American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008)

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American Religious Identication Survey
(ARIS 2008)
SUMMARY REPORT
March 2009
Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar

e ARIS 2008 survey was carried out
during February-November 2008 and
collected answers from 54,461 respondents
who were questioned in English or
Spanish.
e American population self-identifies as
predominantly Christian but Americans
are slowly becoming less Christian.
• 86%ofAmericanadultsidentiedas
Christiansin1990and76%in2008.
• ehistoricMainlinechurchesand
denominations have experienced
the steepest declines while the non-
denominational Christian identity
has been trending upward particularly
since 2001.
• echallengetoChristianityin
the U.S. does not come from other
religions but rather from a rejection of
all forms of organized religion.
34%ofAmericanadultsconsidered
themselves “Born Again or Evangelical
Christians” in 2008.
e U. S. population continues to show
signs of becoming less religious, with
one out of every five Americans failing to
indicate a religious identity in 2008.
• e“Nones”(nostatedreligious
preference, atheist, or agnostic)
continue to grow, though at a much
slower pace than in the 1990s, from
8.2%in1990,to14.1%in2001,to
15.0%in2008.
• AsianAmericansaresubstantially
more likely to indicate no religious
identity than other racial or ethnic
groups.
One sign of the lack of attachment of
Americanstoreligionisthat27%donot
expect a religious funeral at their death.
Based on their stated beliefs rather than
their religious identification in 2008,
70%ofAmericansbelieveinapersonal
God,roughly12%ofAmericansare
atheist(noGod)oragnostic(unknowable
orunsure),andanother12%aredeistic
(ahigherpowerbutnopersonalGod).
America’s religious geography has been
transformed since 1990. Religious
switching along with Hispanic
immigration has significantly changed
the religious profile of some states and
regions. Between 1990 and 2008, the
Catholic population proportion of the
NewEnglandstatesfellfrom50%to
36%andinNewYorkitfellfrom44%
to37%,whileitroseinCaliforniafrom
29%to37%andinTexasfrom23%
to32%.
Overall the 1990-2008 ARIS time
series shows that changes in religious
self-identification in the first decade of
the 21st century have been moderate in
comparison to the 1990s, which was a
period of significant shifts in the religious
composition of the United States.
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY (ARIS) 2008
Principal Investigators: Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar
Highlights

ARIS 2008 Contents
Research Design ................................................................................................................ 2
Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior
A. Belonging ........................................................................................................... 3
Table 1. Religious Self-Identification of the U.S. Adult
Population 1990, 2001, 2008 ................................................................. 3
Table 2. Change in the Religious Self-Identification of the
U.S. Adult Population 1990-2008 ............................................................. 4
Table 3. Self-Identification of U.S. Adult Population by
Religious Tradition 1990, 2001, 2008 ..................................................... 5
B. Belief ................................................................................................................. 8
Table 4. Beliefs about God among U.S. Adult Population 2008 ............................... 8
Table 5. Size and Composition of the Born-Again or
Evangelical Christian Population 2008 ..................................................... 9
C. Behavior ........................................................................................................... 10
Table 6. Life Cycle Religious Rituals of the U.S. Adult
Population 2008 ................................................................................... 10
Part II Demography of the Religious Traditions in 2008
Table 7. Gender Composition of the Religious Traditions 2008 .............................. 11
Table 8. Age Composition of the Religious Traditions 2008 ................................... 12
Table 9. Marital Status of the Religious Traditions 2008 ....................................... 13
Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008
A. Racial Composition ............................................................................................ 14
Table 10. Composition of Racial and Ethnic Groups by
Religious Tradition 1990, 2001, 2008 ................................................. 14
B. Education ......................................................................................................... 16
Table 11. Percentage of College Graduates in the Population
over Age 25 by Religious Tradition 1990-2008 ...................................... 16
C. Geography and Religion ...................................................................................... 17
Table 12. Religious Self-Identification of US Adult Population by Census Region,
Census Division, and State by Percentage 1990 and 2008 .................... 18
Appendix A. The Taxonomy of the Religious Traditions ............................................... 23
Appendix B. The Authors ......................................................................................... 24
© Copyright ISSSC 2009 Design by Jo Lynn Alcorn

Research Design
ARIS 2008 is the third in a landmark time series of large, nationally representative surveys that track changes in the
religious loyalties of the U.S. adult population within the 48 contiguous states from 1990 to 2008. e 2001 and 2008
surveys are replicas of the 1990 survey, and are led by the same academic research team using an identical methodology
ofrandom-digit-dialed telephone interviews (RDD) and the sameunprompted, open-ended keyquestion “Whatis your
religion,ifany?”Interviewersdidnotpromptoroerasuggestedlistofpotentialanswers.Moreover,theself-descriptionof
respondentswasnotbasedonwhetherestablishedreligiousbodiesorinstitutionsconsideredthem tobemembers.Tothe
contrary, the surveys sought to determine whether the respondents regarded themselves as adherents of a religious community.
e surveys tap subjective rather than objective standards of religious identification. e value of this unique series of national
surveys, which allows scientific monitoring of change over time, has been recognized by the U.S. Bureau of the Census e
Bureau itself is constitutionally precluded from such an inquiry into religion, and so has incorporated NSRI/ARIS findings
into its official publication the Statistical Abstract of the United States since 2003.
e key religion question is part of an inquiry that also probes a range of socio-demographic, political, social, and life-cycle
issues as well as attitudes that add richness to the main findings. ese responses reveal the nation’s pattern of religious beliefs,
behaviors and belonging. e ARIS 2008 survey was carried out from February through November 2008 and collected
answers from 54,461 respondents who were questioned in English or Spanish. In order to fill the information gap on the
growing number of people who do not have a landline but use cellular telephones mainly or exclusively, we supplemented the
traditionalRDDsamplewithaseparatenationalcellphonesurvey.ResultsfortheARISkeyopen-endedquestiononreligious
self-identicationindicatenostatisticallysignicantdierencesbetweentheRDDsampleandthecellphonesample.1 ARIS
2001 interviewed 50,281 respondents and the 1990 NSRI interviewed 113,713 respondents. e huge number of cases in
these surveys provides unparalleled, in-depth profiles of the social make-up of religious groups and detailed geographical
coverage with a high degree of statistical precision and a standard error of under 0.5 percent for the full sample in 2008.
As one might expect with over 220,000 interviews recorded over three surveys, the ARIS respondents offered a vast number
of theological, religious and denominational responses to our key question. ese open-ended answers have to be aggregated
down to a manageable number of categories for analytical purposes. is requires using a simplified aggregation that helps
highlightthe majortrendsinreligioussentimentsacrossvemajortheologicalblocsasutilizedinTables1,2and 12.e
categoryCatholiciscomprisedof (1) RomanCatholics,(2)EasternRitesCatholics, and (3) allotherswhousedtheterm
“Catholic” in their response. e “Other Christians” bloc is composed of all non-Catholic respondents who self-identified
with a religious group which claims to be Christian as well as any theological term that related to Christianity. e “Other
Religions” bloc comprises all the other faiths, world religions and religious groups that are not Christian. e “Nones” are an
amalgamation of all the respondents who provided answers to our key question which identified them as having no religious
identity or connection. e most common response was “None” or “No Religion.” is bloc can be described as the non-
religious, irreligious and anti-religious bloc. It includes anti-clerical theists, but the majority are non-theists. For reasons of
scientific integrity we have also included data on the “Unknown” category, composed of those who said they did not know the
answertoourkeyreligionquestionandthosewhorefusedtoreplytoourkeyquestion.Wehavenoreligiousidentication
data on this population but we do have demographic and attitude data.
A further re-classification of the responses that offers a finer-grained taxonomy identifying 12 religious traditions and some
ofthelargerreligiousgroupsisprovidedinTable3andothersubsequenttables.However,thissummaryisjustthetipofthe
iceberg of statistical data on a much larger number of religious groups than can be handled here and many more social variables
than are highlighted here. e 1990 and 2001 studies were fully analyzed and reported in One Nation under God: Religion in
Contemporary American Society (1993) and Religion in a Free Market: Religious and Non-Religious Americans (2006).2
1Detailedanalysisofthereligiousandsocio-demographicprolesofthecellphoneuserswillbeprovidedinalaterreport.
2Barry A. Kosmin and Seymour P. Lachman, One Nation under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society,NewYork,HarmonyPress,
1993; Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, Religion in a Free Market: Religious and Non-Religious Americans,Ithaca,N.Y.,ParamountMarket
Publishing, 2006.
2 ARIS 2008

