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Abstract

Unlike economic exchange, social exchange has no well-defined "value." It is based on the norm of reciprocity, in which giving and taking are to be repaid in equivalent measure. Although giving and taking are colloquially assumed to be equivalent actions, we demonstrate that they produce different patterns of reciprocity. In five experiments utilizing a dictator game, people reciprocated in like measure to apparently prosocial acts of giving, but reciprocated more selfishly to apparently antisocial acts of taking, even when the objective outcomes of the acts of giving and taking were identical. Additional results demonstrate that acts of giving in social exchanges are perceived as more generous than objectively identical acts of taking, that taking tends to escalate, and that the asymmetry in reciprocity is not due to gaining versus losing resources. Reciprocity appears to operate on an exchange rate that assigns value to the meaning of events, in a fashion that encourages prosocial exchanges.

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... Similar effects were also found in the samples taken from 37 countries all over the world (Różycka-Tran, Boski, & Wojciszke, 2015). Many studies showed that negative reciprocity norms lead to conflict behavior, whereas positive reciprocity norms leads to stable social relation exchanges (Keysar, Converse, Wang, & Epley, 2008). The same, the conviction that social life is like a zero-sum game leads to a negative evaluation of social relations in organization. ...
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The purpose of this study was to investigate the mediational role of relational psychological contract in social beliefs and work input attitude dependency. We analyzed data taken from employees (N = 258) in four different organizations operating in the Pomeranian market. A mediation analysis showed a strongly mediating role of psychological contract in the negative relationship between perception of life as a zero-sum game (BZSG) and work input. The motivational effect of the relational psychological contract, that is the role of job security, interesting work, a career in the company, opportunities for promotion and other HRM practices prevail over the significance of personal beliefs, especially when these are negative. If the company lacks the appropriate HRM systems then day-to-day social exchanges can be crucial in modifying the social beliefs of the employee.
... Reciprocity theory also suggests that people reciprocate in two ways: positively (being, e.g., cooperative, empathetic) or negatively, by retaliating (being, e.g., aggressive, tough). Both forces can be quite strong, but negative reciprocity (i.e., "an eye for an eye" approach) is very deeply rooted in human nature (Aristotle 2004;Baumeister et al. 2001) and has been shown not only in social contexts (Keysar et al. 2008) but also in evolutionary psychology as a means for gene selection (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). In our setting, with role reversal, negotiators offer concessions preemptively to generate positive reciprocal feelings. ...
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The authors focus on repeated distributive negotiations to investigate how expectations of role reversal in future transactions (i.e., a buyer [seller] in one transaction is the seller [buyer] in the next transaction) affect behaviors in the current negotiation. They demonstrate that when negotiators expect a role reversal, they are likely to make more concessions and reach agreement more quickly in the current negotiation. The authors find that this effect is driven by negotiators' beliefs that they will be able to recover these concessions, because negotiators expect their counterparts to reciprocate in the later transaction when the parties reverse roles. However, when the two negotiations occur in different "accounting" periods (i.e., fiscal periods) or when the negotiating parties do not explicitly communicate their willingness to reverse roles in the future, role-reversal expectations do not affect concession making. Implications arise in both managerial and consumer contexts where the possibility of engaging in future negotiations-as well as reversing roles-exists.
... In the present study, any amount proposed by the allocator in the ''other'' condition might be considered, implicitly, as a kind of extra ''gain'', even though the recipient may eventually decide to reject the offer and lose it. Conversely, any amount proposed by the allocator in the ''self'' condition might be considered as a kind of ''loss'' as the bargaining property was initially assigned to the recipient and he/she might implicitly declare the ownership of the whole lot (see also[65]). An important finding here was that the modulations of the P300 by offer type and initial ownership appeared to be independent from each other, consistent with the absence of an interaction between fairness of offers and social distance between the allocator and recipient in DG[27]. ...
