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Toward a Sustainable Myth of Self

June 2008
Journal of Humanistic Psychology 49(2):135-173

Authors:

Rocky Mountain Humanistic Counseling and Psychological Association

The self has come under considerable attack in postmodern times. Amidst many deconstructions and reformulations of the self, various myths of self have lost their sustainability. This article reviews various theoretical perspectives on the self along with many postmodern challenges to the self. It is proposed that the self is a socially constructed entity which can be conceptualized from a variety of perspectives; however, not all myths of self are equal. In particular, premodern and modern myths of self are inadequate for postmodern times. Building from an existential-integrative perspective, we propose Schneider's paradoxical self as a promising myth of self for postmodern times.

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Toward a Sustainable

Myth of Self

An Existential Response to the

Postmodern Condition

Louis Hoffman

Sharon Stewart

Denise Warren

Lisa Meek

University of the Rockies

The self has come under considerable attack in postmodern times. Amidst

many deconstructions and reformulations of the self, various myths of self have

lost their sustainability. This article reviews various theoretical perspectives on

the self along with many postmodern challenges to the self. It is proposed that

the self is a socially constructed entity which can be conceptualized from a

variety of perspectives; however, not all myths of self are equal. In particular,

premodern and modern myths of self are inadequate for postmodern times.

Building from an existential–integrative perspective, we propose Schneider’s

paradoxical self as a promising myth of self for postmodern times.

Keywords: existential psychology; postmodernism; self; myths; personality

theory

The self maintained a secure, even sacred, place throughout the history

of Western thought. Despite widespread disagreement about what con-

stituted the self and the essential nature of the self, few questioned its exis-

tence. Contemporary times challenged this privileged place of the self.

Behaviorism and its offshoots replaced the focus on self with behavior

(Polkinghorne, 2001). Technology and pluralism brought metaphors of

multiple selves (Gergen, 1991, 1996). Postmodern analyses quickly followed,

questioning whether a singular, essential self was a healthy construct

Journal of Humanistic

Psychology

Volume XX Number X

Month XXXX xx-xx

10.1177/0022167808324880

http://jhp.sagepub.com

hosted at

http://online.sagepub.com

Author’s Note:An earlier version of this article was presented at the 114th Annual Convention

of the American Psychological Association in New Orleans, LA, in August, 2006.

doi:10.1177/0022167808324880

Journal of Humanistic Psychology OnlineFirst, published on November 11, 2008 as

(Zweig, 1995). The influence of Eastern thought, particularly Buddhist

philosophy, introduced recognition of no-self as an ideal (Mosig, 2006).

Cultural analyses provided examples of cultures which did not have a tra-

ditional conception of self, but rather understood what is referred to as the

self in Western thought in terms of roles which are much more fluid over

time (Cross & Gore, 2005; Sue & Sue, 2003). In the end, the necessity of a

self conception, so basic to Western psychology, is now in question.

It is hard to imagine Western psychology without a conception of the

self. The self is intertwined with diagnosis, personality, assessment, and

treatment. So implicit is it in psychological language that it would appear

to require a significant restructuring of psychology to remove the idea of

the self. Yet, history and convenience should not be the sole argument for

retaining the concept of the self.

This article uses a broad array of resources to elucidate the challenges to

the self in postmodern times. This analysis concludes by developing an

existential-integrative perspective on the self. Several assumptions are

worth noting at the outset. First, consistent with postmodern theory, we

assert that the self is best understood as socially constructed. Second, dif-

ferent constructions of the self may be more appropriate and psychologi-

cally healthier for some cultures and individuals than others. In particular,

we are focusing on the self in Western culture in this paper. It would be

inappropriate to turn any conception of the self into a metanarrative force-

fully applied across cultures and individuals indiscriminately. Third, we

maintain the position that myths of self are valuable, particularly for those

individuals living in Western societies.

Language Issues

Language is relevant to psychological well-being as well as a staple of

some approaches to postmodernism. At the same time, language is devoid

of an absolute meaning; instead, it is more important to understand the local

meaning of words and how they are used differently. Murphy (1996) high-

lights multiple ways language is used in modern and postmodern para-

digms. Modern paradigms assume that language is describing something

real with an absolute meaning. In this paradigm, accurate definitions of

words are essential. Postmodern linguistic theory views language as expres-

sive or related to internal perceptions and feelings. Language is socially

constructive and therefore not used in a consistent manner over time or

2 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

across people. In this paradigm, it makes little sense to debate definitional

issues; however, it remains important to clarify how terms are being used.

Given this assumption, it is important to clarify how certain terms, such

as self and its relation to personality, are defined in this paper. We under-

stand the self as the social and/or personal construction which implicitly

assumes some level of boundaries and distinctions between the self and the

world, including other beings. Self boundaries remain intact despite the

possibility of shared aspects/qualities (spiritual, collective unconscious) or

the ability to transcend these boundaries (transpersonal, transcendent, or

prepersonal experiences). Personality is defined as patterns of internal

experiences (thoughts, beliefs, and emotions) and behaviors which tend to

maintain consistency over time. Personality is secondary to the self and

often flows from it. Changes in personality tend to occur gradually.

The myth of self is a phrase relied on regularly in this paper. The use of

myth relies on the ancient Greek understanding of myth, revitalized by

Rollo May (1991) in The Cry for Myth. According to May, myth is not

something which is false, but rather something that cannot be proven true.

Myths provide deep, sustaining meaning and help provide direction in life;

they are healthy, growth facilitating, and necessary. In referring to myths of

self, we are not making a metaphysical statement about the existence of

self; rather, we are referring to various social constructions of the self which

can provide the aforementioned type of sustained meaning.

A Brief History of the Self

Zedek (1998) states, “Any effort to summarize a 4000-year history and

tradition cannot help but prove inadequate” (p. 255). Certainly this is true

of the history of the self along with descriptions of how the self was domi-

nantly understood in various periods and theories. Any such attempt in an

article of this length requires significant over-simplification. We acknowl-

edge the limitation of not being able to address many nuances of the self

across history; however, it is still necessary to highlight historical develop-

ments in how the self has been understood.

The Premodern Self

The premodern self was intricately tied to the development of dualism.

Originating in Platonism, dualism distinguished between the material self,

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 3

or the body, and the soul, which is understood as a purer or more essential

aspect of the self. The soul, as understood in Platonic thought, has a non-

material, metaphysical basis. In this conception, the physical body is deni-

grated, and the soul is idealized. Religion, primarily Christianity, served as

the gatekeeper and carrier for many philosophical ideas, such as the con-

ception of the self, throughout the premodern period. As such, this distinc-

tion between the soul and the material self is deeply embedded in much

Christian theology, which took an increasingly negative view of the mater-

ial body. Self-denial was a common theme and often encouraged. Some

religious individuals took this to the extreme stating that self-esteem or any

self-focus is sinful and should be discouraged. Conversely, the soul, or the

immaterial and immortal aspect of the self, should be embraced.

In contemporary interfaith dialogues, it is interesting to note that the con-

cept of emptiness has been pointed to as a central concept of convergence in

the Jewish, Christian, and Buddhist dialogues (Abe, 1990; Altizer, 1990;

Borowitz, 1990). Within each of these religions, various traditions have an

emptying or self-emptying religious process. In Christianity, the idea of

Kenosis was also applied to Christ as his self-emptying through the cruci-

fixion (Abe). In Buddhism, the Sunyata, which literally means emptiness, is

seen as the ultimate reality, including the reality of the self (i.e., no-self). In

Jewish mysticism, the idea of emptying is less direct, but nonetheless still

present (Borowitz). Each of these very different religious traditions share a

concept of emptying applied to God or Ultimate reality and the self.

The Modern Self

The modern period questioned many assumptions of premodernism,

which, in turn, questioned premodern assumptions about the nature of per-

sons. Two broad approaches to understanding the self were important in the

modern period; however, it should be noted that it is not possible to cover

all the modernist notions on the self in this article. Instead, we focus on two

of the more influential views that typified the central tenets of the modernist

self. The dominant view of the self was one of reductionistic materialism or

physicalism. It assumed the self is contained within the biology of the indi-

vidual, calling into question metaphysical aspects of the self. Within this

purview, many variations occurred, such as behaviorism and cognitive

theory. Freud developed an alternative biological position. Often misrepre-

sented, Freud’s theory is a biological or drive model in which the self is

contained within the biology. The unconscious, although often conjuring

metaphysical associations, is located within the body for Freud. Freud’s

4 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

theory expanded the conceptualization of the self to include the uncon-

scious along with behavior and conscious aspects of the individual.

A second modern perspective of self attempted to rectify modern

assumptions with religious values. The idea of a soul understood meta-

physically was important for most Western religions. Modern reductionism

and materialism challenged this position. There were a variety of attempts

to rectify this discrepancy, many of which emphasized some type of paral-

lelism between metaphysical and biological aspects of the self.

Psychophysical parallelism, which maintains there is a parallel between

what occurs in the mind and the brain, is a common way to save the idea of

the soul (Brennan, 2003). Several different forms of psychophysical paral-

lelism developed from the 17th through 19th century. Many of these

approaches adhered to a position that there was no interaction between

physical and metaphysical aspects of the person; they simply were parallel

to each other. Others, such as Descartes, advocated for an interaction

between the physical and metaphysical aspects of the person.

Although not a modernist viewpoint, Wilber (2000b) adds a more com-

plex, contemporary alternative to psychological parallelism. In describing

aspects of the self, he states that they

. . . cannot be reduced to material dimensions (because, unlike matter, they

do not possess simple location). Nonetheless, feelings, mental ideas, and

spiritual illuminations all have physical correlates that can be measured by

various scientific means, from EER machines to blood chemistry to PET

scans to galvanic skin response. (p. 75)

For Wilber (2000b), this alternative is not claiming a metaphysical par-

allel to brain and physiological functioning; rather, the relationship is more

complex. Functions of the self cannot be reduced to a singular place in the

brain, but rather are the result of a complex interaction of various parts of

the brain beyond its mere material makeup.

A recent alternative way to reconcile materialism and religion is eluci-

dated in the concept of nonreductive physicalism (see Brown, Murphy, &

Malony, 1998). The basis of this argument is to develop a physicalism

which does not necessitate a metaphysical mind or soul to explain our

higher functions without reducing these same higher functions through

reductionism (Murphy, 1998). Murphy states,

Science has provided a massive amount of evidence suggesting that we need

not postulate the existence of an entity such as a soul or mind to explain life

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 5

and consciousness. Furthermore, philosophers have argued cogently that the

belief in a substantial mind or soul is the result of confusion arising from how

we talk. We have been misled by the fact that “mind” and “soul” are nouns

into thinking that there must be an object to which these terms correspond

. . . . when we say a person has a mind, we might better understand this to

mean that the person displays a broad set of actions, capacities, and disposi-

tions. (pp. 18-19)

Emergent properties, often associated with that which makes people

human, have typically been characterized as part of a metaphysical mind or

soul. Nonreductive physicalism states that these properties emerge from com-

plex actions and interactions arising within the physical make up. The whole,

through complex interaction, becomes greater than the sum of the parts.

