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The causes and prevention of serious crowd injuries and fatalities
at outdoor music festivals
Aldo Raineri
Abstract
Crowds occur frequently in modern society. A major sporting or entertainment event
can attract tens of thousands of avid fans. Usually, these large gatherings of people
occur without serious problems. Occasionally, however, the combination of
inadequate facilities and deficient crowd management results in injury and death.
Outdoor music festivals (OMFs) are increasingly common events on the summer
entertainment landscape for young people around the world. Attending these OMFs is
associated with an increased risk of injury and, in extreme cases, death. A
considerable proportion of these risks can be attributed to high-risk behaviour in the
general admission or standing room only areas in front of the stages, or ‘mosh pits’.
During the ten year period from 1992 to 2002, 66, 787 people have suffered
significant injury and 232 people have died at 306 outdoor music concerts around the
world. Fatality data over a longer period (1974 to 2003) indicates that at least 136
fatal incidents at concert events have not been scientifically explained. Forty one (41)
of these involved persons who died in front of a concert stage.
Crowd incidents show different types of group motivation. In some cases there is an
interruption of a simple traffic process such as exiting a stadium or a passenger
conveyor, resulting in a critical crowd pressure point. Others fall into the two general
behavioural categories of either a flight response or a craze. Flight occurs where
people experience either a real or perceived threat. Frequently mislabelled as panic,
a closer investigation usually shows that flight was a reasonable group reaction
under the perceived circumstances. A mass craze is a competitive rush to obtain some
highly valued objective. Such group behaviour is created where participation in an
event, or viewing of a public personage, is intensively promoted. General admission
events and so called “festival seating” concerts, in particular, cause competition for
favourable seats or standing positions close to entertainers.
October, 2005
1. Introduction
Crowds occur frequently in modern society. A major sporting or entertainment event
can attract tens of thousands of avid fans. Usually, these large gatherings of people
occur without serious problems. Occasionally, the combination of inadequate
facilities and deficient crowd management results in injury and death.
Outdoor music festivals (OMFs) are increasingly common events on the summer
entertainment landscape for young people around the world. Attending these OMFs is
associated with an increased risk of injury and, in extreme cases, death (Arbon, 2003).
While ingress and egress can cause major problems, a considerable proportion of
these risks are attributed to high-risk behaviour in the general admission or standing
room only areas in front of stages, or ‘mosh pits’ (Milsten, Seaman, Liu, Bissell and
Maguire, 2003). This high-risk behaviour is considered a form of free expression by
patrons (Ministry of Culture, 2000).
While the physical risks and hazards associated with staging an OMF are generally
attended to, little attention is paid to patron safety arising from the dynamics of the
crowd itself. As Upton (1999: 3-4) notes:
“A common practice is to appoint a safety officer or health and safety co-
ordinator to music events. They tend to look at trip hazards and steps and so
forth. But the crowd itself is a mystery to them. If a risk assessment on an
event is just based on the floor and the surrounding structures, then the most
important question of all has not been answered: Who is looking after the
crowd?”
Since human emotions are at play, understanding the variables that can influence the
psychology of a crowd (and the extremes of behaviour that can result) becomes
equally as important as understanding the laws of dynamics, a point made by Toft
(1996) in his critique of the limits to the mathematical modelling of disasters. This is
essentially because individuals create their own sets of criteria against which risk is
interpreted.
Sime (1993) has argued that insufficient attention to the way that people behave in a
crowd and the relationship between behaviour and systems design are major factors in
crowd disasters.
In their comparative study of crowd behaviour at two major music events, Kemp, Hill
and Upton (2004) conclude that:
“The wide range of articles, articles and reports into…[crowd] incidents
causing fatalities identify the behaviour of the crowd and the way in which
behaviour is managed as a fundamental factor which needs to be addressed in
any move to make events safer.”
2
2. The Magnitude of the Problem
Spectator injuries and deaths are nothing new to the concert experience. At the
Woodstock Festival in 1969, at the height of the non-violent protest movement in
1960s America, three concert-goers died, and 6000 patrons were treated for injury (De
Barros, 2000). In the same year, 850 injuries and 3 accidental deaths were reported
during the infamous Altamont Festival in northern California (DeBarros, 2000). The
British rock "n' roll band, the Rolling Stones, had helped organize the event and
allowed a member of the Hell's Angels motorcycle group1 to act as security
(DeBarros, 2000). During the festival, an over-zealous member of the Hell's Angels
security force stabbed a spectator to death (Kaltenbach, 2000).
