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Whither Internet Control?
Abstract
Leading liberal democracies such as the United States have begun promoting "Internet freedom" and, by extension, opposing "Internet control." But what exactly is this control, and how best may it be combated? The argument of this essay rests on two basic assumptions. First, "Internet control" is a rather broad, catch-all category that subsumes both censorship and surveillance. As such, it is sensitive to violations of both the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Second, "Internet control" has two separate but often overlapping dimensions, of which one is technological and the other one is sociopolitical. Most talk of "liberation technologies" as ways of weakening "Internet control" turns out to be about the technological rather than the sociopolitical dimension. But what if success in the technological area is met with larger and more sophisticated efforts at exerting sociopolitical control?
... States in response have been trying to undermine the ability of people to organise and express opinions by controlling the technologythe Internet and by applying socio-political tactics (Morozov, 2011). These tactics include distributed denial-of-service attacks, which is the flooding of a site with so many requests to access it that it is unable to cope with the traffic and so no one is able to access it. ...
... Innovations that are happening within privately funded research, such as face recognition software pose the potential of helping states in surveillance matters. The rise in online "publicness"the sharing of personal information including geographic location is already being used for advertising purposes and it is merely a matter of time until governments start using the software too (Morozov, 2011). ...
... The software Morozov (2011) is referring to is the automated network analysis and data mining techniques referred to in the title of this thesis "Countering the Social Ignorance of 'Social' Network Analysis and Data Mining with Ethnography". Any attempt to ensure "Internet Freedom" (Morozov, 2011:74) may not only require a typology of tactics being used by governments but needs to rely on methodological approaches that see the Internet as a reflector of human agency (Farrell, 2011). ...
This thesis questions on one level the assertion that the Internet is a force for democratisation in authoritarian regimes (Habermas, 2006), and at the same time another means for disseminating propaganda, fear and intimidation (Rodan, 1998). It overcomes the limitations of using automated data collection and analysis of blogs by supplementing these techniques with a prolonged period of participant observation and a detailed reading of the textual extracts in order to allow for meaning to emerge. It analyses the discourses and styles of discourse of the Singapore political blogosphere. Hurst (2006) and Lin and Sundaram et al., (2007) described the same blogosphere as isolated from the global blogosphere and clearly demarcated with no central topic. Countering the social ignorance of such automated data collection and analysis techniques, this study assigns meaning to data gathered from January 2009 to February 2010. This case study will help highlight the analytic framework, benefits and limitations of using social network analysis and an anthropological approach to networks. It has targeted blogs using hyperlink network analysis and measured ‘importance’ with ‘betweenness centrality’ (de Nooy & Mrvar et al., 2005) in order to demarcate the boundaries of the sample of blogs that are archived for semantic and discourse analysis. Beyond a brief introduction to betweenness centrality, and the merits or otherwise, of combining various ranking of blogs such as Google’s PageRank, Hits and Blogrank algorithms it avoids the algorithm fetishism within hyperlink data collection and linguistic analysis of corpus collected from blogs; allowing for culture, identity and agency. It assesses which of White’s (2009) three disciplines and relative valuation orders the Singapore blogosphere adheres. The contention raised here is that social network analysis, or rather those elements within it that are focused exclusively on algorithms, are in danger of co-option by states and multinational corporations (Wolfe, 2010:3) unless they acknowledge sociocultural forces. The tools of social network analysis and data mining are moved beyond mere description, while avoiding prescription – and at the same time advancing its contribution to substantive theoretical questions (Scott, 2010). Ensuring space for agency in a field dominated by sociograms, statistics and algorithms with theory that places persons lacking recognition at its centre is important to this thesis. Focusing only on the relational aspects of the interaction and in the individual persons linked (Wolfe, 2010: 3) creates a limited representation of the wider phenomena under study and a narrow awareness of the context in which these networks exist. A people governed by one political party since 1963 (The People’s Action Party) with the government of Singapore is the focus of this case study. This paper also highlights the use of various software technology; blogs, IssueCrawler, HTTrack, NetDraw, and Leximancer while using an ethnographic approach to counter the social ignorance of automated electronic software. The analysis of the Singaporean blogosphere from 2009 to 2010 provides a descriptive analysis of the argument that the non-democratic nature of Singapore society shapes the development of online public spheres.
... However, the role of social media in fostering democracy has been subject of debate by many scholars. One of the critics, Morozov (2011) argues against cyber-utopianism and the Net Delusion, that is, the view that the internet can help in the democratization of authoritarian regimes. He, instead, notes that the medium can be used by authoritarian regimes as a powerful tool for political repression and the spread of extremist propaganda. ...
... The appropriation of technology for activism purposes has taken root in many sub-Saharan African countries and this is more demonstrable by the quick response of dictatorships to resort to internet shutdowns when citizens go online to protest abuses. This reality brings to light Morozov's (2011) observations when he argues that "the forces shaping the future of Internet control come from the realms of politics, society, and business" (p. 72). ...
This study explores three of sub-Saharan Africa’s hashtag movements: Zimbabwe’s
#ZimbabweanLivesMatter, Eswatini’s #EswatiniLivesMatter and Nigeria’s #EndSARS hashtags.
Theoretically, we rely on the transnational alternative digital public sphere and hashtag activism to understand how social media acted as a meeting place for mobilization and building cross boundary pollination and unitary movements. This investigation relied on a combination of virtual ethnography and purposive sampling as methodological approaches. Thematic analysis was the analytical tool employed with four themes informing this investigation: democratisation and human rights, transnational solidarity, states’ response to hashtag movements and use of parody accounts as a counter hegemonic strategy. The study found that these hashtags and movements achieved a modicum of ‘success’ by forcing some of Africa’s enduring dictatorships to make piecemeal concessions of varying degrees.
