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Modern Judaism, Volume 22, Number 3, October 2002, pp. 234-260 (Article)
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Norma Baumel Joseph
RITUAL, LAW, AND PRAXIS:
AN AMERICAN RESPONSE/A
TO BAT MITSVA CELEBRATIONS
Modern American Judaism is marked by its attention to the public
practice of religion. Additionally, Jews, like many Americans, came to
place an emphasis on individual performance. In that environment,
women’s active presence or absence became a cause of concern fueling
the contemporary feminist critique. During the last century, the Re-
form, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reconstructionist movements each
reacted to these concerns with distinct programs and structures. Bat
Mitsva ceremonies, developed during the twentieth century, present a
noteworthy example of the denominational variations and shifts in
practice and outlook that mark this period.
1
Historically, rites de passage
2
for women in Judaism, other than mar-
riage and death, were minimal and most often celebrated privately.
3
Daughters were named in the synagogue in absentia, in a ceremony that
usually involved the father only. Puberty rituals, for the most part, did
not exist. In the latter part of this century an increase in the public
celebration of a girl’s “coming of age” transpired. The ensuing Bat
Mitsva ceremonies, paralleling Bar Mitsva services for boys, increased
in popularity, allowing some women to take a central role in public
synagogue rituals.
The terms Bar and Bat Mitsva refer to one who is subject to the
law and connote membership in the community. By the second half
of the twentieth century, Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative
congregations welcomed this opportunity to include women and to
allow them an opportunity to participate publicly in and stand at the
center of communal celebrations. Even segments of the Orthodox
world willingly included some form of ritual recognition for twelve-
year-old girls. Thus, the Bat Mitsva celebration became the entry point
for women into the Jewish world today, a valid rite of passage that
marks the transformation of the individual from one status in society
to another. In this context, it represents an important vehicle for affir-
mation and endorsement of female Jews. Given the current popularity
of Bat Mitsva ceremonies, one might contend that women’s practice of
religion is no longer an invisible or marginal issue.
Modern Judaism 22 (2002): 234–260 2002 by Oxford University Press
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 235
The validation of Bat Mitsva ceremonies in and of themselves is
not earth shattering. Yet, the process of instituting them, the problems
faced, the strategies used, the arguments voiced, and the gains made
reveal the tip of a feminist transformative iceberg.
4
At issue is the ac-
ceptance of women as religious beings who sincerely need to publicly
participate in, and sometimes stand at the center of, communal cele-
brations. At issue is the role of religion in the lives of Jewish women
and in the human macrocosm.
5
The feminist critique stimulated women within certain religious
traditions to reexamine the levels of their participation and invisibility.
Some deeply religious women chose not to abandon Judaism or Chris-
tianity but instead demanded greater recognition and participation.
That the demand has been greeted with denigration and opposition—
some might even say hostility—only serves to indicate how threatening
and serious this new challenge is.
RITES OF PASSAGE FOR WOMEN
To require a rite of passage for girls signifies the beginning of recogniz-
ing and celebrating women as active “adult” Jews, regardless of their
married state. The celebration is significant within the contemporary
community as a framework for a response to modernity and to the
feminist critique. Women are, after all, part of the Jewish world. They
are born, grow up, some marry, and die as Jews. They work, celebrate,
and suffer as Jews. The Bat Mitsva phenomenon then recognizes an
entry point for women as Jews.
6
All sociological studies focus on the
importance of these life cycle rituals as vehicles for individual and cor-
porate learning, commitment, and identity.
7
Rites of passage mark the entry of an individual into a new status
and designate incorporation into the community. Some cultures claim
that the neophyte is shaped into the next stage by the ritual.
8
Many
initiates understand the ritual in terms of their own self-identity, but
there is always a communal aspect in which the individual is attached
to and supported by the community. The absence of these ritual mo-
ments has left many American Jewish women feeling detached, as
though they personify the weak link in the chain of tradition.
9
To be
required to participate in a Bat Mitsva ritual is to be acknowledged as
an indispensable adult: a responsible and accepted member of society.
Two points call for clarification. Women have always been ritually
active in Judaism. This essay focuses on the shift in the modern period
to different types of public participation as exemplified in initiations
such as Bar and Bat Mitsva. Secondly, there were fewer public mo-
ments and less emphasis on the individual’s public display of belonging
236 Norma Baumel Joseph
in the past. Jewish men and women of an earlier period were exclu-
sively part of the corporate community. As such, their membership and
identity were self-evident. Lacking that sense of belonging in the mod-
ern period, the Jewish community has responded by elaborating and
expanding upon a number of ceremonies and rituals of celebrations.
Bat Mitsva is one of them.
BRIEF HISTORY
Bat Mitsva ceremonies, apparently inaugurated in Germany, France,
and Italy in the nineteenth century, have developed in twentieth-
century America along denominational lines.
10
Beginning slowly, most
notably in 1922 with the Bat Mitsva of the daughter of Rabbi Mordecai
Kaplan,
11
the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a ceremonial evolution in the
Conservative movement. During the thirties and forties the Reform
movement still concentrated on confirmation ceremonies rather than
on the controversial Bat Mitsva. The ritual celebration of Bat Mitsva
became ensconced within Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist
congregations in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1970s many in the Ortho-
dox movement sought ways to fit a Bat Mitsva into the established
order of services.
The variety of styles and formats both invigorates and confuses.
12
In the Conservative, Reconstructionist, and Reform movements, most
girls have a Bat Mitsva celebration in which their performance is identi-
cal with a Bar Mitsva. Even though in some communities this marks
the only time a girl reads from the Torah or Haftorah, nonetheless,
the members feel it appropriate to acknowledge her coming of age
with a Torah ritual. For some the ceremony is held on Friday night;
for many others it takes place during Sabbath morning services. In the
Orthodox communities, as will be seen, there is great resistance to a
public performance in the synagogue. Some prefer home- or school-
based rites. Others permit the use of synagogue when there are no
prayer services.
13
Many prefer a ceremony that is based on an educa-
tional format rather than as a form of worship. Noteworthy are the
increasing numbers who celebrate their Bat Mitsva at the separate
women’s prayer services for Rosh Hodesh. In this array, one fact stands
out—in almost every Orthodox community today, there exists some
format for the recognition and celebration of a girl’s initiation as an
adult Jew on her twelfth birthday.
14
RESPONSA INQUIRY
In an attempt to clarify the process of institutionalization of this new
ritual ceremony, I will examine the work of one leading rabbinic jurist,
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 237
Rabbi Moses Feinstein, as he responds to requests for permission to
celebrate this moment in a synagogue setting. His position, often
hailed by conservatives to be proscriptive, is far more complicated than
that term indicates.
15
It is profitable to place his decision in the context
of some of his colleagues to determine a more comprehensive ap-
proach to this change in ritual.
Not surprisingly, the religious legal issues and debates provide
clues to the surrounding political and moral climate as well as to the
prevailing American norms affecting the Jewish community. Inquiry
into R. Feinstein’s decisions and pattern of legalization illuminates the
process whereby one traditionalist accommodates new ways while also
refusing change, thereby advocating resistance to the modern world.
