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... 9 A descriptive name is a name that is stipulated to refer to whoever satisfies a particular definite description, such as 'Julius' which is arbitrarily assigned to pick out the inventor of the zipper in Evans's famous example (Evans, 1982). 10 The dthat operator, introduced by David Kaplan, turns any arbitrary singular term into a directly referring singular term, in such a way that the description serves only to pick out the referent, rather than contributing to the content of thoughts and utterances containing the dthat expression (Kaplan, 1979, 1989a, 1989b). 11 Deferred demonstratives and pronouns involve the use of contextual information to indicate a referent of a demonstrative or pronoun other than the demonstrated object. ...
In this article, I argue that in typical cases of singular thought, a thinker stands in an evidential relation to the object of thought suitable for providing knowledge of the object's existence. Furthermore, a thinker may generate representations that purport to refer to particular objects in response to appropriate, though defeasible, evidence of the existence of such an object. I motivate these constraints by considering a number of examples introduced by Robin Jeshion in support of a view she calls ‘cognitivism’ (Jeshion, 2010b). Although I agree with Jeshion that acquaintance is not required for all cases of singular thought, I argue that her account doesn't go far enough in rejecting semantic instrumentalism, the view that we can generate singular thoughts arbitrarily, by manipulating the mechanisms of direct reference.
In this paper, I shall defend externalism for the contents of perceptual experience. A perceptual experience has representational properties; it presents the world as being a certain way. A visual experience, for example, might present the world to a subject as containing a surface with a certain shape, lying at a certain distance, in a certain direction; perhaps a square with sides about 30 cm, lying about one metre in front of the subject, in a direction about 20 degrees to the left of straight ahead.
In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)"—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT (the language-of-thought hypothesis) provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (Fodor, LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.
The logical positivists invoked various notions of analyticity, or "truth by convention," to explain the special modal and epistemological character of logic and mathematics, as well as of other nonempirically based assertions. The central idea of at least one version of the argument is that the postulates of, for example, arithmetic, do not describe independently existing fact, and instead constitute linguistic conventions, which represent decisions to use expressions in a certain way, with such-and-such meaning. Such decisions are "conventions" in the sense that alternatives were available and furthermore the choices made among the alternatives do not require epistemic justification. Rather, they are to be justified on pragmatic grounds.1 On reflection, the fundamental claim that the postulates of arithmetic (or of any other subject) require no epistemic justification is really quite puzzling. In fact, conventionalism is based on serious philosophical errors. A linguistic convention which is supposed to be justified pragmatically rather than epistemically is not strictly a piece of cognitive information at all. It is not a truth or a fact; it is a decision, a commitment, a resolve. It is precisely because one's stipulations are in this way prescriptive rather than descriptive, that the justification for their adoption is pragmatic rather than epistemic. This feature already poses a significant challenge for the conventionalist account of the arithmetic postulates and of other a priori statements (statements whose contents are knowable independently of experience). The famous Peano Postulates, for example, describe paradigmatic facts concerning natural numbers; it is generally presumed that they state necessary facts that are knowable a priori. Linguistic conventions, while they are not themselves facts, do of course create, or give rise to, facts. That a particular expression, 'successor' for example, has the meaning it does -even when that meaning was secured by explicit stipulation-is every bit a knowable fact. But the linguistic convention per se, the resolve to use the
Etude du probleme de la connaissance a priori de la verite contingente, necessaire a la fixation de la reference et a la signification d'un terme. Selon Kripke et Mill, l'A. etablit le critere descriptiviste et le critere du privilege epistemique de la fixation de la reference.
In this paper, I argue for an account of metaphorical content as what is said when a speaker utters a metaphor. First, I show that two other possibilities—the Gricean account of metaphor as implicature and the strictly semantic account developed by Josef Stern—face several serious problems. In their place, I propose an account that takes metaphorical content to cross-cut the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This requires re-thinking the notion of metaphorical content, as well as the relation between the metaphorical and the literal.
Analyse de la dialectique de l'argument de la concevabilite utilise par les anti-materialistes contre la these materialiste de la continuite entre le physique et le mental. Examinant la relation entre la concevabilite et la possibilite et d'autres intuitions modales dont depend l'applicabilite de l'argument de la concevabilite au probleme esprit-corps, l'A. critique l'argument anti-materialiste standard fonde sur la notion de qualia et le modele de la propriete distincte concernant l'explication de l'ignorance a priori de l'identite, d'une part, et presente une nouvelle strategie fondee sur l'argument de la connaissance de l'identite et sur l'argument de l'explication, d'autre part
As a class of terms and mental representations, proper names and mental names possess an important function that outstrips their semantic and psycho-semantic functions as common, rigid devices of direct reference and singular mental representations of their referents, respectively. They also function as abstract linguistic markers that signal and underscore their referents' individuality. I promote this thesis to explain why we give proper names to certain particulars, but not others; to account for the transfer of singular thought via communication with proper names; and, more generally, to support a cognitivist, not acquaintance or instrumentalist, theory of singular thought.
This paper considers the debate over how we attribute beliefs, desires, and other mental states to our fellows. Do we employ a theory of mind? Or do we use simulational brain mechanisms, but employ no theory? One point of dispute between these theories focuses upon our ability to have empathic knowledge of the mind of another. I consider whether an argument posed by Ravenscroft settles the debate in favor of Simulation Theory. I suggest that the consideration of empathy does not settle the dispute. Then I look at recent results from false memory research and other research employing neural imaging. I suggest that new discoveries there may help shape the future of the empirical dimension of the debate.
