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Better-Defined Rights and Responsibilities in Marine Adaptation Policy

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ISSUEBRIEF
Date
IssueBrief#
BetterDefinedRightsand
ResponsibilitiesinMarine
AdaptationPolicy
JamesN.Sanchirico
December2009
IssueBrief0912
2SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
ResourcesfortheFuture
ResourcesfortheFutureisanindependent,nonpartisanthink
tankthat,throughitssocialscienceresearch,enables
policymakersandstakeholderstomakebetter,more
informeddecisionsaboutenergy,environmental,natural
resource,andpublichealthissues.Headquarteredin
Washington,DC,itsresearchscopecomprisesprogramsin
nationsaroundtheworld.
1SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
BetterDefinedRightsandResponsibilitiesin
MarineAdaptationPolicy
JamesN.Sanchirico1
AsdefinedbytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,adaptationincludesasetof
actionstomoderateharmorexploitbeneficialopportunitiesinresponsetoclimatechange.To
date,littleresearchhasaddressedpublicpolicyoptionstoframethenation’sapproachtoadaptto
achangingclimate.Inlightofscientificevidenceofextremeandunpredictableclimatechange,
prudentpolicyrequiresconsiderationofwhattodoifmarketsandpeoplefailtoanticipatethese
changes,orareconstrainedintheirabilitytoreact.Thisissuebriefisoneinaseriesthatresults
fromthesecondphaseofadomesticadaptationresearchprojectconductedbyResourcesforthe
Future.Thebriefsareprimarilyintendedforusebydecisionmakersinconfrontingthecomplexand
difficulttaskofeffectivelyadaptingtheUnitedStatestoclimatechangeimpacts,butmayalso
offerinsightandvaluetoscholarsandthegeneralpublic.Thisresearchwassupportedbyagrant
fromtheSmithRichardsonFoundation.
PolicyRecommendations
Twoelementsarekeytomarineenvironmentadaptationpolicy.Onecentersonrightsand
responsibilities,andtheotherongovernance.
Afirststepincreatinganadaptationportfolioformarineandcoastalresourceswouldbeto
establishbetterdefinedrightsandresponsibilitiesforcommercialandrecreationalfisheries.
z Adaptationwillbeenhancedthemorethatthoseholdingtherightshaveflexibilityin
choosingthescale,location,andmethodsofoperation.
………………………………….
1JamesN.Sanchirico,DepartmentofEnvironmentalScienceandPolicy,UniversityofCalifornia,Davis;jsanchirico@ucdavis.edu;and
UniversityFellow,ResourcesfortheFuture.
2SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
z Implementationofrightsbasedprogramsshouldnotbedelayeduntiltheimpactsofclimate
changeonmarinepopulationsarebetterunderstood,becauseexperienceshowsthatrights
basedinstitutionshaveadaptedovertimewithchangingenvironmental,social,and
economicconditions.
z Ancillarybenefitsofrightsbasedmeasuresincludeasourceoffunds(royaltyandcost
recoveryfees)forresearchonthepotentialimpactsofclimatechange.
Asecondstepwouldbetoestablishabroaderoceangovernanceframeworkthatincludes
comprehensiveplanning,allocationofdominantusezonesanduserrightswithinthezones,and
ecologicalstandards.
z Anadaptiveoceangovernanceseascapeneedsto
o createanownershipethicthatfostersthelongtermconservationperspective
necessaryforachievingsustainableandwiseuseofoceanresources,and
o rewardinnovation,permitcontractnegotiations,trades,andcooperativeregimesas
ameanstohaveoptionsotherthanregulationtoaddressuseconflictsinthemarine
environments.
z Speciesadaptationstoclimatechangewillbringneweconomicopportunities,anduserswith
anownershipethicwillbeinabetterpositiontoadaptandprosperfromsuchopportunities.
Introduction
Climatechangeisoccurringandatratesfasterthanoriginallypredicted.Rapidchangesandthe
acidificationoftheoceansduetotheabsorptionofCO2aretworeasonsscientistsbelievethat
selfdirectedadaptationofmarinespeciesislesslikelythaninpastclimaticevents(Brander
2007).Slowingtherateandreducingtheacidificationareforthemostpartaddressedwith
mitigationefforts,suchasputtingapriceoncarbonandinvestmentsincarboncaptureand
storage.
Anotherfactorthatscientistsidentifywillaffectadaptationofmarinespeciesisthecumulative
impactofthecurrentsetofnonclimaterelatedstressorsontheseresources.Thelistofindividual
impactsincludescommercialandrecreationalfishing,lossofcoastalwetlands,damagetomarine
habitats,runofffrompointandnonpointsources,harmfulalgaeblooms,andinvasivespecies.
Inadditiontoreducingthelikelihoodforautonomousadaptationofthemarinespecies,the
cumulativeimpactleadstoeconomicallydepressedcoastalcommunities,especiallythosethat
dependonthehealthofthemarineandcoastalenvironment.Notsurprisingly,similardynamics
regardingselfadaptationarepredictedforcoastalcommunities,whereeconomicallyvibrant
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communitiesarebelievedtobeinabetterpositiontoundergoautonomousadaptation.And,as
such,thecommunitieswillbeabletoprosperratherthansimplysurvivethecomingchanges.