Part I
National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior
3
A. Belonging
Table 1.
Religious Self-Identification of the U.S. Adult Population 1990, 2001, 2008
1990 2001 2008
Estimated % Estimated % Estimated %
Number of People Number of People Number of People
Catholic 46,004,000 26.2 50,873,000 24.5 57,199,000 25.1
Other Christian 105,221,000 60.0 108,641,000 52.2 116,203,000 50.9
Total Christians 151,225,000 86.2 159,514,000 76.7 173,402,000 76.0
Other Religions 5,853,000 3.3 7,740,000 3.7 8,796,000 3.9
Nones 14,331,000 8.2 29,481,000 14.2 34,169,000 15.0
DK/Refused 4,031,000 2.3 11,246,000 5.4 11,815,000 5.2
Total 175,440,000 100.0 207,983,000 100.0 228,182,000 100.0
e U.S. adult population over 18 years of age grew by nearly 53 million persons in the 18 years between
1990and2008.Asaresult,allthereligiousidenticationcategoriesshowninTable1increasedtheiroverall
numbers. e most dramatic changes in the balance of religious sentiments seem to have occurred during
the 1990s. e changes between 2001 and 2008, when the adult population expanded by over 20 million
persons, largely reflect the influence of the heavy immigration primarily from Latin America in recent years.
e 2008 findings confirm the conclusions we came to in our earlier studies that Americans are slowly
becoming less Christian and that in recent decades the challenge to Christianity in American society does
notcomefromotherworldreligionsornewreligiousmovements(NRMs)butratherfromarejectionof
allorganizedreligions.Toillustratethepoint,Table1showsthatthenon-theistandNoReligiongroups
collectively known as “Nones” have gained almost 20 million adults since 1990 and risen from 8.2 to
15.0 percent of the total population. If we include those Americans who either don’t know their religious
identication(0.9percent)orrefusetoanswerourkeyquestion(4.1percent),andwhotendtosomewhat
resemble “Nones” in their social profile and beliefs, we can observe that in 2008 one in five adults does not
identify with a religion of any kind compared with one in ten in 1990.
Other Non-Christian religious groups and faiths have steadily grown in numbers from a small base and have
gained three million adherents since 1990 but they represent only 4 percent of the national population.
e various Christian churches and groups gained 31 million adherents to total over 173 million but their
combined numbers as a proportion of the population fell by 10 percent from 86.2 percent down to 76
percent over the past two decades. e nation’s largest Christian group, the Catholics, gained 11 million,
thanks largely to immigration and now numbers just over 57 million adult self-identifiers, but the Catholic
percentage of the national population still fell from 26.2 percent to 25.1 percent between 1990 and 2008.
e Other Christian category, largely composed of adherents of the Protestant Churches and traditions, also
gained 11 million people but fell from 60 to 51 percent of the total population.
ARIS 2008

4
ARIS 2008 Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior
Table 2.
Change in the Religious Self-Identification of the U.S. Adult Population 1990-2008
Table2illustratesthedynamicsofreligiouspopulationchangesovertheperiod1990-2008whichsawthe
total population grow by 30 percent. As was stated previously every group has increased in absolute numbers
but the rate of growth has varied. e largest net increase in numbers went to the Nones which have grown
by138%intheperiod.erighthandcolumnreectsthedistributionofthepopulationgainssince1990.
e Nones also secured nearly 38 percent of the total population increase. Catholics and the Other Christians
groups each received around a 21 percent share of the population increase. e Other Religions group rose by
50 percent in absolute numbers and gained 6 percent of the share of the national growth.
e population we know least about, those who do not know or refuse to reveal their religious identification,
grew the most rapidly. is reflects social changes in attitudes and in American society over the past two
decades. ere is less willingness to participate in surveys of all types by the American public. Although this
leaves a lacuna in the ARIS statistics the overall rate of refusal to participate is low by international standards.
For example, the rate of refusal to the religion question in the national U.K. Government 2001 Census was
higher at seven percent.
Estimated Estimated Estimated % Growth % Share of National
Population 1990 Population 2008 Population Growth of Group Population Growth
Catholic 46,004,000 57,199,000 11,195,000 24 21
Other Christian 105,221,000 116,201,000 10,980,000 10 20
Other Religions 5,853,000 8,796,000 2,943,000 50 6
Nones 14,331,000 34,169,000 19,838,000 138 37
DK/Refused 4,031,000 11,815,000 7,784,000 193 15
Total U.S. 175,440,000 228,182,000 52,742,000 30 100

