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Battered Women Who Kill The Impact of Expert Testimony and Empathy Induction in the Courtroom

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Mock jurors (N = 312) viewed a simulated trial involving a woman, charged with the murder of her abusive husband, entering a plea of not guilty by reason of self-defense. Expert testimony was varied using battered woman syndrome, social agency framework, or no expert testimony. Within expert testimony conditions, jurors were presented with opening and closing statements either including or not including instructions aimed at inducing empathy. Results indicate differences in gender and expert testimony for ratings of guilt as well as differences in gender, expert testimony, and empathy induction for perceptions of the defendant.
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Violence Against Women
DOI: 10.1177/1077801208329145
2009; 15; 186 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Karyn M. Plumm and Cheryl A. Terrance Empathy Induction in the Courtroom
Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of Expert Testimony and
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186
Violence Against Women
Volume 15 Number 2
February 2009 186-205
© 2009 Sage Publications
10.1177/1077801208329145
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Battered Women Who Kill
The Impact of Expert Testimony and
Empathy Induction in the Courtroom
Karyn M. Plumm
Cheryl A. Terrance
University of North Dakota
Mock jurors (N=312) viewed a simulated trial involving a woman, charged with the
murder of her abusive husband, entering a plea of not guilty by reason of self-defense.
Expert testimony was varied using battered woman syndrome, social agency frame-
work, or no expert testimony. Within expert testimony conditions, jurors were pre-
sented with opening and closing statements either including or not including
instructions aimed at inducing empathy. Results indicate differences in gender and
expert testimony for ratings of guilt as well as differences in gender, expert testimony,
and empathy induction for perceptions of the defendant.
Keywords: battered women; empathy; juror decision making
Domestic violence represents a significant social problem. According to the U.S.
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2000), one out of every five
women in the United States has reported being physically assaulted by a male inti-
mate partner in her lifetime. Moreover, within heterosexual partnerships, women
experience more intimate partner violence and are significantly more likely to be
injured during an assault than are men (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2000). At some point in their abusive relationships, some of these women
resort to the use of lethal force against their abusers and subsequently, within the legal
system, may enter a plea of not guilty by reason of self-defense (Schneider, 2000).
To justify the use of lethal force, the self-defense doctrine requires that the defen-
dant show that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would believe that
she or he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and that the use
of force against the attacker was reasonable (Dressler, 1995). The underlying
assumptions justifying self-defense have been criticized as disregarding the situa-
tions of battered women defendants, as they do not share the same experiences as
men (Faigman & Wright, 1997; Raitt & Zeedyk, 2000; Schneider, 2000). According
to Gillespie (1989), the doctrine was originally formulated to account for the expe-
riences of two men of more or less equal size and strength involved in a one-time
brawl. As a consequence, battered women have had difficulty meeting these criteria
within the courtroom as the self-defense doctrine does not take into account the
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Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 187
cumulative effects of repeated violence, the relationship between the woman and her
batterer, and the prediction of violence in the future (Browne, 1987; Schneider, 2000).
In light of the difficulty some battered women may face in the courtroom, the current
study investigates the impact of varying forms of expert testimony as well as empa-
thy induction attempts on the part of the defense attorney as a means to aid jurors in
their understanding of the application of the self-defense doctrine in certain cases.
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS)
In an effort to aid jurors in their understanding of the experiences of battered
women, strategies are sought by defense attorneys. One such strategy introduced in
many of these cases is expert testimony on the BWS (Schneider, 2000). This testimony
is introduced to show how a battered woman’s perception of imminent danger and her
subsequent use of lethal force may be considered in light of her history of abuse
(Faigman & Wright, 1997; Schneider, 2000). Based on the work of Walker (1979,
1984), BWS emerged from an increased awareness of what some women suffer at the
hands of their intimate partners within their own homes (Faigman & Wright, 1997). As
posited byWalker, there are two main constructs within the syndrome: the cycle theory
of violence and learned helplessness. According to the BWS, battered women experi-
ence a cycle of violence within their relationships. The cycle theory of violence is com-
posed of three phases: a “tension building” phase, characterized by verbal bickering
and increasing tension; an “acute battering incident,” wherein the batterer explodes
into an uncontrollable and violent rage; and, finally, the “loving contrition” stage,
which is marked by apologies and promises by the abuser never to batter again.
Learned helplessness refers to the failure to avoid or escape from an unpleasant
or aversive stimulus that occurs as a result of previous exposure to similar stimuli
(Morris & Maisto, 1999). In light of their failed attempts to control the abuse over
time, battered women come to experience helplessness because they believe there is
no way to escape the violence. Given the cyclical nature of the violence battered
women experience in their relationships, learned helplessness, according to Walker
(1979), renders battered women increasingly passive to the abuse. Coupled with the
ongoing nature of the violence they experience, battered women may come to view
themselves as constantly in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and
having no escape from it. In this regard, a battered woman’s belief of imminent dan-
ger is therefore submitted as reasonable.
Although many have assumed that BWS testimony may help battered women
defendants by explaining their experiences, several commentators have recently cri-
tiqued the use of this testimony in the courtroom (Faigman & Wright, 1997; Raitt &
Zeedyk, 2000; Schneider, 2000). Aside from methodological issues that bring many
of Walker’s findings into question (cf. Faigman, 1986), the syndrome has also been
criticized as establishing criteria against which a battered woman’s experiences will
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be evaluated. Consequently, concern has been directed toward the potential for BWS
testimony to create a typical battered woman stereotype that would merely replace
jurors’ misconceptions regarding battered women (Jenkins & Davidson, 1990;
Terrance & Matheson, 2003). If the woman and her relationship do not exhibit evi-
dence of the cycle theory of violence or of learned helplessness, then she may be per-
ceived by jurors as not fitting the criteria for BWS (Faigman & Wright, 1997).
Consequently, her use of lethal force risks being evaluated outside the context of her
abusive relationship.
Many battered women do not exhibit the cycle theory of violence or learned help-
lessness. Indeed, within Walker’s (1984) own study, only two thirds of the women
reported experiencing abuse in a cyclical nature. Moreover, other researchers have
contended that battered women do not in fact experience learned helplessness and
become passive but rather are active in their attempts to end the violence (e.g., leave
the relationship; Gondolf & Fisher, 1988). Consequently, for those women whose
experiences deviate from the stereotype, fact finders (e.g., judges and jurors) may
deem the testimony irrelevant in providing justification for their use of self-defense.