... Worse, the authorities having geographical jurisdiction over those committing the crimes may have an adversarial relationship with that where the crimes are taking place and actively encourage them as a form of cyberwarfare. They feel justified in this, and other uses of the Internet to disrupt other countries, because they view an Internet-freedom agenda as itself being a weaponization of the technology to undermine their forms of society (Morozov, 2011). Coase's (1937) pre-computer analysis of the formation of organizations may be seen as presaging much of the impact of developing the Internet, good and bad. ...
... Barriers are being erected in cyberspace, similar to territorial boundaries, in order to regulate transactions between entities from different cultures having limited mutual understanding, little basis for trust, or adversarial relations. Several nations have developed national intranets with controlled access to the global Internet (Morozov, 2011), and nearly all nations are implementing censoring of content and services appropriate to their cultures and political structures (Warf, 2011). ...
Five decades ago advances in integrated circuits and time-sharing operating systems made interactive use of computers economically feasible. Visions of man-computer symbiosis and the augmentation of man’s intellect became realistic research objectives. The initial focus was on facilitating interactivity through improved interface technology, and supporting its application through good practices based on experience and psychological principles. Within a decade technology advances made low cost personal computers commonly available in the home, office and industry, and these were rapidly enhanced with software that made them attractive in a wide range of applications from games to office automation and industrial process control. Within three decades the Internet enabled human–computer interaction to extend across local, national and international networks, and, within four, smartphones and tablets had made access to computers and networks almost ubiquitous to any person, at any time and any place. Banking, commerce, institutional and company operations, utility and government infrastructures, took advantage of, and became dependent on, interactive computer and networking capabilities to such an extent that they have now been assimilated in our society and are taken for granted. This hyperconnectivity has been a major economic driver in the current millennium, but it has also raised new problems as malevolent users anywhere in the world have become able to access and interfere with critical personal, commercial and national resources. A major issue for human–computer studies now is to maintain and enhance functionality, usability and likeability for legitimate users whilst protecting them from malevolent users. Understanding the issues involved requires a far broader consideration of socio-economic issues than was required five decades ago. This article reviews various models of the role of technology in human civilization that can provide insights into our current problématique.
... The Senate's case is a clear example of the Morozov's (2011) idea of the perils to open government debates into public and the use of technology to pressure government or citizens. The case of the city of Veracruz shows Morozov's idea of net delusion clearer when the government used technologies to make authoritarian behaviors and control internet ideas in order to maintain peace and security (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2012). ...
... The use of Twitter to make and state official postures about facts and the use of law to entrench citizens freedoms are examples of this clear condition of internet control (Morozov, 2011). ...
Political messaging is adapting to new digital spaces. However, the power of citizens through the use of this digital spaces is still unknown. Many citizens criticize political candidates using Facebook or Twitter, others build networks in Snapchat and some others try to collaborate with candidates using Periscope or WhatsApp. This research is focused in understanding this adaptation of political message on this platforms, analyzing the case of the presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) in Mexico who won the presidency with a large participation but without the support of Twitter users. After two online protests against this presidential candidate - #IamnotProletariat and #Iam132 – political image could have been undermined and voters could have thought differently. But this was not the case and despite of this, the candidate won. The challenge to understand this online protest and its link to the political message is addressed in this paper.
... The Senate's case is a clear example of the Morozov's (2011) idea of the perils to open government debates into public and the use of technology to pressure government or citizens. The case of the city of Veracruz shows Morozov's idea of net delusion clearer when the government used technologies to make authoritarian behaviors and control internet ideas in order to maintain peace and security. ...
... Social pressure and the international spread of the news, published in CNN, BBC, The Guardian and Los Angeles Times put so much pressure against the state prosecutor who finally discharged and release Martinez Vera and Bravo Pagola on September 21 st , after one month in prison (Martinez, 2011). The use of Twitter to make and state official postures about facts and the use of law to entrench citizens freedoms are examples of this clear condition of internet control (Morozov, 2011). ...
Social media has invaded elections in Mexico. However, the power of citizens through the use of this platform is still unknown. Many citizens criticize political candidates using Twitter, others build networks and some others try to collaborate with candidates. This research is focused in understanding this kind of behavior, analyzing the case of the presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) in Mexico who won the presidency with a large participation but without the support of Twitter users. After two online protests against this presidential candidate - #IamnotProletariat and #Iam132 – political image could have been undermined and voters could have thought differently. But this was not the case and despite of this, the candidate won. The challenge to understand this online protest and its link to the political campaign is addressed in this paper.
... First, as was suggested by different Internet user reports (Internet Society, 2012;Pew Research Center, 2014), demand for Internet freedom is a function of Internet use. The Internet has been theorized to be a valuable tool for promoting democratic transitions and maintaining democracies (Groshek, 2009;Morozov, 2011b). Second, social context matters. ...
... The United States has long been an active advocator of Internet freedom (Hanson, 2012;Morozov, 2011b). The landmark public statement by former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2010) at the Newseum in Washington, DC, serves as a good starting point for discussion. ...
This study examines public demand for Internet freedom and control along with their microindividual and macrosocietal predictors. Based on a secondary analysis of the Internet Society’s Global Internet User Survey data, it is found that the picture regarding people’s attitudes toward Internet freedom and censorship is more complicated and nuanced than assumed. First, Internet use was a positive predictor of demand for Internet freedom, but not of demand for Internet control. Second, freedom supply (the amount of Internet freedom in a given country), and individual perception of freedom supply in particular, was found to be negatively associated with people’s demand for both Internet freedom and Internet control, which partially supports the prediction of balance theory. Finally, the results of statistical interaction analyses suggest the impact of Internet use on demand for Internet freedom and control is contingent on people’s perceived freedom supply in their respective countries.
