Washington DC: World Bank World Development Indicators Database
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