Moreover, the Bat Mitsva celebration is an important example of a
response to a grassroots phenomenon. As in the case of welcoming/
naming rituals for daughters, the demand for inclusion of females
came from “the community,” from women of all ages, from mothers
and fathers for their daughters. Thus, this investigation allows us to
explore the responsiveness of responsa (legal decisions) and of the Jew-
ish community. It also highlights the significant place of ritual in the
Jewish feminist quest for religious participation and spiritual expres-
sion. Consequently, this inquiry sheds light on attitudes towards
women as practitioners within the religious community.
LEGAL PRECEDENTS
Precedents are scarce, since even the Bar Mitsva celebration is rela-
tively new
16
and was never legally mandated. One need not have a “Bar
Mitsva” celebration in order to be a Bar Mitsva.
17
Moreover, the biblical
age of majority is usually twenty. Only in the Talmud, the fifth-century
source of rabbinic law and commentary, do we find the ages of twelve
and thirteen as signifiers of adulthood. The Talmud advances the con-
cept of a male and female age of maturity as a juridical status, referring
to a person who is no longer a child and must legally act as an adult.
18
Thus, after their respective twelfth and thirteenth birthdays, girls and
boys must fast on Yom Kippur.
19
For a woman this involves acting on
her own behalf—for example, being no longer dependent on her fa-
ther, mother, or brother in marital arrangements. Ironically, many see
the changes in a boy’s status as pivotal, while this radical change in a
female’s dependency mostly goes unnoticed.
The category of both Bar and Bat Mitsva depends on two criteria:
age and physical signs. Having attained one or both of these measures,
boys and girls are then considered to be of age: persons who are obli-
gated to observe the precepts of Judaism. There is no Talmudic discus-
238 Norma Baumel Joseph
sion of any related ritual celebration. Boys are labeled Bar Mitsva in
their fourteenth year and girls Bat Mitsva in their thirteenth year.
20
The
term Bar Mitsva appears five times (TB BK 15a, BM 96a, San. 84b,
Men. 93b) and Bat Mitsva only once in the Talmud (TB BK 15a). The
Mishna,
21
the third-century collection of religious law that is the basis
of the Talmud, asserts that thirteen is the year of commandment. In a
different section, the Mishna
22
specifies that the vows of a girl who is
twelve and one day are valid, as are the vows of a boy who is thirteen
and one day. The Talmud
23
clarifies that a boy is of age when physical
signs appear after he is thirteen plus one day. The great medieval phi-
losopher and legalist Maimonides
24
stipulates that a girl’s signs of adult-
hood are those that appear only after her twelfth birthday plus one
day. The concern exhibited in the cited texts is for the clarification of
the legal autonomy and obligation of the individual.
There is only one hint of a public ceremonial recognition of this
change in status for a boy of thirteen who is blessed by the elders.
25
In
fact, some claim that there is no description of any ceremonial act
before 1400, and even then it is only described in the lands of Ash-
kenaz (Central and Eastern Europe).
26
In the sixteenth century there
was still no evidence of a Bar Mitsva celebration among Sephardim
(communities originating in Spain or using Spanish custom). The cele-
bration for the male that developed in the medieval period focused on
his participation in the realm of public prayer: tefillin (phylacteries),
aliyah (participating in the public reading of the Torah), and minyan
(prayer quorum).
27
There is no reference to any similar pattern for a
female. Early references to the celebration for a girl are found in some
nineteenth-century sources, most notably and unambiguously in the
book Ben Ish Hay by Rabbi Joseph Hayyim b. Elijah of Iraq.
28
Despite this initial little-known approval, the contemporary res-
ponsa literature on Bat Mitsva remains divided. Some rule against any
celebration, others limit the context, and still others are more accept-
ing of the concept. For the traditional halakhists, there are major ques-
tions to be settled before innovative practices such as celebrating a Bat
Mitsva may take place in synagogues. All acknowledge that girls over
the age of twelve and one day have attained religious adulthood. Subse-
quent to that day a girl is a Bat Mitsva, a person obligated in all areas
of Jewish law that pertain to women. There is no ceremony required
to achieve this transition; the same applies to males. The accompanying
ceremony merely acknowledges the change that has automatically oc-
curred on the appropriate birthday.
Instituting a new and optional ceremony for women raises many
legal questions. The central issues include what a woman may do or
say on this occasion, where it may take place, who can participate, and
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 239
what legal and liturgical responsibilities may ensue. Equally important
is the legal question of where this idea originated and who introduced
it. For some, the entire project is tainted because of its source in the
non-Orthodox sector.
29
There is also an underlying concern, frequently
unstated, that public ceremonies such as a Bat Mitsva celebration will
lead the community to unacceptable actions and to a loss in the ac-
cepted pattern of Jewish life if women take on new roles, especially in
the synagogue.
RABBI MOSES FEINSTEIN (1895–1986)
For Rabbi Moses Feinstein, one of the great legalists of twentieth-
century American orthodoxy, the latter concerns of who introduced
Bat Mitsva and how it will change Jewish life weigh heavily upon his
decisions. In five different texts in his famous collection of responsa,
Iggerot Moshe, R. Feinstein consistently demonstrates his recognition of
Bat Mitsva as a juridical category while maintaining his dislike for the
Bat Mitsva ceremony.
30
His stance shifts slightly over the few years the
texts span, but his overall position remains one of resistance. Within
that realm of general disapproval, however, he provides subtle distinc-
tions that are significant. Of special importance in the context of this
article, he disavows any implication that women’s celebrations are for-
bidden or less important because women are somehow inferior. De-
spite the very real legal differentiation, with which he does not wish to
interfere or diminish, he maintains that there is the same simha, joy,
involved for a girl as for a boy.
The legal categories are very clear and unyielding. Girls become
Bat Mitsva at age twelve. He does not hesitate in using that nomencla-
ture
31
; in fact, he neither cites sources nor presents a legal argument
for its use. Furthermore, the attainment of Bat Mitsva might be cause
for an official simha, a joyous celebration of some sorts. His concern is
related to the location, source, and method of celebration. These are
the only topics of discussion. Without any vacillation R. Feinstein rules
that the ceremony does not enter the realm of a ritual commemorative
prescribed feast, a se’udat mitsva.
32
His discussions center on the permis-
sibility of optional celebrations. How, where, and what are the issues
that concern him.
The following close examination of the responsa texts is unusual
in a sociohistorical investigation, yet the material at hand is rich in
information. If carefully explicated, these five documents can disclose
a great deal about the transformation of ritual in a religious community
and about the process of American cultural adaptation.
240 Norma Baumel Joseph
RESPONSA TEXTS
Rabbi Feinstein’s first responsum, Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:104,
written in 1956, is his most negative and most often cited. In it he
maintains that nothing can be done in the synagogue for a Bat Mitsva.
Any such celebration or service is “worthless” (his word) since it is
optional and all optional acts are deemed forbidden in the sanctuary.
Correspondingly, “It is never to be considered a prescribed feast nor a
commanded act.” He insists unequivocally and steadfastly that the Bat
Mitsva celebration can never be of the same genre as a boy’s Bar Mitsva.
