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General and Special Divine Revelation

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Abstract

Anyone who reflects on divine revelation in the world, and permits himself to review the history of the Church and theology, quite naturally encounters a frequently expressed differentiation between general and special revelation. This differentiation has played an important role in eras of all kinds, and has even precipitated much discussion and strife. Quite understandably the question has often arisen whether theology, in pressing this distinction, has not gone beyond "what was written," and whether or not this differentiation permits a proper view of the wonder of the one divine revelation. I. THE PROBLEM Can we distinguish between various types of revelation? If so, do we do justice to God's revelation in its greatness and indestructible unity? Is this perhaps a subtle differentiation that can be reached only when the revelation of God has become merely an idea, and we are no longer under the overwhelming impression that divine revelation is always special, surprising, new and wonderful? Have we perhaps thereby arrived at that stage of scholastic thought which in every area distinguished between "general" and "special" and that now applies this distinction also to the revelation of God? To the question of terminology we must add still others. Must we not acknowledge that especially in the last centuries the special revelation of God has been attacked from the viewpoint of a much wider general revelation? Especially when the so-called "history of religions" school in the second (p.14) half of the nineteenth century called particular attention to the non-Christian religions, a plea was made for general revelation; scholars did not wish to cast aside these religions as false religions, but rather, wished to view them in connection with a general revelation of God. From this vantage point the so-called absolute character of Christianity was called more and more into question. The Christian confession of a special revelation in the history of Israel, in the person of Jesus Christ, and in the witness to Jesus Christ (the Holy Scriptures), was increasingly criticized from the viewpoint of "general" revelation.

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