Injuries and deaths of this sort were not reserved for major music festivals that drew
crowds in the hundreds of thousands. In 1952, during the infancy of the rock "n' roll
revolution, a local Cleveland disc jockey's rock "n' roll party erupted into a riot. One
man was stabbed and dozens more injured (DeBarros, 2000). In 1958, a Bill Haley
and the Comets show was stopped because of "pitched rioting." (Kleiner, 1999).
Tragedy again occurred in 1979 in Cincinnati at a concert for The Who. In an eerie
precursor to several recent tragedies, eleven people were crushed to death while trying
to enter the arena. Dozens more were injured as thousands of fans pushed through and
over each other to enter (Wertheimer, 2002). Based on this incident, Cincinnati would
later ban all shows that allowed general-admission or festival-style seating.2
The addition of rap and hip-hop to the mainstream music scene in the mid-1980s
(Mendoza, 1992) brought with it similar incidents.3
It is not un-common for several serious concert incidents to occur within a short
period of time. Consider, for example, the recent tragedies of 1999 that occurred
within one month's time. Sixty-one fans were injured severely enough to warrant
hospital trips during an all-day concert in Maryland. Weeks later, a sixteen-year-old in
Indiana collapsed in a crowd-crush incident and fell into a coma (De Baros, 2000).
Later that same month, during a Pearl Jam performance at the annual Roskilde
Festival in Denmark, nine young men were crushed to death in a similar incident
(Drachmann & Tranberg, 2001).
During the ten year period from 1992–2002, 66, 787 people have suffered significant
injury (see Chart 1) and 232 people have died (see Chart 2) at 306 outdoor music
concerts around the world (Crowdsafe, 2003).
1 Historically, the Hell's Angels motorcycle group has been associated with aggressive assaults,
narcotics trafficking, and violent feuding with other rival gangs. See, e.g., Border Police Turn Back
Bikers up to Weekend Hells Angels Party, Deutsche Presse-agentur, Aug. 25, 2000 (noting information
from European authorities on previous convictions of Hell's Angels members).
2 Cincinnati, Ohio, Code 865-29 (1979) (prohibiting festival and general-admission seating in
Cincinnati); see also Cincinnati, Ohio, Code 865-31 (1979) (clarifying the emergency on-the-scene
authority of the Safety Department to order precautionary measures); Cincinnati, Ohio, Code 865-33
(1980) (prohibiting sale of tickets beyond capacity levels).
3 For example, two women were crushed to death in 1987 during a Public Enemy concert while trying
to leave the arena after reports of gunfire: see DeBarros, 2000.
3
In addition, Upton (2004) has conducted empirical research at the international level
to gather data on accidents and incidents that occurred over the period 1974-2003 in
order to establish whether there were similarities between fatal incidents that occurred
at concert events held in different countries. He then undertook a review of enquiry
4
reports and published literature and discounted incidents involving fire or criminal
behaviour, on the grounds that the root cause of the fatality had been clearly
identified. This allowed attention to be focused on incidents where the root cause has
not been scientifically explained and an assumption had been made that irrational
crowd behaviour has caused an incident.
He found that at least 136 fatal incidents at concert events had not been scientifically
explained. Forty one (41) of these involved persons who died in front of a concert
stage (see Chart 3).
Chart 3: Fatal Incidents at Music Concerts
Date Place Killed Activity
1974 White City, UK 1 FOS crush
1979 Cincinnati, USA 11 Ingress crush
1986 Long Beach, USA 3 Fall from balcony
Seattle, USA 1 FOS crush
1987 Nashville, USA 2 Ingress crush
1988 Donington, UK 2 FOS crush
1991 Salt Lake City, USA 3 FOS crush
1992 Costa Rica 1 Ingress crush
South Korea 1 FOS crush
1993 Hong Kong 1 FOS crush
1994 New York, USA 1 Stage diving
1995 London, UK 1 Stage diving
1996 Columbia 3 Ingress crush
Ireland 2 FOS crush
South Korea 2 FOS crush
1997 Michigan, USA 1 Fall from balcony
Germany 1 FOS crush
Brazil 7 Fall from balcony
1999 Belarus 53 Egress crush at railway station
Austria 5 Egress crush
Sweden 1 FOS crush
2000 Baltimore, USA 1 Fall from balcony
2001 Indonesia 4 Egress crush
Belgium 1 Fall from balcony
Australia 1 FOS crush
2002 Venezuela 11 Ingress crush
2003 Brazil 3 Ingress crush
On analysis, Upton found that the 136 victims died in 29 separate incidents that
occurred in 20 different countries in the following manner:
•32 during ingress to a concert;
•29 in front of, or diving off, a stage during a performance;
5
•13 fell from balconies at arenas and stadiums;
•9 during egress form a concert venue; and
•53 during egress from a concert venue directly into a railway station.
