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Constitutional Norm versus Constitutional Reality in Germany A Review Article on Johannes Agnoli's Die Transformation der Demokratie und andere Schriften zur Kritik der Politik (The Transformation of Democracy and other writings on the Critique of Politics)

Authors:
Werner Bonefeld
Constitutional Norm
versus
Constitutional Reality
in Germany
A Review Article on Johannes Agnoli’s Die Transformation
der Demokratie und andere Schriften zur Kritik der Politik
(The Transformation of Democracy and other writings on the
Critique of Politics)*
Johannes Agnoli has influenced numerous student
generations in Germany since the first publication of his Die
Transformation der Demokratie (The Transformation of Demo-
cracy) in 1967. The article was published in a book of the
same title. The book was jointly authored with Peter Brückner
and included also a paper by Brückner on the ‘Transformation
of Democratic Consciousness’. It would be no exaggeration to
say that the book became the bible of the German extra-
parliamentary opposition (APO). Agnoli’s publication reviewed
here includes his article of 1967, an article in commemoration
of his Transformation of Democracy (1986), and papers on
critical political science and the critique of politics (1987); on
election campaigns and social conflict (1977); and a speech
delivered in 1984 to a symposium on ‘Conflict and Consensus:
35 years of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law)’ which was first
Critical political
science represented by
the Marburg school in
Germany, has focused
on the gap between
constitutional norms
and political reality.
Agnoli criticises this
school for presupposing
that the norms are
good in themselves
and for its reformist
optimism. He argues
that the effect of the
political economy of
reforms is to safeguard
political power against
social emancipation.
65
*ISBN 3-924627-20-7 pp. 222; DM 20 Ça Ira-Verlag, Freiburg 1990
66 Capital & Class
published in 1987.Agnoli’s work has been translated into
many languages. The remarkable exception is the English
language. The only article published in English is on the
parliamentary system in the Federal Republic of Germany,
published in the International Socialist Journal in 1965.
In his still untranslated book Agnoli discusses the develop-
ment of the parliamentary system in the Federal Republic of
Germany. His analysis of the role of parliamentarianism is
connected with scholarly analysis of the struggle for social
emancipation. Understanding the role of parliamentarianism
is linked up with the study of the form of the state. The focus
is on the state’s pre-emptive counter-revolution. By this,
Agnoli understands the political integration, and thus
reformulation, of social struggles for social emancipation as
being bound up with a merely political emancipation which
characterises the constitution of power in bourgeois societies.
His analysis of the former West-German state shows that the
legalisation of human relations and their penetration by social
administration, as well as the integration of the reformist left
(for example trade unions, social-democratic parties and the
Greens) into the institutional strategy of the state entails a
progressive statification of the social relations concerned.
However, in qualification to Agnoli’s view ‘statification’
does not indicate something fundamentally new in the
character of the state (Bonefeld, 1991). Rather, the ‘statification
of society’ is presupposed in the state’s social role in maintain-
ing freedom and equality within capitalist social relations.
This freedom and equality is safeguarded by the state through
money and law. The state enforces the norm of social inter-
action between property owners in a way which underpins the
formal recognition of (property) rights to which each
individual is subject. The enforcement of property rights
entails, at the same time, a pre-emptive counter-revolution
because the law, and its enforcement, involves decomposition
of class relations in favour of the abstract individual endowed
with standardised rights. The enforcement of the law of
property inverts into a substantive guarantee of exploitation
and defines the state as the concentrated force of bourgeois
society. The law treats everybody as equal, as all proprietors
are equal before money, an equality that characterises the right
of property as the paradigmatic form of exploitation. The
legalisation of social relations involves their statification
insofar as the politically supervised enactment of law, that is,
the recognition of the right of property, presupposes the
enforcement of the law or in other words the imposition of
political order. The state is a state of law and order. The
historical tendency to legalisation presupposes, and has as its
result, the statification of human relations. The mode of
existence of the state inheres in the historical tendency towards
expanded social organisation of social reproduction in terms of
law, so permitting an attempt to eliminate social conflict
through the instantiation of rights, i.e. control by law and
order. The norms of freedom and equality are norms of
private property and, as norms of private property, the norms
of exploitation are freedom and equality.
Agnoli’s rich and many sided interrogation raises questions
of many kinds. For reasons of space I shall confine myself to
considerations of Agnoli’s notion of a ‘critique of politics’.
For Agnoli, the determination of scholarly social science
is destruction (Agnoli, 1990). ‘Critique’ is understood as
negation. Negation and destruction go hand-in-hand as
moments of one theoretico-practical process, that is, of the
revolutionary project of social emancipation. Agnoli’s project
is that of revealing the internal relation between political
norms and political power. His critique of the form of the
state does not seek a critical comparison between the good
norms of political domination and a bad political reality, but,
rather, an understanding of the character of normative rights
as a moment of political domination. The critique of politics
is necessarily practically reflective. The goal of critique is not
critique itself but the transformation of capitalist relations into
an ‘association which will exclude classes and their antagon-
ism’ (Marx, 1976, p.212). There is no place for the form of
the state in a communist society or in a revolutionary
movement because the role of the state is that of a peace-
maker, domesticating social conflict on the basis of the norms
of freedom and equality. According to Agnoli, only
fundamental opposition is interested in revealing the political
and social constitution of power and its movement. He insists
that only fundamental opposition which is anti-institutional
and which understands itself, politically, as autonomous is able
to transform, and thereby to abolish, the form of the state.
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 67
68 Capital & Class
The focus of a critique of politics is rejection of the principle
of political power, of the idea that political power is a natural
law and that it can, at best, only be kept in check, for example
through some scheme of rights. All forms of political power
have to be negated, according to Agnoli, whatever the form of
the state. The role of political science is not merely to
compare, however critically, the gap between the constitut-
ional guarantee of freedom and equality and the reality of
political domination. The roles of critical political science and
of the critique of politics have to be distinguished. According
to Agnoli, critical political science accepts the normative
values of bourgeois society and seeks to reform political reality
in accordance with the norms of freedom and liberty. The
critique of politics investigates the character of social
constitution in relation to the politically guaranteed and
supervised norms of exploitation. Norms and political reality
are criticised as complementary moments of exploitative social
relations. The political integration of labour into the capital
relation through money and the law entails the form of the
state as a state of equality, equity and rights. To make sense of
this contention, I shall move beyond a direct discussion of
Agnoli to whom I will return below.