There is no element of mitsva, religious duty, involved. He then gives
grudging permission for some celebration in the home, but even so he
displays his disapproval and he warns that it cannot attain the signifi-
cance of a prescribed feast. Interestingly, he includes Bar Mitsva cele-
brations in his condemnation, indicating that the worthiness of the fe-
male is not the issue, nor is her status as a juridically obligated Jew
questioned. Only the ceremony, with all its attendant improprieties, is
unworthy. Contrary to popular opinion and to current psychosocial
studies, he sees no benefit gained from any such celebrations, even for
boys.
33
Fundamentally, R. Feinstein concedes that there are no prohibi-
tions regarding a home celebration for girls but he would rather not
permit something “new.” In conclusion, he forbids any form of celebra-
tion in the synagogue, even when it is not being used as a synagogue.
His disapproval of the celebration, of the stimulus and source (the Con-
servative and Reform communities), and of anything innovative, has
led him to oppose the whole enterprise in general.
The second text, Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 2:97, from 1959,
makes no substantive changes. In it R. Feinstein presents some sources
and establishes the reasons for not applying the category of se’udat
mitsva to the Bat Mitsva celebration. He also clarifies key elements of
his position. A girl reaches the status of a Bat Mitsva when she is twelve
and one day, and on that day she becomes fully obligated under Jewish
law. The difference between boys and girls with respect to this category
of celebration rests on the distinctive nature of male-female ritual par-
ticipation. Boys become men who are counted in the quorum. When a
boy turns thirteen, his change of status has a public face to it. When a
girl turns twelve, her change of status remains private, invisible, and is
not readily apparent in any communal form.
34
For R. Feinstein the is-
sue is not of singular rituals like tefillin or aliya. The issue is one of
public representation that confers significance upon the act. The boy/
man stands up to be counted: he can represent the community in
prayer and, therefore, has a se’udat mitsva. On the other hand, when a
girl becomes obligated in Jewish ritual law, no discernible change of
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 241
communal status occurs and, hence, there can be no equivalent cele-
bratory ritual feast.
35
In the course of this responsum, R. Feinstein makes two interesting
comments. He affirms that there is the same simha for a girl as for a
boy. His usage of the word simha is interesting if ambiguous. It refers
to both an emotional state as well as an event in which that state of joy
is formally expressed. By applying the category of simha to the Bat
Mitsva, R. Feinstein concedes that it is a proper occasion for a celebra-
tory format that would express the emotional state. He allows that
there is a great sense of joy experienced by the girl and her family on
this occasion equal to that of any similar event. Moreover, as seen in
the next text, in accepting the American pattern of celebrating family
and personal events in the synagogue, he is compelled to permit a
synagogue format precisely because he is not willing to treat the female
experience as a less worthy event. Thus, despite the very real difference
in structural significance, he seems to believe that there is no differ-
ence at the communal and affective level.
In this text, R. Feinstein also makes a striking legal observation that
he does not develop. He mentions that it would not be correct to pro-
hibit the festive meal simply on the grounds that there is no known
source specifically permitting it. In other words, each case must be
presented on its own legal merits, and prohibitions cannot be derived
from absent sources. This is a very significant aspect of his legal reason-
ing, mentioned in this responsum merely as an aside that would seem
to contradict the first text. In Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:104, R.
Feinstein argues against allowing even a private party in the home,
because it is new. In this responsum, R. Feinstein says that we cannot
claim that the se’udat mitsva is prohibited simply because we have not
heard of it before. Newness is not in and of itself sufficient in halakha,
Jewish law, to create a prohibition. Consequently, although he lets us
know in no uncertain terms that he does not like the novelty of the
Bar and Bat Mitsva, nonetheless, he will not forbid it. He is consistent.
Ultimately, R. Feinstein does not forbid a celebration, nor does he ar-
gue against it on the basis of its novelty. Rather, he limits and forbids
on specific legal grounds such as se’udat mitsva and sanctity of the syna-
gogue. He manages to separate what he believes the law dictates from
his personal preference.
The next text, Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 4:36, dated 1959, reveals
an interesting shift. He restates the prohibition and then amends it. By
using certain words he manages to permit that which had been forbid-
den and questionable. A ceremony—no; an obligatory meal—no; in the
synagogue—no; at any time—no; in the home—preferably not: this had
been his position. The new responsum permits a kiddush, blessing over
wine with refreshments in the synagogue in celebration of a girl’s Bat
242 Norma Baumel Joseph
Mitsva. He further permits her to say some “words,” milim, at the table,
in the synagogue. There are no sources presented, no argument ad-
vanced. All that we have is a change of terminology. A girl then, cannot
have a Bat Mitsva ceremony in the synagogue, but she can celebrate
her twelfth birthday there. There can be no festive meal, but they can
have a feast. She cannot deliver the traditional derasha, formal learned
discourse, but she can make a speech that will honor the occasion. In
R. Feinstein’s world, since words of Torah are the appropriate vehicle
of such a commemoration, milim most likely refers to a speech that
contains some Torah insight. And all this is done without any recogni-
tion that it in any way contradicts previous decisions. Nor is there any
acknowledgment that women who are exempt from the study of Torah
are now learned in words of Torah. In Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:
104, he mentions women’s exemption from study. A known fact.
36
Here he recognizes and gives implicit approval to women becoming
learned and publicly sharing their knowledge, thereby disregarding any
earlier prohibitions. This is of course consistent with his entire position
on the education of females: the significance here is the tacit accep-
tance that an exemption is not a prohibition.
37
Despite this understated acceptance, R. Feinstein repeats his dis-
like of the whole puberty ritual, male or female. Thus his attitude to
the “why” of a Bat Mitsva ceremony remains consistent. It is a simha
like any other joyous occasion, but the ceremony has no religious sig-
nificance. There is no to’elet, purpose, to a synagogue ceremony for
either a boy or a girl. Furthermore, he adds that although some excep-
tional individuals may benefit from the celebration, the majority of chil-
dren do not. Rather, for most Jews the ceremony involves desecration
of the Sabbath and, therefore, should be eliminated. The claim of the
individual is secondary to the requirements of the majority, and R.
Feinstein does not create a separate category for the elite, which he
does in other situations.
38
Finally, his condemnation does not extend
to the rabbi who, it appears, would like to allow some celebration to
be scheduled.
39
Consistently, his concern for the local rabbi’s position,
honor, and authority, as well as his desire to avoid local controversy,
yields a somewhat flexible text.
The significance of this responsum lies in its consistent rejection
of anything new that nonetheless results in substantive changes. Pivot-
ally, this responsum creates a new venue for a future rabbinic decisor.
Asked whether a family can celebrate a Bat Mitsva in the synagogue,
another rabbi relying only on R. Feinstein’s first text would necessarily
have to say no. Given this third text, that rabbi has room to maneuver—
leeway in which to satisfy the communal search for a proper recogni-
tion of a girl’s induction into ritual responsibility.
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 243
The fourth source, Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 2:30, dated 1961, is
not directly concerned with the Bat Mitsva. The main text focuses on
the proper use of a synagogue. A sanctuary exists for prayer and not
for parties. Prayer requires a place dedicated exclusively to holiness.