5
ARIS 2008 Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior
Table 3.
Self-Identification of U.S. Adult Population by Religious Tradition 1990, 2001, 2008
1990 2001 2008
Religious Tradition Estimate % Estimate % Estimate %
Catholic 46,004,000 26.2 50,873,000 24.5 57,199,000 25.1
Baptist 33,964,000 19.3 33,820,000 16.3 36,148,000 15.8
Mainline Christian 32,784,000 18.7 35,788,000 17.2 29,375,000 12.9
Methodist 14,174,000 8.0 14,039,000 6.8 11,366,000 5.0
Lutheran 9,110,000 5.2 9,580,000 4.6 8,674,000 3.8
Presbyterian 4,985,000 2.8 5,596,000 2.7 4,723,000 2.1
Episcopalian/ 3,043,000 1.7 3,451,000 1.7 2,405,000 1.1
Anglican
United Church 438,000 0.2 1,378,000 0.7 736,000 0.3
of Christ
Christian Generic 25,980,000 14.8 22,546,000 10.8 32,441,000 14.2
Christian 8,073,000 4.6 14,190,000 6.8 16,834,000 7.4
Unspecified
Non-Denom. 194,000 0.1 2,489,000 1.2 8,032,000 3.5
Christian
Protestant 17,214,000 9.8 4,647,000 2.2 5,187,000 2.3
Unspecified
Evangelical/ 546,000 0.3 1,088,000 0.5 2,154,000 0.9
Born Again
Pentecostal/ 5,647,000 3.2 7,831,000 3.8 7,948,000 3.5
Charismatic
Pentecostal 3,116,000 1.8 4,407,000 2.1 5,416,000 2.4
Unspecified
Assemblies of God 617,000 0.4 1,105,000 0.5 810,000 0.4
Church of God 590,000 0.4 943,000 0.5 663,000 0.3
Protestant 4,630,000 2.6 5,949,000 2.9 7,131,000 3.1
Denominations
Churches of Christ 1,769,000 1.0 2,593,000 1.2 1,921,000 0.8
Jehovah’s Witness 1,381,000 0.8 1,331,000 0.6 1,914,000 0.8
Seventh Day 668,000 0.4 724,000 0.3 938,000 0.4
Adventist
Mormon/Latter Day 2,487,000 1.4 2,697,000 1.3 3,158,000 1.4
Saints
Jewish* 3,137,000 1.8 2,837,000 1.4 2,680,000 1.2
Eastern Religions 687,000 0.4 2,020,000 1.0 1,961,000 0.9
Buddhist 404,000 0.2 1,082,000 0.5 1,189,000 0.5
Muslim 527,000 0.3 1,104,000 0.5 1,349,000 0.6
NRMs & Other 1,296,000 0.8 1,770,000 0.9 2,804,000 1.2
Religions
Nones/No Religion 14,331,000 8.2 29,481,000 14.1 34,169,000 15.0
Agnostic 1,186,000** 0.7 991,000 0.5 1,985,000 0.9
Atheist N/A N/A 902,000 0.4 1,621,000 0.7
DK/Refused 4,031,000 2.3 11,300,000 5.4 11,815,000 5.2
Total 175,440,000 100 207,983,000 100 228,182,000 100
* This refers only to Jews by religion and not to the total Jewish ethnic population
** Agnostics and Atheists were combined in NSRI 1990

Categorizing and aggregating religious groups is a difficult and controversial task but it is necessary in order
toeectivelymonitorandmeasuretrends.Table3providesdetailsonchangesinthepopularityofthe12
mainreligioustraditionstobefoundamongtheAmericanpopulationforthethreetimepoints.Dataisalso
providedforsomesub-categoriessuchasthelargestMainlineandProtestantdenominationsandchurches
and other large religious identification response categories. e full listing of the religious groups comprising
each tradition can be found in the appendix. It must be born in mind that respondents to ARIS could easily
and quite legitimately offer a number of terms when answering our key question. e protocol in ARIS is to
use the first response offered. In fact over 100 unique response categories were recorded. is is particularly
true among the “Other Christian” group where a generic religious tradition response, a theological outlook or
belief response or a denominational affiliation response were recorded. In order to try to get some specificity
to the answers if an ARIS respondent offers the answer “Christian” or Protestant” there is then a filter question
which asks “What denomination is that?” AsTable3illustrates,overtimethisfurtherprobinghasbeen
successful in refining the “Protestant” response category. However, it has not succeeded in curbing the tide of
preference for self-identification as a plain “Christian,” the numbers of which have doubled since 1990. is
trend suggests that among those we categorize as “Other Christian” both personal preferences and collective
religious labeling is in flux.
AsTable3warrantsadditionaldiscussion.SincewediscussedCatholicsabove,wenowturntotheBaptist
tradition. “Baptist” is the majority response category in this tradition but numerous varieties of Baptist
denomination, right down to the level of the local chapel, were offered by respondents. is includes, of
course Southern Baptist and American Baptist. e Baptist population was relatively stable over the 1990s.
e sudden growth spurt in Baptist numbers since 2001 seems to reflect a measurable reassertion of a Baptist
identity among the population and more detailed varieties of Baptist were offered by respondents in 2008
than in 2001.
ehistoricMainlineChristianchurcheshaveconsistentlylostmarketsharesincethe1950s,butsince2001
therehasbeenasignicantfallinnumbers.eMethodistsandEpiscopalianshavebeenparticularlyaected
bylosses.MuchofthisdeclineinMainlineidenticationisduetothegrowingpublicpreferenceforthe
generic “Christian” response and the recent growth in the popularity of the “non-denominational Christian”
response. Fewer than 200,000 people favored this term in 1990 but in 2008 it accounts for over eight
million Americans. Another notable finding is the rise in the preference to self-identify as “Born Again” or
“Evangelical” rather than with any Christian tradition, church or denomination.
e Pentecostal tradition made particular headway during the 1990s but its growth appears to have leveled off
recently. e incidence of specific Pentecostal denominational labels such as Assemblies of God or Church of
God has varied over the years. e Protestant denominations, mainly composed of conservative and sectarian
groups,havegrowninsizeandproportion.eMormonandLatterDaySaintstraditionhasslowlybut
steadily grown throughout this period. e above findings lead us to conclude that among the Christian
groups the tendency is to move either to a more sectarian or to a more generalized form of Christian identity
at the expense of a denominational identity. ese trends also suggest a movement towards more conservative
beliefs and particularly to a more “evangelical” outlook among Christians. is important historical trend in
American religious development is discussed in greater detail later in this report.
As we pointed out earlier the so-called minority faiths or non-Christian religions are growing in size and
as a proportion of the American population but at a much slower pace than is often claimed. e Jewish
6
ARIS 2008 Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior

religious population is in slow decline due mainly to a movement towards the Nones among young ethnic
Jews.isispartofageneraltrendamongyoungerwhiteAmericansasisillustratedlaterinTable12.e
Eastern religions, aside from Buddhism, rely on immigration for growth but social integration often leads to
numerical losses for these groups. e popularity of Buddhism and its attraction for white converts that was
evidentinthe1990sseemstohavereceded.eMuslimpopulationdoubledduringthe1990sbutitsgrowth
innumbersnowseemstobeslowing.esizeandproportionoftheMuslimpopulationhasoftenbeen
debated but the ARIS numbers closely resemble the recent findings of the General Social Survey and the 2007
PewReligiousLandscapeSurvey.ecategoryoftheNewReligiousMovementsandOtherReligionsisa
mixed one and includes many groups often referred to as cults. e 2008 survey revealed marked increase in
preferences for personalized and idiosyncratic responses as well as increases in the Neo-Pagan groups.
e rise of the Nones has been one of the most important trends on the American religious scene since 1990.
e overall rate of growth of those expressing no religious preference slowed after 2001 but the numbers
offering a specific self-identification as Agnostic or Atheist rose markedly from over a million in 1990 to
about 2 million in 2001 to about 3.6 million today. e historic reluctance of Americans to self-identify in
thismannerorusethesetermsseemstohavediminished.NeverthelessasTable4showsthelevelofunder-
reporting of these theological labels is still significant.
7
ARIS 2008 Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior

8
B. Belief
ARIS 2008 Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior
Table 4.
Beliefs about God among U.S. Adult Population 2008
Regarding the existence of God, do you think . . . ?
There is no such thing 2.3%
There is no way to know 4.3%
I’m not sure 5.7%
There is a higher power but no personal God 12.1%
There is definitely a personal God 69.5%
Refused 6.1%
n = 1,000 100%
AnewbeliefquestionwasintroducedintoARISin2008.Table4showsthatwhenaskedabouttheexistenceof
God less than 70 percent of Americans now believe in the traditional theological concept of a personal God. is
question was not asked in 1990 and 2001. A surprisingly large proportion of contemporary Americans, just over
12percent,believeinadeistorpaganisticconceptoftheDivineasahigherpower.WhereasTable3showedthat
onlyonepercentofAmericansactuallyself-identifyasagnostics,Table4revealsthat10percentholdagnostic
beliefs(5.7%a“softer”formand4.3%a“harderform”ofagnosticism).esendingsaboutthe“belief ”aspect
of religiosity tend to complicate our interpretation of some of the trends and findings in the earlier tables relating
to “belonging.” If 76 percent of Americans self-identify with Christianity and 80 percent with a religion then
many millions do not subscribe fully to the theology of the groups with which they identify.

Table 5.
Size and Composition of the Born-Again or Evangelical Christian Population 2008
Religious identification Number % Born Again
Mainline Christians 11,158,000 38.6
Other Christian Groups 56,505,000 60.2
Catholics 10,083,000 18.4
Total Christian Adults 77,747,000 44.8
Table5revealsthedimensionsofasignicanttrendin“belief”amongthe76percentofcontemporary
Americans who identify as Christians. ese respondents were specifically asked “Do you identify as a Born
Again or Evangelical Christian?” No definition was offered of the terms, which are usually associated with a
“personal relationship” with Jesus Christ together with a certain view of salvation, scripture, and missionary
work. As the table shows, 45 percent of all American Christians now self-identify in this manner and they
accountfor34percentofthetotalnationaladultpopulation.Whatissignicantistherecentspread
of Evangelicalism well beyond Christians affiliated with those groups that are members of the National
EvangelicalAssociationsothatmillionsofMainlinersandCatholicsnowidentifywiththistrend.
Tables4and5showthatthereisarealandgrowingtheologicalpolarizationinAmericansocietywhereby
34 percent of the population believe they are “Born Again” but 25-30 percent reject the idea of a personal
divinity. ese questions on belief reveal the cultural polarization between the pious and non-religious
portions of the national population, which are today roughly similar in size.
9
ARIS 2008 Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior

10
C. Behavior
ARIS 2008 Part I National Statistics on Belonging, Belief and Behavior
Table 6.
Life Cycle Religious Rituals of the U.S. Adult Population 2008
% Yes % No Don’t Know/ % Total
Refused
Did you have a religious initiation ceremony,
such as a baptism, Christening, circumcision, 71 26 3 100
confirmation, bar mitzvah or naming ceremony?
Were you married in a religious ceremony?
(ever married respondents only) 69 30 1 100
When you die, do you expect to have a
religious funeral or service? 66 27 7 100
n = 1,000
Behavioristhethird“B”inthetriangleofreligiositytogetherwithbelongingandbelief.Table6revealsnewand
unique data, only available only in the 2008 survey, on the extent of religious rituals, practices, or sacraments
of Americans relating to those life cycle events that have been the traditional preserve of most religions. e
proportion of adults who have undergone a religious initiation of some kind is reduced somewhat by the large
number of Baptists in the American population who delay baptism into the adult years. However, for most people
thiswasadecisionmadebytheirparentssothestatistics(giventhemedianageoftheadultpopulation)really
reflect religious practice in an earlier generation, that is to say on average around 1960.
e religious marriage question relates to a more recent and personal decision by the actual respondents but it
is probably also a negotiated decision with the spouse. Nevertheless there is a significant minority, 30 percent of
married couples, that has rejected a religious marriage ceremony. It is the final question that relates to expectation
of a religious funeral which is probably the most revealing of social trends today. Funerals and interments are
important if one has personal concerns about salvation and the immortality of the soul. It appears that over one-
fourthofcontemporaryAmericansareunconcernedwithsuchreligiousideas.OverallthetrendinTable6though
not definitive does suggest a slight erosion of participation in religious rituals over their own life cycles by our
2008 respondents.
endingsandpatternsshowninTables1-6thatrelatetocurrentpatternsofreligiousbelonging,belief
and behavior seem to show a high degree of correlation. ey reveal that the United States in 2008 can be
characterized as a country with a Christian majority population but with a growing non-religious or irreligious
minority. e growing non-religious minority reduces the traditional societal role of congregations and places
of worship in family celebrations of life-cycle events. Forestalling of religious rites of passage, such as marriage,
and the lowering expectations on religious funeral services, could have long lasting consequences for religious
institutions.