The capitalist form of the state is the first one to have no
direct access to the material product of labour of its citizens
(see Gerstenberger, 1978). The constitution of individual
subjects as citizens is mediated through money. The state
appropriates a portion of social labour through taxation. This
form of appropriation has consequences for the social form of
political power in capitalist societies. The power of the
capitalist state is not constituted in terms of a complete
personal subordination of its people to the power of a king or
a monarch. The subordination of social relations to the
capitalist state is, rather, characterised by impersonal or
abstract forms of dependency in terms of law and money. In
capitalism, social relations are subordinated to the state
through the compliance of citizens with the rule of law.
Within the framework of bourgeois freedom, the possibilities
of individual freedom are limited by the freedom of other
individuals. Contractual relations represent a form in which,
according to law, freedom obtains in the form of a legally
bound recognition of private individuals in their relation to
one another. The contract is the juridical form of freedom.
However, the limitation of the freedom of individuals by the
freedom of other members of society means that the freedom
of individuals is not limited by their needs. This concept of
freedom does not entail a form of social relations characterised
by the satisfaction of needs but by the pursuance of one’s own
ends. This, however, entails a form of social relations in which
concrete needs do not figure as such. Instead, it implies a form
of social relations characterised by formal relations of atomised
market individuals, i.e. the freedom to sell one’s property
whatever the concrete form of this property. Freedom obtains
thus as a form of social relations between individuals who are
responsible for and in possession of themselves, of their work
and their labour power.1 These norms of freedom include the
obligation of individuals to sustain themselves through work,
whatever the concrete labour and whatever the particular
employer. The political subordination of social relations to the
abstract form of the law entails the political enforcement of
the norms of social interaction between property owners in a
way which safeguards the formal recognition of property
rights to which each individual is subject. This relation of the
state to society implies that private individuals exist as abstract
citizens endowed with standardised rights. This subordination
of social relations to law characterises the form of the state as
an ‘illusory community’ (Marx and Engels, 1976) subsuming
particular interest to universal interest. This subsumption
equates the safeguarding and legal regulation of the republic of
the market with human rights.
The aims of the capitalist state and forms of social control
employed by it focus on the abstract citizen. This character-
isation of the state is a result of the historical development of
political power from concrete personal relations of dependence
to compliance with abstract and impersonal norms. These
norms treat each individual as equal in law. Instead of
despotism, the state imposes coercion through law and order;
instead of relations of conflict, the state administers
contractual relations of social interaction; instead of privileges,
the state imposes upon social relations free and equal market-
relations, that is, the political organisation of the working class
in the form of wage labour. The form of the state entails – or,
rather, it just is – the coercive suppression of social emancipa-
tion in favour of a legal standardisation of abstract equality.
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 69
70 Capital & Class
Exploitative relations are, thus, displaced and constituted
politically in the form of the safeguarding of rights, equality
and freedom upon which capitalist relations of exploitation
rest.
Returning to Agnoli’s critique of politics, he understands
the left project of social reform after World War II as a
modernisation of the political power of the state. This mod-
ernisation responded to the political power of labour, and
integrated the working class into the capital relation through
the provision of, what Agnoli calls, integration costs like
welfare and employment guarantees. The decomposition of
social conflict through the normalising impact of a state-
sponsored imposition of the wage relation was understood as
both a response to the class struggle and as an inherently
repressive measure designed to undermine any possibility of
social autonomy, that is, social emancipation. Reformist
modernisation of political power acknowledges the presence of
labour in and against capital and seeks to integrate labour into
capitalist reproduction through some scheme of equal rights.
By implication, Agnoli saw the Keynesianism of the left as
being founded on the acceptance of capitalist social relations.
The left idea of ‘equal rights’ is in principle a bourgeois right.
In its content, it is a right of inequality (Marx, 1968, p.320).
The above argument expands the insights of Agnoli’s
work, and shows why it is important. Agnoli discusses the
ideas mentioned in relation, especially, to the German political
arena. However, his points can be generalised. A translation of
Agnoli’s book is thus not just a linguistic matter but relates in
intimate fashion to the movements of contradiction and class
struggle in the nations where he is to be read.
I shall now contextualise Agnoli’s notion of a critique of
politics. In the former West-Germany, critical political science
was, after World War II, largely connected with the so-called
Marburg school of which Wolfgang Abendroth was the most
influential and best representative. The focus of this school’s
critique was the gap between constitutional norms and
political reality. The yardstick for this distinction was a
socialist interpretation of the normative values of the (West-)
German constitution. The normative system of the German
constitution was seen as a model with which to evaluate
political reality. The Marburg school did not focus on the state
in abstract as the guarantor of normative rights. Instead, it
focused on the political, economic and ideological conditions
through which the normative values of the constitution and,
concomitantly, constitutional value decisions materialise. The
focus was on class struggle. Abendroth insisted that the
German constitution entails the real possibility of achieving a
transformation of capitalist social relations into a socialist
form (see Abendroth, 1981). Abendroth’s socialist
interpretation of the (West-) German constitution concen-
trated on Article 15, basic law. This Article proclaims the
possibility of socialising the means of production. Article 14,
section 1, provides the right of parliament to redefine the
concept of property. Further, Article 20 which, according to
Article 79, section 3, cannot be changed, places the state
under social obligation. Article 20, section 1 (see also Article
28,1) contains the formula of a social and democratic federal
state. The Marburg school interpreted this formula to mean
that the basic law guarantees a specific minimum of social
justice. The formula was seen as making it possible in
principle for the democratic state to change the economic and
social order in the direction of the democratic idea of a
substantial, that is, socialist equality (see Abendroth, 1967,
p.137, see also Abendroth, 1966). Abendroth predicated the
realisation of the socialist potential of the constitution on the
class consciousness of the working class. Without such class
consciousness, the democratic constitution of the state cannot
be secured nor, after the years of capitalist reconstruction, can
it be restored. Abendroth acknowledged that the successful
reconstruction of capitalist reproduction has made the fight
for a socialist transformation of the (West-) German state a
difficult task. This was because of the lack of a truly socialist
party, the diminishing difference between the SPD and the
CDU, a politics of consensus and of compromise, the
integration of the trade union leadership into a politics of
consensus and a reasonably successful substitution of class
interest by consumer interest. Capitalist reconstruction in
Germany was seen as having undermined the democratic
character of the German state. As a consequence, the socialist
transformation of the former West-Germany was a remote
task. More urgent was the defence of democracy. Abendroth
insisted that the task was to defend democratic constitutional
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 71
72 Capital & Class
rights against the state’s incursion into constitutionally
guaranteed rights. The fight for a democratic socialist
Germany entailed, first of all, the defence of normative values
so as to fend off further attack on constitutionally enshrined
rights and to further the condition of the working class.
