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The cross-race effect (CRE) is the robust finding that
memory for faces of one’s own race is superior to mem-
ory for faces of another, less familiar race. Malpass and
Kravitz (1969) first demonstrated the effect in recognition
memory for white and black faces, and since then it has
been demonstrated in numerous publications to be a robust
and practically important phenomenon (for a recent meta-
analytic review, see Meissner & Brigham, 2001). A number
of social–cognitive theories have been proposed to account
for the CRE in face recognition (see Meissner & Brigham,
2001; Sporer, 2001). Some researchers have proposed that
interracial contact may account for differences in memory
for own- and other-race faces (Brigham & Malpass, 1985;
Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003). Although several studies
have shown that individuals’ geographic location (and their
related degree of racial mixture) can predict performance
on own- versus other-race faces (cf. Chiroro, Tredoux,
Radaelli, & Meissner, 2008; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995),
self-report measures of interracial contact have shown only
small effects (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Other re-
searchers have proposed that differences in categorization
processes may be at play, whereby other-race faces are
categorized quickly at the expense of encoding individuat-
ing information (Levin, 1996, 2000; MacLin & Malpass,
2001). Still others (Sporer, 2001; Valentine, 1991, 2001)
have argued that the CRE may lie in differing represen-
tational structures to the extent that own-race faces are
more appropriately encoded and represented by diagnostic
feature classifications. These representational differences
may arise as a function of differing encoding strategies,
such as configural or featural processing (Rhodes, Tan,
Brake, & Taylor, 1989), although it has been suggested in
recent studies that own-race faces may be processed to a
greater extent using both configural and componential de-
tails (see Rhodes, Hayward, & Winkler, 2006).
Recently, Meissner, Brigham, and Butz (2005) sought
to apply dual-process theory to distinguish these various
explanations of the effect. In dual-process theories, recog-
nition memory is composed of two independent memory
systems—namely, recollection and familiarity (Jacoby,
1991; Tulving, 1985; for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002).
Recollection generally reflects a controlled, effortful pro-
cess in which one is able to recall specific details about a
memorial episode. Familiarity, in contrast, is a more fluid,
automatic process characterized by a feeling of familiarity
without any specific recollection. A variety of paradigms
have been developed in order to assess these two processes,
including process-dissociation tasks (Jacoby, 1991; Kelley
& Jacoby, 2000), receiver-operating characteristic analy-
sis (Yonelinas, 1994, 1999), and remember–know–guess
judgments (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000).
Given previous research suggesting that effortful en-
coding, divided attention, and distinctiveness manipu-
lations influence recollection but not familiarity (see
Yonelinas, 2002), Meissner, Brigham, and Butz (2005)
predicted that an encoding or representational basis for
the CRE would result in a recollection advantage for own-
race faces. Such a prediction is supported by research in-
dicating that the CRE is sensitive to variation in facial
distinctiveness (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Sporer, 2001;
Valentine, 1991, 2001), as well as to the influence of racial
categorization in diverting attentional resources from suc-
cessful encoding (Levin, 1996, 2000; MacLin & Malpass,
2001). In contrast, differences in familiarity might result
if the CRE is due to stereotyping of other-race faces, if
own-race faces are processed in a configural manner, or
99 © 2009 The Psychonomic Society, Inc.