Part II
Demography of the Religious Traditions in 2008
11
Table 7.
Gender Composition of the Religious Traditions 2008
Since women live longer than men there are normally more women than men in the population. e current
sexratioorgenderbalanceofthenationalU.S.adultpopulationis49malestoevery52females.Table7
reveals that there is a split among the religious traditions whereby Christian groups tend to meet or exceed
this female bias whereas all the non-Christians in the bottom five rows exceed the national average of 49
percent males. Among the religious groups having more female adherents are the Pentecostals, Baptists,
andMainlineChristiansofwhich56%-58%arefemales.emostgenderunbalancedgroupistheNones,
those who profess no religion or self-identified as atheists or agnostics. e ratio of 60 males to 40 females
is a remarkable result. ese gender patterns correspond with many earlier findings that show women to
be more religious than men particularly in majority Christian societies. e male gender bias found among
theminorityreligioustraditionssuchasMuslimsandtheEasternReligionsisduetothehighproportionof
young immigrant males in these groups.
% Male % Female
Catholic 46 54
Baptist 43 57
Mainline Christian 44 56
Christian Generic 48 52
Pentecostal/Charismatic 42 58
Protestant Denominations 45 55
Mormon/LDS 45 55
Jewish 49 51
Eastern Religions 53 47
Muslim 52 48
NRM & Other Religions 52 48
Nones 60 40
ARIS 2008

12
ARIS 2008 Part II Demography of the Religious Traditions in 2008
Table 8.
Age Composition of the Religious Traditions 2008
Nationally 60 percent of the adult population is aged under 50 years and 40 percent is 50 or older. e
Catholic population as the country’s largest tradition is not surprisingly closest to this age balance. A close
examinationofTable8revealsthattheagecompositionofthereligioustraditionsuctuateswidelybutthe
overall tendency is again for a split between the Judeo-Christian traditions and the others towards the bottom
ofTable8.isbinarytrendisparticularlynoticeablefortheproportionofadherentsintheoldestagegroup.
Baptists and Jews have the highest proportions of adherents over 70 years of age.
e proportion of younger adherents varies more across religious traditions. e Generic Christian tradition
has the most youthful adherents among the Christian groups, which helps explain the recent growth in this
categoryofreligiousself-identicationasshowninTable3.eageproleoftheminorityEasternreligions
and Islam, which as previously noted were disproportionately male, shows they are also very young with about
40 percent of their adult adherents under age 30. is reflects their largely recent immigrant origins. e
much larger None group, which we also previously noted was heavily male, has in addition a largely young age
profile with over 70 percent under 50 years of age and very few older people.
18-29 30-49 50-69 70+ % Total
U.S. National Population 22 38 28 12 100
Catholic 21 38 28 13 100
Baptist 11 31 37 21 100
Mainline Christian 18 35 33 14 100
Christian Generic 25 41 25 9 100
Pentecostal/Charismatic 16 34 36 14 100
Protestant Denominations 22 36 28 14 100
Mormon/LDS 22 40 28 10 100
Jewish 21 28 33 18 100
Eastern Religions 37 40 20 3 100
Muslim 42 45 12 1 100
NRM & Other Religions 24 40 27 9 100
Nones 29 41 23 7 100

13
ARIS 2008 Part II Demography of the Religious Traditions in 2008
Table 9.
Marital Status of the Religious Traditions 2008
emaritalstatusofanypopulationtendstocorrelatewithorbeaectedbyitsagecomposition.usasTable8
shows,traditionssuchasMuslim,EasternReligions,andNone,withmanyyoungadherents,wouldbeexpected
to and do contain large proportions of single, never-married adults. By contrast those with an older age profile,
suchastheBaptist,Mainline,PentecostalandJewishtraditions,havemanymorewidowedpersons.
However, with the issue of marital status we would expect to see some influence on the statistics of the teachings of
the various religious traditions. is should apply especially among those that advocate the sanctity of marriage as well
as strict sexual morality and so disfavor cohabitation of couples “living in sin” - or have prohibitions against divorce.
Asregardscurrentlymarriedadults,theMormonsandBaptistshavethehighestproportionswith68and60percent
respectively, reflecting the emphasis on family values in these traditions. Cohabitation or “living with a partner” is
more prevalent among younger people than older persons so we should expect traditions with a younger age profile
to have greater proportions of those just “living together”. is appears to be true as this phenomenon is more
prevalenttowardsthebottomofTable9andhighestamongtheNRM,MuslimandNonetraditionswhileitisvery
lowamongtheMormonandconservativeProtestantDenominationtraditions.elattertwogroupsseembestable
to transmit their moral teachings to the young.
Divorceappearstobewidespreadandnoreligioustraditionisimmune,norareNonesthemostlikelytobecurrently
divorced.Catholics’divorcerateisclosetothenationalaverage.DivorceratesarelowestamongMormonsandJews,
traditionsknownfortheemphasistheyplaceonmarriedlifeandthefamily.Divorcedandseparatedpersons,on
theotherhand,aremostcommonintheNewReligionMovements,otherminorityreligions,andthePentecostal/
Charismatic tradition. Of course divorce and separation are linked to marriage for those who never marry and
remain single or cohabit cannot have this marital status.
One final way to measure commitment to “traditional or normative family values” is to create a combined index
of the proportions divorced and cohabiting, whereby those tradition that score lowest are the most familial.
etraditionswiththelowestpercentagesonthisindexareMormons(11%),Jews(13%)andtheProtestant
Denominations(13%).Eachofthesetraditionsisrelativelysmallintermsofnumbersanditmightbeexpected
that conformity with religious and social norms is easier to maintain in a smaller group than a larger one.
Single Single Married Divorced/ Widowed Don’t %
Never Living w/ Separated Know/ Total
Married Partner Refusal
U.S. National Population 25 N/A 56 13 6 0 100
Catholic 20 7 53 11 8 1 100
Baptist 13 4 60 11 12 1 100
Mainline Christian 20 6 49 14 11 0 100
Christian Generic 23 6 53 12 5 1 100
Pentecostal/ Charismatic 19 4 52 16 10 0 100
Protestant Denominations 23 2 55 11 8 1 100
Mormon/ LDS 14 2 68 9 6 1 100
Jewish 23 5 54 8 10 1 100
Eastern Religions 35 8 45 10 1 3 100
Muslim 36 11 42 10 1 0 100
NRM & Other Religions 24 13 40 16 7 1 100
None 29 11 45 11 3 1 100