Interestingly, the statistics indicate that crowd safety problems are not confined to the
front of stage during a performance and that the parameters of a concert risk
assessment need to consider ingress and egress and be extended to adjacent transport
facilities. Crowd flow and congestion problems associated with ingress and egress at
OMFs will not be dealt with in this paper.
The number of concert-goers seriously injured or killed at concerts in recent years has
increased drastically. Worldwide, concert injuries and deaths are at their highest
levels in a decade. In 1998, Crowd Management Strategies, n5 a concert-industry
watchdog, recorded 8 deaths and 5,711 injuries worldwide at concerts. n6 These
figures alarmingly rose to 70 deaths and 19,723 recorded injuries in 1999. n7 And
these statistics probably understate the problem because of the vast number of concert
injuries that go unreported and the inadequate measures used to gather concert-injury
information. n8Despite denial from the entertainment industry, n9 concerts have
undoubtedly become more dangerous in recent years. n10
3. The View from the Crowd
The physiological pressures within crowds at maximum density can be devastating.
When crowd density equals the plan area of the human body, individual control is lost
as one becomes an involuntary part of the mass. At occupancies of about 7 persons
per square metre a crowd becomes an almost fluid mass. Shock waves can be
propagated through the mass sufficient to lift people off their feet and propel them
distances of up to 3 metres or more.
Intense crowd pressures, exacerbated by anxiety, make it difficult to breathe. The heat
and thermal insulation of surrounding bodies cause some to be weakened and faint.
Access to those who fall is virtually impossible. Removal of those in distress can only
be accompanied by lifting them up and passing them overhead to the exterior of the
crowd.
Fruin (1992) has pointed out that virtually all crowd-related incident deaths are caused
by compressive asphyxia, not as a result of being trampled on by a panicking crowd,
as often reported by the media. There is no fixed point at which death occurs from
being subjected to an intolerable pressure load. A British Home Office report (1973),
for example, cited the death of a male when subjected to an estimated load of 1400 lbs
(over 6Kn) in 15 seconds and of another when subjected to an estimated load of 260
lbs (1.1Kn) for 4.5 minutes. Later experiments by Hopkins, Poutney Heyes and
Sheppard (1993) concluded that males and females were able to withstand pressure
loads in the region of 140-180lbs (approximately 800 Newtons).
Current medical opinion is that in conditions where the human body is subjected to a
higher static pressure load of approximately 300lbs (1.1Kn) on the chest cavity
beyond 2.5-3 minutes, the brain begins to starve of oxygen and permanent injury may
6
be caused. Beyond 3 minutes death may occur at any time (Kemp, Hill and Upton,
2004).
An intolerable pressure load can be caused in a number of ways at a concert. For
example, high crowd density or a lateral or dynamic surge can convert to a static load.
In these circumstances, it is common for those persons right in front of the barrier to
push backwards off the barrier in order to gain space to breath. This can then subject
persons further back from the barrier to a two-way horizontal load as persons at the
back press forward. Alternatively, a crowd collapse can occur as a result of a dynamic
or lateral surge, individuals fainting, ground conditions or cultural behaviour. If a
crowd collapse occurs, an intolerable vertical load is imposed on the person(s) at the
bottom of a pile of bodies very quickly. A crowd collapse can occur anywhere within
a crowd mass.
4. Studies to date
A number of studies have attempted to obtain a better understanding of the issues
faced by patrons at OMFs. These have included OMF patrons (Earl and van Der
Heide, 2001; Earl, 2004; Raineri and Earl, 2005), security personnel (Earl, Parker,
Tatrai and Capra, 2004; Earl 2004; Raineri and Earl, 2005) and volunteers (Earl,
Stoneham and Capra, 2003; Earl, Parker, Edwards and Capra, 2005).
