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" I Went as Far as My Money Would Take Me": Conflict, Forced Migration and Class

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... Most IDPs have been displaced multiple times. When it comes to forced displacement, the most frequently discussed push and pull factors in the literature are: violence (Weiner, 1996;Shellman, 2006, 2007;Steele, 2009) economic circumstances (Schmeidl, 1997;Neumayer, 2005;Van Hear, 2006) and intellectual networks (Schmeidl, 1997;Davenport et al., 2003;Wood, 2008;Edwards, 2009). Armed conflicts, political violence or persecution are the main causes of forced immigration for most (Zolberg et al., 1992;Schmeidl, 1997;Davenport et al., 2003;Moore and Shellman, 2004;Melander and Öberg, 2007). ...
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More than half of the Syrian population has been displaced as a result of war, this paper sets out to understand the scale of displacement, its distribution, as well as, its driving factors. This paper seeks to analyse the correlation between institutions, social capital, economy and so. The most statistically significant factor was Mortality Rate. Displaced persons appear to seek to settle in areas less affected by conflict. The second strong association was the ‘Social Relationships’ indicator, where displacement rates are associated with low social capital areas. It seems that retrospectively the stresses that the arrival of migrants’ place on the host society has fragmented social ties. This tension between the displaced people and the host community is well documented. The degradation of institutional performance, the absence of legal authority, along the severe violation of rights, discrimination, and systematic looting are among the main factors that forced people to evacuate their cities and towns. Governance levels and institutional performance were found to be positively associated with displacement rates showing that people move to areas with lower rates of discrimination, corruption, and lawlessness. Living Conditions were found to be the next significant factor, indicating that displaced persons seek places that have better services such as communications, transportation, electricity, water, and employment. Another important factor was Human Development, as people are attracted to areas with higher levels of human development like good education infrastructure with higher-quality teaching staff and higher rates of enrolment. social variables with rates of forced displacement and migration. Understanding the determinants of displacement is important so as to predict future displacements.
... Refugees engaged in creating a middle-class image of their occupation and drew classed boundaries within the industry they worked in. Moreover, several studies delineate that a refugee remains a 'classed' person (McSpadden, 1999: 251;Van Hear, 2006), that the start in the receiving society is dependent on one's socioeconomic background and can cause frustration and misrecognition if one cannot hold on to one's middle-or upper-class background (Kleist, 2010: 198), and that it is challenging to transfer a celebrated social status from one's country of origin to the country of resettlement (Jansen, 2008: 182). McSpadden's (1999: 251) analysis of the impact of class on constructions of masculinities in forced migration contexts shows the relevance of class and status for men's judgement of 'good' and 'bad' lives. ...
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Various studies have shown that since the late 20th century, Cuban migration follows global patterns of feminisation. As more Cuban women migrate during their reproductive years, fertility rates have decreased in the island, resulting in the shrinking of the youth population relative to older adults. Both the lack and unequal distribution of care services for older adults and the shrinking welfare services suggest an impending crisis; and the failure of social policy to anticipate these problems and plan accordingly further aggravates it. The result is an uneven landscape, particularly within a general context of social stratification, with some sectors and geographical areas facing greater hardships than others. In this Chapter we delve onto these issues to analyse the relationship between international migration patterns and both, population ageing and the crisis of elderly care in Cuba.
... Even so, and whatever the true reasons behind the adopted policies, the return of Syrian refugees is and will still be premature as long as the Syrian regime will not clearly express its will to welcome them, guarantee their safety, and ensure the availability of services and livelihood opportunities for them. Moreover, as it has been proven in previous studies (Van Hear 2006;Massey 2010), increasing refugees' vulnerability prohibits them from resettling or returning to their country of Policies of Exclusion 447 origin. Future prospects are that the fragility of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, a country now facing bankruptcy and the collapse of its political system, will be further increased. ...