Table 10.
Composition of Racial and Ethnic Groups by Religious Tradition 1990, 2001, 2008
White Non-Hispanic Black Non-Hispanic Hispanic Asian*
1990 2001 2008 1990 2001 2008 1990 2001 2008 1990 2001 2008
Catholic 27 23 21 9 7 6 66 57 59 27 20 17
Baptist 15 15 15 50 46 45 7 5 3 9 4 3
Mainline Christian 21 22 17 12 10 7 4 3 1 11 6 6
Christian Generic 17 11 15 9 10 15 8 11 11 13 11 10
Pentecostal/ 3 3 3 6 7 7 3 4 3 2 1 0
Charismatic
Protestant 2 3 3 4 4 6 2 3 4 2 1 2
Denominations
Mormon/LDS 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0
Jewish 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Eastern Religions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 22 21
Muslim 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 8 8
NRM & Other 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
Religions
None 8 15 16 6 11 11 6 13 12 16 22 27
DK/Refused 2 4 4 1 2 2 1 3 5 4 5 5
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
*Asian and Other Race combined in NSRI 1990
Part III
Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008
e interrelationship between changing patterns of religious identification and changes in other social
indicators is complex and dynamic. is third section of the report will provide three examples of social
variables--racial composition, education and geographical distribution – that help explain how and why the
findings reported in the earlier tables change over time as well as how they impact American society.
A. Racial Composition
14 ARIS 2008

e changing make-up of the U.S. population in terms of race and ethnicity is an important factor for
understanding religious patterns. Americans are becoming more diverse in terms of race and ethnic origins
and as a result there has been a growth in the size of the minority population in terms of both numbers and
percentage. e most significant change since 1990 both statistically and demographically has been the rapid
growth of the Hispanic population and to a much lesser extent the Asian population. Hispanics have replaced
African-Americans as the nation’s largest minority.
Table10doesnotmeasurethechangingbalanceofracialgroupsbutinsteadhowthepatternofreligious
identification has changed over time within these groups as religious sentiments have altered. e zeros in the
table do not mean that the cell is completely empty but that the cell contains less than 0.5 percent of the group.
eDon’tKnow/RefusedrowofthetableprovidesaninsightintothenatureofAmericansocietyandhow
different ethnic groups relate to religion. As mentioned earlier there is a growing reluctance to participate in
surveys but the table seems to reveal a trend towards decreasing racial differentiation. Nevertheless, African-
Americans, long considered the most religious group in society, continue to have fewer inhibitions about
discussing religion while Asians, the least religious group, are the most unwilling to reveal their religious
identification.
Historically there have been major differences in the religious allegiances among Americans along racial lines.
etoprowofTable10showsthatCatholicismlostgroundwithineveryethnicgroupbetween1990and2008.
If the Hispanic population, which is the most Catholic, had not expanded then the Catholic population share
nationally would have significantly eroded. One feature of the white population today is in fact the large number
of ex-Catholics, who are now found among the Nones and have helped that group grow. e overall pattern of
identification among whites other than for Catholics and Nones seems relatively stable over time. Another feature
revealed is that the rapid proportionate growth of the Nones among whites was a 1990s phenomenon while the
fastdeclineinwhiteMainlineChristiansisamorerecenttrend.
Among the black or African-American population the main trend in the 1990s was similar to that of whites, a
move into the Nones, in this case mostly by former Baptists. Since 2001 the main movement in self-identification
hasbeentowardsaGenericChristianidentityandslightlytotheconservativeProtestantDenominations
tradition.ereisalsomovementoutoftheMainlinetradition,whichinthiscaseismainlytheAfrican
Methodistchurches.
e Hispanic religious profile reflects changes brought about by immigration particularly since 2001. e
evidence for this is that we found significant differences between our respondents interviewed in English and
those who chose to be interviewed in Spanish. Spanish speakers are much more likely to be Catholic, while
English-speakingHispanicsaremorelikelytoidentifyasBaptistorMainliners.Interestinglythereisnotmuch
difference in the proportions of Nones by language preference. ough the percentages do not show it, the
doublinginthenumberofHispanicsidentifyingwiththeProtestantDenominationssince1990isquitelargein
terms of real numbers.
e religious profile of Asian Americans has also changed over time mainly as a result of immigration especially
as the source countries of immigration have changed. e entry of Chinese, Koreans and Indian immigrants
has diminished the Catholic proportion since 1990. e main trend in the 1990s was towards a greater share for
Eastern Religions but this has now slowed. In contrast the share of the Nones among Asians has continually and
steadily grown since 1990.
Inconclusion,Table10demonstratesthatthehistoricaltrendofmajorreligiousdierencesbetweenAmericans
of different racial and ethnic origins still seems to persist even as the internal patterns are modified by changes in
religious outlook and sentiment.
15
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008

16
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008
Table 11.
Percentage of College Graduates in the Population Age 25 and Over
by Religious Tradition 1990-2008
1990 2008
U.S. National Population 21 27
Catholic 22 25
Baptist 11 16
Mainline Christian 26 35
Christian Generic 22 26
Pentecostal/Charismatic 9 13
Protestant Denominations 13 21
Mormon/LDS 22 31
Jewish 50 57
Eastern Religions 44 59
Muslim 41 35
NRM & Other Religions 35 33
None 28 31
DK/Refused 29 31
B. Education
Aside from differences in religious profiles by race another major historical feature of American religion has been
differences in terms of social class. A good measure of class in a meritocratic society is education, particularly
the attainment of a college degree. e overall level of educational attainment has improved in U.S. society in
recent decades so that in 2008 more than one-fourth of American adults age 25 and over are college graduates.
AsTable11showsnearlyeveryreligioustraditionhasmadeadvancessince1990withtheexceptionofMuslims
andNRMs.Neverthelessdierentreligioustraditionsattractorperhapsproducedierentproportionsofcollege
graduates.Interestingly,asidefromMainlineChristians,thedomainoftheold“WASP”elite,alltheChristian
groups have a smaller proportion of well-educated individuals than the Non-Christian traditions as of 2008.
Since 1990 the best educated groups, the Jews and those in Eastern Religions, have made advances and so
continuedtoattract,retainorproducegraduates.eMuslimsandNRMshavelostsomeground.Incontrast
the Pentecostals and Baptists have considerably improved their proportions of graduates though from a low base.
eMormonstoohavemadeconsiderableheadwaysince1990.AnothersignicantndingisthattheNones
are only slightly better educated than the average American. is may reflect the changing make up of the
population of Nones, as a wider spectrum of people are choosing this option.
One caveat is required here. In terms of statistical probability it is much more likely for small religious groups to
show educational homogeneity than for large ones to do so. erefore, it is not surprising that the Catholic and
Generic Christian traditions with tens of millions of adherents tend to mirror the overall national proportions of
college graduates while groups with only two or three million adherents do not.

