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ISSUEBRIEF
Date
IssueBrief#
Better‐DefinedRightsand
ResponsibilitiesinMarine
AdaptationPolicy
JamesN.Sanchirico
December2009
IssueBrief09‐12
2SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
ResourcesfortheFuture
ResourcesfortheFutureisanindependent,nonpartisanthink
tankthat,throughitssocialscienceresearch,enables
policymakersandstakeholderstomakebetter,more
informeddecisionsaboutenergy,environmental,natural
resource,andpublichealthissues.Headquarteredin
Washington,DC,itsresearchscopecomprisesprogramsin
nationsaroundtheworld.
1SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
Better‐DefinedRightsandResponsibilitiesin
MarineAdaptationPolicy
JamesN.Sanchirico1
AsdefinedbytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,adaptationincludesasetof
actionstomoderateharmorexploitbeneficialopportunitiesinresponsetoclimatechange.To
date,littleresearchhasaddressedpublicpolicyoptionstoframethenation’sapproachtoadaptto
achangingclimate.Inlightofscientificevidenceofextremeandunpredictableclimatechange,
prudentpolicyrequiresconsiderationofwhattodoifmarketsandpeoplefailtoanticipatethese
changes,orareconstrainedintheirabilitytoreact.Thisissuebriefisoneinaseriesthatresults
fromthesecondphaseofadomesticadaptationresearchprojectconductedbyResourcesforthe
Future.Thebriefsareprimarilyintendedforusebydecisionmakersinconfrontingthecomplexand
difficulttaskofeffectivelyadaptingtheUnitedStatestoclimatechangeimpacts,butmayalso
offerinsightandvaluetoscholarsandthegeneralpublic.Thisresearchwassupportedbyagrant
fromtheSmith‐RichardsonFoundation.
PolicyRecommendations
Twoelementsarekeytomarineenvironmentadaptationpolicy.Onecentersonrightsand
responsibilities,andtheotherongovernance.
Afirststepincreatinganadaptationportfolioformarineandcoastalresourceswouldbeto
establishbetter‐definedrightsandresponsibilitiesforcommercialandrecreationalfisheries.
z Adaptationwillbeenhancedthemorethatthoseholdingtherightshaveflexibilityin
choosingthescale,location,andmethodsofoperation.
………………………………….
1JamesN.Sanchirico,DepartmentofEnvironmentalScienceandPolicy,UniversityofCalifornia,Davis;jsanchirico@ucdavis.edu;and
UniversityFellow,ResourcesfortheFuture.
2SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
z Implementationofrights‐basedprogramsshouldnotbedelayeduntiltheimpactsofclimate
changeonmarinepopulationsarebetterunderstood,becauseexperienceshowsthatrights‐
basedinstitutionshaveadaptedovertimewithchangingenvironmental,social,and
economicconditions.
z Ancillarybenefitsofrights‐basedmeasuresincludeasourceoffunds(royaltyandcost‐
recoveryfees)forresearchonthepotentialimpactsofclimatechange.
Asecondstepwouldbetoestablishabroaderoceangovernanceframeworkthatincludes
comprehensiveplanning,allocationofdominantusezonesanduserrightswithinthezones,and
ecologicalstandards.
z Anadaptiveoceangovernanceseascapeneedsto
o createanownershipethicthatfostersthelong‐termconservationperspective
necessaryforachievingsustainableandwiseuseofoceanresources,and
o rewardinnovation,permitcontractnegotiations,trades,andcooperativeregimesas
ameanstohaveoptionsotherthanregulationtoaddressuseconflictsinthemarine
environments.
z Speciesadaptationstoclimatechangewillbringneweconomicopportunities,anduserswith
anownershipethicwillbeinabetterpositiontoadaptandprosperfromsuchopportunities.
Introduction
Climatechangeisoccurringandatratesfasterthanoriginallypredicted.Rapidchangesandthe
acidificationoftheoceansduetotheabsorptionofCO2aretworeasonsscientistsbelievethat
self‐directedadaptationofmarinespeciesislesslikelythaninpastclimaticevents(Brander
2007).Slowingtherateandreducingtheacidificationareforthemostpartaddressedwith
mitigationefforts,suchasputtingapriceoncarbonandinvestmentsincarboncaptureand
storage.
Anotherfactorthatscientistsidentifywillaffectadaptationofmarinespeciesisthecumulative
impactofthecurrentsetofnon‐climate‐relatedstressorsontheseresources.Thelistofindividual
impactsincludescommercialandrecreationalfishing,lossofcoastalwetlands,damagetomarine
habitats,runofffrompointandnonpointsources,harmfulalgaeblooms,andinvasivespecies.
