No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India and the Doha development agenda
Abstract
The Doha round of multilateral negotiations has witnessed the relocation of Southern powers towards the core of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decision-making structure. Brazil and India are the only developing countries that have participated consistently in all major ministerial phases of the Doha round between 2001 and 2008. Their consolidation as trading powers cannot be attributed solely to their status as emerging economies. Their projected legitimacy as representatives of the global South has operated as a catalyst in facilitating their relocation. In various phases of negotiations, however, Brazil and India have refrained from playing a proactive role in driving negotiations forward. Their defensive stance has raised questions about the two countries' prospects for systemic leadership in world trade. In explaining this condition, this article will argue that Brazilian and Indian trade diplomacy is consistently directed towards maintaining broad bases of followership. Brazil and India are disposed to exercise assertive leadership only when that accommodates the expectations and preferences of their followership in the global South. Their preoccupation with constantly reasserting their Third World image often renders blocking agreement the preferable strategy to avoid paying a high price in terms of legitimacy.
... In pursuit of trade liberalization in agriculture, the breaking of negotiation deadlock consequently overshadows Brazilian status considerations at the WTO. Second, this implies that an established literature on Brazil's developing country leadershipand in general the leadership roles of emerging economiesrequires more nuance (Doctor, 2015;Efstathopoulos, 2012). Third, the flexibilization of Brazilian trade strategy provides a counter-narrative to scholars that portray emerging economiesand Brazil in particularas stuck in a 'graduation dilemma' (Margheritis, 2017;Milani et al., 2017). ...
... Reliance on this smaller coalition was pushed aside in 2003 when Brazil fundamentally redrew its coalitional strategy and co-founded the G20 group of developing countries. Comprising Brazil, China, India, and a flurry of smaller developing states, the G20 strategically placed the Brazilian delegationas its main representativeat the table with the most influential WTO players, including the United States (US), the European Communities (EC), Japan, and Australia (Efstathopoulos, 2012). ...
... An established pattern of US-EC coordination was interrupted, yielding in 2005 to the 'New Quad' consisting of the US, the EC, India, and Brazil. Different constellations of this groupsupplemented by China, Australia, and Japanpersisted until the full collapse of talks in 2008, again over the issue of agriculture and special safeguard mechanisms (Efstathopoulos, 2012). Throughout this period, Brazil was included in high-level talks as a representative of the G20 while India could also claim to speak for the alternative G33 developing country group (ibid.). ...
Brazil has changed its negotiation strategy in World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. In the first half of the WTO era (1995–), Brazil adopted a strong developing country leadership role as coordinator and spokesperson of the G20 group of developing countries. More recently, however, this group has disappeared from the negotiation scene. This article examines how Brazil has departed from a 2000 status quo and arrived at a more flexible approach, less reliant on the industrialized-developing divide as a structuring principle of its diplomacy. Using WTO negotiation documents, trade delegate interviews, dispute settlement case law, and secondary literature, I outline the contours of new directions in Brazilian trade policy. These include joint legislative initiatives with the EU, a move towards the plurilateral level on non-traditional issues, a greater heterogeneity of dispute settlement targets, and a newly flexible handling of its rights under the WTO's special and differential treatment status. The article contributes to ongoing debates on Brazil's status in international affairs, its reliance on large coalitions, and the maintenance of followership as key directives of its foreign policy, and scholarship that sees Brazil as stuck in a ‘graduation dilemma’.
... Due to conflicting ideas on the technicalities of the SSM, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy convened a smaller set of meetings with a select few countries, in the hopes to re-focus discussions and come up with a compromised agreement (Ismail, 2009;VanGrasstek, 2013). This group -known as the G7 1 -included the EU, US, China, Brazil, India, Japan, and Australia (Efstathopoulos, 2012). ...
... The G20 2 was identified by interviewees as one of the most influential coalitions in the 2008 July negotiations. The G20 emerged in 2003, as a coalition of advanced and emerging economies with the goal of ambitious agricultural reforms in developed countries with certain flexibilities for developing countries (Efstathopoulos, 2012). Member countries of the G20 represent a very high percentage of the global population and global trade, and with the inclusion a number of developing countries the success of this coalition represented a major power shift at the 2008 July Ministerial (Margulis, 2014;Stephen, 2012). ...
... This power shift in the relationship between developed countries and large developing countries, represented by the emergence of the influential G20 and G33, was a major reason for the resulting stalemate (Da Conceição-Heldt, 2013;Efstathopoulos, 2012;Wolfe, 2009b). One interviewee identified that in the early days of the WTO, countries such as the US, UK, EU, Japan, and Canada dominated the high table because they were countries with amongst the largest economies in the world (based on GDP). ...
Food insecurity and the double burden of malnutrition have emerged as prevailing global health challenges of the twenty-first century. These have been influenced by trade policy decisions, particularly in relation to agriculture, which are highly political and can have large effects on global, national, and local food systems. The aim of this study was to analyse two multilateral trade policy decisions relevant to food and nutrition security, to understand the political and power dynamics in the spaces in which these decisions are being made at the global level, in order to strengthen trade-related food systems governance to improve population nutrition. This qualitative policy analysis drew on data from a targeted literature and policy review, as well as in-depth interviews with eight individuals with expert knowledge and/or involvement in the case studies. The analysis focussed on policy processes and power dynamics, drawing on two frameworks from political science. This study found that power dynamics were shifting, such that developing countries had more of a voice at these multilateral negotiations, and decisions reflected growing resistance from developing countries who were unable to protect their most vulnerable. Contextual factors such as level of food insecurity, socio-economic situation, and historical institutional processes at the World Trade Organisation, were influential in shaping actor agendas. The study suggests that engagement with the historical context of agricultural trade policy, the global spaces in which these policy decisions take place, and creating strong coalitions will be essential to create sustainable and equitable future food systems.
... As a result, the countries at the "peripheries" remain economically underdeveloped. The idea of the South-South cooperation originated in the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, when the 11 Palit (2011);Nayyar (2016); Narlikar (2017); Efstathopoulos (2012); Wang and French (2013). 12 ...
... 21 Narlikar (2007); Lim and Wang (2010); Gao (2012); Efstathopoulos (2012); Vickers (2012). 22 Hurrell and Narlikar (2006); Efstathopoulos (2012); Hopewell (2012). and position themselves within the multilateral trade order and the kinds of adjustments they make to be part of that order or otherwise. ...
... 30 Narlikar and Tussie (2004); Palit (2011). 31 Efstathopoulos (2012). 32 Martin and Anderson (2008). ...
As China and India have begun to rapidly integrate into the world economy, they have generated scholarly interest in the processes of their economic transformations and consequences of their international economic engagements across a range of domains such as trade, finance, development, global economic governance, etc. However, research in these areas is primarily comparative, exploring the apparent variations with little focus on how they relate to each other in their response to “circulatory global forces”. This article discusses the challenges of understanding China-India interactions in the field of global economic governance in general and in the context of the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) in particular, and examines how they have responded, adapted, or innovated, both individually and as part of a collective or coalition, at similar points in time. In contrast to the other international economic institutions, the WTO has emerged as a site of struggle between ideas, actors, and norms, replete with instances of solidarity, failed solidarity, etc.
... The aim was to prevent another failing conference in Hong Kong (Bello 2005). In the course of the Hong Kong conference, the new Quad completely replaced the old core negotiation group (Efstathopoulos 2012 As expected by IPST, the outcome of the negotiations constituted a merely imperfect adaptation. It was a PINPO result because it was shaped by the combination of functional efficiency, bargaining power, and path-dependency logics. ...
... However, the outcome also followed a logic of bargaining power, because it served the interests of the most powerful actors much better than those of their less powerful counterparts. Significantly, and in line with path-dependent 7 In this arrangement, the US and the EU represented the most powerful developed countries, Australia represented the Cairns Group, and Brazil and India represented the G20 (Efstathopoulos 2012). 8 This also served to comfort Japan, which criticized the formation of the FIPs and the new Quad but, due to its deteriorated bargaining position, could not do much about it (Wilkinson and Lee 2007), as well as Australia, which was one of the FIPs but also dropped out of the group of the privileged four in the Quad. ...
... The traditional negotiations in this rather closed club persisted, even though the cast of actors involved in the core negotiation group changed. As a consequence, the G110 did not even outlive the conference in Hong Kong and the cohesion among the G20 members soon started to dwindle once Brazil and India had been included in the new Quad (Bello 2005;Efstathopoulos 2012;WTO 2007). What is more, in spite of the institutional adaptations, improvements to the WTO's effectiveness and efficiency remained partial. ...
