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A review of the powers of bail bond agents and bounty hunters: Exploring legalities and illegalities of quasi-criminal justice officials

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Abstract

Bail bond agents and bounty hunters are integral figures within the United States criminal justice system. Their job is to ensure that an individual who has been released from jail on bail returns to court for his or her scheduled court appearance. This article addresses the legal environment surrounding bail bond agents and their subcontracted bounty hunters, as well as the extra-legal violence and constitutional rights violations committed by them. This legal analysis is developed by examining state court decisions dating back to the nineteenth century. Historical and contemporary trends in the law are illustrated throughout the article with respect to bail bond agents and bounty hunters. Using inductive legal research methodology, the cases are divided into two constitutional areas, outlining the types of issues state courts litigate: the legitimacy/legality of arrests and bail bond agents entering third-party residences. The article concludes that although bail agents and bounty hunters have been criticized in the past for exercising their extra-legal authority, state statutes and state court cases have modified the bail bond system, rendering it more amenable to the rule of law.
A review of the powers of bail bond agents and bounty hunters: Exploring
legalities and illegalities of quasi-criminal justice ofcials
Shannon M. Baker
c,2
, Michael S. Vaughn
b,
, Volkan Topalli
a,1
a
Department of Criminal Justice, Partnership for Urban Health Research, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 4018, Atlanta, GA 30302-4018, United States
b
College of Criminal Justice, Institute for Legal Studies in Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77341-2296, United States
c
Ofce of International Services, Vanderbilt University, Student Life Center, 310 25th Avenue South, Suite 103, Nashville TN 37203, United States
article info abstract
Article history:
Received 10 May 2007
Accepted 25 February 2008
Available online 18 March 2008
Bail bond agents and bounty hunters are integral gures within the United States criminal
justice system. Their job is to ensure that an individual who has been released from jail on bail
returns to court for his or her scheduled court appearance. This article addresses the legal
environment surrounding bail bond agents and their subcontracted bounty hunters, as well as
the extra-legal violence and constitutional rights violations committed by them. This legal
analysis is developed by examining state court decisions dating back to the nineteenth century.
Historical and contemporary trends in the law are illustrated throughout the article with
respect to bail bond agents and bounty hunters. Using inductive legal research methodology,
the cases are divided into two constitutional areas, outlining the types of issues state courts
litigate: the legitimacy/legality of arrests and bail bond agents entering third-party residences.
The article concludes that although bail agents and bounty hunters have been criticized in the
past for exercising their extra-legal authority, state statutes and state court cases have modied
the bail bond system, rendering it more amenable to the rule of law.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Law enforcement
Legal arrest
Legal processes
Criminals
Defendants
Criminal justice
Contents
1. Methods .........................................................125
1.1. Roles and functions performed by the bail bond system ...............................125
1.2. Problems with the bail bond system ........................................125
1.3. Court precedents that regulate the actions of bail bond agents and bounty hunters ..................126
2. The legitimacy/legality of arrests .............................................126
2.1. Summary of the legitimacy/legality of arrests ....................................127
3. Bail bond agents entering third-party residences ......................................127
3.1. Cases where entering a third-party residence is not authorized ...........................127
3.2. Cases where entering a third-party residence is authorized .............................128
3.3. Summary of bail bond agents entering third-party residences ............................129
4. Discussion ........................................................ 129
5. Conclusion ........................................................ 129
References ..........................................................130
Aggression and Violent Behavior 13 (2008) 124130
The authors wish to thank the following for their insights, commentary, and support: Sue Carter Collins, Dean A. Dabney, and Richard J. Terrill. Any errors are
those of the authors.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 936 294 1349; fax: +1 936 294 1653.
E-mail addresses: shannon.m.baker@vanderbilt.edu (S.M. Baker), mvaughn@shsu.edu (M.S. Vaughn), vtopalli@gsu.edu (V. Topalli).
1
Tel.: +1 404 413 1033; fax: +1 404 413 1030.
2
Tel.: +1 615 343 7467; fax: +1 615 343 7757.
1359-1789/$ see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.avb.2008.02.003
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Aggression and Violent Behavior
Use of bail and release from jail for those awaiting trial and court appearances has been part of the United States criminal justice
system since its inception (Chamberlin, 1998; DeHaas, 1940; Drimmer, 1996; Duker,1977; Kaufman,1999). The U.S. system of bail
and bond is derived from English Common law (DeHaas, 1940; Duker, 1977). Bail is necessary because there are not enough jails to
hold arrestees awaiting court appearances (Chamberlin, 1998; Patrick, 1999). Bail bond agents supply funds so a person charged
with a crime can be released from jail until their scheduled court appearance. In return, the bond agent collects a fee but is
nancially liable if the accused fails to appear in court. When an accused skips bail, bond agents are armed with widespread power
to capture them and bring them to court, often hiring bounty hunters (Burns, Kinkade, & Leone, 2003; Toborg, 1983).
