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African Security Review 16.2 Institute for Security Studies
African Union promotion of
human security in Africa
Thomas Kwasi Tieku*
This paper explores the contribution of the African Union (AU) to human security promotion in
Africa. It contends that human security concerns informed the formation of the AU. Through the
efforts of the AU Commission, the African ruling elite and policy-makers have become aware of
human security doctrines. Human security ideas have been integrated into AU binding agreements,
declarations, decisions and policies. The commission is now in the diffi cult, yet most important, phase
of trying to persuade signifi cant numbers of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human
security as a guiding principle and the desirable norm. Through the African Citizens’ Directorate
(CIDO), the commission is using indigenous African civil society groups to institutionalise human
security doctrines in Africa. The commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to make human
security the only security norm. While member states of the AU that have never been comfortable
with the introduction of human security doctrines into the continental integration project are tacitly
undermining the CIDO’s ability to work with civil society groups to institutionalise the doctrines in
Africa, the leaders who enthusiastically supported the integration of human security doctrines into the
documents and work of the AU have seemed in recent times to be less resolute in their support of AU
Commission’s human security work.
* Thomas Kwasi Tieku is an adjunct professor and visiting scholar of international relations
in the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Features 27
Introduction
Human security, defi ned as the protection of people and communities, rather than of states,
from violence and imminent danger, has become a central feature of the contemporary
international order. Human security doctrines inform the foreign policies of many states,
particularly middle powers. They have strong support within research and academic
institutions. Human security ideas occupy a privileged position in many institutions of
higher learning in Europe, the Americas and Asia. In Canada alone 1 016 courses on human
security were taught in institutions of higher learning in 2006 (Canadian Consortium on
Human Security 2007). Human security is a priority area in the assistance programme of
aid agencies. International organisations such as the United Nations have also assumed
leadership roles in the promotion of human security. So what role, if any, is Africa’s premier
organisation, the African Union, playing in the promotion of human security?
The purpose of this paper is to show the contribution the AU is making in the promotion
of human security doctrines in Africa. It contends that the African ruling elite and policy-
makers have become aware of human security doctrines through the AU. Human security
ideas have been integrated into AU documents and work. They inform many AU binding
agreements, key policy documents, treaties, memoranda of understanding, plans of action,
mission and vision statements, communiqués, conventions, declarations and decisions.
Almost all decisions, declarations and protocols that African leaders have adopted since the
formation of the AU have had strong human security undertones. The AU Commission is
now in the diffi cult, yet most important, phase of trying to persuade signifi cant numbers
of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human security as the ‘only security
game in town’. The commission is using indigenous civil society groups to institutionalise
human security in Africa. The paper suggests that the jury is out, however, on whether the
AU would be able to institutionalise human security in Africa effectively.
The argument of the paper is organised into four sections. The fi rst sets the context for
the analysis, noting that the establishment of the AU was informed, in part, by human
security concerns. It is followed by an outline of ideas of human security as they may be
said to exist in the AU, teasing out the human security elements in key AU documents. The
third section examines AU institutions that promote human security. The fourth examines
challenges that the AU faces in its efforts to convince the African elite that they should
accept the human security doctrine as the desirable norm and guiding principle.
Pan-Africanism in practice:
From the OAU to the AU
African leaders created the African Union on 26 May 2001 to refl ect a shift in the focus of
the Pan-African project.1 Pan-Africanism as practised within the institutional framework
28 African Security Review 16.2 Institute for Security Studies
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) focused primarily on legitimising and
institutionalising statehood in Africa. Protection of states and governing regimes in
Africa became the referent of Pan-Africanism. As part of the efforts to protect and
consolidate the African state, the Charter of the OAU committed African governments
to a treaty that contained some of the ‘purest statements [that defend and hold together
the rings] … of elements of juridical sovereignty ever to be embodied in any international
organization’ (Clapham 1996:111). The Charter also put in place only institutions,
rules and administrative mechanisms that strengthened sovereign prerogatives and the
territorial integrity of African states. Many institutional restrictions were imposed on
the OAU Secretariat to prevent it becoming a supranational entity.