For R. Feinstein, synagogue means sanctuary and not a social hall. In
a separate responsum, Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 4:35, he discusses
the use of other rooms in the synagogue building. He declares that
they do not have any sanctity and, therefore, all general activities are
permitted. However, he firmly prohibits cards, bingo, and mixed danc-
ing. Significantly, for R. Feinstein the synagogue has special sanctity
only if it is devoted exclusively to prayer (and study). Any other activity
is inappropriate. Nonetheless, he recognizes that there are proper uses
for rooms in buildings that also house prayer rooms, though their syna-
gogue status might be compromised.
In the final paragraph of Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 2:30, he turns
to the question of celebrating a Bat Mitsva in the synagogue. Since it
does not involve an obligatory meal, it cannot be held in the synagogue
proper. If, however, the “synagogue” is one of those dedicated to both
prayer and parties, then it has the status of a social hall and not a
sanctuary. Thus, a proper celebration with a festive meal can take
place. In other words, if the synagogue is not “kaddosh,” sanctified,
then a proper Bat Mitsva celebration can take place there.
Once again, by emphasizing intent and changing words—syna-
gogue to “hall”—R. Feinstein increases the possibilities for a public cele-
bration when a girl reaches majority. While expanding the possibilities,
this decision appears to contradict the previous one. Is it only a kiddush,
wine and refreshments, that is allowed in a proper synagogue? In Ig-
gerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 4:36, R. Feinstein specifies that in the syna-
gogue, the designated location of prayer, no optional feast—se’udat
reshut—can take place. But a kiddush can be held even in the sanctuary.
In this text, it would appear that a festive meal and Bat Mitsva celebra-
tion can take place only in a place not dedicated primarily to prayer.
Combining the two positions, it seems that a girl’s twelfth birthday can
be celebrated only with a kiddush and milim, words, in the synagogue
proper. A different type of celebration can take place in public build-
ings sometimes associated with synagogues, but R. Feinstein never
specifies what such a ceremony would look like or is named. This res-
ponsum confirms the shift from Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:104. In
the former, no synagogue involvement was allowed. Now a kiddush can
be held in a proper synagogue and a joyful meal can be held anywhere.
In the first decision, no public celebration was permitted, and even
one in the privacy of the home was discouraged. Now a celebration in
the public arena has two possible venues.
244 Norma Baumel Joseph
In the final document, Iggerot Moshe Yoreh De’ah 3:14.4, dated
1977, R. Feinstein rules on the requirement for the recital of a special
thanksgiving blessing, sheheheyanu. For our purposes, its main signifi-
cance is that he treats boys and girls alike in this ritual act. Boys who
are thirteen and girls who are twelve are not renewing their obliga-
tions; rather, they have reached a level where their previous exemp-
tions no longer apply. Therefore, they do not recite this blessing of
renewal.
40
Both males and females reach a level of growth where they
are no longer exempt by virtue of age, even though women are categor-
ically exempt from specific ritual obligations. Nonetheless, in principle
women are like men—at the proper age they become juridical adults,
responsible for the corpus of Jewish law. The Bat Mitsva, according to
R. Feinstein’s legal interpretation, is on some grounds equal to, though
on others unlike, the Bar Mitsva.
It is interesting to compare this stance to the Ben Ish Hay. In the
nineteenth century, Rabbi Joseph Hayyim b. Elijah wrote about having
asimha for a girl on the day she becomes a Bat Mitsva.
41
He declared
that even though it was not the custom in his community (Baghdad) to
make a se’udat mitsva for her, nonetheless the event should be cele-
brated on that day and the girl should wear special (shabbat) clothing.
Additionally, if at all possible, she should put on something new so
that she could say the benediction sheheheyanu. R. Hayyim, in a rather
early document, posits that there is an equal sense of simha for boys
and girls as they reach juridical responsibility. He also anticipates R.
Feinstein in saying that there is no se’udat mitsva for the girl, but his
legal grounds are quite different. Different too is his brief note that it
is appropriate to celebrate this wonderful occasion. He also finds a way
to include the prayer sheheheyanu for both girls and boys. Although
both agree that the proper place for celebration is in the privacy of
one’s home, there is a very different tenor to the two documents.
42
SOURCES AND LEGAL REASONING
Rabbi Moses Feinstein bases his entire argument on two primary legal
distinctions or judgments. One concerns the proper use of the syna-
gogue and the other involves the required conditions for obligatory
celebrations. His legal reasoning is sound and consistent given those
two premises. He claims that a synagogue may be used only for pre-
scribed activities; it cannot be used for merely permitted functions.
Accordingly, a festive meal, even one for a charitable benefit, cannot
take place in the synagogue (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 2:30).
43
The
distinction is not between the permitted and the forbidden; obviously
an event to raise money for charity cannot be considered forbidden.
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 245
The legal issue revolves around the location of the event and the cate-
gories of what is permitted and prescribed. Things may be permitted,
though they cannot take place in certain locations. For R. Feinstein
reshut has no place in the beit knesset, sanctuary. In an earlier respon-
sum, Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:45, he does admit that Hasidim,
pious Jews, do permit optional celebrations to take place in the syna-
gogue, but he forbids it without presenting any argument or grounds.
On the other hand, a meal such as a se’udat mitsva can be held in the
sanctuary. He insists that he does not refuse a Bat Mitsva ceremony
because it is a ceremony for girls but because it remains in the optional
realm: not being prescribed, it cannot take place in the sanctuary.
Within this consistency, one glaring exception must be mentioned.
R. Feinstein acknowledges that a kiddush is permitted in the sanctuary—
even one in honor of a girl’s birthday. It is possible to argue that the
kiddush is in the realm of an obligatory Sabbath and holiday ritual, for
it allows the community to recite the required blessings over wine and
cake. But what could be his justification for allowing her to say words
of Torah? After all, according to R. Feinstein it is not a derasha which
would establish a se’udat mitsva. It is merely optional, since a girl is
not obligated in Torah study. Why is this optional item allowed in the
sanctuary? Moreover, why if the kiddush is permitted can it not be trans-
formed into an authoritative festive meal? R. Feinstein never entertains
these questions.
44
For him, items with distinct purposes and disparate
legal categories must be kept separate, and different words help keep
the necessary separations. His continued insistence on separations, es-
pecially between men and women, is at odds with many American
norms and patterns of behavior yet consistent with his own legal and
moral standards and cultural context.
The primary problem with this ruling is finding rabbinic sources
for it and discerning R. Feinstein’s reason for restricting the prescribed
category and its application. He never once mentions any sources to
corroborate his assertion. It is merely stated, as though all agree. At
the outset, there are serious halakhic positions that forbid any food in
the sanctuary.
45
Yet there is no mention of this prohibition nor of the
complex exemption for a se’udat mitsva.
46
None of his responsa ever
alludes to the debate over food as the basis for the distinction between
a prescribed event and a “merely” permitted one. R. Feinstein does not
explain why a kiddush may be held in the sanctuary. Nonetheless, he is
very deliberate in his choice of words. He does allow food in a syna-
gogue dedicated to prayer in honor of a Bat Mitsva while refusing to
bestow on it the classification of a se’udat mitsva. Why? More impor-
tantly, from where does he generate this discrimination of the optional
and its concomitant exclusion from the synagogue? There are sources
discussing the prohibition to eat and drink in the synagogue when the
246 Norma Baumel Joseph
celebration does not emanate from a commanded act.
