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Designing a Mobile Game to Teach Conceptual Knowledge of Avoiding
“Phishing Attacks”
Nalin Asanka Gamagedara Arachchilage, Steve Love, Michael Scott
School of Information Systems, Computing and Mathematics
Brunel University
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UK
Abstract
Phishing is a form of online identity theft, which
attempts to appropriate confidential and sensitive
information such as usernames and passwords from
its victims. To facilitate cyberspace as a secure
environment, phishing education needs to be made
accessible to home computer users and mobile
games enable embedded learning in a natural
environment. Previously, we have introduced a
mobile game design that aimed to enhance
avoidance motivation and behavior to protect
against phishing threats. This paper focuses on a
design that develops the conceptual knowledge that
is necessary to combat phishing threats, home
computer teaching users about phishing emails and
web addresses. The prototype game design is
presented on Google App Inventor Emulator.
Keywords - mobile game design; phishing attacks;
security awareness; human computer interaction;
mobile game based learning
1. Introduction
Security exploits can include IT threats such as
viruses, malicious software (malware), unsolicited e-
mail (spam), and monitoring software (spyware).
Phishing, however, is a form of semantic attack [1,
8] that leverages human vulnerabilities, rather than
exploiting technical pitfalls. Attackers will attempt to
trick Internet users into following malformed URLs
(Uniform Resource Locators) that mimic legitimate
versions as closely as possible. These will typically
lead to fraudulent websites that share the same look-
and-feel as the real version. Users may then
unintentionally provide private information such as
usernames, passwords or bank details to a third
party.
This research comprehends the need of which the
human aspect of security can be influenced to avoid
malicious IT threats in the context of home computer
use. These users are susceptible to phishing threats
due to the rapid growth of Internet technology [9]. It
is so ubiquitous today that it provides the baseline for
modern living, enabling ordinary people to socialize,
shop, and be entertained all through their home
computers. As people’s reliance on the Internet
grows, the possibility of hacking, attacking and other
security breaches increases day by day [5].
Therefore, home computer users make a significant
contribution in helping to make cyberspace a safer
place for everyone and the message “security starts
at home” should be spread to all home computer
users [2].
In the past, phishing attacks have been distributed
through scam emails [10, 17]. For example, urging
people to participate in a survey or verify their bank
account information. Now it has become a persistent
threat as people consume and distribute a significant
amount of information through links in social media.
This includes internet enabled services such as
Facebook, Hi5, Skype, Twitter, Orkut, Google+, and
even more professional social networking website
such as LinkedIn.
In addition, as organizations have become
increasingly ‘virtual’ there has been a technological
move from work to the domestic environment [7].
Employees have freedom to work at home or bring
unfinished work home due to the pervasiveness of
Internet technology. This increases the opportunity
for home computer users to open a “back door” to
vulnerable IT threats. These home computer users
are unlikely to have a sufficient IT infrastructure or
technology to protect themselves from malicious IT
attacks, or may not have a proper standard or strict
IT security policies in place. For example, most
home computer users are not IT professionals and
lack the necessary computer literacy to establish a
secure home computing system. Home computer
users also tend to display unsafe computer behavior
that is particularly vulnerable to IT threats. For
example, browsing unsafe websites, downloading
suspicious software, sharing passwords among
family and peers, and using unprotected home
wireless networks [5].
As phishing attacks become increasingly
sophisticated, it becomes more challenging to protect
against them [3, 13] and without an appropriate level
of security awareness, some home computer users
are becoming vulnerable to these new threats [12,
14]. A number of automated software tools have
been developed to alert users of potentially
fraudulent emails and websites [13]. Ye and Sean
International Journal for e-Learning Security (IJeLS), Volume 2, Issues 1/2, March/June 2012
Copyright © 2012, Infonomics Society
127
[21] and Dhamija and Tygar [15] have developed a
prototype called “trusted paths” for the Mozilla web
browser that is designed to help users verify that
their browser has made a secure connection to a
trusted website. However, these systems are not
totally reliable in detecting phishing attacks [19].
Previous research has revealed that the available
anti-phishing tools such as Calling ID Toolbar,
Cloudmark Anti-Fraud Toolbar, EarthLink Toolbar,
Firefox 2, eBay Toolbar, and Netcraft Anti-Phishing
Toolbar are insufficient to combat phishing threats
[18]. Even the best toolbars miss over 20% of
phishing websites [20]. On the one hand, software
application designers and developers, with the help
of security expertise, will continue to improve
phishing and spam detection. Nonetheless, the
human factor risk is high and people are the weakest
link in information security [4]. Therefore, it is
appropriate to mitigate human factor risks by
educating users against phishing threats [16, 18].
In this paper, we present the design of a mobile
game that aims to develop conceptual knowledge of
phishing URLs. The most significant feature of
mobile environment is mobility itself such as
mobility of the user, mobility of the device, and
mobility of the service [11, 22]. It enables users to be
in contact while they are outside the reach of
traditional communicational spaces. For example, a
person can play a game on his mobile device while
travelling on the bus or train. The reminder of this
paper is organized as follows: section two discusses
related work; section three describes the game
prototype design we created on Google App Inventor
Emulator; and the paper concludes in section four
opening future work directions.