Reducingthesestressorsandtherebyimprovingacoastalcommunity’sandspecies’abilityto
adaptrequiresaportfolioofpoliciesthatsimultaneouslyimprovetheeconomicandecological
healthofouroceansandcoasts.Developingtheportfoliointermsofboththerelianceon
differenttypesofpolicies(suchascommandandcontrol,liability,incentivebased,andthelike)
andthedesignofthespecificpoliciesiscomplexbecauseofthecoupledhumannaturaldynamics
ofmarineandcoastalenvironments.Someofthemoresignificantquestionsonthecomponents
oftheportfoliofollow:Whatistheappropriatetemporalandspatialscaleofthepolicies?What
roleisthereforthefederal,state,andlocalgovernmentsindesigningandimplementing
adaptationpolicies?Howandwhenshouldtheeffectsofachangingclimatebeincorporatedinto
thechoiceofthepoliciesandtheirdesign?
Althoughthesequestionsarecriticalforthemarineandcoastalecosystem,theterrestrialportion
oftheportfolioisnotdiscussedinthisissuebrief(seeKlingandSanchirico2009).
Beforediscussingthechallengethatclimatechangeposestomarineenvironments,itis
imperativetoaskwhyenvironmentsarealreadysostressed.Marinehabitat,species,andthe
wateritselfarecommonpoolresources.2Undertheseconditions,individualusersofthese
resourcesdonottakeintoaccounthowtheiractionsaffectthewelfareandwellbeingofother
individualsusingthesameresources.Forexample,apowerplantdischargingwaterintothe
oceandoesnotnecessarilyconsiderhowthewarmerthannormalwaterwillaffectthelarvaeof
marineorganisms—organismsthatarethetargetofacommercialorrecreationalfishery.
Theconditionsofilldefinedrightsandresponsibilitiesthatcharacterizecommonpoolresources
leadtothewellknowntragedyofthecommons.Commercialandrecreationalfisheriesarea
classicexampleofthetragedythatleadstoecologicallyandeconomicallydepressedmarineand
coastalecosystemsandcommunities.Theseconditionsinturnleadtoshorttermthinking,which
istheantithesisofputtinginplacethenecessarypoliciestoimprovetheresilienceofourcoasts
andcoastalcommunities.
Unfortunately,theseproblemscannotbelefttothemarkettosolve.Governmentinterventionis
needed.IntheUnitedStates,theappropriatelevelofgovernmentisnotuniformbecause
jurisdictionsoffederal,state,andlocalagenciesvaryalongourcoastlines.Figure1highlightsthe
differencesinprivate–publiccoastallandsalongwithdifferentrolesandresponsibilitiesofstates
andthefederalgovernmentwithrespecttomarineresources.Inmostcases,stateshaveprimary
………………………………….
2Commonpoolresourceshavetwocharacteristics:thesetofpotentialusersisdifficult(costly)tocontrol,anduseoftheresourcebyan
individualdetractsfromtheothersabilitytousetheresource(e.g.,congestioneffects).Additionalexamplesofthesetypeofresources,
includegroundwaterpools,cleanair,openpasturelands,andwildanimalpopulations(e.g.,buffalo).
4SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
jurisdictionfromthecoastlineoutthreenauticalmilesandthefederalgovernmentfromthereto
200nauticalmiles.3Anadditionalcomplicationistheinteractionoftheofficiallinesinthewater
withthedifferencesinthetopographyofthecoasts,suchastheexpanseofthecontinentalshelf.
Themajorityofmarineresourcesarefoundonornearthecontinentalshelf.
Fortunately,whateverthelevelofgovernment,thefundamentalcauseofthetragedyisa
misalignmentoftherightsandresponsibilitiesofthecurrentusers.Withoutasenseofownership
insomeformordegree,theusersarenotlikelytochangetheirbehaviorinwaysbeneficialtoall
thosewithinterestsintheeconomicandecologicalhealthoftheoceans.
Figure1.Private,State,andFederalRightstoCoastalandMarineResources
Notes:LOS,LawofSea;MHW,meanhighwater;MHHW,meanhighhighwater;MLLW,meanlowerlow
watermark.
Source:U.S.DepartmentofInterior2006.
Incommercialfisheries,ownershiprightshavecomeintheformofindividualfishingquotasand
cooperatives.Effortsareunderwaytotaketheseformsofmanagementandapplythemtothe
recreationalcharterfishingsector.Wediscussinthenextsectiontheeconomicandecological
………………………………….
3Forfederalfisheryresources,NMFSworksinconjunctionwiththeeightfisherymanagementcouncilstosetfisheryregulations.When
consideringtheeffectsofclimatechangeonmarineresources,jurisdictionsareimportantbecauseofdifferencesinthetopographyofthe
coasts,suchasthelocationofthecontinentalshelfandtheeffectsofeutrophication,whichoccurmainlywithinthezero‐tothreemile
limit.Furthermore,inmanycases,theseboundariesarecompletelypermeable(e.g.,pollutionandmovementsofmarinepopulations)and
arelikelytobechangingoverthenextcentury(seeKlingandSanchirico2009).
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gainsfromthecurrentprogramsinplacethroughouttheworld,andhowthecomingchangesin
themarineenvironmentshouldorshouldnotalterthecurrentdesignsofU.S.programs.
Establishingrightsforcommercialfishersisanimportantfirststepinthebuildingofanadaptation
portfoliobutasweargueinthethirdsection,amorecomprehensiveapproachisneeded.In
particular,thecreationofcomprehensiveplanninganddesignationofdominantusezonesalong
withuserrightsisnecessarytofosterthegrowthofabroadownershipethicunderwhichthose
whouseresourcesinternalizehowtheiractionsaffectothers.Thisethicisanecessarycondition
forthelongtermperspectivemostlikelytoleadtovibranteconomicandecologicalcommunities.