47
Why does he
not refer to them? He does not even refer to his own earlier responsum
which raises some of these issues (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:45). His
decisions on synagogue practice—such as Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 2:
30—advance an evident standard that forbids the permissible. This
must be seen as the paramount halakhic enigma. What would he rule
about permissible acts or ceremonies that do not involve eating? His
discussion of the Bat Mitsva ceremony always hinges on its status as a
se’udat mitsva. What if there were to be no food involved? Finally, the
definitive contradiction in this sector resides in R. Feinstein’s stated
disapproval of Bar Mitsva ceremonies in light of his categorizing them
as prescribed and therefore authorized. In an earlier responsum, he
questions whether the Bar Mitsva actually retains the classification of a
prescribed event (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:45). Without ever en-
gaging the major sources that codify the Bar Mitsva as a se’udat mitsva
(he does fleetingly list them in Orah Hayyim 2:97), he shifts his posi-
tion of doubt to a definitive stance. In the above texts the Bar Mitsva
ceremony has undeniably become obligatory in R. Feinstein’s classifica-
tion.
His second major justification for denying the Bat Mitsva syna-
gogue ceremony depends on the category nikar, that which is recogniz-
able. A boy may legitimately celebrate his Bar Mitsva in a public syna-
gogue ceremony because his change of status is publicly in evidence.
Here he is not referring to the rabbinic discussion of visible growth, of
having those physical signs that we all associate with adulthood. It is
quite clear in the discussions in the Talmud and Maimonides that the
rabbis also considered the female signs of physical maturity as signifi-
cant and determinative of Bat Mitsva adulthood. R. Feinstein’s distinc-
tion between a boy’s ceremony and a girl’s ceremony lies in the realm
of minyan, the quorum of ten males essential for Orthodox public
prayer. Both boys and girls, upon reaching their respective age of ma-
jority, have a personal obligation to pray. However, communal halakhic
prayer is the preferred mode of fulfilling that obligation,
48
and only
males constitute that quorum. Males are counted in the public obliga-
tory quorums of ten and three.
49
That is nikar: a public ritual recogni-
tion, which entitles the boy of thirteen to a synagogue celebration. It is
the absence of any equivalent position that prevents the female cere-
mony from taking place in the synagogue, according to R. Feinstein.
50
Where is the support for this ruling? The distinction based on pub-
licly evident traits or actions is certainly well established in Jewish law.
The question rests with R. Feinstein’s use of it in this case. From where
does the equation of nikar with obligatory celebration come? He argues
that it emanates from the Talmudic description of Rabbi Yosef, who
was blind.
51
This story forms the basis of the laws of se’udat mitsva. The
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 247
question arose as to whether R. Yosef was exempt from public prayer
because of his blindness. Prayer and attendance at public service are
two obligations incumbent upon the “normal” male. Normalcy is usu-
ally defined in terms of competence derived from possessing all of
one’s faculties. Hence, the question arose concerning R. Yosef because
of his blindness. The decision that he was obligated allegedly pleased
him immensely in light of Rabbi Hanina’s ruling that commanded acts
are preferred to merely voluntary ones. In appreciation he declared a
festive day for the sages. R. Feinstein claims that the only way to under-
stand that section is through the application of nikar as the distinctive
and hence qualifying criteria that permits a se’udat mitsva. R. Yosef was
able to perform certain rituals on behalf of others.
52
Hence, as a repre-
sentative of others, his status was nikar, worthy of a se’udat mitsva.
53
Furthermore, what is to be considered nikar or publicly recogniz-
able? The Talmud clearly discusses that a twelve-year-old female must
fast on Yom Kippur. Does that occur in the public realm? For R. Feinstein
that ritual does not comprise a sufficient distinction. He is consistent
in that, in his view, neither the male rituals of aliyah nor tefillin are
sufficiently distinctive for the nikar status. A woman’s other ritual obli-
gations, notably candle lighting on Sabbath and festivals, take place in
the domestic realm. But one change seems quite nikar: after her twelfth
birthday, a girl may betroth herself. She is no longer dependent on her
father or brothers. In legal terms she is now a person.
54
Even this
change which is a very distinctive change of status, is not sufficient for
R. Feinstein. The only absolute difference is that the boy/man now
stands in a quorum; he has not just entered the community, he repre-
sents it and can perform, or contribute to the performance of, a com-
munal ritual obligation. It is of course exactly this absence of quorum
status and communal representation that is at the core of a great deal
of the feminist critique.
R. Feinstein’s rejection of a Bat Mitsva ceremony relies totally on
his singular determination of the se’udat mitsva category. Although
quite a few contemporary decisors rule that a girl’s twelfth birthday is
a cause for a se’udat mitsva (R. H. Grossberg, R. Y. Nissim, R. O. Haa-
daya, and R. Ovadia Yosef),
55
R. Feinstein refuses to confirm that cate-
gory here. Yet, even he recognizes that according to the general use
of the term, it would appear that a Bat Mitsva might justify a se’udat
mitsva.
The clearest description of the criteria for a se’udat mitsva is found
in the sixteenth century Yam Shel Shlomo,
56
written by Rabbi Solomon
Luria. The Bar Mitsva is considered an especially appropriate justifica-
tion for this prescribed festive meal since it provides an opportunity
for praise to God on the occasion of the boy’s attainment of his com-
plete ritual obligation. The discussion revolves around the Talmudic
248 Norma Baumel Joseph
concept of the obligatory being preferred to the voluntary, as noted
above.
57
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, in two responsa,
58
claims that the same is true
for the female. At age twelve and one day a girl enters the world of
adulthood precisely because she becomes obligated to all the laws that
are incumbent upon a female. She is thus no longer voluntarily fulfill-
ing her ritual role, but acting as commanded. She has risen from the
inferior halakhic status of not commanded and is now metsuveh ve’oseh,
obligated. Hence, she can have a se’udat mitsva to celebrate the attain-
ment of this status, conforming to the description in Yam shel Shlomo.
For R. Yosef there can be no distinction between the girl and the boy
in the application of this halakhic category.
59
He goes so far as to say
that it is a mitsva to celebrate a Bat Mitsva. Accordingly, there should
be a festive meal, the se’udah, words of Torah, and a dignified celebra-
tion with appropriate simha. In fact, after citing many different sources,
R. Yosef decides that not only is it legally appropriate but that there is
a moral imperative. By denying girls the opportunity to celebrate, he
maintains that the opponents of halakhic Judaism gain in their claims
that the Orthodox version of Judaism discriminates unfairly between
boys and girls.
Although sensitive to the charge, R. Feinstein absolutely disagrees.
In this respect boys and girls are different. There can be no formal
halakhic ceremony for a girl’s transition into adulthood. He then must
rely on this unusual use of the category of nikar, that which is evident
in the public ritual sphere, to prevent the equation of male and female
celebrations.
