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From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship: the transformation of the spaza sector in Delft, Cape Town

Authors:
  • Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation
  • Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation

Abstract and Figures

Small, home-based grocery stores, known as spaza shops, are ubiquitous throughout the township areas of urban South Africa, constituting an important business in the informal economy. In recent years, this retail market has become a site of fierce competition between South African shopkeepers and foreign entrepreneurs, especially Somalis, and is often cited in the media as one reason behind the xenophobic attacks on foreigners. Drawing on original data collected in the Delft township in the city of Cape Town, this paper demonstrates that foreign entrepreneurs, overwhelmingly Somalis, have come to own around half of the sizeable spaza market in Delft in the last five years. This increase is attributable to larger scale and price competitive behaviour as these entrepreneurs operate collectively in terms of buying shops, and stock, as well as in stock distribution. Also important are some more customer friendly services too. Compared to the more 'survivalist' local business model where individual owners look to supplement existing household income rather than generate an entire livelihood, the Somali business model has rapidly outcompeted local owners, bringing spaza prices down and forcing many locals to rent out their shop space to foreign shopkeepers. Consequently, while South African shopkeepers resent the Somali influx, most consumers appreciate the better prices and improved service. The rise of Somali shopkeepers thus represents a transformation of business practice in the spaza sector from survivalist to entrepreneurial modes. [End Page 47]
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TRANSFORMATION 78 (2012) ISSN 0258-7696 47
Article
From local survivalism to foreign entre-
preneurship: the transformation of the spaza
sector in Delft, Cape Town1
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
andrew.charman@livelihoods.org.za,leif.petersen@livelihoods.org.za,
lpiper@uwc.ac.za
Abstract
Small, home-based grocery stores, known as spaza shops, are ubiquitous throughout
the township areas of urban South Africa, constituting an important business in the
informal economy. In recent years, this retail market has become a site of fierce
competition between South African shopkeepers and foreign entrepreneurs,
especially Somalis, and is often cited in the media as one reason behind the
xenophobic attacks on foreigners. Drawing on original data collected in the Delft
township in the city of Cape Town, this paper demonstrates that foreign
entrepreneurs, overwhelmingly Somalis, have come to own around half of the
sizeable spaza market in Delft in the last five years. This increase is attributable to
larger scale and price competitive behaviour as these entrepreneurs operate collectively
in terms of buying shops, and stock, as well as in stock distribution. Also important
are some more customer friendly services too. Compared to the more JsurvivalistK
local business model where individual owners look to supplement existing household
income rather than generate an entire livelihood, the Somali business model has
rapidly outcompeted local owners, bringing spaza prices down and forcing many
locals to rent out their shop space to foreign shopkeepers. Consequently, while
South African shopkeepers resent the Somali influx, most consumers appreciate the
better prices and improved service. The rise of Somali shopkeepers thus represents
a transformation of business practice in the spaza sector from survivalist to
entrepreneurial modes.
48
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
Introduction
Spaza shops are often cited as examples of micro-entrepreneurial endeavour
and success within the informal economy of South African townships. The
term <spaza= is taken from the isiZulu language, meaning <hidden= (Bear et
al 2005), and emerged in the apartheid era when business opportunities for
black entrepreneurs were restricted. These micro-convenience stores traded
in a clandestine manner to provide township residents with local access to
everyday goods otherwise only available at distant supermarkets. Over time
the scale of the spaza shop market has grown steadily (Marketing Mix 1995),
in part due to the greater levels of disposable income in the hands of
historically poor communities (Van der Berg and Louw 2003:7). While there
is no precise data on the current size of South Africa=s spaza market, a
detailed investigation in 2002 estimated that spaza shops account for 2.7%
of total retail trade, equivalent to approximately R8 billion in value (Ligthelm
2005:202). More recently, SPAZA News (2011) estimates that there are more
than 100,000 spaza enterprises with a collective turnover of R7 billion.
Since about 2005, a growing class of entrepreneur retailer has emerged as
a major economic player within spaza markets. These entrepreneurs,
characterised by <opportunity-motivated= individuals (as described in
Ligthelm 2005:204; see also Charman and Petersen 2010), have steadily
outcompeted many survivalist businesses (estimated to be 75% of all
enterprises by Ligthelm 2005:204). The majority of these retailers are
immigrants, and the ensuing consequences of their rising dominance has a
distinct national or ethnic character, pitting South African shopkeepers
against immigrants from countries including Somalia, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This is cited as a source of
tension between South Africans and foreigners, especially Somalis. Thus in
the xenophobic attacks of 2008, a considerable number of foreign operated
spaza shops were looted and burned down. Aside from this event, foreigner
storekeepers, in particularly the Somali community, continue to report
attacks on their possessions and persons (Charman and Piper 2011). The
advent of foreign storekeepers is thus widely associated with social conflict
as well as a changing business environment, and therefore any research of
this sector ought to cast light on these issues too.