Defending the political potential of normative values was seen
as a matter of urgency and as a matter of a constitutionally
guaranteed peaceful realisation of a good politics, that is, a
politics devoted to social emancipation. Only the democratic
substantiation of political reality in terms of the normative
values of the constitution could further the goal of a socialist
society. Socialism was to be achieved through the best possible
realisation of political emancipation.
Agnoli shows that the critical dimension of this approach
was that of an oppositional protest which merely deplores the
gap between the normative values of the (West-) German
constitution and the reality of constitutional politics or, in
other words, between the idea of formally guaranteed rights
and the reality of a law-and-order state rooted in the tradition
of pre-1945. The only political dimension of critical political
science was the denunciation of political reality in favour of
the good norms of the constitution. Class struggle assumed
the form of a constitutional struggle over the question of the
political substantiation of value decisions. Working class
politics, understood in this way, was to effect a socialist
substantiation of the system of norms. The limitation of this
approach was that it saw the system of values as existing
independently from capitalist social relations and that it
accepted, however critically, the normative values of the
bourgeois state. In qualification to Agnoli’s view, acceptance of
normative values includes the acceptance of supervising the
normative guarantee of rights. Supervising has as its presup-
position the instantiation of political emancipation and, thus,
the imposition of law and order. The political dimension of
critical political science entails the disciplining of social
relations in favour of a political substantiation of rights, so
permitting a pre-emptive counter-revolution against social
emancipation. Returning to Agnoli, critical political science
cannot comprehend that the normative system of values is, in
fact, not separate from political reality. Normative values
describe the coercive rules with which the state enforces law
and order. By implication, critical political science distinguishes
between good and bad sites of political reality. This critical
differentiation involves moralising. This is because the critical
comparison between constitutional norms and political
practice involves the weighing up of good and bad legislative
and governmental activities. In the end, and as the logical
conclusion of this comparison, a politics which fits the
constitutional norms depends on good and faithful politicians
who are devoted to the normative values of the constitution.
In sum, the critical rejection of bad political practice coincides
with the claim for politics with a human face.
Critical political science is, following Agnoli, restricted by
the horizon of a given reality which it seeks to transform in
terms of a more ‘human’ use of power. Agnoli insists that this
position is deeply paradoxical. First, it presupposes that the
norms are in themselves good and that they are misused for
reasons of capitalist reproduction and because of wayward
politicians. However, the norms do not possess any ideal
character but, rather, they manifest the norms of capitalist
reproduction. As Agnoli maintains, the interpretation of the
normative system does not fall into the confines of an ethical
court but into that of the law or, rather, the Constitutional
Court. Second, critical political science presupposes an
inhuman social constitution of the power of the capitalist
state. It seeks to reform its inhuman character without attacking
its inhuman constitution. However, the humanisation of
political power presupposes the end of an inhuman state of
affairs. The attempt to reform, rather than to abolish, an
inhuman constitution of political power entails the acceptance
of the form of the capitalist state as eternal. If one cannot
escape the capitalist form of the state, then there is nothing
left but to reform and to humanise. By restricting its horizon
to existing reality, critical political science remains blinkered to
the political economy of reforms, that is, the safeguarding of
political power against social emancipation. By implication,
critical political science performs a constructive role. It not
only accepts existing ‘structures’ of political domination but,
also, makes these structures the project of its bid for political
power. Critical political science is, in fact, an affirmative
critique of the status quo. For Agnoli, the political dimension
of critical political science is that of eternal protest without
revolt.
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 73
74 Capital & Class
In the mid 1960s, Agnoli’s intervention involved not only
an immanent critique of critical political science but, also, the
reformulation of a Marxist critique of the form of the state.
Agnoli’s analysis of the West-German state and of the internal
relationship between normative values and political reality had
directly practical consequences. In the place of a politics
seeking to protect the normative values of the constitution,
critique was now devoted to the revolutionary testing and
transformation of reality.
Agnoli’s critique of politics meant and means a refusal to
provide constructive critique. Instead it reclaims the notion of
critique as a negative task. The critique of politics is not
interested in the question as to whether political institutions
can be reformed or not. Instead, it asks about the character of
the reforms. Reforms are understood as a technique of social
peace, that is, the pacification of class conflict by the state (see
also Agnoli, l975). The state is characterised as a peace-maker
between two opposing classes. The only viable opposition to
the power of the capitalist state is that which reclaims social
emancipation in opposition to the political emancipation of
capitalist social relations. The political power of the state, as
Agnoli showed in his ‘Transformation’ of 1967, stabilises when
the opposition begins to water down its fundamental character
and starts to institutionalise and, thereby, to constitutionalise
itself. By doing so it dismisses the project of social emanci-
pation, in its form of an extra-institutional movement and
favours, instead, the rule of the play of a parliamentary
democracy. For Agnoli, any fundamental opposition which
seeks to use parliament as a means of transforming the
political and social status quo has to achieve parliamentary
credibility. The attempt to achieve this entails acceptance of
the rules of parliament, so permitting, as Agnoli puts it, an
assimilation with political domination. The acceptance of
parliamentary responsibility entails the renunciation of
fundamental opposition in favour of a radical acceptance of
the normative values of political power. Opposition
degenerates to a parliamentary activity. Agnoli showed that the
parliamentarianism of the organised left had, by the 1960s,
become a means of stabilising capitalism.
The character of the state as a peace-maker is, in qualifi-
cation to Agnoli, expressed in the German basic law. The idea
of an unrestricted right to associate in political parties is
constrained by constitutional norms. Article 21 of the basic
law declares that parties have to be committed to the
constitution. This Article outlaws the organisation of dissent
whose purpose is understood to be to question, or to put into
disrepute, the normative values of the basic law. Critique of
the norms is in opposition to the constitution and can thus be
prosecuted if the critique transforms into practice and gives
itself an organisational form. Further, the constitution
demands the mystification of the social character of the
constitution through Article 5, section 3, basic law. Loyalty to
the constitution is demanded of scholarly science. Thus,
scholarly science which is understood to challenge the free and
equal constitution of exploitative relations, is not protected by
the constitution even if it operates within the legal framework
of the constitution. Unless scholarly science accepts the
constitutional order, it would otherwise place itself in legal
jeopardy and subject to police surveillance and persecution. In
Germany, the legalisation of politics, and conversely, the
politicisation of the law is characterised by a constitutionally
guaranteed repression seeking to reproduce social relations
within the limits of their capitalist form. How can one
understand, in constitutional terms, the juxtaposition of
liberal rights with the outlawing of those rights whose purpose
it is, or whose purpose is understood to be, the critique of
constitutional norms?