The institutionalisation of the state across the African continent meant that Pan-
Africanism needed a new focus and meaning. A new generation of Pan-Africanists led by
South African president Nelson Mandela and Tanzanian diplomat Ahmed Salim Ahmed
made conscious efforts in the 1990s to give a new meaning to Pan-Africanism. They felt
that Pan-Africanism needed to deal with challenges facing ordinary Africans, rather than
those encountered by broader entities such as states and regimes (Mandela 1994; Salim
199 0). They identifi ed t hree mai n challeng es, namely sec urit y th reats, underdevelopment
and the impact of international political economic forces (Salim 1995). These three
major issues informed the creation of the AU and the drafting of its legal text, called the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA). To provide a framework for dealing with
human insecurity, the CA empowers the AU to prevent, manage and resolve confl icts
on the continent (Powell & Tieku 2005).2 It is hoped that the AU will create conditions
in which peace may prevail on the African continent; to make continental Africa a ‘zone
of peace’. African leaders also felt that regional economic integration could provide a
basis for sustainable development; as a result, the CA provides the legal and institutional
framework for African states to integrate their economies (African Union 2001). Last,
the AU is designed to assist African governments in managing international issues
effectively. As part of the move to enhance Africa’s role in the international system, in
July 2003 in Maputo in Mozambique, African leaders asked the AU Commission ‘to set
up a negotiating team … headed by [an] experienced person to negotiate on behalf of
all Member States the fundamental issues that are being negotiated in the World Trade
Organization (WTO)’ (African Union 2003).
These three core areas drive the work of the 17 institutions that make up the AU
(Cilliers 2003) the key institutions being the African Heads of State and Government
(Assembly), the Executive Council, the Permanent Representative Committee, the Pan-
African Parliament (PAP), the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council, the
Pan-African Court of Justice, the Economic, Social and Cultural Councils (ECOSOC),
the African Central Bank, the Investment Bank, and the Monetary Fund. In theory, the
Assembly provides policy directions, including the human security agenda for the Union.
In practice, though, the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Council have
Features 29
taken centre-stage in shaping the AU human security agenda. These human security
objectives entail creating conditions for individuals to satisfy their basic needs. These
include working to provide the social, economic, political, environmental and cultural
conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual; striving to create
conditions for the protection of and respect for human rights and good governance; and
trying to guarantee for each individual the opportunity to fulfi l his/her full development
(African Union 2005). This understanding of human security informs the AU’s work in
the areas of peace, security, political governance and economic development.
AU human security agenda
The AU human security agenda in the areas of peace and security is clearly expressed
in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (CA) of the African Union. Article 4(h), which
empowers the Union to intervene in the affairs of a member state in order to ‘prevent war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’, was inserted into the CA, as a number of
informed writers on the CA have eloquently argued, with a view to protecting ordinary
people in Africa from abusive governments (Malan 2002; Cilliers & Sturman 2002;
Kioko 2003).3 To provide an operational arm to this specifi c human security element, the
AU made room for the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF) charged with the task
of intervening militarily in states for humanitarian purposes (African Union 2001). The
condition laid down for human security intervention under the AU ‘goes “beyond” the
provision made for intervention in the internal affairs of a country in the UN Charter’
(Schoeman 2003). The CA has actually set lower thresholds for intervention than those
outlined in any international legal code (Weiss 2004). The specifi cation of war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity by the drafters of the CA as grounds for intervention
has provided a clearer set of criteria for the Union to intercede in a state to protect
human security. The AU, unlike other international organisations, does not necessarily
require the consent of a state to intervene in its internal affairs when populations are
at risk. That is, the OAU’s system of complete consensus has been abandoned. Under
the AU, a decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly is required for
intervention (Powell & Tieku 2005). The AU used this principle to arrive at the decision
to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefi re in Burundi in April 2003. The
Assembly also used this principle to decide on the mission to the Darfur region of Sudan
in the summer of 2004.
The AU also approaches economic development from a human security perspective.
