No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict
Abstract
Many aspects of the Iraq venture have turned out differently from what was purported before the war: there were no weapons of mass destruction, no clear link between Al Qaeda and Iraq, no imminent danger that would warrant a pre-emptive war. Whether Americans were greeted as liberators or not, there is evidence that that they are now viewed as occupiers. Stability has not been established. Clearly, the benefits of the War have been markedly different from those claimed. So too for the costs. This paper, in two parts first provides an estimate of the 'direct' expenditures, and provide adjustments to reflect the true social costs of the resources deployed. The second provides an estimate of the macro-economic costs; the effects of the War on the overall performance of the economy, taking into account both the effects of the expenditures themselves and of the increased price of oil, some of which at least should be attributed to the War. Americans could, and should have asked, are there ways of spending that money that would have enhanced our long run well being—and perhaps even our security—more.
... Many papers, similar to Ali's (2011) on the economic costs of the armed conflcit have been generated in the last two decades (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003;Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2006;Bozzoli et al., 2008;Bozzoli et al., 2010;de Groot, 2010;Fitzgerald, 1987;Grobar & Gnanaselvam, 1993;Lopez & Wodon, 2005;Pradhan, 2001;Roux, 1996). All these works show enormous costs of social conflicts and a negative impact on the level of economic activity; precisely, due to those resources for war or the destruction of physical and human capital and the loss of productivity in the country. ...
Theoretical and empirical studies showing the relationship between economic growth and conflict have increased over time, but there are no studies considering the relationship between economic growth, conflict, and gender. There is even less research examining it from a gender perspective growth. This work focuses on analyzing and quantifying the impact of conflicts through the variable kidnapping in Colombia’s economic growth from a gender perspective through panel data methodology and the ordinary least squares method. The overall conclusion is that the abduction of men and women negatively affects economic growth in each of the regions and the country at the aggregate level.
... Ideally, estimating the cost of conflict would require a quantification of the direct impacts and indirect costs (Skaperdas, 2011). In this regard, the cost accounting method was used by Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006) and Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008); they used standard economic and accounting/budgetary frameworks to estimate the costs of the Iraq War. Arunatilake et al. (2001) discussed in detail the conceptual and methodological challenges associated with assessing the economic costs of conflicts and estimated that the cumulative costs of the Sri Lanka conflict to be twice the country's 1996 GDP. ...
This study estimates the output loss in South Sudan as a result of the double shock of the protracted post‐independence conflict and macroeconomic crisis. Using the synthetic control method for comparative studies, the analysis suggests that the cumulative loss in the growth rate of real per‐capita gross domestic product (GDP) was 69.63% (or a yearly average of 15.65%) over the period 2012–2018. This resulted in an accumulated loss in the real per‐capita GDP of US$7,070 (yearly average of US$1,010) and an accumulated loss in the aggregate GDP of US$81.1 billion (yearly average of US$11.6 billion) over the same period. Consequently, South Sudan's real per‐capita GDP in 2018 was just a third of what it would have been in the absence of conflict. Moreover, we find that exports and investment were the main channels through which the economy was adversely impacted by the conflict. These results are robust to several placebo and robustness tests. Implications for future research are discussed.
We estimate the effects of the Syrian civil war using a synthetic control method which is based on a counterfactual scenario of an absence of the armed conflict that has led to the humanitarian crisis and one of the largest population displacements without a precedent in modern history. By comparing Syria’s growth and development trajectories with the characteristics of a set of sixty-six countries with no armed internal conflict between 1996 and 2021, we can deduce a series of gaps in economic growth, human development, and institutional quality that can be attributed to the civil war. Our analysis shows that the effect of the Syrian civil war on the trajectory of economic growth was temporary and almost disappeared before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Conversely, the war led to an unprecedented decline in human development, a high rise in infant mortality, and a prevalent degradation of institutional quality. To the present day, the civil war has led to more than 4500 additional infant deaths with a permanently derailed trajectory of longevity. The unparalleled and permanent deterioration in institutional quality resulting from the war is indicated by a diminished rule of law, civil liberties, government efficiency, and a widespread escalation of corruption. To ensure the internal validity of the findings, the estimated effects were subjected to and passed a variety of placebo checks.
Purpose
This study examined the clinical utility of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), low resilience, poor sleep, and lifetime blast exposure as risk factors for predicting future neurobehavioral outcome following traumatic brain injury (TBI).