2. Related work
All Arachchilage and Cole [11, 12] designed a
mobile game design prototype as an educational tool
to teach home computer users to protect themselves
against phishing attacks. Their research proposed a
mobile game design for learning, based on a story,
which simplifies and exaggerates real life situations.
The research asked the following questions: The first
question is how does the system developer identify
which issues the game needs to address? Once the
developer has identified the salient issues, they are
faced with second question, what principles should
guide the structure of this information. A theoretical
model derived from Technology Threat Avoidance
Theory (TTAT) was used to address those mobile
game design issues and the mobile game design
principles were used as a set of guidelines for
structuring and presenting information in the mobile
game design context [6, 11]. The objective of their
anti-phishing mobile game design was to teach the
user how to identify phishing URLs and emails,
which is one of many ways to identify a phishing
attack. The overall mobile game design was focused
to enhance avoidance behavior through motivation of
home computer users to thwart phishing threats. The
prototype game design was presented on Google App
Inventor Emulator.
The proposed mobile game design was focused
almost entirely on procedural knowledge. However,
some conceptual knowledge about the parts of URL
and email might help the user to distinguish phishing
URLs and email messages from legitimate ones [19].
Therefore, this research attempts to address this issue
in the mobile game design context. For example,
when a user correctly identifies a phishing URL, they
should be asked which portion of the URL indicates
phishing, to determine whether or not they have
understood the concept of a phishing URL.
Alternatively, when a user is presented with a portion
of a phishing email, addressing “Dear Valued
Customer” this can also be used to determine
whether or not they have understood the concept of
phishing email. Therefore, this research attempts to
extend Arachchilage and Cole’s [11, 12] mobile
game design by addressing conceptual knowledge of
phishing URLs and emails to thwart phishing
attacks.
3. Game prototype design
To explore the viability of using a game to thwart
phishing attacks based on conceptual knowledge, a
prototype was implemented using Google App
Inventor Emulator. We created a story addressing
conceptual knowledge of phishing URLs and emails
within a game design context.
3.1 Story
The game is based on a scenario of the character
of a small fish and a big fish that both live in a big
pond. The main character is the small fish, who
wants to eat worms to become a big fish. Worms are
randomly generated in the game design. The user
role-plays as the small fish. However the small fish
should be careful of phishers those who try to trick
him with fake worms. This represents phishing
attacks by developing threat perception. The other
character is the small fish’s teacher, who is
experienced fish in the pond. The proposed mobile
game design prototype contains two sections:
teaching the concept of phishing URLs and phishing
emails. In the mobile game design, the user is
presented a combination of phishing and legitimate
URLs (in this case 15 URLs) and emails (in this case
15 emails). Both URLs and emails are targeted to
teach user conceptual knowledge of phishing attacks.
International Journal for e-Learning Security (IJeLS), Volume 2, Issues 1/2, March/June 2012
Copyright © 2012, Infonomics Society
128
3.1.1 Concepts of phishing website addresses
(URLs)
Each worm is associated with a URL, which
appears as a dialog box. The small fish’s job is to eat
all the real worms which are associated with URLs
and avoid fake worms which are associated with fake
URLs before the time is up (Fig. 1). This attempts to
develop the severity and susceptibility of the
phishing threat through the game design. If a
phishing URL is correctly identified, then users are
prompted to indicate which portion of the URL
indicates phishing in order to determine whether or
not they have understood the conceptual knowledge
of the phishing URL (Fig. 2). At this time the users
score will be doubled in order to encourage them to
complete the game. Nevertheless, if the phishing
URL is incorrectly identified, then users get real time
feedback saying why their decision was wrong with
an example such as “Legitimate websites usually do
not have numbers at the beginning of their URLs.
For example,
http://181.57.97.116/.www.hsbc.co.uk”. Therefore,
this attempts to teach conceptual knowledge of
phishing URLs within the game design context.
If the worm associated with the URL is
suspicious or if it is difficult to identify, the small
fish can go to the ‘teacher’ and request help. The big
fish would then provide some tips on how to
recognize bad worms. For example, “website
addresses associated with numbers in the front are
generally scams,” or “a company name followed by a
hyphen in a URL is generally a scam”. Whenever the
small fish demands help from the teacher, the time
left will be reduced by certain amount (in this case
by 1 minute) as a payback for safeguard measure.
This attempts to address the safeguard effectiveness
and the cost needs to pay for the safeguard in the
game design context. The consequences of the
player’s actions are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Scoring scheme and consequences of the
player’s action.