The syndrome has also been criticized as not only promoting a standard that bat-
tered women must meet but also portraying battered women as pathologized (Finkel,
Meister, & Lightfoot, 1991; Schuller & Hastings, 1996). Although BWS has not yet
been specifically listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), it is generally recognized as an implied
subcategory of posttraumatic stress disorder (i.e., intimate partner violence is con-
sidered a traumatic stressor). Furthermore, BWS has been included in the World
Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases. The inclusion of
BWS as both a disorder and a disease risks exacerbating its portrayal as pathologi-
cal (Terrance & Matheson, 2003). The “reasonableness” of the defendant’s actions
may thus be undermined. Indeed, Kasian, Spanos, Terrance, and Peebles (1993) sug-
gested that this form of testimony is more consistent with incapacity defenses (i.e.,
automatism, insanity). In light of these problems, an alternative form of expert testi-
mony, referred to as “social agency framework” (SAF; Schuller & Hastings, 1996),
has been proposed as more suitable in the defense of battered women who kill.
SAF
SAF expert testimony places emphasis on the social reality of the woman’s situ-
ation (e.g., lack of effective community alternatives, inadequacy of police response,
information pertaining to risks of leaving home) as opposed to her psychological
reactions (Schuller & Hastings, 1996). This form of testimony, then, may be more
suitable than BWS expert testimony for battered women entering a plea of self-
defense for killing their batterers, as it does not imply individual pathology as the
primary cause of their behavior.
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Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 189
As opposed to linking a battered woman’s use of lethal force to a syndrome, SAF
testimony highlights the inadequacies that exist within formal help sources as well as
the threats a battered woman may face while seeking help. These situational factors
can be influential in keeping battered women in their relationships. In fact, in com-
parison to the large number of battered women who require such services, shelters
remain scarce. Battered women may also lack the financial support necessary to
establish independence from their abusers (N. Archer, 1989; Bowker, 1993; Dutton,
1993). Some of these women do not work and may have limited access to finances as
a result of the control their abuser may hold over them. In addition, escaping an abu-
sive partner often requires flight, which requires further resources and may involve
leaving a job and a regular paycheck. Unfortunately, even if a woman does escape the
abusive situation and is able to maintain her job, it is not uncommon for the abuser to
disrupt the victim’s employment with his subversive behavior (Hoff, 1990).
Women who have successfully left an abusive relationship may still face retalia-
tion from their abusers. Indeed, the commonality of incidents of abuse that occur fol-
lowing separation has led to the creation of the term separation assault (Mahoney,
1991). It is not uncommon for women who have managed to escape the abusive envi-
ronment to be sought out and abused (Hirshel, Hutchison, & Dean, 1992). In fact, a
large proportion of the battered women who are eventually killed by their batterers
are not living with them at the time of their death (Dutton, 1993; Sheehy, Stubbs, &
Tolmie, 1992; Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, & Rogan, 1992).
Taken together, SAF testimony addresses the obstacles and lack of alternatives
available to women in abusive relationships. This form of testimony locates the expla-
nation for a battered woman’s use of lethal force in the context within which many bat-
tered women live. As opposed to explaining a battered woman defendant’s reactions as
reflecting an individualized psychological pathology, SAF testimony locates the
woman’s response to the violence within the social structure. That a battered woman
may fear that she is in imminent danger and have no other recourse but to rely on lethal
force is, in light of her circumstances and experiences, submitted as reasonable.
Furthermore, SAF testimony does not promote the portrayal of stereotypical bat-
tered women in that it does not advance specific criteria to which battered women
must conform. Rather, emphasis is placed on contextual and structural constraints in
the lives of battered women that arguably play important roles in their perception of
the situation and in their decision that lethal force is necessary. The effectiveness of
this testimony, however, remains equivocal.
In their examination of mock juror reactions to a case involving a battered woman
who entered a plea of self-defense in the murder of her abusive husband, Schuller
and Hastings (1996) found no difference in jury verdicts or juror judgments based
on BWS testimony versus SAF testimony. However, closer examination of both
forms of testimony indicates that there was considerable overlap in the actual con-
tent of each form of testimony. Within the SAF testimony, the expert made reference
to elements of BWS (i.e., cycle of violence, learned helplessness). Thus, although a
difference in the psychological focus of the two types of testimony was evidenced,
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190 Violence Against Women
jurors may not have been attentive to the situational information relayed within SAF
testimony when evaluating the case. Incorporating more dichotomous forms of
expert testimony may afford a better opportunity to delineate those elements of SAF
and BWS that jurors consider relevant in their determination of self-defense.
Even in its more “pure” form (i.e., no reference to elements of BWS), SAF testi-
mony may be limited in that it conveys only a description of the context within
which battered women live and the barriers that make it difficult for them to leave
their abusive relationship. Thus, although SAF testimony highlights the situational
context of the lives of battered women, jurors may be inclined to focus instead on
the dispositional characteristics of battered women defendants. The reasonableness
of the battered woman’s claim of self-defense may thus be jeopardized if jurors
explain her reaction as reflecting supposed unique dispositional characteristics (i.e.,
pathology) instead of viewing her reactions (i.e., failure to leave the relationship, use
of lethal force) in light of the overall social context that contributed to her actions.
The failure to account for the defendant’s perspective by jurors is not surprising
in light of attribution biases that render the situational factors and constraints that
may be operating within the lives of battered women invisible. This bias, referred to
as the fundamental attribution error, represents the tendency for observers to under-
estimate situational influences and overestimate dispositional influences on the
behavior of others (Ross, 1977). This attribution bias may arise because of the fact
that jurors have difficulty placing themselves in the defendant’s situation.
Consistent with the actor–observer effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), jurors, as
observers, may be inclined to attribute the defendant’s behavior to internal causes,
such as character flaws, pathology, or judgment errors. Rendered largely invisible
are the situational factors that act on her behavior that contribute to her failure to
leave the relationship and the decision that lethal force was necessary. Thus,
although jurors are presented with information concerning a defendant’s situation,
they may not, as detached observers, be able to fully appreciate its importance in
evaluating her claim of self-defense.