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 85% of defendants released on surety bond
3
made all scheduled court appearances
compared with only 58% of defendants released on an unsecured bond. One study reported that 25% of felony defendants released
on their own recognizance failed to appear at trial (Patrick, 1999). In New York, an estimated 35,000 people jump bail each year
(Chamberlin, 1998; Patrick, 1999). Bail bond agents, therefore, contract with bounty hunters to pursue and apprehend between 87%
and 99% of all defendants who skip bail (Chamberlin, 1998; Patrick, 1999).
1. Methods
This article presents a legal analysis of all criminal state appellate court rulings that have established limits or modied powers
of bail bond agents and bounty hunters. Since the article focuses on criminal case law, all civil cases were eliminated from the
analysis. Cases were located through a West Law and Lexis-Nexis search of all state court criminal cases, illustrating the current
state of the law. In the allstatesdatabase in West Law, keywords searched to identify cases included bail bond agent,”“bounty
hunter,”“criminal lawsand Taylor vs. Taintor.The Taylor decision was selected because it has been the most cited and relevant
case for bail related law. Of the 52 cases uncovered in the search, 38 were relevant and reported in this article. Cases dating back to
the nineteenth century, along with cases decided within the past decade, show how the courts have dealt with problematic
behavior (i.e., corruption, excessive force, false imprisonment) that has plagued the U.S. bail system. Using inductive legal research
methodology, the cases were divided into two distinct themes: the legitimacy/legality of arrests and bail bond agents entering
third-party residences. This analysis illustrates how bail bond agents function as quasi-criminal justice personnel.
1.1. Roles and functions performed by the bail bond system
Although at times heavily criticized for operating outside the rule of law and engaging in excessive violence, the commercial
bail system is intact and expanding, in part because governmental entities rely on bond agents and bounty hunters to relieve the
costs associated with pre-trial incarceration (Stout,1997). The cost to jail one inmate in 1994 was estimated to be as high as $17,000
per year (Joiner, 1999). Budget shortfalls (Ruback & Bergstrom, 2006) and the transfer of legal authority to private sector bonding
agents have led bounty hunters to carry out tasks originally performed by the criminal justice system, including arrest and
transportation of defendants to court (Feeley & Rubin, 1998).
Bail bond agents also serve a utilitarian purpose by offering defendants legal advice, recommending attorneys, reminding them
of their court dates and assigned court rooms, and advising them about the proceedings to which they are subject (Toborg, 1983).
Moreover, bond agents assist courts administratively by clearing up mistakes and by identifying mandated court dates.
1.2. Problems with the bail bond system
Both bail bond agents and bounty hunters have long been criticized for their roles in the criminal justice system (Beeley, 1927).
Critics claim that the system is outdated, corrupt, and operates independently of a democratic society based on the rule of law
(Hansen, 1981; Kaufman, 1999). Because both bail bond agents and bounty hunters are considered private actors, they are
sometimes free from constitutional constraints placed on criminal justice agents acting under the color of law (Vaughn & Coomes,
1995). In many cases, this permits bail bond agents and their subcontracted bounty hunters to use extra-legal violence to enter a
suspect's home without a warrant, arrest a suspect using excessive force, and/or search and apprehend a suspect without
government authorization (Burton, 1990; Kaufman, 1999).
Such unchecked authority at times has resulted in excessive use of force, false imprisonment, destruction of property, and arrest
of innocent citizens (Drimmer, 1996; Goldfarb, 1967). In some cases, the lack of formal regulation has encouraged individuals to
assume the role of bounty hunterwithout ofcial consent or authority. In 1997, ve bounty huntersbroke into a Phoenix home,
held several individuals at gunpoint, and eventually murdered a young couple (Chamberlin, 1998; Kaufman, 1999). While a police
investigation discovered that the men were not actual bounty hunters, the fact that they chose to commit these crimes by
disguising themselves as bounty hunters feeds into the public perception that bounty hunters are vigilantes (Drimmer, 1997).