Modernism maintained a consistent view of the self as a material reality.

Increasingly this was understood in physical terms, leading to metaphors of

machines and later computers to illustrate human functioning. The essen-

tial nature of the self, although understood differently, was largely unques-

tioned. The late modern period, however, reflected a shift away from the

focus on the self. Polkinghorne (2001) notes academic psychology shifted

to focus on behavior instead of the self. This deemphasized the necessity of

the self in psychology and understanding what it means to be human,

paving the way for the postmodern rejection of the self.

Changing Conceptions of the Self in Postmodern Times

Postmodern Themes

. . . there is nothing that is written about periods, places, or cultures that can-

not be discredited. One can always find strong emanations of the past in what

is “new.” (Gergen, 1991, p. ix)

Modernism represented a period of history when cultures remained

fairly isolated. There was little doubt that this played a role in the narrow-

ness of the modernist epistemology and worldview. The height of mod-

ernism brought with it great confidence in human potential, confidence in

the role of humanity (particularly White humanity) in the order of all living

things, and belief that science and technology would save the world from

wars, sickness, and even death. Myths of the fountain of youth, manifest

destiny, utopia, and other grandiose themes abounded. Modernism made

attractive promises but, in the end, modernism failed. Postmodernism

6 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

emerged with the flurry of anger that so often accompanies the disillusion-

ment of fallen heroes and broken ideals. In response to the idealism of mod-

ernism, postmodernism began with a reactionary pessimism that, over time,

opened doors toward a theory able to integrate hopeful optimism with tem-

pered pessimism. The myriad of postmodern theories today reflect every-

thing from exuberant sanguinity to dreadful cynicism while, at their best,

bringing together modulated versions of both dispositions.

Danger often ensues when individuals take on a modern or postmodern

outlook without critical examination of potential consequences. It is

assumed that modernism and postmodernism reflect different ends of a

continuum; however, these theories are paradigmatically different, not

opposite extremes. Extremes such as absolute relativity, scientific material-

ism, and logical positivism can all be located in broader conceptions of

modernism and postmodernism, but focusing on these more extreme exam-

ples prevents people from grasping the diversity within each paradigm. This

is a difficult distinction for many. Western thought wants to place things in

opposites or dualities. Continuums demonstrate this difference in polar

extremes. However, opposites can also be seen as categorically different or

the complete negation of the other. In this view, there is not a gradual tran-

sition between extremes but the choice of one option which is implicitly

assumed to be the opposite of the other. The difference between modernism

and postmodernism cannot be conceptualized as merely being opposites.

Instead, they are paradigmatically different but not necessarily to such an

extreme as to fully negate the other viewpoint. Postmodernism embraces

many aspects of modernism, such as modernist epistemology, by placing it

in a different context and changing its deeper significance (i.e., placing it as

one of many ways of knowing instead of the way of knowing). To under-

stand distinctions and similarities between these theories, alternative ways

of conceptualizing and categorizing difference are needed.

Anderson (1995) states that the transition from modernism to postmod-

ernism “has to do with a change not so much in what we believe as in how

we believe” (p. 2). It is the nature of knowledge and truth (i.e., epistemol-

ogy) that is changing. Modernism believes there is a knowable absolute

truth that can be known through science and reason (see Hoffman &

Kurzenberger, 2008). Postmodernists disagree about whether some forms

of ultimate truth may exist but agree that this truth cannot be definitively

known. This reflects a radical and important shift. Throughout the premod-

ern and modern periods there was agreement by the majority of authorities

that truth, even ultimate truth, existed and could be definitively known. The

postmodern shift represents the first major change in the history of Western

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 7

thought which called the assumption of knowable truth into question on a

large scale.

Modernism utilized a foundational theory of knowledge which begins

with knowable ultimate Truth (Hoffman & Kurzenberger, 2008; Murphy,

1996). From this perspective, all knowledge is built from that which can be

certainly known. The well-known example of Descartes demonstrates the

epistemology and methodology of this perspective. Descartes began ques-

tioning everything he could question and came to the conclusion that he

could not question that he was thinking, which means he exists (i.e., “I

think therefore I am”). This statement, often cited as the beginning of mod-

ernism, asserts that all knowledge must be built from this basic foundation

of knowledge. Descartes began with rationalism, but his theory evolved into

a more scientific approach which combined rationalism and a form of

empiricism (i.e., knowing through the senses). These two ways of knowing

were the privileged epistemologies of the modernist period. The primary

methodologies of logic (a rationalistic method) and science (application of

reason to empiricism) were elucidated from these ways of knowing.

Postmodernism began as a reaction against privileging modernist episte-

mologies and methodologies. The early phase of postmodernism decon-

structed modernism and the second phase began developing alternative

epistemologies and methodologies (Hoffman & Kurzenberger, 2008). The pri-

mary epistemological position demonstrates an epistemological pluralism

(Hoffman & Kurzenberger) and a metaphysical holism (Murphy, 1996), which

does not privilege any one way of knowing. As an alternative, postmodernism

suggests that multiple epistemologies and methodologies should be utilized

regardless of the assumption of whether or not ultimate truth exists.

Quine and Ullian (1978) developed a web theory providing the basis for

a postmodern theory of knowledge. Although their formulations are impor-

tant, their approach remained limited in that it privileged modernist ways of

knowing (Murphy, 1996). Quine and Ullian’s theory conceptualized knowl-

edge as being similar to a large web of knowledge. Each point of connec-

tion represents a piece of knowledge, which is not an ultimate truth, but

rather the current understanding which is subject to reformulation.

Knowledge, like a spider web, is interconnected and most dependent on the

connection points closest to it. If any connection point is changed, it

impacts all the other points in the web. The closest points are impacted

more than the distal points. In this view, points of knowledge should con-

tinually be reexamined and reconsidered.

The common critique of postmodernism and the web theory of knowl-

edge is that it appears to relegate all ways of knowing as equal (i.e., absolute

8 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

relativism). However, this represents an oversimplification and misunder-

standing of postmodernism rather than a valid critique. Although some

postmodern approaches embrace extreme relativism, this is not essential to

postmodernist thought. Postmodernism is pluralistic, embracing many dif-

ferent viewpoints and approaches, but is not necessarily relativistic, stating

that all viewpoints are equal. Furthermore, absolute relativism is based in a

personal constructivism, whereas postmodern thought is rooted in social

constructivism. The social or cultural factors limit relativism by locating

truth in a complex relational matrix.

In summary, at least five major themes emerge in a postmodern theory

of knowledge. First, truth, regardless of whether there is ultimate truth, can

only be understood locally or to a limited degree, often portrayed in post-

modern theory as bound by language. Second, truth, if and where it exists,

is best approximated using multiple epistemologies and multiple method-

ologies. Third, if ultimate truth exists, there is less of it than the modernists

would portray. Fourth, truth should continually be reexamined in light of

new information. Fifth, truth is interconnected and interdependent. It could

be noted that this is a broader and more inclusive definition of postmod-

ernism than what is typical. This is intentional; we maintain postmodernism

is best understood as a variety of approaches that share many common

values instead of narrowly focusing in on particular requirements to be

considered postmodern.

General Postmodern Themes in Relation to the Self

It has been argued that a coherent self in the postmodern era is under

unprecedented attack and in danger of annihilation (Zweig, 1995).

Adjectives applied to the postmodern self include empty,multiple, and sat-

urated (Messer & Warren as cited in Bracken, 2003). These descriptors

stand in contrast to the modern view of an autonomous, boundaried, stable

self. Postmodern thought encompasses a variety of ideas about the self that

generally center on the idea that the self is socially mediated. The individ-

ual self is situated in culture providing a framework for understanding

personal experience and guiding behavior.

Threats to the self are inherent in the extremes of postmodernist theory.

The more moderate positions argue for a plurality of selves appropriate to the

context and environment (e.g., Martin & Sugarman, 2001; Neimeyer, 1998).

The real postmodern challenge may be to a modern conceptualization of a

permanent, autonomous self. The postmodernist self is a more holistic, com-

plex, nuanced, and adaptive self that is actively engaged in the world.

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 9

Challenges to the Self

The Self and Pluralism

Culture provides a lens through which experience, behavior, and the self

are interpreted. It involves, among other things, shared language, symbols,

and values. Therein lays another threat to the postmodern self. To the extent

that a culture becomes less coherent or weakened through input from other

cultures that is integrated by its members, the culture becomes less func-

tional as an interpretive and evaluative lens. May (1991) believes that expe-

rience and the self are evaluated, directed, and interpreted by shared aspects

of a culture’s myths. The loss or weakening of that culture may leave the

self rudderless and without structure.

Exposure to other belief systems is also viewed as potentially under-

mining to the self in the postmodern era because other belief systems may

challenge values that contribute to the framework through which the self

and experience are interpreted and given meaning (e.g., Gergen, 1991).

Challenges to values may result in the perception of truth as relative and

fluid. Exposure to varied cultures offers parallel belief systems which may

cause questioning of those values integrated into the self concept by way of

our personal myths (May, 1991).

The Self as a Social Construction

One broad theoretical orientation in psychology allied with postmodern

thinking is called, variously, constructivism, constructionism, and con-

structive (Raskin, 2002). Radical constructivism holds that human reality is

created by interpretation of objective reality and that there is no actual

objective reality. Social constructivists argue that an individual’s identity is

constructed by social interaction, but the person actively constructs that

identity. Nonetheless, according to Raskin, social constructivists aver that

there is no internal self. What is perceived as the self is actually a configu-

ration of positions taken within a social network. Another form of con-

structivism is critical constructivism. Critical constructivists believe that

there exists an independent first order reality that constrains, but does not

create, individual, or second order, reality. Second order reality is created

by an individual’s active interpretation of and influence on experience in

the context of social interaction (Mahoney, 1991). Language holds a criti-

cal place in constructivist theory in that selfhood and reality are said to be

coconstructed through shared language (Gergen, 1991).

One line of thought is that, because a sense of self is culturally con-

structed, a homogenous social environment is required for its existence.

10 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

Proponents of this view see personal identity as intrinsically social and

founded on relations with others (Greenlaw, 1994). These theorists believe

that the requisite cultural homogeneity is eroded by technologically facili-

tated exposure to other cultures and contexts. For these writers, language

and its consensual meaning is critically important for the development of a

self concept. According to Gergen (1996), “To the extent that there is

homogeneity in context of expression . . . the underlying psychological

source is enhanced” (¶ 10). The expanded vocabulary of the self, both from

other cultures and from the mainstreaming of terminology in the field of

psychology, is thought to create a potential for confusion in the culturally

based meaning of words used defining the self.

The Self and Fluidity

Lifton (1995), drawing on Greek mythology, introduces the Protean self:

We know from Greek mythology that Proteus was able to change his shape

with relative ease from wild boar to lion to dragon to fire to flood. What he

found difficult, and would not do unless seized and chained, was to commit

himself to a single form, a form most his own, and carry out his function of

prophecy. We can say the same of Protean man, but we must keep in mind his

possibilities as well as his difficulties. (p. 130)

Proteus is not the typical mythic figure. In the West, it is more common to see

myths of stability as can be easily illustrated in movies and literature. People in

the United States have been inundated with images of the unwavering cowboy

or hero who perseveres by sticking to his or her values and commitments.