Earl and van Der Heide (2001) conducted a study of university students attending an
OMF. The participants in this study were asked to identify their greatest concerns
associated with attending OMFs. The participants considered that being in the ‘mosh
pit’ was the most significant issue in terms of public health and safety.
Earl, Parker, Tatrai and Capra (2004) undertook a study of security personnel at
OMFs in order to gain a clearer understanding of the factors that influence crowd
behaviour at OMFs. This study identified that some of the differences between music
crowds and other crowds such as the larger crowd sizes, impacts from the music,
crowd demographics and security capacity, had a significant impact on safety
outcomes. Additionally, the participants from this study also considered the main
safety issues were intoxication, crowd crushes, crowd behavioural issues (eg: crowd
surfing) and over-crowding of venues. Finally, the influences of the music and the
performers were considered the most influential factors overall.
7
5. Influences on Crowd Behaviour
Irrational crowd behaviour at concert events arguably has its roots in the campaign by
press agent George Evans in the 1940s, who appears to have drawn on traditionalist
crowd theory to launch the career of Frank Sinatra. It has been alleged by some
researchers (Kureishi and Savage, 1995; Kelly, 1998) that Evans paid young women
to scream “Frankie” during the singer’s live radio performances, the objective being
to create a mass hypnosis by peer pressure. The degree of success achieved by this
marketing strategy can be seen from the research of Bliven (1944), who describes
how150 police officers failed to control 10,000 young women trying to get into a
Sinatra concert at the 3,500 capacity Paramount Theatre in New York in 1944.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the strategies used by Evans were widely copied,
most notably by Colonel Tom Parker to launch the career of Elvis Presley and Brian
Epstein for the Beatles. Both these campaigns focused on artiste image to create
hysteria among female fans. However, by the time Andrew Oldham launched the
Rolling Stones there had been a dramatic change in crowd behaviour, particularly on
the Stones 1965 tour, which became notorious for stage invasions and disorder by
predominantly male audiences (Anon, 1965).
5.1 Cultural Influence
Rock culture originated in the United States of America during the mid fifties and
from the outset it was promoted as an anti-establishment youth culture that
deliberately encouraged a demonstrative response from a crowd. At contemporary
concert events, crowd excitement levels can be maintained and even increased by the
clever use of lighting, sound, special effects and the actions of the performer(s) to a
point where a crowd mass can often appear to act irrationally.
Support for this argument is to be found in the actions of a youth culture that now
accepts risk-taking behaviour in the form of such activity as moshing,4 skanking,5
pogoing,6 crowd surfing, 7 stage diving8 and swirling9 as normal cultural behaviour
(Ambrose, 2001). The crowd accepts such activities as normal in spite of the fact that
each has the potential to cause a lateral or dynamic surge, crowd swirl, crowd collapse
or localised high density, all of which might possibly subject crowd members to a
dangerously high-pressure load.
4 This is the act of persons slamming into each other (sometimes referred to as slam dancing).
5 This is where crowd members dance around in a circle similar to a tribal dance, and can be a prelude
to moshing or crowd surfing.
6 This is the act of jumping up and down in the one place.
7 This is where individuals hoist themselves above head height of the crowd and then surf (or roll)
around supported by the crowd, normally towards the stage.
8 This is the act of a performer or crowd member diving from the stage into a crowd with the intention
that the crowd will support the diver above their heads and allow them to surf.
9 This is where crowd members run in a circular motion drawing more patrons in, thereby causing a
whirlpool effect.
8
5.2 Motivation
Crowd incidents show different types of group motivation which invariably fall into
the two general behavioural categories of either a flight response or a craze (Fruin,
1981). Flight occurs where people experience either a real or perceived threat.
Frequently mislabelled as panic, a closer investigation usually shows that flight was a
reasonable group reaction under the perceived circumstances. For example:
•In 1981, 45 persons died (27 of them children) in the Quitab Minar Tower,
New Delhi, India. The 800 year old tower is a popular tourist attraction and
museum. A blackout, combined with what some witnesses said were cries that
the tower was falling, triggered a sudden exodus of 300 to 400 people.