Strategies that require jurors to better appreciate the situational factors that influ-
ence a battered woman’s failure to leave an abusive relationship and her subsequent
use of lethal force may be sufficient to undermine this bias. By placing themselves
in the defendant’s “shoes,” jurors may be encouraged to explicitly consider the situ-
ational constraints and experiences of battered women. In turn, jurors may be better
able to relate SAF testimony to the defendant herself. One strategy that encourages
jurors to consider the perspective of the defendant is the inclusion of empathy induc-
tion instructions introduced by defense lawyers.
Empathy
Empathy can be defined as “the process whereby one person tries to understand
accurately the subjectivity of another person” (Wispe, 1986, p. 320). Empathy is said
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to occur when people can seemingly understand the underlying reasons for the
behavior of someone other than themselves. In other words, empathy represents the
ability of one person (observer) to take on the perspective of another (actor).
Empathy can be induced in a variety of ways and is influenced by many different
factors. At least two forms of empathy, trait (similarity) and state (situational), have
been empirically examined (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995; Haegerich &
Bottoms, 2000).
Trait or similarity empathy has been referred to as both general similarities
between the actor and observer that produce higher empathic responses and individ-
ual differences in people’s general ability to empathize (Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, &
Bentley, 1982; Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000). Similarities between the observer and
actor on their own may thus be sufficient to produce “trait” empathy. Similarity
between individuals may be determined by a number of different attributes, such as
physical or situational characteristics. Because this form of empathy relies on the
characteristics of the observer that exist prior to the situation, trait empathy is diffi-
cult if not impossible to manipulate.
Trait empathy may explain one consistent finding within jury simulation studies
pertaining to battered women who kill. That is, female mock jurors are more likely
than their male counterparts to rate battered women defendants as not guilty and
view them as credible (Kasian et al., 1993; Schuller & Hastings, 1996; Terrance,
2000). It may be the case, therefore, that by virtue of their similarity (gender),
women are better able to empathize with battered women defendants than are men.
Another form of empathy, referred to as state or situational empathy, relies on the
effectiveness of the observer to imaginatively place herself or himself in the situa-
tion of the actor. This form of empathy can be induced and therefore manipulated.
When empathy is successfully induced, it may be reflected in a number of different
responses by the observer. These responses include cognitive, affective, and behav-
ioral reactions (Davis, 1996).
The cognitive response of empathy involves the ability of a person to imagina-
tively take on the role of another person and is said to be able to accurately predict
that person’s thoughts, feelings, and actions. The affective response of empathy is the
emotional response a person would have by taking on another’s thoughts and feelings
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Typically, the cognitive and affective responses are not
directed toward the actor in the situation but tend to help the observer decide what
action to take (behavioral response). Thus, the behavioral response of empathy is the
action the observer directs toward the actor in the situation.
To induce state empathy, an individual can be explicitly instructed to think about
a situation that previously took place and imaginatively experience it as another did
or would have (Davis, 1996). Given that the description of a situation is clear and
detailed, empathy can be produced quite effectively simply by instructing a person
to carefully consider how another was thinking and feeling (Haegerich & Bottoms,
2000). In the courtroom, jurors can be explicitly instructed to imagine themselves as
Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 191
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the defendant in some particular situation when considering the evidence. At the
same time, although trait empathy cannot be induced, it can nevertheless play a part
in the induction of state empathy. Indeed, the induction of state empathy may more
readily occur in those individuals who find themselves similar to the person with
whom they are being asked to empathize (trait empathy) than in those who are dis-
similar (R. L. Archer, Foushee, & Davis, 1979; Deitz et el., 1982; Haegerich &
Bottoms, 2000).
A number of studies have attempted to examine the effectiveness of empathy
induction techniques within the courtroom in a variety of criminal cases. For instance,
R. L. Archer et al. (1979) examined the effectiveness of empathy induction instruc-
tions in a criminal case involving a male defendant who, it was alleged, used greater
force than was necessary in repelling the male victim during a barroom brawl and
had entered a plea of not guilty by reason of self-defense. Mock jurors heard an
appeal by the defense lawyer either to imagine themselves as the defendant (empa-
thy appeal) or to pay close attention to the facts of the case (nonempathy appeal).
Results indicated that mock jurors hearing the empathy inducing appeal were
more likely to perceive the defendant’s actions as lawful and less likely to attribute
blame for the defendant’s actions to his individual personality attributes than their
counterparts in the nonempathy condition. This was particularly the case for those
jurors who were highly empathic and were of the same gender as the defendant
(male). These findings suggest not only that empathy induction appeared to enable
mock jurors to better appreciate the defendant’s perspective but also that without the
induction of empathy mock jurors may attribute a person’s actions more to her or his
individual characteristics than to her or his situation.
In more ambiguous cases, however, jurors need to infer considerably more infor-
mation about the individuals in the case and their situation, thus making them espe-
cially vulnerable to the fundamental attribution bias. In such cases, empathy may play
an especially pivotal role. For example, Deitz et al. (1982) examined the influence of
empathy on verdict, sentencing, attribution of responsibility, and empathy for the
victim in a rape trial. Using a written description of a criminal case involving rape, all
evidence leading to the arrest of the defendant was circumstantial to allow for differ-
ences in responses because of the ambiguity of the case. Results indicated that the
more empathy a person had for the victim, the more certain she or he was of the
defendant’s guilt. Mock jurors with higher empathy ratings toward the victim also
handed down more severe sentences and attributed more responsibility to the defen-
dant for the crime. Results also indicated that similarity was an important factor con-
tributing to empathy. Female participants exhibited greater empathy for the victim
than did their male counterparts, and women who had experienced rape were likewise
more empathic than were women who had not been raped. Arguably, however, empa-
thy may be more easily experienced and induced for some victims than for others.
Compared to victims of rape, jurors may have more difficulty empathizing with other
victims, notably those who are also perpetrators of crime.
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Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 193
To investigate this possibility, Haegerich and Bottoms (2000) examined mock
jurors’ decisions in a patricide trial involving child sexual abuse. Participants in this
study read a trial transcript that depicted a child as a defendant in the murder of her
or his father. The child advanced a claim of self-defense as protection against her or
his father’s sexual abuse. Participants were presented with information conveying
the gender of the defendant and either were provided with empathy induction
instructions or, alternatively, were given no such instructions.
Results indicated that jurors who were asked to take the defendant’s perspective
showed more empathy for the defendant, found the defendant both less guilty and
less responsible for the crime, and were more likely to take the circumstances of the
situation (childhood sexual abuse) into account as a reason for the defendant com-
mitting the crime than those who were not asked to take the defendant’s perspective.
