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WHY MONKEYS AND PIGEONS, UNLIKE CERTAIN APES, CANNOT REASON ANALOGICALLY
Abstract
Recent research indicates that early in life humans and chimpanzees have perceptual and Language-training, or prior experience with cognitive precursors for the development of arbitrarysymbolsfortheabstractconcepts"same higher level analogical information process- and different", appears to be necessary before ing abilities that are not shared by adult or in- chimpanzee or child can judge different pairs of fant macaque monkeys (Thompson, 1995; Th- objects or patterns to be analogically the same. ompson & Oden, 1996). Furthermore, some Comparable training with symbols for "same and form of re-coding via language or analogous different", however, does not enable macaque symbolic
... Over the past 50 years, evidence from anthropological studies has been growing that the 'exclusively human' characteristics which are held most dear can also be found in other species. The long-held supposition that 'lower animals feel no pain' is now 'on its last legs'; Thompson and Ogden [10] have impressively demonstrated that while macaque monkeys and pigeons cannot use analogy as a tool, chimpanzees can and do on a regular basis [11]; the widely published video of Betty the crow manufacturing a hook from a piece of wire to get hold of food [12] has been a shattering revelation! The dethronement of both anthropomorphism and anti-anthropomorphism leaves a descriptive vacuum to be filled. ...
... The second issue is whether Evolutionary mutation is truly random -undirected -or whether some sense of internal or environmental consequence can control mutation in a … -genotype (x-1) -geno- 9 'Pre-fetching' is a computer technique which speeds up applications and services by anticipating their procedural requirements and loading them into memory in advance. 10 … where the textual ambiguity is appropriate. 11 It is worth noting that recent research places the origin of self-reproducing entities at the level of RNA, where two enzymes have been demonstrated to perpetually 'crossreplicate' [18]. ...
... Given effective coupling between short-term and long-term memory we would expect stasis-neglect to be an important factor in judgment of the criticality of particular aspects of our surroundings. However, Thompson and Ogden [10] and Ogden et al. [11] have demonstrated that the use of analogyitself a fundamental component of short-to-long-term coupling and of the transition from episodic to mimetic cognitive processes -is unavailable to neurally-simple animals. In its absence, anticipatory stasis-neglect is unlikely, and such an animal would most probably perpetually feel that it is at the 'sharp end' of Deacon's [2] 'sensory evolution', constantly risking predatory annihilation. ...
René Descartes is habitually associated with the fundamentality of a categorical distinc-tion between mind and matter [1]. Contrarily, Terrence Deacon has described our self-experience, not as a (static) category but as a process: as "what we should expect an evolu-tionary process to feel like" [2]. 'Modernistic' Darwinism would maintain that the pri-mary character of evolution is genetic-mutational randomness. But where, then, does the mind's apparently directed causality of free will come from? Is evolution indeed random? In the light of early 21st century genetics we will question the attribution of environmentally-isolated randomness to evolutionary mutation. We submit that evolu-tion has itself evolved from 'Darwinian' atemporal randomness towards anticipative awareness, auto-catalyzed by Anticipative Capability, which both drives the evolution and bounds it. We consequently argue that the evolutions of survivability, anticipa-tion, consciousness, intelligence, wisdom, evolution itself, and indeed the mind are broadly equivalent. We reject the anthropomorphically convenient categorical separa-tion of entities into 'living' and 'non-living', and note that the manifestation of 'life' indicates a continuity of evolvability and Anticipative Capability between blind inani-mate dependence on Newton's Laws and human technological control. We derive definitions of intelligence, sapience and wisdom from the multiscalar properties of bira-tional hierarchical information-processing, and point out the relevance of mirror neu-rons and empathy to anticipation. Overt anticipatory behavior depends on just those hyperscalar properties of neuronal networks which are responsible for the evolution of the mind through self-observation. We explain how Anticipative Capability in the ab-sence of self-observation is unlikely; that self-observation in the absence of scalar de-velopment is impossible; that emergence of scale corresponds to the emergence of a 'theory of self' in infants; and that the attainment of 'wisdom' in humans is associated with the development of cervical hyperscalarity. We conclude that both the historical development of the mind and its ongoing evolutionary nature can be best characterized by 'survival of the adequately anticipative'.
... Over the past 50 years, evidence from anthropological studies has been growing that the 'exclusively human' characteristics which are held most dear can also be found in other species. The long-held supposition that 'lower animals feel no pain' is now 'on its last legs'; Thompson and Ogden [10] have impressively demonstrated that while macaque monkeys and pigeons cannot use analogy as a tool, chimpanzees can and do on a regular basis [11]; the widely published video of Betty the crow manufacturing a hook from a piece of wire to get hold of food [12] has been a shattering revelation! The dethronement of both anthropomorphism and anti-anthropomorphism leaves a descriptive vacuum to be filled. ...