Inadditiontoreducingthelikelihoodforautonomousadaptationofthemarinespecies,the
cumulativeimpactleadstoeconomicallydepressedcoastalcommunities,especiallythosethat
dependonthehealthofthemarineandcoastalenvironment.Notsurprisingly,similardynamics
regardingself‐adaptationarepredictedforcoastalcommunities,whereeconomicallyvibrant
3SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
communitiesarebelievedtobeinabetterpositiontoundergoautonomousadaptation.And,as
such,thecommunitieswillbeabletoprosperratherthansimplysurvivethecomingchanges.
Reducingthesestressorsandtherebyimprovingacoastalcommunity’sandspecies’abilityto
adaptrequiresaportfolioofpoliciesthatsimultaneouslyimprovetheeconomicandecological
healthofouroceansandcoasts.Developingtheportfoliointermsofboththerelianceon
differenttypesofpolicies(suchascommandandcontrol,liability,incentive‐based,andthelike)
andthedesignofthespecificpoliciesiscomplexbecauseofthecoupledhuman‐naturaldynamics
ofmarineandcoastalenvironments.Someofthemoresignificantquestionsonthecomponents
oftheportfoliofollow:Whatistheappropriatetemporalandspatialscaleofthepolicies?What
roleisthereforthefederal,state,andlocalgovernmentsindesigningandimplementing
adaptationpolicies?Howandwhenshouldtheeffectsofachangingclimatebeincorporatedinto
thechoiceofthepoliciesandtheirdesign?
Althoughthesequestionsarecriticalforthemarineandcoastalecosystem,theterrestrialportion
oftheportfolioisnotdiscussedinthisissuebrief(seeKlingandSanchirico2009).
Beforediscussingthechallengethatclimatechangeposestomarineenvironments,itis
imperativetoaskwhyenvironmentsarealreadysostressed.Marinehabitat,species,andthe
wateritselfarecommonpoolresources.2Undertheseconditions,individualusersofthese
resourcesdonottakeintoaccounthowtheiractionsaffectthewelfareandwell‐beingofother
individualsusingthesameresources.Forexample,apowerplantdischargingwaterintothe
oceandoesnotnecessarilyconsiderhowthewarmerthannormalwaterwillaffectthelarvaeof
marineorganisms—organismsthatarethetargetofacommercialorrecreationalfishery.
Theconditionsofill‐definedrightsandresponsibilitiesthatcharacterizecommonpoolresources
leadtothewell‐knowntragedyofthecommons.Commercialandrecreationalfisheriesarea
classicexampleofthetragedythatleadstoecologicallyandeconomicallydepressedmarineand
coastalecosystemsandcommunities.Theseconditionsinturnleadtoshort‐termthinking,which
istheantithesisofputtinginplacethenecessarypoliciestoimprovetheresilienceofourcoasts
andcoastalcommunities.
Unfortunately,theseproblemscannotbelefttothemarkettosolve.Governmentinterventionis
needed.IntheUnitedStates,theappropriatelevelofgovernmentisnotuniformbecause
jurisdictionsoffederal,state,andlocalagenciesvaryalongourcoastlines.Figure1highlightsthe
differencesinprivate–publiccoastallandsalongwithdifferentrolesandresponsibilitiesofstates
andthefederalgovernmentwithrespecttomarineresources.Inmostcases,stateshaveprimary
………………………………….
2Commonpoolresourceshavetwocharacteristics:thesetofpotentialusersisdifficult(costly)tocontrol,anduseoftheresourcebyan
individualdetractsfromtheothersabilitytousetheresource(e.g.,congestioneffects).Additionalexamplesofthesetypeofresources,
includegroundwaterpools,cleanair,openpasturelands,andwildanimalpopulations(e.g.,buffalo).
4SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
jurisdictionfromthecoastlineoutthreenauticalmilesandthefederalgovernmentfromthereto
200nauticalmiles.3Anadditionalcomplicationistheinteractionoftheofficiallinesinthewater
withthedifferencesinthetopographyofthecoasts,suchastheexpanseofthecontinentalshelf.
Themajorityofmarineresourcesarefoundonornearthecontinentalshelf.
Fortunately,whateverthelevelofgovernment,thefundamentalcauseofthetragedyisa
misalignmentoftherightsandresponsibilitiesofthecurrentusers.Withoutasenseofownership
insomeformordegree,theusersarenotlikelytochangetheirbehaviorinwaysbeneficialtoall
thosewithinterestsintheeconomicandecologicalhealthoftheoceans.
Figure1.Private,State,andFederalRightstoCoastalandMarineResources
Notes:LOS,LawofSea;MHW,meanhigh‐water;MHHW,meanhighhigh‐water;MLLW,meanlowerlow‐
watermark.
Source:U.S.DepartmentofInterior2006.