Corruption also exists between bail bond agents and criminal justice employees. It has been reported that some judges accept
bribes from bond agents, while other bond agents have given gifts to state ofcials (Freed & Wald, 1964; Kaufman, 1999). In
Arizona, a bail bond agent was convicted of organized criminal activity, including money laundering, improper inuence peddling,
and bribing public ofcials (Kaufman, 1999). Research also indicates that many bounty hunters are felons with criminal records
(Drimmer, 1996; Kaufman, 1999). A 23 state bail bond organization located in Cleveland, for example, was led by a felon and an
3
A surety bond allows release of the defendant to a bail bond agent in exchange for money, while an unsecured bond permits the release of the defendant
usually on their own recognizance and without any monetary bail being set.
125S.M. Baker et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 13 (2008) 124130
arms smuggler (Kaufman, 1999). Finally, police ofcers in Georgia faced controversy regarding their relationships with bail bond
agents (Kaufman, 1999). Suspicions concerning the DUI sweeps and roadblocks conducted by a Georgia State Patrol Commander
led to the discovery that he had been using information supplied by bail bond agents in deciding when and where to set up illegal
trafc checkpoints.
1.3. Court precedents that regulate the actions of bail bond agents and bounty hunters
The current bail bond system is criticized because it is heavily based on the dated New York state decision of Nicolls v. Ingersoll
(1810) and the nineteenth century decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taintor (1873).InNicolls, the Supreme Court of
New York held that (1) the bail bond agent may appoint another to take and surrender their principal (i.e., the defendant to whicha
bond has been applied), (2) that the person appointed by the bail bond agent may transport the defendant to another state at any
time and in any place, and (3) the bail bond agent may break open the outer door of the house to apprehend the defendant.
The Taylor court expanded the powers of the bail bond agent to include (1) continued custody over the defendant who is outon
bail, (2) seizure of the defendant without obtaining a warrant, (3) imprisonment of the defendant until he or she can be taken into
state custody, (4) utilization of bounty hunters to return bail skippers, (5) pursuit of defendants into other states, and (6) breaking
into and entering defendants' dwellings.
Although criticized as outdated, Nicolls and Taylor remain the law throughout the U.S. with respect to bail bond agents and
bounty hunters.
4
These cases established that neither bail bond agents nor bounty hunters are considered government agents,
making it difcult to limit their activities. Most signicantly, a majority of courts have ruled that the Fourth
5
and Fourteenth
Amendments
6
do not apply to bail bond agents or bounty hunters (Stout, 1997), giving them the legal authority to operate outside
the common understanding of the rule of law. The article focuses on two constitutional areasthe right to arrest and the right to
search third-party residencesthat have been addressed by the courts. Concluding that court cases have restricted some of the
powers of bail bond agents and bounty hunters, this analysis helps shed light on the quasi-criminal justice roles carried out by bail
bond agents and bounty hunters.
2. The legitimacy/legality of arrests
The following cases explore the legality of an arrest made by a bail bond agent or bounty hunter. Legality of arrest issues
typically arise in circumstances involving, the execution of a warrant that did not have the bail agent's name on it, the amount of
force a bounty hunter may use while making an arrest, and the rights of bail agents and bounty hunters to apprehend bail skippers.
In Linder v. State (1987), the issue was the validityof executing a warrant that did not have the bounty hunter's name printed on
it. Appellant Daniel Linder, a licensed bail bond agent in Brazos County, Texas, had obtained a copy of a warrant for Steven Woods
from a bail bond company and proceeded to Woods' home to arrest him. When Woods revealed himself, Linder handcuffed him
and took him to the sheriff's ofce. Linder was later convicted of kidnapping.
On appeal, Linder argued that his arrest of Woods was valid because Woods willingly accompanied him to the sheriff's ofce.
The Texas Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that Woods was apprehended through coercion and threat. Linder
additionally said that he satised the requirements of Texas law, which states that the bond holder must secure an arrest warrant
for the bail skipper and that the warrant only demonstrated an error of form, not substance. The court also rejected this argument,
saying that Texas law required that if anyone other than a licensed law enforcement ofcer executes a warrant that person must be
specically named in the warrant.
Seeking to establish the defense of mistake, Linder argued that he received wrong advice from the district attorney about
whether he could arrest Woods, through which he sought to establish the defense of mistake. Upholding Linder's conviction, the
court held that the defense of mistake of law does not apply to oral advice given by an attorney.
Mistake of law and unlawful restraint were also raised in State v. Nugent (1986). Here, Frederick Nugent was a professional bail
bond agent. The bail skipper, William Barraso, failed to make a court appearance and a re-arrest warrant was subsequently issued.