... The Senate's case is a clear example of the Morozov's (2011) idea of the perils to open government debates into public and the use of technology to pressure government or citizens. The case of the city of Veracruz shows Morozov's idea of net delusion clearer when the government used technologies to make authoritarian behaviors and control internet ideas in order to maintain peace and security (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2012). ...
... The use of Twitter to make and state official postures about facts and the use of law to entrench citizens freedoms are examples of this clear condition of internet control (Morozov, 2011). ...
Political messaging is adapting to new digital spaces. However, the power of citizens through the use of this digital spaces is still unknown. Many citizens criticize political candidates using Facebook or Twitter, others build networks in Snapchat and some others try to collaborate with candidates using Periscope or WhatsApp. This research is focused in understanding this adaptation of political message on this platforms, analyzing the case of the presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) in Mexico who won the presidency with a large participation but without the support of Twitter users. After two online protests against this presidential candidate - #IamnotProletariat and #Iam132 – political image could have been undermined and voters could have thought differently. But this was not the case and despite of this, the candidate won. The challenge to understand this online protest and its link to the political message is addressed in this paper.
... such as online censorship, 2 keyword filtering, 3 distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, 4 astroturfing, 5 surveillance, 6 and physical intimidation. 7 Despite these stringent measures, netizens in authoritarian regimes can still gain access to more diverse content in social media than in traditional media or government mouthpieces, thanks to social media's ability to spread user-generated content within individual users' social networks. 8 For instance, in China, where the Internet is subjected to severe state controls, 9 much of the censorship is triggered post hoc; namely, after the content has circulated through the Internet for a while. ...
Even in authoritarian regimes that enforce vigorous information controls, netizens are still able to access fairly diverse – sometimes even sensitive – information from social media than from traditional media. We argue that this ‘breathing space’ in social media may have an indirect positive effect on regime stability via a subtle emotional channel; exposure to news on social media heightens one’s generalized fear, which in turn increases one’s demand for social controls by the state. We test our argument using an original survey that evaluates public support for China’s social credit system. We find that the support for this seemingly all-encompassing surveillance system is positively correlated with one’s generalized fear, while one’s generalized fear is positively correlated with one’s exposure to news on WeChat, the most popular social media platform in China.
... This put so much pressure against the state prosecutor that he finally discharged and released Martinez Vera and Bravo Pagola on September 21st, after one month in prison (Martinez, 2011). The use of Twitter to make and state official postures about facts and the use of law to entrench citizens freedoms are examples of this clear condition of Internet control (Morozov, 2011). ...
Political activism is more alive than ever. After the scandal of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, online social media platforms restricted the distribution of content to privacy laws. However, populism disruption has fostered political discontent, online protests, and claims which are rising every day in many countries, and added to this context, environmental problems and the absence of an ideological framework seem to be an ongoing topic at present. All of these conditions promote the use of digital activism. This field of research has studied single cases, loosing connections to societies and history. This chapter aims to explain the evolution of digital activism, which has been going on for a long time. To achieve such purpose, I analyzed eleven Mexican events that took place from 2000 to 2019 and provided a classification framework to understand how it has transformed over time.
... This put so much pressure against the state prosecutor that he finally discharged and released Martinez Vera and Bravo Pagola on September 21st, after one month in prison (Martinez, 2011). The use of Twitter to make and state official postures about facts and the use of law to entrench citizens freedoms are examples of this clear condition of Internet control (Morozov, 2011). ...
Political activism is more alive than ever. After the scandal of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, online social media platforms restricted the distribution of content to privacy laws. But populism disruption in many countries fosters political discontent. Online protests and everyday claims are rising. Add to this context environmental problems and an absence of an ideological framework. All these conditions foster the use of digital activism. But this field of research has studied single cases, losing connections with societies and history. The aim of this chapter is to explain the evolution of digital activism in a long period of time. To achieve such purpose, the author analyzes 11 Mexican events that took place from 2000 to 2019 and provide a classification framework to understand how digital activism transforms over time.
... However, this policy is most heavily pursued by authoritarian countries seeking to regain lost control over their citizens. China, Iran, and Russia have argued in favor of "informational sovereignty" in an effort to nationalize their cyberspace and assert control over what their citizens can and cannot access online [67]. China's state of the art, AI-enhanced monitoring systems allow tight control over the flow of information behind the "Great Firewall of China" [68,69]. ...
Malicious networks of botnets continue to grow in strength as millions of new users and devices connect to the internet each day, many becoming unsuspectingly complicit in cyber-attacks or unwitting accomplices to cybercrimes. Both states and nonstate actors use botnets to surreptitiously control the combined computing power of infected devices to engage in espionage, hacking, and to carry out distributed denial of service attacks to disable internet-connected targets from businesses and banks to power grids and electronic voting systems. Although cybersecurity professionals have established a variety of best practices to fight botnets, many important questions remain concerning why levels of botnet infections differ sharply from country to country, as relatively little empirical testing has been done to establish which policies and approaches to cybersecurity are actually the most effective. Using newly available time-series data on botnets, this article outlines and tests the conventionally held beliefs and cybersecurity strategies at every level—individual, technical, isolationist, and multilateral. This study finds that wealthier countries are more vulnerable than less wealthy countries; that technical solutions, including patching software, preventing spoofing, and securing servers, consistently outperform attempts to educate citizens about cybersecurity; and that countries which favor digital isolation and restrictions on internet freedom are not actually better protected than those who embrace digital freedom and multilateral approaches to cybersecurity. This latter finding is of particular importance as China’s attempts to fundamentally reshape the internet via the “Digital Silk Road” component of the Belt and Road Initiative will actually end up making both China and the world less secure. Due to the interconnected nature of threats in cyberspace, states should instead embrace multilateral, technical solutions to better govern this global common and increase cybersecurity around the world.