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Previous behavioral studies have shown that initial ownership influences individuals' fairness consideration and other-regarding behavior. However, it is not entirely clear whether initial ownership influences the brain activity when a recipient evaluates the fairness of asset distribution. In this study, we randomly assigned the bargaining property (monetary reward) to either the allocator or the recipient in the ultimatum game and let participants of the study, acting as recipients, receive either disadvantageous unequal, equal, or advantageous unequal offers from allocators while the event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to reject disadvantageous unequal and equal offers when they initially owned the property as compared to when they did not. The two types of unequal offers evoked more negative going ERPs (the MFN) than the equal offers in an early time window and the differences were not modulated by the initial ownership. In a late time window, however, the P300 responses to division schemes were affected not only by the type of unequal offers but also by whom the property was initially assigned to. These findings suggest that while the MFN may function as a general mechanism that evaluates whether the offer is consistent or inconsistent with the equity rule, the P300 is sensitive to top-down controlled processes, into which factors related to the allocation of attentional resources, including initial ownership and personal interests, come to play.
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Bidirectional associations between being cyberbullied and cyberbullying others have been suggested, as well as bidirectional patterns of online prosocial behavior (reciprocity). However, so far, these relations have been studied as population-level associations, and it is not clear whether they also reflect within-person behavioral patterns. Therefore, this study aimed to disentangle between-person and within-person processes in online antisocial (cyberbullying) and prosocial behavior over time. Random intercept cross-lagged panel models were used to examine long-term within-person patterns of involvement in cyberbullying and online prosocial behavior. The findings showed no within-person effects between cyberbullying victimization and perpetration over time. In contrast, results did reveal significant within-person autoregressive effects of performing and receiving online prosocial behavior over time, and within-person cross-lagged effects between receiving online prosocial behavior and acting prosocially later on. These results indicate long-term positive, reinforcing spirals of prosocial exchanges, but no long-term negative spirals of cyberbullying perpetration and victimization.
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Introduction: Over the last decades, response rates XE "response rates" in market and social surveys have been declining continuously. Given that the response rate is one of the most critical methodological issues, a special conference aimed at professionals from the top agencies in market research was devoted to this topic in 2008. The conference title was: Where have all the respondents gone? All participants observed a serious loss in respondents' cooperation (AMA and SPSS 2008), although there was no agreement on which response rate level is still acceptable: governments demand 85 %, academics accept about 50 % for their publications, and for an average marketing study 20 % seems to be a good level. At the end of the conference, a discussion took place on how to engage with selected people and make them want to interact with interviewers. This discussion culminated in a call for investigating and working out the basics of how to interact with people in today's world. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012. All rights are reserved.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate, through the lens of gift-giving theory, volunteers’ motivations for intending to stay with organizations. Design/methodology/approach – Data were collected from 379 volunteers from 30 charitable organizations operating in Italy’s socio-healthcare service sector. Bootstrapped mediation analysis was used to test the hypothesized relationships. Findings – Volunteers’ reciprocal attitudes and gift-giving intentions partially mediated the relationship between motives and intentions to stay. Practical implications – Policy makers of charitable organizations are advised to be more responsive to behavioral signals revealing volunteers’ motivations, attitudes, and intentions. Managers should appropriately align organizational responsiveness with volunteers’ commitment through gift-giving exchange systems. Originality/value – The findings reveal that reciprocity and gift-giving are significant organizational variables greatly influencing volunteers’ intentions to stay with organizations. Signaling theory is used to explain how volunteers’ attitudes are linked with organizational responsiveness. Furthermore, this study is the first to use an Italian setting to consider motives, reciprocity, and gift-giving as they relate to intentions to stay.
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Recent research suggests that self-righteousness is bounded, arising more reliably in evaluations of immoral actions than in evaluations of moral actions. Here, we test four implications of this asymmetry in self-righteousness and the mechanism explaining it. We find that people are less likely to make negative character inferences from their own unethical behavior than from others’ unethical behavior (Experiment 1), believe they would feel worse after an unethical action than others (Experiment 2), and believe they are less capable of extreme unethical behavior than others (Experiment 3). We observe weaker self–other differences in evaluations of ethical actions. This occurs partly because people base evaluations of themselves on their own moral intentions, leading to predictable individual differences. People more likely to ascribe cynical motives to their own behavior exhibit a smaller asymmetry in self-righteousness (Experiment 4). Self-righteousness seems better characterized as feeling “less evil than thou” than feeling “holier than thou.”