Incommercialfisheries,ownershiprightshavecomeintheformofindividualfishingquotasand
cooperatives.Effortsareunderwaytotaketheseformsofmanagementandapplythemtothe
recreationalcharterfishingsector.Wediscussinthenextsectiontheeconomicandecological
………………………………….
3Forfederalfisheryresources,NMFSworksinconjunctionwiththeeightfisherymanagementcouncilstosetfisheryregulations.When
consideringtheeffectsofclimatechangeonmarineresources,jurisdictionsareimportantbecauseofdifferencesinthetopographyofthe
coasts,suchasthelocationofthecontinentalshelfandtheeffectsofeutrophication,whichoccurmainlywithinthezero‐tothree‐mile
limit.Furthermore,inmanycases,theseboundariesarecompletelypermeable(e.g.,pollutionandmovementsofmarinepopulations)and
arelikelytobechangingoverthenextcentury(seeKlingandSanchirico2009).
5SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
gainsfromthecurrentprogramsinplacethroughouttheworld,andhowthecomingchangesin
themarineenvironmentshouldorshouldnotalterthecurrentdesignsofU.S.programs.
Establishingrightsforcommercialfishersisanimportantfirststepinthebuildingofanadaptation
portfoliobutasweargueinthethirdsection,amorecomprehensiveapproachisneeded.In
particular,thecreationofcomprehensiveplanninganddesignationofdominantusezonesalong
withuserrightsisnecessarytofosterthegrowthofabroadownershipethicunderwhichthose
whouseresourcesinternalizehowtheiractionsaffectothers.Thisethicisanecessarycondition
forthelong‐termperspectivemostlikelytoleadtovibranteconomicandecologicalcommunities.
UserRightsforCommercialFisheries
Individualfishingquotas(IFQs)andfishingcooperativesaddresstheeconomicwasteassociated
withthetragedyofthecommons.IFQprogramsareanalogoustoothercap‐and‐tradeprograms,
suchasthesulfurdioxideallowanceprogram.Theylimitfishingoperationsbysettingatotal
allowablecatch(TAC),whichisthenallocatedamongfishingparticipants,typicallybasedon
historicalcatch.InmostIFQfisheriesacrosstheworld,participantscantradetheirperpetualright
toashareoftheTACandtheirannualcatchentitlement,whichisequaltotheproductoftheir
shareandtheTACinafishingseason.
Cooperatives,suchasthePacificWhitingConservationCooperativeandthetwointheNorth
PacificPollockFishery,areformedaroundafishingsectorsuchthatthesetofparticipantsiswell
definedandthesectorhasreceivedanallocationoftheallowablecatch.Theallocationtoeach
member,alongwithanytradingamongmembers,ishandledthroughprivatenegotiationsand
rulesasoutlinedintheircharter.Effortsarealsounderwaytoexpandthesector‐basedallocation
programsintheNewEnglandgroundfishfishery.
WhetheranIFQorcooperative,theallocationofsharesoftheTACreducestheincentivestorace
forfish,becauseparticipantshavegreatercertaintyontheircatchlevels,andtheabilitytobuy
andsellsharesprovidesflexibilityforparticipantstoadjustthescaleoftheiroperations.In
commercialfisheries,thegainsfromownershipandtradeincludethefollowing:
z reducingtheincentivetoraceforfishresultinginlongerseasons,
z shiftingtheincentivesfrommaximizingnumbersoffishcaughttomaximizingthevalueof
thecatch,
z reducingthenumberofvesselsandfishingcapacity,
z increasingtheflexibilitytomatchquotaholdingswithcatches,
z improvingtheabilitytoplanbusinessoperations,and
6SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
z catchingtheTACatthelowestpossiblecosts(becausehigher‐cost,thatis,lessefficient,
vesselsfinditmoreprofitabletosellortradetheirsharesthantofishthem).
Table1presentsempiricalexamplesofthesebenefits.Furthermore,researchhasshownthat
thesechangesresultedinprofitratesbetween20and60percent—thisisinfisheriesthatwere
ofteneconomicallyandecologicallydepressedbeforetherights‐basedsystemwascreated(see
Sanchirico2008).
DuringaninterviewwithatopgovernmentscientistinNewZealandin2002,Iaskedwhetherthe
NewZealandIFQprogram,thelargestsystemintheworldintermsofnumberofspeciesand
markets,wasdeemedasuccess.Theanswerwas“yes.”Theexplanationwasthat“sincethe
creationoftheIFQsystem,therelationshipbetweenthecommercialfishingindustryand
governmenthasbecomelessconfrontationalandthereisnowasenseofworkingtogetherto
improvetheconditionsofthefishery.”Thisanswerwasunexpected.Ihadanticipatedhearing
abouteconomicefficiency,stockrecovery,ortheabilitytorecovercostsoffisherymanagement
andscience.Butitiseasytoimaginethatapartnershipbetweengovernmentandmarineusersis
beneficialforadaptation.