UserRightsforCommercialFisheries
Individualfishingquotas(IFQs)andfishingcooperativesaddresstheeconomicwasteassociated
withthetragedyofthecommons.IFQprogramsareanalogoustoothercapandtradeprograms,
suchasthesulfurdioxideallowanceprogram.Theylimitfishingoperationsbysettingatotal
allowablecatch(TAC),whichisthenallocatedamongfishingparticipants,typicallybasedon
historicalcatch.InmostIFQfisheriesacrosstheworld,participantscantradetheirperpetualright
toashareoftheTACandtheirannualcatchentitlement,whichisequaltotheproductoftheir
shareandtheTACinafishingseason.
Cooperatives,suchasthePacificWhitingConservationCooperativeandthetwointheNorth
PacificPollockFishery,areformedaroundafishingsectorsuchthatthesetofparticipantsiswell
definedandthesectorhasreceivedanallocationoftheallowablecatch.Theallocationtoeach
member,alongwithanytradingamongmembers,ishandledthroughprivatenegotiationsand
rulesasoutlinedintheircharter.Effortsarealsounderwaytoexpandthesectorbasedallocation
programsintheNewEnglandgroundfishfishery.
WhetheranIFQorcooperative,theallocationofsharesoftheTACreducestheincentivestorace
forfish,becauseparticipantshavegreatercertaintyontheircatchlevels,andtheabilitytobuy
andsellsharesprovidesflexibilityforparticipantstoadjustthescaleoftheiroperations.In
commercialfisheries,thegainsfromownershipandtradeincludethefollowing:
z reducingtheincentivetoraceforfishresultinginlongerseasons,
z shiftingtheincentivesfrommaximizingnumbersoffishcaughttomaximizingthevalueof
thecatch,
z reducingthenumberofvesselsandfishingcapacity,
z increasingtheflexibilitytomatchquotaholdingswithcatches,
z improvingtheabilitytoplanbusinessoperations,and
6SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
z catchingtheTACatthelowestpossiblecosts(becausehighercost,thatis,lessefficient,
vesselsfinditmoreprofitabletosellortradetheirsharesthantofishthem).
Table1presentsempiricalexamplesofthesebenefits.Furthermore,researchhasshownthat
thesechangesresultedinprofitratesbetween20and60percent—thisisinfisheriesthatwere
ofteneconomicallyandecologicallydepressedbeforetherightsbasedsystemwascreated(see
Sanchirico2008).
DuringaninterviewwithatopgovernmentscientistinNewZealandin2002,Iaskedwhetherthe
NewZealandIFQprogram,thelargestsystemintheworldintermsofnumberofspeciesand
markets,wasdeemedasuccess.Theanswerwas“yes.”Theexplanationwasthat“sincethe
creationoftheIFQsystem,therelationshipbetweenthecommercialfishingindustryand
governmenthasbecomelessconfrontationalandthereisnowasenseofworkingtogetherto
improvetheconditionsofthefishery.”Thisanswerwasunexpected.Ihadanticipatedhearing
abouteconomicefficiency,stockrecovery,ortheabilitytorecovercostsoffisherymanagement
andscience.Butitiseasytoimaginethatapartnershipbetweengovernmentandmarineusersis
beneficialforadaptation.
Anotherpotentialgainfromrightsbasedfisheryprogramsistheabilitytorecovercosts.
Throughouttheworld,costrecoveryfeesformanagementareleviedonquotaownerstooffset
observercoverage,scientificresearch,quotaregistrymanagement,andgeneralcostsoffishery
management.Unlikeothermanagementmeasuresthatrestrictthequantityofcatch,IFQs
provideasustainablesourceoffundstocoverobservers,whichareanimportantcomponentofa
wellfunctioningrightsbasedsystemandcanprovidehigherqualitydataoncatches.Inthe
UnitedStates,legislationplacesaceilingonthecostrecoverylevyat3percentofthevalueofthe
fishery(royaltyfeesarealsopermittedandthereiscurrentlynocap).Thislimitshouldbe
revisitedtoensurethatenforcementandmonitoringprograms,suchasonboardobserversand
realtimeelectroniccatchrecording,arefullyfunded.Animportantancillarybenefitofthese
fundsandeffortsistheabilitytocollecthigherqualitydataoncatches,suchasspeciesageand
sizecomposition,thatcanbeusedbymarinescientiststoimprovepredictionsonthecoming
changes.
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Table1.RightsBasedApproachesforCommercialFisheryManagement
BenefitsEmpiricalfinding
Reducingtheincentivetoracefor
fishresultinginlongerseasons
IntheBritishColumbia(BC)HalibutFishery,theseasonlengthwentfrom10
daystheyearbeforetheimplementationoftheIFQ(1990)to260daysthe
yearafter.
Theseasonlengthwentfrom75daysin1998to149daysin1999afterthe
creationofthecooperativesintheNorthPacificPollockfishery,even
thoughtheoffshoresectorhadareductionintheirallocationoftheTAC.A
similarresultoccurredinthePacificWhitingCooperative.
Shiftingtheincentivesfrom
maximizingquantityoffishcaught
tomaximizingthevalueofthetheir
catch
SincethecreationofthecooperativesinthePacificPollockfishery,the
shareofcatchgoingtoproducefilletshasincreased.Theshifttohigher
valuedendproductswasalsoevidentinthePacificWhitingCooperative.
