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The Golem: What You Should Know about Science
Abstract
Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch liken science to the Golem, a creature from Jewish mythology, powerful yet potentially dangerous, a gentle, helpful creature that may yet run amok at any moment. Through a series of intriguing case studies the authors debunk the traditional view that science is the straightforward result of competent theorisation, observation and experimentation. The very well-received first edition generated much debate, reflected in a substantial new Afterword in this second edition, which seeks to place the book in what have become known as ‘the science wars’.
... Here it is useful to link with Harry Collins' work on expertise in science and medicine (Collins & Pinch, 1998, 2005Collins & Evans, 2007). Collins and Evans (2007) demarcate specialist tacit knowledge held by active practitioners from ubiquitous tacit knowledge held by the general lay public. ...
Professions are one means of organizing the delivery of goods and services. In this paper, the authors consider how the power and control of professional groups can change within specific fields of work due to a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Their case study is the changing role of UK architects within the private residential sector over the post-war period. The architect was once the primary actor who brought together, organized, and integrated the workflow of a myriad of contractors, legal agencies, and planning authorities, but this is no longer the case. To understand how this occurred, and whether the architectural profession could regain a key position in the UK housing industry, the authors conduct a broad historical analysis of the factors at play within the UK architectural profession and the industry as a whole that have resulted in this shift in knowledge, roles and power.
... Here it is useful to link with Harry Collins' work on expertise in science and medicine (Collins & Pinch, 1998. demarcate specialist tacit knowledge held by active practitioners from ubiquitous tacit knowledge held by the general lay public. ...
Academics generally present the acquisition of academic proficiency as a learning process dedicated to specializing in an area of expertise. During their careers, scholars are expected to develop their academic profile by progressively building on their knowledge and their professional networks in their chosen specialty. However, prompted by reflections on their own experiences and by exploratory conversations with colleagues, the authors find that this portrayal of streamlined professionalization in academia hides playful deviations from the primary path into new intellectual and social spaces. They introduce the notion of a Spielwiese [literally: playing meadow] to describe these spaces, how they emerge, and how academics engage with them. The authors conclude by laying the groundwork for a typology and outline a research agenda for Spielwiesen in academia, whose utilizers should consider national career systems, disciplinary contexts, and different cohorts and career stages.
... 9 We will focus on philosophical critiques of the value-free ideal in this paper. For sociological critiques, see Barnes (1977), Latour and Woolgar (1986), and Collins and Pinch (1993). For historical critiques, see Kuhn (1962;. ...
In recent years, many philosophers of science have rejected the “value-free ideal” for science, arguing that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in scientific inquiry. However, this philosophical position raises the question of how to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influences of values in science. In this paper, we argue that those seeking to address this “new” demarcation problem can benefit by drawing lessons from the “old” demarcation problem, in which philosophers tried to find a way of distinguishing between science and non-science. Many of those who worked on this problem ultimately found that efforts to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for defining science failed, and most concluded that the best solution to the problem was to characterize scientific hypotheses, theories, and research programs in terms of some common norms. We suggest that those seeking to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate value influences on science would do well to adopt a similar approach. Rather than attempting to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying appropriate value influences, it will be more fruitful to evaluate scientific activities based on their adherence to a set of epistemic and ethical norms that can be implemented in scientific practice by means of rules, conventions, policies, and procedures.
... The position of 'mechanical' objectivity of quantification as 'knowledge based completely on explicit rules' (Porter, 1995, p. 7) is what the REF was set up to achieve. A range of studies show the importance of distant objectivity, 'the view from nowhere' (Nagel, 1986) as a way to manage demands of public accountability (Collins & Pinch, 1993;Jasanoff, 1990Jasanoff, , 2011Jasanoff, , 2012. ...
The Research Excellence Framework (REF) is a UK policy tool for distributing government funding and an important indicator of the academic status of a UK university. The legitimacy of the policy comes from peers' consensus on what academic quality is. We are interested in how the REF enables this funding distribution by determining the academic quality of a broad array of different forms of research through a single peer-review process. As they search for academic quality that is contingent to a specific epistemology and requires more time than the REF allows, how do academics agree to agree, and within constraints of a given timeframe? Interviews with REF panellists and their accounts of the process lead us to suggest that the consensus is enacted by setting up a situation: the mechanics of the REF with its practices of benchmarking, scoring, calibrating, and normalizing. This situation sets the boundaries of reviewing and, in doing so, propels peers to shift from assessment contingent on epistemic commitments to evaluation on a single scale. We argue that this shift renders academic quality distinct from scientific or epistemic quality.
... Technical expertise does not by itself lower the temperature of controversy or mitigate political disputes (Nelkin, 1975), and controversies often also involve the legitimacy of who is able to provide reliable expertise or be present at the table to make decisions (Nelkin & Hilgartner, 1986). Disputes around trust and values tend to become highly visible in controversies, as STS literature has extensively shown (Collins & Pinch, 1998;Lynch & Cole, 2005). ...