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When the Syrian war erupted in 2011, the Lebanese government withdrew from managing the influx of Syrian refugees. Three years later, Lebanon’s Council of Ministers set new regulations for Syrians with the purpose of reducing access to territory and persuading refugees to leave the country. This article analyses the reasons for and the outcomes of Lebanon’s response to the refugee crisis before and after 2014. It then examines, through a qualitative exploratory approach and based on two longitudinal case studies, the impact of Lebanese regulations. In both cases, the so-called ‘temporary gatherings’ became permanent settlements beyond the government’s control. The government’s strategy backfired: in attempting to avoid ghettos, it created them. We conclude that when refugee situations become protracted, most efforts aimed at excluding refugees fail. Excluding refugees increases their vulnerability and reduces their chances of repatriation or resettlement. To prevent this, we argue that hosting policies must lead to the temporary integration of refugees within urban systems and public institutions.
... While the decisions people make reflect the resources that they, their family and community control, the culture of migration includes material and non-material factors that may increase or decrease insecurity as well. The clearest example of the insecure mover is the refugee who is forced to flee her or his home in response to the threat or reality of violence (Sirkeci 2006b;Van Hear 2006). Moving beyond this narrow view, we argue that insecurity can take many different forms and that it typically extends to include all movers as they balance their desires and abilities against the demands of family, home and community, against the pressures of state and global programmes and against their fears of the border, of their reception at their destination and of the challenges of settlement (Sirkeci 2009). ...
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This paper studies long‐term trends and patterns in global refugee migration. We explore the intensity, spread, and distance of refugee migration at a global, regional, and country level between 1951 and 2018. The analysis did not detect a long‐term increase in the global intensity of refugee migration. Primarily depending on levels of conflict, refugee numbers have fluctuated at levels of between 0.1 and 0.3 percent of the world population. Apparent increases in numbers of the globally displaced are driven by the inclusion of populations and countries that were previously excluded from the data. While refugee populations continue to be concentrated in countries with low‐to‐medium income levels, the analysis reveals several geographic shifts in refugee migration. Refugees tend to come from a shrinking number of origin countries and move to an increasing variety of destination countries. This trend seems to reflect a concentration of recurrent conflict cycles in a relatively small number of countries and a parallel increase in the number of safe destinations. Although the vast majority of refugees remain near to origin countries, the average distance between origin and destination countries has increased over time, presumably linked to the greater ease of travel and migration‐facilitating networks.
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It is a poorly kept humanitarian secret that wherever food aid is given, it is also sold, as recipients seek to vary their diets to include culturally desired food, start businesses, or deal with economic shocks. This holds true in Nyarugusu refugee camp in Tanzania, the site of this research. While this article addresses the supply side of the World Food Programme resale system, its main focus is the demand side, providing one of the first in‐depth studies on what happens after the sale. Engaging with the political and development anthropology literature on brokers, the author introduces the intermediaries who make up this system, including low‐level madalali brokers and refugee and Tanzanian ‘bosses’. There is agreement within brokerage research of the moral ‘ambiguity’ or ‘ambivalence’ of these figures, a nebulous quality that is heightened by the seemingly innumerable different types of brokers. This article contends that a Marxian conceptualization of social class, beyond Bourdieu's widely applied social capital theory, is productive in understanding the threat of violence that a small cartel of bosses has set up in collusion with Tanzanian police to maintain the exploitative food aid resale pyramid. Members of this elite class are, in turn, ‘products and producers’ of a structurally violent encampment and aid system.
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When people flee conflict or persecution, a common pattern is for most to seek safety in other parts of their country, for a substantial number to look for refuge in a neighbouring country or countries, and for a smaller number to seek asylum in countries further afield, perhaps in other continents. If displacement persits and people consolidate themselves in their territories of refuge, complex relations will develop among these different domains of what we may call the refugee diaspora: that is, among those at home, those in neighbouring territories, and those spread further afield. Each of these domains corresponds to some extent to one of the locations or sites associated with the three 'durable solutions' that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is charged with pursuing for refugees: integration in the country of first asylum, resettlement in a third country, or return to the homeland. Taking its cue from the burgeoning literature on diasporas and transnationalism, this paper looks at some of the shortcomings of the notion of 'durable solutions' and offers a simple schema for considering diaspora and transnational relations that may transcend the thinking underlying this notion. The Afghan, Palestinian and Sri Lankan refugee diasporas are considered in the light of this schema, and transnational connections among some displaced households in Sri Lanka are highlighted. The paper concludes by exploring how transnationalism might be considered in itself as an 'enduring' if not a 'durable' solution to displacement.