Assessing the influence of recollection
and familiarity in memory for
own- versus other-race faces
JESSICA L. MARCON, KYLE J. SUSA, AND CHRISTIAN A. MEISSNER
University of Texas, El Paso, Texas
In the present research, we examined the contributions of recollection and familiarity in memory for own- and
other-race faces. In Experiment 1, we used a repetition lag paradigm (Jennings & Jacoby, 1997) to demonstrate
the typical cross-race effect with respect to discrimination accuracy and response bias. Participants were more
likely to commit repetition errors by falsely recognizing repeated other-race faces. In Experiment 2, we used
process-dissociation equations to estimate differences in recollection and familiarity. As predicted, results
showed a greater reliance on recollection-based processing for own-race faces. The theoretical and practical
implications of these findings are discussed.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
2009, 16 (1), 99-103
C. A. Meissner, email@example.com
100 MARCON, SUSA, AND MEISSNER
(1997). In their “repetition lag paradigm,” young and old
participants were presented a series of items at encoding
that they would be subsequently asked to recognize from
among a set of novel items. However, at recognition, the
experimenters also repeated novel items at varying lags
(or intervals), and participants were instructed to appro-
priately recognize these repeated items as distinct from
those they had viewed at study. This repetition of novel
items at test placed recollection and familiarity in op-
position. Specifically, Jennings and Jacoby argued that
the successful recognition of these repeated items as new
required recollection of their prior presentation on the
test list (as opposed to on the study list), whereas a failure
of recollection and a reliance upon perceived familiarity
would lead to a misattribution of old. Using this para-
digm, Jennings and Jacoby showed that older adults were
more likely to commit a repetition error, replicating prior
studies suggesting that the ability to recollect is reduced
as we age.
In a second experiment, Jennings and Jacoby (1997)
refined the procedure to allow for the use of process-
dissociation equations to directly estimate recollection and
familiarity. More specifically, participants were instructed
to either exclude (say “no”) or include (say “yes”) repeated
novel items at test. Although participants could respond
yes to an inclusion trial on the basis of both recollection
and familiarity (facilitation condition), exclusion trials
were designed to place recollection and familiarity in op-
position (opposition condition). Specifically, responding
no to an exclusion trial required that participants be able to
recollect the prior presentation of the face, whereas a yes
response would likely be a product of context-free famil-
iarity. Using this opposition procedure, Jennings and Ja-
coby were able to compute recollection and familiarity via
process-dissociation equations (see Jacoby, 1991). Once
again, their results confirmed differences in recollection-
based processing as a function of age, but they found no
effect of familiarity.
In the present experiments, we sought to apply the Jen-
nings and Jacoby (1997) framework to examine differ-
ences in recollection and familiarity in the recognition of
own- and other-race faces. In Experiment 1, we assessed
the extent to which participants commit repetition errors
to a greater degree when recognizing other-race faces,
whereas in Experiment 2, we more directly estimated
the contributions of recollection and familiarity using
process-dissociation equations. Consistent with prior
research by Meissner, Brigham, and Butz (2005), it was
predicted that participants would demonstrate repetition
errors to a greater extent with other-race faces and that a
failure of recollection would be responsible for the differ-
ences in processing own- and other-race faces.
. Fifty-four Hispanic students (58% female, mean
age 19.24 years) from the University of Texas at El Paso partici-
pated in this experiment.
. The facial stimuli used in this study included 25 His-
panic males and 25 African-American males. Two different photo-
if a shift in criterion is responsible for the effect. For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that stereotyping responses
tend to be rather automatic (Dasgupta, McGhee, Green-
wald, & Banaji, 2000) and are thus supported by an “ac-
cessibility bias” that is under limited conscious control
(Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002). As such, other-race
faces may involve a greater familiarity response at the
time of recognition. With regard to configural process-
ing (or the representation of associations between internal
facial features), Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, and Soltani
(1999) found that inversion effects appear to be isolated to
familiarity-based processing. If configural processing is
influenced by inversion and is dominant in own-race face
recognition (Rhodes et al., 1989), we might expect greater
familiarity-based processing to occur for own-race faces.
Finally, it is worth noting that shifts in response criterion
are generally captured by differences in familiarity-based
responding (Yonelinas, 2001). If a more liberal response
bias is chiefly responsible for the CRE (see Sporer, 2001),
we might expect greater estimates of familiarity to be as-
sociated with responses to other-race faces.