... How traditional authoritarian regimes maintain their resilience under the impact of technological innovation has become one of the most important topics in the current social sciences (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2011;King et al., 2013;Kyriakopoulou, 2011;Mackinnon, 2011;Morozov, 2011;Moss, 2018;Pallin, 2017). Indeed, the political ramifications of digital technology are not determined solely by state actors or citizens. ...
This article examines how market actors are actively engaged in state control of the Internet in China by studying the emerging industry of Internet-opinion management in that country. It presents an ecology of this industry, identifies three main market actors whose competitiveness is deeply rooted in the Chinese political context and identifies three stages of state-market collaboration. This article sheds light on how the rise of big data has strengthened state capacity for Internet control. It provides original evidence for how the profit motive drives Chinese data companies and media organisations to seek active involvement in the institutional construction of Internet-opinion control. This article also contributes to the literature on repression and contentious politics. It demonstrates that by relying on the market, authoritarian states are able to turn advanced technology into a repressive tool, which makes it more difficult for their citizens to use the Internet to mobilise.
... Almost all governments in the world have exercised some form of control over the internet since its inception ( Morozov 2011 ). Governments usually invoke concerns over national security, public order and government stability to legitimize internet control. ...
... While democracies officially recognize free media, the agenda setting and news making of traditional media are often shaped by the society's political and economic elites (see Robinson, 1976;Hallin, 1984;Herman and Chomsky, 2010). By contrast, while the Internet may be subject to regulation in any country, it is far more difficult for the government to control the Internet in the same degree it does the traditional media (Howard, 2010;Morozov, 2011). Technical difficulties and the lacking of capacities and resources often prevent authoritarian institutions from completely controlling the Internet. ...
The Internet has played important roles in driving political changes around the world. Why does it help to topple political regimes in some places but improve the quality of governance in others? We found Internet usage in general leads to citizens’ distrust in political institutions. Different political environments, however, can condition such trust-eroding impacts of the Internet in significantly different ways. A democracy enables citizens to connect their online behaviors and offline expression and organization, releasing political discontent while facilitating state–society communication. On the contrary, by restricting various forms of off-line expression, authoritarian regimes drive Internet-active citizens' discontent and distrust to higher levels. We use the World Values Survey data to establish these different mechanisms across democracies and authoritarian systems. Entropy balancing shows our findings to be highly robust.
... This put so much pressure against the state prosecutor that he finally discharged and released Martinez Vera and Bravo Pagola on September 21st, after one month in prison (Martinez, 2011). The use of Twitter to make and state official postures about facts and the use of law to entrench citizens freedoms are examples of this clear condition of Internet control (Morozov, 2011). ...
Political activism is more alive than ever. After the scandal of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, online social media platforms restricted the distribution of content to privacy laws. But populism disruption in many countries fosters political discontent. Online protests and everyday claims are rising. Add to this context environmental problems and an absence of an ideological framework. All these conditions foster the use of digital activism. But this field of research has studied single cases, losing connections with societies and history. The aim of this chapter is to explain the evolution of digital activism in a long period of time. To achieve such purpose, the author analyzes 11 Mexican events that took place from 2000 to 2019 and provide a classification framework to understand how digital activism transforms over time.
... Despite some earlier optimism about the Internet's roles in undermining authoritarian rule and promoting democratization, many recent studies suggest that the actual political impacts of the Internet have been overstated (Gunitsky 2015;Lynch 2011;Margolis and Resnick 2000;Morozov 2011). Bellin (2012), for example, argues that the contribution of the Internet and new media in the Arab Spring is only "permissive." ...
... Tech exceptionalism is rooted in an old idea that has again come to the fore: the belief that there are technological solutions for the world's complex social problems. We see this mentality, often rooted in what Evgeny Morozov has called "cyber utopianism" (Morozov, 2009(Morozov, , 2011, throughout today's tech titans, from Tesla founder Elon Musk's lofty claims to rocket or tunnel humanity to utopia, to the dozens of startups promising to 'reboot' or otherwise disrupt democratic procedures, bypassing imperfect politicians and institutions in the process. The most dangerous assumption in tech exceptionalism is the belief that new technologies can be deployed wholesale in fragile and conflict-affected states to deliver positive societal change. ...
... Optimists focus on online activism, arguing that the Internet empowers society and facilitates collective action against authoritarian rule (Esarey & Xiao, 2008;Yang, 2009;Zheng, 2007). Pessimists focus on state control, arguing that the government may still have a firm control over information (Gunitsky, 2015;MacKinnon, 2011;Morozov, 2011;Sullivan, 2013). For example, Stockmann (2010) finds that propaganda dispersed through marketized online media channels is still an effective method of influencing citizens' opinions. ...
Social media provide a free space for opinion leaders (OPLs) to influence public opinion in contemporary China, where OPLs need to compete with the powerful propaganda machine. So how much influence can OPLs exert on the public under the shadow of authoritarianism? A survey experiment of 1,326 Internet users in Beijing found that OPLs guide respondents' policy opinions and encourage information sharing when the OPLs are not perceived to be a part of the propaganda campaign. However, when audiences believe that OPLs are the agents of propaganda, such effects disappear. The results reveal that the OPLs' effects are conditioned by the authoritarian institutional context in which the public discussion takes place. We conclude that such effects have ambiguous consequences in cultivating critical citizens.