Although admirable in many situations, there is also the image of the tragic hero

who loses everything because he or she is unwilling to adapt or change.

This second side of the Protean myth is as dangerous as the first. May

(1991) illustrates:

But this addiction to change can lead to superficiality and psychological

emptiness, and like Peer Gynt, we never pause long enough to listen to our

own deeper insights. Lifton uses the myth of Proteus to describe the

chameleon tendencies, the ease with which many modern Americans play

any role the situation requires of them. Consequently, we not only do not

speak from our inner integrity, but often have a conviction of never having

lived as our “true selves.” (p. 105)

The tragedy is in the inability to balance the stability and fluidity of the

self, as illustrated in constrictive and expansive potentialities (Schneider,

1999). Proteus and the lonely hero are equally tragic.

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 11

In mainstream psychology, theorists across different domains fall prey to

both tragedies. Many view the self as a dynamic, adaptive structure which

is naturally in a constant state of change (e.g., Markus, & Nurius, 1986). At

the same time, research from a number of theoretical orientations inquiring

into the nature of the self concluded that adults direct more attention and

more quickly process information that is self-relevant and congruent with

internal representations of the self. Individuals tend to interpret ambiguous

information or fill in missing information in a manner consistent with their

internal representations (e.g., Bowlby, 1973; Treboux, Crowell, & Waters,

2004). In other words, they construct the self in a consistent manner.

Results from studies such as these suggest that people have some stability

of self-representations that are likely to be resistant to change or dissolu-

tion. However, self-representations are not equivalent to the self and could

refer to a perceived self instead of a real self. Additionally, although some

self-representations remain stable and resistant to change, others readily

change. As Gergen (1995) states, “We have paid too much attention to such

central tendencies, and have ignored the range and complexity of being.

The individual has many potential selves” (p. 142).

Another challenge to the self represented by postmodernist thought is

the question of whether the self can change or grow in any real or purpose-

ful way. Social constructivism argues for a nonagentic self constructed by

culture and social discourse with language as a “matrix of meaning

making” (Neimeyer, 1998, p. 135). One could argue, as does Lyddon

(1998), that accepting this to be true is tantamount to an abdication of any

personal responsibility because the individual is at the mercy of social cur-

rents and circumstances as well as the extent of one’s facility with lan-

guage. This begs the question of what this means for adherence to culturally

accepted norms of behavior or legal systems which infer agency and con-

fer responsibility (Neimeyer). The constitution of the self through social

discourse also begs the question of how current technologies, which may

replace or minimize person-to-person discourse, influence the self (see

Gergen, 1991). The advent of television, voice mail, e-mail, and the Internet

allow exchanges of language without any live discourse. How social must

the discourse be to have meaning in the construction of the self?

The Self and Masks

Gergen (1995), in his early writing, challenged the conception that a sta-

ble, coherent self is necessary for psychological health. As Gergen points

out, nearly all psychological research and assessment is based on the

12 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

assumption that it is normative for individuals to develop a “firm and con-

sistent sense of identity” (p. 137). If this is normative and healthy, then

inconsistency is seen as bad. Gergen states,

My research over the past few years has led me to question both of these

assumptions very seriously. I doubt that a person normally develops a coher-

ent sense of identity, and to the extent that he does, he may experience severe

emotional distress. The long-term intimate relationship, so cherished in our

society, is an unsuspected cause of this distress because it freezes and con-

stricts identity. (p. 138)

This statement not only calls into question prominent psychological

assumptions, but also many cultural and religious values. For instance, this

could be interpreted to mean that the constrictive nature of marriage may

interfere with optimal psychological health. Furthermore, could it be that

multiple marriages or relationships over a lifespan, each fitting the current

conception of the self, may be healthier? This protean idea of the self chal-

lenges many religious views of marriage and young children’s need for

stability and consistency.

Gergen is not necessarily advocating for this extreme position and nei-

ther are we. However, this has some important implications. For example,

in premarital counseling, the assumption of a stable, coherent sense of iden-

tity pervades. The supposition is that if the couple is currently a good fit,

they will remain a good fit. This works for couple where both individuals

are less likely to engage in personal change and development, given exter-

nal influences do not change this propensity. However, for many couples, a

greater risk is inherent. Premarital counseling should attempt to explore the

likely trajectory of growth and change in the individuals. To do this, a dif-

ferent approach to psychological assessment is needed as well as interven-

tions designed to promote sharing in the growth process and, perhaps, to

moderate growth in divergent directions.

In the marriage example, Gergen’s (1995) concern centers on three inter-

related issues. First, he believes many couples focus on their spouse for ful-

fillment of their needs. Second, the inability to appreciate or tolerate

differences in the other causes spouses to pressure the other for consistency.

Finally, the idealization process naturally brings about several extreme

states of emotion that do not last and are difficult to tolerate. The concep-

tion of the self and the spouse in their relationship often develop during

periods of intense passion and idealization. When these break, there is the

natural tendency to shift to extremes of anger and sadness. If the couple is

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 13

not prepared to withstand these challenges, it may lead to the dissolution of

the relationship.

For Gergen (1995), the healthy resolution of this problem is to become

more comfortable with different experiences and different masks. If indi-

viduals can seek out and learn to appreciate a broad range of experiences

and emotions, they are better able to tolerate differences with their spouse

or others with whom they choose to maintain long-term relationships.

Additionally, they will learn to adjust and appreciate different sides of

themselves. Their appreciation for diversity within themselves and others

replaces the need for a stable self.

This self, who is more prone to adjust within the context, is comfortable

playing many different roles. The stable self is replaced by an intersubjec-

tive self, which is created anew in different contexts. According to Gergen

(1995), this does not threaten the depth of being, but rather creates it in a

more pluralistic, diverse context. Stated differently, “The mask may be not

the symbol of superficiality that we have thought it was, but the means of

realizing our potential” (Gergen, p. 144).

Gergen’s Saturated Self

Gergen’s (1991) most significant contribution to the literature on the self

is The Saturated Self. In this book, he develops an important postmodern

thesis stating that social saturation threatens the self. Social saturation

means that the technology of this age facilitates interpersonal interaction so

that people may engage in more relationships than before. Pluralism is one

part if this new matrix. The potential threat is predicated on the belief that

personal essence is based on social context and a multiplicity of relation-

ships means the self is under constant construction and reconstruction with-

out opportunity for introspection.

It is not necessarily the exposure, in itself, that is dangerous, but rather

the rapid rate of exposure, not allowing time for introspection and integra-

tion. In The Saturated Self, Gergen (1991) takes a more cautionary agenda

than in his previous article advocating for multiple masks (1972/1995; the

original version of this article was published in 1972, almost 20-years prior

to The Saturated Self). Although he recognizes that this progression into

multiplicity of experience is inevitable at this point, he appears more reti-

cent about the consequences of these changes.

Regardless of how an individual feels about the modern self, it is

not likely that this construction can exist in a meaningful way for most

people in contemporary life. Modern stability is quickly overwhelmed by

14 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

the postmodern plurality. Although a rigid defensive position is possible, it

may not be able to maintain psychological health. This does not necessitate

a discarding of the self or moving to the extreme of no-self or many selves,

but it does call for some necessary reconstruction.

Buddhism’s No-Self and the Middle Path

A central concept in Buddhist philosophy is that of no-self, or anatta.

Buddhism teaches that personal identities are the individual’s creation and

the source of suffering. Gaskins (1999) writes, “The Buddha taught that

what we recognize as a self of permanent essence is actually an ever-chang-

ing configuration of physical or mental energies or processes that is only

meaningful because of . . . [particular contexts]” (p. 206). Here, the dis-

tinction between the self and personality is illuminating. In Buddhist per-

spectives on reincarnation, what continues on into the next life is an

enduring pattern, not the self, which is an illusion. In comparing this with

the definitions above, this is more consistent with the idea of personality.

Most Western interpretations of reincarnation assume that it is the self, not

the personality, which endures.

The creation of a self not only divorces people from their natural state, but

also from the reality of the moment because the meaning-making self filters

and interprets experience rather than being in experience. Part of the mean-

ing-making function of the self is evaluative. This evaluative quality leads

individuals to desire (crave) those things, qualities, and characteristics that

are valued more highly resulting in unending craving and discontentment.

Gaskins (1999) states that enlightenment and freedom from suffering in

Buddhist philosophy is the dissolution of the false structures which encum-

ber the natural human state, accepting and returning to the original state of

impermanence. Dissolving the distorted boundaries between the individual

and existence—a return to anatta—is the path to freedom from suffering to

happiness and contentment. Anatta frees people from craving and the

expectations, wants, and evaluations that form as a result of creating an

independent self.

The Buddhist conception of self is often misinterpreted in Western cul-

ture (Hoffman, 2008a). These misconceptions arise out of misunderstand-

ing the current state and the Buddhist ideal. In the Buddhist view of self,

the ultimate goal is to reach an understanding that the self is an illusion or

empty. This often is viewed as a cognitive understanding or assent to the

idea that the self is not real. The Buddhist conception, however, goes much

deeper than the cognitive realm. A better analogy is that the Buddhist seeks

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 15

to achieve a letting go of the illusions of the self at an experiential level. It

is the experience of no-self.

Additionally, many Buddhist perspectives do not advocate that the

no-self ideal is something that individuals should directly seek to accomplish.

In other words, denying oneself will not yield the experience no-self. It is

helpful, if not necessary, to maintain a conception of the self along the way

(Epstein, 1995; Hoffman, 2008a). Using the analogy of the middle path, the

journey to no-self avoids the extremes of excessively holding on to con-

ceptions of the self and the extreme of denying oneself. According to

Epstein,

When asked the ultimate narcissistic question by another follower—“What is

the nature of the self?”—the Buddha responded that there is neither self nor

no-self. The question, itself, was flawed, the Buddha implied, for it was being

asked from a place that already assumed that the self was an entity. (p. 65)

The middle path, for the Buddha, attempted to avoid the extremes of nar-

cissistic or grandiose conceptions of the self that held firmly to the idea of

a real self and the opposite extreme of a self-deprecating, empty self

(Epstein, 1995). Epstein continued, stating,

If Buddha had answered that there was a Self, he would have reinforced his

questioner’s grandiosity, that is, the idealized notions of possessing something

lasting, unchanging, and special. If he had answered that there was truthfully

no Self, he would have reinforced his questioner’s sense of alimentation and

hollowness, a despairing belief in personal nothingness. (p. 65)

There is an inherent sense of paradox in much of Buddhist thought,

which parallels Schneider’s (1999) paradoxical self. Both see the dangers

apparent in the extremes, along with the wisdom of a middle path. Another

way of conceptualizing the no-self is through the idea of impermanence

(Eckel, 2002). Eckel states, “To be wise . . . is to see that the self changes

at every moment and has no permanent identity” (p. 60). In this conception,

the idea of no-self emphasizes that the self is in a constant process of

changing or becoming, so there is no permanent self, but instead a fluid,

ever-changing self.