How do international institutions adjust to shifting power distributions among their members? We argue that institutional adaptations to the rise of emerging and the decline of established powers are different from what power transition theories (PTTs) would lead us to believe. Institutional adaptations are not impossible, as pessimist PTT variants hold; and they are rarely easy to attain, let alone perfect, as optimist PTT variants imply. To bridge the gap between these versions of PTT, we propose an institutionalist power shift theory (IPST) which combines insights on the conditions and mechanisms of institutional change from functionalist, historical and distributive variants of rational institutionalism. IPST claims that institutional adaptations will succeed or fail depending on whether or not emerging powers are able to undermine the international institution and to make credible threats to this effect. To demonstrate IPST’s plausibility we analyze: (1) how India and Brazil gained the agreement of established powers to their membership in the WTO core negotiation group (“Quad”), which had previously been dominated by developed countries; and (2) how China reached agreement with established powers on (more) even-handed surveillance of IMF members’ financial stability, which, up to then, had focused on developing countries and exchange rate issues.
... The 2005 Hong Kong ministerial witnessed the emergence of the G-4 (US, EU, Brazil, India), a new group encompassing both established and emerging powers that was more effective and legitimate in driving the negotiating process (Wilkinson, 2006). Also described as the 'New Quad', the G-4 replaced the traditional Quad (US, EU, Japan, Canada) that had successfully provided leadership in the GATT and depicted the emergence of a North-South multipolar system of governance in the WTO (Efstathopoulos, 2012). The G-4 states were not bound by the collective understandings that had underpinned the Western-centric Quad, but nevertheless shared a common interest in achieving progress in the DDA. ...
... The formation of the G-4 allowed established and emerging powers to manage multipolarity in global trade rather than being driven into competition by systemic factors. These states strived to agree on the balance of commitments over critical areas such as agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Special and Differential Treatment (Efstathopoulos, 2012). The ministerial meeting that took place in Geneva in July 2008 was a particularly critical moment as all major players were close to reaching agreement but the meeting collapsed due to disagreement over flexibilities on food security (Wolfe, 2010). ...
... In many cases, emerging powers defended interests that were not their own but were vital for other developing countries. Because of the need to control their alliances, Brazil and India could not provide many concessions in the G-4 (Efstathopoulos, 2012). Disagreement therefore within the G-4 did not signify a lack of commitment over the WTO's stability but rather reflected the belief of emerging powers that achieving such stability required alleviating the frustration of weaker members. ...
This article assesses the role of emerging powers in the liberal order by examining the diplomacy of these states in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article discusses the changing shape of global trade governance through the insights provided by multipolarity, unipolarity as well as critical perspectives on emerging states. Based on the insights provided by these approaches, the article provides an analytical account of WTO negotiations to argue that the changing position of emerging powers in global trade governance is indicative of a system of reformist multipolarity. This system entails three major characteristics. First, it is based on a multipolar decision-making process where established and emerging powers hold veto power over the negotiating process, but commit to the stable management of the global economy. Second, it comprises a nascent great power concert where established and emerging powers share a common worldview on the centrality of the WTO to operate as the overarching authority for regulating and managing global trade. Third, emerging states maintain a reformist approach in this multipolar system seeking to renegotiate the rights and responsibilities to be undertaken by each major stakeholder.
... EPs feel entitled to more influence within the USled global order (Hurrell 2006), and increasingly leverage their economic capabilities to achieve it (Cooper and Flemes 2013 investing heavily in Africa, primarily intent upon extracting natural resources necessary to facilitate their own continued growth, but framing cooperation nonetheless in terms of mutual benefit (Khanna 2009). Alternatively, EPs may articulate a regional project, such as a development bank, as a means of gaining acknowledgement of their leadership potential (Mazenda and Ncwadi 2016).The perceived importance of such acknowledgment is evident in EPs' willingness to adjust their behaviour in trade negotiations to attract followership from this group (Efstathopoulos 2012). ...
... This has helped established states secure EPs' continued participation in the Round without sacrificing the benefits established states receive from status quo trade governance(Wilkinson 2014). For EPs, in contrast, it represents both public acknowledgement of EPs' improved status and a new opportunity to pursue their diplomatic ambitions in trade policy(Narlikar 2010a, Efstathopoulos 2012. ...
What, exactly, is an emerging power? While empirical scholarship discussing states such as Brazil, India or China has blossomed over the past twenty years, little attention has been paid to conceptualising these states. This creates confusion about emerging powers themselves as well as their impact on global affairs. I argue systematic study of three factors – growing material (especially economic) capabilities, diplomatic ambitions, and peer recognition by others – will enable us to overcome the contemporary conceptual problems of coherence and differentiation. Doing so will require scholars of international political economy to re-evaluate theoretical assumptions embedded in today’s literature. It will also empower us to better contribute to policy discussions of emerging states. These arguments are illustrated in reference to emerging power activities in global economic governance.
... The agricultural negotiations at the WTO Doha Round have signaled the rise of a new India in global economic governance. Scholars and commentators of international trade have variously commented as India being a 'leader' (Efstathopoulos, 2012), 'emerging power' (Conceição-Heldt, 2013), or a 'great power' (Narlikar, 2011), based on their analysis of India's role in global agricultural trade negotiations. There is near scholarly consensus that India has played an active role in shaping the agriculture negotiations at the WTO by submitting detailed proposals, building and leading coalitions with other developing nations, and adopting tough unilateral positions (or veto) to pursue its strategic interests. ...
... Another line of international relations scholarship sees India's activist position in the Doha agricultural trade negotiations as merely an attempt to emerge as a significant player in global economic governance (Hopewell, 2015;Hurrell and Narlikar, 2006;Efstathopoulos, 2012;Flemes, 2009). From this vantage point, despite limited policy focus on agriculture, India could simply be using the agricultural agreement as a bargaining chip for addressing Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) issues. ...
India has actively tried to shape the WTO agricultural negotiations by submitting detailed proposals, building coalitions, and even taking hard stands (veto) at critical junctures. However, this aggressive posturing presents a sharp contrast with India's domestic agricultural space, where the situation highlights policy neglect, manifesting in agrarian distress and farmer suicides. This paper analyzes contradictions between India's internationally espoused negotiating positions and its domestic policy goals. It argues that India's core focus has been to preserve status quo in the domestic food markets, driven by the political need to provide food-based consumption subsidies and manage an assured price and supply protection to its vulnerable consumers. As a result, India's interests are divergent from most of its developing country coalition partners in the G-20 as well as the G-33 groups. Our discussion has significant implications for both the domestic policy, as well as the sustainability of India's strategy in global agricultural trade negotiations.
... The Singapore issues, which were initially proposed at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996, included four areas: trade facilitation, competition policy, investment and transparency in government procurement. Developing countries were concerned that, particularly in the areas of investment and competition policy, these issues could limit their autonomy in formulating domestic policies, thereby affecting their ability to protect their industries and promote economic development [6]. ...
This article delves into how developing countries can effectively advance their interests by leveraging strategic alliances and multilateral negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework, emphasizing the roles of Brazil, India, and China in the Doha Development Agenda. By closely examining the influence these nations have wielded through alliances like the G20, this study explores their efforts to address crucial issues, including reducing agricultural subsidies, enhancing non-agricultural market access, and improving trade in services. Through these alliances, developing countries have collectively pushed back against entrenched trade inequities, showcasing both their strengths and limitations within the multilateral trading system. The research highlights how these strategies reveal a significant shift, as developing nations now command a larger presence in shaping global trade norms. At the same time, it exposes the inherent trade-offs these countries face: balancing their pursuit of national economic interests with their advocacy for a more equitable global trade structure. This analysis underscores the complex dynamics of power, negotiation, and compromise within the WTO, illustrating how developing countries must navigate the dual imperatives of self-interest and global equity to sustain their long-term influence on the multilateral stage.
... The trade agreement with Indonesia is officially known as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). 2. For literature examining middle power diplomacy in multilateral trade negotiations, see, for example, Higgott and Cooper (1990) and Efstathopoulos (2012). 3. ...
The political economy literature extensively discusses how great powers use asymmetric power relations as a tool in trade negotiations, yet discussion regarding how asymmetric power relations can account for the variety of power asymmetry dynamics in international relations, especially in the cases of middle power countries such as South Korea, is scarce. This paper examines how South Korea’s free trade agreement (FTA) strategies with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were enabled under the Moon Jae-in administration’s New Southern Policy (NSP) by analyzing the sources of South Korea’s power asymmetry with ASEAN. Understanding power asymmetry as an evolving process, this paper takes the constructivist approach to middle power to demonstrate how South Korea’s development of a middle power identity shaped the country’s negotiation leverage in trade negotiations. This enabled South Korea to secure in-depth FTAs with ASEAN at the bilateral level under the NSP, despite ASEAN members’ initial reluctance.
... Over the past two decades, rising powers such as China and India have transformed global trade politics, bringing an end to the longstanding dominance of the US, EU and other advanced-industrialized states at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Emphasizing their identities as developing countries, the emerging powers have portrayed themselves as leaders of the developing world, defending and promoting the collective interests of the Global South in the trade regime (Efstathopoulos 2012;Hopewell, 2016;Nel & Stephen, 2010). According to Chinese officials, for example, 'China is still 100 percent a developing country' and striving to 'safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries' (Hong, 2019). ...