TheNZRedSnapperfisherymovedfrommainlyafrozenproducttothelive
fishmarketinJapan.
IntheBCHalibutfishery,freshproductincreasedfrom42percentofthe
catchtoover90percentafterimplementation.
Iceland’sdemersalfisheriesexperiencedtotalrevenueincreasesof$6
milliondollarsin1984duetohigherqualityfish.
Reducingthenumberofvesselsand
fishingcapacity
InthefirstyearaftertheimplementationofthePollockCooperativeonly16
ofthe20vesselsfished;only6of10fishedinthePacificWhitingfishery
postimplementationofthecooperative.
NewZealandfisherieshaveseenareductioninquotaownersontheorder
of35%sincetheprogram’sinceptionin1986.Asof2003,themajorityof
thereductionswereinmidsizefirms.
Increasingtheflexibilityprovided
forparticipantstomatchquota
holdingswithcatches
Annualtradesorleasesofcatchesforthemedianfishstockareonthe
orderof
40percentofthetotalallowablecatchinNewZealand
30percentinIceland
40percentinSouthEastAustraliantrawlIFQfisheries.
Improvingtheabilitytoplan
businessoperations
NZfishermenreportedshiftingfishingtripstolaterintheseasonwhen
pricesweretraditionallyhigher.
SurveysofCanadianfishprocessorsworkingwiththeBCHalibutfishermen
supportthisstatement.Forexample,theynotedthatfishermenwere
callingintofindoutwhattheexpectedpriceoffishisbeforeheadingoutto
sea.
CatchingtheTACatthelowest
possiblecosts,ashighercost(less
efficient)vesselsfinditmore
profitabletosellortradetheir
sharesthantofishthem.
Exantepredictedestimatesofthepotentialcostreductions,areonthe
orderof50percentoftotalrevenuesintheMidAtlanticsurfclamand
oceanquahogIFQ.
Costreductions($8million)areestimatedtobegreaterthantwotimesthe
potentialrevenuegains($3million)for1993intheGulfofMexicoRed
Snapperfishery.
Source:Sanchirico2008.
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Whataboutcoastalcommunitiesthatdependonthecommercialfishingindustry?Onthisfront,
yourperspectivedependsonyourposition.Weknowthatrightsbasedmeasureswillleadtoa
consolidationofthefishingfleet,asmanyfisheriesarecharacterizedby“toomanyboatschasing
toofewfish”beforeimplementation.Wealsoknowthattheeconomicreturnsinthese
overcapitalizedfisheriesaredepressed.Ifyouthinkthatafisherywith100boatsandassociated
crewisbetterthanonewith40boats,eventhoughtheformerisbarelymakinganeconomic
return,thenthesocialimpactsarenegative.If,however,vibrantportsandcoastalcommunities
withfewerboatsarebetterthandepressedportswithmoreboats,thenthechangesbroughton
byrightsbasedmeasuresarepositive.
Anotherlegitimateconcernisthataparticularlocationonthecoastcanendupwithnoboatsas
vesselsselltheirquotatoboatswithotherhomeportsorlocateinareasclosertomarkets,andso
on.RestrictionsontradingquotaacrossregionsinIceland’sIFQprogramwereinstitutedto
reducethelikelihoodofthisoccurring.Othermeansofreducingitaretodevelopcommunity
basedquotasystems,suchastheonecurrentlyinplaceinAlaska,whereacommunityisallocated
thecatchanddetermineswhofishesit.Thecatchcouldbeallocatedtoportandharbormasters
(thoughIamunawareofanyprogramswiththisfeatureinplace).Theycouldinturnusethe
quotatoenticefishermentodockattheirport,processorstolocateorremainintheir
community,andasastablesourceofdemandforshippingandotherinfrastructureservices.
Whatchallengesdoesclimatechangeposetothedesignofrightsbasedsystems?Inthenear
term,itisnotclearthatregionalfisherymanagementcouncilsintheUnitedStates,whichdesign
thepolicies,shouldmakeanycoursecorrections.First,thepredictedchangesaremanyyearsoff,
eventhoughtheyareoccurringatfasterratesthanoriginallypredicted.Inaddition,everywhere
thatrightsbasedmeasureshavebeenimplemented,thedesignshavechangedovertimeas
fishermen,conservationists,politicians,andmanagersdeterminewhatisworkingandwhatisnot.
Therefore,thereisnoexantereasontothinkthatthesesystemscouldn’tbechangedovertime
astheneeddevelops.
Second,intheUnitedStates,theseprogramshavenotbeenaneasyselltothecurrent
constituencies,whoareuncertainhowtheywillfareunderanewinstitutionalsystemandare
interestedinensuringanadequateinitialallocation.Complicatingthediscussionsinthe
preliminarydesignphasewilllikelyonlydelaymatters.
Finally,limitedrightsbasedmeasurescanopenthedoorformorewiderangingsystemsas
fishermengainexperienceonhowtheyworkandcapturethebenefits(eveniftheyarelimited)of
betterdefinedrights.Inotherwords,anincrementalapproachcouldbethepathofleast
resistance,especiallyunderthecurrentU.S.fisherymanagementsystem.
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Whatdimensionsofthecurrentdesignsshouldberevisitedwiththechangingclimate?Ingeneral,
thefocusshouldbeonremovingdesignfeaturesthatreducetheabilityandflexibilityoftheright
holdertocaptureallofthepotentialefficiencygains.ProgramsintheUnitedStatesareoften
denominatedonasectorspeciesareabasis,wheresharesoftheTACareallocatedtodifferent
fleetsorsectors(e.g.,thetrawlerIFQprogram)foraspeciesorspeciescomplexinaparticular
area.