Anotherpotentialgainfromrights‐basedfisheryprogramsistheabilitytorecovercosts.
Throughouttheworld,costrecoveryfeesformanagementareleviedonquotaownerstooffset
observercoverage,scientificresearch,quotaregistrymanagement,andgeneralcostsoffishery
management.Unlikeothermanagementmeasuresthatrestrictthequantityofcatch,IFQs
provideasustainablesourceoffundstocoverobservers,whichareanimportantcomponentofa
well‐functioningrights‐basedsystemandcanprovidehigherqualitydataoncatches.Inthe
UnitedStates,legislationplacesaceilingonthecost‐recoverylevyat3percentofthevalueofthe
fishery(royaltyfeesarealsopermittedandthereiscurrentlynocap).Thislimitshouldbe
revisitedtoensurethatenforcementandmonitoringprograms,suchasonboardobserversand
real‐timeelectroniccatchrecording,arefullyfunded.Animportantancillarybenefitofthese
fundsandeffortsistheabilitytocollecthigherqualitydataoncatches,suchasspeciesageand
sizecomposition,thatcanbeusedbymarinescientiststoimprovepredictionsonthecoming
changes.
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Table1.Rights‐BasedApproachesforCommercialFisheryManagement
BenefitsEmpiricalfinding
Reducingtheincentivetoracefor
fishresultinginlongerseasons
IntheBritishColumbia(BC)HalibutFishery,theseasonlengthwentfrom10
daystheyearbeforetheimplementationoftheIFQ(1990)to260daysthe
yearafter.
Theseasonlengthwentfrom75daysin1998to149daysin1999afterthe
creationofthecooperativesintheNorthPacificPollockfishery,even
thoughtheoffshoresectorhadareductionintheirallocationoftheTAC.A
similarresultoccurredinthePacificWhitingCooperative.
Shiftingtheincentivesfrom
maximizingquantityoffishcaught
tomaximizingthevalueofthetheir
catch
SincethecreationofthecooperativesinthePacificPollockfishery,the
shareofcatchgoingtoproducefilletshasincreased.Theshifttohigher
valuedendproductswasalsoevidentinthePacificWhitingCooperative.
TheNZRedSnapperfisherymovedfrommainlyafrozenproducttothelive
fishmarketinJapan.
IntheBCHalibutfishery,freshproductincreasedfrom42percentofthe
catchtoover90percentafterimplementation.
Iceland’sdemersalfisheriesexperiencedtotalrevenueincreasesof$6
milliondollarsin1984duetohigherqualityfish.
Reducingthenumberofvesselsand
fishingcapacity
InthefirstyearaftertheimplementationofthePollockCooperativeonly16
ofthe20vesselsfished;only6of10fishedinthePacificWhitingfishery
postimplementationofthecooperative.
NewZealandfisherieshaveseenareductioninquotaownersontheorder
of35%sincetheprogram’sinceptionin1986.Asof2003,themajorityof
thereductionswereinmid‐sizefirms.
Increasingtheflexibilityprovided
forparticipantstomatchquota
holdingswithcatches
Annualtradesorleasesofcatchesforthemedianfishstockareonthe
orderof
40percentofthetotalallowablecatchinNewZealand
30percentinIceland
40percentinSouthEastAustraliantrawlIFQfisheries.
Improvingtheabilitytoplan
businessoperations
NZfishermenreportedshiftingfishingtripstolaterintheseasonwhen
pricesweretraditionallyhigher.
SurveysofCanadianfishprocessorsworkingwiththeBCHalibutfishermen
supportthisstatement.Forexample,theynotedthatfishermenwere
callingintofindoutwhattheexpectedpriceoffishisbeforeheadingoutto
sea.
CatchingtheTACatthelowest
possiblecosts,ashigher‐cost(less
efficient)vesselsfinditmore
profitabletosellortradetheir
sharesthantofishthem.
Exantepredictedestimatesofthepotentialcostreductions,areonthe
orderof50percentoftotalrevenuesintheMid‐Atlanticsurfclamand
oceanquahogIFQ.
Costreductions($8million)areestimatedtobegreaterthantwotimesthe
potentialrevenuegains($3million)for1993intheGulfofMexicoRed
Snapperfishery.
Source:Sanchirico2008.
8SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
Whataboutcoastalcommunitiesthatdependonthecommercialfishingindustry?Onthisfront,
yourperspectivedependsonyourposition.Weknowthatrights‐basedmeasureswillleadtoa
consolidationofthefishingfleet,asmanyfisheriesarecharacterizedby“toomanyboatschasing
toofewfish”beforeimplementation.Wealsoknowthattheeconomicreturnsinthese
overcapitalizedfisheriesaredepressed.Ifyouthinkthatafisherywith100boatsandassociated
crewisbetterthanonewith40boats,eventhoughtheformerisbarelymakinganeconomic
return,thenthesocialimpactsarenegative.If,however,vibrantportsandcoastalcommunities
withfewerboatsarebetterthandepressedportswithmoreboats,thenthechangesbroughton
byrights‐basedmeasuresarepositive.