Emerging powers, such as China and India, have used claims of developing world leadership and South–South solidarity to strengthen their bargaining position in WTO negotiations. Yet analysis of the growing battle over special and differential treatment (SDT) suggests that such claims are increasingly tenuous. The question of how emerging economic powers should be classified and treated under global trade rules has become an acute source of conflict in the trade regime. The emerging powers insist on access to SDT as an unconditional right of developing countries. But in a debate dominated by the emerging and established powers, the interests of most developing countries have been largely overlooked. Drawing on the cases of agriculture and fisheries – two areas of international trade of particular importance to the developing world – I show that extending SDT to the emerging powers is increasingly problematic for global development. In these areas, many emerging economies are now among the world's largest subsidizers, and the harmful effects of their policies are felt most keenly by other developing countries. Granting SDT to exempt emerging subsidizers from WTO disciplines would therefore undermine efforts to use global trade rules to promote global development, as well as to protect the environment.
... This points to a fundamental shift of power within the multilateral trading system toward increasingly self-confident emerging economies such as China, Brazil, and India. As a result, the ability of the old industrial powers EU, United States, Canada, and Japan to determine the rules of the global trade regime largely on their own no longer seems to exist (Efstathopoulos 2012;Hopewell 2015). ...
Trade policy is one of the most integrated policy fields of the European Union’s (EU) external economic relations. By creating a customs union, the EU member states have largely delegated their trade and investment policy competence to the European level. Consequently, the EU can speak with a single voice in international trade fora. Nevertheless, the formulation and conduct of EU trade policy has always remained a controversial issue and underwent a substantial (re-)politization over recent times. How did EU trade policy develop over the last decades? What implications does the institutional design of trade policy have for the EU as an actor in international economic relations? How does the EU conduct its unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral relations with its trading partners? What conclusions can be drawn from these issues for the evaluation of the EU as a trade policy actor? To answer these questions, the chapter traces the institutional development of EU trade policy from the 1950s until today and explores the role of different actors and processes in the formulation of EU trade policy. Subsequently, the chapter examines EU trade policy within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as the EU’s trade relations with different countries and regions. Finally, the chapter evaluates the EU as an international trade and investment actor by making use of different theoretical approaches.
... In addition, the BICs sought to enhance funding for programs supporting development. This included additional trade financing (Li, 2009) and an expansion of the climate investment fund (Chidambaram, 2008)both developmentfriendly policies that rising powers have long sought to institutionalize in global governance (Efstathopoulos, 2012). As such, they indicate BIC expectations that material resources could enable deeper integration of rising state issues into Bank decision-making and therefore improve issue flexibility. ...
Given long‐standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO's flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision‐making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.
... Wolfe 2015). At the same time, this contrasts with its less prominent public stance during the Doha negotiations, especially when compared to Brazil and India (Efstathopoulos 2012;Hopewell 2015). ...
This paper offers the first comprehensive quantitative explanatory study of the World Trade Organization (WTO) member states’ activity in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), the WTO’s central monitoring instrument. We analyze both the written questions submitted and the oral declarations delivered by the WTO members in all 95 trade policy reviews in the six-year period of 2009–2014. Descriptively, we find that the European Union and the United States are the most active members, but that the so-called ‘rising’ powers – namely China, Brazil, and India – very closely follow. In addition, almost the entire membership is involved in reviewing activity, at least to some extent. The explanatory results reveal that activity in the TPRM is strongly associated with a coun-try’s market size. However, the member states’ overall aggregate membership in international organizations plays an almost equally important role.
... Over the course of the Uruguay Round, and in particular in the preparatory and negotiation stages of the WTO's DDA, the governments of new powers have also become central protagonists in the politics of the WTO in its rulemaking, rule-monitoring and rule-implementation stages (Narlikar 2010, Zeng 2013, Júnior et al. 2015, Hopewell 2016, Karlas and Parízek 2017. This has included a renewed attempt to forge developing country coalitions to boost bargaining power in negotiations (Cho 2004, Narlikar and Tussie 2004, Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004, Taylor 2006, Efstathopoulos 2012, Doctor 2015. While China is by far the largest new power economically, already since the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference, it has been Brazil and India, partly with the support of South Africa, that have led the effective opposition to the established powers in the WTO (Hopewell 2015, p. 324). ...
Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.
... At the WTO, India has formed bargaining coalitions with other members of the BRICS. As a traditional critic of the dominance of Western countries in the multilateral trade regime, India has deftly exploited coalitions with other developing countries to receive integration in 'green room' negotiations of the major trade powers [Efstathopoulos 2012]. While characterized by strong dissimilarities in their trading profiles, India and the other BRICS states shared an aversion to the 'deep integration' agenda fostered by established powers [Stephen, Parizek 2015]. ...
Indian policy makers have welcomed India’s framing as a ‘rising power’ and celebrated the BRICS initiative as a common front in reforming aspects of global governance. Yet China’s rise in Asia has unsettled the balances of power which have underpinned the region, as a consequence of which India has hesitantly pursued a strategic rapprochement with the United States. Assessing New Delhi’s multilateral and geo-strategic diplomacy, this article argues that India bandwagons with the BRICS on a global level, but seeks to balance China at the regional level. On the global multilateral level, India has common cause with other rising powers in reforming the policies and structures of most international organizations. The exceptions are the United Nations Security Council and the Non-proliferation Treaty, where China and Russia can be qualified as established powers. On the regional level, however, India has maintained ties to Russia and cultivated a strong relationship with the United States in an effort to balance and increase leverage relative to a rising China. This underlines that major power rivalries are strongly mediated by issue area and institutional context.
... Epitomising a Southern diversification process, Brazil became an eminent player in the negotiations, definitively entering the WTO's high-levels of decision-making and occupying a prominent role in the multilateral trade area, as it acted as a representative of the developing world by leading the G20-T, which operated as a 'launching pad' for Brazil's integration into the WTO power structures. Brazil helped developing countries to have the boldness to withstand developed countries' pressures, refusing to accept pre-cooked deals and decisions exclusively taken by the US and the EU, and showing it was impossible to advance proposals without the developing countries' participation (Bello 2005, Efstathopoulos 2012, p. 283, Hopewell 2013, pp. 611-615, Schor and Onuki 2015. ...
Rising powers gain economic and political clout and challenge the post-Cold War world order. Located in a relatively peaceful region away from global conflict zones, Brazil has fought no war with its neighbours in 150 years, and with limited military capabilities, Brazil differs from its BRICS peers as a non-militarised emerging power. Based on Nye’s soft power concept, this article examines Brazil’s soft power characteristics (preference for diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution, use of force as a last resort; actions as agenda-setter, bridge-builder, Southern interests’ supporter, pro-multilateralism, etc.). This paper compares Brazil’s role conception to its role performance to conclude that Brazil projects itself as a soft power broker.
... Esta particularidade da atuação de países em desenvolvimento na OMC é uma das três dimensões intrínsecas à liderança exercida pelos mesmos e que foram identificadas por Efstathopoulos (2012). A primeira dimensão, como já exposto, está relacionada ao caráter não radical da liderança exercida por países em desenvolvimento na OMC. ...
This thesis has as its theme the study of the international insertion of intermediate countries in the Multilateral Trading System (MTS). Due to the fact that there are different ways to categorize the countries that make up the intermediate stratum of the International System (IS), it was understood as appropriate for this categorization to focus on the international behavior of Middle Powers. Within this context, the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) promoted, in addition to the union of a diverse range of countries, the creation of an auspicious place for the performance of second-tier countries in a political context lacking niches of opportunities for protagonists that are not hegemonic powers. Moreover, it was observed that from a given historical moment, certain developing countries with a widely recognized international role, crystallized in their performances behaviors which are now labeled as those of Middle Powers. Thus, considering this scenario and accepting the locking of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a turning point for the affirmation of the role of certain countries in structuring the current MTS, the following research problem was elaborated: Are there theoretical and empirical elements that support the rescue and (re)definition of the Middle Power concept in the modern world? The search for this answer raised another question derived from it: Can it be said that currently certain countries are practicing protagonisms that can be considered to be of a Middle Power? To answer these questions, we took the following steps: (a) a review of the literature efforts for the categorization of intermediate countries in the IS; (b) the construction of a model for the classification of countries within the concept of Middle Power; (c) an analysis of the historical evolution and the economic and political dynamics that were crucial to driving and shaping the MTS; and (d) the application of the criteria for classification of countries into the concept of Middle Power through the model proposed in this thesis. The results suggest that Argentina and Brazil were the countries that better fit the requirements of the model for classification of countries in the concept of Middle Power. The use of less restrictive criteria within the proposed model enables the framing of Chile, Índia, Indonesia and Colombia, along with Brazil and Argentina, in the group of Middle Powers.