Using a dual-process framework, Meissner, Brigham,
and Butz (2005) asked participants to complete a stan-
dard recognition paradigm involving the presentation of
both own- and other-race faces, and to provide remember–
know–guess judgments at the time of recognition. In this
paradigm, when participants responded that they recog-
nized a face from the study list, they were also asked to
provide a judgment of either remember (they can recollect
details of the study episode), know (they cannot recollect
specific details, but report a general feeling of familiar-
ity), or guess (they have no memory or experience of fa-
miliarity and are simply guessing). Meissner, Brigham,
and Butz’s results suggested that remember judgments (or
recollection-based processing) were significantly greater
in number when discriminating own-race faces (compared
with when discriminating other-race faces), whereas no
differences in know (corrected for independence) or guess
judgments were observed. Meissner, Brigham, and Butz
interpreted these findings to support those theories that
argued that attentional, encoding, and representational
differences lead to the CRE.
One potential criticism lodged against the remember–
know–guess procedure is that these judgments may not,
in fact, index recollection and familiarity, but that they
are, rather, indicators of confidence (Dunn, 2004). Ad-
ditionally, feelings of remembering and knowing may not
necessarily be indices of separable memory categories,
such as recollection and familiarity in the dual-process
memory literature, but instead may be the result of stimu-
lus construction, context, experimental task, expectations
regarding performance, or other aspects of the experience
that the participants deem relevant (e.g., Bodner & Lind-
say, 2003). Given the various concerns expressed, the goal
of the present research was to replicate previous research
findings regarding the role of recollection in own- versus
other-race face recognition using an alternative, process-
Our search for an appropriate process-dissociation
paradigm led us to the work of Jennings and Jacoby
CROSS -RACE EFFECT 101
to directly estimate the contributions of recollection and
. Twenty-two Hispanic undergraduate students (65%
female, mean age 19.61 years) from the University of Texas at
El Paso participated in this experiment.
. The facial stimuli chosen for this study included 48
Hispanic and 48 African-American faces. The presentation of stim-
uli was identical to that employed in Experiment 1.
Design and Procedure
. A single-factor (race of target face: own
vs. other race) within-subjects design was employed. Once again,
the Jennings and Jacoby (1997) repetition lag paradigm was used.
Twenty-four faces (12 Hispanic and 12 African-American) were
presented in the study phase for a period of 2 sec with a 1-sec ISI.
Following the encoding phase, participants solved anagram prob-
lems for 3 min before beginning the test phase. In the recognition
task, participants completed two phases in which they were asked
to exclude and include novel faces that were repeated in the test
list. Specifically, during exclude trials, participants were asked to
respond yes to old faces, no to new faces when initially presented,
and no to any repetition of a new face that occurred at test. During
include trials, participants were asked to respond yes to old faces,
no to new faces when initially presented, and yes to any repetition
of a new face that occurred at test. Lags of 4 and 6 faces separated
novel and repeated faces. The presentation of exclusion and inclu-
sion phases was counterbalanced across participants, faces within
each phase were randomized across participants, and faces were not
repeated across exclusion and inclusion trials.
Results and Discussion
. A significant CRE was
observed in estimates of false alarms [t(21) 5.96, p
.001, d 1.46], discrimination accuracy [t(21) 8.51,
p .001, d 1.39], and response criterion [t(21) 3.26,
p .01, d .52]. Once again, participants were signifi-
cantly better at discriminating own-race faces from mem-
ory and were more liberal when responding to other-race
faces. Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations
for all measures across own- and other-race faces.
graphs for each face were available: An image of each target face
smiling was used at the time of study, whereas another image, in
which the target face had a neutral expression, was used at test. All
clothing was cropped from the photographs, such that only the face
of the target was visible. The experiment was performed on PC com-
puters running Medialab software, with images displayed on 19-in.
LCD monitors using a 1,280 1,024 pixel resolution.