Anotherlegitimateconcernisthataparticularlocationonthecoastcanendupwithnoboatsas
vesselsselltheirquotatoboatswithotherhomeportsorlocateinareasclosertomarkets,andso
on.RestrictionsontradingquotaacrossregionsinIceland’sIFQprogramwereinstitutedto
reducethelikelihoodofthisoccurring.Othermeansofreducingitaretodevelopcommunity‐
basedquotasystems,suchastheonecurrentlyinplaceinAlaska,whereacommunityisallocated
thecatchanddetermineswhofishesit.Thecatchcouldbeallocatedtoportandharbormasters
(thoughIamunawareofanyprogramswiththisfeatureinplace).Theycouldinturnusethe
quotatoenticefishermentodockattheirport,processorstolocateorremainintheir
community,andasastablesourceofdemandforshippingandotherinfrastructureservices.
Whatchallengesdoesclimatechangeposetothedesignofrights‐basedsystems?Inthenear
term,itisnotclearthatregionalfisherymanagementcouncilsintheUnitedStates,whichdesign
thepolicies,shouldmakeanycoursecorrections.First,thepredictedchangesaremanyyearsoff,
eventhoughtheyareoccurringatfasterratesthanoriginallypredicted.Inaddition,everywhere
thatrights‐basedmeasureshavebeenimplemented,thedesignshavechangedovertimeas
fishermen,conservationists,politicians,andmanagersdeterminewhatisworkingandwhatisnot.
Therefore,thereisnoexantereasontothinkthatthesesystemscouldn’tbechangedovertime
astheneeddevelops.
Second,intheUnitedStates,theseprogramshavenotbeenaneasyselltothecurrent
constituencies,whoareuncertainhowtheywillfareunderanewinstitutionalsystemandare
interestedinensuringanadequateinitialallocation.Complicatingthediscussionsinthe
preliminarydesignphasewilllikelyonlydelaymatters.
Finally,limitedrights‐basedmeasurescanopenthedoorformorewide‐rangingsystemsas
fishermengainexperienceonhowtheyworkandcapturethebenefits(eveniftheyarelimited)of
better‐definedrights.Inotherwords,anincrementalapproachcouldbethepathofleast
resistance,especiallyunderthecurrentU.S.fisherymanagementsystem.
9SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
Whatdimensionsofthecurrentdesignsshouldberevisitedwiththechangingclimate?Ingeneral,
thefocusshouldbeonremovingdesignfeaturesthatreducetheabilityandflexibilityoftheright
holdertocaptureallofthepotentialefficiencygains.ProgramsintheUnitedStatesareoften
denominatedonasector‐species‐areabasis,wheresharesoftheTACareallocatedtodifferent
fleetsorsectors(e.g.,thetrawlerIFQprogram)foraspeciesorspeciescomplexinaparticular
area.
Thesector‐species‐areabasisconstrainsfisherman’schoicesacrossmultipledimensions.It
specifiesthetypeofgearusedtoharvestthespeciesandassuchreducestheflexibilityofthe
fishermentoadjusttheirinputstochangingecologicalandeconomicconditions.Gearswitching
rulesaresometimesincludedinprogramsbutareoftenlimited.ThebasisofNewZealand’squota
managementsystemisspecies‐areacombinations,wherequotaownersarefreetochoosethe
appropriategear(subjecttooversightregardingpotentialecologicalimpact).
Therearerestrictions,however,intheNewZealandsystemontradingquotaacrossmanagement
areaswithinthesamespecies.Forexample,theNewZealandredsnapperfisheryisdividedinto
eightzones,orquotamarkets,eachwithitsownTACandsetofquotaowners.Fishermanand
fishingcompaniesarepermittedtoownquotaindifferentmarketsforthesamespecies,subject
tosomeaggregateaccumulationrestrictions.
Icelandhastakenadifferentapproach.ThebasisforitsIFQsystemisspeciesbutitpermits
intraspeciestradingwherethequotamanagementsystemmeasuresspeciesquotaincod
equivalenceunits.Cod,themostimportantspeciesinIceland,canbeconvertedtootherspecies
butotherspeciescannotbeconvertedintocod.Exchangeratesacrossspeciesarebasedon
measuresofexpectedrevenues,suchthateconomicconditionsdonotleadownerstoconverttoo
muchquotaintoonespeciestherebyexceedingthatspecies’TAC.Otherwaystogroupspecies
arequotabaskets,inwhichtheTACisforthecollectionofspeciesandthecatchmixdependson
theeconomic,ecological,andenvironmentalconditions.