Thesectorspeciesareabasisconstrainsfisherman’schoicesacrossmultipledimensions.It
specifiesthetypeofgearusedtoharvestthespeciesandassuchreducestheflexibilityofthe
fishermentoadjusttheirinputstochangingecologicalandeconomicconditions.Gearswitching
rulesaresometimesincludedinprogramsbutareoftenlimited.ThebasisofNewZealand’squota
managementsystemisspeciesareacombinations,wherequotaownersarefreetochoosethe
appropriategear(subjecttooversightregardingpotentialecologicalimpact).
Therearerestrictions,however,intheNewZealandsystemontradingquotaacrossmanagement
areaswithinthesamespecies.Forexample,theNewZealandredsnapperfisheryisdividedinto
eightzones,orquotamarkets,eachwithitsownTACandsetofquotaowners.Fishermanand
fishingcompaniesarepermittedtoownquotaindifferentmarketsforthesamespecies,subject
tosomeaggregateaccumulationrestrictions.
Icelandhastakenadifferentapproach.ThebasisforitsIFQsystemisspeciesbutitpermits
intraspeciestradingwherethequotamanagementsystemmeasuresspeciesquotaincod
equivalenceunits.Cod,themostimportantspeciesinIceland,canbeconvertedtootherspecies
butotherspeciescannotbeconvertedintocod.Exchangeratesacrossspeciesarebasedon
measuresofexpectedrevenues,suchthateconomicconditionsdonotleadownerstoconverttoo
muchquotaintoonespeciestherebyexceedingthatspecies’TAC.Otherwaystogroupspecies
arequotabaskets,inwhichtheTACisforthecollectionofspeciesandthecatchmixdependson
theeconomic,ecological,andenvironmentalconditions.
Withclimatechange,therulesthatprohibittradeandconvertingonespeciesquotaintoanother
weredevisedundertheassumptionofarelativelystableenvironmentandmightneedtobe
revisited,especiallyasspeciesrangeschange.Thereisalreadysomeevidenceofspeciesshifting
theirdistributionsinresponsetochangingoceanandsurfacetemperatures,eitherlocally(e.g.,a
zonalshiftofabenthicorganismwithinaregion)oracrossbroadareas.Theabilityof
biogeographicallyshiftingpopulationstoadapttoclimatechangedependsontheirspatialextent
andtherateoverwhichthechangesoccur.Forexample,speciescouldbesqueezedout,
especiallywhenthechangescausesignificantphysiologicalstressonorganismsadaptedtoa
specific,oftennarrow,rangeofenvironmentalconditions.
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Accumulationlimitsonthequotathatcanbeownedorfishedinagivenyearareanotherdesign
elementthatreducestheflexibilityofquotaownerstodetermineaneconomicallyoptimalmixof
inputsandlimittheoverallcosteffectivenessofthesystem.Argumentsfortheseoftenrevolve
aroundtheneedtoreduceconsolidationtopreservethesocialfabricofcoastalcommunities.
Althoughtheseimposeacostintermsofthelosteconomicgains,thisrestrictioncaneasilybe
changedovertimeasneeded.Furthermore,asevidentinthediscussionsofthesesystemsinthe
UnitedStates,theselimitshaveconsiderablevalueintermsofeasingconstituencyconcernson
thetransitiontorightsbasedapproachesthatcouldverywelloffsettheefficiencycosts.
Planning,DominantUseZones,andUserRights
Sustainablemarinecommunitieswillnotbeachievedbyallocatinguserrightsonlytocommercial
fishinginterests.Abroaderpolicytoolthatcanintegratecommercialfishingwithotherusersof
themarineenvironment,suchasrecreationalfishers,energy,aquaculture,shipping,and
nonconsumptiverecreationisrequired.Inacollectionofpapers,mycoauthorsandIdiscusshow
thecombinationofmarinespatialplanning,allocationofdominantusestoparticularlocations,
ecologicalstandardsforeachzone,andallocationofuserrightswithinthedominantuse
categoriesissuchatool(seeSanchiricoetal.forthcoming;Eagle,Sanchirico,andThompson
2008).Thetypeofzoningweenvisionisameansofimplementingecosystembasedmanagement
principlesthatcanhelpensureresilientmarinepopulationsandcommunitiesbeyondcommercial
fishingoperations.
Undersuchaplan,statewatersandtheU.S.ExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)wouldbedividedinto
areaswithprescribeddominantuses,suchasrecreation,energydevelopment,commercial
fishing,andconservation.Withanappropriatemixofprotectedandactiveuseareas,zoningcan
protectcriticalhabitatasitrestructuresincentivesinawaythatdiscouragesoveruseand
promotesoceanstewardship.
Inparticular,weenvisioncomprehensiveplanningleadingtoatwotierallocationprocessin
whichthefirsttierallocatesareastodominantusesandsetsecologicalstandards,andthesecond
tier(ifnecessary)allocatestheresourceswithintheparticularuse.Dependingontheuse,policy
instrumentsforthesecondtiercouldbelongtermconcessions,leases,cooperatives,or
developmentofotherrightsbasedprograms.Forexample,theresourcesinacommercialfishing
areawillbesubjecttoarightsbasedfisherymanagementsystem.Withoutthesecondtier
allocation,thezoningregimewouldreducethescaleofthetragedyofthecommonsratherthan
addressit.