Design and Procedure
. A single-factor (race of face: own vs.
other race) within-subjects design was employed. The Jennings
and Jacoby (1997) repetition lag paradigm was used. The partici-
pants viewed a sequence of 30 faces (15 Hispanic and 15 African-
American) during the study phase and were instructed that they
would later be asked to recognize these faces. Faces were presented
for 3 sec each at encoding, with a 1-sec interstimulus interval (ISI),
and presentation order was randomized for each participant. Im-
mediately following the study phase, the participants completed a
3-min filler task in which they solved a series of anagrams. During
the test phase, the participants were asked to distinguish studied
faces from new faces and repetitions of these new faces with inter-
vening lags of 2, 5, and 7 faces. The participants were instructed to
respond yes to faces that they had viewed at study and no to new
faces and any repetition of a new face that occurred at test. The pre-
sentation of old and new faces was randomized for each participant,
and the assignment of faces to old and new sets (and to varying lags
as new faces) was counterbalanced across participants.
Results and Discussion
A significant CRE was observed in estimates of hits
[t(53) 2.23, p .05, d .35], false alarms [t(53) 5.44,
p .001, d .76], discrimination accuracy [t(53)
5.62, p .001, d .73], and response criterion [t(53)
3.93, p .001, d .36]. Consistent with prior research
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001), a mirror effect pattern was
observed in which participants produced greater hits and
fewer false alarms to own-race faces, resulting in superior
discrimination accuracy. Participants were also more lib-
eral in responding to other-race faces. Of particular inter-
est in the present study was the repetition error rate across
own- and other-race faces. As predicted, results showed
a significant increase in repetition errors for other-race
faces [t(53) 4.04, p .001, d .43].1 Table 1 presents
the means and standard deviations for all measures across
own- and other-race faces.
The results of Experiment 1 replicated the robust CRE
in face recognition and, furthermore, showed that partici-
pants were more likely to commit a repetition error when
processing other-race faces. This error may reflect a fail-
ure of recollection when recognizing other-race faces, or
it could result from greater familiarity-based responding
to other-race faces. In Experiment 2, we sought to apply
Jennings and Jacoby’s (1997) process-dissociation para-
digm to the recognition of own- and other-race faces and
Tab le 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Hits, False Alarms,
Discrimination Accuracy (A
), Response Criterion (C), and
Repetition Errors Across Own- and Other-Race Faces in Experiment 1
Hits Alarms AzCErrors
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Own-race faces .70 .14 .12 .16 .90 .10 .52 .52 .19 .19
Other-race faces .64 .20 .25 .18 .78 .14 .24 .56 .30 .18
Tab le 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Hits, False Alarms,
Discrimination Accuracy (A
), and Response Criterion (C)
Across Own- and Other-Race Faces in Experiment 2
Hits Alarms AzC
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Own-race faces .60 .15 .09 .07 .88 .08 .62 .37
Other-race faces .54 .18 .28 .18 .70 .11 .30 .52
102 MARCON, SUSA, AND MEISSNER
demonstrated the influence of recollection with a His-
panic sample. Although we have no reason to believe that
these results would not generalize to other racial or ethnic
groups, further research demonstrating the generality of
recollection-based processes in accounting for the CRE
would prove useful.
The influence of recollection within the CRE suggests
that own-race faces may be encoded using greater atten-
tional resources and may be represented in memory with
respect to more diagnostic feature sets, leading to supe-
rior recognition. Although this is consistent with several
theories accounting for the CRE (Chiroro & Valentine,
1995; Sporer, 2001; Valentine, 1991, 2001), a process-
dissociation perspective allows us to further make predic-
tions regarding conditions under which the CRE might
be mitigated. For example, situations that disrupt effort-
ful or semantic encoding or that distract participants’ at-
tention at study or recognition should lead to a lessening
of the CRE by reducing performance on own-race faces.
Along similar lines, manipulations that improve encod-
ing may not differentially improve performance on other-
race faces. For example, own-race faces appear to benefit
most from those factors that promote the use of contextual
information—a finding confirmed in two recent studies
(Evans, Marcon, & Meissner, in press; Horry & Wright,
2008). In contrast, participants’ criterion of responding is
unlikely to fully account for the CRE, since manipulations
that influence response bias are typically associated with
differences in reported familiarity (see Yonelinas, 2002).