Methods
Participants were 591 U.S. military service members and veterans who had sustained a TBI (n = 419) or orthopedic injury without TBI (n = 172). Participants completed the Neurobehavioral Symptom Inventory, PTSD Checklist, and the TBI-Quality of Life (TBI-QOL) scale at baseline and follow-up.
Results
Using the four risk factors at baseline, 15 risk factor combinations were examined by calculating odds ratios to predict poor neurobehavioral outcome at follow-up (i.e., number of abnormal scores across five TBI-QOL scales [e.g., Fatigue, Depression]). The vast majority of risk factor combinations resulted in odds ratios that were considered to be clinically meaningful (i.e., ≥ 2.5) for predicting poor outcome. The risk factor combinations with the highest odds ratios included PTSD singularly, or in combination with poor sleep and/or low resilience (odds ratios = 4.3–72.4). However, poor sleep and low resilience were also strong predictors in the absence of PTSD (odds ratios = 3.1–29.8).
Conclusion
PTSD, poor sleep, and low resilience, singularly or in combination, may be valuable risk factors that can be used clinically for targeted early interventions.
With more than ten thousand casualties, the ongoing hybrid Ukrainian war between pro-Russian separatists and the government in the Donbass region, Ukraine’s productive core, has taken a severe toll on the country. Using cross-country panel data over the period 1995–2017, this paper estimates the causal effects of the Donbass war on Ukraine’s GDP. Our counterfactual estimation by the synthetic control method shows that Ukraine’s per capita GDP foregone due to the war amounts to 15.1% on average for 2013–2017. Separate analysis for the affected regions of Donetsk and Luhansk indicates an average causal effect of 47% for 2013–2016. Results are robust to pre-war confounds, namely, the Orange Revolution and Ukrainian-Russian gas disputes. As such, we discuss mechanisms underlying the war’s causal effects on economic performance, which is of broader relevance for debates on the role of government in hybrid conflict management.
A reorientation of the Bush administration’s nuclear non-proliferation policy toward North Korea is discussed in this chapter. Taking prevailing accounts for why Washington began to soften its posture toward the regime in Pyongyang into consideration, the chapter brings the IRT into the context to test if it generates a more convincing analysis for the redirection of the Bush administration’s stance toward North Korea in its second term. The chapter additionally has a focus on the influence of domestic public opinion on states’ foreign policy making. The nexus between agents and structures is extensively discussed by offering the description of how the changed social structure due to the US role-taking influenced Japan’s perceptions and its subsequent foreign policy behavior. The Roh government’s enduring North Korea policy despite strong resistance from the conservative party and the media conglomerates is also analyzed with regard to the changed public attitude toward North Korea.
Blast induced neurotrauma (BINT) is a prevalent injury within military and civilian populations. The injury is characterized by persistent inflammation at the cellular level which manifests as a multitude of cognitive and functional impairments. Epigenetic regulation of transcription offers an important control mechanism for gene expression and cellular function which may underlie chronic inflammation and result in neurodegeneration. We hypothesize that altered histone acetylation patterns may be involved in blast induced inflammation and the chronic activation of glial cells. This study aimed to elucidate changes to histone acetylation occurring following injury and the roles these changes may have within the pathology. Sprague Dawley rats were subjected to either a 10 or 17 psi blast overpressure within an Advanced Blast Simulator. Sham animals underwent the same procedures without blast exposure. Memory impairments were measured using the Novel Object Recognition (NOR) test at two and seven days post-injury. Tissues were collected at seven days for Western blot and immunohistochemistry analysis. Sham animals showed in-tact memory at each time point. The novel object discrimination decreased significantly between two and seven days for each injury group (p
The two most recent definitions of marketing, as posited by thoughtful members of the AMA in 2004 and 2007, have generated considerable discussion about the nature, scope and foci of marketing. The 2004 definition was not fully embraced by the AMA membership, nor has it been uniformly adopted by other marketing organizations and associa. tions around the world, where some of the most compelling marketing activity now unfolds; hence the 2007 revised definition.
We examine the sector-specific distributive effect of war in the US economy. We argue that war generates sector-specific distributive effects via demand-side and supply-side mechanisms. We also claim that war's distributive effects materialize over time. Our empirical analysis utilizes a panel data set with 22,354 U.S. firms for the period from 1960 to 2007. It probes the impact of the U.S. Government's war making on firm performance in the U.S. arms and non-arms (hybrid and civilian) sectors in both the short and long runs. Our analysis shows that war does not always affect U.S. non-arms sectors adversely. Indeed, war exercises a positive total long-run effect for these sectors. It also finds that the supposedly positive distributive effect of war for U.S. arms sectors proves weaker than analysts generally assume. Finally, it demonstrates that war-induced demand and supply shocks can explain these results. Overall, our research sheds light on a relatively understudied aspect of war and advances the general understanding of the political microeconomy of war making.