Empathy induction, then, may also be useful for victims who are perpetrators of
crimes. At the same time, however, although empathy induction was effective for the
perpetrator in this case, the defendant on trial was also a highly sympathetic charac-
ter (i.e., a victim of child sexual abuse). The effectiveness of empathy induction
remains unclear for perpetrators who are likely to be viewed less sympathetically.
For instance, a battered woman who kills her abuser is likely to be held more respon-
sible for her actions than a child would be for killing her or his abuser. That is,
despite being victims, battered women are often held responsible for their situation
as they are viewed as having choices, such as leaving the relationship, that children
may not have (Schneider, 2000).
Purpose
Despite the lack of empirical evidence fully supporting it, BWS testimony con-
tinues to be admitted in the courtroom (Faigman & Wright, 1997). Given the diffi-
culties surrounding BWS testimony, expert testimony on SAF has been examined as
a possible alternative. Although SAF testimony is less likely to promote a patholog-
ical portrayal of battered women and criteria on which the legitimacy of their claims
may be evaluated, SAF may not be sufficient in terms of enabling jurors to fully
appreciate the context of a battered woman defendant. Rather, in light of the funda-
mental attribution error, situational factors that lead some battered women to rely on
the use of lethal force may be rendered invisible. To encourage jurors to consider the
situational context within which battered women live, empathy induction instruc-
tions may afford jurors a way of evaluating the situation from the perspective of the
defendant.
Using a jury simulation paradigm, the impact of expert testimony, trait empathy
(specifically gender), and empathy induction instructions on mock jurors’ percep-
tions of a battered woman defendant and her claim of self-defense were examined.
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To this end, jurors viewed a videotape of a simulated court trial depicting a case in
which a battered woman killed her abuser. Jurors were randomly assigned to hear the
presentation of expert testimony conveying either BWS or SAF. Within expert testi-
mony conditions, jurors either were presented with an appeal by the defense lawyer
to place themselves in the defendant’s position (empathy induction) or, alternatively,
no such appeal was provided. To assess the effectiveness of empathy induction
instructions, a no expert control was included.
In light of the potential for BWS testimony to portray the defendant as patholo-
gized, it was anticipated that jurors would fail to evaluate her claim of self-defense
as reasonable. A main effect of expert testimony was thus anticipated, with jurors
being more likely to rate the defendant guilty when presented with BWS testimony
than when presented with SAF testimony.
It was further anticipated that the effectiveness of the empathy induction appeal
would vary as a function of the form of expert testimony presented to jurors. More
specifically, within the BWS condition, it was anticipated that jurors exposed to
empathy induction instructions would have difficulty taking the defendant’s perspec-
tive. That is, given the potential for BWS testimony to promote a pathological por-
trayal of the defendant, jurors would likely, in the presence of empathy instructions,
view themselves as very dissimilar to the defendant. Thus, irrespective of instructions
that attempt to aid jurors in evaluating the actions of the defendant in light of her sit-
uation, it was anticipated that jurors would perceive her within a diminished capacity
perspective and thus fail to perceive her claim of self-defense as reasonable.
Given that SAF testimony does not lend itself to a pathologized portrayal of the
battered woman, perspective taking on the part of jurors may be easier to accom-
plish. In turn, such perspective taking was anticipated to lend itself to consideration
of the social context that led to the defendant’s actions. Consequently, within SAF
expert conditions, it was hypothesized that jurors presented with empathy induction
instructions would be more likely to empathize with the defendant and more likely
to evaluate the defendant’s claims as more reasonable than when no such instructions
were included.
Method
Participants
In all, 312 participants were recruited from the Psychology Department partici-
pant pool (216 women, 96 men) and asked to participate in a study examining per-
ceptions of violence in exchange for course credit. A total of 42 groups were formed,
composed of 4 to 12 members, with at least one member of the opposite gender
included in each group.
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Materials
A jury simulation paradigm was employed whereby groups of jurors watched a
videotaped trial that included all elements of actual court cases (i.e., opening state-
ments by lawyers, cross-examination of witnesses, judge’s charge). Transcripts were
derived from case studies of battered women, an actual legal case, and similarly con-
ducted studies (Gillespie, 1989; R. v. Lavallee, 1990; Schuller & Hastings, 1996;
Terrance & Matheson, 2003). The trial included opening statements from the judge,
prosecution, and defense, including empathy induction instructions from the defense
depending on condition. Witnesses for the prosecution were then presented, includ-
ing a police officer present at a former dispute between the defendant and deceased,
a friend of the deceased, the arresting officer present on the evening in question, and
the coroner. Witnesses for the defense were presented next, including a physician
who had previously treated the defendant, a neighbor of the defendant, the defen-
dant, and an expert witness (either BWS, SAF, or no witness). The trial was con-
cluded with closing arguments by the defense and prosecution, including empathy
induction instructions depending on condition and the judge’s charge.
The basic case facts were as follows. The trial involved a 23-year-old woman who
had suffered emotional and physical abuse at the hands of her husband. On two pre-
vious occasions, the defendant left her husband, only to return to the abusive rela-
tionship. On the night in question, prior to the shooting, the defendant’s husband had
threatened her life while cleaning a gun. After guests had arrived for a party, an argu-
ment ensued between the defendant and her husband’s sister. The defendant was
chased upstairs by her husband, was physically abused, and was threatened with
death before the next morning. Her husband threw the gun he had used to threaten
her on the bed and turned to leave the room. The defendant picked up the gun and
shot him twice in the back. The defense entered a plea of self-defense and alleged
that as a result of continued abuse over the years and following attempts by the
defendant to leave the marriage without success, the defendant had no alternative but
to take the life of her husband before he could take hers. The prosecution conceded
that she was a battered woman but argued that she chose not to accept any help that
had been offered to her by the police. Furthermore, the prosecution maintained that
the defendant could have sought the aid of the adults who were in the house at the
time of the shooting. The prosecution alleged that the shooting was the result of rage
and revenge for the abuse the defendant had suffered, as evidenced by the argument
that had ensued that evening.
Expert Testimony
BWS. Expert testimony concerning the BWS relayed the cycle theory of violence
and the concept of learned helplessness as described by Walker (1979, 1984).