The development agenda in articles 3 and 4 of the CA is intended to create conditions
necessary for sustainable development. As part of this agenda, the AU commits its
member states to ensuring balanced economic development, to promoting gender
equality and good health, and to working towards eradicating preventable diseases
(articles 3(j) and (n); 4(l) and (n)).
30 African Security Review 16.2 Institute for Security Studies
The AU has adopted an approach to political governance in Africa that is human
security-centred in as much as the CA commits member states to promoting ‘respect
for the sanctity of human life’ (article 4(o)). Article 4(i), moreover, makes it clear that
African people have a ‘right to live in peace’. Article 3(h) therefore commits member
states to a path where they will ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in
accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant
human rights instruments’. It is signifi cant that 3(g) enjoins member governments
to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good
governance. This provision is important, because it is generally understood in the
human security research community that democratic development is a critical aspect
of human security (Hammerstad 2005). The decision to exclude from the AU states
whose governments came to power through unconstitutional means therefore advances
the human security agenda. The strength of the human security ideas embedded in the
CA provokes questions on how and why these human security doctrines entered the
discourse, agenda, documents and programmes of the AU.
Pan-Africanisation of human security
Human security entered the discourse of Pan-Africanism in the early 1990s. It was
initiated by the Kampala Movement and Salim Ahmed Salim (Deng & Zartman 2002).
The Kampala Movement was an initiative of civil society groups that met in Kampala in
Uganda in the early 1990s to develop a regime of principles regarding security, stability,
development and cooperation for Africa. At the heart of the principles, widely known as
the CSSDCA, was a conscious effort to redefi ne security and sovereignty, and to demand
certain ‘standards of behaviour ... from every government [in Africa] in the interest of
common humanity’ (Obasanjo & Mosha 1992:260). The movement demanded that
African leaders redefi ne their states’ security as a multidimensional phenomenon going
beyond military considerations to include economic, political and social aspects of the
individual, the family and the society. In the view of the movement, ‘[t]he concept of
security must embrace all aspects of society ... [and the] security of a nation must be
based on the security of the life of the individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy
basic needs’ (Obasanjo & Mosha 1992:265).
The document was submitted to African leaders for integration into the OAU framework
in early 1991. The OAU convened a meeting of African governments to discuss it in
May 1991 in Kampala. The leaders who attended agreed in principle in the Kampala
Declaration to explore the possibility of integrating the ideas into the OAU in another
meeting in June 1991 in Abuja in Nigeria. The CSSDCA was not adopted at the Abuja
summit because of opposition by Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi , Sudan’s Omar Hassan
Ahmed el-Bashir and Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi (Deng & Zartman 2002). The leaders
suspended discussions on the document and, indeed, on human security indefi nitely.
Features 31
Although the OAU leadership rejected the CSSDCA, the Kampala initiative provided
the platform for Salim Ahmed Salim to place human protection on the OAU’s agenda.
The specifi c elements of the human protection agenda formed part of a broader policy
initiative articulated in a document called The political and socio-economic situation in Africa
and the fundamental changes taking place in the world, which the Assembly of the OAU
adopted as a Declaration on 11 July 1990 (Salim 1990). This declaration recognised that
the end of the Cold War had fundamentally changed the geopolitics of the world and
that African governments needed to adopt specifi c measures to adapt to the new world
order. It further argued that African states would henceforth have to do things on their
own; there would be no geo-strategic basis for outside powers to protect Africans. It
therefore called on the leaders to revive indigenous continental protection initiatives.
More specifi cally, the declaration urged the OAU leadership to develop a framework for
preventing, managing and resolving confl icts, since there would be no rationale for the
international community to keep peace and promote human rights in Africa in the post-
Cold War era.
The declaration opened the space for Salim, at the OAU summit in July 1991 in Abuja,
to propose to the assembly a framework to create a mechanism for the OAU to prevent,
manage and resolve confl icts in Africa. This mechanism was not just for maintaining
order as many writers emphasise; it had the broader goal of protecting ordinary Africans
from imminent danger. The assembly adopted the mechanism in principle and instructed
the OAU secretariat to hold consultations with member states and to revise the proposal
to refl ect ‘the views, comments and proposals of Member States’ (AHG/Decl 1 XX VIII).