... China has attracted particular criticism, portrayed as refusing to contribute to the Doha Round and 'all but ensur [ing] the talks' failure' (Bergsten 2008: 60). The need of the rising powers to portray themselves as representing the rest of the developing world is also identified as a problem for achieving agreement, as they would pay a high price in terms of legitimacy among the other developing countries if they were to agree to a Doha deal that did not fully reflect the needs of their fellow developing countries (Efstathopoulos 2012). ...
This paper identifies the emergence of a new set of trade intellectuals from the global South, primarily from the rising powers. It argues that this group of ‘Southern trade intellectuals’ has formed a loose epistemic community, and traces the impact the group is having on global trade governance. The subject examined differs from most other uses of the epistemic community framework in that it analyses a case in which there is no objective, scientific knowledge being promoted by the group. Instead, the group is engaged in promoting one subjective understanding of events over another. However, the emergence of this epistemic community has been important in providing an alternative trade narrative that has weakened the dominance previously enjoyed by the Western powers over trade analysis. This broadening of the range of trade analysis and expert opinion forms an important, though potentially problematic, area of leadership provided by the rising powers to less developed countries.
The article undertakes a critical analysis of India’s approach to multilateralism as a foreign policy mechanism and India’s projection of its self-image in the world order. It observes that despite reflecting broad continuities in its normative assumptions, India’s multilateralism has largely remained layered and complex, responding to systemic shifts in global politics. India’s engagements have been particularly tested by the compulsions of the liberal international order, which remains structurally and operationally biased to the unipolar dominance of the United States. The article investigates the normative leanings and strategic priorities underlying India’s multilateralism and the essential challenges posed by the liberal international order. India’s espousal of justice as non-domination, egalitarianism and non-hierarchy in international order is resisted, which compels India’s variegated multilateralism. The article also argues that India’s practice of multilateralism remains sensitive to the compulsions of its India’s domestic politics. It explores the scope of India-European Union partnership in re-envisioning the current dynamics of the liberal international order.
This Chapter analyses thoroughly the reasons that led to the inclusion of Regulatory Cooperation Chapters in the New Generation FTAs. It does so via the concept of ‘characteristics’ of Regulatory Cooperation. The first characteristic is its bilateral nature through its inclusion in bilateral FTAs, which is explained by the shortcomings of the relevant WTO rules. The second characteristic is its inclusion in a legally binding Treaty, as opposed to some previous bilateral attempts that were of political character.
While traditional IR scholarship tends to see states as being motivated by interests in security, power, wealth and relations within international institutions, many of Brazil’s actions in the world can be seen as a reflection of its ambition for status. This chapter contributes to the scholarship of Brazil’s foreign relations by establishing that the country has a historic aspiration for greater active involvement in international relations, to acquire a higher status, and to become recognized as an important player in the global arena, even as a great power. It discusses Brazil’s international aspirations and how this ambition for recognition is ingrained in the very identity of the state. It explores the different attempts Brazil has made to improve its status and evaluates the evident outcomes of these processes. It also looks at different scholarly attempts to assess where Brazil stands in the world according to different methods of analysis.
La historia, los actores, las condiciones —junto con la disposición de los sujetos—
y las oportunidades son elementos conceptuales que nos permiten
ahondar en el sentido que le podemos asignar a las relaciones internacionales,
asumiéndolas como proceso de construcción de interdependencias
complementarias. No en vano, Innerarity (2006) considera que en la esfera
internacional “el poder no se mide por los recursos acumulados, sino que
consiste en la capacidad de hacer o impedir” (p. 232).
Considerar el régimen presidencialista como elemento clave para analizar
las relaciones bilaterales entre dos países es asumir que las que hemos
llamado interdependencias complementarias no se limitan al juego
tensionante del poder; por el contrario, conlleva un elemento histórico de
encuentros y desencuentros, unas condiciones institucionales y estructurales
que han definido los acercamientos o distanciamientos —considerando
también la disposición de quienes lideraron las políticas conducentes a convivir
con, o alejarse de, ese país vecino— y las oportunidades que ofrecen las
diversas circunstancias en las que se presenta el juego del poder político en
cada país y, por ende, en la región donde se ubican los actores interesados.
This chapter enquires the ways in which the current US–China trade wars are affecting the balance of power in the capitalist system. The discussion analyzes the emergence of US–China trade wars and shows how protectionist trade policies are increasingly deployed by the two leading economies of the globe to exercise greater political pressure against one another. Such trade wars are understood as targeted mechanisms that increasingly comprise a key diplomatic tool in US–China economic relations, and which are also used to promote diplomatic and security objectives in the capitalist system. The chapter also focuses on how middle powers reassess their options when encountering US–China economic frictions. It is argued that middle powers seek to retain access to both US- and China-led economic agreements, but polarization and geopolitical imperatives are increasingly propelling middle powers to provide their own leadership in the negotiation of new trade agreements in the capitalist system.
The Doha Round or the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which was officially launched in 2001, is the very first trade round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since developed and developing countries have different priorities and interests, the Doha Round has witnessed a series of deadlocks over ten years until the Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013. The first deadlock occurred at the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003. The primary points of dispute between developed and developing countries were agriculture and the so-called Singapore issues. This study investigates the Cancún Ministerial Conference as it is a remarkable example of how participant countries strive to secure their interests even at the expense of the collapse of the multilateral trade negotiations. In that regard, this study aims to examine the opposing negotiation behaviour has witnessed and determine how their insistence on different proposals lead to the failure of trade negotiations in Cancún. The primary argument of this study is that developing countries’ common stance and the creation of so-called G-20under the leadership of Brazil, along with India and China, prove the triumph of these countries as they succeeded to block any agreement that disrupts their interests at the Cancún Ministerial Conference. Although the Cancún failure damages the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, developing countries appreciate their coherent coalition strategies, which trigger the shift in the balance of power within the WTO in their favour.
This paper investigates why India actively negotiated and ratified the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the first global health treaty to curb tobacco use worldwide. The World Health Organization’s (WHO) decision to conduct FCTC negotiations aligned with India’s shifting disease burden that was pivoting from infectious to non-communicable diseases, particularly cancer, which shot up due to surging tobacco use. The WHO’s decision to frame the agreement around constraining global tobacco commerce, particularly the might of multinational tobacco companies, meshed with the interests of New Delhi, which was concurrently seeking to curb surging tobacco consumption. This triggered a positive approach and attitude to FCTC negotiations, leading to India’s ratification. India’s negotiation and ratification of the FCTC shows that the literature(s) on rising powers and international organizations must consider how factors like the WHO’s institutional politics, specifically the intent to negotiate a focused global agreement to curb tobacco production and distribution worldwide, affects how countries perceive and seek to use that agreement to bolster domestic policy concerns like tobacco control.
Afin d’analyser la posture diplomatique actuelle de l’Inde sur la scène internationale, ce travail de recherche étudie les processus d’institutionnalisation et d’adaptation du ministère des Affaires étrangères indien de 1947 à 2015. Le dispositif théorique de cette thèse conjugue les recherches menées sur l’adaptation des ministères des Affaires étrangères comme acteurs centraux de la diplomatie et la sociologie politique des institutions. En effet, on ne peut comprendre l’évolution de la diplomatie indienne que si on l’analyse à partir d’une démarche micro sociologique, par l’étude de ses lieux de production. Ces lieux désignent dans un sens restreint l’organisation du ministère des Affaires étrangères et le rôle qui y est joué par les diplomates. Dans un sens plus large, ils renvoient à l’interaction de ce ministère avec l’environnement diplomatique national et international. Cette thèse vise à démontrer la façon dont la vulnérabilité du ministère des Affaires étrangères indien, déterminée par son sous-dimensionnement structurel et sa marginalisation croissante dans le processus de décision, conditionne son adaptation graduelle aux évolutions de la mondialisation. Cette adaptation se manifeste par la plus grande importance donnée aux pratiques de « low diplomacy » comme la diplomatie économique, publique et consulaire. Mais elle reste fortement limitée, ce qui explique la posture diplomatique prudente de l’Inde sur la scène internationale, contrainte par la priorité donnée au développement économique du pays.
The Doha Round or the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which
was officially launched in 2001, is the very first trade round of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since developed and developing
countries have different priorities and interests, the Doha Round has
witnessed a series of deadlocks over ten years until the Bali
Ministerial Conference in 2013. The first deadlock occurred at the
Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003. The primary points of
dispute between developed and developing countries were agriculture
and the so-called Singapore issues. This study investigates the Cancún
Ministerial Conference as it is a remarkable example of how
participant countries strive to secure their interests even at the
expense of the collapse of the multilateral trade negotiations. In that
regard, this study aims to examine the opposing negotiation
behaviour has witnessed and determine how their insistence on
different proposals lead to the failure of trade negotiations in Cancún.