... Given effective coupling between short-term and long-term memory we would expect stasis-neglect to be an important factor in judgment of the criticality of particular aspects of our surroundings. However, Thompson and Ogden [10] and Ogden et al. [11] have demonstrated that the use of analogyitself a fundamental component of short-to-long-term coupling and of the transition from episodic to mimetic cognitive processesis unavailable to neurallysimple animals. In its absence, anticipatory stasis-neglect is unlikely, and such an animal would most probably perpetually feel that it is at the 'sharp end' of Deacon's [2] 'sensory evolution', constantly risking predatory annihilation. ...
... 'Pre-fetching' is a computer technique which speeds up applications and services by anticipating their procedural requirements and loading them into memory in advance.10 … where the textual ambiguity is appropriate. ...
Abstract: René Descartes is habitually associated with the fundamentality of a categorical distinction between mind and matter [1]. Contrarily, Terrence Deacon has described our self-experience, not as a (static) category but as a process: as “what we should expect an evolutionary process to feel like” [2]. ‘Modernistic’ Darwinism would maintain that the primary character of evolution is genetic-mutational randomness. But where, then, does the mind’s apparently directed causality of free will come from? Is evolution indeed random? In the light of early 21st century genetics we will question the attribution of environmentally-isolated randomness to evolutionary mutation. We submit that evolution has itself evolved from ‘Darwinian’ atemporal randomness towards anticipative awareness, auto-catalyzed by Anticipative Capability, which both drives the evolution and bounds it. We consequently argue that the evolutions of survivability, anticipation, consciousness, intelligence, wisdom, evolution itself, and indeed the mind are broadly equivalent. We reject the anthropomorphically convenient categorical separation of entities into ‘living’ and ‘non-living’, and note that the manifestation of ‘life’ indicates a continuity of evolvability and Anticipative Capability between blind inanimate dependence on Newton’s Laws and human technological control. We derive definitions of intelligence, sapience and wisdom from the multiscalar properties of birational hierarchical information-processing, and point out the relevance of mirror neurons and empathy to anticipation. Overt anticipatory behavior depends on just those hyperscalar properties of neuronal networks which are responsible for the evolution of the mind through self-observation. We explain how Anticipative Capability in the absence of self-observation is unlikely; that self-observation in the absence of scalar development is impossible; that emergence of scale corresponds to the emergence of a ‘theory of self’ in infants; and that the attainment of ‘wisdom’ in humans is associated with the development of cervical hyperscalarity. We conclude that both the historical development of the mind and its ongoing evolutionary nature can be best characterized by: ‘survival of the adequately anticipative’.
... The longheld supposition that 'lower animals feel no pain' is now 'on its last legs'. Thompson and Ogden (1998) have impressively demonstrated that while macaque monkeys and pigeons cannot use analogy as a tool, chimpanzees can and do on a regular basis . The internet-published video of Betty the crow manufacturing a hook from a piece of wire to get hold of food (Weir et al, 2002) was a shattering revelation! ...
Living organisms survive through their generation and use of internal models of themselves and of their environments. Homo sapiens internalizes the environment through modeling in such a way that it can effectively be artificially present at any number of different external locations. While this capacity is clearly advantageous for survival, it may well have yet another 'meaning'. We believe that entities internalize their environment in a local attempt to reunify the fragmented global landscape of which they are a part. This paper charts the argumentational route which must be taken to justify this hypothesis.
Die Denkpsychologie befasst sich mit der Beschreibung, Erklärung und Vorhersage menschlichen Denkens. Ein wichtiger Aspekt des Denkens ist das Erschließen neuen Wissens aus bisher bekanntem Wissen, z. B. über das Bilden von Analogien. Diese Fähigkeit nutzen wir u. a., um kausale Zusammenhänge zu erschließen, komplexe Probleme zu bearbeiten oder kreative Lösungen zu entwickeln. Wie eng diese Elemente miteinander verknüpft sind, zeigt sich beim Problemlösen. Häufig ist hier nicht nur der Weg zum Ziel unbekannt. Das Ziel selbst kann unscharf definiert sein, zusätzlich kann eine Vielzahl vernetzter und sich verändernder Elemente die Problemsituation beeinflussen. Den Umgang mit solch komplexen Situationen vereinfachen Menschen durch die Nutzung sog. Heuristiken, erfahrungsabhängiger Faustregeln, die rasche Entscheidungen ermöglichen, jedoch nicht mit Sicherheit zur Problemlösung führen. Das Lösen von Problemen erfordert oft auch die Fähigkeit, neue Verbindungen zwischen Wissenselementen herzustellen, also kreativ zu denken. Und immer sind diese Prozesse an Emotionen gebunden, die unser Denken fördern, aber auch behindern können. So begünstigt eine positive Stimmung einerseits die Kreativität im Denken, andererseits führt sie häufiger zu typischen Denkfehlern.