A watered-down version of the mechanism was adopted by the assembly in Cairo, Egypt,
in June 1993 (Ibok 1999). Certain governments in Africa – in particular those of Daniel
arap Moi of Kenya and Lansana Conté of Guinea – ensured that certain provisions in
the draft framework were removed. These emphasised human protection and proposed
the delegation of powers to the OAU secretariat to protect ordinary Africans from state
abuse. The extensive revisions of the draft framework by African governments largely
explain why the mechanism that was approved at the OAU summit in Cairo in June 1993
adopted a traditional security approach. Nevertheless, Salim’s initiative set in motion
serious discussions within the OAU leadership on the need for it to play a central role in
protecting ordinary Africans from imminent threats.
Former South African president Nelson Mandela pushed the human security discussions
further on 13 June 1994 when he asked African leaders to empower the OAU to protect
African people and to prevent African governments from abusing the sovereignty of
states (Mandela 1994). The call emboldened the OAU secretariat to initiate a series
of reform processes between 1995 and 1998 that were aimed at structuring the OAU
in order to make it focus on human security concerns (Salim 1995, 1997). It also, in
1998, encouraged the secretariat to submit, and the assembly to adopt, two key human
security issues. The fi rst sought to make the promotion of ‘strong and democratic
32 African Security Review 16.2 Institute for Security Studies
institutions’ a key objective of the OAU (AHG/Decl XXXV). The second excluded
from the OAU states ‘whose Governments came to power through unconstitutional
means’, and the third gave the OAU the mandate to assist military regimes that may
exist on the African continent in moving towards a democratic system of government.
The election of Olusegun Obasanjo, who was a key fi gure in the Kampala Movement,
as president of Nigeria encouraged the OAU secretariat to embellish OAU documents
and policies with human security doctrines. Obasanjo himself made it a top priority to
set in motion the process of integrating the CSSDCA into the OAU (Deng & Zartman
2002:xv).
The decision to create the AU in September 1999 provided a good opportunity for
the Nigerian and the South African governments to support the OAU secretariat in
merging human security doctrines with Pan-African ideas. The strategy adopted by the
secretariat aimed at encouraging the delegations that negotiated the legal treaty of the AU
to codify as principles some of the ideas in the CSSDCA, while simultaneously working
with African leaders to ensure the adoption of the CSSDCA as a working document of
the AU. The then assistant secretary-general in charge of political affairs, Said Djinnit,
and the acting legal counsellor of the OAU, Ben Kioko, were instrumental in making
the delegations adopt the concepts in articles 3 and 4 of the CA (discussed above). As
a step towards making African leaders adopt the CSSDCA, the secretariat, with the
strong backing of the Nigerian government, convened a ministerial meeting in May
2000 to discuss ways of integrating the CSSDCA into the AU/OAU. The report of the
ministerial meeting was approved by the OAU summit in Lomé in July 2000. African
leaders agreed to use the CSSDCA as norms and guiding principles of security, stability,
development and cooperation in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in July 2002
in Pretoria, South Africa. Though MoU added many traditional security concerns to the
CSSDCA, it retained most of the human security principles.
Institutional mechanisms for
promoting human security
The MoU paved the way for the secretariat to create a unit within the OAU to
coordinate CSSDCA activities. The CSSDCA unit is now called the African Citizens’
Directorate (CIDO). More crucially, it opened the space for the AU Commission to try
to institutionalise human security ideas in Africa, which it does through civil society
channels. The CIDO is building coalitions around, and engineering consensus on,
human security within civil society groups. The offi ce of the Chairperson of the AU
Commission, the Political Department, the Peace and Security Department and the
Legal Affairs Department also use state channels, such as the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government, the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Representative
Committee, to convince the African ruling elite to accept human security doctrines.