Zweig’s No-Self

Zweig’s (1995) idea of no-self integrates the Buddhist viewpoint into a

psychological perspective. Similar to Gergen, Zweig focuses on pluralism

16 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

to argue for a social construction of self that appears to be moving in

the direction of no-self. However, Zweig focuses more on psychological

pluralism than cultural pluralism in her discussion:

This relativizing of beliefs about the Self in our time goes far beyond a mere

nod of the head to cultural pluralism: Many theorists are calling into question

any idea of a Self as a stable, continuing entity apart from its own descrip-

tions of being. (p. 149)

Here, Zweig provides an important distinction about the stability of the

self. Although self-descriptions may remain stable, as demonstrated by psy-

chological tests, the actual self or construction thereof is more fluid. The

apparent stability of the self may be more because of limitations of lan-

guage and conceptualization than a reality.

As Zweig (1995) illustrates, this development can be seen across several

psychological orientations toward an understanding that the self is socially

constructed. Within these constructions, trends toward a more relational

understanding of self along with views of a less essential self or no-self are

appearing with greater frequency in psychological theory.

Existential Perspectives on the Self

Existential and humanistic perspectives on the self share with postmod-

ern thought the basic premise of inherent impermanence in our existence,

or no-thingness. The ancestral existentialist philosophers such as Lao Tzu

and Pascal foreshadow the postmodern view of the self as mutable, fluid,

and endlessly constructed and re-constructed. The self is seen as a process

rather than a stable entity and is a product of consciousness (Bugental,

1978). Lao Tzu and Pascal both spoke of the infiniteness of existence

(Schneider & May, 1995). Pascal also spoke of the paradox of infinite pos-

sibilities inherent in no-thingness (Friedman, as cited in Schneider & May),

which confers on people the freedom to transform or create who they are in

any moment, unconstrained the moment before (Schneider & May).

Existential thought allies this freedom with responsibility for the individ-

ual’s creation. Existential theorists believe that the terror and awe of both

infiniteness and nothingness—both states of nonbeing—fuel the striving to

be and, often, the form which being takes (Schneider, 1999, Schneider &

May). Paul Tillich’s (1952) The Courage to Be is a classic example of this

paradox in existential thought. Although he focuses more on the courage to

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 17

be in the face of nonbeing, he also points toward the connection with the

ground of being, or infiniteness. For many existentialists, the allure of the

being/nonbeing paradox is the foundation for striving to be (see Sartre,

1943/1956, Schneider, 2004; Tillich).

At this point in the article, we begin building an argument for an exis-

tential answer to the problem of self. This begins with an overview of

humanistic psychology, of which existential psychology is often considered

a subset. However, the distinction between an existential and a humanistic

viewpoint is also necessary. In agreement with Rollo May, we believe the

humanistic view of the self has severely neglected the potential for evil, or

the daimonic. Although humanistic and existential psychology agree on

much regarding the nature of the self, this distinction makes it important to

speak of an existential perspective on self.

Humanistic Psychology and the Self

Foundations of the Self in Humanistic Psychology

Early humanistic psychology developed three important conceptualiza-

tions of the self which are important for our conversation. First, beginning

with Maslow and Rogers, it emphasized the self as being, or becoming

(Polkinghorne, 2001). The self is always in process or flux, ever changing

rather than stable. This point is shared with many of the postmodern view-

points; however, postmodernism tends to describe the changes in terms of a

fractured or divided self, or in terms of multiple selves interacting with each

other. Humanistic and existential perspectives favor the idea of a fluid and

changing, but integrated self. The integration of the self, as should be evi-

dent, is necessarily an ongoing process that adjusts to the fluid nature of the

self. Although this difference may be viewed as a semantic one, we disagree.

This distinction influences the way one experiences oneself and what the

individual does with that experience. Fragmented and multiple selves are

more chaotic, less integrated, and less centered. For most, this self experi-

ence can be chaotic and often incoherent. Furthermore, the assent to the idea

of multiple selves does not encourage one to make sense of the inter-rela-

tionships between the selves or how the multiple selves share responsibility.

Second, the self is experienced; it is not merely a cognitive construct

(Polkinghorne, 2001). In contemporary psychology, the focus is typically

on self-concept (i.e., how a person understands or defines themselves) or

self-esteem (i.e., how one feels about or appraises oneself). Neither of these

approaches the deeper conception of how a person experiences oneself.

18 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

Gendlin (1962/1997) discusses this in terms of one’s felt sense of oneself.

The felt sense is often a preverbal and presymbolic experience recognized

within one’s body. Contrary to many postmodern theories that emphasize

the necessity of language in self understanding, this suggests another realm

of experiencing oneself beyond words. Furthermore, it suggests that there

is a real self and that this real self can be experienced directly. Gendlin

(2003) understands this as contradicting postmodernism; however, we

would disagree and even purport that it could be understood as postmodern.

In our view, postmodernism does not deny the possibility of a direct form

of knowledge or experience, but rather views this as always incomplete and

lacking in definitiveness. Gendlin approaches this through what he refers to

as focusing. If focusing is understood as an ultimate truth, then it would

conflict with the understanding of postmodernism presented in this article.

However, we believe the rather ambiguous, incomplete, and subjective

nature of the truth obtained through focusing is quite postmodern.

Third, the self is an agent, or has the ability to act. This, according to

Frie (2003) and Frederickson (2003), is the biggest challenge to integrating

postmodern perspectives on the self with psychotherapy approaches, such

as humanistic and existential, which emphasize personal responsibility.

Without a clear, boundaried self, there appears to be no base from which to

act. However, as we will discuss shortly, there is the possibility of a cen-

tered self that does not necessitate clear boundaries.

Contemporary Developments

Polkinghorne (2001) uses four theories to develop possibilities for a con-

temporary humanistic view of the self that takes into consideration the chal-

lenges of postmodernism. This development adds several themes to the

humanistic view. First, consistent with postmodernism, it does not necessi-

tate a “real me” or an essential self and recognizes that what is viewed as

self is dependent on a point of view or perspective. Second, it advocates for

a whole person understanding of the self that includes emotions as well as

cognitions and ideas about the self. In other words, it integrates the con-

ceived self, the interpersonal self, and the experienced self as part of a

larger whole self. The language of multiple selves in humanistic psychol-

ogy is more metaphorical than the language used in postmodernism. Third,

the humanistic view implies integration, centeredness, or connectedness

that is not part of the postmodern viewpoint: postmodernism sees these

selves as more distinct. Each self is part of the larger, whole self. Similarly,

Polkinghorne discusses Gendlin’s advocacy for a real self beyond the

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 19

cultural constructs that is able to experience the self in connection with the

world. Fourth, building on Ricoeur, Polkinghorne maintains that humanis-

tic psychology can be blended with a narrative understanding of the self in

which the self is redefined and understood in process.

Sleeth (2006, 2007a, 2007b), in a series of articles, develops a perspec-

tive on self, or the self system, which incorporates transpersonal psychol-

ogy into a humanistic perspective. Although there is debate in the field

about whether transpersonal psychology is distinct from humanistic psy-

chology, it appears evident in these articles that Sleeth’s theory extends

beyond typical humanistic understandings of the self through seeking to

incorporate spiritual aspects of the self. Krippner (as cited in Sleeth, 2007b)

stated that an “individual’s sense of identity appears to extend beyond its

ordinary limits to encompass wider, broader, or deeper aspects of life or the

cosmos—including elements of the divine” (p. 47). In referencing this to

the self, Sleeth confuses identity, which is more akin to what we have

referred to as a self-concept, with the self, which is rooted in experience

and agency. Feeling connected with something beyond oneself, even to the

degree of understanding it as part of one’s identity, does not necessarily

make it part of the self.

In general, Sleeth’s perspective highlights the distinctiveness of human-

istic and transpersonal theories through accenting different aspects of self

more than developing a convincing humanistic perspective. Although

humanistic psychology, in general, opens itself to the incorporation of spir-

itual ideas, it does not necessitate them as in transpersonal psychology.

Therefore, humanistic psychology remains more adaptable in working with

multiple religious and nonreligious views whereas transpersonal psychol-

ogy privileges perspectives with certain spiritual beliefs. Nonetheless, two

aspects of Sleeth’s discussion are consistent with contemporary humanistic

understandings of the self. First, along with Polkinghorne, Sleeth recog-

nizes the importance of respecting the complexities of the self. Second,

Sleeth advocates for a holistic understanding of the self.

Rollo May: Myths and the Self

May (1991) believed in the importance of myth to add structure and

vitality to daily existence. He also saw myth as the narrative form of sym-

bolism that unites members of a culture through communication of shared

themes of existence, belief systems, and meanings (May, 1975). According

to May, a significant problem in contemporary times is the loss of myths

and concomitant loss of values. On a cultural level, the loss of myth results

20 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

in cultural fragmentation that is a primary source of problems in living for

the members of that culture who tend to embody the cultural dysfunction

(May, 1969). May blamed a loss of myth for the increasing alienation,

meaninglessness, and mechanization he observed in human existence.

May (1991) understood a person’s life story as their own personal myth

that guides and informs individual experience and development, thereby

playing an important role in forming self and identity. Identity, the inter-

pretation of the self, is a personal myth made up of individual values, expe-

riences, and relationships including material from the cultural mythology:

May’s use of the term “self,” however, is not to be confused with the splin-

tered and defensive fragment of personality referred to by the Freudians as

the “ego,” or by the Jungians as the “persona.” Rather, the existential “self”

is that indivisible point of centered integration presumed to exist as some

level of the personality, from which we can objectively observe our own

behavior in the world. (Diamond, 1996, pp. 102-103)

May’s distinction of the self as “centered integration” lacks the clear

boundaries of the self that is typical in most portrayals of the modernist

self, allowing for a real self while at the same time leaving room for the self

to be socially constructed. This allows for a distinction between the con-

ceived self (i.e., self-concept) and self experience, while recognizing that

they are also indelibly related.

There is also a social aspect to the personal myth derived not only from

relationships with others but also from the cultural context. May believed

myths provide a sense of belongingness and imbue existence with meaning

while allowing the individual to make sense of their experience. Without

myths, people are restricted in their capacity to exercise their inherent free-

dom to choose the form and nature of their existence and more vulnerable

to neurotic guilt and anxiety. May (1969) wrote,

Psychotherapy reveals . . . the immediate situation of the individual’s “sick-

ness” and the archetypal qualities and characteristics which constitute the

human being as human. . . . It is the latter characteristics which have gone

awry. . . . The interpretation of a patient’s problems . . . is also a partial inter-

pretation of man’s self-interpretation of himself through history in the arche-

typal forms in literature. (pp. 19-20)

Archetypes in the Jungian tradition are principles that make sense of

experience (Storr, 1983). The literary expression of archetypes in myth is,

according to May, the expression of themes shared by humankind of struggles

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 21

for identity and affirmation. The loss of myth for individuals means a loss

of the ability to organize experience, with a corresponding diminution in

meaning-making ability as well as the loss of sustenance and comfort as

people confront universal struggles of human existence.