This paper provides a street level insight into the competition between
local and foreigner retailers in one case study. The study is set in Delft South
and a portion of Eindhoven (hereafter Delft), a relatively poor township on
the outskirts of the City of Cape Town (see Figure 1). The objective of the
49
From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship
research was to investigate the extent to which immigrant entrepreneurs
have entered the spaza market and the strategies they have utilised to
capture market share, as well as popular attitudes towards these dynamics.
To this end the paper begins by situating the topic within the literature on
the informal economy. We then outline the methodology, before specifying
the key findings and the emergent analysis.
In brief we discover a story of the relatively rapid capture of the spaza
retail market by larger-scale, collective businesses run by Somalis. Further,
these immigrants employ entrepreneurial business practices, especially
price competition, to outcompete and in many cases, take over, South
African shops typically run on more individual and <survivalist= lines.
Importantly, the latter includes the local practice of competing on location
rather than price, reducing profit margins but also retaining market entry
opportunities for nearly anyone looking to supplement income. The advent
of a price-competitive business model has upped rates of profit and reduced
prices but simultaneously reduced market access options. In terms of
popular attitudes towards this change, our research revealed that while
South African shopkeepers resent the Somali advent, most consumers
appreciate the better prices and improved services.
The informal economy and spaza shops
The informal economy refers to the existence and activities of informal
businesses (and their employees) outside the legal and institutional regulatory
framework. The concept refers to enterprises and workers that are unregistered
and unincorporated (Statistics South Africa 2010). In its broadest
interpretation the informal economy encompasses illegal activities such as
crime and tax avoidance and activities that, apart from the non-compliance
with specific national and local laws, are otherwise legal such as street
trading (see Ligthelm 2008). It includes all activities for which income is
unreported for taxation. In this article we refer specifically to that component
of the informal economy situated spatially within poor communities, where
small-scale, unregistered and usually family-based firms with less than five
employees predominate. These enterprises fall within the definition of
micro-enterprises, as set out in the Small Business Act (1996 and 2004); that
is, an enterprise with less than five full time employees, a turnover below
R0.2million and total gross assets valued at less than R0.1 million. Scholars
argue that informality should be conceptualised in terms of gradients of
formalisation, rather than absolutes (Maloney 2004:1168). This is particularly
50
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
evident in the spaza market as these micro-enterprises sometimes abide with
particular regulatory requirements (such as registering as businesses) and
ignore others such as zoning requirements.
The current state of knowledge of the informal economy still requires
much development, given that existing theoretical frameworks do not
adequately explain the internal dynamics of micro-enterprises in the informal
economy. It is not necessarily correct to see the informal economy as sphere
of marginalisation, although Meagher (2005: 268) argues that, in Africa, the
informal sector is mostly populated by the poor and marginalised, and that
genuine entrepreneurs are a small minority. Studies have found that there is
a rationale, on the basis of an implicit cost-benefit analysis, for micro-
entrepreneurs and informal workers to position themselves in the informal
economy (see Becker 2004, Charman and Petersen 2010, Devey et al 2006,
Petersen and Charman 2008). Thus no generalisation can be made on whether
the terms of employment in informal businesses are inferior to the formal
labour market or whether the failure of micro-enterprises to expand indicates
that they are trapped in a low growth cycle. Through the increasing
availability of qualitative studies, the field of knowledge now recognises the
rules of doing business in the informal economy do not (necessarily) mirror
those of formal businesses. For example, working capital is typically raised
from family and friends, where surety rests on the strength of social relations
and repayment terms are flexible. Doing business through social networks
and family makes sense, as Maloney (2004:1168) points out, because it
enables the <micro entrepreneur to enforce implicit contracts, insure against
risks=, whereas <participating in the formal institutions of civil society is
needlessly expensive=.
The informal economy in developing countries such as South Africa
provides an entry point for persons otherwise excluded from the formal
labour market due to a lack of education and skills to pursue business
opportunities or gain employment. There is a great diversity of economic
activities and forms of employment in informal micro-enterprises (see Valodia
et al 2007). The majority of these entrants, however, either engage in trade,
often starting off through selling goods on the street or by working for others
doing the same, or provide personal services such as hair care or child
minding. It is thought that about 50% of the economic activity of the poor
in the South African informal economy involves trade (Ligthelm 2008:373).
The considerable demand for goods and services within poor communities,
especially where formal businesses are largely absent, provides an
51
From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship
opportunity for the emergence of micro-enterprises that are modelled on
formal businesses, but operate informally. It is in this context that spaza
shops conduct their business.