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196 Violence Against Women
Testimony relaying information about the cycle theory of violence included the three
phases experienced during the cycle: tension building, acute battering incident, and
loving contrition. Information about learned helplessness conveyed the defendant’s
unsuccessful attempts to stop the violence and her subsequent feelings of helplessness.
SAF. Expert testimony conveying SAF focused on the context within which bat-
tered women live and highlighted the lack of effective community alternatives and the
risks a battered woman faces if she leaves the home (i.e., retaliation violence). No men-
tion was made regarding the cycle theory of violence or learned helplessness.
Empathy Induction
The defense lawyer provided empathy induction instructions in both the opening
and closing statements. Empathy induction instructions asked the jurors to imagine
themselves as the defendant in the situation on the night of her husband’s death.
More specifically, in part they were instructed to “imagine if it were you in this sit-
uation. Put yourself in Judy Richards’s 23-year-old shoes and think about how you
would be thinking and feeling in her situation.” Alternatively, no instructions were
added to the opening and closing statements.
Questionnaires
Individual juror opinions. On an 11-point scale, participants were asked to indi-
cate whether they believe the defendant should be convicted (+5) or should not be
convicted for killing her husband (–5). Participants were informed that their ratings
need not reflect legal requirements but rather reflect their own personal belief as to
the defendant’s guilt or innocence. To assess jurors’ ratings both prior to and fol-
lowing the trial, the individual opinion scale was given at two intervals: (a) after
opening statements and (b) after closing statements.
Credibility checklist. Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they
found the defendant and expert to be credible on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (not
credible)to6(very credible). In addition, participants rated the credibility of the
neighbor and friend of the deceased. These items were included as fillers.
Perceptions of the defendant. This questionnaire consisted of 11 statements
assessing perceptions of the defendant and her use of lethal force. Participants were
asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the items
on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree)to6(strongly agree). Subscales
were generated. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients indicated that these scales were reli-
able. Items for each subscale were summed and averaged.
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Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 197
The Reasonableness subscale measured the jurors’ perception of the reasonable-
ness of the defendant and included four items such as, “Any reasonable woman
would have acted the same as the defendant” (α=.90). The Typical subscale mea-
sured the jurors’ perception of how typical a battered woman the defendant was and
included two items such as, “How typical of battered women did you find Judy to
be?” (α=.76). The Justify subscale asked jurors how justified the defendant was in
her actions and included four items such as, “The defendant’s actions were justified”
(α=.88). And the Mental Stability subscale measured jurors’ perceptions of the
mental stability of the defendant. It consisted of one item: “The longer the defendant
stayed in the battering relationship, the more mentally unstable, weak, and out of
control she became.”
Procedure
Participants were asked to play the role of jurors in a case involving a battered
woman who killed her abusive husband during a confrontation and had entered a
claim of self-defense. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 42 juries.
Participants were placed in a “jury” group to view the trial and answer question-
naires in an attempt to simulate an actual trial setting as closely as possible to
increase realism and maximize role-playing on the part of the “jurors.” They were
randomly assigned to one of six conditions stemming from a 3 (expert testimony:
BWS vs. SAF vs. control) ×2 (empathy: induction vs. no induction) factorial design.
On entering the study, participants were given a description of what the study
entailed and were asked to sign an informed consent form. After signing the consent
form, they watched the video of the trial, which was stopped at two different points
(after opening statements and after closing statements). At these times participants
were asked to fill out the individual juror opinion of guilt rating scale. On comple-
tion of the video, participants were asked to fill out the credibility checklist, the indi-
vidual juror verdicts, and the perceptions of the defendant scale. Participants were
debriefed and compensated for their time.
Results
Individual Juror Opinions
The individual opinion of guilt rating scales were analyzed using a mixed 3 (expert
testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) ×2 (empathy: induction vs. no induction) ×2
(gender) ×2 (interval: individual juror opinions following opening and closing state-
ments) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with interval as the within-subjects variable.
Results indicated a main effect for gender, F(1, 300) =24.62, p<.001. An interaction
between interval and gender was also evident, F(1, 300) =9.15, p<.05.
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198 Violence Against Women
A simple effect analysis of gender at each interval revealed significance for
Intervals 1 (following opening statements), F(1, 300) =15.28, p<.001, and 2 (fol-
lowing closing statements), F(1, 300) =28.78, p<.001, such that men rated the
defendant more guilty than did women following opening statements (men: M=
0.48, SD =2.62, women: M=–0.72, SD =2.42) as well as following closing state-
ments (men: M=0.73, SD =3.89, women: M=–1.43, SD =3.48). Generally, men
rated the defendant guilty more often than women did. Participants’ initial beliefs
seemed to be strengthened with men rating the defendant more guilty and women
rating the defendant less guilty throughout the course of the trial.
Credibility Checklist
As the credibility of the expert is not relevant to the control condition, individual
ANOVAs were conducted separately on the credibility of the defendant and expert
for the credibility checklist. The credibility rating of the defendant was analyzed
using a 3 (expert testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) ×2 (empathy: induction vs.
no induction) ×2 (gender) ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect for gender, F(1,
300) =12.84, p<.001, such that women (M=4.67, SD =1.15) rated the defendant
as more credible than did men (M=4.15, SD =1.26). Both expert testimony (F<1)
and empathy (F<1) failed to reach significance. Tested against the midpoint of the
scale, t(311) =22.12, p<.001, the defendant was perceived as highly credible irre-
spective of condition (M=4.51, SD =1.21). In all conditions, the defendant was
rated as a highly credible witness. Furthermore, women tended to rate her credibil-
ity higher than did men.
The credibility rating of the expert was analyzed using a 2 (expert testimony:
BWS vs. SAF) ×2 (empathy: induction vs. no induction) ×2 (gender) ANOVA.
Results indicated a main effect for gender, F(1, 204) =17.42, p<.001, such that
women (M=4.91, SD =1.01) rated the expert as more credible than did men (M=
4.19, SD =1.27). Both expert testimony (F<1) and empathy (F<1) failed to reach
significance. Tested against the midpoint of the scale, t(311) =26.66, p<.001, the
expert was perceived as highly credible irrespective of the condition (M=5.74, SD
=1.82). Similar to the credibility ratings of the defendant, the expert witness was
also rated as highly credible in all conditions. Once again, women tended to rate the
expert as a more credible witness than did men.