Myths of self provide important meaning for individuals that help them

survive difficult times. Whether they are acknowledged or not, myths exist.

However, when not acknowledged, they often lack the coherence and inte-

gration to be sustaining. From an existential perspective, the reality of the

self may not be as important as the myth of self. Individual myths should

be assessed pragmatically as well as in comparison with an individual’s val-

ues. Myths also have an integrative capacity; they can serve as a point to

integrate the experienced self with the socially constructed, interpersonal,

and even spiritual aspects of the self in a centered manner.

Sartre’s Existence and Essence

Sartre’s philosophy gave rise to two tenets of existential psychology: The

self is in constant evolution and existence precedes essence. Sartre

(1943/1956) described a human being as being-for-itself and a material object

as being-in-itself. Being-in-itself is something complete, the initial conceptu-

alization, or essence, of which is brought into physical existence. Being-for-

itself refers to human beings as products of freedom in the consciousness

inherent in each person and exercised in the choice each person makes as to

who they are to be. Who people are, in Sartre’s thinking, is their essence.

“Existence precedes essence” refers to the idea that human beings are without

predetermined form or limitations: They exist. The form individuals choose

for themselves follows and constitutes their essence. Sartre (1946/1948, p. 28)

said, “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself.”

What people make of themselves is essence. The freedom to choose what

to make of one’s self is accompanied by responsibility for one’s existence.

Sartre (1937/1988) viewed the choices that become the self as the result

of a stream of reflective acts of consciousness. Sartre posited two kinds of

acts of consciousness: first and second degree. First degree acts of con-

sciousness are the awareness of objects excluding the self and are, in

Sartre’s language, nonreflective. A second degree act of consciousness

reflects on the self and through reflective activity, gives form to the self that

is reflected on. An unending series of second degree acts of consciousness

form the ego or the Me. Despite the human experience of a constant Me

across time, Sartre believed that each reflective act gave birth to a new self

different from that created by the previous act. Thus, in Sartre’s view, the

22 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

self is impermanent because it is unendingly changing, a constant project

(Schneider & May, 1995).

Sartre also acknowledged the social nature of the self. He believed that

the self that is created truly exists only to the extent that others acknowl-

edge its existence. Accordingly, individuals are aware of a self only in the

instant that others are aware of them (Danto, 1975). In Sartre’s (1946/1948)

thinking, however, for consciousness to be directly aware of itself makes

that consciousness into an object which is an affront to the dignity of people

and is never the case. He states, instead, that in the Cartesian phrase “I

think, therefore I am,” the “I think” (the cogito) refers to not only the imme-

diate sense of self but that of others as well, and it is in the other’s recog-

nition of the self that the self is attained.

The Shadow, the Daimonic, and the Self

Jung’s idea of the shadow, along with May’s conception of the daimonic,

adds a vital dimension to discussions of the self (Diamond, 1996). Too

often, these discussions build idealistic pictures of inner beauty and poten-

tial without considering the potential for evil. This does not heed

Whitmont’s (1991) warning, “The shadow cannot be eliminated. . . . When

we cannot see it, it is time to beware! . . . It becomes pathological only

when we assume we do not have it; because then it has us” (pp. 18-19).

The shadow has been defined as “that part of the personality which has

been repressed for the sake of the ego ideal” (Whitmont, 1991, p. 18-19).

For most theorists, the shadow remains largely or entirely in the uncon-

scious. According to Jung, there is both a personal shadow along with a col-

lective shadow (Jacobi, 1942/1973; Zweig & Abrams, 1991). The collective

shadow connects with the potential for evil inherent in the human condition

(Zweig & Abrams). Although May felt Jung’s contribution of the shadow

was an important development, he believed its definition was too con-

straining (Diamond, 1996). Instead of attempting to broaden Jung’s termi-

nology, he introduced a new term, the daimonic, which was borrowed from

ancient Greek thought. The daimonic is “any natural function which has the

power to take over the whole person” (May, 1969, p. 65).

Both Jung and May believed that the shadow or daimonic could be

destructive or instructive, a force of evil or a force of creativity (Diamond,

1996). Consistent with psychoanalytic thought, they believed that which is

repressed will find expression. When these forces, which represent the indi-

vidual’s dark side or disavowed aspects of the self, are not dealt with, they

will find another way to exert themselves. For both Jung and May, it is

better to integrate them into our self-conceptions utilizing their energy

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 23

constructively as a creative force. Diamond, however, identified an impor-

tant distinction in that May was concerned that the shadow or daimonic not

be used to avert responsibility. May emphasized that the roles of choice and

responsibility, no matter how small, were always present; the daimonic

could not be used to abdicate responsibility or claim one was merely

possessed by external or unconscious forces.

One danger in moving toward a conception of multiple selves or no-self

is the difficulty of dealing with evil. If there is no self, then it is easy to dis-

regard the potential for evil inherent in every person. If multiple selves are

conceived of, it becomes easy to relegate evil to particular selves, of aspects

of the self, to avoid taking full responsibility for evil acts. Furthermore,

when the potential for evil is not owned, it becomes easier for it to be

projected onto other people or groups. Keen (1991) states,

In the beginning we create the enemy. Before the weapon comes the image.

We think others to death and then invent the battle-axe or the ballistic mis-

siles with which to actually kill them. Propaganda precedes technology. . . .

Instead of being hypnotized by the enemy we need to begin looking at the

eyes with which we see the enemy. . . . We need to become conscious of . . .

“the shadow.” The heroes and leaders toward peace in our time will be those

men and women who have the courage to plunge into the darkness at the bot-

tom of the personal and corporate psyche and face the enemy within. Depth

psychology has presented us with the undeniable wisdom that the enemy is

constructed from denied aspects of the self. (pp. 198-199)

When the self is no longer a container for individuals to own their poten-

tial for evil, the temptation to project evil onto the other increases. This sit-

uation is particularly hideous when connected with racism, sexism, and

homophobia. For many, hate begins with the inability to tolerate aspects of

the self and ends with the projection of this intolerance onto others who

represent difference. The problem of evil therefore becomes one of the

stronger arguments to maintain a myth of self.

Schneider’s Paradoxical Self

The paradoxical self, according to Schneider (1999), is a function of

positions on a continuum between contradictory polarities of constricting

and expanding capacities across six spheres of consciousness. A constricted

consciousness is narrow in expression and experience. An expansive

consciousness is enlarging of experience and expression.

24 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

The paradoxical principle conceives of the psyche as a constrictive/

expansive continuum (Schneider, 1999). In other words, the self paradoxically

encompasses the capacity for expansion and the capacity for constriction.

Positions on the continuum reflect the individual’s capacity to expand or

constrict their experience. The center (or centric) position reflects integra-

tion of the polarities, which means enhanced conscious experience, self-

awareness, and the ability to flexibly shift from one polarity to the other.

Only part of the continuum is available to consciousness. The extremes of

the polarities represent potential annihilation, either through constriction

into nothingness or expansion into chaos.

In Schneider’s model, six spheres of consciousness form a hierarchy of

depth with physiological consciousness at the surface level followed, suc-

cessively, by environmental, cognitive, psychosexual, interpersonal, and

(deepest) experiential consciousness (Schneider, 1999, 2008). The spheres

of consciousness also reflect the degree to which one is free to choose.

Freedom of choice increases with depth. Thus, experiential consciousness

at the core of the spectrum relates to the “being level or ontological free-

dom” (Schneider, 2008, p. 38). Different configurations of positioning

along the continuum within each sphere of consciousness are associated in

Schneider’s model with specific psychological dysfunction. Optimal, adap-

tive functioning is the extent to which an individual can integrate the polar-

ities and admit into consciousness the previously denied part of the self.

Integration of the polarities, or centering, refers to the capacity to fluidly

and adaptively experience the poles of the continuum that have been denied

(Schneider, 1999). This development frees the individual to exercise expe-

riential freedom in the creation of self and meaning.

The paradoxical self, as a myth of self, offers the most promise of

those we have explored through its ability to adapt while maintaining a

coherent view of self. It is able to balance the polarities of an absolute,

stationary self with the opposite extreme of no-self without relegating

the final, ontological reality to the metaphysical realm. It can balance the

tension between the potential for good and the potential for evil; stabil-

ity, fluidity, and adaptability; individualistic needs and collectivist

needs; the innate, the personally constructed, and the socially con-

structed; and between the subjective and the intersubjective. Although

adaptable enough to pull in many of the various perspectives discussed

above, it should not be turned into an oppressive metanarrative or ideal

which is forced on all people.

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 25

Toward an Integration

Implications of Whitehead’s Process Philosophy

Alfred Whitehead, the founder of process philosophy, delineated a new

way to understand reality. Cobb and Griffin (1976) provide a summary of

process thought:

Process thought by definition affirms that process is fundamental. It does not

assert that everything is in process; for that would mean that even the fact that

things are in process is subject to change. There are unchanging principles of

process and abstract forms. But to be actual is to be a process. Anything which is

not a process is an abstraction from a process, not a full-fledged actuality. (p. 14)

Whitehead (1929/1978) believed that most philosophers erred in focusing

on either the substance or the flow/flux; however, “in truth, the two lines can-

not be torn apart in this way” (p. 209). Substance and change are connected;

however, most measurements of material or substance assume stability.

Similarly, most abstract concepts and processes assume stability. It is easier

to understand, discuss, and study entities that are stable. Because of this, the

human tendency is to reify abstractions of process turning them into objects.

This process mentality can be applied broadly to a variety of realities,

including the self. The tendency is to conceptualize the self in a reified

manner which focuses more on stability than flux. The idea of the self in

process does not negate the possibility of aspects of stability; instead, it

negates the necessity of stability. Consistency in measures of psychological

inventories identify that, for many, aspects of the self or personality remain

fairly consistent over time. But, again, this tendency is not a necessity.

Existential thinkers such as Becker (1973) identify the need for defenses

against some realities of life. For example, to live in constant awareness of

the fragility of life causes many people to retreat from life into a form of

living death. Similarly, the awareness of the constant flux of the self and the

surrounding world can create overwhelming anxiety. The myth of the sta-

ble self provides security that helps people cope with the world. When

overly reified, this becomes a constricting force preventing people from

engaging in free, responsible living.

Quantum Physics Applications

At first glance, quantum physics appears to have little to do with the self.

However, two themes are relevant for the current discussion. First, Newtonian

26 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

physics, which represented the utopia of science’s promise, was the dominant

mode of thought in the modernist period. Physics was the quintessential mod-

ernist science maintaining that some things are stable over time and defini-

tively known. Quantum physics called these assumptions of Newtonian

science into question (Ford, 2004; Wolf, 1981). This played a major role in

the transition from modernism to postmodernism. Quantum physics demon-

strated that truth is more complicated than it appears. Geertz (1973), the

influential anthropologist, points out that the Newtonian view of people

emphasized simplicity and laws which governed human behavior. The world

of quantum physics, by contrast, calls into question the simplicity along with

many of the laws thought to govern human behavior and selfhood.