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Advancing a theoretical model to explain the negative effects of texting on romantic relationships, we suggest that constant texting leads partners to attend to their cell phones instead of communicating with their significant other (Pphubbing), reducing through two different processes the perceived quality of a romantic relationship. These processes are: (1) conflicts erupting between couples due to texting behavior; and (2) lack of intimacy, stemming from texting activities that displace focus on the romantic partner. To test the model we conducted a two-wave, representative panel survey, separated by one year. A cross-lagged analysis of the two-wave panel demonstrates that frequency of texting leads to lower levels of perceived quality in relationships. This relationship militates against the argument that individuals in unhappy relationships turn to the phone to avoid being together with the partner. Additionally, results support the proposed model suggesting that both mediators -lack of intimacy and conflicts- have negative effects on perceived relationship quality over time.
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Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political exchanges-whether they involve legislative vote trading, interbranch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt exchange of public resources for private wealth-require reciprocity. But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection practices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of reciprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experimental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of holding office on politicians' behavior.
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Two experiments with preschoolers (36 to 78 months) and 8-year-old children (Experiment 1, N = 173; Experiment 2, N = 132) investigated the development of children's resource distribution in dominance contexts. On the basis of the distributive justice literature, 2 opposite predictions were tested. Children could match resource allocation with the unequal social setting they observe and thus favor a dominant individual over a subordinate 1. Alternatively, children could choose to compensate the subordinate if they consider that the dominance asymmetry should be counteracted. Two experiments using a giving task (Experiment 1) and a taking task (Experiment 2) led to the same results. In both experiments, children took dominance into account when allocating resources. Moreover, their distributive decisions were similarly affected by age: Although 3- and 4-year-old children favored the dominant individual, 5-year-old children showed no preference and 8-year-old children strongly favored the subordinate. Several mechanisms accounting for this developmental pattern are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Smartphones allow people to connect with others from almost anywhere at any time. However, there is growing concern that smartphones may actually sometimes detract, rather than complement, social interactions. The term “phubbing” represents the act of snubbing someone in a social setting by concentrating on one’s phone instead of talking to the person directly. The current study was designed to examine some of the psychological antecedents and consequences of phubbing behavior. We examined the contributing roles of Internet addiction, fear of missing out, self-control, and smartphone addiction, and how the frequency of phubbing behavior and of being phubbed may both lead to the perception that phubbing is normative. The results revealed that Internet addiction, fear of missing out, and self-control predicted smartphone addiction, which in turn predicted the extent to which people phub. This path also predicted the extent to which people feel that phubbing is normative, both via (a) the extent to which people are phubbed themselves, and (b) independently. Further, gender moderated the relationship between the extent to which people are phubbed and their perception that phubbing is normative. The present findings suggest that phubbing is an important factor in modern communication that warrants further investigation.
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Both restorative justice and resource theory focus attention on harmful interactions whose resolution sometimes requires the involvement of a third party. Ronald Cohen, in this chapter, reviews recent work in both traditions and underscores the importance of identifying and examining three issues that have escaped systematic attention. First, the nature of the central roles of victim, perpetrator, and “community” need to be clarified. Second, the complexities involved in shifting from a dyadic to a triadic social relation need to be addressed. And, third, the discursive dimension of status alignments and realignments needs to be analyzed. Cohen offers suggestions about why these issues are important and how they might be addressed.