R. Feinstein’s reasoning is as follows: Only obligatory or prescribed
events can take place in the sanctuary/synagogue. A se’udat mitsva con-
firms an event as obligatory or prescribed. At a boy’s thirteenth birth-
day the change in his status has a public recognizable element. This
nikar factor establishes this as a se’udat mitsva. Hence, the Bar Mitsva is
a legitimate cause for a se’udat mitsva. A girl enters the world of obliga-
tions and is “commanded” at age twelve. There is equal simha value in
the occasion. There is no recognizable change in her public life, as she
can never represent the community. Without nikar there is no se’udat
mitsva. There can be no se’udat mitsva for a girl. Hence no Bat Mitsva
ceremony or celebration may take place in the synagogue proper.
Given this intricate legal argument it is worth noting not only how
he argues but also what he neglects. In the absence of a clear definition
or legal delineation of the se’udat mitsva, it is difficult to understand R.
Feinstein’s application of the term. According to him, the Bar Mitsva
ceremony can be labeled a se’udat mitsva because the boy’s entry into
adulthood is nikar. Does a marriage dictate a se’udat mitsva because the
change is publicly evident? In what way? What about the celebration
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 249
with a groom before his wedding, which R. Feinstein allows is a se’udat
mitsva (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:45)? What about that experience
is “recognizable”? Just as there is no methodical use of sources to gen-
erate this concept, there is no systematic development of the term with
a classificatory design. It is unclear how and when its use is necessary.
60
Is it only used here to prevent the female celebration from taking place
in the synagogue? No, since R. Feinstein does allow a kiddush and
“words” in the sanctuary in honor of the Bat Mitsva. Yet, nikar is used
conveniently to differentiate the male from the female ceremony; to
ensure that there is no analogy; to substantiate that the celebrations
are not indistinguishable and to safeguard the separation.
THE CEREMONY
Interestingly, Rabbi Feinstein ignores the issue of the type of ceremony
and the style of the “party.” In one aside he indicates that it must be
modest and proper (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 2:30),
61
but he again
does not elaborate. In contemporary America, the debate is precisely
over this issue of content. The ceremony is in fact an evolving distin-
guishing mark between the denominations. His only relevant comment
is to repudiate the idea of a Bat Mitsva because of its having originated
in the non-Orthodox world. Not only does he overlook the contempo-
rary debate, but he also makes no reference to the rabbinic debate
concerning blessings. There is a traditional parental blessing of formal
release, barukh she-petarani, made at the time of a Bar Mitsva. Some
would apply it to females, too.
62
R. Feinstein is silent on this issue.
These lacunae can be explained somewhat by the type of questions to
which he is responding. But since he frequently goes beyond the lim-
ited focus of a question, the ignored items offer clues to his major
preoccupation. R. Feinstein’s general, consistent pattern focuses on
protecting the sanctity of the synagogue, preventing any non-Orthodox
pattern from emerging in Orthodox synagogues, and promoting the
separation between male and female.
MAINTAINING SEPARATIONS
In these five short texts, Rabbi Feinstein manages to maintain his stan-
dard of separation. His overall disapproval remains constant, as does
his equation of male and female value. Girls reach Bat Mitsva on their
birthday, as do boys. Some form of celebration can take place in a
public arena, even the synagogue. Food can be eaten and words of
Torah spoken, even by the girl herself. But men are public figures with
250 Norma Baumel Joseph
communal responsibilities, and women are different. The ritual must
reflect those differences and all separations must be maintained.
63
R. Feinstein’s Bat Mitsva responsa confirm and continue his policy
of keeping the Orthodox world uncontaminated by non-Orthodox
communities. In the first document, he rejects the idea easily, espe-
cially since it emanates from the Conservative and Reform movements.
Without any serious analysis of the motivation for a celebration, of
the psychological impact, or of the sociological background, he merely
alludes to its source, implying that that is enough to automatically dis-
qualify something.
In contrast, Rabbi J. J. Weinberg, twentieth-century author of the
Sridei Esh, writing specifically about Bat Mitsva celebrations (3:93),
states that the source of the idea is irrelevant in determining permissi-
bility.
64
He claims that there is no violation of the biblical law forbid-
ding imitating gentile customs (Lev. 18:3). Those wishing to institute
the celebration do so out of a desire to strengthen the girl’s love of
commandments and pride in her people. In his analysis, application of
that law must depend on intention and not only on the source. R.
Weinberg further explains that earlier generations did not need to in-
vest in specific efforts to educate girls. The entire atmosphere was suf-
fused with Torah values and beliefs. Girls absorbed their Jewish heri-
tage without any special action, “almost nursing it from their mother’s
breasts.” Since he finds the opposite to be true today, he sees the Bat
Mitsva as one mechanism for attending to their necessary religious edu-
cation. In this text, R. Weinberg pays careful attention to the girl’s
personal feelings of discrimination, self-esteem, and spiritual pride.
The difference between the two decisors is one of attitude and
context, not legal reasoning. In fact, both forbid use of the sanctuary
for the celebration and R. Weinberg approvingly refers to R. Feinstein.
The difference lies in the tone of the decisions and the approach used.
R. Feinstein looks with disfavor on the whole endeavor, fighting any
similarity or shared environment with the non-Orthodox. R. Weinberg
discounts the Conservative and Reform source and looks instead to the
psychological and emotional motivations. Both operate within the
same legal tradition but from different standpoints vis-a
`-vis their com-
munity. R. Weinberg is concerned with the individual, with her feelings
of religious inclusion and sense of well being. R. Feinstein is concerned
with communal boundaries. As just noted, one of R. Feinstein’s goals
is to keep the Orthodox world separate from the non-Orthodox.
It is important to note the background of these contemporary rab-
binic differences. R. Weinberg functioned in a European context. R.
Yosef wrote in Israel. For these rabbis, the influence of the Conserva-
tive and Reform movements was negligible. R. Feinstein, working in
America with its great denominational divide, felt as though he must
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 251
battle with all things non-Orthodox.
65
It is significant that he does not
forbid the celebration because of its source. Rather, his prohibition is
based on his interpretation of the legal use of a sanctuary. Nonetheless,
in the course of responding, his evaluation of the source colors his
approach. Furthermore, he uses the decision to continue his barrage
against all things Conservative and Reform. He can find no good in
the proposed celebration, especially since it comes from “them.”
R. Feinstein’s ruling in this case remains consistent with his general
policy of making distinctions and keeping firm boundaries. The syna-
gogue (male defined and dominated) must be protected in order to
keep its distinct character and sanctity. It can be used only for the
purpose of mitsva, commanded or obligatory ritual expressions. Ironi-
cally, a Bat Mitsva ceremony, which will always remain in the realm of
reshut, optional, is categorically forbidden in the sanctuary. It would
appear that the ruling is not based on the fact that it is a girl’s celebra-
tion, but rather on the gender distinction that the girls’ celebrations
are optional and not obligatory, permitted, not prescribed. At its core,
his ruling is quite simple. Stripped of all his asides and personal views,
the synagogue’s sanctity and dedicated purpose frames the legal argu-
ment and determines the decision. The synagogue—the place of prayer,
of a commanded male quorum—must never be misused. Boys become
males and are part of that obligatory quorum. Their celebration may
take place in the sanctified synagogue. Social halls, even those located
in close proximity to the sanctuary, are fine for permitted optional
celebrations. Bat Mitsva celebrations of a kosher kind may take place
there. Despite all his misgivings and personal preferences, R. Feinstein’s
legal ruling sticks to the juridical domain of synagogue function always
keeping distinct the optional and obligatory, as he delineates them.