Withclimatechange,therulesthatprohibittradeandconvertingonespeciesquotaintoanother
weredevisedundertheassumptionofarelativelystableenvironmentandmightneedtobe
revisited,especiallyasspeciesrangeschange.Thereisalreadysomeevidenceofspeciesshifting
theirdistributionsinresponsetochangingoceanandsurfacetemperatures,eitherlocally(e.g.,a
zonalshiftofabenthicorganismwithinaregion)oracrossbroadareas.Theabilityof
biogeographicallyshiftingpopulationstoadapttoclimatechangedependsontheirspatialextent
andtherateoverwhichthechangesoccur.Forexample,speciescouldbesqueezedout,
especiallywhenthechangescausesignificantphysiologicalstressonorganismsadaptedtoa
specific,oftennarrow,rangeofenvironmentalconditions.
10SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
Accumulationlimitsonthequotathatcanbeownedorfishedinagivenyearareanotherdesign
elementthatreducestheflexibilityofquotaownerstodetermineaneconomicallyoptimalmixof
inputsandlimittheoverallcost‐effectivenessofthesystem.Argumentsfortheseoftenrevolve
aroundtheneedtoreduceconsolidationtopreservethesocialfabricofcoastalcommunities.
Althoughtheseimposeacostintermsofthelosteconomicgains,thisrestrictioncaneasilybe
changedovertimeasneeded.Furthermore,asevidentinthediscussionsofthesesystemsinthe
UnitedStates,theselimitshaveconsiderablevalueintermsofeasingconstituencyconcernson
thetransitiontorights‐basedapproachesthatcouldverywelloffsettheefficiencycosts.
Planning,DominantUseZones,andUserRights
Sustainablemarinecommunitieswillnotbeachievedbyallocatinguserrightsonlytocommercial
fishinginterests.Abroaderpolicytoolthatcanintegratecommercialfishingwithotherusersof
themarineenvironment,suchasrecreationalfishers,energy,aquaculture,shipping,and
nonconsumptiverecreationisrequired.Inacollectionofpapers,mycoauthorsandIdiscusshow
thecombinationofmarinespatialplanning,allocationofdominantusestoparticularlocations,
ecologicalstandardsforeachzone,andallocationofuserrightswithinthedominantuse
categoriesissuchatool(seeSanchiricoetal.forthcoming;Eagle,Sanchirico,andThompson
2008).Thetypeofzoningweenvisionisameansofimplementingecosystem‐basedmanagement
principlesthatcanhelpensureresilientmarinepopulationsandcommunitiesbeyondcommercial
fishingoperations.
Undersuchaplan,statewatersandtheU.S.ExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)wouldbedividedinto
areaswithprescribeddominantuses,suchasrecreation,energydevelopment,commercial
fishing,andconservation.Withanappropriatemixofprotectedandactiveuseareas,zoningcan
protectcriticalhabitatasitrestructuresincentivesinawaythatdiscouragesoveruseand
promotesoceanstewardship.
Inparticular,weenvisioncomprehensiveplanningleadingtoatwo‐tierallocationprocessin
whichthefirsttierallocatesareastodominantusesandsetsecologicalstandards,andthesecond
tier(ifnecessary)allocatestheresourceswithintheparticularuse.Dependingontheuse,policy
instrumentsforthesecondtiercouldbelong‐termconcessions,leases,cooperatives,or
developmentofotherrights‐basedprograms.Forexample,theresourcesinacommercialfishing
areawillbesubjecttoarights‐basedfisherymanagementsystem.Withoutthesecondtier
allocation,thezoningregimewouldreducethescaleofthetragedyofthecommonsratherthan
addressit.
Intheterrestrialsetting,propertyrightsenablesignificantprivateordering,leadingmanyto
arguethatzoningisnotnecessary.Intheocean,however,marketfailuresarisingfromthelackof
well‐definedrightsgeneratetransactioncoststhatcreatesignificantbarriersforuserswhomight
11SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
otherwiseseekoutbeneficialpartnerships,negotiations,andcollaborationstoaddressconflicts.
Dominantuseandplanningcanreducethesetransactioncosts.Forexample,thecertaintyof
allocatingspacetooffshoreaquacultureusescouldreducetransactioncoststhatcurrentlymake
negotiationswithanoffshoreoilplatformtoactasanaquaculturemonitoringandmanagement
facilitytoocostly.