‘The Federal Republic of Germany is, in contrast to the
Weimar Republic, a democracy which does not tolerate the
misuse of basic rights for an attack on a constitution which is
based on the idea of liberty. It is expected that the people of
the Federal Republic of Germany defend the liberal order
(Constitutional Court 28, p.48). Further, the Federal Republic
of Germany ‘does not tolerate the enemies of its basic order,
even if they move formally within the framework of legality’
(Constitutional Court, 30, p.119).2 The German Federal
Republic understands itself to be a Rechtsstaat. Its democracy
is understood to be a militant democracy (wehrhafte Demo-
kratie). Rechtsstaat is defined as a state whose power is
determined and constrained by a set of binding rules for the
state and its people alike. In contradistinction to systems
where a monarch sets binding rules which are binding for
himself and the bureaucracy, in a Rechtsstaat these rules
emanate from the decision of a representative council – or
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 75
76 Capital & Class
parliament – which has been elected by the people. A
Rechtsstaat emanates from the will of the people who are seen
as sovereign. From the point of view of political power, the
problem involved is that of shifting majorities in parliament
and thus of changing constitutional rule. In Germany, this
problem had, at the beginning of this century, given rise to
debates on the distinctive difference between legality and
legitimacy (Legalität and Legitimität).3 Legality comprises a set
of rules which describe the legal order which is determined by
the development of individual rights and majority decisions in
parliament. Legality connotes the idea of a pluralist society.
The utilisation and interpretation of legal norms is
constrained by the ‘superlegality’ of legitimacy. The level of
legitimacy defines the ground order (Grundordnung) to which
legality is subordinated. The level of legitimacy defines the
framework within which individual rights might develop. The
following example might help to clarify the point just made.
The normative right to free speech and free expression of
opinion is restricted if the expression of opinion is in
opposition to the liberal democratic ground order. The legally
protected right to express the opinion that there is no freedom
of opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany casts doubt on
the validity of the constitutional value of the liberal
democratic ground order. Because of this, the opinion that
there is no freedom of opinion in Germany is not protected by
the basic right of free opinion.4
The German basic law is often seen as having two
competing constitutions. There is, on the one hand, the
catalogue of liberal rights (Freiheitsrechte) and, on the other,
the constitutionally defined task for the state of promoting a
social unity in terms of a socially just state and in terms of
achieving a social balance (gesamtgesellschaftliches Gleich-
gewicht).5Whereas the former, i.e. the catalogue of individual
rights, comprises a set of norms regulating the individual
rights of atomised property owners as discussed in classical
liberalism, the latter, i.e. the political task of intervening for
the good of society as a whole, comprises a set of values which
constrain the private use of freedom. The contradiction is
resolved through the differentiation between legality and
legitimacy. For example, Article 2, section 1 of the basic law
declares that everybody has the right of the free development
of his/her individuality insofar as he/she does not infringe the
right of others and insofar as he/she does not violate the con-
stitutional order (verfassungsmäßige Ordnung). Thus the limits
of one’s freedom are not only constrained by the rights of
others but, also, by the constitutional order. This constraint
means, in fact, that the constitutional order is not identical
with the basic law. The constitutional order divides itself into
basic law and ground order. The ground order is identical
with legitimacy.
According to the Constitutional Court, the constitutional
order is defined as the ‘liberal democratic ground order’. This
term is used in Article 18 (which deals with the loss of basic
rights), Article 21, section 2 (outlawing of parties) and Article 91
(emergency authority of the federal state). The basic law does
not give a clear definition of the various elements of the term
‘liberal democratic ground order’. The term is, however, a
substantial concept which contains a binding value decision
that defines the framework of rights and the scope of legality.
The ground order provides the state with a superlegality which
gives legitimacy to the political infringement of liberal rights
so as to protect social relations. The normative system of
liberal rights describes the scope of possible or actual social
‘behaviour’. The social unity of these norms contains the
concrete social pattern of social relations. This unity pertains
in the value decision of the constitution to which parliament
is accountable and which subordinates the normative behaviour
of individuals. The loose definition of the term ‘liberal
democratic ground order’ endorses the value decision of the
German constitution in favour of a militant democracy. It’s
loose character renders it open to political substantiation
through parliament and the Constitutional Court. This
political substantiation confirms the idea of a Rechtsstaat. The
Rechtsstaat is no longer legally bound by a catalogue of liberal
norms and rules but, rather, by the liberal democratic ground
order. The ground order provides a constitutionally
guaranteed repression of oppositional activities and
constitutional directives for the pacification of social conflict.
These directives outlaw ‘unconstitutional’ uses of liberal rights
and affirm a welfare state (Sozialstaatsklausel). Within the
context of the constitutional order single constitutional norms
are subordinate to the political substance of the higher order
of the ground order or, in other words, any single norm is
defined by the superlegality of the ground order. Intolerance
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 77
78 Capital & Class
of the enemies of freedom means that freedom cannot apply
in those circumstances in which political power seeks to secure
the institutional conditions of capitalist reproduction. The
notion of freedom transforms from a guaranteed norm of
social interaction to a means of legitimating political power.
Individual norms transform into combative norms protecting
the constitutional order against those who make an oppositional
claim for particular norms. There is thus a dualist system of
norms. On the one hand, we find the constitutional guarantee
of liberal rights and, on the other, the subordination of this
guarantee to the militant character of the liberal democratic
ground order. Laws which might be legally protected by the
basic law have to gain a stamp of approval from the
superlegality of the ground order. In Germany, the tendency
to a legalisation of political power, and conversely, to a
politicisation of the Constitutional Court, is bound up with
the distinction of legality and legitimacy.