The primary argument of this study is that developing countries’
common stance and the creation of so-called G-20under the
leadership of Brazil, along with India and China, prove the triumph of these countries as they succeeded to block any agreement that
disrupts their interests at the Cancún Ministerial Conference.
Although the Cancún failure damages the Doha Round of multilateral
trade negotiations, developing countries appreciate their coherent
coalition strategies, which trigger the shift in the balance of power
within the WTO in their favour.
Keywords: Trade Negotiations, the WTO, the Doha Round,
Developing Countries, G-20
This chapter is divided into two larger sections. The first aims at tracing the position Africa occupies in the global economy concentrating on the last two decades. It will be shown that although there is some progress in development and wealth creation dominant trajectories from the post-colonial period continue to persist.
The article considers whether Brazil’s foreign policies aimed at reforming the global governance architecture for development finance can be considered the application of ‘strategic diplomacy’, and assesses the conditions for and limitations of implementing strategic diplomacy in new democracies. To do so, the analysis focuses on the Workers’ Party (PT) governments’ policies and actions related to national and multilateral development banks. It examines whether the Brazilian National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and the New Development Bank (NDB; or BRICS Bank) exhibited four key features of strategic diplomacy (systemic focus; long-term objectives; dynamic view of national interest; and engaged political leadership) and what its implications were for achieving Brazil’s long-term foreign policy objectives of national development and autonomy.
This chapter explores approaches of emerging powers to international trade law and is structured in a comparable way to Chap. 5. The chapter starts with a brief description of emerging powers’ earlier involvement—in some cases non-involvement—in the world trade order throughout the GATT years (1948–1994). This first part (A.) asks whether Brazil, China, India, and South Africa can be characterized as rule-takers or rule-makers during that period. The second part (B.) analyses whether their rise in economic power has led to an increased importance of emerging powers within the international trade order and its law-making processes. In its third and main part (C.) the chapter examines several examples of how emerging powers have sought to make WTO agreements more just according to our three-dimensional human rights approach and whether they succeeded.
This book examines the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the context of the global economy in the twenty-first century, arguing that many problems within the institution lie in the disparity between its design and the nature of its tasks.
Studying the global trade regime and the unsuccessful Doha round of trade liberalization negotiations, this volume suggests that important institutional adjustments may be necessary for the WTO and other major international institutions to (re-)gain their ability to manage the global economy. It uses extensive new qualitative and quantitative evidence to identify systematic dysfunctions in how the Doha negotiations have been conducted and links these dysfunctions to the exclusively inter-governmental design of interest representation in the WTO. Based on this, the book argues that global economic institutions should consider allowing broader parliamentary and non-state representation of their members.
Presenting findings which can also be applied to other global economic institutions, Negotiations in the World Trade Organization will be useful to students and scholars of international trade, global governance and international political economy.
In the 2016 edition of its World Development Indicators (WDI), the World Bank introduced an important change in the way it categorises countries: it explicitly stated the intention to eliminate the distinction of countries as ‘developing’ and ‘developed’. This decision represents the first time one of the world’s most powerful and influential international organisation has overtly decided to move away from this fuzzy-yet-ubiquitous terminology for categorising countries (and not proposing to replace the division). This paper takes this shift to discuss country groupings based on development levels, particularly the ‘developed’/’developing’ dichotomy, focusing on the latter term. The paper argues for a paradoxical scenario, wherein the label ‘developing’ will increasingly become analytically useless while concurrently retaining – or even strengthening – its power in the context of foreign policy strategies. The analysis details the motives behind this paradox and provides a reasoning for when and why the term’s usage is likely to be weakened or strengthened. Simply put, the ‘developed’/’developing’ dichotomy is weakening in its analytical capacity, mostly due to the increasing heterogeneity among countries under the ‘developing’ label and concurrent porosity of ‘boundaries’ between the two categories, while showing little sign of being phased as a term for self-identification.
Advancing a constructivist conceptual approach, this book explains the surprising outcome of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union and developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP countries). Despite the EU's huge market power, it had limited success with the EPAs; an outcome that confounds materialist narratives equating trade power with market size. Why was the EU unable to fully realise its prospectus for trade and regulatory liberalisation through the EPA negotiations? Emphasising the role of social legitimacy in asymmetrical North-South trade negotiations, Murray-Evans sets the EPAs within the broader context of an institutionally complex global trade regime and stresses the agency of both weak and strong actors in contesting trade rules and practices across multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiating settings. Empirical chapters approach the EPA process from different institutional angles to explain and map the genesis, design, promotion and ultimately limited impact of the EU's ambitious prospectus for the EPAs. This volume will be particularly relevant to students and scholars of international trade and development and the EU as an international actor, as well as those researching international political economy, African politics and international trade law.
Rising powers gain economic and political clout and challenge the post-Cold War world order. Located in a relatively peaceful region away from global conflict zones, Brazil has fought no war with its neighbours in 150 years, and with limited military capabilities, Brazil differs from its BRICS peers as a non-militarised emerging power. Based on Nye’s soft power concept, this article examines Brazil’s soft power characteristics (preference for diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution, use of force as a last resort; actions as agenda-setter, bridge-builder, Southern interests’ supporter, pro-multilateralism, etc.). This paper compares Brazil’s role conception to its role performance to conclude that Brazil projects itself as a soft power broker.
The article evaluates the extent to which Brazil's foreign policy actions, negotiating positions and diplomatic strategies in global governance institutions contribute to supporting its national interest and foreign policy aims. It compares Brazil's preferences and behaviour in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Group of 20 (G20). For decades, Brazil's primary national interest has been national economic development. The article argues that Brazil is moving from a material interests based definition of its prime national interest to a more complex one that includes both material and prestige/status based aspects. Research demonstrates that Brazil has become increasingly focused on gaining recognition as a leader of developing countries, sometimes even at the cost of realising its full material interests. It considers the value of constructivist international relations theory to understanding Brazilian foreign policy.
In recent years, scholars have called into question the often-heard policy statements that link a stronger single voice of the European Union (EU) to more European influence in international negotiations. This article examines this challenge in an area where the EU has a particularly long tradition of establishing common policies: agriculture. By comparing in particular the international agricultural negotiations that have taken place in the framework of the Uruguay and the Doha Development Rounds (up until Cancún), it argues that internal coherence is actually not a sufficient condition for EU influence in these negotiations. On the contrary, by building on different strands of literature – International Relations, EU studies and trade policy – it shows that the EU’s ability to influence outcomes has been increasingly affected by external developments. More specifically, the article draws on three crucial external processes in this regard: First, emerging powers have gained substantial commercial weight. Second, key countries, especially Brazil, have played an increasingly active role in the negotiations. Third, these countries have strengthened their positions through successful coalition-building. Consequently, if European policy-makers want to increase the EU’s influence in agricultural trade negotiations, they have to more consciously adapt its negotiation approaches to the changing external negotiation environment.
Growing interdependence requires greater global cooperation, but across a range of issues multilateral policy making seems to have stalled. We argue that this growing gap between the need for global governance and the ability of intergovernmental institutions to provide it must be understood as a general and conjunctural state of the multilateral order, which we term gridlock. The causes of gridlock are diverse – rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, increased complexity – but can be found across a range of global issue areas. Importantly, these drivers are, in part, products of previous, successful cooperation over the postwar period, and can therefore be understood as ‘second‐order’ cooperation problems. We argue that a process of self‐reinforcing interdependence has altered the nature of global politics over the past decades, and has therefore in part undermined the ability of multilateral institutions to sustain the very interdependence they have helped to create. This article lays out this argument with regard to three core areas of world politics: security, trade and finance.
Emerging powers such as Brazil and Germany increasingly articulate their desire for leadership in global governance. Examples comprise the bids for permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the founding of the G20 at the WTO meeting in Cancùn. Emerging powers, however, often fail to achieve their goals. This article focuses on followership as a core condition for success and failure of emerging power leadership in global governance. I argue that in order to perform successfully, any leadership must be accepted by followers and that followership depends on the credible inclusion of the interests and/or ideas of potential followers into the leadership project. This argument is tested in case studies on Brazil’s and Germany’s bids for structural power in the UNSC, for directorship in international organizations and for policy positions in the WTO trade negotiations.
In the aftermath of 9/11 surely of great significance is the reas- sertion of the South - North divide as a defining axis of the international system. In this context the emergence of a coterie of Southern countries actively challenging the position and assumptions of the leading states of the North is an especially significant event. The activism on the part of three middle-income developing countries in particular—South Africa, Brazil and India—has resulted in the creation of a 'trilateralist' diplomatic partnership, itself a reflection of broader transformations across the developing world in the wake of globalisation. This article will examine the rise of the co-operative strategy known as 'trilateralism' by regional leaders within the South. Specifically it will look at the relationship between emerging regional powers in the context of multilateralism, as well as at the formulation and implementation of trilateralism. As with previous co-operative efforts in the developing world, the prospects of success are rooted in overlapping domestic, regional and international influences on South African, Brazilian and Indian foreign policies. The article will conclude with an assessment of these influences over the trilateral agenda.