Features 33
The African Citizens’ Directorate (CIDO)
The CIDO was originally established in 2001 as the implementation directorate of the
CSSDCA. The Nigerian government, which provided the resources for the creation
of the directorate, wanted the unit to focus on integrating CSSDCA ideas into all
documents of the AU. The AU Commission gave the CIDO the additional responsibility
of facilitating civil society engagement with the AU. As part of its efforts to engage
civil society with the AU organs and process, in 2001 the CIDO developed an annual
conference of indigenous African civil society and the AU. The CIDO usually invites
over 50 civil society groups in Africa to attend these conferences, which are normally
held before AU summits. About fi ve conferences have been held since the fi rst AU-
civil society meeting in June 2001. The conferences have turned out to be a good place
for the AU Commission to sell AU programmes, projects and agendas to civil society
groups. The CIDO is using the conferences to create awareness about the AU’s work
and persuade the civil society groups to integrate the AU’s policies, including the human
security agenda, into their advocacy activities and promote them in their states. Because
the CIDO was established to promote CSSDCA and the AU human security agenda,
the discussions of all past AU-civil society conferences have been dominated by human
security issues. The head of the CIDO, Jimmi Adisa, has taken full advantage of these
conferences to create awareness and update civil society groups about the CSSDCA and
AU human security activities.
The CIDO also promotes the human security agenda in the intellectual and diaspora
communities and its head therefore took advantage of the CIDO civil society mandate
to sell the human security agenda at two major conferences – the fi rst in October 2004
in Senegal and the second in July 2006 in Brazil.
Challenges to AU human security promotion
The AU Commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to promote human security. A
number of AU member states oppose the human security agenda and the space the CIDO
has opened for civil society to participate in AU activities. The states that opposed the
integration of the CSSDCA into the OAU in the early 1990s remain uncomfortable with
the human security agenda. Perhaps these leaders are opposed to the AU’s promotion
of human security doctrines because it renders their regimes vulnerable. They have,
however, succeeded in creating the impression in AU leadership circles that the human
security and the CSSDCA process are nothing but vehicles for promoting Western values
in Africa. A number of African leaders, including Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi , seem to
think that the introduction of human security language and doctrines into the work and
documents of the AU is a conscious effort by Western governments and institutions to
use the AU as an instrument to pursue their cultural colonialism project.
34 African Security Review 16.2 Institute for Security Studies
The anti-human security leaders in the assembly have made conscious efforts in recent
times to reduce the infl uence of human security ideas in AU policy documents. They
have been able to asser t their infl uence primarily because the unwavering support human
security enjoyed in the Assembly of the AU in the early days has waned considerably.
Strong supporters of the CSSDCA, such as Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, have seemed
in recent times to be less keen to talk about the issue. The ambivalent attitude of the
supporters of human security has allowed anti-human security leaders in the assembly
to move to curb its infl uence in recent AU documents. For instance, the African Union
Non-Aggression and Defence Pact that was recently developed took a minimalist human
security approach. Compared with the original draft of the Common African Defence
and Security Policy (developed in the early days of the AU), this follow-up document
has paid human security scant heed. The minimalist human security orientations of
recent policy documents attest to the increasing infl uence of the anti-human security
elements in the AU leadership. The increasing visibility of the anti-CSSDCA elements
raises the question: does human security have a future within the AU when Obasanjo
and Mbeki leave offi ce?
In addition, the CIDO human security promotion through civil society groups is facing
serious problems. Anti-human security governments in Africa are undermining the
CIDO’s ability to meet civil society groups. These governments usually do not cooperate
with the CIDO to convene the AU-civil society conferences when they host the AU
summits. The Libyan and the Sudanese governments failed to give the CIDO the
necessary logistical and political support to convene AU-civil society conference before
the summits in Sirte in June 2005 and in Khartoum in January 2006.
