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The Economics of Open Source Software

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Abstract

This paper oers an introduction to the merits of open source software in the real world and as compared to closed source software. It also states how open source software products can aord to be the basis of a for-profit venture, what specific business models it may employ, and its future in the economy.

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... Libre software usage is becoming more and more widespread. Studies like [20] [21] [32] show Copyright c 2006 Arnoldo José Müller Molina, Takeshi Shinohara. Permission to copy is hereby granted provided the original copyright notice is reproduced in copies made. ...
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