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People who are in powerful positions (e.g., government officials, employers, parents) often decide how to allocate goods to other people. Indeed, control over resources is precisely one of the things that confers power. This chapter provides a brief overview of distributive justice theory, which deals with fairness standards for allocating some limited resource. We next review relevant research on social power, or the ability to influence others in psychologically meaningful ways through the giving or withholding of rewards and punishments. We then present two experiments that examine the effects of power and a number of situational (e.g., ingroup–outgroup, priming notions of power or merit), demographic (e.g., gender), and attitude and personality variables (e.g., political orientation, communal orientation, merit orientation, work ethic, egalitarianism, collectivism, and empathy) on individuals’ allocation behavior in a resource distribution task. The experiments examine the allocation of two different resources: money (Experiment 1) and time on work assignments (Experiment 2). Across both experiments, the results indicate a strong norm of equality, which appears to trump other considerations, such as recipients’ apparent need, merit, or similarity to the allocator. The final section discusses the findings’ implications, such as whether this egalitarian norm can be overcome, and whether it is desirable to do so.
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Recent research has found that even preschoolers give more resources to others who have previously given resources to them, but the psychological bases of this reciprocity are unknown. In our study, a puppet distributed resources between herself and a child by taking some from a pile in front of the child or else by giving some from a pile in front of herself. Although the resulting distributions were identical, three- and five-year-olds reciprocated less generously when the puppet had taken rather than given resources. This suggests that children’s judgments about resource distribution are more about the social intentions of the distributor and the social framing of the distributional act than about the amount of resources obtained. In order to rule out that the differences in the children’s reciprocal behavior were merely due to experiencing gains and losses, we conducted a follow-up study. Here, three- and-five year olds won or lost resources in a lottery draw and could then freely give or take resources to/from a puppet, respectively. In this study, they did not respond differently after winning vs. losing resources.
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This dissertation provides a cultural-cognitive perspective on the relationship between cooperation and competition within organizations. Instead of explicitly defining the relationship between cooperation and competition, I examine lay beliefs about the relationship and the impact of these beliefs on perceptions and behavior. This dissertation consists of two studies. In the first study, I examine the role of peoples’ categorization of competitive behaviors as cooperative or non-cooperative in teams. I assess the influence of dialectical reasoning, a culturally-shaped reasoning style, on the categorization of competitive behaviors and the reaction to competitive behaviors within teams. I test my predictions with a laboratory experiment with participants in the US and China. The analyses from this study reveal cultural differences in perceptual and behavioral reactions to competitive behaviors, with differences partially attributed to reasoning style and categorization. In the second study, I examine the role of people’s categorization of competitive behaviors as cooperative or non-cooperative in working relationships. I assess the influence of culture and categorization on people’s ego-centric network of working relationships. I test my predictions with a survey of working professionals in the US and China. The analyses from this study demonstrate that people who categorize certain competitive behaviors as cooperative are more likely to be more cooperative with people they are more competitive with instead of having exclusively cooperative or competitive relationships. The analyses also reveal national cultural differences in people’s networks of working relationships that are partially attributable to categorization of competitive behaviors. By empirically connecting culture and reasoning style to cooperative and competitive behavior in teams and working relationships, this research enhances our understanding of fundamental aspects of organizations, suggesting a new approach to examining the influence of societal factors in behavior within organizations. Management
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For this text focused on the social psychology of justice, the authors have assembled the most current information relating to 5 major questions. These questions look specifically at how justice is defined, how it influences individuals' thoughts and actions and shapes their behavior, and when and why it matters. The underlying unifying theme is that individuals do care about issues of fairness in their interactions with others, with groups, and with institutions they support or oppose. Using this theme as their guidepost, the authors explore research on relative deprivation, distributive justice, procedural justice, and retributive justice. Extensive use of examples drawn from contemporary culture make this book an informative and engaging collection of the most current thinking about topics such as diversity, gender, equal pay, personal satisfaction, 3rd-party dispute management, crime, cultural preservation, and scarcity theory. This text will be a valuable source for advanced courses on social justice, interpersonal relations, negotiation, intergroup conflict, and group processes in social psychology, political science, sociology, and legal studies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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The greater power of bad events over good ones is found in everyday events, major life events (e.g., trauma), close relationship outcomes, social network patterns, interpersonal interactions, and learning processes. Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback have more impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly than good. The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good ones. Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones. Various explanations such as diagnosticity and salience help explain some findings, but the greater power of bad events is still found when such variables are controlled. Hardly any exceptions (indicating greater power of good) can be found. Taken together, these findings suggest that bad is stronger than good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena.