17
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008
C. Geography and Religion
evastarrayofgeographicdataavailablefromARISshowninTable12demonstrateshowtheAmerican
religiousmaphasbeenredrawnatthestate,CensusDivisionandregionallevelsbetween1990and2008.
In order to follow these changes over time it is necessary to return to an analysis based upon the five main
religiousblocsusedinTables1and2.epaceanddirectionofchangevariesacrossthesespatialunitsbut
the decrease in the share of the combined total Christian population occurred in every region of the country
over the past two decades.
elargeblocofOtherChristians,i.e.non-Catholics,declinednationallyfrom60%in1990tojust51%of
theadultpopulationin2008yetintheWestitdeclinedfasterfrom54percentto42percent.InCalifornia
theproportionofOtherChristiansdroppedfrom49%in1990tojust35%in2008.eabsolutenumber
of Other Christians —not just their share of the population--fell despite major population growth in the state
during the 18-year period.
CatholicnumbersandpercentagesroseinmanystatesintheSouthandWestmainlyduetoimmigration
fromLatinAmerica.CatholicsincreasedtheirshareinCaliforniaandTexastoaboutone-thirdoftheadult
population and in Florida to over one-fourth. In terms of numbers they gained about 8 million adherents in
these three states in the past two decades. At the same time the proportion of Catholics was eroded in other
parts of the country, mainly in the Northeast Region, where Catholic adherents fell from 43 percent to 36
percent of the adult population. New England had a net loss of one million Catholics. Big losses in both
thenumberofCatholicadherentsandtheirproportionoccurredalsoinMassachusetts,andinRhodeIsland,
the nation’s most heavily Catholic state where the proportion of Catholics dropped from 62 percent to 46
percent.NewYorkstatelost800,000Catholicsandtheydroppedfrom44%to37%oftheadultpopulation.
e most significant influence on American religious geography over time has been the increase in the Nones,
or No Religion bloc. As noted earlier, nationally the Nones more than doubled in numbers from 1990 to
2008andalmostdoubledtheirshareoftheadultpopulation,from8%in1990to15%in2008.Moreover,
theNonesincreasedinnumbersandproportionineverystate,CensusDivisionandRegionofthecountry
from 1990 to 2008. No other religious bloc has kept such a pace in every state.
NoneshavehistoricallybeenconcentratedintheWestregionandparticularlyinthePacicNorthwest(i.e.
OregonandWashington),wherenowtheyaccountforaboutone-quarterofthepopulation.However,
this pattern has now changed and the Northeast emerged in 2008 as the new stronghold of the religiously
unidentied.In2008Vermontreached34%Nones,NewHampshire29%,Maine25%,andMassachusetts
22%.AsurgeintheproportionofNonesalsooccurredintheMountainStatesofColorado,Idaho,Nevada
andWyoming(28percent)in2008.
An intriguing research question we intend to explore further is the relationship between the two phenomena,
the relative decline of the combined Christian population and the increase in Nones. ere appear to be
regional differences at play. e data presented in this report show that changing patterns of religious self-
identification by gender, age, race, and region can help to explain this important and recent phenomenon. An
in-depth investigation of religious switching will shed further light on the doubling of the Nones during this
period.

18
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008
Table 12.
Religious Self-Identification of US Adult Population by Census Region,
Census Division, and State, 1990 and 2008
NORTHEAST REGION
New England Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
CT
1990 50 36 3 6 4 100
2008 38 36 8 14 4 100
MA
1990 54 29 6 8 3 100
2008 39 26 5 22 7 100
ME
1990 31 54 2 11 2 100
2008 22 47 3 25 4 100
NH
1990 41 44 4 9 2 100
2008 32 30 2 29 7 100
RI
1990 62 26 3 6 3 100
2008 46 28 2 19 5 100
VT
1990 37 47 3 13 1 100
2008 26 29 4 34 6 100
Division 1990 50 35 4 8 3 100
Total 2008 36 32 5 22 6 100
Middle Atlantic Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
NJ
1990 46 40 6 6 3 100
2008 42 30 7 15 6 100
NY
1990 44 36 10 7 3 100
2008 37 34 8 14 6 100
PA
1990 33 56 3 6 2 100
2008 31 46 4 15 4 100
Division 1990 41 43 7 6 3 100
Total 2008 36 38 6 15 5 100
Region 1990 43 41 6 7 3 100
Total 2008 36 36 6 17 5 100

Table 12. (continued)
Religious Self-Identification of US Adult Population by Census Region,
Census Division, and State, 1990 and 2008
MIDWEST REGION
East North Central Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
IL
1990 33 53 3 8 3 100
2008 32 45 3 13 6 100
IN
1990 19 69 1 8 2 100
2008 19 59 3 15 4 100
MI
1990 29 57 3 9 2 100
2008 20 55 3 16 5 100
OH
1990 24 64 2 8 2 100
2008 20 56 3 17 4 100
WI
1990 39 52 2 6 2 100
2008 29 47 4 15 5 100
Division 1990 29 59 2 8 2 100
Total 2008 24 53 3 15 5 100
West North Central Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
IA
1990 22 69 1 7 1 100
2008 22 54 4 15 5 100
KS
1990 17 74 1 6 2 100
2008 21 61 3 11 5 100
MN
1990 29 61 2 6 2 100
2008 29 51 4 12 5 100
MO
1990 20 69 1 7 2 100
2008 18 61 3 14 5 100
ND
1990 30 65 0 2 3 100
2008 28 62 0 7 4 100
NE
1990 29 60 2 7 2 100
2008 22 53 3 17 6 100
SD
1990 26 69 1 4 1 100
2008 19 59 4 12 5 100
Division 1990 24 67 1 6 2 100
Total 2008 23 57 3 13 5 100
Region 1990 27 61 2 7 2 100
Total 2008 23 54 3 15 5 100
19
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008