Anadvantageofreducingthesetransactioncostsandprovidingvariousshadesofownershipto
certaingroupsinanareaisthepossibilitythatnonregulatoryapproaches,suchasprivateordering
andjudicialresolutions,canbeusedtoaddressgroupconflicts.Conflictsareatthemoment
confinedtotheregulatorysystemandleadtoinefficient,rent‐seekinglobbyingactivities.Having
otherandmoretransparentresolutionscanbetteralignuserincentiveswithresource
stewardshipandprovidegreaterspeedandflexibilityinrespondingtochangingoceanconditions.
Becausethecurrentregulatorysystemisbasedonexistingenvironmentalconditionsandthe
numberofpotentialusesforthemarineenvironmentisincreasing,thenatureandnumberof
conflictsislikelytoincreaseasoceanconditionschange.Thisreinforcestheneedtodevelopa
governancestructurethatprovidesuserswithmultipleoptionsfordealingwiththesechallenges.
Onearealikelytobenefitsignificantlyfromtherecommendedzoningregimeisthemanagement
ofprivaterecreationalanglers.Currently,recreationalfishingismanagedwithbaglimitsandtime
andareaclosures.Giventhatsaltwateranglingisalargeandgrowingsector,andthediversityof
theanglers,recreationalfishingclubshavebeenproposedasawaytobetteraligntheincentives
ofanglerswithconservation(foradiscussionofrecreationalfishingclubs,seeSutinenand
Johnston2003,471).Theclubwouldbeallocatedcatchthatitwouldthendistributetoits
members,andtheclubwouldberesponsibleformonitoringandenforcingthecatchrules.By
creatingsuchanumbrellaorganization,regulatorswouldbeabletoholdtheorganizationliable
forcatchesinexcessofitslimits(e.g.,withholdingcatchthenextyear).Thecreationofdominant
userightstoareasforrecreationalfishingcanbethecatalysttocreatetheclubs,ratherthanthe
usualtop‐downplanning,andcanprovidetheclubswithbetter‐definedaccessrights.Thelatteris
criticalforestablishingincentivestomaintainqualityfishinggrounds.
Otherimportantdynamicsarisingfromthecreationofabroadersetofrightsoragroup
ownershipethicarethedevelopmentofaco‐managementregimeandamuchneeded
reassessmentofthefocusandscopeoftheregulatoryinstitutionsinvolvedinocean
management.Bothchangeswillhelpusherinanewerainoceangovernanceregime
characterizedbyownershipgroupsworkingcloselywitheachother,national,state,andlocal
governmentstodevelopsustainableruleswithineachzone.
Theconceptofcreatingamosaicofdominantusezonestoimprovetheabilityofcoastal
communitiesandmarinespeciestoadapttochangingoceanconditionsisadmittedlynot
12SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
intuitive.Thisisespeciallytruegiventhefluidityofthemarineenvironment,thelikelihoodfor
shiftsinspeciesranges,andthepotentialchangeintheproductivityofareascausedby
acidificationandalterationsinupwellingevents.
Toskepticsofthepotentialmeritofthisapproach,weprovideanumberofreasonswethinkitis
morelikelytobesuccessfulthanourcurrentsystemandmoretop‐downoceanzoningproposals
currentlyonthetable.First,thesystemweenvisionprovidesflexibilitytothegroupsmanaging
theusesinthezonesbypermittinggroupstonegotiatewithotherzones.Forexample,aprivate
NGOrunningaconservationareacouldnegotiatewithrecreationalfishingclubtopermitfishing
withintheareaforgreaterconservationintheclub’szone.Althoughtheseagreementsneedtobe
monitoredtoensurethattheyarenotputtingtheecologicalhealthofthesystematgreaterrisk,
theflexibilitytoworktogetheroutsidetheregulatoryprocessiscritical.Comingattheproblem
frommultiplefrontsandcreatingasystemunderwhichcreativityandingenuitycanflourishwill
improveacoastalcommunity’sabilityforself‐adaptation.
Second,climatechangeisunlikelytoturnproductiveareasintowastelands.Thecurrentsetof
biologicalresourceswilllikelybereplacedwithanewsetofspeciesandwithitneweconomic
opportunities—opportunitiesbestlefttobediscoveredbyanimblesetofuserswithadirect
stakeintheoutcome.Fortheothersetofusers,suchaswaveandwindenergy,oilandnatural
gas,andaquacultureoperations,climatechangeislesslikelytohaveasignificantimpactontheir
abilitytooperateinaparticularlocation.Ofcourse,thedeliveryofthesegoodsandservicescan
beaffectedbysealevelriseandtheresultingimpactsoncoastalinfrastructure.ChangesinthePH
andtemperaturemightalsohaveanimpactontheproductivityofaquacultureoperations,but
withthetechnologicaladvancesinoffshoreoperations,thesechangesmightbelowerthan
predicted.Ontheotherhand,ifaquacultureissignificantlyaffectedintheirzone,theycould
negotiatetooperateinanotherzonewheretheburdenofproofwouldbeontheownersofthe
aquaculturefacilitytoshowthatitwouldnothaveanadverseimpactonthedominantuse
designatedforthatzone.