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Physical conflicts tend to escalate. For example, as tit-for-tat exchanges between two children escalate, both will often assert that the other hit him or her harder. Here we show that, in such situations, both sides are reporting their true percept and that the escalation is a natural by-product of
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This review covers recent developments in the social influence literature, focusing primarily on compliance and conformity research published between 1997 and 2002. The principles and processes underlying a target's susceptibility to outside influences are considered in light of three goals fundamental to rewarding human functioning. Specifically, targets are motivated to form accurate perceptions of reality and react accordingly, to develop and preserve meaningful social relationships, and to maintain a favorable self-concept. Consistent with the current movement in compliance and conformity research, this review emphasizes the ways in which these goals interact with external forces to engender social influence processes that are subtle, indirect, and outside of awareness.
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Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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Community standards of fairness for the setting of prices and wages were elicited by telephone surveys. In customer or labor markets it isacceptable for a firm to raise prices (or cut wages) when profits arethreatened, and to maintain prices when costs diminish. It is unfair toexploit shifts in demand by raising prices or cutting wages. Several market anomalies are explained by assuming that these standards of fairness influence the behavior of firms. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.
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The manner in which the concept of reciprocity is implicated in functional theory is explored, enabling a reanalysis of the concepts of "survival" and "exploitation." The need to distinguish between the concepts of complementarity and reciprocity is stressed. Distinctions are also drawn between (1) reciprocity as a pattern of mutually contingent exchange of gratifications, (2) the existential or folk belief in reciprocity, and (3) the generalized moral norm of reciprocity. Reciprocity as a moral norm is analyzed; it is hypothesized that it is one of the universal "principal components" of moral codes. As Westermarck states, "To requite a benefit, or to be grateful to him who bestows it, is probably everywhere, at least under certain circumstances, regarded as a duty. This is a subject which in the present connection calls for special consideration." Ways in which the norm of reciprocity is implicated in the maintenance of stable social systems are examined.
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Game theory attempts to dissect the rules by which humans interact. In his commentary, Wedekind discusses some new results in a recent paper in Nature that suggest that some acts of altruism may not be so altruistic after all. A donation to a street musician or a beggar may actually be an act of self-interest, if the giving can be observed by others and increases the donor's social status.
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Retribution and revenge, two highly related concepts, are arguably the oldest, most basic and most pervasive justice reactions associated with human social life. While scholarship about retribution and revenge has tended to focus on criminal justice, empirical evidence indicates that retribution is important in other matters related to law. For example, medical malpractice, discrimination, and a panoply of civil lawsuits can be primarily fueled by a desire for retribution. Retributive motives can appear at the core of intractable business disputes and other commercial disagreements. In this article, Professor Vidmar develops a conceptual framework to study retribution as a psychological and social phenomenon. He explores a number of conceptual issues, including how a social science approach differs from legal and philosophical approaches. His discussion explores the sociological and psychological functions that punishment serves. Separate sections of the article discuss the cognitive dynamics of retribution and its emotional/behavioral aspects as well. The article raises important questions about retribution. Are reactions different if the justice is dispensed by the victim, by neutral authorities, or by "acts of fate" (or God)? What are the consequences when nothing happens to the perpetrator? How does excessive punishment of the offender or remorse affect retributive reactions? The author's insight raises important implications for legal and other settings in which punishment is administered.