This open access book explores the relevance of the concept of technology assessment (TA) on an international and global level. Technologies play a key role in addressing global challenges such as climate change, population aging, digitization, and health. At the same time, their use increases the need for coordinated action and governance at the global level in the field of science, technology and innovation (STI).
Featuring case studies on STI fields such as energy, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and health technology, as well as TA activities at the national and international levels, this book reflects on the challenges and opportunities of global technology governance. It also provides an in-depth discussion of current governmental STI cultures and systems, societal expectations, and the policy priorities needed to achieve coordinated and effective STI intervention in policymaking and public debate at the global level. Lastly, the book promotes the establishment of a forum for a truly global dialogue of TA practitioners, fostering the articulation of their needs, knowledge and perspectives.
... Technical expertise does not by itself lower the temperature of controversy or mitigate political disputes (Nelkin, 1975), and controversies often also involve the legitimacy of who is able to provide reliable expertise or be present at the table to make decisions (Nelkin & Hilgartner, 1986). Disputes around trust and values tend to become highly visible in controversies, as STS literature has extensively shown (Collins & Pinch, 1998;Lynch & Cole, 2005). ...
This chapter examines the governance of health technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic and reflects on three interrelated challenges that need to be addressed in future assessment approaches for achieving systemic resilience: problems of scale, trust and politics. The chapter focuses on digital surveillance technologies and vaccines, two cornerstones in the efforts to mitigate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 around the globe. Tracing apps were introduced in many countries, but their effectiveness has been constrained by issues of data privacy, insufficient interoperability and digital inequalities. In parallel, a global research race enabled the development of different vaccines with unprecedented speed, building on innovative biotechnologies. However, vaccination worldwide was marked by disparities in access and controversy. We conclude that governance and assessment should be built around strong international coordination and cooperation, without limiting local experimental learning and innovation. Further, public trust should be considered as a necessary condition for the success of any technological innovation in the health context. As trust in policymakers, academia and industry is strongly context-specific, global governance should also be sensitive to the diversity of social and cultural contexts. Finally, to improve overall systemic resilience, global power imbalances should be addressed in all phases of the innovation process.
Contemporary school science education is instrumental, its rationale interwoven in neoliberal discourse. Given the problems schools and science education are faced with in a diverse and uncertain world there needs to be a fundamental re-thinking of what is entailed by learning and understanding science. I argue that Vision I and Vision II approaches are not fit for purpose for a socially eco-just society. I identify political and epistemological issues which arose in the process of trying to socialise science in my own teaching experience, and why some genuinely radical formulations fall short. I propose the metatheory of Critical Realism which enables a pedagogy that situates social justice and sustainability at the core of science teaching without diluting understanding of core scientific concepts. On the contrary a Critical Realist approach not only enables consideration of the socio-political nature of science but both deepens and problematises its concepts. I draw on a detailed example to illustrate its core ideas in a science education context. Critical Realism offers the prospect of an epistemological solution to learning science which foregrounds philosophical, political and social dilemmas.KeywordsCritical realismEpistemologySocial justiceNeoliberalism
Giving humility a key role in scientific practice and communication would improve its objective social function—that is, the production of knowledge about our world and its application to the improvement of the human condition—and its public acceptance. This article reviews the limits of science arising from systemic, epistemic, methodological, and individual limitations and links them to the phenomena in scientific practice that they originate from. The reflection invites us to consider science from the point of view of its limits in situations where there is difficulty in reaching a consensus but also when a consensus has indeed been achieved. Science and technology reflect who we are as individuals and as a society and inherit both our virtues and weaknesses. Humility is the key to getting technoscience that brings us closer to the truth and helps us advance toward improving the human condition. Humbler science becomes a better science.
"Learned behavior has been reported to be transferred as a result of injecting RNA-containing fractions from the brains of trained rats (donors) into untrained rats (recipients)… . In 18 experiments no clear evidence of a transfer of any of these kinds of training from trained donors to recipients was found." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This paper examines some of the social processes involved in the replication of experiments on planarian worms. In conformity with the results of a previous study by Collins, scientists are shown to be conducting negotiations over the characteristics of the expenmental phenomenon in question. Evidence is also presented to show that explanations and arguments that would normally be thought of as part of the philosophy or sociology of science became issues In the scientific debate.
Scientific knowledge is a communal belief system with a dubious grip on reality, according to a widely quoted school of sociologists. But they ignore crucial evidence that contradicts this allegation.
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.5.203
The problem of the observational determination of the light-deflection in the gravitational field of the Sun, as predicted by Einstein's General Theory of Relativity, is outlined. All available results obtained at eclipse expeditions until now, as far as these have been successful, and their critical discussions are briefly summarized. Each set of observations is represented diagrammatically by the particular star field, and the published measures are shown for each star separately. The relevant details of each attempt are tabulated. An extensive bibliography covers most of the essential work on the problem.