Intheterrestrialsetting,propertyrightsenablesignificantprivateordering,leadingmanyto
arguethatzoningisnotnecessary.Intheocean,however,marketfailuresarisingfromthelackof
welldefinedrightsgeneratetransactioncoststhatcreatesignificantbarriersforuserswhomight
11SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
otherwiseseekoutbeneficialpartnerships,negotiations,andcollaborationstoaddressconflicts.
Dominantuseandplanningcanreducethesetransactioncosts.Forexample,thecertaintyof
allocatingspacetooffshoreaquacultureusescouldreducetransactioncoststhatcurrentlymake
negotiationswithanoffshoreoilplatformtoactasanaquaculturemonitoringandmanagement
facilitytoocostly.
Anadvantageofreducingthesetransactioncostsandprovidingvariousshadesofownershipto
certaingroupsinanareaisthepossibilitythatnonregulatoryapproaches,suchasprivateordering
andjudicialresolutions,canbeusedtoaddressgroupconflicts.Conflictsareatthemoment
confinedtotheregulatorysystemandleadtoinefficient,rentseekinglobbyingactivities.Having
otherandmoretransparentresolutionscanbetteralignuserincentiveswithresource
stewardshipandprovidegreaterspeedandflexibilityinrespondingtochangingoceanconditions.
Becausethecurrentregulatorysystemisbasedonexistingenvironmentalconditionsandthe
numberofpotentialusesforthemarineenvironmentisincreasing,thenatureandnumberof
conflictsislikelytoincreaseasoceanconditionschange.Thisreinforcestheneedtodevelopa
governancestructurethatprovidesuserswithmultipleoptionsfordealingwiththesechallenges.
Onearealikelytobenefitsignificantlyfromtherecommendedzoningregimeisthemanagement
ofprivaterecreationalanglers.Currently,recreationalfishingismanagedwithbaglimitsandtime
andareaclosures.Giventhatsaltwateranglingisalargeandgrowingsector,andthediversityof
theanglers,recreationalfishingclubshavebeenproposedasawaytobetteraligntheincentives
ofanglerswithconservation(foradiscussionofrecreationalfishingclubs,seeSutinenand
Johnston2003,471).Theclubwouldbeallocatedcatchthatitwouldthendistributetoits
members,andtheclubwouldberesponsibleformonitoringandenforcingthecatchrules.By
creatingsuchanumbrellaorganization,regulatorswouldbeabletoholdtheorganizationliable
forcatchesinexcessofitslimits(e.g.,withholdingcatchthenextyear).Thecreationofdominant
userightstoareasforrecreationalfishingcanbethecatalysttocreatetheclubs,ratherthanthe
usualtopdownplanning,andcanprovidetheclubswithbetterdefinedaccessrights.Thelatteris
criticalforestablishingincentivestomaintainqualityfishinggrounds.
Otherimportantdynamicsarisingfromthecreationofabroadersetofrightsoragroup
ownershipethicarethedevelopmentofacomanagementregimeandamuchneeded
reassessmentofthefocusandscopeoftheregulatoryinstitutionsinvolvedinocean
management.Bothchangeswillhelpusherinanewerainoceangovernanceregime
characterizedbyownershipgroupsworkingcloselywitheachother,national,state,andlocal
governmentstodevelopsustainableruleswithineachzone.
Theconceptofcreatingamosaicofdominantusezonestoimprovetheabilityofcoastal
communitiesandmarinespeciestoadapttochangingoceanconditionsisadmittedlynot
12SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
intuitive.Thisisespeciallytruegiventhefluidityofthemarineenvironment,thelikelihoodfor
shiftsinspeciesranges,andthepotentialchangeintheproductivityofareascausedby
acidificationandalterationsinupwellingevents.
Toskepticsofthepotentialmeritofthisapproach,weprovideanumberofreasonswethinkitis
morelikelytobesuccessfulthanourcurrentsystemandmoretopdownoceanzoningproposals
currentlyonthetable.First,thesystemweenvisionprovidesflexibilitytothegroupsmanaging
theusesinthezonesbypermittinggroupstonegotiatewithotherzones.Forexample,aprivate
NGOrunningaconservationareacouldnegotiatewithrecreationalfishingclubtopermitfishing
withintheareaforgreaterconservationintheclub’szone.Althoughtheseagreementsneedtobe
monitoredtoensurethattheyarenotputtingtheecologicalhealthofthesystematgreaterrisk,
theflexibilitytoworktogetheroutsidetheregulatoryprocessiscritical.Comingattheproblem
frommultiplefrontsandcreatingasystemunderwhichcreativityandingenuitycanflourishwill
improveacoastalcommunity’sabilityforselfadaptation.
Second,climatechangeisunlikelytoturnproductiveareasintowastelands.Thecurrentsetof
biologicalresourceswilllikelybereplacedwithanewsetofspeciesandwithitneweconomic
opportunities—opportunitiesbestlefttobediscoveredbyanimblesetofuserswithadirect
stakeintheoutcome.Fortheothersetofusers,suchaswaveandwindenergy,oilandnatural
gas,andaquacultureoperations,climatechangeislesslikelytohaveasignificantimpactontheir
abilitytooperateinaparticularlocation.Ofcourse,thedeliveryofthesegoodsandservicescan
beaffectedbysealevelriseandtheresultingimpactsoncoastalinfrastructure.ChangesinthePH
andtemperaturemightalsohaveanimpactontheproductivityofaquacultureoperations,but
withthetechnologicaladvancesinoffshoreoperations,thesechangesmightbelowerthan
predicted.Ontheotherhand,ifaquacultureissignificantlyaffectedintheirzone,theycould
negotiatetooperateinanotherzonewheretheburdenofproofwouldbeontheownersofthe
aquaculturefacilitytoshowthatitwouldnothaveanadverseimpactonthedominantuse
designatedforthatzone.