This paper is exploring whether analogy-making as an early developing ability could potentially help children to develop deductive reasoning ability and in particular, transitive inference. In addition the study is intending to explore whether young children have relativistic understanding of relations. One experiment is presented and the age of children studied in it is 4 years of age. The results showed that both groups Control group and the Draw-bar+train group could solve transitive inference tasks but children in the second group are significantly better in both measurements. The empirical findings support Halford's suggestions that deductive reasoning is being developed on the basis of children's ability to make analogies.
Does language make moral cognition possible? Some authors like Andy Clark have argued for a positive answer whereby language and the ways people use it mark a fundamental divide between humans and all other animals with respect to moral thinking (Clark, Mind and morals: essays on cognitive science and ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996; Moral Epistemol Nat Can J Philos Suppl XXVI, 2000a; Moral Epistemol Nat Can J Philos Suppl XXVI, 2000b; Philosophy of mental representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 37–43 and discussion, 44–61, 2002). I take issue with Clark’s view and argue that language is probably unnecessary for the emergence of moral cognition. I acknowledge, however, that humans unlike other animals seem to posses what Haugeland in Philosophy of mental representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002) terms ‘norm-hungriness’: an idiosyncratic need or desire to create and abide by a multitude of norms. Our peculiar norm-hungriness, I suggest, depends on what can be called florid control rather than on language.
This paper is exploring whether analogy-making as an early developing ability could potentially help children to develop deductive reasoning ability and in particular, transitive inference. Two experiments are presented. In the first one transitive mapping is explored further to make sure children at the age of 4 can do the transitive mapping task even when all three objects are hidden and no perceptual clues are available. After demonstrating that children can do that, the second experiment shows that the train analogy can help children correctly solve the transitive inference task. The empirical findings support Halford's suggestions that deductive reasoning is being developed on the basis of children's ability to make analogies.
Studied analogical reasoning in a 16-yr-old female chimpanzee (Sarah) in 5 experiments. The general design of the analogy problems was "A – B same A′ – B′," where same was Sarah's plastic symbol for "same." Sarah solved analogy problems with 2 types of displays: (a) forced choice, in which she had to complete an analogy by choosing the correct B′ from a set of alternatives (Exps I, II, and IV) and (b) same–different, in which she had to complete an analogy by choosing the correct predicate, same or different (Exps III and V). In addition, she correctly solved both figural analogy problems, in which the stimuli were geometric figures and the relations among them were differences in size, color, or marking (Exps I-III), and conceptual analogy problems, in which the stimuli were household objects and the relations were functional and spatial (Exps IV and V). The data indicate that Sarah used the relation between A and A′ to solve the analogy problems. A list of stimuli used in the studies is included. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Some regularities enjoy only an attenuated existence in a body of training data. These are regularities whose statistical visibility depends on some systematic recoding of the data. The space of possible recodings is, however, infinitely large type-2 problems. they are standardly solved! This presents a puzzle. How, given the statistical intractability of these type-2 cases, does nature turn the trick? One answer, which we do not pursue, is to suppose that evolution gifts us with exactly the right set of recoding biases so as to reduce specific type-2 problems to (tractable) type-1 mappings. Such a heavy-duty nativism is no doubt sometimes plausible. But we believe there are other, more general mechanisms also at work. Such mechanisms provide general (not task-specific) strategies for managing problems of type-2 complexity. Several such mechanisms are investigated. At the heart of each is a fundamental ploy representational redescription language and culture – may themselves be viewed as adaptations enabling this representation/computation trade-off to be pursued on an even grander scale.
Analogy and similarity are often assumed to be distinct psychological processes. In contrast to this position, the authors suggest that both similarity and analogy involve a process of structural alignment and mapping, that is, that similarity is like analogy. In this article, the authors first describe the structure-mapping process as it has been worked out for analogy. Then, this view is extended to similarity, where it is used to generate new predictions. Finally, the authors explore broader implications of structural alignment for psychological processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Do monkeys perceive abstract relations in handled object pairs ?
- N Chaudhri
- L Ghazi
- R K R Thompson
- D L Oden
Chaudhri, N., Ghazi, L., Thompson, R. K. R., &
Oden, D. L. (1997). Do monkeys perceive
abstract relations in handled object pairs ?
Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Eastern Psychological Association.