After receiving a tip about Barraso's whereabouts and conrming that he had two outstanding arrest warrants, Nugent went to
Barraso's dwelling and was given consent to enter. He then told Barraso to accompany him to the police stationwhere Nugent was
told that the warrant had not been issued in that district. Nugent was arrested and convicted for unlawful restraint.
On appeal, Nugent claimed that the trial court erred by failing to consider mistake of law and by instructing the jury that it was
unlawful for the bail bond agent to restrain the victim. The court agreed with Nugent, ruling that the jury instructions regarding the
restraint of the victim were incorrect, referring to the common law in Taylor, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the bonding
company can seize the bail skipper and deliver him whenever possible. The Taylor Court also maintained that, absent any state
statute, the bond holder does not need any legal process to apprehend the principal; therefore, Nugent was exonerated.
Bennett v. State (1983) was a Georgia case that addressed the amount of force a bail bond agent can use when making an arrest.
Bennett was hired by a bond agent to apprehend bail skipper, Charles Brannon, after Brannon failed to appear for trial. Bennett went
to Brannon's residence, red a shot in his backyard, kicked in his front door, and beat Brannon on the head and face with a pistol.
4
Also see Reese v. U.S. (1869), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that bail bond agents are similar to jail guards and may exercise total control over their
principals in order that they make their court appearance.
5
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.
6
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens due process and equal protection.
126 S.M. Baker et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 13 (2008) 124130
While Bennett was found guilty of simple assault, he based his appeal on two grounds. First, he argued that the trial court erred by
improperly instructing the jury on the rights a bail bond agent has to seize an arrestee. Second, Bennett maintained that the trial
court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on the rights of a bail bond agent to use force when seizing a bail skipper.
The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected Bennett's seizure argument, holding that bounty hunters must follow the same seizure
rules as law enforcement ofcers. Next, the court addressed the excessive force claim. Citing the laws police ofcers must follow
when using force in an arrest situation, the court noted that in Mullis v. State (1943), the Georgia Supreme Court held that an ofcer
can use no more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, and cannot use violence disproportionate to the
resistance offered.Since Brannon was being arrested for failure to appear for a D.U.I. charge and had not resisted arrest, the
Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that the use of force was unreasonable, afrming the conviction.
In State v. Everett (1988), defendant Everett was hired by a bail bond agent to apprehend his principal, George Crawford. Everett
located Crawford near his residence, handcuffed him, and took him to his car. A short time later, Everett shot Crawford. Everett
contended that Crawford jumped from the car and began eeing. Everett red one warning shot and two additional rounds at
Crawford. Crawford, on the other hand, maintained that Everett pushed him out of the automobile and shot him in the back.
Everett was convicted of aggravated battery.
On appeal, Everett made two arguments. First, Everett argued that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury about the
rights a bounty hunter has with respect to making warrantless arrests and transporting fugitives across state lines. The Louisiana
Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Everett additionally claimed that because bounty hunters have the authority to arrest
fugitives, his actions were within the connes of the law. Afrming the conviction and sentence, the court found that Everett's use
of force while making the arrest was unreasonable and therefore was not justied.
Other cases acknowledge the distinction between bail bond agents and governmental agents. For example, the case of
Commonwealth v. Elmobdy (2003) involved a bail bond company and its agents, who sought and apprehended Aymen Elmobdy
after he failed to make a court appearance. Robert Clark, an agent of the bond company, later located Elmobdy in a hotel.
Accompanied by two of the bonding company's subcontractors, Clark knocked on Elmobdy's door and identied himself. After
being refused entry, Clark received permission from the hotel manager to throw a brick at Elmobdy's window, at which point
Elmobdy ran out of the room and was subdued with pepper spray. When Elmobdy was later told that he had to pay for the broken
window, he told the bond agent that he had money in his bag. Upon opening the bag, the agent found money, marijuana, and a
loaded rearm. The bail bond agents gave the bag to the hotel employees and asked them to call the police. Denying Elmobdy's
motion to suppress the evidence, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the bail bond agents had not violated his
constitutional rights.
To determine whether the trial court erred in failing to grant Elmobdy's motion to suppress, the court rst had to decide
whether the bail bond agents could be considered state actors. Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution protect persons against government-authorized unreasonable searches and seizures; however,
neither protects individuals from searches and seizures conducted by private persons. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. (1982), which statedthat a private individual is regarded as a state actor if he or she acts as an instrument
or agent of the state, the court upheld the denial of Elmobdy's motion to suppress because none of the three bonding agents was
law enforcement ofcers, they were employed by the private bail bonds company, their actions were focused on apprehending
Elmobdy, they only searched his bag at his request, and they did not speak with law enforcement until after they found the
marijuana.