The term ‘liberal democratic ground order’ is an ‘aggressive
concept’ (Kampfbegriff) which connotes the character of a
militant democracy. The Rechtsstaat is a militant democracy
subordinated to the repressive principles of the liberal
democratic ground order. The aggressive concept of the
Rechtsstaat entails, fundamentally, the concept of ‘state-
security’ and the obligation of parliament, political parties and
other organisations such as the trade unions, to articulate
social interests and to represent the sovereign people in
accordance with the value decision of a liberal democratic
ground order. The term connotes the concept of ‘state-
security’ because of the constitutional directive that there is no
freedom for the enemies of freedom. The militant character of
the constitution entails that no individual who intends to
undermine the constitutional order with the help of the basic
law can claim protection from the basic law.6 To sum up, the
German constitution makes a distinctive difference between a
legal order and a value order. The value order predominates
over the legal order. The legal order describes the freedom and
equality of social relations which are embedded in the
framework of a ‘superlegality’, i.e. the value order of the liberal
democratic ground order. The repressive character of the
constitution appears in a ‘superlegality’ whose purpose it is to
fend off any legally protected activity which might be
interpreted as an attack on the ground order.
Agnoli understands the political substantiation of the
term ‘liberal democratic ground order’ as comprising a
tendency to involution. Involution is understood as a term
which stands directly opposite to the term evolution. The term
involution connotes complex regressive political, social, and
ideological processes which characterise the development of
democratic states, parties, and theories into pre-democratic, if
not anti-democratic, forms. The tendency to involution entails
the development of the state into an authoritarian Rechtsstaat.
Agnoli’s analysis of the authoritarian transformation of
democracy takes the former West-German state as an example.
He insists, however, that different states undergo similar
developments which are different only in terms of their
historically specific formation. In Germany, important
elements of the tendency to involution are the transformation
of political parties into peoples parties, the transformation of
parliament into a representative and legislative body of state
power, the integration of the organised opposition into the
framework of the liberal democratic ground order and the
attempt to displace class antagonism into a pluralist
distribution struggle. The authoritarian Rechtsstaat of the
liberal democratic ground order is characterised by an
identification of the organised opposition, like the SPD and
later the Greens, with the values of the constitution. This
identification is expressed, for example, in the formula of the
unity of democratic responsibility of the major parties. This
notion of a politics of ‘social partnership’ entails, at the same
time, a contest of loyalty between the parties as to the best
representation of the ground order. Parties transform thus into
agencies of social peace, closing rather than opening-up
political debate. The notion of a ‘liberal pluralism’ degenerates
into a politics of conformity. Indeed, parties no longer
represent their electorate but, rather, represent the liberal
democratic ground order to the electorate. Members of
parliament do not, according to the basic law, represent their
electorate but the people as a whole. The supreme will of the
people is enshrined in the ground order. The representation of
the ground order by the parties entails the representation of
the people’s supreme advocate, i.e. the constitution. Any party
which violates the aims and the values of the ground order
violates the supreme will of the people, their liberty and
freedom. The transformation of parties into parties of the
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 79
80 Capital & Class
liberal democratic ground order entails a form of social pacifi-
cation integrating social relations into the nexus of the
constitutional order and domesticating social conflict on the
basis of social and political responsibility. The integration of
social relations into the constitutional order characterises the
parties as parties of the status quo, that is, as parties of a militant
democracy. The acceptance of the ground order entails the
social obligation to secure the ground order against subversive
activities of the enemies of freedom. As Agnoli puts it, parties
become agents of conservation. Defence of the status quo
becomes a pre-emptive counter-revolution aiming at under-
mining oppositional activities in favour of the stability of
political power. Parliamentary debate and controversy assumes
the form of a circus in which the party-political-protagonists
unite under the roof of the liberal democratic ground order.
Loyalty to the normative values of capitalist reproduction
structures the aims and programmes of parties. The ground
order becomes the yardstick of parliamentary debate.
For Agnoli, another element of the transformation of
democracy is the integration of a ‘market economy’ with a
policy of social responsibility. This integration is expressed in
ideological form in the term a ‘social market economy’. This
concept connotes the role of the state as a peace-maker. The
attempt to displace, or rather eliminate, class conflict through
a politically supervised competition between pluralist
redistribution interests need not be discussed here in detail.
The political economy of the Keynesian welfare state has been
widely analysed. With regard to the tendency to involution,
Agnoli saw the integration of capitalist relations of exploit-
ation with welfare policies as a modernisation of political
domination. The welfare state secured the material survival of
its members and entailed their adjustment to the limits of
capitalist reproduction through monetary pacification. The
welfare state entailed also the social conditioning and
surveillance of its members through bureaucratic control.
Inherent in the
welfare’ state is the enormous extension of
central bureaucratic networks of social regulation, supervision,
and control. With the help of these controlling agencies the
state extends into the social organism, seeking to undermine,
pre-emptively, oppositional activities in favour of social
emancipation. In contradistinction to the Marburg school,
Agnoli saw the constitutional provision of a ‘socially just state’,
and its implementation in practice, as legitimating political
power. This provision, rather than making possible a socialist
transformation of political reality, implied a synthesis of
political domination with a legitimating discourse of
equal
rights’, seeking to decompose class relations on the basis of
money and law. The political economy of social reform entails
– or, rather, it just is – the conservation of political power, that
is, the coercive suppression of social emancipation in favour of
a political stabilisation of the status quo.
The transformation of democracy comprises, thus, three
interrelated aspects. First, there is the transformation of parties
into peoples parties. This transformation is characterised,
amongst other things, by the replacement of social interest-
representation by the political imposition upon social relations
of the limits of the authoritarian Rechtsstaat. Second, the
transformation of democracy is characterised by pacification
of social conflict through a policy of social reform, so
legitimating the disciplining of social conflict through policies
of ‘equal rights’. Lastly, the functioning of parliament as a
platform for shadow-boxing parties entails the adjusting of
public opinion in line with the liberal democratic ground
order, permitting the erosion of the liberal idea of democracy
in favour of an institutional and procedural legitimation of
political domination. The transformation of democracy
excludes social relations from political power and, at the same
time, contains them within the limits of the liberal democratic
ground order by means of social administration and
surveillance. In sum, the term involution connotes the political
erosion of the classical ideas of liberty and democracy in
favour of a surveillance state seeking to protect the liberal
democratic ground order against any political substantiation
of ‘liberty’ which might upset the status quo. For Agnoli, this
development obtains in different form in different countries.
The development, he insists, is irreversible.