The purpose of this study is to extend the animosity model by examining the internal motivations of consumer animosity and their effects on willingness to buy. In particular, this research focuses on studying the model of consumer animosity in a new context. The Iraqi war that started in 2003 and the Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006 created tension in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) toward the United States. It is within this context that we examined whether individuals’ animosity affects willingness to buy American products in two countries of that region (Lebanon and Tunisia). Specifically, are consumers’ internal motivations behind refusing to buy American products just to express anger, or to “punish” the United States and its companies, or to enhance self-image by rejecting American goods? To examine these issues, a structural equation model was developed and tested cross-nationally in both Tunisia (N = 164) and Lebanon (N = 300). Results suggest that consumers’ internal motivations to avoid purchasing American products are very different from each other. In particular, even though both countries seem similar culturally, results show that consumers in Tunisia and Lebanon have very different perceived motivations behind their animosity toward the United States, which in turn, differentially affect their willingness to buy American products.
Purpose
– This study aims to examine animosity's role in determining consumers' product choices. Considerable research attention has been devoted to studying the relationship between animosity and consumers' willingness to buy foreign products. Few studies, however, have considered that individual consumers may harbor varying degrees of animosity toward different countries, thus, differentially affecting their willingness to buy products from these countries. The within‐subject comparison of the present study seeks to provide a clearer and cleaner approach to examining the impact of animosity on consumers' preferences for foreign products. Extending this line of inquiry, it also aims to explore the link between consumers' choice of products from high versus low animosity countries at different price levels.
Design/methodology/approach
– Two studies were conducted to examine the impact of consumer animosity on product choice. Study 1 contains a survey study, and Study 2 is a full factorial conjoint analysis.
Findings
– It is discovered that animosity plays a stronger role in determining consumers' willingness to buy foreign products from high‐level animosity countries than from low‐level animosity countries. Through conjoint analysis, the paper demonstrates that consumers are willing to make trade‐offs between price and animosity.
Originality/value
– This study fills a void in the literature by exploring what role animosity plays in determining a consumer's choice of products, particularly when different degrees of animosity are held toward different countries. The within‐subject design of this research provides considerable insight on this front. In addition, this study represents an initial attempt to explore the dynamics between animosity and price via a conjoint analysis.
Consider a state that chooses security levels at two sites (Targets A and B), after which a terrorist chooses which site to attack (and potentially a scope of attack). The state values A more highly. If the state knows which target the terrorist values more highly, he will choose a higher level of security at this site. Under complete information, if the terrorist’s only choice is which site to attack, the state will set security levels for which the terrorist prefers to attack A over B if and only if the ratio of the value of B to the value of A is greater for the state than for the terrorist. When the state has incomplete information on the terrorist’s target values, the optimal security levels may be such that: a target is completely undefended (but attacked with positive probability); the probability of attack is greater at A than at B; and the expected damage from an attack is greater at A than at B. In total, the results reveal that the state’s choice of security is heavily influenced by the terrorist’s target valuations.
Abstract The degree to which carbon capture and storage (CCS) is deployed will be partly determined by the returns to scale of the technological system that captures, trans- ports, and stores carbon dioxide (CO2). This technological system spatially connects the organization of CO2 point sources with the organization of geologic CO2 storage reservoirs. These point sources and storage reservoirs are heterogeneous in the amount of CO2 that they produce or store and in the costs of capturing or storing CO2, and the associated cost structures interact to determine the returns to scale for the entire coupled system. The SimCCS cost-minimizing geospatial deployment model is used to deploy CCS for a variety of combinations of CO2 sources and injection reservoirs and determine the returns to scale for CCS deployment and unravel the determinants thereof. SimCCS minimizes the total costs of the entire capture, transport, and storage system by simultaneously determining how much CO2 is captured from each source, how much CO2 is stored in each storage reservoir, and assigning CO2 ows through pipeline networks that include trunk distribution lines that are routed to minimize the inuence,of the social and physical topography. The returns to scale for the entire CCS system involves the interaction of the cost structures for each link in the CCS chain - capture at the source, transport through the network, and storage at the reservoir - This paper is was also presented at the 7, Annual Conference on Carbon Capture and Sequestration,
The article describes how over the past two decades the role of US forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons has gradually declined, and explains the logic behind their decreased importance. The main arguments in favor of the continuation of the process of their removal from Europe, until they have been entirely eliminated over the next couple of years, are listed, and the reasons for NATO’s desire to nevertheless prolong its reliance on these weapons are investigated. Further, the political feasibility of their complete withdrawal and the political practicalities of such a withdrawal are analyzed.