2.1. Summary of the legitimacy/legality of arrests
Cases discussed above illustrate the complex legal environment surrounding the arrest and apprehension powers of bail bond
agents and bounty hunters. In Linder v. State (1987), the bail bond agent's actions were unlawful because his name was not written
on the arrest warrant. In State v. Nugent (1986), the court followed Taylor and a state law, nding that the restraint of the victim
was not unlawful because no legal process was required for Nugent to arrest the bail skipper. In Bennett v. State (1983) and State v.
Everett (1988), courts ruled that the defendants' arrest of the bail skipper was illegal based on the unnecessary use of force. Finally,
in Commonwealth v. Elmobdy (2003), the court held that the bond agents were not state actors and could also cross state lines to
apprehend the principal. What these cases demonstrate is that bail bond agents and bounty hunters frequently abuse their extra-
legal authority when pursuing bail skippers.
3. Bail bond agents entering third-party residences
A series of state court decisions show that bounty huntersdo possess some rights to enter a third party's dwelling and to legally
arrest the bail jumpers. A bail bond agent's right to forcibly enter the principal's residence was rst established in Taylor, which
held that a bounty hunter may break into, enter, and seize a bail skipper. Cases below examine whether the common law rule
established in Taylor extends to third-party dwellings.
3.1. Cases where entering a third-party residence is not authorized
When searching for bail skippers, bail bonds agents are frequently confronted with the prospect of having to enter a third
party's home. Common law, prior court decisions, and state statutes help courts determine the legality of the bail bond agent's
127S.M. Baker et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 13 (2008) 124130
actions. In Herd v. State (1999), for example, the defendant, Frederick Herd, a licensed bail bond agent in the state of Maryland, was
convicted of fourth-degree burglary for forcibly entering the dwelling of a third party to search for a bail skipper. When he and his
partner discovered that the dwelling was owned by someone other than their suspect they apologized; Herd was later arrested for
burglary.
Herd appealed his conviction, maintaining that a reasonable belief that intrusion is warranted is a complete defense to fourth-
degree burglary. Rejecting Herd's contention, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that even if Herd had believed that he
was entitled to enter the home of a third person, the defense would not exonerate him for burglary (State v. Tapia, 1991; Mishler v.
State, 1996; State v. Portnoy, 1986). The appellate court ruled that neither common law nor statutory authority allows a bond agent
to forcibly enter a third-party residence. The court also opined that Herd did not have a reasonable basis for concluding that the bail
skipper was in the residence since he failed to substantiate the authenticity of the tip he had received.The court also reasoned that
a reasonable bond agent would have checked with the telephone company, the electric company, the post ofce, or the tax
assessment ofce to determine the suspect's location. Afrming Herd's burglary conviction, the court concluded that the bail bond
agent should have conducted surveillance on the property and checked with neighbors to see if anyone recognized the suspect as
living there.
Entry into a third-party dwelling was also the issue in State v. Woods (1999), where Terry Woods, employed as a bounty hunter
for a Missouri bonding company, was found guilty of second-degree assault and rst-degree trespassing. Woods attempted to
locate a bond jumper named William Hernandez. Upon arriving at the address believed to be Hernandez's, Woods encountered
resident Martin Tong. Tong claimed that he did not know Hernandez, and that Hernandez did not reside at that address. After
hearing voices from the front of the house, Woods kicked down the door and red his weapon, shooting Tong.
On appeal, Woods rst claimed that he could not be convicted of rst-degree trespass because insufcient evidence was
presented to show he knowingly entered unlawfullyinto Tong's house. As a bounty hunter, Woods possessed a bond I.D. card that
authorized him, when apprehending a bail skipper, to, “…break and enter [into] his house for that purpose…” Rejecting Woods'
argument, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the conviction because he had insufcient evidence to establish that Hernandez
was in the house. The court also ruled that Woods' reliance on the bond I.D. card was unreasonable based on his knowledge that
Tong and not Hernandez resided there.