Keeping the categories of permitted and prescribed separate also
necessitates differentiating between boys and girls. Boys and girls are
equally considered responsible adults, although they are differently ob-
ligated, and their position in the community differs. According to the
vision of R. Feinstein, they have equal value and worth, but their ritual
and communal environment is distinct and that must be maintained.
The girl is Bat Mitsva, a fully obligated female, just as a Bar Mitsva is a
fully obligated male.
66
Notably, he insists the celebration quotient, the
simha level, is the same. Boys and girls are of equal value, and their
birthdays, especially this one, are worthy of equal festivity. As in other
texts (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 4:49), he is insistent that there is no
ascription of inferiority involved in the distinction. But the distinction
cannot be avoided. Boys celebrate their Bar Mitsva in the sanctuary
and the feast is considered prescribed. Boys become men who are com-
munal representatives in public prayer. Women can never attain that
status. Their ceremony is optional, never mandated. Initially, R. Fein-
252 Norma Baumel Joseph
stein forbids the synagogue location, but eventually permits a public
venue for the Bat Mitsva; however, its liturgical value can never equal
that of the Bar Mitsva. R. Feinstein is unwavering in affirming that
males and females are equal, different, and must be kept separate in
the realm of ritual.
IN AMERICA
The recent emphasis on Bar/Bat Mitsva ceremonies is characteristically
North American and symbolic of a major shift in the modern practice
of Judaism. In the premodern era Jewish celebrations focused on his-
toric and communal events. Rites de passage were minimal for the most
part. Certainly, they did not focus on the individual in the way that
today’s life cycle ceremonies do. Bar Mitsva celebrations were festive
communal occasions for emphasizing the integration, if not submer-
sion, of the individual into the community. The contemporary counter-
part is a celebration of the individual as an individual, focusing on her/
his accomplishment and singularity. This shift naturally fits into the
cultural context of American individualism. It is a personal experience
that is not privatized. It may take place in the community, in the public
sphere, but its purpose is the glorification and display of the individual,
not the collective. The battle for the Bat Mitsva becomes comprehensi-
ble in this changed environment. It is about the religious and commu-
nal celebration of women as individuals. Opportunities for personal
public ritual participation and support were once unavailable to women
and unimportant for both men and women. The changed emphasis in
the general Jewish community has resulted in a shift to increase wom-
en’s involvement and responsibility.
Rabbi Feinstein does not reject all opportunities for increased par-
ticipation of females in a public ritual context (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hay-
yim 4:49). It is only this public ritual that he renounces. He calls the
Bat Mitsva worthless or nonsense (hevel bealma,Iggerot Moshe Orah Hay-
yim 1:104), insinuating that since there is no purpose or function
served by the Bat Mitsva, there is no reason to start something new.
His attitude is consistent, as he adds that the Bar Mitsva is in no way
beneficial (Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 4:36). He admits quite plainly
that if he could, he would stop the entire custom, even though it origi-
nates in a religious duty. In both texts he mentions the deleterious
effects of the ceremony since it frequently causes people to violate the
Sabbath. Thus, instead of celebrating and embracing God’s law, it ulti-
mately involves a desecration. R. Feinstein is so overwhelmed by this
infraction, which he sees as common among Jews in America, that he
can see no value in the celebration.
67
He argues with his questioner
(Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 4:36) on just this point. There is no in-
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 253
creased commitment or devotion, “not even for one hour” (Iggerot
Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:104). In all these comments his sense of outrage
is apparent and his disapproval is resolute. He is focused on the totality
of the celebration and sees only desecration.
Others like Rabbi J. J. Weinberg have concentrated on the individ-
ual and her need for religious and communal affirmation. For many
rabbis and educators the celebration offers many benefits as a vehicle
of learning, commitment, and identification. They claim that anyone
who experiences this moment of public support, confirmation, and in-
clusion is often changed in subtle and everlasting ways.
This shift to highlight an individual as a Jew does not reverberate
in R. Feinstein’s decisions. He responds to individuals all the time: that
is the nature of responsa. He is neither unconnected nor unfeeling. In
private matters such as birth control, he takes special care to consider
all the needs, physical and emotional, of the individual.
68
But in writing
decisions for the entire community, he is compelled to a juridical stan-
dard that serves the collective and maintains the historical pattern as
he defines it.
R. Feinstein’s measure is one of immediate actions; he is not mea-
suring long-term identity or psychological factors. As a decisor, he re-
sponds to his perception of the immediate act, rather than long-term
intangibles. At one point, he even admits that an exceptional girl might
benefit in some way from the celebration. But because the majority will
not improve but will also, in fact, disgrace the community standard,
the act must be banned. The needs of the individual are submerged in
the necessity to protect the group.
Evidently, R. Feinstein is reacting to the perceived threat of moder-
nity with its violation of the Sabbath and collapse of all barriers. His
method enforces separations, keeps legal categories protected, main-
tains distinctions, strengthens boundaries, and decries unchecked
change. His goal is firmly fixed on group preservation and solidarity.
In this discourse, unlike some other arenas of his work, R. Feinstein
does not advocate or yield to the prevailing American version. He dis-
agrees with those who firmly believe that there are notable and vital
benefits. He does not see that in America, the rituals of Bar and Bat
Mitsva do in fact bring youngsters and their families to Torah.
69
None-
theless, embedded in his posture is an acceptance of a different Ameri-
can norm. The synagogue is the vital place to be protected from
change; it is the locus of religious practice.
CHANGE AND NO CHANGE
De facto, Rabbi Feinstein does allow a different configuration to
emerge. Given his dislike of the entire process and his initial ban on
254 Norma Baumel Joseph
synagogue usage, his final decision is quite startling. Under the guise
of opposition, of prohibiting any “new” ceremonial, R. Feinstein in fact
opens the door to a new format with a synagogue celebration of the
Bat Mitsva. In Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 1:104, as previously dis-
cussed, he specifically states that nothing can take place in the syna-
gogue and, furthermore, it is better not to start something new, even
if there is no prohibition involved such as with a party at home. But by
Iggerot Moshe Orah Hayyim 4:36 he has shifted the discussion with a
change in terminology. By using precise categories and specific words,
his decisions do not appear to require innovative legal reasoning. They
appear to permit the established pattern to continue. The synagogue
kiddush is a well-established tradition. Historically, it was recited Friday
night after services. R. Feinstein’s application refers specifically to the
North American custom of a Saturday morning recitation combined
with a communal social event. Claiming its applicability to the girl’s
twelfth birthday requires no justification, according to him. It is merely
a case of permitting the permissible without requiring extra judicial
explanation or authorization. The introduction of this ritual to honor
a female goes unnoticed as an innovation, as does his acceptance of the
Saturday morning congregational kiddush, and the institution of birthday
celebrations in the synagogue.
70
While resisting one aspect of American
culture, he readily accepts another. There is simha on this occasion,
and we designate such joyous events with a kiddush in synagogue.