Third,significantadhocandincompletezoningeffortsarealreadyunderwayintheUnitedStates
thatfocusmainlyoncreatingareasofflimitstocommercialandrecreationalfishing(marine
reserves).Insomecases,regulatorsarealsoprescribingotherpermitteduses,suchaspelagic
trollingformigratoryspecies.Theconservationvalueoftheseprograms,ofcourse,issubjectto
thesameclimaticforcesastheproposedmorecomprehensiveoceanzoningregime.The
differenceisthatthemorecomprehensiveapproachdevelopsalargerandmoreflexibletoolbox
thanthelimitedapproach,whichdependsonregulation.
Finally,theallocationofdominantusesandgrouprightswillalsoimprovetheaccountabilityof
users,becausetheycanbeheldresponsibleforchangesintheecologicalhealthoftheirzone.
Accountability,inturn,createsincentivesforthegroupstoworktogethertoensurethattheyare
13SANCHIRICO|RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE
incompliancewiththeecologicalstandardssetforthezone.Inthissense,theopennessofthe
marineenvironmentwillincreasetheincentivetoworktogether,especiallyifactivitiesinone
zonearenegativelyaffectingtheecologyinotherzones.
Conclusion:MovingtheAdaptationAgendaForward
Althoughpredictingallpossiblepermutationsonhowenvironmentalchangewillaffectthe
livelihoodsofcoastalcommunitiesoverthenext10yearsisdifficult,itshouldnotsloweffortsto
createthenecessaryconditionsforautonomousadaptationtoeventsfurtheroffintime.These
conditionsincludehealthyecologicalandeconomiccommunities,wherethelatterisanimportant
precursortotheformer.Startingnowisnecessarybecauseinmanycasesthemarinespecieswill
takedecadestorebuildandcoastalcommunitiesarebeginningtomakelonglivedcapital
investmentsininfrastructuretoaddressclimatechange.Amethodtoimproveeconomic
conditionsrequiresgrantingrightsandresponsibilitiestothosewhousetheocean,becauseit
developsaconstituencywhosewealthandwellbeingaredirectlyconnectedwiththe
environment.
Overthepastyear,thecurrentadministrationandNOAA,theleadagencyinchargeofocean
governance,aretakingstepsconsistentwiththeproposalsjustpresented.Firstisastatedgoalto
increasethenumberoffisherieswithrightsbasedprograms.4Anissue,however,thatcould
impedesuccessisthecurrentlogjamstemmingfromdisputesoverinitialallocationofquota.To
removethelogjam,NOAAshoulddevelopasetofrulesfortheinitialallocationprocesstobethe
defaultnationwide.Councilscoulddeviatefromtheallocationbuttheonuswouldbeonthemto
arguewhy.Forexample,ineveryfishery,70percentisallocatedbasedonavessel’saverage
shareofthetotalallowablecatchoverthelastsevenyears,15percentisauctionedoff,and15
percentisreservedforinnovativecommunitybasedprojects.Thelatterwouldincludeallocations
toportandharbormastersasawaytomaintaineconomicallyviableportsandcoastal
communities.
Anothernoteworthyeffortisonoceangovernanceandincludesapresidentialmemorandum
datedJune12,2009,thatcreatedanInteragencyOceanPolicytaskforce.Itschargeistodevelop
aframeworkforanationaloceanpolicyandformarinespatialplanning.Withrespecttospatial
planning,thememorandumstatesthat5
within180daysfromthedateofthismemorandum,theTaskForceshall
develop,withappropriatepublicinput,arecommendedframeworkforeffective
coastalandmarinespatialplanning.Thisframeworkshouldbea
comprehensive,integrated,ecosystembasedapproachthataddresses
………………………………….
4FormoreinformationonNOAA’sefforts,seehttp://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/.
5Thememorandumisavailableatwww.whitehouse.gov/oceans(lastaccessedonNov.15,2009).
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conservation,economicactivity,userconflict,andsustainableuseofocean,
coastal,andGreatLakesresourcesconsistentwithinternationallaw,including
customaryinternationallawasreflectedinthe1982UnitedNationsConvention
ontheLawoftheSea.
Althoughtheneedformarinespatialplanningeffortisconsistentwithideasjustpresented,itis
notimmediatelyclearthattheframeworkwillencompassmorethanplanning.Planning,
however,needstobecombinedwithadesignationofdominantusezones,asetofecological
standardsforeachzone,anduserrightsarrangementswithinthezones.Weneedanocean
governanceseascapethatrewardsinnovation,permitscontractnegotiations,trades,and
cooperativeregimesanddoesnotrequireregulationtosolveeveryuseconflictthatexistsorwill
exist.
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References
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... Many mechanisms that can help effectively manage the impacts of ocean change on fisheries, some of which already exist, demonstrate how the guidelines we propose can be put into action. For example, rights-based programs can foster a long-term conservation ethic, and adaptive harvest rules can use data technology to inform managers and stakeholders about needed management changes (Costello et al., 2016;Gaines et al., 2018;Sanchirico, 2009). ...