Perceptions of the Defendant
Reasonableness. Reasonableness of the defendant was analyzed using a 3 (expert
testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) ×2 (empathy: induction vs. no induction) ×2
(gender)ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect for gender, F(1, 300) =14.47, p<.001,
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Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 199
such that women (M=3.28, SD =1.39) rated the defendant as more reasonable than
did men (M=2.60, SD =1.53). This main effect was qualified by a significant inter-
action involving expert testimony, F(2, 300) =4.25, p<.05. Means are presented in
Table 1.
A simple effect analysis of expert at each level of gender indicated significance
for men only, F(2, 307) =3.15, p<.05. Follow-up pairwise comparisons (family-
wise error: α=.05) revealed that men rated the defendant as more reasonable within
the SAF expert condition than within either the BWS expert condition, t(66) =–2.45,
p<.05, or the control condition, t(63) =2.25, p<.05, which failed to differ from
each other, t(57) =0.14, ns. Women’s ratings of defendant reasonableness failed to
differ across expert testimony conditions (F<1). Generally, women rated the defen-
dant as more reasonable than did men. For the men however, those who received the
SAF expert testimony rated the defendant as more reasonable than did men in the
other two conditions.
Typical. The degree to which the defendant was perceived as typical of a battered
woman was analyzed using a 3 (expert testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) ×2
(empathy: induction vs. no induction) ×2 (gender) ANOVA. Results indicated a main
effect for expert, F(2, 300) =3.80, p<.05. Follow-up comparisons revealed that par-
ticipants in the control condition (M=4.88, SD =1.07) rated the defendant as more
typical of a battered woman than did those in the SAF condition (M=4.52, SD =
1.17), t(208) =–2.33, p<.05. The BWS condition (M=4.61, SD =1.21) was not sig-
nificantly different from either the control, t(200) =–1.70, ns, or the SAF conditions,
t(210) =0.55, ns. A main effect for gender was also found, F(1, 300) =8.41, p<.01,
such that women (M=4.80, SD =1.03) rated the defendant as more typical of a bat-
tered woman than did their male counterparts (M=4.35, SD =1.36). Empathy con-
ditions failed to reach significance (F<1). Participants in the control condition (i.e.,
heard no expert testimony) rated the defendant as more typical of a battered woman
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Reasonableness
of the Defendant as a Function of Expert Testimony and Gender
Expert Testimony
Battered Woman Social Agency
Syndrome Framework Control
Gender MSDMSDMSD
Women 3.38 1.29 3.10 1.54 3.36 1.32
Men 2.24 1.48 3.14 1.52 2.29 1.46
Note: The potential range of responses is 0 (strongly disagree)to6(strongly agree).
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200 Violence Against Women
than did those in the SAF testimony condition. Also, women were more likely to rate
the defendant as more typical of a battered woman than were men.
Justify. How justified the defendant was in her actions was analyzed using a 3
(expert testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) ×2 (empathy: induction vs. no induc-
tion) ×2 (gender) ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect for gender, F(1, 300) =
21.03, p<.001, such that female participants (M=3.70, SD =1.23) rated the defen-
dant to be more justified in her actions than male participants did (M=2.94, SD =
1.49). This main effect was qualified by an interaction with expert, F(2, 300) =3.15,
p<.05. Means are presented in Table 2.
An analysis of simple effects of expert at each level of gender revealed signifi-
cance for males only, F(2, 306) =3.46, p<.05. Within the SAF expert testimony con-
dition, male jurors’ perceptions of how justified the defendant was in her actions were
higher compared to the control condition, t(63) =2.01, p<.05, but not the BWS
expert condition, t(66) =–1.98, ns. Men’s ratings of the justification of the defen-
dant’s actions within the control and BWS expert testimony conditions did not differ,
t(57) =0.02, ns. Women rated the defendant as more justified in her actions (i.e.,
killing her abuser) than did men. For the men, those who heard SAF testimony were
more likely to rate her as justified in her actions than were those hearing no testimony.
Mental stability. Mental stability of the defendant was analyzed using a 3 (expert
testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) ×2 (empathy: induction vs. no induction) ×2
(gender) ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect for gender, F(1, 300) =6.12, p<
.05, such that female participants (M=4.83, SD =1.23) rated the defendant as more
mentally unstable than their male counterparts did (M=4.51, SD =1.19). A main
effect for empathy, F(1, 300) =4.40, p<.05, was also found, such that participants
in the no empathy condition (M=4.85, SD =1.23) rated the defendant as more men-
tally unstable than did those in the empathy present condition (M=4.58, SD =1.20).
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for How Justified the
Defendant Was in Her Actions as a Function of Expert Testimony and Gender
Expert Testimony
Battered Woman Social Agency
Syndrome Framework Control
Gender MSDMSDMSD
Women 3.76 1.15 3.57 1.38 3.78 1.12
Men 2.67 1.52 3.39 1.46 2.66 1.42
Note: The potential range of responses is 0 (strongly disagree)to6(strongly agree).
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Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 201
This main effect was qualified by an interaction between empathy and expert condi-
tions, F(2, 300) =3.14, p<.05. Means are presented in Table 3.
An analysis of simple effects of empathy at each level of expert revealed signifi-
cance for the BWS expert testimony condition, F(1, 306) =5.36, p<.05. Both the
SAF (F<1) and control conditions, F(1, 306) =2.37, ns, failed to reach significance.
Within the BWS expert condition, participants receiving empathy induction instruc-
tions rated the defendant as less mentally unstable than did those receiving no empa-
thy induction instructions. Women were more likely to rate the defendant as
mentally unstable than were men. Also, those who did not receive the defense attor-
ney’s empathy induction instructions were more likely to rate the defendant as men-
tally unstable than were those who did receive empathy instructions; this was
especially the case for participants receiving the BWS expert testimony.
Discussion
The present study evaluated the impact of differential forms of expert testimony
and empathy induction instructions within a case involving a battered woman who
killed her abuser and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of self-defense. Overall,
results indicated that gender, expert testimony, and, to a lesser degree, empathy
played a role in juror perceptions of a battered woman who killed her abuser. Women
were more likely to rate the defendant as justified, mentally stable, reasonable, cred-
ible, and having fewer options available to her than were men. Participants receiving
SAF expert testimony found the defendant to be less guilty after hearing the testi-
mony than those in the BWS or control conditions and also rated the defendant as
having fewer options available to her and as less typical of a battered woman than
did those in other conditions. Participants receiving empathy induction instructions
rated the defendant as more mentally stable than did those receiving no instructions.