Some might want to object to Agnoli’s analysis on the
grounds that it has been discredited by the attack on the
‘nanny’ state and, particularly in Germany, the success of the
‘Greens’. Let us look briefly at his response to both of these
objections. Has the abdication of collective responsibility for
public services in favour of ‘self-help’ and individual responsi-
bility expanded and enriched social autonomy? Does the
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 81
82 Capital & Class
abdication of collective responsibility entail the ‘empower-
ment’ of responsible individuals? It seems self-evident, as
Agnoli suggests, that the ‘statification’ of society is synthesised
with the ideological appeal of a ‘withdrawal’ of the state. The
devolution of responsibility has nothing to do with an
expansion of social autonomy but, rather, with a privatisation
of responsibility which is controlled by the legal and monetary
authority of the state. Rather than being an indicator of the
reversal of the transformation of democracy, in terms of
Agnoli’s concept of involution, the monetarist articulation of
the limits of state intervention connotes precisely the regressive
development of political domination to pre-democratic, if not
anti-democratic, forms. Rather than simply relying on a
repressive protection of the established form of the state
through the suppression and criminalisation of extra-
institutional movements and a rigid surveillance of all kinds of
social and political ‘deviants’ as well as through the Berufs-
verbote (which means the systematic and legalised keeping of
‘radical’ persons out of the civil service), the abdication of
collective responsibility involves an attempt to integrate extra-
institutional movements into the form of the state. In the
1970s and early 1980s there had been conflicts between a
corporatist, unified form of political domination and extra-
institutional, anti-statist, social movements which tried to
articulate and satisfy neglected needs and interests. The
integration of these movements into the form of the state
through policies of ‘self-help’ does not entail forms of ‘social
autonomy’ but, rather, the pacification of social conflict on the
basis of a devolution of political responsibility. Agnoli shows
that the tendency to involution has not been reversed but that
it has further progressed through the ‘statification’ of citizens’
initiatives (see also Hirsch, 1980; 1983; 1991).
Regarding the Greens, Agnoli asks if they have put parlia-
ment into the centre of politics and if they have made it the
decision-taking body of the people? Agnoli’s answer to these
questions is no (see his commemoration of 1986). His argument
is that the Greens have undoubtedly enriched parliament.
However, their critique of the abuses of parliamentary power
by the established parties has not changed the character of
parliamentary democracy but worked within its terms. Instead
of criticising the norms of the form of the state, a critique which,
as discussed above, is unconstitutional, the Greens assumed
political responsibility. This implied, following Agnoli, the
accommodation of political programmes and strategies to the
rules of parliamentary democracy. The aim of the Greens is that
of achieving a politics with a human and, to be sure, ecological
face. Like the Marburg school, the Greens sought to reclaim
the values of the normative system in opposition to the bad
politics of the old parties. Political reality had to be changed in
accordance with the normative values. The focus on the good
norms of the constitution denies the correspondence between
political domination and the normative value system and
involves a defence of the value system of the constitution. As
Agnoli puts it, the obeisance of the Greens to the state and
their embracing of parliament entails the acceptance of the
state’s monopoly of violence or, in other words, the liberal
conception of political emancipation. The Greens’ espousing
of the state involved their institutionalisation as a party of the
liberal democratic ground order. Rather than the Greens taking
over the state, the state has taken over the Greens. Their
integration into the state of the liberal democratic order has
made political life a bit more exciting. But, as Agnoli asks, have
the Greens made the Federal Republic a ‘freer’ state, a state of
the people, a state such as, according to the Constitutional
Court, the Federal Republic has always been? If the Greens
have indeed achieved an even ‘freer state’, is this achievement
identical with a much freer society or even freer people?
The institutionalisation of the Greens has, once again,
provoked the urgent and fundamental question of the relation
of the left to the form of the state. For Agnoli, the Greens
perform the role of a domesticated opposition which is as
important to the stability of the German state, as was the
stabilisation of political power through policies of social reform
in the 1960s. Once again, fundamental opposition has been
trapped in the contradiction between a radical rejection of the
system of political domination and participation in the func-
tioning of political domination. The critique of politics or, in
other words, the scholarly work of negation, has not been made
redundant by the ‘greening’ of German politics. Rather, the
critique of politics is much more urgent because of the inte-
gration, and thus assimilation, of a fundamental opposition
into the liberal democratic ground order. Agnoli’s book
documents the ‘enormous gap between ecological realism and
social-revolutionary necessity’ (see Bruhn, 1990).
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 83
84 Capital & Class
Let us return to Agnoli’s notion of a critique of politics.
The critique of politics is, in itself, not enough. It is not
enough because it lacks consciousness. It is not sufficient to
complain about the miserable conditions of political reality
and to be satisfied with the statement that the form of the
state can no longer be conceived of as a means of
revolutionary politics. Every critique of politics, if it wants to
be more than a political stand-point or mere political
conviction, has to include the criteria of political practice. The
critique of politics makes sense only when it sees itself not as a
means in itself but as a means of achieving the goal of critique:
the transformation of capitalist social relations. The critique of
politics minus practical reflexivity entails the acceptance of
existing reality. This is so because apathy and/or unreflective
spontaneity are the overt faces of a critique of politics which
does not include, as its presupposition and premise, the
practical dimension of critique. Agnoli’s critique of politics is
predicated on an emphatic conception of the unity between
theory and practice.7 For Agnoli, the notion of a unity
between theory and practice implies not that Marxist
categories are merely given, as in those approaches in which
history is used for empirical and pragmatic testing of pre-
formed categories. His approach reclaims the incompleteness
of categories insofar as the capital-labour relation appears in
various forms and within changing empirical circumstances.
For Agnoli, the ‘heresy of reality’ (Agnoli, 1980) always
challenges its abstract conceptualisation, forcing a permanent
reconsideration of the validity of the meaning of concepts.
In qualification to Agnoli, the difficulty of conceptualising
the heresy of reality necessitates, firstly, the openness of the
categories themselves and, secondly, an understanding of class
struggle as being unpredictable. These two elements exist in a
contradictory way in that the binding values of theory have to
be constantly reasserted through the movement of the class
struggle whose unpredictability involves a possible crisis of
theory.8 For theory, the unpredictability of class struggle
necessitates a generalisation through abstraction so as to avoid
the closure pertaining in a fixed and given social reality. The
contradiction between abstract conceptualisation and the
heresy of reality asserts, in theoretical terms, the contradictory
existence of a perverted world.9 This contradiction connotes
the unpredictability of the movement of class struggle itself.
The link between conceptualisation and unpredictability is a
critique which opens theory to practice and practice to theory.