... The answer to this question is important insofar as it provides us with a window to understanding how regimes perceive their own strengths and weaknesses. Conventional wisdom on censorship dictates that authoritarian regimes will censor any information critical of their hold on power (Lee 1998;Marolt 2011;Morozov 2011;MacKinnon 2013). More recent literature demonstrates that censors are quite tolerant of criticism, as long as it does not raise the collective action potential, "regardless of whether they are critical or supportive of the state and its leaders (King, Pan, and Roberts 2014, 1)." ...
Recent literature claims that China censors information that has the potential to ignite collective action. This article extends this finding by arguing that Chinese censors respond differently to political challenges than they do to performance challenges. Political challenges call into questioning the Party's leading role, whereas performance challenges are directed at the failures of public goods provisions. A survey experiment of about 60 media professionals finds that censors are inclined to block political challenges and to tolerate criticism of the government's performance. However, when criticism contains both performance and political challenges, censorship is far more likely. By exploring the range of censorship activities, the results suggest that the Chinese regime's reliance on popular support constrains its censorship decisions.
... assemblies and demonstrations-while simultaneously allowing criticism of the government, apparently so that they can monitor public opinion (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). A technological "cat-and-mouse" game between dissidents and defenders of existing regimes is underway (MacKinnon, 2012;Morozov, 2011;Shirky, 2011), and it is hard to imagine that it will ever disappear. ...
It is often claimed that social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are profoundly shaping political participation, especially when it comes to protest behavior. Whether or not this is the case, the analysis of “Big Data” generated by social media usage offers unprecedented opportunities to observe complex, dynamic effects associated with large-scale collective action and social movements. In this article, we summarize evidence from studies of protest movements in the United States, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine demonstrating that: (1) Social media platforms facilitate the exchange of information that is vital to the coordination of protest activities, such as news about transportation, turnout, police presence, violence, medical services, and legal support; (2) in addition, social media platforms facilitate the exchange of emotional and motivational contents in support of and opposition to protest activity, including messages emphasizing anger, social identification, group efficacy, and concerns about fairness, justice, and deprivation as well as explicitly ideological themes; and (3) structural characteristics of online social networks, which may differ as a function of political ideology, have important implications for information exposure and the success or failure of organizational efforts. Next, we issue a brief call for future research on a topic that is understudied but fundamental to appreciating the role of social media in facilitating political participation, namely friendship. In closing, we liken the situation confronted by researchers who are harvesting vast quantities of social media data to that of systems biologists in the early days of genome sequencing.
... Equally concerning, the current trend in this area is negative: "Internet freedom around the world declined in 2016 for the sixth consecutive year (4)." While the government of the United States, for example, would be considered a leading advocate for internet freedom in many contexts (5,6), it is important to note that tides can rapidly change because individual viewpoints (7) and societal norms in the arena of censorship evolve over time. Indeed, "people's attitudes toward Internet freedom and censorship is more complicated and nuanced than assumed (8)." ...
This introductory chapter provides current context for the state of the art and practice in online tools and experiments in chemical education. In addition to providing an overview of the specific work detailed in the chapters of this volume, some important net neutrality trends laffecting world wide access to high quality educational information are briefly discussed. We conclude with a call to action for science educators.
... Through sophisticated regulation and censorship, the people of China, along with those of Vietnam, Cuba, Iran and Singapore, have not received the benefit of the democratising effects of the Internet (Boas, 2006;Harwit and Clark, 2001;Boas, 2001, 2003;Rodan, 1998;Taubman, 1998). By employing technological and institutional means, these authoritarian regimes have managed to use the growth of the Internet to help economic development, technology innovation and globalisation and, at the same time, to reduce its harmful political effects (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005;Morozov, 2011). Researchers have argued that, particularly in China, by controlling the technological infrastructure, co-opting private Internet companies, documenting the 'real-name' access and developing sophisticated censorship systems, the regime has imposed a close grip on cyberspace and has successfully transformed itself into a 'networked authoritarianism' (Hachigian, 2001;Harwit and Clark, 2001;Hassid, 2008;Hung, 2010). ...
This study seeks to identify and test a mechanism through which the Internet influences public support in an authoritarian environment in which alternative information is strictly censored by the state. Through online discussions, web users often interpret sanctioned news information in directions different from or even opposite to the intention of the authoritarian state. This alternative framing on the Internet can strongly affect the political views of web users. Through an experimental study conducted in China, we find that subjects exposed to alternative online framing generally hold lower levels of policy support and evaluate government performance more negatively. This finding implies that even though the access to information on sensitive topics is effectively controlled by the government, the diffusion capabilities of the Internet can still undermine the support basis of the seemingly stable authoritarian regime.
The increasing adoption of social media across Africa has raised hopes that they represent a new locus of youth political agency. However, as social media has become more ubiquitous, so has its control by African regimes. How do these controls affect young people’s use of social media for information? This article approaches online controls based on how overt – that is, visible and directly experienced by citizens – they are. It shows that overt forms of controls, such as social media shutdowns, are associated with a higher informational use of social media. Surprisingly, the association is stronger for older citizens. The article makes two important contributions. First, it points to the need for research to develop a better understanding of citizens’ perception of online controls. Second, its findings show that theories of youth citizenship should include the comparative group – older citizens.
Drawing on the resource theory of political participation, we compare the determinants of Internet-based e-participation and conventional offline political participation in China by employing data from an original survey conducted in 2013. We find that e-government and other online platforms provide more equal participation opportunities to Chinese citizens traditionally lacking political resources. Although non-party members and non-elites are disadvantaged in conventional offline participation, they are not in e-participation, especially through using e-government systems. Internet/computer access and Internet skills push individuals away from conventional offline participation, and frequent social media users are more likely to engage in e-participation. Taken together, these results suggest that e-government and other online platforms offer the genuine potential to expand the scope of participation and empowers those traditionally disadvantaged in China.