The great majority of spaza shops operate informally without a license to
trade (Chebelyon-Dalizu et al 2010). A number of studies have investigated
the enterprise characteristics of spaza shops (Cant and van Scheers 2007,
Chebelyon-Dalizu et al 2010, Ligthelm 2005, Perry 1989). Their success was
based on three factors: first, the role of the extended family in providing start-
up capital and labour; second, the business location, physically operating
from rooms of residential households and spatially situated close to people=s
homes; and, third, the informal rules that permitted each spaza a small share
of the market on roughly equal terms. The research also emphasises the
importance of the social ties between the micro-entrepreneur and his/her
neighbours and the broader community, which determines the terms on
which lines of credit are extended (Ligthelm 2005:205). At the same time credit
is also recognised as a potential cause of business failure.
Whilst the spaza market offers potential opportunity for success, many
new entrants fail. Although no accurate data on the survival of spaza
business is available, it is thought that up to 50% of new entrants are unable
to sustain their businesses for longer than five years, though those that do
survive have great longevity. The Ligthelm (2005:205) study reports that an
impressive 40% of spazas in the urban context had been in operation for
longer than five years. It is significant that existing spaza shop micro-
entrepreneurs were willing, until the arrival of immigrant shopkeepers, to
permit a continuous stream of new entrants into the market. Before this time,
spaza shops rose and fell, but accounts of foreigner competition and/or
violent entrepreneurship from competitors were rare.
There is anecdotal evidence, confirmed during our research, that the
historically low barriers to entry in the spaza market was attributable to some
form of collusion in price setting, a practice widely evident among street
traders (Charman and Petersen 2007). In this regard, Charman and Petersen
have shown that the use of price competition is considered unfair and
unethical. Instead street traders compete through non-price mechanisms,
including their spatial location, product presentation, customer engagement,
the bonds of clan and kinship, and by seeking supernatural support (Charman
and Petersen 2007, Petersen and Charman 2008). Price competition is strongly
discouraged among these informal micro-entrepreneurs because <fixed=
prices help to ensure that market entry barriers remain low, thus keeping the
52
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
market open for others who equally need a means of survival. This informal
<rule= of doing business enables street traders to sustain their micro-
enterprises for many years, for under fixed prices, they have an equal
opportunity to sell their goods or services even though growth prospects
are limited for all.
This outlook underpins the <survivalist= practice identified in much of the
research on the South African informal economy. Ligthelm (2008) proposes,
for example, that less than 15% of all micro-entrepreneurs have the necessary
skills and business acumen to expand and develop their business. Unlike
classical opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, the strategy of the survivalist
micro-entrepreneur is to derive an income as a means of employment, often
until such time as a better paying job becomes available, though not
necessarily to expand the business if growth requires the elimination of
competition.
These insights help inform the key finding of this study, namely that the
conflict between local and foreigner spaza retailers is less about identity
politics than it is about fundamentally differing approaches towards business.
Most local spaza micro-enterprises, we propose, had not historically engaged
in price competition but rather operated on the basis of their location and
relationships with clients. Foreigner entrepreneurs, in contrast, are known
to use price competition and bulk procurement strategies to aggressively
compete with local spaza shops through undercutting their price (Knowledge
Link Services 2009: 39-40), a practice confirmed by this study.
Methodology
The study looked to explore the scale, nature, and perception of the spaza
sector in one study site. It is fundamentally a case study driven approach,
although extensive use of both quantitative and qualitative methods is
made. In terms of sites, the research was confined to the residential area and
high street of Delft that fringes the City of Cape Town. The case study site
was chosen because of the known penetration of foreigner shopkeepers into
the market and, as a consequence, of the history of tensions between
immigrants and South African residents in the area (see Charman and Piper
2011). The case study site comprises a racially diverse community, made up
of <coloured= and <black African= (predominantly Xhosa) people, whose
heterogeneity is reinforced through the diversity of religions (Christian,
Islam, traditional) and cultural belief systems.
53
From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Micro-Enterprises, Delft South / Eindhoven
The township of Delft was established as a new housing development in the
54
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
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56
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Spaza Shops, Delft South / Eindhoven
gauge local shopkeeper views on the historic practices and recent changes in
57
From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship
gauge local shopkeeper views on the historic practices and recent changes
in the Delft spaza market, the researchers facilitated a focus group discussion
with eight South African spaza shop owners.
Findings
The findings emerge in the order identified in the research methodology
section starting with the number, ownership, and spatial distribution of
spazas; price competitiveness and other businesses; and South African
responses, including popular attitudes. The key findings include, first, the
remarkable scale of the informal economy in Delft, and especially the
comparative size of the spaza market; second, the substantial portion of
foreign ownership, and its recent arrival into the market; third, the importance
of price competitiveness to this success, but also other business practices
and, fourth, the inability of South African spaza shops to match the
competitive challenge with customers choosing foreigner-run shops.