Third,significantadhocandincompletezoningeffortsarealreadyunderwayintheUnitedStates
thatfocusmainlyoncreatingareasofflimitstocommercialandrecreationalfishing(marine
reserves).Insomecases,regulatorsarealsoprescribingotherpermitteduses,suchaspelagic
trollingformigratoryspecies.Theconservationvalueoftheseprograms,ofcourse,issubjectto
thesameclimaticforcesastheproposedmorecomprehensiveoceanzoningregime.The
differenceisthatthemorecomprehensiveapproachdevelopsalargerandmoreflexibletoolbox
thanthelimitedapproach,whichdependsonregulation.
Finally,theallocationofdominantusesandgrouprightswillalsoimprovetheaccountabilityof
users,becausetheycanbeheldresponsibleforchangesintheecologicalhealthoftheirzone.
Accountability,inturn,createsincentivesforthegroupstoworktogethertoensurethattheyare
13SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
incompliancewiththeecologicalstandardssetforthezone.Inthissense,theopennessofthe
marineenvironmentwillincreasetheincentivetoworktogether,especiallyifactivitiesinone
zonearenegativelyaffectingtheecologyinotherzones.
Conclusion:MovingtheAdaptationAgendaForward
Althoughpredictingallpossiblepermutationsonhowenvironmentalchangewillaffectthe
livelihoodsofcoastalcommunitiesoverthenext10yearsisdifficult,itshouldnotsloweffortsto
createthenecessaryconditionsforautonomousadaptationtoeventsfurtheroffintime.These
conditionsincludehealthyecologicalandeconomiccommunities,wherethelatterisanimportant
precursortotheformer.Startingnowisnecessarybecauseinmanycasesthemarinespecieswill
takedecadestorebuildandcoastalcommunitiesarebeginningtomakelong‐livedcapital
investmentsininfrastructuretoaddressclimatechange.Amethodtoimproveeconomic
conditionsrequiresgrantingrightsandresponsibilitiestothosewhousetheocean,becauseit
developsaconstituencywhosewealthandwell‐beingaredirectlyconnectedwiththe
environment.
Overthepastyear,thecurrentadministrationandNOAA,theleadagencyinchargeofocean
governance,aretakingstepsconsistentwiththeproposalsjustpresented.Firstisastatedgoalto
increasethenumberoffisherieswithrights‐basedprograms.4Anissue,however,thatcould
impedesuccessisthecurrentlogjamstemmingfromdisputesoverinitialallocationofquota.To
removethelogjam,NOAAshoulddevelopasetofrulesfortheinitialallocationprocesstobethe
defaultnationwide.Councilscoulddeviatefromtheallocationbuttheonuswouldbeonthemto
arguewhy.Forexample,ineveryfishery,70percentisallocatedbasedonavessel’saverage
shareofthetotalallowablecatchoverthelastsevenyears,15percentisauctionedoff,and15
percentisreservedforinnovativecommunity‐basedprojects.Thelatterwouldincludeallocations
toportandharbormastersasawaytomaintaineconomicallyviableportsandcoastal
communities.
Anothernoteworthyeffortisonoceangovernanceandincludesapresidentialmemorandum
datedJune12,2009,thatcreatedanInteragencyOceanPolicytaskforce.Itschargeistodevelop
aframeworkforanationaloceanpolicyandformarinespatialplanning.Withrespecttospatial
planning,thememorandumstatesthat5
within180daysfromthedateofthismemorandum,theTaskForceshall
develop,withappropriatepublicinput,arecommendedframeworkforeffective
coastalandmarinespatialplanning.Thisframeworkshouldbea
comprehensive,integrated,ecosystem‐basedapproachthataddresses
………………………………….
4FormoreinformationonNOAA’sefforts,seehttp://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/.
5Thememorandumisavailableatwww.whitehouse.gov/oceans(lastaccessedonNov.15,2009).
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conservation,economicactivity,userconflict,andsustainableuseofocean,
coastal,andGreatLakesresourcesconsistentwithinternationallaw,including
customaryinternationallawasreflectedinthe1982UnitedNationsConvention
ontheLawoftheSea.
Althoughtheneedformarinespatialplanningeffortisconsistentwithideasjustpresented,itis
notimmediatelyclearthattheframeworkwillencompassmorethanplanning.Planning,
however,needstobecombinedwithadesignationofdominantusezones,asetofecological
standardsforeachzone,anduserrightsarrangementswithinthezones.Weneedanocean
governanceseascapethatrewardsinnovation,permitscontractnegotiations,trades,and
cooperativeregimesanddoesnotrequireregulationtosolveeveryuseconflictthatexistsorwill
exist.
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