A second, more direct implication pertains to the interrelatedness of all

things. According to some perspectives in quantum physics, things are not

as separate as they appear; all things are related (Wheatley, 2001; Wolf,

1981). The boundaries placed between different objects are more arbitrary

than once was believed. These quantum physics approaches focus on the

world or universe as a holistic, interdependent system in which distinctions

between self and world are not as absolute as previously believed. This calls

into question even the materialist distinction between the self, others, and

the world. Although it does not deny that the possibility of the self as a dis-

tinct agent acting in the world, it emphasizes,as did the Gestalt psycholo-

gists, that the distinct is part of the whole; boundaries are not so absolute as

in the modernist or Newtonian views.

Jung and the Collective Unconscious

In contrast to Freud, Jung identified the ego as the conscious personal-

ity and then developed a more complex understanding of the self which

incorporated the ego, archetypes, and the collective unconscious as aspects

of the self (Hall & Nordby, 1973; Jung, 1964). According to Jung, the

unconscious, which is made up of personal and collective levels, was in

existence far before the conscious and it remains more primary (Jacobi,

1942/1973). Jacobi asserts that it is difficult to distinguish between the

realms of the unconscious; however, regardless of their realm, they exert

their influence. Although consciousness is also important in Jung’s theory,

to view it as primary is a mistake.

The collective unconscious presents challenges to previous conceptions

of the self. According to Jacobi (1942/1973),

The collective unconscious consists entirely of elements characteristic of

the human species. . . . The contents assigned to the collective unconscious

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 27

represent the suprapersonal foundation both of the personal unconscious and of

consciousness; it is neutral in every respect; the value and position of its con-

tents are defined only when they come into contact with consciousness. (p. 35)

Accordingly, the collective level of the unconscious plays a primary role

in the self’s composition and organization. The self, in this view, cannot be

contained within the material makeup of the body. Instead, the collective or

universal aspect of the self is foundational to the self; there is an intercon-

nected quality in human beings. It is also important to note that Jung

believed in the wisdom of the unconscious in contrast to Freud who viewed

the unconscious with greater suspicion.

Transpersonal Psychology, Spirit, and the Self

Transpersonal psychology focuses on the role of the spirit or the spiri-

tual in the self (Cortright, 1997, Sleeth 2006, 2007a, 2007b). It is interested

in a variety of transpersonal experiences or experiences which transcend the

boundaries of the self or the personal (Daniels, 2005). Similar to Jung, this

calls into question the distinct boundaries of the self. Although going

beyond the self or beyond the personal suggests there is a self, it concur-

rently suggests that elements of the self extend beyond the traditional

boundaries of the self. The spirit, which is neither individual nor contained

within the material self, is yet part of the self.

Wilber (2000b), whose integral studies influenced transpersonal psy-

chology, conceptualizes the soul as “the great intermediate conveyor

between pure Spirit and individual self” (p. 106). This suggests a spiritual

realm beyond the self in contrast to a personal self which is more contained.

Elsewhere, Wilber (1998) questions the traditional idea of the real self, as

the real self assumes some essential boundaries. The self is more of a wit-

ness (active voice) than an entity; a witness not contained within bound-

aries, but in a state of no boundaries. Wilber (2000a) also speaks of a

spiritual self which is one with God or Brahma. Wilber (1998) states,

The Self is “not this, not that”. . . . The Self is not this, not that, precisely

because it is the pure Witness of this or that, and thus in all cases transcends

any this and any that. The Self cannot even be said to be “one,” for that is just

another quality, another object that is perceived or witnessed. The Self is not

“Spirit”; rather, it is that which, right now, is witnessing that concept. The

Self is not the “Witness”—that is just another word or concept, and the Self

is that which is witnessing that concept. The Self is not Emptiness, the Self

is not a pure self—and so on. (p. 276)

28 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

In response to these seemingly inconsistent ideas of the self, Wilber

(1998) states, “Because the real self resides neither within nor without,

because the subject and object are actually not-two, the mystics can speak

of reality in many different but only apparently contradictory ways” (p. 25,

emphasis added).

Cultural and Gender Issues

Western psychology emerged during a period in which individualism

was largely assumed. For much of Western history, collectivist ideas were

given very little consideration. Psychologists today, however, are remiss to

not take into consideration collectivists ideas, particularly when working

with or considering individuals from collectivist cultures (Sue & Sue,

2003). Sue and Sue state,

In many non-Western cultures, identity is not seen apart from the group ori-

entation (collectivism). The Japanese language does not seem to have a dis-

tinct personal pronoun I. The notion of the atman in India defines itself as

participating in unity with all things and not being limited by the temporal

work. (p. 108)

Cultural competency and sensitivity in therapy and psychological theory

mandates that therapists develop the flexibility to work with clients with a

variety of conceptions of the self. The practice of therapy often assumes a

particular view of the self. As therapists often are unfamiliar with the

diverse conceptions of the self, they may assume a certain understanding of

the self and impose it on clients without recognizing they are doing so.

An Existential-Integrative Ending

The Need for a Myth of Self

As a practicing psychoanalyst I find that contemporary therapy is almost

entirely concerned . . . with the problems of the individual’s search for myths.

The fact that Western society has all but lost its myths was the main reason

for the birth and development of psychoanalysis. . . . I speak of the Cry for

myths because I believe there is an urgency in the need for myth in our day.

Many of the problems of our society . . . can be traced to the lack of myths

which will give us as individuals the inner security we need in order to live

adequately in our day. (May, 1991, p. 9)

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 29

A myth is a way of making sense in a senseless world. Myths are narrative

patterns that give significance to our existence . . . myths are our way of find-

ing this meaning and significance. (May, 1991, p. 15)

May’s (1991) The Cry for Myth demonstrates the dangers inherent in

trying to live in a world without myth. He credits the lack of myth for many

of the personal and social problems in contemporary society.

Postmodernism, although bringing many benefits, has played a devastating

role in the destruction of myths. The early phase of postmodernism focused

on deconstructing destructive modern myths and metanarratives, but only

recently has begun attempting to build new mythologies which can replace

the meaning systems it deconstructed (Hoffman & Kurzenberger, 2008).

Premodern and modern myths of self were fraught with problems in

addressing pluralism and the postmodern world. Consistent with other early

postmodern deconstructions and re-constructions, the initial reformulations

of the self were extremist, often calling for getting rid of the idea of the self

altogether. However, more tempered alternatives, such as Schneider’s para-

doxical self, provide alternatives to radical deconstruction of the self.

The self is too integral a myth in Western society to be completely aban-

doned. Even if a psychologically healthy alternative of no-self exists, it

remains dangerous to move toward this ideal too quickly. The loss of this

myth and resulting impact of meaninglessness for many is too risky. The

myth of self sustains many people helping them survive what would other-

wise be an unlivable life.

An Existential-Integrative Perspective

We have suggested that Schneider’s (1999) paradoxical self, although

not the only healthy alternative, is a strong myth of self for postmodern

times. As illustrated in the review of conceptions of the self, the paradoxi-

cal self is sufficiently broad to integrate diverse perspectives, from religious

to quantum physics, and sufficiently flexible to allow for different cultural

viewpoints. In this section, we develop several points of integration across

theories of the self.

Whitehead’s process philosophy emphasizes the idea of realities in

process. Applied to the self, process philosophy suggests the self and what

influences it are fluid. Although bringing a different understanding to the

idea of fluidity, Schneider (2004) integrates this idea into an existential

perspective:

30 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

The fluid center is any sphere of human consciousness which has as its con-

cern the widest possible relationships to existence; or to put it another way,

it is structured inclusiveness—the richest possible range of experience within

the most suitable parameters of support. The fluid center begins and unfolds

through awe, the humility and wonder of living. (p. 10)

Both conceptions of fluid reflect a potential for expansion, growth, and

development. Although existential psychology has often been associated with

the search for an essential self, it has been frequently misperceived as advo-

cating that this essential self is a stable self. As illustrated in the writings of

Sartre, May, and Schneider, the existential view of self is one of fluidity.

Schneider’s conception of awe points toward what is beyond the self.

Existential thought has maintained a tenuous relationship with religion;

sometimes collaborative while at other times antagonistic (Hoffman,

2008b). In essence, existentialism is definitively neutral in its stance on reli-

gion. By using the concepts of awe and mystery as the basis for spirituality

in existential thought, a broader framework is established for working with

a variety of belief systems. However, it is important for existential thought

to engage with the religious and spiritual dimensions in a manner respect-

ful of the client’s beliefs.

Jungian and transpersonal psychology, along with religion, suggests

there is a metaphysical reality that is beyond the self, but also part of the

self. Similarly, quantum physics emphasizes the interrelated or intersubjec-

tive nature of the self. This forms another potential paradox within the exis-

tential integrative framework. The self is independent and boundaried while

also being interrelated or interconnected (Tillich, 1957)

Finally, cultural and gender issues are an important, but largely

uncharted territory in existential thought. Despite the breadth and compre-

hensiveness of existential-integrative psychology, it remains weak in its

engagement with issues of diversity. Although partially rectified in

Schneider’s (2008) Existential-Integrative Psychotherapy, which incorpo-

rates several perspectives on cultural diversity, sexual orientation, and

gender issues, it is imperative that existential-integrative psychology con-

tinue to address this issue.

As primarily an illustration of the need for discussions about diversity,

existential philosophy and psychology have been decidedly individualistic

in their focus throughout much of their history. Although, as discussed ear-

lier, there has been a tipping of the hat to relational, social, and cultural

influences, this lacked the necessary depth to be a force in a postmodern,

pluralistic world. The individualist focus provides a challenge in applying

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 31

existential psychology with diverse individuals, particularly those from col-

lectivist cultures. As Serlin (2008) indicates, this is also a limitation when

working with women.

The paradoxical self, if developed and applied appropriately, has poten-

tial to address this weakness in existential thought. The individualist and

collectivist tendencies can be understood as polarities within the paradoxi-

cal self. The tendency in Western culture is to err to the extreme of the indi-

vidualist, whereas the tendency in Eastern culture is to err to the side of the

collectivist impulse. Balance can be, and often is, achieved by Western and

Eastern individuals. The optimal balance or integration for psychological

health, however, may be culturally determined.

Krippner and Achterberg (2000), in their review of the research litera-

ture, demonstrate that there is a strong foundation for the assertion that

what is healing, in both physical and psychological realms, is at least par-

tially determined by culture. Hoffman and Kurzenberger (2008) further

develop this conception maintaining that mental illness, psychological suf-

fering, and various forms of healing vary across culture and historical

epochs. For example, perceptions of depression as a mental illness change

the way an individual experiences depression as opposed to when it is expe-

rienced as a normal aspect of human experience. From an existential per-

spective, a major aspect of the epidemic of depression and antidepressants

in Western culture is directly tied to the resistance to existential depression

(i.e., normal depression), therefore creating a neurotic depression.

The nature of the self entails various existential givens (Yalom, 1980).