The scale of the informal economy of Delft
The scale of the informal economy in Delft is much larger than officially
thought. The City of Cape Town, for example, identified 123 businesses
within Delft South in a recent strategic planning survey. Our research
identified 818 registered and unregistered micro-enterprises, whose spatial
distribution is presented in Figure 1. The various categories of micro-
enterprises identified are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Identified Micro-Enterprises, Delft 2011
Enterprise Category No Enterprise Category No Enterprise Category No
Agriculture 6 Game Shops 32 Seven Eleven 2
Building Services 22 Green Grocer 21 Shebeen 83
Business Services 12 House Shop 124 Soup Kitchen 8
Butchery 7 Manufacture 36 Spaza 179
Car Wash 6 Mechanical /
Electrical Services
58 Take-Aways 31
Drug Dealers 6 Personal Services 73 Tavern 18
Educare/ Crèche 32 Phone Shop 10 Trade (general) 25
Fire wood 4 Recycling 16 Transport 2
Food Retail 14 Restaurant 5 Wholesaler 3
58
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
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Figure 4: Transect, Household Survey
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63
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Figure 6: Comparative Aggregate Prices (ZAR)
64
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
Figure 7: Price Variation (in ZAR), Standard Deviation of Mean
65
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66
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
Figure 8: F1#2&$&*4-$/,$6*+1"$7)%/(',$&.'@'$PR$*)$&1*%#&Q$("#'.#%$1"',
1"#$'0#%'3#$.%/(#$/,$6*2'4/$&.'@'&
Large businesses versus small
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milk
eggs
½ loaf
loaf
250g
sugar
500g
sugar
1kg
sugar
340ml
coke
450ml
coke
1.5L
coke
Jive
Premium
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67
From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship
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68
Andrew Charman, Leif Petersen and Laurence Piper
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South African responses
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69
From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship
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70
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71
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@#9*-699&56"5:6D&6956+*,::?&()"7&!"7,:*,<&M#)$%6)7")6D&,-;&7"9$&*75")$,-$:?D
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72
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c'.#$',-$%#&#'%("$&+..*%1$)%*2$1"#$6+&1'/,'94#$d/0#4/"**-&$>*+,-'1/*,$P6d>Q8
References
K#'%:$[:$N$K%'-,+2:$6$!4'-/$',-$T$N#-%*$P^DDIQ$Making Retail Markets Work for
the Poor 3 why and how triple trust organisation decided to intervene in the Spaza
market in South Africa.$L'&"/,31*,:$T8c8E$!"#$6SSN$e#15*%;8
K#(;#%:$h>$P^DDCQ$`!"#$/,)*%2'4$#(*,*2<O8$61*(;"*42E$\Wg]!$c*,&+41/,3$7K
)*%$1"#$T#.'%12#,1$)*%$F,)%'&1%+(1+%#$',-$S(*,*2/($c*=*.#%'1/*,$P6FT7Q8
c',1:$[$',-$d$0',$6("##%&$P^DD?Q$`7,'4<&/,3$1"#$/,)4+#,(#$*)$1"#$&.'@'$&"*.$*,
1"#$('&"$',-$('%%<$5"*4#&'4#%$/,$1"#$6*+1"$7)%/(',$-/&1%/9+1/*,$("',,#4O8$!*;<*E
N%*(##-/,3&$*)$1"#$F,1#%,'1/*,'4$K+&/,#&&$7('-#2/(&$c*,&*%1/+2$c*,)#%#,(#:
!*;<*8
c#,&+&N4+&$^DD?8$Community Survey 2007 Database8$
5558&1'1&&'83*08@'. Accessed
12 March 2009.
c"'%2',:$7$',-$d$ N#1#%&#,$P^DD?Q$Informal Economy Study: trade component.
Micro economic development strategy8$c'.#$!*5,E$N%*0/,(/'4$g*0#%,2#,1$*)
L#&1#%,$c'.#8
c"'%2',:$7$',-$d$N#1#%&#,$P^DBDQ$`7,$/,0#&1/3'1/*,$*)$("'%'(1#%/&1/(&$-/&1/,3+/&"/,3
i#,1%#.%#,#+%&j$)%*2$1"#$i&#4)=#2.4*<#-j$/,$6*+1"$7)%/(',O&$/,)*%2'4$#(*,*2<O8
k*"',,#&9+%3E$ ],.+94/&"#-$ N'.#%$ .%#&#,1#-$ '1$ 1"#$ LF!6$ c*,)#%#,(#$ *,
S,1%#.%#,#+%&"/.8
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%#'&&#&&2#,1$*)$1"#$2*9/4/&'1/*,$*)$A#,*."*9/($0/*4#,(#$/,$1"#$('&#$*)$&.'@'
&"*.&$/,$ T#4)1$ 6*+1":$ c'.#$ !*5,:$6*+1"$7)%/('O8$c'.#$!*5,E$ ],.+94/&"#-
.'.#%$ .%#&#,1'1/*,$ 1*$ T#.'%12#,1$ *)$ N*4/1/('4$ 61+-/#&:$ ],/0#%&/1<$ *)$ 1"#
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73
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... Food vendors that sell the same products will organise for all their produce to be delivered in bulk, reducing costs for everyone. From the outside the whole system seems like it's unorganized and chaotic but the reality is that to be able to be competitive in the formal industry means that you need to more organized than your competitors (Charman, Petersen, & Piper, 2012). Secondly, the notion that the informal sector is not regulated also does not stand up to scrutiny, there is an assumption here that because it isn't regulated by the government it must be unregulated and therefore unsafe. ...