Unlike the above cases, McFarland v. State (2003) examined a post-conviction relief application by Philip McFarland, a bounty
hunter who was found guilty at trial of assault and second-degree burglary. McFarland and his partner were pursuing bail jumper
Maurecio Gomez; McFarland received a tip that Gomez was hiding in a mobile home. Consequently, he broke down the door and
entered the wrong mobile home occupied by the Leach family, an innocent third party. After realizing he had made a mistake,
McFarland apologized and went to the trailer next door to arrest Gomez.
On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals afrmed the convictions of assault and second-degree burglary related to the Leaches.
McFarland then led a post-conviction relief application, claiming that he had the extra-legal authority to enter a third-party
residence based on the common law established in Taylor. The Iowa court rejected this argument, reasoning that the Leach family
was completely innocent. In Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a bail bond agent could enter a principal's residence, but no
reference was made to a third-party dwelling.
7
3.2. Cases where entering a third-party residence is authorized
Under some circumstances, a bail bond agent and/or a bounty hunter can legally enter a third-party residence. In State v. Kole
(2001), for example, the defendant entered a third-party dwelling and was convicted of abduction, having a weapon while under a
disability, and burglary with a rearm. Kole, a bounty hunter, was contracted by a bail bond company to apprehend the bail skipper,
Cecil Cobb. Kole was given the address of Cobb's stepbrother, William McAuliffe, by the bail bond agency. Upon arrival at the
McAuliffe address, Kole and his partner entered the residence without permission. After inquiring about Cobb's whereabouts, Kole
and his partner left the apartment. Later that night, they staked out the apartment until Cobb returned and proceeded to
apprehend him. The court relied on Taylor, stating that although a bond agent may enter the principal's residence and seize him, he
may not pursue the principal into a third party's dwelling.
On appeal, Kole argued that Ohio law allowed a bail bond agent and/or bounty hunter to arrest a bond jumper at any time or
place before he is nally charged.Kole also argued that during the trial, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. To determine
whether Kole received ineffective counsel, the Ohio Supreme Court applied the Strickland test (Strickland v. Washington, 1984).
First, the court agreed that his counsel's performance was decient for failing to raise Ohio's statutory defense. Second, Kole proved
that his counsel's errors deprived him of a fair trial inasmuch as the court found that the trial judge should have instructed the jury
that bounty hunters, under Ohio law, were authorized to forcibly enter the dwelling of a third party. The court concluded that
Kole's counsel was ineffective and his conviction was reversed.
In State v. Mathis (1998), North Carolina defendants Charles Mathis and Barak Williamson were licensed bail bond agents
employed by a bail bond company. The facts show that William Tankersley failed to make his court appearance. Mathis and
Williamson were given information by their bonding agency about Tankersley's whereabouts. After receiving a tip that Tankersley
was at his residence, the agents drove to his residence and entered without consent. The police were called and both bail bond
agents left, only to return later after seeing Tankersley's truck in the driveway. The defendants agged down a police ofcer and
7
See State v. Lopez (1986) for a similar outcome.
128 S.M. Baker et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 13 (2008) 124130
took Tankersley into custody. Subsequently, Mathis and Williamson were charged with breaking and entering. The trial court
refused to give instructions to the jury concerning the rights Mathis and Williamson had as bail bond agents. Both men were
convicted of breaking and entering, and Mathis was convicted of misdemeanor assault.
After the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed their convictions, the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that the
common law rules set forth in Taylor and Nicolls determine the rights of bail bond agents. The court also recognized that North
Carolina law authorized a bond agent to apprehend a bail jumper. The court also said that force can be used when entering a
residence of a third party since Tankersley lived there. Moreover, under North Carolina law, when a third person knowingly
impedes the arrest or capture of a suspect, the arrestor is allowed to use reasonable force against that person. Thus, the North
Carolina Supreme Court found that the trial court had erred in not properly instructing the jury. The defendant's convictions were
reversed and a new trial was ordered.
3.3. Summary of bail bond agents entering third-party residences
A number of cases have explored the issue of whethera bail bond agent can legally break into and enter a third party's residence
in search for their principal. In Herd v. State (1999),State v. Woods (1999), and McFarland v. State (2003), the state courts found that
it was unlawful for a bail bond agent or his subcontracted bounty hunter to break into and enter a third-party dwelling. Each case
based its decision on the common law set forth in Taylor, as well as state case law and current state statutes. In State v. Kole (2001),
however, the court found that an Ohio statute permitted a bail bond agent to arrest his principal at any time or place, including a
third party's home. Likewise, in State v. Mathis (1998), the court ruled bail bonding agents had the legal authority to enter a third
party's dwelling as long as the bail skipper resided there.