Good worm
(associate with
legitimate URL)
Bad worm
(associate with
phishing URL)
Player
eats Correct, gain 15
points (each attempt
= 1 point)
False negative,
(each attempt loses
1 minute out of 10
minutes)
Player
reject False positive, (each
attempt loses 1
minute out of 10
minutes)
Correct, gain 15
points (each attempt
= 1 point)
Figure 1. Main Menu of the game prototype design
displayed on Google App Inventor Emulator.
Figure 2. Phishing URL dialog box: Learning
conceptual knowledge of phishing URL.
3.1.2 Teaching the concept of phishing emails
Each worm is randomly generated with an email
icon in the game design, so the small fish needs to
eat the worm to open the email (Fig. 3 and Fig. 5).
This task is done once the user clicks on the worm.
At this point, a portion of an email will appear asking
the user to identify whether it is legitimate or
phishing email. This represents phishing attacks by
developing threat perception. The reason for using a
portion of an email, instead of an email, is to
determine whether or not the user has understood the
conceptual knowledge about phishing emails. The
small fish’s job is to eat all the real worms by
clicking the “ACCEPT” button while avoiding fake
worms by clicking the “AVOID” button (Fig. 6). If
the user falsely accepted a legitimate or phishing
email, they are susceptible to a phishing attack. This
causes to lose one life at each attempt in the game
Teache
r
http://181.5
7.97.116/.w
ww.hsbc.co
.uk
Hook
Worm
Small
fish
Legitimate
websites
usually do not
have numbers
at the
beginning of
their URLs.
For example,
http://81.153.1
92.106/.www.
h
sbc.co.uk
International Journal for e-Learning Security (IJeLS), Volume 2, Issues 1/2, March/June 2012
Copyright © 2012, Infonomics Society
129
design. At this point, the game design emphasizes
both the likelihood of phishing attack and severity
caused by the attack. The different sections of an
email help user to identify the legitimacy of email
[9]. For example, phishing emails often contain
generic salutation such as “Dear Valued Customer”
or use of a trusted company logo. It could also be a
statement urging immediate action or mimicking the
email address (Fig.7). Each worm associated with a
portion of an email may contain phishing email traps
as well as legitimate ones. The phishing email traps
covered in the game design include fake links or
email addresses, generic salutations, statements
urging immediate actions and much more.
If the portion of an email is suspicious and if it is
difficult to identify, the small fish can go to ‘his’
teacher and demand help. The teacher could help him
by giving some tips on how to identify phishing
emails. For example, “phishing emails often contain
a generic salutation” or “emails associated with
urgent requests are generally phishing emails”.
Whenever the small fish demands help from the
teacher, the time left will be reduced by certain
amount (in this case by 1 minute) as a payback for
safeguard measure. This attempts to address the
safeguard effectiveness and the cost needs to pay for
the safeguard in the game design. The small fish’s
teacher may also help the player throughout the
game until it is completed by providing some tips
(Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). This can enhance the learnability
of the game itself for the user.
The proposed game design is presented in
different levels such as beginner, intermediate and
advance. When the user moves from the beginner to
advanced level, the complexity of the combination of
URLs and emails is dramatically increased while
considerably decreasing the time period to complete
the game. Therefore, self-efficacy of preventing from
phishing attacks will be addressed in the game
design. Furthermore, a reference guide in the game
design provides useful information on where the user
can learn more about phishing attacks. The reference
guide is linked to the education section of the Anti-
Phishing Work Group website (APWG -
http://education.apwg.org/). The overall game design
is used to teach conceptual knowledge of phishing
emails and URLs for home computer users to thwart
phishing threats.
Figure 3. The small fish’s teacher provides tips:
Click on the worm to “OPEN” the email.
Figure 4. The small fish’s teacher provides tips: If
you think this is a portion of a phishing email, Click
“AVOID”. However, if you think this is a portion of
a legitimate email, Click “ACCEPT”.
Figure 5. The small fish is waiting for open the
email.
Figure 6. Learning the concepts of phishing emails
“AVOID
” button
Hook
Small
fish Teacher
If you think this is
a portion of a
phishing email,
click “AVOID”
However, if you
think this is a
portion of a
legitimate email,
click “ACCEPT”
“ACCEPT”
button
Email
icon
Hook
Small
fish Teacher
Click on the
worm to
“OPEN” the
email
Worm
International Journal for e-Learning Security (IJeLS), Volume 2, Issues 1/2, March/June 2012
Copyright © 2012, Infonomics Society
130
Figure 7. Different sections of a phishing email:
mimicked email address, salutation, logo, urging
message.
4. Conclusion
Author This research focused on designing a
mobile game as an educational tool for home
computer users to develop the conceptual knowledge
behind phishing attacks. Previous research resulted
in a mobile game to educate home computer users
about phishing attacks, but it was aimed almost
entirely on procedural knowledge. Conceptual
knowledge helps users avoid phishing attacks more
robustly, due to the necessity to teach users to
identify phishing concepts in order to avoid evolving
threats on new platforms, such as social media. We
believe that by providing this type of education and
training for home computer users, it could make a
considerable contribution to enabling cyberspace to
be a more secure environment.
5. References
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