In introducing the idea of paradox, these givens often are in the form of

paradox, such as the polarity between the individualist and collectivist

pulls. Although the paradoxical self warns against the dangers of the

extremes, it does not necessitate a specific answer to this paradox. In other

words, it does not necessitate a certain stance in relationship to the individ-

ualist-collectivist paradox. Finally, integrating the cultural understanding

suggests that different stances, as long as they avoid the extremes, may rep-

resent psychological health for different individuals, and which stance rep-

resents optimal health may be partially, or primarily, culturally determined.

Although we do not mean to suggest that the individual cultures emphasize

a boundaried self and collectivist societies emphasize a no-self, there are

inherent differences within these two approaches in understanding the

boundaries of the self and how the self is related to culture.

The paradoxical self, from an existential perspective, can also address

the challenges which postmodernism often refers to as multiple selves.

Another way of conceiving experience labeled as different selves is to

32 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

construe this process as encompassing different aspects of the self which

are activated in particular interpersonal settings; the self and these aspects

of the self are also fluid or changing over time. Although this conception

may be more a way of labeling experience than describing an ultimate real-

ity, we have maintained throughout this article that such ideas and language

do matter. The assumption that language and conceptions of reality have no

real impact on one’s experience is naive and serves to cut off aspects of

experience. Additionally, this perspective fits better with May’s conception

of the self as centered integration. Centered integration does not necessitate

clear or specific boundaries; it allows for the self to be conceived in differ-

ent ways. It allows for different and permeable boundaries. Yet, it does so

without removing a fulcrum from which one could impact the world, or

agency.

The integrated center, which incorporates the various aspects of the

paradoxical self and its relation to the existential givens, is the root or

source of agency. Rationally, many theorists want to place clear boundaries

around this agent, but it is not necessary. The self can remain somewhat

ambiguous with permeable boundaries without discarding the will and

intentionality. However, it is more doubtful that we can retain the will and

the accompanying responsibility without any conception of the self.

Last, it is necessary to address the paradoxical tension between self and

no-self. In many ways, these represent the extremes of individualism and

collectivism. Individualism often focuses excessively on the self; con-

versely, collectivism de-emphasizes the self. Although collectivism and the

de-emphasis on the self do not necessitate the conception of no-self, they

do move in this direction. No-self can be seen as an extreme of the self lost

in the collectivist system. All of the major world religions include some

warnings against excessive self, or excessive self-focus. This excess can

also be understood as being represented in extreme personality styles, such

as anti-social and narcissistic personalities. The dangers of no-self are eas-

ily illustrated in representations in religion and psychological health. The

major world religions all stress levels of personal accountability and devel-

opment, even if the goal in mind is to eventually achieve the recognition of

no-self. The lack of self, similarly, can be seen in the extremes of depen-

dent personality patterns, in which the sense of self is attained through oth-

ers. Partially represented through the collectivist-individualist tension, the

extremes of self and no-self both carry psychological and emotional liabil-

ities. This is not to say that the Buddhist goal of no-self is a pathological

end; however, consistent with Buddhist thought, it does suggest that short-

cuts to no-self have high costs and may be dangerous.

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 33

Conclusion

To me, the reality of life is paradox. When we are doing what’s most impor-

tant, being our most honest, working at healing ourselves, it’s paradoxical.

No one falls into the neat categories we like to place them in to make

navigating our world easy. (Baker-Fletcher, 1998, p. 91)

What is the ideal for mental health, then? A lived, compelling illusion that

does not lie about life, death, and reality; one honest enough to follow its own

commandments: I mean, not to kill, not to take the lives of others to justify

itself. (Becker, 1973, p. 204)

The self is not an easy thing to locate, define, or describe. Maybe this is

why after more than 100 years psychologists still intensely debate its exis-

tence. We hold no delusions of grandeur that we have solved the problems

of the self; however, we hope that we have provided a solid argument to not

throw away the concept of a coherent or integrated self too quickly.

We have maintained that the self is a social construction which can be

conceived of in many different ways. No one view of the self, or myth of

self, is best for all people. Myths of self should be evaluated in terms of

their pragmatic benefit and their fit to the individual’s culture, beliefs, and

value system. Healthier myths of self are adaptable and able to facilitate

growth and development. In this manner, healthy myths of self balance the

constrictive and expansive, individualist and collectivist, and other needs of

the individual. Additionally, we have advocated for Schneider’s (1999)

paradoxical self as an important myth of self because of its adaptability and

ability to reconcile many of the different tensions inherent in the human

condition.

Referring to the self as socially constructed and as a myth in no way is

intended to suggest that there is not a real self or that this real self cannot

be experienced. Rather, it indicates that the self is something that cannot be

definitively known; it cannot be isolated from its surroundings and studied

in a reductionistic manner. The self may be at one time distinct and yet

indistinguishable; this may be the ultimate paradox of the self. But even the

extremes of no-self cannot abdicate some responsible agent even if that

agent is part of an impermanent larger whole. Indeed, the self is so complex

that it is unknowable in the ultimate sense, which is part of why different

cultures and individuals experience the self so differently. Even if it is our

life mission to study the self, in the end we will fall short of complete

understanding. It comprises us, yet is undeniably beyond us.

34 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

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Sharon Stewart earned her Master’s degree psychology in 2001. She com-

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38 Journal of Humanistic Psychology

Denise Warren, a graduate student from the University of the Rockies, is

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She hopes to continue serving a diverse population in a post doctoral

position, and apply existential therapeutic approaches to help persons

with brain injury adapt to the enormous challenges of living with the out-

comes of their injury.

Lisa Meek is a doctoral candidate in clinical psychology at the University of the

Rockies in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Her professional interests are in the

areas of teaching, psychotherapy and assessment.

Hoffman et al. / A Sustainable Myth of Self and the Postmodern Condition 39

The Problems with the Self: A Conceptual Analysis

Preprint

Full-text available

Mar 2024

Sohrab Hadeei

Many diverse theories and accounts, scattered across different disciplines, have already been proposed about the self and its nature, but the self has still remained ambiguous without a clear definition universally accepted by the majority of social scientists or philosophers and it is worth understanding why. In this regard, there are some problems that need to be addressed, including the multidisciplinarity, polysemy, multiplicity, multi-referentiality, linguistic issues, and so forth. Also at issue is the improper use of the term ʹselfʹ, that is a serious oversight putting the self into a state of confusion. The primary aim of the present study is to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the self and to identify its various meanings already used in psychology, philosophy, sociology, and neuroscience. Another is to provide some plausible explanations for why the self has become so problematic, and also to shed light on the obstacles to achieving a general consensus on its definition. In the end, a useful set of suggestions for dealing with the problem is recommended.

The Problems with the Self: A Conceptual Analysis

Preprint

Apr 2023

Sohrab Hadeei

p>Many diverse theories and accounts, scattered across different disciplines, have already been proposed about the self and its nature, but the self has still remained ambiguous without a clear definition universally accepted by the majority of social scientists or philosophers and it is worth understanding why. In this regard, there are some problems that need to be addressed, including the multidisciplinarity, polysemy, multiplicity, multi-referentiality, linguistic issues, and so forth. Also at issue is the improper use of the term ʹselfʹ, that is a serious oversight putting the self into a state of confusion. The primary aim of the present study is to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the self and to identify its various meanings already used in psychology, philosophy, sociology, and neuroscience. Another is to provide some plausible explanations for why the self has become so problematic, and also to shed light on the obstacles to achieving a general consensus on its definition. In the end, a useful set of suggestions for dealing with the problem is recommended. This study focuses exclusively on the terminological and conceptual confusion around the self and also reveals the excessive multiplicity of concepts which creates unwanted redundancy and adds unnecessary complexity to a given problem. The purposes of this study are to identify various meanings of ʹselfʹ, to address problematic issues regarding the self and to redress authorsʹ inattention to improper uses of the term, as this is a serious oversight which makes the term more ambiguous. </p

FORMATTING EMPTINESS: ZEN, POSTMODERNITY AND METAFICTION IN RUTH OZEKI'S THE BOOK OF FORM AND EMPTINESS

Chapter

Full-text available

Jul 2024

Mojca Krevel

By examining the structuring of the literary subject(s) and literary world(s) in The Book of Form and Emptiness with regard to Baudrillard’s concepts, this chapter establishes that Ozeki’s last novel complies with the fundamental ontological tenets of postmodernity. As such, it is an instance of a growing body of literature that not only comments on the postmodern condition but is an inherent part of its non-dualist ontology. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the novel’s ontological provenance is predominantly determined by metafictional (auto)referentiality. This suggests that within the postmodern ontological order, metafictional references are no longer a tool for contesting the reality principle due to their fundamental otherness. Rather, metafiction functions as a world-building device that productively participates in the formation of the postmodern realities and identities.

The impact of self-development on the tendency toward organizational innovation in higher education institutions with the mediating role of human resource agility

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2021

Purpose Considering innovation and its improvement as an essential strategy to enable organizations to continue their lives in the new competitive environment leads to a focus on employees' self-development as a factor that affects human resource agility (HRA) and the tendency toward organizational innovation. Consequently, the purpose of the study was to explain the impact of self-development on the tendency toward organizational innovation with the role of the mediator, HRA in higher education institutions as one of the most important and vital organizations in any society. Design/methodology/approach The study was an applicable one with the quantitative approach using the descriptive–correlative method. The population consisted of 477 nonacademic employees of Kharazmi University among whom 214 ones were selected as the sample group, using a simple random sampling technique. Data were collected through the self-development, HRA and the tendency toward organizational innovation questionnaires and then analyzed using the structural equation modeling approach. Findings The study findings revealed a positive impact of self-development on the HRA ( γ = 0/79) and HRA on the tendency toward organizational innovation ( β = 0/6). Also, self-development with mediating HRA impacts the tendency toward organizational innovation ( β = 0/58). Finally, self-development had no direct impact on the tendency toward organizational innovation. Research limitations/implications Taking the circumstances of doing this research into consideration, if there were the opportunity to do the research on the staffs of more than one university simultaneously and categorize the university staff into executives, managers and experts, more favorable results could be achieved. Also, considering group and organizational factors with the attention to the self-development approach and its factors would provide more awareness-training information on the higher education system in Iran. For future researches, both the individual and group factors are suggested to be surveyed and compared, to assess the weight and impact of these factors all together and to provide an adequate clarification of the role of the group and the organization. Finally, in future studies, it is also recommended that a qualitative approach be used to reach deeper clarifications on the aspects of these variables in the context of higher education. Practical implications These findings have major practical implications concerning the higher educational settings. The findings of this study must give significant and practical insights for policymakers of universities and other higher education stakeholders, as well as recommendations to the academic community for further research in this area. First, they should recognize that nonacademic staff members are professional employees who contribute to improving organizational innovation. Higher education must focus on designing and implementing successful mechanisms and a well-planned self-development program that can help and promote the self-development approach among all staff. If the above-mentioned programs are designed based on the employees' needs analysis, they will get trained in a way to enhance mental and behavioral flexibility. The programs with such an approach can result in the proactive, adaptive, resilient behavior and agility of HR. Originality/value The model for this study has integrated and prioritized the key innovation drivers that would help universities design, adopt and implement policies and practices that facilitate and encourage improvements and adaptation to a fast-paced environment. Furthermore, the convincing reason for the significance of the current research is that although several types of research have been carried out on each of these three variables in different contexts separately, very few studies, like this, have directly examined the correlation between these three variables among the non-academic staff in higher education institutes. So, given the importance of the issue and rare availability of evidence in this regard, the authors were intrigued to discover whether the self-development through the mediation of HRA could reinforce and strengthen the tendency toward organizational innovation and whether HRA could be an appropriate mediator of the relationship between self-development and the tendency toward organizational innovation among the nonacademic staff of Kharazmi University as one of the most prestigious and celebrated universities in Iran.