4. Discussion
The court cases reported in this article demonstrate how the bail bond system has been changed as a result of state statutory
enactments, state constitutional provisions, and decisions rendered by state criminal courts. In the past, the common law
established in Taylor v. Taintor (1873) and Nicolls v. Ingersoll (1810) have given bail bond agents and bounty hunters unchecked
powers. These wide powers of arrest, seizure, detention, and transportation, while still in existence, are being curtailed by state law
and by state court decisions. Today, bail bond agents and bounty hunters have jurisdictional constraints placed on their actions, and
they must follow the law or be subject to criminal prosecution (Johnson & Warchol, 2003). While empirical research is lacking, the
threat of criminal prosecution shows that bail bond agents and bounty hunters must follow the rule of law, consistent with a
democratic society (Armstrong & Bruno, 2000). Even though their actions are not subject to the full restraints of the U.S. and State
Constitutions, folklore that bounty hunters are above the law continues to mislead the public (Mixon & Trevino, 2003). For the most
part, arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory actions committed by bail bond agents and bounty hunters are subject to criminal
prosecution, although some continue to use their extra-legal authority to aunt the rule of law.
Bounty hunters still retain much of their power, however, as they can cross state lines and apprehend bail skippers, an action
that licensed criminal justice personnel are prohibited from doing (Suspect Seeks Damages,2004). Law enforcement ofcials, for
example, have no legal authority once they enter a state where they are not certied to work (Vaughn & Coomes, 1995). Partly as a
result of the threat of criminal prosecution, many states have bail bond societies and associations that are working to
professionalize the industry (Burns, Kinkade, & Leone, 2003). More jails, and the Sheriff's Ofces that run them, require bail bond
agents and bounty hunters to be licensed, are using technology to established early warning systems to monitor potential
misbehavior (Geerken & Peters, 2005), and require criminal background checks to detect potential wrong-doing within the
industry before it spirals out of control into a major scandal (Kansas: Police Back Controls,2004; Oklahoma: Police Want
Licenses,2003). Some research shows that the bail bond system has been benecial in reducing domestic violence when the bail
bond agents are assigned to intensively supervise domestic batterers (Lasley, 2003).
5. Conclusion
The bail and bond system in the United States has faced many obstacles since its inception. Both bail bond agents and their
subcontracted bounty hunters have been criticized for their roles in the criminal justice system, especially violence committed
under the guise of quasi-criminal justice actors. When deciding the legality of their behavior, the unchecked authority afforded to
bail bond agents and bounty hunters has left a number of state courts referring back to state statutes and the common law
established by the nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court case of Taylor v. Taintor (1873). Case law shows that some state courts
have concluded that bail bond agents and/or bounty hunters do not have the right to enter a third-party dwelling (Herd v. State,
1999; McFarland v. State, 2003; Mishler v. State, 1996; State v. Tapia, 1991; State v. Woods, 1999). Although the Taylor ruling
established that a bounty hunter or bail bond agent could enter the dwelling of their principal, forcible entry into a third-party
residence has been deemed unlawful in most states. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held that a state statute permitting a bail
bond agent or bounty hunter to arrest a bail skipper at any time or place was permissible (State v. Kole, 2001). The cases involving
third-party residences illustrate the confusion bail bond agents and bounty hunters face concerning the different standards
established by Taylor and individual state statutes.
The widespread power afforded to bond agencies and their bounty hunters through the Taylor ruling has since been narrowed
through state statutes, state constitutions, and state court rulings. Claims that the bail bond system is outdated have been
129S.M. Baker et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 13 (2008) 124130
addressed through state statutes, preventing bounty hunters from forcibly entering third-party dwellings, charging expenses to
their principals, and failing to forfeit the bond after their principal fails to appear in court. Although bail bond agents and bounty
hunters still face fewer constitutional constraints than state actors, they are not completely free to violate the law, as evidenced by
the cases presented in this article.
State statutes and state case law today prohibit behaviors that were once permitted by common law, which has led to a bail bond
system that is slowly adhering to the rule of law. This is critical when considering that the use of bail is essential to the United States
criminal justice system due to the paucity of jail space to hold arrestees awaiting court appearances (Chamberlin, 1998; Patrick, 1999).
Furthermore, bail bond agents and their bounty hunters have helped relieve the costs associated with pre-trial incarceration and have
served the utilitarian interests and needs of both the defendants and courts. As long as statutes continue to prevent bail bond agents and
bounty hunters from committing illegal acts, while allowing them to complete their jobs, the commercial system of bail bo ndw ill continue
to benet the criminal justice system as a whole. The only way to ensure an effective bail bond system is to create laws permitting
commercial bail bond agents to have control over their principals without harming them or interfering with the lives of others.