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Mental Stability of the Defendant as a
Function of Expert Testimony and Empathy Induction Instructions
Expert Testimony
Battered Woman Social Agency
Syndrome Framework Control
MSDMSDMSD
Empathy absent 5.09 1.09 4.70 1.27 4.70 1.34
Empathy present 4.50 1.19 4.80 1.12 4.33 1.29
Note: The potential range of responses is 0 (strongly disagree)to6(strongly agree).
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Although the two forms of expert testimony (BWS and SAF) present different
theories about the experiences and situations of battered women, they may not be
sufficient in aiding jurors to take the perspective of the defendant. Although both
experts were found to be credible, the form of expert testimony had an impact on
jurors’ perceptions of the defendant. Specifically, SAF appeared to be most influen-
tial among male participants. Women overall rated the defendant as both more rea-
sonable and justified in her actions than men did. Men receiving expert testimony
relaying SAF, however, found the defendant to be more reasonable and justified in
her actions than did men in other conditions. On hearing testimony on the social con-
straints many battered women face, men may thus find it easier to account for the
context within which battered women live and, therefore, may better appreciate the
reasonableness of a battered woman’s actions.
It is interesting that jurors in the SAF condition found the defendant to be less
typical of a battered woman. It may be the case that although SAF expert testimony
is serving to highlight social factors that play a part in the lives of battered women,
it may nevertheless be less effective given the lack of explicit links to the defendant,
as jurors may be viewing the testimony as irrelevant to her and dismissing it. Jurors
may have benefited more from SAF expert testimony if it had made explicit links to
the defendant’s case. In cases of battered women who kill (Schuller, 1992), expert
testimony had a greater impact on jurors’ perceptions when it explicitly linked psy-
chological research findings to the defendant’s case. Future research may want to
address the issue of linking the expert testimony directly to the defendant’s situation
rather than proffering general testimony about the experiences of battered women.
Consistent with previous research reporting that female jurors are more likely to
lend greater weight to the testimony of the defendant and expert witness in similar
cases (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002), female jurors in this study found the defendant and
the expert witness (who was also female) to be more credible than did male jurors.
With respect to perceptions of the defendant, female jurors were able to see her as
more reasonable and as being more justified in her actions than male jurors did. On
the other hand, female jurors also tended to view the defendant as more typical of a
battered woman and more mentally unstable than male jurors did. It may be the case
that although female jurors, by virtue of their same gender, may be able to more eas-
ily empathize with the defendant in some ways, they may also have a more difficult
time putting themselves in her place. No women would want to imagine themselves
as being a victim of domestic violence and might, to draw a clear line between how
they see themselves and how they view this “unfortunate” victim, attribute negative
personality characteristics to those who are victims (McCaul, Veltum, Boyechko, &
Crawford, 1990).
Male jurors appeared to have benefited from empathy induction instructions. Men
receiving the empathy induction instructions were able to see the defendant as less
mentally unstable than men who did not receive the instructions. When considering
perceptions of the defendant, empathy induction appears to have aided male jurors
202 Violence Against Women
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Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 203
in their ability to take the perspective of the defendant, regardless of their differences
and the possible difficulty of placing themselves in her situation.
As with any research, methodological limitations should be noted. As in similarly
conducted simulation studies (e.g., Follingstad et al., 1989; Kasian et al., 1993;
Schuller & Hastings, 1996) the artificial nature of the task as well as the sample
employed (university undergraduate students) limit the external validity of the find-
ings. Although watching the trial video may have been more ecologically valid than
asking students to read transcripts, it still lacks the impact of an actual courtroom
trial where the jurors are asked to give real, not hypothetical, verdicts in an actual
case. Jurors in this study also were asked to render individual verdicts rather than
being asked to deliberate or discuss as a group their findings in the case. A recent
review of jury simulation research (Bornstein, 1999), however, found little differ-
ence between verdicts of university student mock jurors and actual jurors in similar
cases. Nevertheless, a more representative cross-section of the population with
demographic characteristics consistent with that of actual jurors may contribute to
the generalizability of the findings. Future research may also warrant engaging par-
ticipants in deliberation instead of focusing on individual juror verdicts.
These difficulties notwithstanding, this study did show that expert testimony and
empathy induction instructions both play a role for battered women who kill their
abusers and enter a plea of not guilty by reason of self-defense. For male jurors espe-
cially, SAF expert testimony and empathy induction instructions appear to be help-
ful in terms of aiding them in their consideration of the defendant’s experiences and
situation. In this regard, SAF testimony may be useful in undermining the
actor–observer effect.
However, given the similarity of gender among female jurors and the defendant,
women may be better able to empathize with the defendant irrespective of the form
of expert testimony or explicit empathy induction instructions. Consistent with previ-
ous research (Kasian et al., 1993; Schuller & Hastings, 1996; Terrance, 2000), female
jurors in this study were less likely to rate the defendant as guilty and more likely to
perceive her as credible than were male jurors. Further research in this area may want
to consider the effects of empathy and the reasons behind why female jurors are able
to empathize so well with some aspects of the lives of battered women.
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Karyn M. Plumm is a full-time instructor in the Psychology Department at the University of North
Dakota. She received her PhD at the University of North Dakota in Grand Forks in 2006. Her research
interests focus on treatment and perceptions of underrepresented groups and the implications of both
within the legal setting.
Cheryl A. Terrance is an associate professor in the Psychology Department at the University of North
Dakota. She received her PhD at Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Her research interests
primarily focus on how the experiences of marginalized groups are constructed and reacted to within the
courtroom.
Plumm, Terrance / Battered Women and Empathy 205
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... Despite the majority of serial killers targeting marginalized and vulnerable populations, all three of the most popular docuseries feature killers who almost exclusively targeted white women (Hickey, 2009;Vronsky, 2018). learning about (Plumm & Terrance, 2009). An observation that should be noted is that while featuring more extensive description of the victims and their lives, I'll be Gone in the Dark also centres around a serial killer who targeted white, middle-class people. ...
... While not mentioned in his initial theorization of the ideal victim, researchers have found strong links across ideal victim standards and racial bias (Forringer-Beal, 2022). The humanization afforded to "ideal victims" furthers the empathy they receive, as they are made to be relatable and understood as fellow humans (Plumm & Terrance, 2009), while severely limiting the connection to other victims who are not provided the same attention. In cases of violent crime especially, the more detail given about the victim, the more the audience feels empathy towards them (Anastasio & Costa, 2004). ...