In addition to looking at the ongoing election campaigns in Nigeria, past election campaigns both locally and globally (especially since Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the 2016 presidential election in the United States) have highlighted how fake news and hate speech can be used to cause political instability in society. Ever since, fake news and hate speech issues and their impacts on democratic processes have gained widespread research attention. Hence, an urge exists to not only further understand the concepts of fake news and hate speech but also to define them based on empirical and critical literature. This chapter intends to clearly provide further understanding about the definition of fake news through a redefinition of the concept based on a critical review of literature. Also, critically discussed in this chapter are the impacts both fake news and hate speech can have on the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Some policy recommendations are offered.
In a path-breaking study of Russian elections, Regina Smyth reveals how much electoral competition matters to the Putin regime and how competition leaves Russia more vulnerable to opposition challenges than is perceived in the West. Using original data and analysis, Smyth demonstrates how even weak political opposition can force autocratic incumbents to rethink strategy and find compromises in order to win elections. Smyth challenges conventional notions about Putin's regime, highlighting the vast resources the Kremlin expends to maintain a permanent campaign to construct regime-friendly majorities. These tactics include disinformation as well as symbolic politics, social benefits, repression, and falsification. This book reveals the stresses and challenges of maintaining an electoral authoritarian regime and provides a roadmap to understand how seemingly stable authoritarian systems can fall quickly to popular challenges even when the opposition is weak. A must-read for understanding Russia's future and the role of elections in contemporary autocratic regimes.
In a path-breaking study of Russian elections, Regina Smyth reveals how much electoral competition matters to the Putin regime and how competition leaves Russia more vulnerable to opposition challenges than is perceived in the West. Using original data and analysis, Smyth demonstrates how even weak political opposition can force autocratic incumbents to rethink strategy and find compromises in order to win elections. Smyth challenges conventional notions about Putin's regime, highlighting the vast resources the Kremlin expends to maintain a permanent campaign to construct regime-friendly majorities. These tactics include disinformation as well as symbolic politics, social benefits, repression, and falsification. This book reveals the stresses and challenges of maintaining an electoral authoritarian regime and provides a roadmap to understand how seemingly stable authoritarian systems can fall quickly to popular challenges even when the opposition is weak. A must-read for understanding Russia's future and the role of elections in contemporary autocratic regimes.
An Article in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Communication in Hong Kong Baptist University, back then I have described the carnivalesque patterns of the Chinese Internet and the Internet in general and have analyzed such a trend. However, I have viewed such carnivalesque trends to be adapted to by various entities including the government. Years later, it turns out that current Chinese policies tend to criticize online carnivalesque trends as well. Based on this thesis, I've submitted to and attended the IAMCR (International Association for Media and Communication Research) Conference 2016.
Social movements often seek news media attention as a means to garner public attention to social problems; social movements may also attempt to circumvent traditional media channels through the use of social networks. The role of social media in cultivating political and social change is an area of increasing interest to scholars studying the politics of social movements, yet there exist few systematic studies on how social media attention interacts with traditional forms of media to produce public attention to social issues. Using the 2016–2017 protests of the Dakota Access Pipeline by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and allies, we examine how social media (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter) influenced public attention to the NoDAPL protests, demonstrating that engagement with social media has effects independent of traditional forms of media coverage.
With the development of social media and new information communication technology (ITC), state control imposed by authoritarian regimes over society has been challenged due to the media’s pressure on legislation, policy implementation and the mobilization of collective activism. Yet it does not mean the power of media is unlimited in the authoritarian context. Using China as a case, this article tries to point out the limitations of the media’s role in promoting religious freedom by reviewing the existing literature on media and social control. It stresses that the nature of religious issues, the accessibility of information, and the social consensus among netizens contribute to the difficulty in enhancing religious freedom and rights protection in China at this moment.
This study aims to investigate the influences on perceived threat to and preparedness for cybersecurity, as well as what causes the gap between these two perceptions regarding public infrastructure and business systems in the United States. To that end, the study considers Cybersecurity Survey data from the Pew Research Center. Using ordered logistic regression analysis, the significant determinants of perceived threat and preparedness are determined. Personal experience in and awareness of cybersecurity breaches increased the level of perceived cyber threats, but reduced that of perceived preparedness. In contrast, confidence in organizational cybersecurity capacity, social trust, and liberalism exhibited opposite trends regarding these two outcomes. By employing multinomial logistic regression analysis, the study investigates the unexplored relationships of various theoretical determinants with the gap between perceived threat and preparedness. The analysis results show that the effects of these determinants differ with the type of gap. The determinants for perceived overperformance (good preparedness relative to low threat) and perceived underperformance (poor preparedness relative to high threat) are significantly different from those for perceived fair performance (matching levels of threat and preparedness).
China is one of the world’s most sophisticated Internet censoring countries. Chinese Internet users who wish to visit blocked Web sites will have to use circumvention tools to get around the Great Firewall, a censoring system inspecting, filtering, and blocking foreign Web sites outside China. Using a nationally representative survey dataset, this study compares circumvention tool users and nonusers in terms of demographic features, Internet-use motivation, levels of media trust, and, most importantly, political attitude and behavior differences. We found that more than 11% of Chinese Internet users had ever used circumvention tools and they were most likely to be young and well-educated. Compared to nonusers, circumvention tool users were more likely to oppose censorship, to place less trust in news media, and to participate more actively in civic activities. However, circumvention tool users tend to hold more politically conservative attitudes than nonusers.