Due to the lack of studies in the criminal justice and criminology literature, future research should focus on bail bond agents and
bounty hunters. Qualitative observational studies are needed to uncover the day-to-day functions of bail bond agents and their
bounty hunters (Johnson & Warchol, 2003). Quantitative research also needs to be conducted to determine the exact number of
bail bond agents and bounty hunters, who are licensed and who are not, and the sanctions brought against rogue agents (Burns,
Kinkade, & Leone, 2003). State governments, with help from their federal counterparts, need to collect data on bail bond system,
which is currently not done (Willing, 2004). Cases reported in this article show that bail bond agents and their bounty hunters are
not immune from criminal prosecution. Similar case analysis research needs to occur in tort law to determine if civil liability is also
a concern to the bail bond industry. Much more needs to be known about this critical component of the criminal justice system.
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... While bail bondsmen allow individuals accused of a crime to be released from jail pending trial, they also serve as insurance salesmen, social workers, and quasi-law enforcement officers (Liptak 2008). Bail bondsmen monitor defendants while they are in the community awaiting their court dates, provide legal advice and recommend attorneys, provide information about the court process to defendants, and help to ensure that those who are released show up for court (Baker, Vaughn, and Topalli 2008;Tabarrock 2011). The commercial bond system is thriving in the United States because agents lobby legislators to allow the practice to continue. ...
... Bail bondsman and bounty hunters are considered quasi-criminal justice personnel, but because they are still private actors they are not constrained by constitutional protections that would limit sworn law enforcement officers. The power of bail bondsmen and bounty hunters is gleaned from two court decisions -the New York State decision in Nicholls v. Ingersoll (1810) and the US Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Taintor (1872) (Baker et al. 2008). As a result of those rulings, bail bondsman do not need a warrant to enter an individual's home, may apprehend someone with excessive force, may search a suspect without probable cause, and may pursue defendants across state lines (Kaufman 1999;Baker et al. 2008). ...
... The power of bail bondsmen and bounty hunters is gleaned from two court decisions -the New York State decision in Nicholls v. Ingersoll (1810) and the US Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Taintor (1872) (Baker et al. 2008). As a result of those rulings, bail bondsman do not need a warrant to enter an individual's home, may apprehend someone with excessive force, may search a suspect without probable cause, and may pursue defendants across state lines (Kaufman 1999;Baker et al. 2008). Subsequent courts have ruled that the constitutional provisions that limit police officer misconduct do not apply to bail bondsmen or their bounty hunters (Stout 1997). ...
Chapter
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This entry discusses the origin and evolution of bail bondsmen, the states in which they are still permitted to work for profit, and why they have continued to play an integral role in the functioning of the criminal court system. The link between bail bondsmen and bounty hunters is reviewed, and the authority of bail bondsmen and bounty hunters to apprehend defendants who have failed to appear in court is highlighted. Arguments for and against bail bondsmen are presented, with a focus placed on the reality that these individuals operate private businesses for profit. A discussion of the bail bondsmen in New York is provided as an example. The entry concludes with a review of regulations placed on bail bondsmen and issues that surround the profession.
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... The US is one of only two nations to have a commercial BB industry, the other being the Philippines, though BB practices are banned in the District of Columbia and the states of Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Bail has been used for those awaiting trial in the American criminal justice system informally for a few hundred years (Baker et al. 2008b) with the first BB company emerging around 1898 (Justice Policy Institute, 2012, p. 5). Since then, the commercial bail industry has grown into one of the largest and most profitable parts of the criminal justice system -there are around 14,000 bail agents in operation across America who extract $2 billion a year from America's most disadvantaged families (Page 2017), though publicly-available statistics on BB practices are typically hard to come by (Justice Policy Institute, 2012, p. 33). ...
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... In this period, the commercial bail industry has sought to secure its market share and protect profits through political lobbying and promoting professionals' standards. Arguing that courts were too aggressive in collecting bond forfeitures in cases where defendants have violated the terms of their release but still managed to appear in court (Baker, Vaughn and Topalli 2008), industry insiders orchestrated the introduction of the Bail Bond Fairness Act. This bill, which would deem a failure to appear as the only legitimate reason for a Federal judge to demand bond forfeiture, has come before both houses of Congress on numerous occasions but never made it into law. ...
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