•In 1988 more than 100 persons died and 700 were injured at Nepal’s National
Stadium in Katmandu when a sudden violent hailstorm caused 30,000
spectators to flee the open grandstand but found that the exit gates were
locked.
•In 2003 in Chicago, the use of pepper spray to break up a fight in a nightclub
caused the crowd to surge down a stairwell, killing or injuring over 70 people
(CNN, 2003a).
•Additionally, in 2003, in a Rhode Island nightclub, a fire started by a
pyrotechnic display rapidly spread and overtook the crowd attempting to
escape through the clogged front exit, killing 97 people (CNN, 2003b).
These incidents often show mutual cooperation and assistance among individuals
within the group rather than destructive behaviour. For example, in 1943 during
World War II, 173 persons died of compressive asphyxia and 93 were injured in a
London Underground air raid shelter after a person fell on a lower level entry stair.
Excited by the sounds of bombing, people at the surface continued to press forward.
This resulted in a tangled mass of humanity on the stair that took rescuers some 3
hours to unravel (Dunne, 1943).
A mass craze is a competitive rush to obtain some highly valued objective. For
example:
•In Bangkok, Thailand, 19 persons died as a crowd of 3000 assembled to obtain
packages of free food. The crowd was attempting to pass through a gate
approximately 4 metres wide into a meeting hall where the food was being
distributed. A contingent of 30 police officers assigned to control the crowd
was overwhelmed by the crush.
•In 1986, 46 pilgrims died in Hardwar, India on a crowded bridge across the
Ganges River. At the 12 year cycle of the Khumb Mlea festival as many as 4
million Hindus gather to bathe in the Ganges.
•In 1990, 1426 people were killed in a crowd crush during the annual
pilgrimage of 2 million people at Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The crush occurred in
a 500 metre long tunnel joining Mecca and the tent city of Mina. Temperatures
9
at the time were 44 degrees C outside the air-conditioned tunnel. It is
speculated that someone fell in the tunnel, blocking movement.
Craze like group behaviour is created where participation in an event, or viewing of a
public personage, is intensively promoted. For example:
•Untold hundreds, and possibly even thousands, were killed in Moscow, Russia
during a massive procession of 3 million people viewing the body of Joseph
Stalin after his death in 1953. Army tanks and trucks used to control
movement of the crowd blocked side streets along the route to Stalin’s bier.
Police and military, some on horseback, beat people with clubs to further
control the crowd, even as people were fatally crushed against building walls,
the parked tanks and trucks. Horses were lifted off their feet by crowd surges
and also crushed to death (Pozner, 1990).
•During the 1980 world tour by the Pope, 13 people were killed in 2 African
cities in crowd rushes.
General admission events10 and so called “festival seating”11 concerts cause craze like
competition for favourable seats or standing positions close to entertainers. For
example:
•In 1979, 11 young music fans were asphyxiated in a crowd crush outside the
Cincinnati, Ohio Coliseum (Fuller, 1981). After 10,000 persons had entered
the venue, 8,000 were still waiting to enter the general admission event. Many
were waiting for hours. A warm-up band started playing and the fans outside
thought that the concert had begun. Only 2 doors were open for entry
(Wertheimer, 1980).
•In 1991, 3 rock music fans died of compressive asphyxia at a festival in Salt
Lake City, Utah. Fans standing in an open area in front of the concert stage
pressed forward, causing some to fall and others to be forced on top of seated
fans (Gross, 1991).
5.3 Communication
Psychologists have likened a crowd to a series of intermeshing behavioural cells.
Each cell is comprised of a small group of surrounding people with limited
communication between them. Cell members do not have a broad view of what is
occurring in the crowd. A dominant cell member may influence the collective
behaviour of the cell. Chains of cell to cell communication can occur, often with the
spread of rumours and incorrect information, potentially inciting inappropriate and
dangerous behaviour.
Most crowd incidents exhibit a lack of “front to back” communication. People in the
rear of the crowd press forward while those in front experience severe distress. This is
10 These are events for which tickets do not entitle holders to specific, or reserved, seating.
11 This term refers to standing room only environments.
10
due, in part, to the flow process itself. The lighter densities in the rear allow freer
movement while those in front are immobile and under great pressure. The collapsing
of front ranks gives a false perception of forward movement. Security personnel often
attempt local control of a crowd from the front, urging people not to push. However,
this type of control is largely ineffective during a serious crowd incident in progress.
11
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