Two distinct literatures have emerged on the World Trade Organization's Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and its likely benefits for developing countries. One is built on the use of computable general and partial equilibrium simulations, while another explores the political economy of the negotiation process to explore the opportunities a concluded round will bring for developing countries. Both literatures generate important insights into the DDA, and both highlight that the deal on offer to developing countries is very weak. However, there has been little engagement between these two bodies of thought. This paper seeks to begin to redress this, fusing a review of the simulations of likely DDA gains with an examination of the passage of the Doha negotiations. It argues that through this process we can arrive at a fuller understanding of how limited, and problematic, the results of the DDA are likely to be for the less developed countries. If the DDA is to deliver on its mandate, a qualitative shift in the negotiations is required.
Regional powers of the Global South are perceived to be agents of change. But what exactly is the nature of the change that they want? This article argues that there is some continuity between the goals of the current generation of regional leaders and that of their predecessors. The current generation tend to have more confidence in their ability to effect the redistribution of wealth, prestige, and power in the global political economy, though, and tend therefore to be more integrationist than the first generation of post-colonial leaders. The goal of redistribution is premised on a more fundamental unfinished struggle of developing countries, one that Brazil, India, and South Africa in particular have taken up. This is the struggle for recognition of developing countries as full and equal partners in the society of states, but also as states with specific development needs that are too easily ploughed-under in the spurious universality promoted by the developed North. The struggle for recognition focuses on inclusive multilateralism and ‘non-indifference’ towards the development needs of the Global South. Using recent contributions to the theory of recognition, the article interprets these two goals as linked to the unfinished struggle against disrespect and humiliation.
An abridged version of this note is to be published soon on www.voxEU.org, a neat new blog for economists writing on all manner of public policy matters (not just trade). Some fabulous stuff has been posted there…you might want to take a look for yourself. Many worry that regionalism is undermining the multilateral trading system, but are past unilateral trade reforms and fast rates of economic growth in leading emerging markets at the root of Doha's problems? The Doha Round came to a serious impasse on 21 June 2007 when four leading trading powers could not agree on terms to liberalise international commerce. Their failure makes it almost inconceivable that the Doha Round negotiations will be concluded favourably before the next U.S. presidential ad-ministration takes office. Officially the talks aren't dead. Last year India's trade minister said the Doha Round was in intensive care; if that was the case then, now the patient appears to be in terminal de-cline. A mismatch in negotiating objectives sunk Thursday's trade negotiation in Potsdam, Germany. India and Brazil wanted Europe and the U.S. to commit to greater reforms of their agricultural sectors, while the latter insisted that the large emerging markets create more commercial opportunities for exporters by opening up their manufacturing sectors further. This time around it appears that Europe and the United States both signalled some flexibility, but it wasn't enough for India and Brazil. The Brazilian trade minister said it was "useless" to continue negotiating on the proposed terms. Early press reports said that India's trade minister abandoned the talks first without even consulting his colleagues. Last weekend I argued that the Doha Round talks were unravelling 2 ; Potsdam confirmed that the leading trading powers hardened their negotiating positions. Under these circumstances, an impasse seems not just a matter of "if", but "when." Now the negotiations go back to Geneva where the chairman of the negotiations in each area are sup-posed to issue texts that could--fingers crossed--form the basis of an agreement. Don't bet much on this particular process working out--remember the breakdown arose not within any one negotiating area but because no satisfactory trade-off across issues could be found. Realistically the only person left who can put a cross-cutting deal on the table is the WTO's Director-General. This all-or-nothing gambit is particularly risky--not least because the WTO members will likely blame Mr. Lamy if his proposals are rejected. The blame for this Round's debacle lies squarely on the shoulders of WTO member governments; Mr. Lamy and the WTO secretariat should not be made convenient scapegoats.
In recent years the bipolar multilateral trading system of the post-war years has given way to a multipolar alternative. Although
many specifics have yet to be determined, some contours of this new trade policy landscape are coming into focus. This article
examines their implications for the EU's external commercial policy. Particular attention is given to both the state of business-government
relations and the propensity to liberalise under the auspices of reciprocal trade agreements by Brazil, India, and China,
the potential new poles of the world trading system.
This article offers an account and analysis of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 7th Ministerial Conference – a meeting that, although ‘successfully’ concluded, failed to address a series of key issues in the increasingly moribund Doha Round of trade negotiations. We begin with an account of the meeting that offers an insight into the ‘colour’ of these biennial gatherings. The article then identifies and explores the primary consequences of pursuing an agenda designed not to focus on the core issues in the Doha Round but instead to ensure that the meeting is a ‘success’. Here we draw attention to the increasingly problematic nature of the Round's ‘development’ content, the thorny issue of agricultural liberalization and the problems posed for developing countries when their industrial counterparts pursue trade objectives through regional and bilateral means. In the concluding section, we consider the way forward for both the Doha Round and the WTO as an institution.
Cet essai invité offre un compte-rendu et une analyse de la 7ème conférence ministérielle de l′Organisation mondiale du commerce, une réunion qui, bien qu’ayant été formellement conclue de manière « satisfaisante », n′a pas abordé les questions clés associées aux négociations commerciales du Cycle – de plus en plus moribond – de Doha. Nous commençons avec une description de la réunion même, afin de donner une idée de la tonalité de ces rassemblements bisannuels. Nous identifions et explorons ensuite les conséquences du fait que la conférence ait poursuivi un ordre du jour qui n′avait pas pour but de se pencher sur les questions fondamentales du Cycle de Doha, mais plutôt d′assurer que la réunion serait un « succès ». Nous poursuivons notre analyse en attirant l′attention sur la nature de plus en plus problématique du contenu des négociations du Cycle de Doha, le problème épineux de la libéralisation agricole et les problèmes rencontrés par les pays en voie de développement quand leurs partenaires industriels poursuivent des objectifs commerciaux par des moyens régionaux et bilatéraux. En guise de conclusion, nous considérons le futur du Cycle de Doha ainsi que de l′OMC en tant qu′institution.
Introduction It is widely known that Brazil, as a major exporter of agricultural and agro-industrial goods, has adopted an offensive stance in negotiations on the liberalization of trade in agriculture taking place in the WTO, as well as in other negotiating processes. In line with this Brazil has participated actively in the Cairns Group – a coalition of developed and developing countries exporting agricultural products – both during and after the Uruguay Round. As the launching of a new multilateral round of trade negotiations was being discussed, Brazil pushed for including in the agenda ambitious goals related to market access and the reduction or elimination of export and domestic support schemes. Moreover, in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and EU–Mercosur negotiations, Brazil has presented proposals consistent with those developed in the multilateral arena. However, in the months preceding the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003, an interesting process of strategy-shifting took place, involving Brazil's stance in negotiations on agriculture. Without breaking with the Cairns Group and giving up its pro-trade liberalization stance in agricultural negotiations, Brazil led the setting of an issue-based developing countries' coalition aimed at bargaining jointly during the Ministerial Conference and beyond. This new coalition, the G20, brought together developing countries which traditionally adopted differing – even opposed – positions in the agricultural negotiations in the WTO; the simultaneous presence of Argentina and India in the group is the best example of this novelty.
This book develops a new theoretical approach to understanding the role of leadership in trade negotiations. By examining in detail the key role of leadership in the GATT/WTO system, it offers new insights into trade bargaining from the inception of the GATT through to the current WTO Doha Round. David A. Deese makes use of an impressive range and amount of primary material on the GATT/WTO system from a variety of official sources. World Trade Politics will be recommended reading for upper level undergraduate as well as postgraduate and research students, and will be essential reading for scholars of the global trade system.
The so-called theory of hegemonic stability is a research program composed of two distinct theories. Leadership theory builds upon public goods models and seeks to explain the production of the international economic infrastructure. The theory is extended here by identifying its necessary and sufficient conditions and explicating when leadership is likely to be benevolent or coercive. Hegemony theory, subsuming three independent analytic traditions, focuses on the different structurally derived trade policy preferences of states and attempts to explain international economic openness. The core logic of each variant and questions for future research are examined. Neither leadership nor hegemony theory has been tested adequately by existing empirical studies. While theorists have generally failed to present their arguments in an appropriate fashion, empiricists have not been sufficiently sensitive to variations in the theory and have produced studies that suffer from inadequate theoretical and operational specification and theoretical "over-extension." At this stage, formal tests should not seek decisive disconfirmation of the research program but should aim to provide guidance for further theoretical refinement.
It is often difficult to distinguish dominance from leadership in international economic relations. The latter concept, however, rejects exploitation and implies an often critical function in the provision of public goods. In its absence, the provision of such public goods as a market for distress goods, a steady flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism may disappear. This stabilization function was provided by the United States in the first postwar decades, but the U.S. now has neither the will nor the international acceptance to play such a role. And a successor is not in sight.