AU-civil society conferences have also come under attack. Some of the big NGOs
operating in Africa have started to question their relevance. They are unhappy with the
CIDO’s engagements with African civil society, and claim that the civil society groups
invited to these conferences are neither representative of civil society organisations in
Africa nor given the opportunity to contribute to the work of the AU. A recent report by
some of the NGOs sums up their concerns:
[T]he quality of the debate [during AU-civil society conferences] is often
poor, with a lack of substance, and there are some concerns that the forums
are rather used to endorse decisions that have already been taken than
to provide a real opportunity for civil society organisations to infl uence
decision-making at the summit … In addition, the criteria applied by
CIDO in selecting participants to attend forums are not clear; many of
those who are invited are quite closely connected to governments, and there
have been cases where self-funded participants have been excluded from
the meetings, even though they would appear to fulfi ll the qualifi cations to
attend (AfriMAP, AFRODAD, Oxfam 2007:31).
Features 35
The paucity of opportunities for civil society to shape the AU agenda may discourage
civil society groups from adding AU human security initiative to their work.
The CIDO unit itself is seriously understaffed. Besides Jimmi Adisa, the head, only one
person works full-time. It is also poorly equipped. The AU Commission intends to add
four more permanent staff members but this is still inadequate. The unit needs at least a
dozen well-equipped staff members in the short to medium term. In the long term, the
unit must be better resourced even than the Peace and Security Department, which is
considered one of the better resourced branches of the commission.
Conclusion
This paper sought to show that the AU has taken a centre stage in the promotion
of human security in Africa. The organisation drew on the work of the civil society
movement in the early 1990s to develop a Pan-African version of human security that
contains the principles of security, stability, development, and cooperation in Africa.
This conceptualisation of human security is meant not only to give a new perspective on
the doctrines, but also provides creative ways of making the concept acceptable.
Member states of the AU approved the principles in 2000 in Lomé, Togo, and the
AU Commission has made serious efforts to integrate it into the work of the AU.
The integration of human security doctrines into AU binding agreements and other
documents is signifi cant. It is signifi cant in part because legalisation is one of the most
important aspects of institutionalisation of ideas and in part because it provides a basis
for the incorporation of human security doctrines into national laws and policies.
Legalisation of human security doctrines has also strengthened the hands and the work
of human rights advocates operating in the Africa region. It has given the human rights
advocates and their organisations region-wide legal instruments and resources they could
use to infl uence African governments to pursue human security-oriented policies.
The commission has taken the leadership role in persuading and socialising African
elites to adopt the principles to guide actions and inform policies of their states. The AU
is pursuing the institutionalisation processes through the CIDO and indigenous African
civil society groups. The commission, however, has encountered serious challenges in
its efforts to institutionalise human security. A number of African governments are
undermining the CIDO’s work, tacitly undercutting its ability to meet with civil society
groups. The CIDO also faces serious institutional and human resource challenges. It
is understaffed and under-resourced. Also, there is a real danger that the entire human
security agenda may go off the radar screen of the AU when Obasanjo and Mbeki,
key supporters of human security in the AU leadership, step down as presidents of
their countries.
36 African Security Review 16.2 Institute for Security Studies
Acknowledgement
The author is grateful to Robert Matthews, James Milner, Erin Norman Hannah, Nick Swift and referees for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. The usual disclaimers apply.
Notes
1 26 May 2001 is recognised as the offi cial date that the AU came into existence because it was the date that
the Constitutive Act of the African Union entered into force. It was exactly thirty days after the deposit of
the instrument of ratifi cation by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU, as provided for in article 28
of the CA.
2 The new security architecture, which is managed by a newly created fi fteen-member Peace and Security
Council (herein referred to as PSC), calls for the development of a rapid reaction force, an African Standby
Force (ASF), to be fully developed by the year 2010. The ASF will build on the militar y capabilities of
the regional economic communities in Africa to develop the ASF. Note that the new security regime had
already undertaken its fi rst peacemaking operations called the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). AMIB
was an integrated mission made up of 3 500 contingents drawn mainly from South Africa, Mozambique
and Ethiopia deployed by the AU in April 2003 to monitor a ceasefi re in Burundi. On 21 May 2004 the
United Nations Security Council passed a resolution to take over the mission after AMIB had stabilised
and created conditions conducive for peacekeeping operations. It has also deployed another mission to the
Darfur region of Sudan.
3 The article has been amended to include intervention to ’restore peace and stability’ and in response to ‘a
serious threat to legitimate order’.
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