... Many residents in Delft rent out their homes to foreigners who then proceed to run a tuckshop from the premises. (Charman, Petersen, & Piper, 2012), the majority of tuckshops within Delft are foreign owned as well, with Somalian tuckshop owners making up the biggest share. Somalian tuckshop owners have managed to capture and outcompete almost all local tuckshop owners in the area because they are well organized, tending to work together instead of individualistically such as local tuckshop owners tend to do (Charman, Petersen, & Piper, 2012). ...
... (Charman, Petersen, & Piper, 2012), the majority of tuckshops within Delft are foreign owned as well, with Somalian tuckshop owners making up the biggest share. Somalian tuckshop owners have managed to capture and outcompete almost all local tuckshop owners in the area because they are well organized, tending to work together instead of individualistically such as local tuckshop owners tend to do (Charman, Petersen, & Piper, 2012). They also have access to a logistics network which sources and delivers food to the area, further reducing costs for individual tuckshop owners. ...
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Food security is a complicated phenomenon that consists of the intersections of food and people and the cultures people create around food. In general, food security research is concerned with how people access food, how reliable that access is, how affordable that food is and how culturally appropriate that food is. This analysis tends to ignore the complex relationships people have with food and who these people are. Through the mapping of the Delft food system by remote sensing, surveys and interviews I create a food atlas that consists of maps of the spatiality of food but also maps of feelings, anxieties, fears and resilience, all centred around the people of Delft. The results and discussions of this thesis shows that food security is far more complicated than initially thought and that there are multiple avenues of inquiry into the lives of people who are considered food insecure. My research shows that the people of Delft are food insecure but that this label cannot be applied too liberally as food insecurity has different meanings for various residents and it manifests in various ways. I explore this through the creation of three women who represent three different classes of women who live within Delft. ii
... Most foreign investors lack community security in this aspect. According to Charman et al. (2012), this, therefore, exposes foreign investors to abuse, criminality, and extortion by people and community leaders. ...
... Investors from other nations were forced to rely almost entirely on the recognized institutions of justice because of a lack of confidence and faith in the law enforcement authorities, such as the police and courts, especially due to cultural and linguistic problems. According to Charman et al. (2012), the police and prosecutor's decisions were unfavorable to international investors. Worse still, victims of crime who were foreign investors found it impossible to interact with law enforcement throughout court proceedings due to the drawn-out legal system and communication issues. ...
... Worse still, victims of crime who were foreign investors found it impossible to interact with law enforcement throughout court proceedings due to the drawn-out legal system and communication issues. Charman et al. (2012), the most frequent types of violence committed during xenophobic assaults fall under the following categories: murder, attempted murder, robbery, theft, and assault. ...
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Xenophobia is not a recent theme in historical studies. However, the attempts penned by academics to analyze the phenomenon are sparsely centered on the economic aspect of the assault. In this way, the study fills a historical gap accentuated by extant literature on the subject. Using primary sources in corroboration with secondary sources of data, the study attempts a description of the South African economy and the migrations and roles of different races to South Africa to enhance comprehension. It posits that competition for limited resources between the natives and immigrants from other countries results in xenophobic violence. It is said that xenophobic incidents in South Africa have negatively affected the country’s trade ties with the impacted nations. In actuality, it has diminished the communities and the victims’ economic power. The eradication of xenophobic assaults in the region under study is finally predicted. The article concludes that xenophobia has damaged South Africa’s reputation in international forums.
... Consequently, the South African government's commitment and increased SMME support heightened over the years (South Africa Department of Trade and Industry (SA DTI), 2013; SA Economic Development Department, 2014; South African Government, 2021), however, enterprise performance in the country over the last ten years is not in tandem with expected success threshold (OECD, 2020). Compared with a global average of 20%, an average of 70% SMME failure rate is being recorded in the country (Masama, 2018;Fatoki, 2021Madzimure & Tau, 2021, with assumptions that South African black-owned SMMEs leads on the list (Charman et al., 2012;Nkondo, 2017). Preliminary findings obtained earlier point to entrepreneurial orientation and business patterns (Nkondo, 2017), the nature and typology of support initiatives (Fatoki & Chindoga, 2011;Netshandama et al., 2021), limited entrepreneurship research conducted to crystalise critical entrepreneurial ecosystems, as well as cash flow and access to formal credit (Masama, 2018;Madzimure & Tau, 2021). ...