Agnoli’s approach is that of a Marxist heretic swimming
against the stream of the orthodox practice of subordinating
history to pre-formed categories.
Following Agnoli, the critique of politics refuses to
engage in a normative-moralist complaint about the gap
between the normative values of bourgeois societies and the
repressive character of political domination. This normative-
moralist complaint is associated with critical political science.
The critique of politics accepts the repressive and oppressive
character of capital and its state. But it accepts it, unlike
critical political science, not as something eternal and external.
The acceptance of the horizon of a given world as its own
theoretical horizon amounts to acceptance of its inescapability.
Against this view of critical political science, the critique of
politics accepts the horizon of a given political reality as a
reality to be transformed. To speak today of the project of
social emancipation seems to be out-dated. However, as
Agnoli puts it, a critique of politics minus the project of social
emancipation amounts precisely to accepting capitalist
reproduction and its form of the state. Agnoli insists that
those who see the project of social emancipation as a utopian
idea should accept the logical consequences of their argument
by either declaring their support courageously for the capitalist
system or by following the example of R. Michels whose dis-
appointment in left revolutionary practice led him to join the
fascist forces in Italy.
Agnoli’s lucid analysis has lost none of its vigour after
more than 20 years. The book is excellent and provides a
comprehensive review of Agnoli’s scholarly work. It is to be
hoped that recent debates in Britain on the ‘Bill of Rights’ and
‘Citizenship’ will be enriched by a translation of Agnoli’s book
into English.
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 85
86 Capital & Class
1. This section is heavily dependent on Preuß (1973; 1981).
2. Cited in Preuß (1973, p.9).
3. See the work of Carl Schmitt.
4. See Preuß (1973, p.24) referring to a decision by the Constitu-
tional Court.
5. See the Stabilitätsgesetz (Stability Act) introduced in 1967,
amended in 1969. On the political economy of this Act see
Holloway (1975).
6. The historical connection between Weimar and the rise of the
Nazis seems apparent. However, a similar, although less detailed
emergency legislation was in force during the Weimar Republic.
The comparison with Weimar serves as a means of legitimating
the repressive character of the liberal democratic ground order.
Hase (1981) sees the difference between Weimar and Bonn in
terms of an occasional emergency state (Weimar) and a permanent
emergency state (Bonn).
7. Gunn (1991) makes a similar point in his compelling Against
Historical Materialism; see also Gunn (1987).
8. From a different angle, a similar argument has been made by
Psychopedis (1991).
9. In Marx, ‘perversion’ has a two-fold meaning: deranged
(verrückt) and de-ranged (ver-rückt), mad and displaced. The
two-fold meaning of perversion comprises the notion of an
internal relationship between the abstract and the concrete. See
Backhaus (1991) on the two-fold meaning of the term
‘perverted’.
Abendroth, W. (1966) Das Grundgesetz. Verlag Günther Neske,
Pfullingen.
__________ (1967) Antagonistische Gesellschaft und politische
Demokratie. Luchterhand, Neuwied.
__________ (1981) ‘11 Thesen zur politischen Funktion und zur
Perspektive des Kampfes für die Erhaltung des demokratischen
Verfassungsrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ in
Ordnungsmacht?: Über das Verhältnis von Legalität, Konsens und
Herrschaft. ed. Deiseroth, D., F. Hase and K-H. Ladeur.
Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt/Main.
Notes
References
Agnoli, J. (1975) Überlegungen zum bürgerlichen Staat. Wagenbach,
Berlin.
__________ (1980) in: Mandel, E and J. Agnoli Offener Marxismus:
Ein Gespräch über Dogmen, Orthodoxie und die Häresie der
Realität. Campus, Frankfurt/Main.
__________ (1990) ‘Destruktion als Bestimmung des Gelehrten in
dürftiger Zeit’ in Konkret No.2 February, Hamburg; forthcoming
in English in Common Sense, No.12, Edinburgh.
Backhaus, H-G. (1991) ‘Philosophy and Science: Marxian Social
Economy as Critical Theory’, forthcoming in Open Marxism,
Vol.I: History and Dialectics, ed. Bonefeld, W., R. Gunn and K.
Psychopedis. Pluto Press, London.
Bonefeld, W. (1991) ‘Social Constitution and the Form of the
Capitalist State’, forthcoming in Open Marxism, Vol.I: History
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Bonefeld, W. and J. Holloway [eds.] (1991) Post-Fordism and Social
Form. Macmillan, London.
Bonefeld, W., R. Gunn and K. Psychopedis [eds.] (1991a). Open
Marxism, Vol.I: History and Dialectics. Pluto Press, London.
__________ (1991b). Open Marxism, Vol.II: Theory and Practice.
Pluto Press, London.
Bruhn, J. (1990) ‘Review on Agnoli’s “Die Transformation der
Demokratie” ’ in Links No.5, May. Offenbach.
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macht?: Über das Verhältnis von Legalität, Konsens und Herrschaft.
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Gerstenberger, H. (1978) ‘Kritische Anmerkungen zum Begriff des
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Hickel. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen.
Gunn, R. (1987) ‘Practical Reflexivity in Marx’ in Common Sense,
No.1. Edinburgh.
__________ (1991) ‘Against Historical Materialism’ forthcoming in
Open Marxism, Vol.II: Theory and Practice, ed. Bonefeld, W., R.
Gunn and K. Psychopedis. Pluto Press, London.
Hase, F. (1981) ‘“Bonn” and “Weimar”: Bemerkungen zur
Entwicklung vom “okkasionellen” zum “ideologischen” Staats-
schutz’ in Ordnungsmacht?: Über das Verhältnis von Legalität,
Konsens und Herrschaft, ed. Deiseroth, D., F. Hase and K-H.
Ladeur. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt/Main.
Hirsch, J. (1980) Der Sicherheitsstaat. Europäische Verlagsanstalt,
Frankfurt/Main.
__________ (1983) ‘The Fordist Security State and New Social
Movements’ in Kapitalistate No.10/11. Berkely; reprinted in
Clarke, S. [ed.] (1991) The State Debate. Macmillan, London.
__________ (1991) ‘Fordism and Post-Fordism’ in Post-Fordism and
Social Form, ed. Bonefeld, W. and J. Holloway. Macmillan,
London.
Johannes Agnoli’s Critique of Politics in Germany 87
Holloway, J. (1975) ‘Decentralisation of State Power in the Federal
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Croom Helm, London.