Diverse representations of the economy exist in both academic and nonacademic, everyday contexts. I show how investigating these representations challenges existing conceptions of both the discipline of economics and “real” economic relations and institutions - such that they can be denaturalized, and new ones can be produced.
We estimate the causal effect of a large development program on conflict in the Philippines through a regression discontinuity design that exploits an arbitrary poverty threshold used to assign eligibility for the program. We find that barely eligible municipalities experienced a large increase in conflict casualties compared to barely ineligible ones. This increase is mostly due to insurgent-initiated incidents in the early stages of program preparation. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that insurgents try to sabotage the program because its success would weaken their support in the population.
In this article, we estimate the total costs of the German participation in the Afghanistan war, both past and future. This is a hugely complex and uncertain calculation, which depends on several important assumptions. These assumptions pertain to the different cost channels and the shares of these channels that can be attributed to the German participation in the war. By calculating the costs of the German participation, we provide a framework for other researchers to do the same with respect to other countries. The article can function as a roadmap for researchers focusing on this topic. In the end we find that, in the most realistic of several possible scenarios regarding the duration and intensity of the German participation in the war in Afghanistan, the German share of the net present value of the total costs of the war ranges from 26 billion Euro to 47 billion Euro. This large range reflects the uncertainties with which the costs must be estimated. On an annual basis, we estimate that the German participation in the war costs between 2.5 and 3 billion Euro. This contrasts with the official war budget, which is little over 1 billion Euro for 2010, showing that governments may not adequately represent the costs of military action.
Der Krieg gegen den Irak, den die USA am 20. März 2003 unter der Bezeichnung Operation Iraqi Freedom begannen, stellt sich heute als eine der schwerwiegendsten strategischen Fehlentscheidungen in der Geschichte der amerikanischen
Außenpolitik dar. Die USA gingen aus diesem Konflikt im mehrerer Hinsicht massiv geschwächt hervor: Militärisch, weil — so
der ehemalige Generalstabschef Richard B. Myers — große Teile der Streitkräfte am Rande der Leistungsfähigkeit angelangt sind
und kaum noch Reserven zur Verfügung stehen, die für andere Konflikte oder Drohkulissen mobilisiert werden können (New York Times 2005); wirtschaftlich, weil der Krieg den Ölpreis, die Staatsverschuldung, die Inflation und die Zinsen in die Höhe getrieben
und die Abhängigkeit von ausländischem Kapital vergrößert hat (Bilmes/Stiglitz 2006); und politisch, weil die mangelnde Legitimation des Krieges die Glaubwürdigkeit der Vereinigten Staaten und die Akzeptanz
ihrer Führungsrolle in der Welt untergraben hat. Das ‚politische Kapital‘, das die USA durch die Ereignisse des 11. September
2001 ohne eigenes Zutun erworben hatten — versinnbildlicht durch die öffentlichen Solidaritätsbekundungen vor allem in Europa
— wurde mit dem Irakkrieg verspielt. Die politischen Kosten des Krieges waren bereits bei seinem Beginn hoch, weil die Zustimmung
der wichtigsten Verbündeten und ihrer Bevölkerungen zum Krieg weitgehend fehlte. Sie stiegen in der Folgezeit weiter an, weil
sich die Begründungen der amerikanischen Regierung für den Krieg als unhaltbar erwiesen und das Vorgehen der amerikanischen
Truppen im Irak, vor allem im Folterskandal von Abu Ghraib, das Image der USA weiter beschädigte. Der Krieg zog zudem den
Verlust der Reputation als unbesiegbare Militärmacht, die nach dem Vietnamkrieg langsam wieder aufgebaut worden war, nach
sich, denn die USA konnten zwar den konventionellen Krieg im Irak gewinnen, nicht aber den folgenden asymmetrischen.
The current paper constructs a progress measurement appropriate for measuring multiple and different dimensions of progress.
The paper is not meant to be a detailed discussion of the framework but rather a demonstrated application of the measure.