... This is also essential in bridging market-related challenges that are already pervasive in the study area -key stakeholders and allies have the potential to link partners to resourceful market channels. For instance, a cross-examination of enterprise performance in South Africa reveals that Asian-owned enterprises perform better and, in most cases, outsmart the locals, resulting from the ability of the entrepreneurs to network and form collaborative partnerships, among other traits (Charman et al., 2012;Dludla, 2014;Iwara, 2020). Asian entrepreneurs connect easily with one another within and outside business lines and form a strong alliance through which they jointly fund their businesses, purchase goods in bulk at a discounted rate, and market their products using their established networks. ...
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This paper investigates constructs fundamental to enterprise efficacy in Limpopo Province. Following the purposive sampling technique, 724 entrepreneurs operating Small, Micro, and Medium-scale enterprises (SMMEs) in selected rural areas of the province were sampled. Data collection was performed one-on-one using a structured questionnaire whose constructs were derived from an existing entrepreneurship prototype in Vhembe District. The analysis modelled on Multilayer Perceptron through IBM SPSS v27 suggests endogenous entrepreneurial capacity building in bridging networks, resilience, risk awareness, self-efficacy, and nonconformist factors. These were perceived as being lacking amongst the entrepreneurs and critical to enterprise efficacy in the area. Although exogenous construct tends to be less critical compared to endogenous, it poses a challenge to local enterprises. The factors include access to the market, enterprise financing, stiff competition, operational costs, lack of physical capacity, and sociocultural issues. Local infrastructure concerns and entrepreneurial capacity building need solutions at a local level to facilitate targeted support on the two identified constructs affecting SMMEs’ efficacy in rural areas. The study's emphasis on local-level solutions for addressing infrastructure concerns and enhancing entrepreneurial capacity building adds practical value. By highlighting the need for targeted support at the local level, it provides actionable insights for policymakers, local authorities, and organizations aiming to foster SMME efficacy in rural areas.
... The township economy is a crucial part of South Africa's economic landscape, driven by informal enterprises that provide goods, services, and employment in marginalised communities (Mahajan, 2014). Spaza shops and small-scale retail outlets play a key role in enhancing local economic development, fostering entrepreneurship, and promoting community interdependence (Ligthelm, 2005(Ligthelm, , 2012Charman, Petersen & Piper, 2012). Despite their importance, these shops face challenges such as resource constraints, competition from larger retailers, and shifts in operator demographics, often dominated by foreign nationals, raising debates about inclusivity (Tengeh, 2012). ...
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This article explores the crucial role played by spaza shops, colloquially referred to as "tuck shops" or "convenience stores", in shaping the socioeconomic landscape of South African communities. These locally owned establishments are deeply interwoven into the fabric of neighbourhoods, serving as indispensable hubs for communities to access daily necessities, and fostering community interaction. The article adopts a cross-sectional case study design, employing a survey through a self-administered questionnaire to collect quantitative data. This research design allows for data collection at a single point in time, providing a snapshot of the current state of spaza shops across different provinces in South Africa. Most participants (66%) were aged 36-45; 58% of respondents were female and 41% male. Most purchases at spaza shops focus on snacks (51%), followed by groceries (16%), and a smaller proportion (8%) on buying household items. Approximately 91% of participants viewed spaza shops as vital for job creation, while 8% disagreed. Foreign nationals dominated spaza shop operators, with Somalians comprising 58%, Ethiopians 25% and South Africans and other nationalities each accounting for 8%. Focusing on local entrepreneurship through training, funding, and support for aspiring company owners would boost spaza out-lets' socioeconomic effect in South African communities. Fostering inclusive practices between local and foreign shop operators could help build cooperative networks that strengthen community cohesion and economic growth. Furthermore, enhancing policy frameworks to encourage sustainable job creation and economic collaboration would ensure that these small enterprises continue to serve as vital drivers of local development and employment opportunities.
... Service quality in township establishments is more than just efficient service delivery; it reflects the socio-economic realities and cultural diversity of these areas, with implications for economic empowerment, community development, and social cohesion (Mncube et al., 2023;Mtati, 2023). Understanding customer perceptions of service quality in these settings requires a nuanced approach that considers the unique characteristics of township economies and the varied needs of their residents (Charman et al., 2012;Rogerson & Rogerson, 2017;Scheba & Turok, 2020). Effective management of service quality in township pubs involves mastering concepts integral to quality differentiation strategies and ensuring precise definitions of quality constructs (Getty & Thompson, 1994). ...