Marx, K. (1968) ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ in Selected
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__________ (1976) ‘The Poverty of Philosophy’ in Collected Works,
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Marx, K. and F. Engels (1976) ‘The German Ideology’ in Collected
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Preuß, U. K. (1973) Legalität und Pluralismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/
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__________ (1981) ‘Rechtsstaat – Steuerstaat – Sozialstaat: Eine
Problemskizze’ in Ordnungsmacht?: Über das Verhältnis von
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Psychopedis, K. (1991) ‘Crisis of Theory in Contemporary Social
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J. Holloway. Macmillan, London.
STOP PRESS!
The following notice was received just as C&C 46 was going to press. Further
details can be obtained from CSE, 25 Horsell Road, London N5 1XL or the
addresses given below
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCE
The Alternative Perspectives on Finance conference seeks
to broaden research on finance into new paradigms and
methods, inviting researchers from inside and outside finance
to contribute. The conference will be held at Bucknell
University, Lewisburg, PA, USA June 10-12, 1992. Deadline
for submissions is March 6, 1992. For further information,
submissions, expressions of interest in participating or advice
on suitability of proposed submissions, contact either of the
following:
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Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, 17837 USA
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York University, North York, Canada M3J 1P3
(BITNET AS000037@ORION.YORKU.CA)
88 Capital & Class
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Chapter
Die folgenden Einwände beziehen sich auf das Konzept des Steuerstaates, wie es von den Herausgebern dieses Bandes in ihrem Einleitungskapitel entwickelt wird. Dieses Konzept ist inhaltlich umfangreicher als dasjenige, welches Goldscheidt mit dem von ihm eingeführten Begriff verbunden hatte, und es intendiert eine allgemeine Strukturbestimmung des bürgerlichen Staates; eine kategoriale Fassung der nach Ansicht der Herausgeber zunehmenden Krisenhaftigkeit des Strukturtypus Steuerstaat; eine politische Strategie zur Thematisierung der spezifischen Probleme des Steuerstaates und damit zur Vorbereitung von deren (revolutionärer?) Überwindung.
Article
The aim of the present paper is to elucidate Marx's understanding of the relation between theory and practice. No claim is entered to the effect that Marx's conception of the theory/practice relation is original to him: rather – although space prevents a defence of this view here – I would argue that it originates with Hegel, who urges that true theory and free (or mutually recognitive) practice are internally linked. 1 If this is so, then Marx's reading of Hegel as an idealist who severs theory from practice, preparatory to reducing the latter to the former, 2 wholly misses its mark. So too does Marx's polemic against the Young Hegelians 3 who, it may be argued, carry forward Hegel's understanding of theory's relation to practice rather than succumbing to "idealism", as Marx thinks. My concern in what follows is not, however, with the fairness or unfairness of Marx's criticisms but with the substantive view of the relation beteen theory and peactice which Marx defends. To this view I turn. I Marx develops his characteristic understanding of the relation between theory and practice in the course of polemics which, in the 1840s, mark successive stages in his break with his erstwhile Young Hegelian allies. 4 From his scattered comments and assertions both then and later, a rich and systematic conception of the relation between theory and practice emerges. The task of the present section is to make this 1 Relevant passages by Hegel include his Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press 1977) pp. 44, 104 and (especially) 490-1; also his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences para. 382. 2 Cf. Marx/Engels Collected Works (Lawrence and Wishart 1975-) [henceforward: CW], 3, pp. 326-46. 3 See N. Lobkowicz Theory and Practice (Notre Dame 1973) Part III; D. McLellan The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (Macmillan 1979); L. S. Stepelevich (ed.) The Young Hegelians: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press 1983). 4 As my introductory comments indicate, I consider that Marx's interpretation of the Young Hegelians is open to question. When present paper refers to the Young Hegelians, this is generally to the Young Hegelians as seen through Marx's eyes.
Stability Act) introduced in 1967, amended in 1969. On the political economy of this Act see Holloway
  • See
  • Stabilitätsgesetz
See the Stabilitätsgesetz (Stability Act) introduced in 1967, amended in 1969. On the political economy of this Act see Holloway (1975).
) makes a similar point in his compelling Against Historical Materialism
  • Gunn
Gunn (1991) makes a similar point in his compelling Against Historical Materialism; see also Gunn (1987).
Rechtsstaat – Steuerstaat – Sozialstaat: Eine Problemskizze' in Ordnungsmacht?: Über das Verhältnis von Legalität, Konsens und Herrschaft
  • Lawrence
  • Wishart
  • London
  • U K Preuß
Lawrence & Wishart, London. Preuß, U. K. (1973) Legalität und Pluralismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/ Main. __________ (1981) 'Rechtsstaat – Steuerstaat – Sozialstaat: Eine Problemskizze' in Ordnungsmacht?: Über das Verhältnis von Legalität, Konsens und Herrschaft. ed. Deiseroth, D., F. Hase and K-H. Ladeur. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt/Main.
The Fordist Security State and New Social Movements' in Kapitalistate No.10/11. Berkely The State DebateFordism and Post-Fordism' in Post-Fordism and Social Form
  • J Hirsch
Hirsch, J. (1980) Der Sicherheitsstaat. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt/Main. __________ (1983) 'The Fordist Security State and New Social Movements' in Kapitalistate No.10/11. Berkely; reprinted in Clarke, S. [ed.] (1991) The State Debate. Macmillan, London. __________ (1991) 'Fordism and Post-Fordism' in Post-Fordism and Social Form, ed. Bonefeld, W. and J. Holloway. Macmillan, London. Johannes Agnoli's Critique of Politics in Germany 87
perversion' has a two-fold meaning: deranged (verrückt) and de-ranged (ver-rückt), mad and displaced. The two-fold meaning of perversion comprises the notion of an internal relationship between the abstract and the concrete. See Backhaus (1991) on the two-fold meaning of the term
  • In Marx
In Marx, 'perversion' has a two-fold meaning: deranged (verrückt) and de-ranged (ver-rückt), mad and displaced. The two-fold meaning of perversion comprises the notion of an internal relationship between the abstract and the concrete. See Backhaus (1991) on the two-fold meaning of the term 'perverted'.
The German Ideology' in Collected Works
  • Lawrence
  • Wishart
  • London
  • K Marx
  • F Engels
Lawrence & Wishart, London. Marx, K. and F. Engels (1976) 'The German Ideology' in Collected Works, Vol.