There are two interpretations of what it means for a singular term to be referentially direct, one truth-conditional and the other cognitive. It has been argued that on the former interpretation, both proper names and indexicals refer directly, whereas on the latter only proper names are directly referential. However, these interpretations in fact apply to the same singular terms. This paper argues that, if conceived in purely normative terms, the linguistic meaning of indexicals can no longer be held to make these terms referentially indirect under the second interpretation. This result is then generalized to proper names, by ascribing them a normative meaning as well.
L'A. mesure la plausibilite de la premisse principale de l'argument de la connaissance developpe par F. Jackson en faveur d'un physicalisme objectif. Soulevant la question des experiences visuelles de la couleur, d'une part, et examinant les differentes objections epistemiques et semantiques opposees au cas Mary par D. Dennett, D. Kaplan et D. Lewis, d'autre part, l'A. montre que la conception traditionnelle du physicalisme est compatible avec la these des faits nouveaux defendue par Jackson
Hybrid accounts of folk psychology maintain that we sometimes theorize and sometimes simulate in order to understand others.
An important question is why this is the case. In this paper, I present a view according to which simulation, but not theory,
plays a central role in empathy. In contrast to others taking a similar approach to simulation, I do not focus on empathy’s
cognitive aspect, but stress its affective-motivational one. Simulating others’ emotions usually engages our motivations altruistically.
By vicariously feeling what others are feeling, we directly come to be motivated by their projects and concerns. Simulation contrasts with more theoretical approaches to psychological
attribution that help us understand and explan others, but that do not move us altruistically. This helps us see why we would
posit two different folk psychological approaches instead of merely one.
In short, the situation regarding language and the passage of time is this. A person may consistently hold either of the two views concerning time's special treatment in our ordinary language, LP and LNP, provided that that person holds the appropriate view from among several semantical views available. Each of these different semantical views, in turn, can be consistently maintained in such a way that it is not susceptible to arguments from the other side, provided that these arguments do not appeal to metaphysical considerations. But of course advocates of either The Linguistic Argument For SPT or The Linguistic Argument Against SPT may not appeal to metaphysical claims in defense of either LNP or LP, since these allegedly linguistic theses are to be used in arguments designed to prove just such metaphysical claims. Moreover, if the different parties to the dispute between LP and LNP do appeal to metaphysical considerations, then they may be able to develop non-circular, non-question-begging arguments for their respective linguistic theses. What those metaphysical considerations might be, and what arguments might be developed from them, are important topics to be considered, but I will not consider them here. The point of this paper has been to show that those who wish to debate the question of whether time passes cannot settle the debate merely by discussing linguistic matters.
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle l'approche reponse-dependante des notions morales et autres attributs normatifs -tels que le mal- s'apparente, d'un point de vue ontologique, a une forme d'objectivisme. Ceci ne s'applique qu'au cas des approches reponses-dependantes rigides, les approches non-rigides etant non-objectives
In this paper we propose a formal theory of metaphors called Constrained Semantic Transference [CST]. We start from the assumptions that metaphors are characterized by the description of one domain, called the target domain, in terms of another domain, called the source domain; and that a metaphor works by transferring a set of structural relationships from the source domain to the target domain coherently.
Starting from these assumptions, we formally define the concept of T-MAPs which are partial coherent mappings from the source domain to the target domain. We also define two operators, called Augmentation and Positing Structure that extend a given T-MAP by adding new structure to the target domain.
We show how T-MAPs can be used to characterize metaphorical interpretations of a given set of sentences. This characterization allows several cognitive features of metaphors to be described in CST. In particular, our characterization uses the same criterion for deciding metaphorical truth as for literal truths.
My primary goal in this paper is to focus attention on a certain conception of internal access, on the Cartesian conception that a rational subject's capacity to determine sameness and difference in explicit propositional attitudes is independent of knowledge of the external world. This conception of introspection plays a crucial, if unacknowledged, role in numerous arguments and theoretical positions. In particular, it plays a large role in motivating psychological internalism. I argue in favor of rejecting this epistemology and the internalism it supports.
Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence
of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is,
sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions.
If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal,
identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts
simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with
the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence
supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular
Kripke’s own.
Fodor has launched many arguments in Aunty’s direction since The Language of Thought (1975), and the assault has not ceased. Even since Psychosemantics (1987a), there has been Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1988) attack on connectionism and its followers, amongst whom they number—qua “NewConnectionist Groupie” (Fodor 1987a,p. 139)—Aunty.
This article focuses on the problem of representational content. Accounting for representational content is the central issue in contemporary naturalism: it is the major remaining task facing a naturalistic conception of the world. Representational content is also the central barrier to contemporary cognitive science and artificial intelligence: it is not possible to understand representation in animals nor to construct machines with genuine representation given current (lack of) understanding of what representation is. An elaborated critique is offered to current approaches to representation, arguing that the basic underlying approach is, at root, logically incoherent, and, thus, that standard approaches are doomed to failure. An alternative model of representation— interactivism is presented that avoids or solves the problems facing standard approaches. Interactivism is framed by a version of functionalism, and a naturalization of that functionalism completes an outline of a naturalization of representation and representational content.
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