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Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
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The "iterated prisoner's dilemma" is the most widely used model for the evolution of cooperation in biological societies. Here we show that a heterogeneous population consisting of simple strategies, whose behavior is totally specified by the outcome of the previous round, can lead to persistent periodic or highly irregular (chaotic) oscillations in the frequencies of the strategies and the overall level of cooperation. The levels of cooperation jump up and down in an apparently unpredictable fashion. Small recurrent and simultaneous invasion attempts (caused by mutation) can change the evolutionary dynamics from converging to an evolutionarily stable strategy to periodic oscillations and chaos. Evolution can be twisted away from defection, toward cooperation. Adding "generous tit-for-tat" greatly increases the overall level of cooperation and can lead to long periods of steady cooperation. Since May's paper [May, R. M. (1976) Nature (London) 261, 459-467], "simple mathematical models with very complicated dynamics" have been found in many biological applications, but here we provide an example of a biologically relevant evolutionary game whose dynamics display deterministic chaos. The simulations bear some resemblance to the irregular cycles displayed by the frequencies of host genotypes and specialized parasites in evolutionary "arms races" [Hamilton, W. D., Axelrod, R. & Tanese, R. (1990) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 87, 3566-3573; Seger, J. (1988) Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London B 319, 541-555].
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The defining feature of social dilemma situations is the inherent conflict faced by those involved: should one act in his or her own individual best interest or sacrifice a measure of one's personal payoff to help maximize the joint payoff of the group as a whole? In such dilemmas, those making individualistic and defecting choices are always at a competitive advantage relative to those who choose to cooperate. One seemingly inevitable consequence of the resulting resource allocation asymmetry is that it must challenge and threaten the cooperator's sense of fairness and justice, and it is the reaction of those caught in social dilemmas to this injustice and unfairness that is the focus of this article. We examine how justice processes-distributive justice, procedural justice, restorative justice, and retributive justice-operate in social dilemmas. Within this examination, we consider ideas from classic and contemporary conceptual analyses of justice to provide a broader context within which to understand social dilemmas and the roles that justice plays as people strive to ensure fair outcomes for themselves and for others. We conclude with the proposal of a 4-stage, sequential model of justice in social dilemmas that posits groups move between the types of justice concerns when unfair and unsatisfactory outcomes (e.g., inequitable resource allocations, violations of agreed-on allocation rules, intentional and egregious exploitation of the group) cause members to "recognize the necessity" for change to ensure fair and just outcomes for all.
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Loss aversion occurs because people expect losses to have greater hedonic impact than gains of equal magnitude. In two studies, people predicted that losses in a gambling task would have greater hedonic impact than would gains of equal magnitude, but when people actually gambled, losses did not have as much of an emotional impact as they predicted. People overestimated the hedonic impact of losses because they underestimated their tendency to rationalize losses and overestimated their tendency to dwell on losses. The asymmetrical impact of losses and gains was thus more a property of affective forecasts than a property of affective experience.
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Analysis of decision making under risk has been dominated by expected utility theory, which generally accounts for people's actions. Presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and argues that common forms of utility theory are not adequate, and proposes an alternative theory of choice under risk called prospect theory. In expected utility theory, utilities of outcomes are weighted by their probabilities. Considers results of responses to various hypothetical decision situations under risk and shows results that violate the tenets of expected utility theory. People overweight outcomes considered certain, relative to outcomes that are merely probable, a situation called the "certainty effect." This effect contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains, and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In choices where gains are replaced by losses, the pattern is called the "reflection effect." People discard components shared by all prospects under consideration, a tendency called the "isolation effect." Also shows that in choice situations, preferences may be altered by different representations of probabilities. Develops an alternative theory of individual decision making under risk, called prospect theory, developed for simple prospects with monetary outcomes and stated probabilities, in which value is given to gains and losses (i.e., changes in wealth or welfare) rather than to final assets, and probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The theory has two phases. The editing phase organizes and reformulates the options to simplify later evaluation and choice. The edited prospects are evaluated and the highest value prospect chosen. Discusses and models this theory, and offers directions for extending prospect theory are offered. (TNM)
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Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.
The origin of virtue: Human instincts and the evolution of cooperation
  • R T Ridley
Ridley, R.T. (1971). The origin of virtue: Human instincts and the evolution of cooperation. London: Penguin Books.
Resource theory of social exchange
  • U G Foa
  • E B Foa
Foa, U.G., & Foa, E.B. (1975). Resource theory of social exchange. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.