Authoritarian regimes craft and disseminate reasons, stories, and explanations for why they are entitled to rule. To shield those legitimating messages from criticism, authoritarian regimes also censor information that they find threatening. While committed opponents of the regime may be violently repressed, this book is about how the authoritarian state keeps the majority of its people quiescent by manipulating the ways in which they talk and think about political processes, the authorities, and political alternatives.
Using North Korea, Burma (Myanmar) and China as case studies, this book explains how the authoritarian public sphere shapes political discourse in each context. It also examines three domains of potential subversion of legitimating messages: the shadow markets of North Korea, networks of independent journalists in Burma, and the online sphere in China. In addition to making a theoretical contribution to the study of authoritarianism, the book draws upon unique empirical data from fieldwork conducted in the region, including interviews with North Korean defectors in South Korea, Burmese exiles in Thailand, and Burmese in Myanmar who stayed in the country during the military government. When analyzed alongside state-produced media, speeches, and legislation, the material provides a rich understanding of how autocratic legitimation influences everyday discussions about politics in the authoritarian public sphere.
Explaining how autocracies manipulate the ways in which their citizens talk and think about politics, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of Asian politics, comparative politics and authoritarian regimes.
The less we question the technical and semiotic properties of the so-called social media, the more oblivious we remain to their political agency. The media transformations, which occurred in China at incredible speed and depth, must lead us to question the ways in which ‘new media’ affect the sites and forms of power. This article offers a reading into the economic and theoretical dynamics of what is commonly referred to as the ‘Chinese Internet’. Its history is marked by strategic attempts to shape, constrain and leverage social visibility. Thus, the author uses the notion of computerized media and invokes Hannah Arendt’s conception of visibility to describe what appears in China to be a new form of globalized media capitalism.
Political messaging is adapting to new digital spaces. However, the power of citizens through the use of this digital spaces is still unknown. Many citizens criticize political candidates using Facebook or Twitter, others build networks in Snapchat and some others try to collaborate with candidates using Periscope or WhatsApp. This research is focused in understanding this adaptation of political message on this platforms, analyzing the case of the presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) in Mexico who won the presidency with a large participation but without the support of Twitter users. After two online protests against this presidential candidate - #IamnotProletariat and #Iam132 – political image could have been undermined and voters could have thought differently. But this was not the case and despite of this, the candidate won. The challenge to understand this online protest and its link to the political message is addressed in this paper.
Internet communication technologies (ICTs) enable diasporas to act transnationally by facilitating ties to their places of origin and providing low-cost ways to mobilize against home-country regimes. However, studies neglect to address how ICTs globalize regimes’ methods of social control and impact anti-regime diasporas. In order to investigate the operation and effects of what I call digitally-enabled transnational repression, this study analyzes data that include original interviews with pro-revolution Syrian activists based in the US and Britain. The findings demonstrate that the presence and tactics of pro-regime agents online during the onset of Syria’s 2011 uprising (i) eroded respondents’ transnational ties and (ii) deterred many from using ICTs to contest the Assad regime. The study shows how networked authoritarianism mitigates diaspora members’ voices and tactics during periods of violent unrest, which is precisely when ICT-enabled activism can aid home-country movements in significant ways. I conclude by discussing implications for the study of authoritarian regimes, diasporas, and transnational dynamics of contention.
In this chapter we return to the theme of democracy and its social base. Current impacts are dramatically demonstrated in the social movements of the Arab Spring, with Tunisia and Egypt as the leading examples. The brief surge of the Occupy Wall Street movement, replicated in many cities throughout the world, is also notable, both for its global manifestation and for its fleeting existence. This section is closed by outlining what we consider to be the conditions for the creation of new imagined communities and of the contribution the data analysis method we developed hold in this field. We conclude that social media holds huge promise for democracy in the capacity of interest articulation but falls short with interest aggregation. We consider this process as one of the key steps to attain effective interest aggregation, which in turn is conducive to regaining social cohesion and the formation of new imagined communities.
With the Internet’s prevalence growing exponentially during the past decade, cyberspace has increasingly embedded itself in the Chinese society. China’s government has responded in kind. Under the rhetoric of building a harmonious online society, Beijing has constructed a China model to monitor and regulate the Internet to eliminate political challenges posed by the decentralized and borderless technological system. This top-down model of Internet governance is characterized by a dual strategy. First, the government blocks online content and communication that it deems threatening to its rule. Second, the state fights for technical standard-setting and resource reallocation on a global stage under the guise of protecting Internet sovereignty. This dual strategy is increasingly difficult to sustain, however, as shown in the implementation of the Green Dam (lüba) program and the Google dispute. More recently, in the face of criticism and discontent, the Chinese government has switched to a softer approach: interacting with netizens, making its presence felt online, and negotiating with global Internet governance institutions. Meanwhile, at the same time China softens its stance, many developing countries have subscribed to the China model of Internet control to deal with various social and political challenges amplified by the use of the Internet.
There is much criticism of political leaders and leadership in contemporary political commentary and the public debate around the globe. Yet more than anything else this criticism indicates that leaders and leadership are believed to matter for the overall performance of political regimes, and the relations between different regimes. This belief seems to be largely justified. Indeed, the ever-growing complexity of politics in an increasingly interdependent world has made leadership in terms of providing direction and guidance, and devising solutions for collective problems, more important than ever.