The use of self: Towards an expanded critique and paradigm in counselling psychology

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2020

Fraser Smith

The use of self in counselling psychology is a term both widely used in terminology and yet highly debated over with regards to its place in counselling psychology and even its definition. This review seeks to gain clarity from the small body of literature that attempts to quantify the use of self in counselling psychology. The fundamental aim of this paper is to inevitably seek clarity in this topic by looking at the historical significance of counselling psychology and philosophical considerations of counselling psychology in order to better understand the use of self. This work also seeks clarification from analysing the multiple psychological and empirical paradigms in counselling psychology to illustrate the place for the use of self and the inevitable need for further study.

Image of God and Image of Human Being: A Philosophical Investigation of the God-Human and Human-Machine Relationships

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2019

One of the answers to the question of the human nature was provided by the mystical philosophers such as Ibn ‘Arab? through the theory of divine form of human being. This theory in Judeo-Christian tradition is known as imago Dei. It means God created human being in His image/form. The main effort of the scholars in both Judeo-Christian and Islamic tradition has been to interpret the imago Dei and to find an explanation for man-God relationship. The present paper indicated that the meaning and functions of the theory could be understood in the light of philosophical investigations on the artificial intelligence. The paper outlined the wish of God to be seen outside of His Essence in His ‘image’ (human) based on Ibn‘Arab?’s interpretation. Then, we indicated that human being similarly tries to find the ‘other’ outside of his being, AI-based machines, to see his potentialities in his form (machines). Man can know himself through other (machine) which has similarities with him. We argued that this investigation helps to understand more explicit meaning of the theory and the goal of creation of the human being based on the interpretation of imago Dei in Ibn‘Arab?’s perspective. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to provide a comprehensible meaning of imago Dei based on Ibn ‘Arab?’s interpretation regarding the philosophical bases of the need for AI-based machines. The method that used for this investigation is the conceptual analysis; also, we considered pluridisciplinary which opens new possibilities of understanding of the meanings in art and philosophy.

Canonical Narratives as a Tool of Analysis in Psychology

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2024

Neil Franchuk

In this article, I develop the concept of canonical narratives, drawing on Jerome Bruner’s (1915-2016) later writings on the central role of culture in shaping human psychology. I argue that we can develop the concept of canonical narratives past its initial purpose in explaining how folk psychology acquires meaning for individuals and develop the concept into a tool of analysis that can shed new light on the broader dialectic between academic psychology and social-cultural environments. I examine the role of canonical narratives in contemporary psychology by focusing on the narrative that human beings are best conceptualized as machines. I argue that not only are psychology’s constructs shaped by social-cultural environments, which have been well established but that their meanings are, to some extent, established through a dialectic with canonical narratives.

The social self in humanistic counseling: A dialogical alternative for the practice of wellness and social justice

Article

Sep 2023

Classical humanistic philosophy and psychology both infer the persistence of a stable, authentic, and volitional self, which neither fully coheres with the values implicit to professional counseling nor offers sufficient relevance to culturally diverse client groups. As an alternative, the authors suggest that humanistic counseling can emerge as a distinct discipline of practice independent of its early influences. Further, the authors offer a dialogical alternative for humanistic counseling practice that might better support contemporary clients and their various social determinants of experience.

Express Your Self: Exploring the Nature of the Expressive Self and the Health and Well- Being Consequences of Its Restriction in a Market Society

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2020

The purpose of this article is to explore the expressive aspects of the self. Three main assumptions underlying our notion of the expressive self are it is innate, experiential, and holistic. The expressive self is by nature a dynamic inner imperative that both creates and uses energy. Our primary focus is to propose and explain four innate central tendencies of the expressive self: eudaimonia, self-determination, flow, and biophilia. We first describe the essence of each of these innate potentialities with an overview of how they interrelate to form a coherent expressive self. Then, we delve into how our present cultural system (market society) is thwarting the development of this naturally expressive self that is longing for release. This thwarting process of the expressive self has led to the emergence of a restrictive self with myriad negative physical, psychological, social, and behavioral health and well-being consequences. We conclude with research possibilities and ideas for future exploration of the expressive self.

The Courage to Be: Using DBT Skills to Choose Who to Be in Uncertainty

Article

Aug 2020

Lynne-Marie Shea

The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a unique set of circumstances in which most of us are struggling with the same sort of existential questions across our unique contexts and subjective experiences. As we work to answer these questions within the uncertainty of the pandemic, dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) provides tools through which to consider and make meaning of these existential questions. DBT skills, which are aimed at increasing our capacity to practice mindfulness, regulate emotions, tolerate distress, think dialectically, and interact interpersonally, provide practical strategies to increase our senses of agency as we consider who we are in our own lives and in our relationship with others. With increased agency, we are more able to respond to the existential questions inherent in a global crisis by building the kind of courage needed to choose who to be.

The Self System: Toward a New Understanding of the Whole Person (Part 2)

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2007

D. B. Sleeth

Of all psychology concepts, perhaps none has a more lengthy history or engendered more controversy and ambiguity than that of the self. Indeed, the self has come to mean so many things that it hardly means anything at all. Consequently, there is currently no single theory integrating all the various meanings of the self concept. Therefore, the primary purpose of this article is to develop an overarching metapsychology by which all aspects of the self can be understood. To accomplish this purpose, this article engages in a hermeneutic analysis of the self as it appears in cognitive-behavior psychology, the psychoanalytic theories of ego and self psychology, and humanistic-existential theories of the self. In so doing, it is possible to identify three principle concepts by which the various aspects of the self can be compared and classified: the Conflation Frame, the collapsing of entity, intellect, and identity into a single rendering of the self; the Integral Interface, the overriding theoretical framework within which each of these aspects of self can be differentiated and subsumed; and the Integral Axes, the two fundamental tracks by which the individual grows and develops, which consist of self-actualization and self-emancipation.

The Self System: Toward a New Understanding of the Whole Person (Part 3)

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2007

D. B. Sleeth

Of all psychology concepts, perhaps none has a more lengthy history or engendered more controversy and ambiguity than that of the self. Indeed, the self has come to mean so many things that it hardly means anything at all. Consequently, there is currently no single theory integrating all the various meanings of the self concept. Therefore, the primary purpose of this article is to develop an overarching meta-psychology by which all aspects of the self can be understood. To accomplish this purpose, this article engages in a hermeneutic analysis of the self as it appears in transpersonal psychology and also what could be called transcendental psychology (i.e., nondualism). In so doing, it is possible to identify two principle concepts by which the various aspects of the self can be compared and classified: the S/self and the Twin-Tiers, the presence of both a lower self and deeper Self as aspects of the individual; as well as the presence of nondual reality (i.e., God), which is described relative to two fundamental processes: the Illusion of Relatedness and the Grid of Attention.

Technology and the Self: From the Essential to the Sublime

Chapter

Jan 1996

Kenneth J. Gergen

Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach to the Subjective.

Article

Jun 1964

"Adding legs to a snake": A reanalysis of motivation and the pursuit of happiness from a Zen Buddhist perspective.

Article

Jun 1999

Robert W. Gaskins

Current theories of motivation provide insightful discussions of why people behave as they do. In addition, the research studies surrounding these theories provide insights that can help people move toward the goals of greater competence, autonomy, and relatedness. However, these theories cannot lead to realization of what is widely considered the most fundamental goal of humanity: underlying contentment. In this article, a Zen Buddhist perspective is presented that illuminates some problematic aspects of current theories of motivation. The article also presents the way in which Zen Buddhism avoids these problems and points toward contentment (whether linked to Buddhist doctrine or not). The article closes with educational implications of a Zen Buddhist perspective.

Kenotic God and dynamic Sunyata

Article

Jan 1990

M. Abe

Existentialism is a humanism

Book

Jan 2007

This book presents a new English translation of two seminal works by Jean-Paul Sartre, the most dominant European intellectual of the post-World War II decades. The volume includes Sartre's 1945 lecture "Existentialism Is a Humanism" and his analysis of Camus's The Stranger, along with a discussion of these works by acclaimed Sartre biographer Annie Cohen-Solal. This edition is a translation of the 1996 French edition, which includes Arlette ElkaÏm-Sartre's introduction and a Q&A with Sartre about his lecture. In her foreword, intended for an American audience, acclaimed Sartre biographer Annie Cohen-Solal offers an assessment of both works. It was to correct common misconceptions about his thought that Sartre accepted an invitation to speak on October 29, 1945, at the Club Maintenant in Paris. The unstated objective of his lecture ("Existentialism Is a Humanism") was to expound his philosophy as a form of "existentialism," a term much bandied about at the time. Sartre asserted that existentialism was essentially a doctrine for philosophers, though, ironically, he was about to make it accessible to a general audience. The published text of his lecture quickly became one of the bibles of existentialism and made Sartre an international celebrity. The idea of freedom occupies the center of Sartre's doctrine. Man, born into an empty, godless universe, is nothing to begin with. He creates his essence-his self, his being-through the choices he freely makes ("existence precedes essence"). Were it not for the contingency of his death, he would never end. Choosing to be this or that is to affirm the value of what we choose. In choosing, therefore, we commit not only ourselves but all of mankind.

Beyond postmodernism: From concepts through experiencing

Article

Jan 2003

E. Gendlin

Multiple identity: The healthy, happy human being wears many masks

Article

Jan 1972
Psychol Today

K.J. Gergen

Religion and Mental Health from the Jewish Perspective

Chapter

Dec 1998

Michael R. Zedek

This chapter describes the religion and mental health from the Jewish perspective. Along with the terms Jews and Jewish, Israel has been used to designate Jewish people even long before the establishment of the modern state with that name because Israel connects Jews to a specific group. There are some issues which are related to psychiatric treatment, like Jews frequently may suggest about themselves some variation of “Jews are like everybody else, only more so.” However, the clinician may encounter Jewish persons who subscribe to the possible reality or myth of such distinctiveness. Such persons may evidence a considerable element of denial, guilt, or shame with regard to emotional fragileness on their part. To need a mental health professional and, especially, to be emotionally ill may be viewed as a horrendous embarrassment for the individual, the family network, and, in rare circumstance, the extended community. One additional factor which impacts Jewish persons in treatment is the long history as a minority community. Regarding any preferences for a specific treatment theory or technique, a pharmacological repertoire, family systems theory, and psychotherapeutic models are all potential therapies that may be recommended. Trust between the patient and caregiver is far more essential than a particular prejudice favoring one theory of intervention over another.

Toward a Sustainable Myth of Self

Abstract

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