Thesis
Stories of crime have consistently captured the attention of the public, with stories of heists, kidnappings and murder. The true crime genre receives enormous attention and serves for many as the primary source of crime knowledge, including who commits crime, how they commit crime and how law enforcement responds. Books and podcasts have been interrogated by researchers to understand the nature of the content but missing are the true crime documentaries and docuseries that have dominated streaming platforms in North America. The present study examined three true crime series about serial killers using social constructionism and social problems theory, and examining narratives, dialogue, pictures, and claimsmakers in the docuseries. Four guiding questions were posed (1) how are serial killers constructed as social problem? (2) how are serial killers constructed? (3) how are victims constructed? (4) Who are the main claimsmakers featured? Three recent docuseries were selected, Conversations with a Killer: The Ted Bundy Tapes, Night Stalker and I’ll be Gone in the Dark. Employing qualitative media analysis, the docuseries were examined in their entirety using the program NVivo. Analysis revealed several key findings. The first finding relates to the construction of serial homicide in an episodic fashion, with mythology building around the killer taking place. The perpetrators are given variable amounts of time in each docuseries, with some positioning the killer at the center while others prioritized victim’s stories. Construction of the victims also varied widely, from another statistic and evidence to an empathetic person, through the use of dialogue and images. The last component examined was claimsmakers, who overwhelmingly belongs to branches of law enforcement. The implications of these findings are discussed, in addition to the future directions for literature.
... By providing information that is unknown to the powerful actors, less-powerful employees may annoy or anger those whom they hope will become their allies. New information, especially when in opposition to previously held beliefs, is not always welcome and can cause aggravation (Boyle & Corle, 2010;Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Reflecting these insights, some of the lactating workers in my study were unable to have educational conversations with their supervising managers because they lacked power. ...
... Educational discussions sometimes posed risks to the lactating employees insofar that they were challenging their managers' beliefs about motherhood, worker identity, physiology, and division between home and work. Literature shows that posing alternate understandings to powerful actors' beliefs-although critical to changing their opinions-might also anger or annoy them (Boyle & Corle, 2010;O'Brien, 2001;Plumm & Terrance, 2009). An example is disabled workers initiating discussions for better accommodations (O'Brien, 2001). ...
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... A handful of studies have examined the utility of social science expert testimony in educating jurors. For instance, in the context of a battered spouse case, Plumm and Terrance (2009) found that presenting jurors with expert testimony about interpersonal violence elicited lower guilt ratings. Gibson and Greene (2013) reported success with social framework testimony in educating jurors about elder financial abuse. ...
... Second, researchers could explore if young adults are able to identify these internal refusal feelings in their partner to inform sexual assault prevention programs as these programs tend to focus on interpretation of consent and refusal communication but perhaps should expand their discussion to identifying and respecting feelings as well. Indeed, empathy researchers suggests that people do have the ability to recognize the perspective of another person (Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Thus, encouraging young adults to be "tuned in" to their partner's feelings may enable them to recognize if someone wants sexual activity to stop and encourage them to check in with their partner. ...
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The present study investigated the effects of child and expert witness testimony on mock jurors’ decision-making and perceptions of a case in which a female defendant claimed self-defense as the reason for killing her husband during a domestic dispute. A 3 (expert witness: Battered Woman Syndrome [BWS] vs. Social Agency [SA] vs. No Expert) × 3 (child witness: Age 5 vs. Age 8 vs. no child) between-subject design was used to examine the effects of two different forms of expert testimony and their interaction with the presence of a child witness. Jury-eligible participants ( N = 370) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and a Psychology Undergraduate Student Pool. The mock jurors who were exposed to the BWS expert perceived the defendant as more guilty when an 8-year-old testified compared to when no child testified at all. Furthermore, when the jurors were exposed to the BWS expert, they imposed a harsher sentence on the defendant when an 8-year-old child testified compared to a 5-year-old child or no child testifying. Although the jurors perceived the defendant in the BWS condition as more fearful compared to no expert and the SA condition, this knowledge did not seem to translate into a lighter verdict or sentencing decision. This study aims to provide guidelines for future researchers and legal professionals considering the issue of expert testimony and child witnesses in intimate partner homicides.
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In recent decades, as women entered the US workforce in increasing numbers, they faced the conundrum of how to maintain breastfeeding and hold down full-time jobs. In 2010, the Lactation at Work Law (an amendment to the US Fair Labor Standards Act) mandated accommodations for lactating women. This book examines the federal law and its state-level equivalent in Indiana, drawing on two waves of interviews with human resource personnel, supervising managers, and lactating workers. In many ways, this simple law - requiring break time and privacy for pumping - is a success story. Through advocacy by allies, education of managers, and employee initiative, many organizations created compliant accommodations. This book shows legal scholars how a successful civil rights law creates effective change; helps labor activists and management personnel understand how to approach new accommodations; and enables workers to understand the possibilities for amelioration of workplace problems through internal negotiations and legal reforms.
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Recent research on the practices of justice operators with women victims of intimate partner violence has evidenced the existence of gender stereotypes and gender-blind practices in the Spanish legal system (Albertín et al., 2020; García Jiménez et al., 2019, 2020), as well as the graves consequences that such practices imply for these women. In this context, the present study explored the existence of a battered woman stereotype and its variation when the victim defends herself from the abuser. An opportunity sample of 505 undergraduates of Law, Psychology and other studies from two Spanish universities assessed some personality characteristics of a woman after watching a 1-minute-long silent video. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three observation conditions (“control”, “victim” or “self-defense victim”), which differed in the previous information given about the target woman. The Principal Components Analysis reduced the information from the questionnaire to three dimensions: “brittleness” (α = .91), “positive” (α = .786), and “hostile” (α = .809). The MANOVA confirmed the battered woman stereotype and its modification when the victim reacts against the abuser in self-defense: in this case the attribution of brittleness decreases and the attribution of hostility increases. The type of academic training showed significant effects on the stereotype, this being more negative among Law students than among Psychology ones. Law students perceive the target woman in the “victim” condition more hostile and manipulator. As for the “self-defense” condition, Law students attribute less brittleness to the victim, and perceive her more manipulator and dangerous. The effect of the observer's gender on the stereotype is consistent with the previous literature. Implications for professional training and judicial practices are discussed.
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