This article attempts to explain how the online activism of citizens armed with the Internet ("netizens") is changing the political process in southern China. It poses two sets of questions. The first question it asks is, what are the characteristics of online activism in China? Despite the control over the Internet exercised by the Chinese government, netizens have been generating public opinion and expanding issue areas online. How has this been possible? Second, what is the power of online activism as a force for social and political change? What influences has the Internet had on the process of political change in southern China despite the government's tight control, and in what way does digital political participation lead to new political discourse and change in society? The characteristics of this activism will be examined through an analysis of the three most controversial examples of online activism in recent years: a protest against a miscarriage of justice, the exposure of an example of the abuse of power and corruption by local officials, and two examples of Internet activism that led to the securing of political and civil liberties. The paper applies the concept of smart mobs to show how Chinese netizens have been changing the political process through their online political activism. Online activism has expanded the political and civil freedoms of the people to the extent that a sort of liberal democracy (in contrast to electoral democracy) is in the making in southern China.©nstitute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC).
This paper, which is entitled ‘The Role of Social Media in the ‘Syrian Uprising’ aimed to report on survey research conducted which identify the role of played by social media in the ‘Syrian Uprising’ Currently social media tools were good mediums of electronic communication among protesters in Syria. Further, it was a vital medium for spreading information such as photos, videos and documents about the revolution for national, regional and international spheres. This paper looked at the impact and relationship between protesters and Syrian people who used social media ,technology and the nature of its role in the ‘Syrian Uprising ‘ as well as the study has made a controversial argument between different views of scholars about the subject and its case. This paper has interviewed 30 protesters inside Syria through a survey.
This study, demonstrate the appeal that social media can have both positive and negative points in the ‘Syrian uprising’.
This study analyzed public opinion data for the 45 societies from the latest World Values Survey and found that Internet use promotes democratic support in democratic countries but not in authoritarian countries. In advanced democracies, democratic ideas and thoughts are freely produced and disseminated in cyberspace, and Internet users tend to absorb them. On the other hand, this online content is highly controlled by authoritarian governments in non-democratic settings, and Internet users are likely to be exposed to pro-government messages and entertainment, thereby nullifying the democratic utility of Internet use. These different social learning processes result in a global reinforcement effect of Internet use on democratic support. The results confirm that the Internet is a neutral technology and its effect depends on the political environment where it is used.
Non-democratic regimes have increasingly moved beyond merely suppressing online discourse, and are shifting toward proactively subverting and co-opting social media for their own purposes. Namely, social media is increasingly being used to undermine the opposition, to shape the contours of public discussion, and to cheaply gather information about falsified public preferences. Social media is thus becoming not merely an obstacle to autocratic rule but another potential tool of regime durability. I lay out four mechanisms that link social media co-optation to autocratic resilience: 1) counter-mobilization, 2) discourse framing, 3) preference divulgence, and 4) elite coordination. I then detail the recent use of these tactics in mixed and autocratic regimes, with a particular focus on Russia, China, and the Middle East. This rapid evolution of government social media strategies has critical consequences for the future of electoral democracy and state-society relations.
This article suggests a nontraditional approach to Russian journalism and posits treating it as a national cultural value. With this purpose, the author brings attention to the question of patriotic view on the Russian domestic press. The Russian journalism possesses a number of features which noticeably distinguish it from journalism in other countries simultaneously putting it on the par with such high values as national literature, arts, and science. This cultural-valuable approach extends to journalism education which also cannot be evaluated according to generally accepted universal criteria.
This article looks into the ambiguous effects that ‘mediatisation’ in its various forms has had, or may have, on the conditions for good democratic political leadership by prime ministers and presidents in established western democracies. For the purposes of this article, good democratic political leadership is defined in terms of three fundamental criteria: authenticity, effectiveness and responsibility. Whereas the ‘new media age’ offers political chief executives some distinct opportunities with regard to all three criteria, these tend to be outweighed by a wealth of media‐related constraints which in sum make good democratic political leadership considerably more difficult and demanding than ever. Understood as a publicly responsible profession, contemporary political science, and comparative executive leadership research more specifically, faces two inter‐related tasks: to penetrate empirically the notorious smokescreens of executive politics, and to provide the public with reasonable standards for evaluating the performance of executive leaders.
Internet Censorship, Saudi Style
- Peter
Peter Burrows, “Internet Censorship, Saudi Style,” Business Week, 13 November 2008.
Surveillance Software Knows What a Camera Sees
- Tom Simonite
Tom Simonite, “Surveillance Software Knows What a Camera Sees,” Technology Review, 1 June 2010.
Face Recognition Software Gaining a Broader Canvas
- Maija
- Palmer
Maija Palmer, “Face Recognition Software Gaining a Broader Canvas,” Financial Times, 22 May 2010.
Political Net Attacks Increase
- Erica Naone
Erica Naone, “Political Net Attacks Increase,” Technology Review, 13 March 2009.
Saudi Campaign to Clean Up YouTube available at www.itp.net/564689-saudi-campaign-to-clean-up-youtube. 10. Billing Saudi Campaign to Clean Up YouTube
- Soren Billing
Soren Billing, " Saudi Campaign to Clean Up YouTube, " ITP.net, 13 August 2009,
available at www.itp.net/564689-saudi-campaign-to-clean-up-youtube.
10. Billing, " Saudi Campaign to Clean Up YouTube. "
11. Michael Wines, " In Restive Chinese Area, Cameras Keep Watch, " New York
Times, 2 August 2010.
Iranians and Others Outwit Net Censors
- John Markoff
John Markoff, " Iranians and Others Outwit Net Censors, " New York Times, 30 April
2009.
U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet
- Charlie Savage
Charlie Savage, " U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, " New York
Times, 27 September 2010.
Politically Motivated Cyber Attacks available at www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=9957. 7
- See
See " Politically Motivated Cyber Attacks, " Help Net Security, 6 October 2010,
available at www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=9957.
7. " Thai Website to Protect the King, " BBC News, 5 February 2009, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7871748.stm.