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This study explores customers' perceptions of service quality at a selected pub restaurant in Mamelodi, prompted by concerns over its relative underperformance compared to local competitors. Using a quantitative and descriptive approach, data was collected through self-administered questionnaires, employing the SERVPERF model for a detailed analysis. The results reveal several strengths, including convenient operating hours, modern equipment, and appealing physical facilities. However, it also identifies critical areas for improvement, particularly in staff attire and the design of menus and pamphlets. A significant finding is the strong association between customers' educational levels and their perceptions of tangibility and responsiveness in service quality, highlighting the influence of socio-demographic factors. The study's implications are central to enhancing service quality, with a key recommendation to establish a prescribed uniform policy to improve staff presentation. This recommendation is vital not only for enhancing the establishment's aesthetic appeal but also for reinforcing a professional image, which could lead to increased customer satisfaction. By focusing on these targeted improvements, the study provides valuable insights into optimising service delivery that is aligned with customer expectations and demographic profiles, offering a blueprint for operational excellence in the hospitality sector.
... The addition of a situational component has distinct value in the study of the consumer behaviour of the BoP, due to their vulnerability and resource constraints (Charman et al., 2012;Duvenage et al., 2010;Jacobs & Smit, 2010;Simpson & Lappeman, 2017). BoP consumers are more vulnerable to income shocks and higher inflation than are the middle and upper classes (Jacobs & Smit, 2010 (Ajzen, 1991) and the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989). ...
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This paper proposes a new household decision‐making model for base of pyramid (BoP) consumers. Many decision‐making models focus on general consumer behaviour theory, with few focusing on the resource constraints experienced at the BoP. By focusing on the dynamics of household decisions, the data collected bring a unique perspective to BoP consumer behaviour and extend recent work in the BoP domain. The study comprised qualitative interviews with 61 household representatives (representing 233 household members) to explore decision‐making, loyalty, budgeting, shopping and category trade‐offs. The study proposes a household‐focused decision‐making framework, which is far more characteristic of BoP consumer behaviour (as opposed to isolated individual decisions). The proposed framework reveals the impact of situations and financial constraints on BoP household decision‐making and how most households operate in both the formal and informal economy. Family obligation was observed to be a key factor, as well as how functional illiteracy drives brand loyalty but also creates embarrassment. Word of mouth trumps all other sources of information and, due to household complexities, there is significant decision‐maker ambiguity, making it hard to define a target audience with a communication strategy. Brands are important, but fundamental value is still key and there is inexorable monthly variation in finances, making category trade‐offs commonplace.
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Current research suggests that effective and favourable policies in host countries are an important driver of migrant entrepreneurial activities. However, there is a dearth of knowledge about how migrants enact entrepreneurship in host countries where formal migrant entrepreneurship support is lacking. In this regard, we explore how migrant entrepreneurs navigate the lack of institutional support in host countries, with specific emphasis on the coping strategies they use. Leveraging the new institutional economics perspective and building on interviews with migrant entrepreneurs in Ghana, we unpack three phenomena that underlie the conceptualisation of weak institutional support (i.e. policy voids, nationalistic policy support, and anti-immigration sentiment) two main sources of migrant entrepreneurial apprehension (social risk and political risk) and four coping strategies for addressing apprehension (localisation, political connections, social ties and spiritualism). Our findings make important contributions to the migrant entrepreneurship literature and generate valuable implications for policy and practice.
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Necessity entrepreneurship is often highly intertwined with contexts of poverty and the informal economy. Extant literature on necessity entrepreneurship and the informal economy focuses on the role of individuals (i.e., the necessity entrepreneurs). We provide a complementary community-based perspective by scrutinizing ethnicity as a source of variation within a geographic community. Leveraging the ethnic enclave construct from sociology and using geospatial data of necessity enterprises from the Delft township in Cape Town, South Africa, we demonstrate that a) foreign entrepreneurs differ in behavior from domestic entrepreneurs and b) that foreign entrepreneur behavior further varies depending on whether they are inside or outside their ethnic enclave. We theorize on the tradeoffs that foreigners face when deciding whether to operate in an enclave – on the one hand, enclaves reduce rigidity to transact (i.e., provide more flexibility), but on the other hand, the enclave brings scrutiny from the government and wary domestic entrepreneurs. Our study provides new insights and a compelling direction for future research to unpack significant variation at the intersection of community and necessity entrepreneurship.