The constructed resource-infrastructure-environment progress measure employs a non-monetary evaluation adopting a weighting
technique based on public opinion. The proposed index is assessed from a single summary standpoint. The aggregation method
is evaluated via a z-score standardisation technique. The progress index is applied to three countries that are representative
of different clusters. They are Australia (mid-industrialised nation), Mexico (emerging economy), and the US (highly industrialised
nation). These selected countries provide an opportunity to highlight any divergences that may exist in their perceived economic
strength. The results showed Australia as consistently having the highest levels of progress, closely followed by Mexico and
then the US.
KeywordsMeasurement–Progress–Aggregation–Weighting
Perhaps the most daunting challenge the next generation of Americans will face is what President Bush called our “addiction to oil”. The challenge is to find the means to provide for our transportation needs in the face of declining world oil production. Perhaps the central question is whether we will export the great wealth of America to foreign countries in payment for oil before we tackle the grand challenge of creating a new transportation future that does not rely completely on oil.This article presents the historical facts relative to America's oil demand and domestic and world oil production resources. These historical trends are used to construct a scenario of future supply and demand for oil in the US. A range of existing technologies, which can reduce the need for petroleum imports, are then evaluated using wedges analysis, giving projections to the year 2030.
This paper examines what costs are included and which are excluded from a war budget and why it is in the best interests of the U.S. political elite to under-cost warfare. It provides a social accounting for war that goes beyond the economic by documenting the human and social consequences of conflict. In so doing, it demonstrates the potential of social reporting for emancipation. If the U.S. government was required to disclose the social and human costs of a war, the horror would be revealed, making it difficult to rationalize violence as a means to an end.
This paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.
Writing 50 years after the publication of C. P. Snow's Two Cultures and The Scientific Revolution, this paper considers the many cultures that have to intersect to sustain and deepen the advances in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness. To bridge this "two-culture divide," the paper contextualizes scientific developments in this field within work in medical ethics and the humanities. The author asserts that this line of inquiry cannot go forward responsibly absent input from the humanities and an appreciation of the lived experiences of patients and families who confront the quotidian and existential challenges of severe brain injury.
In 2007, the United States spent over $650 billion on national defense. Even after adjusting for inflation, this was the largest annual amount since 1945, surpassing previous post-World War II peaks reached during the Korean, Vietnam, and Cold wars. Defense spending has risen steadily this decade, today accounting for nearly 5 percent of overall gross domestic product—about the same share as residential construction. ; National defense represents an even larger share of economic activity in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. The region is home to some of the country's largest military installations, a number of private defense contractors, and a disproportionately large number of reservists and National Guardsmen. ; Is the buildup in national defense stimulating the economies of the states in the Tenth District? Wilkerson and Williams find that, relative to the nation, increased defense spending is likely to help the region more in the long run than the short run. Since 2001, defense spending has risen more moderately in the district than the nation, due primarily to slower growth in the types of defense activities concentrated in the region. Still, the region is poised for an expansion of defense spending in the future. And the region benefits from a less cyclical defense sector than that of the nation.
Analyses of the full social cost of motor vehicle use in the US often estimate an "oil import premium" that includes the military cost of defending oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. Estimates of this cost have ranged from essentially zero to upwards of a $1 per gallon (about $0.25 per liter). In this paper, we attempt to narrow this range, by carefully answering the question: "If the US highway transportation sector did not use oil, how much would the US federal government reduce its military commitment in the Persian Gulf?" We work towards our answer in five steps, accounting for interests not related to oil, the interests of other oil-consuming countries, the interests of producers apart from the interests of consumers, and the interests of non-highway users of oil. We estimate that were there no oil in the Persian Gulf, then US combined peacetime and wartime defense expenditures might be reduced in the long run by roughly $27-$73 billion per year (in 2004 dollars), of which roughly $6-$25 billion annually ($0.03-$0.15 per gallon or $0.01-$0.04 per liter) is attributable to motor-vehicle use.
The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq”, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper SeriesOil price shocks and real GDP growth: empirical evidence for some OECD countries
- Nordhaus
- William
- Rodriguez
- Marcelo Rebeca
- Sanchez
Nordhaus, William D. “The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq”, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper Series, Yale University, December 2002 Rodriguez, Rebeca and Marcelo Sanchez, “Oil price shocks and real GDP growth: empirical evidence for some OECD countries”, Applied Economics, 2005, 37, 201–228 Stiglitz, J. E. “Reflections on the Natural Rate Hypothesis,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1), Winter 1997, pp. 3-10