The July Framework Document is a major triumph for the big trade superpowers, particularly the United States. As for the developing world, the situation is more complex, with most countries losing but some claiming that they have made gains. Among the few claiming to be in the win column are Brazil and India, which are acknowledged as the leaders of the G20 and two of the Five Interested Parties (FIPS) that played the leading role in drafting the agriculture text. Attention needs to be paid to the dynamics of the July framework negotiations since they were a departure from traditional North-South trade negotiations and may set patterns for things to come. GENERAL COUNCIL SUPPLANTS THE MINISTERIAL Institutionally, among the innovations is that the General Council has now become de facto the supreme institution for WTO decision-making. What the July meeting came up with was effectively a ministerial declaration without a ministerial meeting. Two ministerial collapses--Seattle and Cancun--underlined to the WTO secretariat and the trade superpowers the unwieldiness of the ministerial as an arena for decision-making. It attracted NGOs and popular protests. It drew ministers, many of whom were not professional negotiators but political people determined to stand up for their country's interests. It brought the press in large numbers, thus making decision-making more transparent despite the wishes of negotiators accustomed to exclusive "green rooms." Only some 40 trade ministers were present in Geneva for the July GC meeting, with many representatives of countries that played a key role at the Cancun ministerial, such as Kenya and Nigeria, absent. Obviously, with some 100 ministers of WTO member countries absent, a great many governments failed to fully grasp the significance of the meeting.
The growth of Brazil, China, and India—and the rise of middle-tier economic powers such as Indonesia and Turkey—is transforming the geopolitical landscape. These emerging powers often oppose the political and economic ground rules of the post—World War II liberal order. To hold this order together, the United States will have to embrace multilateral cooperation more itself.
India has adopted a policy of pragmatic engagement with multilateral economic organizations in recent years. In the context of India’s economic diplomacy at the World Trade Organization (WTO), where it is seen as one of the major voices of dissent from the developing world, a shift in its traditional posturing is clearly evident. This article seeks to interpret the shift both in the context of structural changes within the WTO and the changing goals of India’s economic policy. In view of the stalemate at the Doha round of negotiations, the article argues that multi-lateral organizations like the WTO need to recognize the role of domestic lobbies and transnational civil society networks in shaping the aspirations of emerging economies like India.
Governments, organizations and individuals who do something out of the ordinary to influence the course and outcome of international negotiations, are sometimes called leaders or entrepreneurs. This article discusses the meanings of the two concepts. The first part defines `entrepreneur' and `leader' in general terms, by reference to how the concepts traditionally have been used. The second part asks how leadership can be exercised in negotiations among states. It places this type of activity alongside other, more ordinary policies in a typology of negotiation behaviour. Finally, the article takes a critical look at important contributions to the growing literature on international leadership, arguing that they fail to draw a clear line between the activity of a leader and that of an agent who engages in ordinary bargaining.
In agreement with Lake (1993) a new research programme is required to revitalize the Theory of Hegemonic Stability. However, this article disagrees that Lake's differentiation between `leadership theory' and `hegemony theory' is useful. In refining this distinction, Lake not only exaggerates the positivist foundations of the original theory, but endorses the trend towards the development of a holistic, rationalistic methodology, which discourages the development of behavioural contributions to international political leadership. This article argues that Lake's proposed research programme perpetuates at least three fundamental confusions. (1) By accepting that international leadership refers to the provision of public goods, it obfuscates the essential nature of political leadership, which is essentially an organizational skill, with a function of management, or the governance of a system. This leads to (2) the perpetuation of the belief that leadership is costly, and hence that only a single hegemonic state, or a wealthy collectivity, is able to lead. Finally (3) to emphasize structurally determined policy preferences, particularly as this relates to a state's willingness to lead, overlooks the skills, perceptions and motivations of statesmen, and their efforts in leading groups, both domestically and internationally.
This article seeks to develop a distinction between emerging and traditional middle powers as a means to giving the concept of a middle power greater analytical clarity. All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.
Australia has often been identified as a middle power in foreign policy terms. This article assesses the worth of the concept in understanding the role of Australia in global environmental governance. Using a case study of the role played at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, it assesses whether Australia conformed to a classic middle power role, building coalitions as a ‘good international citizen' or whether its role was more like a veto state, preventing positive change. This is done via a reflection of Australia's Summit priorities and an assessment of its impact over the Summit outcomes. The article shows that Australia was able to offer leadership in certain specific areas, but overall domestic policy preferences, a growing mistrust of multilateralism, and a strong defence of the national interest meant that Australia played the role of a veto state, often in coalition with the United States of America.
Particularly in the North-South confrontation at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, developing countries seemed to be presenting a unified stance of resistance against the developed world. These developments were greeted with considerable surprise in the scholarly as well as policy communities, not least because many theorists of International Relations had predicted increasing homogenisation and policy convergence by developing countries around liberal solidarist norms. In this paper, we analyse the apparent revitalisation of the Third World, and evaluate the policies of developing countries at and around Cancun to assess the claims that this heralds a more activist and less accommodating period in North/South relations. We buttress this general analysis by probing further into the policies of two of the major players, namely Brazil and India. We argue that recent policy changes can be explained by learning and adaptation by developing countries within the specific institution of the World Trade Organisation. We examine this adaptation along four planes: coalitions, insider activism, negotiation strategies, and transnational coalitions. Domestic politics in both our country cases play, at best, a supportive role. We also investigate the extent to which these shifts in trade politics might be seen as broader shifts in foreign policy. This work forms part of a project on Emerging Powers in International Regimes, funded by the Nuffield Foundation.
Recent years have seen a plethora of writings—by scholars, journalists and policy makers alike—on India's rise to power. This paper argues that this much-vaunted rise needs to be viewed with caution. It examines the case for India's rise, and operationalises its growing influence by applying and further developing the concept of ‘veto-player’. It highlights ways in which India has indeed acquired the status of a de facto veto-player in international relations. But the paper then presents three sets of reasons for caution. First, even though India's rise to power might appear dramatic and sudden, it is a product of a long and incremental process. This has policy implications: not all the policies of the preceding era should be carelessly abandoned by India or by other developing countries in similar circumstances. Second, there are still significant hurdles—many of which are domestic—that it must overcome if it is to fully realise its potential and acquire the status of a great power. Third, India may have acquired effective veto-player status in certain crucial negotiations, but this does not automatically translate into an ability to achieve preferred outcomes. Having examined the hurdles that India faces on its pathway to power, the paper goes on to suggest strategies that could be adopted to convert veto-player status into positive influence.
It is almost a decade since India began its economic reforms. Apart from the purely domestic economic objectives that the reforms were expected to achieve, there was a recognition that reform was imperative if India wanted to become an economic power of consequence within and beyond its region. This had important foreign policy implications. Official pronouncements reflected the concern that the balance of fiscal power as opposed to military power was the key factor in determining a country's international standing. This called for an integrated strategy to bring economic and foreign policies closer. The implementation of a vigorous foreign economic policy could not be undertaken without sharpening the commercial diplomatic tool. Indian foreign policy over the last decade has been grappling with this challenge. This article analyses the reorientation in Indian foreign policy, assesses the efforts undertaken so far to make commercial diplomacy viable and highlights the challenges that multi-layered diplomacy poses for a country like India.
A group of developing countries within the World Trade Organization, called the G22, formed in 2003 to bring attention to important economic concerns of the Global South. This coalition building at the global level is instructive to the literature on social movement coalition building and strategies in a transnational context. This article examines coalition building among nation-states within the context of the WTO. Drawing upon existing trading blocs, the G22 are able to leverage attention away from the WTO consensus. The declining significance of the global institution is a result of the breaking of this consensus.
Since the early years of the twentieth century, Brazil's major foreign policy aspiration has been to achieve international recognition based upon the belief that it should assume its `natural' role as a `big country' in world affairs. Although the bases for an autonomous foreign policy have become more restricted in the post-Cold War period, Brazil still seeks to preserve an independent voice within the international community and a certain level of independent capacity to determine its actions. In addition, the country has demonstrated a clear intention of wanting to expand the roles that it plays and the responsibilities that it assumes in regional politics, in Third World agendas and in multilateral institutions. As democracy deepens its roots within the country, Brazil has attempted to link an increasingly activist stance in world affairs with political support at home based upon a more active partisan involvement in foreign policy. In this context, the present government's fight against poverty and unequal income distribution at home and its assertive and activist foreign policy can be viewed as two sides of the same coin. In this article the authors provide an overview of the core features of Brazilian foreign policy, focusing upon four aspects: (i) the instrumental nature of Brazilian foreign policy and its close relationship with the country's economic and development objectives; (ii) the commitment of Brazil to multilateralism; (iii) the growing importance for Brazil of regional politics and security; and (iv) the recent evolution of Brazil's relations with the United States. The conclusion reviews the main challenges facing Brazil and the difficulty of matching increased ambition with concrete results.