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Boundary spanning – the practice of facilitating knowledge exchange to address complex sustainability challenges – has the potential to align research and policymaking and increase the uptake of research in decision making. But the goals, methods, and outcomes of boundary-spanning activities in the environment sector can be difficult to describe, missing an opportunity to share lessons learned and improve as a community of practice. This paper describes boundary-spanning activities to integrate research about environmental sustainability with federal ocean policy dialogues in the U.S. We describe the process of organizing, facilitating, and learning from a series of meetings in which five interdisciplinary researchers engaged with federal ocean policy audiences. While the longer-term impacts of the activities associated with these meetings are subtle and remain difficult to detect, more immediate outcomes are observable. These include new professional relationships among researchers and policy staff, reported relevance of the research to general policy discourse, and a narrative that frames the opportunity for policymakers to learn from past industrialization on land as they manage an emerging industrial revolution in the ocean. By presenting the process and outcomes of our boundary-spanning activities, we aim to stimulate timely debate within ocean policy, management, and research communities about the importance of multiple benefits provided by healthy and intact ocean ecosystems and how to protect them in the face of the expanding industrialization of the ocean.
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Ocean-zoning arguments often center on the biology of ocean species, the geography of fishing-use patterns, and the need for preventing use conflicts. Here we expand this discussion to the social and legal aspects of ocean zoning, focusing on comprehensive planning, segregation of activities into use-priority areas, and the allocation of user rights within each zone. The inclusion of all of these features within an ocean-zoning regime can be a catalyst for a variety of ancillary benefits, including opportunities for user groups to form informal or formal long-lived institutions and a reassessment of the focus and scope of the regulatory institutions involved in ocean management. Along with the ability of users to negotiate and trade within and between zones, both features will lead to improved conflict resolution, efficiency of use, and ecosystem stability - critical components for the production of ecosystem services and maintenance of biological and human economic benefits.
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"For the past thirty years, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (the Act) has served as the primary legislative mechanism for conserving fish populations in United States marine waters. At the time Congress passed the Act, many of those populations were in jeopardy, the result of decades of virtually unregulated industrial-scale fishing. Throughout the first twenty years of its implementation, the Act was highly ineffective in rebuilding stocks and in preventing other stocks from becoming overfished. During this period, implementation of the Act by the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils focused more on maintaining fishing opportunities for fishermen than it did on maintaining healthy fish populations."
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This paper examines ways to reduce conflicts and improve the sustainability and value of marine recreational fisheries by fully integrating the recreational sector into the management of fisheries. One possibility involves a novel approach, here called angling management organizations (AMOs), which combines three of the more pervasive and promising trends in fishery management worldwide--management devolution, strengthened harvest rights, and co-management. AMOs are community-based organizations that are designed to conform to seven basic principles of integrated fishery management, which are described below. AMOs are loosely related to rights-based producer organizations in commercial fisheries, and are expected to strengthen resource stewardship, reduce enforcement and monitoring costs, alleviate management conflicts, and produce greater long-term net economic benefits in recreational fisheries. The other organizational structures considered here, including the management status quo, do not conform to all seven principles and are not expected to be as effective as AMOs.
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Current global fisheries production of ≈160 million tons is rising as a result of increases in aquaculture production. A number of climate-related threats to both capture fisheries and aquaculture are identified, but we have low confidence in predictions of future fisheries production because of uncertainty over future global aquatic net primary production and the transfer of this production through the food chain to human consumption. Recent changes in the distribution and productivity of a number of fish species can be ascribed with high confidence to regional climate variability, such as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation. Future production may increase in some high-latitude regions because of warming and decreased ice cover, but the dynamics in low-latitude regions are governed by different processes, and production may decline as a result of reduced vertical mixing of the water column and, hence, reduced recycling of nutrients. There are strong interactions between the effects of fishing and the effects of climate because fishing reduces the age, size, and geographic diversity of populations and the biodiversity of marine ecosystems, making both more sensitive to additional stresses such as climate change. Inland fisheries are additionally threatened by changes in precipitation and water management. The frequency and intensity of extreme climate events is likely to have a major impact on future fisheries production in both inland and marine systems. Reducing fishing mortality in the majority of fisheries, which are currently fully exploited or overexploited, is the principal feasible means of reducing the impacts of climate change. • fisheries • net primary production
An overview of the economic benefits of cooperatives and individual fishing quota systems. Written testimony prepared for the Subcommittee for Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and Coast Guard of the Senate Committee on Commerce
  • James N Sanchirico
Sanchirico, James N. 2008. An overview of the economic benefits of cooperatives and individual fishing quota systems. Written testimony prepared for the Subcommittee for Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and Coast Guard of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, July 9, 2008. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. http://www.rff.org.
An adaptation portfolio for the United States coastal and marine environment
  • David Kling
  • James N Sanchirico
Kling, David, and James N. Sanchirico. 2009. An adaptation portfolio for the United States coastal and marine environment. RFF report. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-Rpt-Adaptation-KlingSanchirico.pdf.
Mineral Management Service OCS Mapping Initiative Energy Policy Act of 2005: Implementation Plan for the Multipurpose Marine Cadastre Available at: http://www.mms.gov/ld
  • U S Department
  • Interior
U.S. Department of Interior.Mineral Management Service.2006. OCS Mapping Initiative Energy Policy Act of 2005: Implementation Plan for the Multipurpose Marine Cadastre. Available at: http://www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/MappingInitiative.pdf (Last accessed Nov. 15, 2009).