In the present study, it is likely that the CRE observed in
a measure of response criterion was associated with the
greater (though nonsignificant) familiarity estimates ob-
served in the recognition of other-race faces.
From a practical perspective, a recollection-based inter-
pretation of the CRE would suggest a difficulty in mod-
erating the effect at the time of a lineup identification.
For example, some studies have suggested that sequential
presentation of faces may lead witnesses to provide more
conservative responses (Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, &
MacLin, 2005). Although such a manipulation may mod-
erate participants’ liberal responding to other-race faces,
it is unlikely to lead to better discrimination (or promote
greater recollection). As noted above, attempts at provid-
ing context reinstatement support similarly fail to improve
performance on other-race faces (Evans et al., in press).
Future research assessing predictions regarding the role of
recollection in the CRE would appear warranted.
This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant
SES-0611636 to the third author. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions
Recollection- versus familiarity-based processing
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations as-
sociated with the proportion of yes responses to repeated
faces in the inclusion (INC) and exclusion (EXC) condi-
tions, as well as estimates of recollection and familiarity
across own- and other-race faces. Consistent with Jen-
nings and Jacoby (1997), recollection was computed as
R INC EXC, whereas familiarity was computed as
F EXC/(1 R).2 No significant differences were ob-
served in the inclusion condition [t(21) 1.23, p .23,
d .24]; however, consistent with Experiment 1, partici-
pants were more likely to commit a repetition error on ex-
clusion trials when viewing other-race faces [t(21) 4.13,
p .001, d .78]. Consistent with Meissner, Brigham,
and Butz (2005), own-race faces showed significantly
greater recollection when compared with other-race faces
[t(21) 4.21, p .001, d .83], whereas no significant
difference in familiarity estimates was observed [t(21)
1.78, p .09, d .38].3
The purpose of the present study was to examine the CRE
using Jennings and Jacoby’s (1997) process- dissociation
framework and to assess whether other-race faces were
more prone to repetition errors, whereas own-race faces
might benefit from recollection-based processing. Prior
research using the remember–know–guess paradigm sug-
gested that memory for own-race faces involved greater
reliance upon recollection (Meissner, Brigham, & Butz,
2005); however, the use of phenomenological judgments
has been criticized (Dunn, 2004). In the present study, we
sought to replicate this finding using a process- dissociation
paradigm that did not require such judgments.
In Experiment 1, the results showed the typical CRE
findings of greater discrimination accuracy and a more
conservative response bias for own-race faces. Addition-
ally, the participants were more likely to falsely recognize
repeated other-race faces, thereby committing a repetition
error. In Experiment 2, we sought to determine the extent
to which recollection and/or familiarity contributed to
the superior recognition of own-race faces using process-
dissociation equations. As predicted, a greater reliance on
recollection when processing own-race faces appeared to
be responsible for the CRE.
In the present study, we employed only Hispanic
participants because of limitations in the participant
pool. Meissner, Brigham, and Butz (2005) previously
demonstrated similar effects of recollection using the
remember–know–guess paradigm with Caucasian and
African-American samples, whereas the present study
Tab le 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Inclusion, Exclusion, Recollection, and
Familiarity Estimates Across Own- and Other-Race Faces in Experiment 2
Inclusion Exclusion Recollection Familiarity
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Own-race faces .78 .15 .08 .09 .70 .20 .29 .28
Other-race faces .73 .13 .26 .22 .45 .24 .44 .26
CROSS -RACE EFFECT 103
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and 7 [F(1,53) 4.42, p .05, h=; however, lag failed to interact
with the CRE [F(1,53) 0.34, n.s., h=.
2. The interested reader can obtain a complete description and deriva-
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[F(1,19) 0.59, n.s., h=.
(Manuscript received May 15, 2008;
revision accepted for publication July 22, 2008.)
or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors
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