The pairing of Australia and Canada has become a rich source of comparative studies with respect to foreign economic policy. This matching has been largely inspired by the like-mindedness of the two countries. Yet, if Australia and Canada may be said to have similar objectives in terms of the international system, the methods through which they have attempted to pursue these objectives have differed sharply. Using international-level and domestic-level modes of analysis, this article explains the reasons for the contrasting style in the case of agricultural trade. It is demonstrated that a number of mutually reinforcing factors combine to give a tough-minded quality to Australia's approach. In contrast, because of both a greater complexity in the domestic policy-making process and the range of foreign policy options, Canada's style in the agricultural trade issue has become increasingly nuanced.RésuméLes études comparant l'Australie et le Canada sont devenues une source riche d'enseignements sur la politique économique étrangère. Les similitudes entre les deux pays ont inspiré ces comparaisons. Ceal dit, bien que les deux pays aient des objectifs semblables dans le système international, leurs méthodes diffèrent nettement. En considérant tant le contexte internationale que les contextes nationaux, cet article expose les raisons qui expliquent ces styles différents dans le cas du commerce agricole. Une combinaison de facteurs ont conduit l'Australie à adopter une orientation plus radicale. Aucontraire, le Canada adopte des positions de plus en plus flexibles en matière de commerce agricole, à la fois en raison de la complexité de sa politique intérieure et de l'éventail de ses orientations en politique étrangère.
For realists regionalism remains a difficult phenomenon to explicate. A particular puzzle for realists is why major states should want to pursue regional institutionalisation. Nor are pluralist accounts satisfactory given the empirical evidence of state actor prominence in processes of regional institutionalisation. This article sets out to account for the formative phase of regionalist endeavours, proposing an ideational–institutional realism as the basis for understanding regionalism. On this basis a specific theory of co-operative hegemony is developed. Stressing the importance of the grand strategies of major regional powers and their responses to the balance-of-threat in a region, the author argues that major states may advance their interests through non-coercive means by applying a strategy of co-operative hegemony which implies an active role in regional institutionalisation and the use of, for instance, side payments, power-sharing and differentiation. The article outlines a number of preconditions for regional institutionalisation, stressing what is called the capacity for power-sharing; the power aggregation capacity and the commitment capacity of the biggest power in a region. While regionalising state elites are constrained, they possess a much greater freedom of choice than neo-realism claims.
This article examines the interrelationship between and the relative importance of individual leadership and structural power in promoting (or impeding) regime implementation. The theoretical debates on structural power and individual leadership are related to a particular case of regime implementation: the efforts of the Preparatory Commission on the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to make the international seabed regime operational. The article concludes that hegemonic stability theory highlights a variable—structural power—which in this case is the key determinant of the ability to exert influence. On the other hand, hegemonic stability theory fails to establish causal links and it ignores other important variables, such as the constraints imposed by changes in the domestic environments of leading states as well as in the international environment. In the pulling and hauling of international negotiations aimed at regime implementation, individuals can and do play significant roles as structural, intellectual and, most particularly, entrepreneurial leaders.
The WTO’s nine day sprint in July 2008 was an attempt to break the logjam on “modalities” for agriculture and NAMA in the marathon Doha Round negotiations. All that observers can know for certain is that the parties did not agree, but understanding the failure is an essential prelude to any attempt to relaunch the Round. This paper is a counterfactual analysis of the various explanations that have been offered for the failure. I consider factors exogenous to the negotiation process, such as the macroeconomic context; and factors endogenous to the process such as the timing and level of participation in the meeting, and the nature of the issues under discussion. I conclude that sprinting during a marathon is unwise. The London G-20 Summit commitment to a balanced outcome is achievable, but assembling a package with so many issues involving 153 members takes time and patience.
The G20 summit has recently emerged as the dominant agency of global governance. It claims that its economic weight and broad membership give it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the management of the global economy and financial system. But the G20 still excludes from membership some 150 other countries, all of which have interests at stake within the contours of contemporary global governance. In the financial arena these excluded countries contributed significantly to the alternative agenda for dealing with the global financial crisis proposed by the United Nations conference that met in June 2009. In the trade arena they engaged extensively in a variety of coalitions within the World Trade Organization during the so-called Doha Round and played a part in preventing a deal emerging that was unsatisfactory from their perspective. Questions are raised about the legitimacy of the G20 by the active presence of so many other country voices outside its remit and it can be expected that the excluded ‘G150’ will increasingly explore different ways to engage with the members of the G20 over the next few years.
No good deed goes unpunished: the WTO's timely response to accommodate the new powers—Brazil, India and China—at the heart of its decision-making has produced new inefficiencies, has heightened its proclivity to deadlock, and has exacerbated disengagement and disillusionment among all its stakeholders. Particularly in the context of a major economic crisis, a reliable international institution is necessary to ensure the continued provision of freer trade—well-recognized as the route to recovery. With the WTO's recent record to provide these necessary public goods under doubt, where do the solutions lie? This article discusses the changing role of the new powers in the WTO, and further analyses the opportunities and challenges that these developments generate. The concluding section examines possible routes to reform. While very little can, or indeed should, be done to alter the balance of power itself, it is argued that appropriate institutional reform can help the multilateral trading system retain the advances it has made on grounds of fairness and further address the concerns of efficiency that are central to the crisis that it faces today.
The demographic weight and the scale and magnitude of economic growth in China and India—as well as in Brazil and South Africa—marks a seismological transformation in world politics. However, despite their economic clout, the emerging powers of the global South have done little to challenge the Euro-North American domination of the international stage—leaving that task to Bolivia, Venezuela, and Iran. The reluctance of the large states of the global South to challenge the contemporary world order—and the widening income and wealth inequalities within their borders—suggests that they are increasingly complicit in this new world order. However, as growing inequalities unleash greater political instability, it is in the interests of states in the global South to cooperate with each other to change the rules of the game.
The U.S. is no longer providing leadership in trade policy. In recent years, we have seen a sharp turn toward a rapid proliferation of bilateral preferential trade agreements, accords that are likely to undermine the World Trade Organization (WTO). By pursuing a strategy of 'competitive liberalization' both on a sectoral basis under the Bill Clinton administration, and then a policy of seeking bilateral arrangements under the George W. Bush administration, this article argues that American administrations have undermined the coalition for free trade in the United States. Consequently, protectionist industries including textiles, steel, and agriculture have made further liberalization more difficult and thus the prospects for promoting continued trade liberalization have grown dimmer.
Over the last 60 years, the multilateral management of trade through the GATT and subsequently through the WTO has been led by the United States and Europe. Since the turn of the new millennium, however, developing countries have increasingly used their leverage to insist that talks on agriculture receive priority attention, deny the inclusion of investment and competition policy on the negotiating agenda, and block agreement on negotiating modalities for agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA). Cooperation between the United States and the European Union is still essential, but no longer sufficient, for successful multilateral negotiations. Specifically, the "BRICKs" (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Korea) are likely to be pivotal in directing the course and contributing to the success or failure of the WTO.
Perhaps the key question of debate among neorealist scholars of international political economy concerns the manner in which cooperation may or may not be secured in the global economic order "after hegemony," a question posed by Robert Keohane. A second broad question of interest to scholars of international politics concerns the manner in which weaker states attempt to influence stronger ones. A conflation of these two questions could cause scholars and practitioners alike to pay closer attention than they have in the past to coalitions of the weak as vehicles for cooperation and regime building in the global political economy.
This article offers a case study of one recent exercise in coalition building as an attempt to foster cooperation in a "nonhegemonic" environment. Specifically, it examines the role of the Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations in its attempts to foster reform in global agricultural trade within the current Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The Cairns Group is shown to be an atypical, single-issue driven, transregional coalition. Led by Australia, the Group's actions represent an interesting exercise in "middle power" politics in a global economic order whose decisionmaking processes are increasingly more fragmented and complex and whose major actors need coaxing toward processes of cooperative economic management.
The July 2008 attempt by a group of ministers to agree on modalities for the WTO's Doha Round broke down in part because they could not agree on a proposed (SSM) for developing countries in agriculture. This paper offers a corrective to the conventional story that the breakdown was due to a simple conflict of interests over the SSM between the United States and India. The term SSM was first used in a Doha Round text in 2004, but neither the principles nor the commercial implications had ever been discussed by ministers before July 2008. The conceptual origins of the SSM go back to proposals in the late 1990s for a , but by the time of the ministerial, negotiators had been unable to agree on the purpose of the safeguard, or how it would work, including the agricultural products it would cover, how it would be triggered, the remedies (additional tariffs) allowed, or the transparency requirements for its operation. The SSM was therefore one of the least parts of the text placed before ministers in July 2008. Members were far from reaching a consensual understanding of the SSM, which resulted in a fiasco that might have been avoided. Ministers should not have been asked to engage in a poorly prepared discussion of a sensitive issue, because inevitably they staked out incompatible positions. Members may subsequently find it difficult to back down.