Table 12. (continued)
Religious Self-Identification of US Adult Population by Census Region,
Census Division, and State, 1990 and 2008
SOUTH REGION
South Atlantic Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
DC
1990 16 71 4 7 2 100
2008 13 59 6 18 4 100
DE
1990 26 59 1 7 6 100
2008 26 48 1 23 2 100
FL
1990 23 62 5 8 2 100
2008 27 49 4 14 6 100
GA
1990 6 86 2 5 1 100
2008 9 72 4 9 6 100
MD
1990 25 61 4 8 2 100
2008 27 49 6 13 5 100
NC
1990 6 86 1 5 2 100
2008 9 73 2 10 6 100
SC
1990 6 88 1 3 2 100
2008 10 73 2 10 4 100
VA
1990 12 76 3 7 2 100
2008 11 65 4 15 5 100
WV
1990 6 83 1 8 2 100
2008 7 70 2 15 5 100
Division 1990 14 74 3 7 2 100
Total 2008 17 61 4 13 5 100
East South Central Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
AL
1990 4 89 1 4 1 100
2008 6 80 1 11 3 100
KY
1990 13 77 1 7 2 100
2008 14 66 1 13 5 100
MS
1990 7 88 1 3 1 100
2008 11 80 1 5 3 100
TN
1990 5 87 1 6 2 100
2008 7 76 3 9 5 100
Division 1990 7 85 1 5 1 100
Total 2008 9 75 2 10 4 100
20
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008

Table 12. (continued)
Religious Self-Identification of US Adult Population by Census Region,
Census Division, and State, 1990 and 2008
SOUTH REGION
West South Central Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
AR
1990 5 85 1 6 3 100
2008 8 79 1 8 3 100
LA
1990 47 49 1 3 1 100
2008 31 57 1 8 3 100
OK
1990 8 79 2 7 4 100
2008 7 73 2 11 6 100
TX
1990 23 68 2 5 2 100
2008 32 48 2 12 6 100
Division 1990 23 68 2 5 2 100
Total 2008 27 55 2 11 5 100
Region 1990 16 74 2 6 2 100
Total 2008 19 62 3 12 5 100
21
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008

22
ARIS 2008 Part III Religious Identification and Social Change 1990-2008
Table 12. (continued)
Religious Self-Identification of US Adult Population by Census Region,
Census Division, and State, 1990 and 2008
WEST REGION
Mountain Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
AZ
1990 24 57 3 13 3 100
2008 29 44 5 17 5 100
CO
1990 25 56 4 13 3 100
2008 21 49 4 21 5 100
ID
1990 12 72 1 13 3 100
2008 10 59 3 23 6 100
MT
1990 28 58 1 11 3 100
2008 12 58 4 21 5 100
NM
1990 37 48 2 11 2 100
2008 33 41 3 16 7 100
NV
1990 24 56 4 14 2 100
2008 23 41 4 24 7 100
UT
1990 6 81 1 9 3 100
2008 7 71 1 14 7 100
WY
1990 18 56 9 14 3 100
2008 13 54 1 28 3 100
Division 1990 23 59 3 12 3 100
Total 2008 22 50 4 19 6 100
Pacific Division
State Year Catholics Other Other Nones DK/Refused % TOTAL
Christians Religions
CA
1990 29 49 5 14 3 100
2008 37 35 5 18 5 100
OR
1990 15 62 2 18 2 100
2008 14 52 3 24 7 100
WA
1990 19 60 2 15 3 100
2008 16 48 5 25 6 100
Division 1990 27 51 4 15 3 100
Total 2008 32 39 5 20 5 100
Region 1990 26 54 4 14 3 100
Total 2008 29 42 5 20 5 100

Appendix A
e Taxonomy of the Religious Traditions
e long list of religious classifications supplied by ARIS respondents’ calls for a shorter, more manageable
listformostanalyticalpurposes.erefore,forTable3theARISrespondentshavebeencollatedintothe
following 13 religious groupings of varying sizes:
1. Catholic: Roman, Greek and Eastern Rites.
2. Mainline Christian: Methodist, United Methodist, African Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian,
Episcopalian/Anglican, United Church of Christ/Congregational, Reformed/Dutch Reform, Disciples of
Christ, Moravian, Quaker, Orthodox (Greek, Russian, Eastern, Christian)
3. Baptist: including Southern Baptist, American Baptist, Free-Will, Missionary, and African-American
denominations.
4. Christian Generic: Christian, Protestant, Evangelical/ Born Again Christian, Born Again,
Fundamentalist, Independent Christian, Missionary Alliance Church, Non-Denominational Christian.
5. Pentecostal/Charismatic: Pentecostal, Assemblies of God, Full Gospel, Four Square Gospel, Church of
God, Holiness, Nazarene, Salvation Army.
6. Protestant Denomination: Churches of Christ, Seventh Day Adventist, Mennonite, Brethren, Apostle,
Covenant, Christian Reform, Jehovah’s Witness, Christian Science, Messianic Jews.
7. Mormon/ Latter Day Saints
8. Jewish/Judaism
9. Eastern Religions: Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist, Baha’i, Shintoist, Zoroastrian, Sikh.
10. Muslim/Islam
11. New Religious Movements and Other Religions: Scientology, New Age, Eckankar, Spiritualist,
Unitarian-Universalist, Deist, Wiccan, Pagan, Druid, Indian Religion, Santeria, Rastafarian.
12. Nones: None, No religion, Humanistic, Ethical Culture, Agnostic, Atheist, Secular.
13. Refused: Don’t Know.
23
ARIS 2008

Appendix B
e Authors
Dr. Barry A. KosministheFoundingDirectoroftheInstitutefortheStudyofSecularisminSocietyand
Culture(ISSSC)andResearchProfessor,PublicPolicy&LawProgramatTrinityCollege.Asociologist,
Dr.KosminhasbeenaprincipalinvestigatorofmanylargenationalsocialsurveysinEurope,Africa,Asia
and the U.S. including the 1990 National Survey of Religious Identification, the American Religious
IdenticationSurveysof2001and2008andtherecentWorldviewsandOpinionsofScientists-India
2007-08(http://www.worldviewsofscientists.org).
Dr. Ariela Keysar,ademographer,isAssociateProfessor,PublicPolicy&LawProgramatTrinityCollege
andtheAssociateDirectoroftheInstitutefortheStudyofSecularisminSocietyandCulture.Sheisa
principalinvestigatoroftheAmericanReligiousIdenticationSurvey2008andtherecentWorldviews
andOpinionsofScientists-India2007-08.Dr.KeysarwastheStudyDirectoroftheAmericanReligious
Identification Survey 2001. She is the co-author, Religion in a Free Market: Religious and Non-Religious
Americans,ParamountMarketPublications,Ithaca,N.Y.,2006.
24
Program on Public Values
Mark Silk, Director
Trinity College
300 Summit Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06106
USA
Phone: (860) 297-2381
E-mail: isssc@trincoll.edu
www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org
© Copyright ISSSC 2009
ARIS 2008 was made possible by grants from Lilly Endowment, Inc. and the Posen Foundation.
The Program on Public Values comprises the Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture
and the Leonard E. Greenberg Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life.
ARIS 2008