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In South Africa, in many economic sectors, foreign blacks are more likely to get a job than a similarly skilled black South African. This paper is about why employers prefer foreign African labour in South Africa, how this contributes to seeing South African black workers as inferior and how job hoarding networks in employment niches have emerged. We examine this in the context of literature on ‘xenophobia’. Both discursive and material practices of racist-ethnicist employers are significant. In a new hierarchy of fictive labour imaginaries which reflects a new labour ‘frontier’ in a diversified post-apartheid southern African pool. The new frontier reflects neoliberal flexible labour systems which also operate within a human rights free-market framework.
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The present paper maintains that initiatives to promote and support small businesses need to focus on those with growth potential rather than on the small business sector as a whole, and that the human factor, especially entrepreneurial intentions and behaviour, is the overwhelming force in small business success. Empirical evidence shows that many entrepreneurs setting up businesses in the informal economy of South Africa have little business acumen. The majority of informal businesses operate as survivalist entities with limited development and growth potential. The paper suggests that only between 10 and 15 per cent of informal entrepreneurs have sufficient business skills to expand and develop their businesses. These should be the focus of policy initiatives. Separate collective support measures should be designed to make the business environment more hospitable to low-potential informal businesses.
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The informal trade sector constitutes an important part of the South African economy, with estimated sales of R32 billion in 2002. Its emergence is largely attributed to the divergence between the growth in population, especially the urban population, and employment growth in the formal economy. Growth of informal enterprises, especially in the retail sector, is also thriving on the demand of less affluent households, whose household needs for unsophisticated and affordable products are aptly supplied by the informal sector. The aim of this article is to focus on one of the prominent sub-sectors of informal retailing, namely spaza or tuck shops, defined as small retail businesses which operate from a residential stand or home. Particular attention is paid to the size, role and characteristics of spaza trade in South Africa, which is estimated to account for nearly 3 per cent of South Africa's retail trade.
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The paper draws on recent evidence––economic, sociological and anthropological––from Latin America to forward a view of the informal sector in developing countries primarily as an unregulated microentrepreneurial sector and not as a disadvantaged residual of segmented labor markets. It offers alternative explanations for many of the characteristics of the sector customarily regarded as evidence of its inferiority.
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Neo-liberal theories of informality have emphasized the potential of the informal sector for independent employment creation and growth. An alternative perspective is provided by the structuralist 'informalization' approach which regards the expansion of informal activity as part of the restructuring strategy of the formal sector in the face of economic recession. The informalization perspective challenges the traditional notions of the informal sector by focusing on such issues as differentiation, social networks, subcontracting and supply linkages with the formal sector, and the role of the state in informal sector expansion. Despite its First World and Latin American focus, the informalization approach offers important insights for the study of urban informal sectors in Africa.
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THE HEATED DEBATE about trends in post-transition racial distribution of income, inequality and poverty has been fed by different perspectives on the policy path followed by the new government, particularly regarding its economic and distributive policies. Unfortunately, this debate has floundered because of uncertain trends in post-transition income, mainly for reasons of poor quality of information. This can be related to the fact that much of our distribution data comes from surveys and censuses, which are in many respects poor information sources - they take place only intermittently, there is poor comparability between different surveys and censuses, the data is subject to long time lags before it becomes available, and results are usually incompatible with National Accounts trends or are not made to be compatible with National Accounts by those who interpret them.
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Abstract: The idea of a ‘second economy’ has become a feature of recent government economic policy. In this paper we focus on one important element of the second economy – the informal economy. We analyse the nature of the informal economy in South Africa, providing some descriptive statistics and analysis to highlight the nature and extent of the informal economy. Given the present prominence of the ‘second economy’ concept, we provide some analysis of the efficacy of current government support measures to the informal economy, concluding that these are few and far between, patchy and incoherent, and largely ineffective. We then examine linkages between employment in the formal and the informal economy arguing that, contrary to the views of the President and the ANC, there are in fact fairly close linkages between the formal economy and the informal economy. Finally, by way of conclusion, we use the evidence provided in the paper to comment on the accuracy and relevance of the ‘second economy’ concept.
The informal economy'. Stockholm: ORGUT Consulting AB for the Department for Infrastructure and Economic Co-operation (SIDA)
  • K F Becker
Becker, KF (2004) 'The informal economy'. Stockholm: ORGUT Consulting AB for the Department for Infrastructure and Economic Co-operation (SIDA).
Quarterly Labour Force Survey-Quarter 1
Statistics South Africa (2010) Quarterly Labour Force Survey-Quarter 1. Pretoria, South Africa.
Making Retail Markets Work for the Poor -why and how triple trust organisation decided to intervene in the Spaza market in South Africa
  • M Bear
  • S Bradnum
  • D Tladi
  • Pedro
Bear, M, P Bradnum, S Tladi and D Pedro (2005) Making Retail Markets Work for the Poor -why and how triple trust organisation decided to intervene in the Spaza market in South Africa. Washington, D.C.: The SEEP Network.