Hence, we mark the girl’s birthday with this customary synagogue rit-
ual. No change in law has ostensibly transpired, but the result is a defi-
nite change in practice. Whereas in previous eras there was no mention
of a girl’s Bat Mitsva, no celebration in home, school, or synagogue, R.
Feinstein, while maintaining his disapproval, has paved the way for two
types of synagogue celebration. Thus, a girl can have a celebration with
a festive meal in the social hall of the synagogue building. She can also
consecrate the moment in the sanctuary itself with a kiddush and with
a speech. Innovation is permitted under the posture of preservation,
and those traditionalists who appear to oppose modern innovations,
often provide the vehicle of accommodation.
According to Rabbi Moses Feinstein’s responsa, a girl who is Bat
Mitsva can be honored in the sanctuary and there can be a public rec-
ognition of her attainment of majority. The form of the ceremony is
not similar to the Bar Mitsva for males, and it must signify their respec-
tive distinct legal capacities. Most importantly, perhaps, the format will
not approximate the Reform or Conservative custom. The distinctions
he is so concerned with have not been eroded. However, a liturgical
location has been found for this rite of passage, and it is in the public
domain of the synagogue. Without losing the critical thread of continu-
ity and tradition, without embracing all of American modernity, some-
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 255
thing new has entered the ritual program, and it has the potential to
change the face of the community.
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
NOTES
For helpful information and comments on earlier drafts, I would like to
thank Michael Oppenheim, Gilad Gevaryahu, Jack Lightstone, Ira Robinson,
Pamela Nadel, and my research assistant Sonia Zylberberg. This research was
funded in part by the Quebec government (FCAR).
1. For an excellent description of the development of distinct denomina-
tional rites of passage for boys and girls in the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury, see Jenna Weissman Joselit, “Red-Letter Days,” in The Wonders of America:
Reinventing Jewish Culture 1880–1950 (New York, 1994), pp. 89–133.
2. This refers to rituals marking the transition from one stage in the life
cycle to the next, most notably found at birth, death, marriage, and puberty.
Arnold van Gennep was the first anthropologist to note the importance of
these rituals in his book Les Rites de Passage, 1909 (reprinted: Chicago, 1960).
His phrase rites de passage has become a part of the language of anthropology
and sociology.
3. Maimonides mentions special celebrations involving a first-time bride.
In his Hilchot Ishut (10:13, 16:25), he refers to special celebrations the groom
held in honor of the bride: seven days for a virgin, three days for a widow.
Some of the customs involved special clothing and there was an element of
communal involvement. Ira Robinson first mentioned this reference to me.
4. For more discussion on feminism and Judaism in America, see Sylvia
Barack Fishman, A Breath of Life (New York, 1993). Also see my article clarify-
ing the transformative impact, “The Feminist Challenge to Judaism: Critique
and Transformation,” in Gender, Genre and Religion: Feminist Reflections, ed.
Morny Joy and Eva K. Neumaier-Dargay (Waterloo, 1995), pp. 47–70.
5. There has been a range of articles about Bat Mitsva celebrations in the
past thirty years. Some related articles include Cherie Koller-Fox, “Women and
Jewish Education: A New Look at Bat Mitzvah,” in The Jewish Woman: New
Perspectives, ed. Elizabeth Koltun (New York, 1976), pp. 31–42; Rabbi Alfred S.
Cohen, “Celebration of the Bat Mitzvah,” The Journal of Halakhah and Contem-
porary Society, Vol. 12 (Fall 1986), pp. 5–16; Byron Sherwin’s chapter, “Bar
Mitzvah, Bat Mitzvah,” in his In Partnership With God: Contemporary Jewish Law
and Ethics (Syracuse, 1990); Paula E. Hyman, “The Introduction of Bat Mitzva
in Conservative Judaism in Postwar America,” YIVO Annual, Vol. 19 (1990), pp.
133–146; and Erica Brown, “The Bat Mitzvah in Jewish Law and Contemporary
Practice,” in Jewish Legal Writings by Women, ed. Micah Halpern and Chana
Safrai (Jerusalem, 1998), pp. 228–254. In 1961 an Orthodox basis for the cere-
mony was proposed by Leon Katz in “Halakhic Aspects of Bar-Mitzvah and
Bat-Mitzvah,” Journal of Jewish Music and Liturgy, Vol. 9 (1986), pp. 22–30. See
also the description in Fishman, A Breath of Life. Jenna Weissman Joselit’s chap-
256 Norma Baumel Joseph
ter, “Red-Letter Days,” in her The Wonders of America adds an important histori-
cal context for the Bar/Bat Mitsva phenomenon in American Judaism. A new
book in Hebrew dedicated specifically to Bat Mitsva has just been published:
Bat Mitzvah: Collected Writings and Reflections, ed. Sara Friedland Ben Arza (Je-
rusalem, 2002).
6. See especially Cynthia Ozick’s point that the only place she is not a Jew
is in her synagogue, in “Notes Toward Finding the Right Question,” Lilith, Vol.
6 (Spring 1979), reprinted in On Being a Jewish Feminist, ed. Susannah Heschel
(New York, 1983), pp. 120–151.
7. As we will see, awareness of this concept is relevant for some rabbinic
decisors but most definitely not for Rabbi Feinstein.
8. See Audrey Richards, Chisungu; A Girls’ Initiation Ceremony among the
Bemba of Northern Rhodesia (London, 1956). The Bemba say they grow the child
into woman.
9. Many have written about these problems. See my brief reminiscence as
well as the other articles on these rituals: Norma Joseph, “When Do I Get to
Say Today I Am a Jew?,” Lifecycles, Vol. 1, ed. Rabbi Debra Orenstein (Ver-
mont, 1994), pp. 92–93.
10. Zvi Kaplan mentions the European origins of the ceremony in the Ency-
clopedia Judaica article but no details are given: “Bar Mitzvah, Bat Mitzvah,”
Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 4, pp. 243–247. Research into the history of the vari-
ous ceremonies is being undertaken by Gilad Gevaryahu, e-mail communica-
tion (9 September 1996; 14 January 2001). In “Il Bat Mitzva in Italia: Una
Riforma Discussa,” in L’Educatore Israelitico, Riccardo Di Segni notes the early
arguments between the Orthodox and Reform in Italy on this issue. Notewor-
thy are the nineteenth-century references to Bat Mitsva celebration in Il Vessillo
Israelitico (Pane, 1899), pp. 11–23, ed. Cav. Flaminio Servi, from 1899, 1901,
and 1902 in which various authors mention an iniziazione religiosa delle fanciulle
and la maggiorita delle fanciulle from as early as 1844. I am indebted to Franca
Coen Giorgio for these sources and to Ira Robinson for helpful translations.
There are a number of intriguing references to Bat Mitsva celebrations in
different European cities in the early twentieth century. Dov Sadan quoting a
Polish journal Voshkod, Vol. 88 (1902), p. 3, mentions a ceremony in Lwow in
1902, although it was called confirmation, in “Bat Mitzvah,” Dat Umada (Tevet,
1949), pp. 59–61. I am indebted to Jonathan Sarna and Gilad Gevaryahu for
this information. Gevaryahu also told me (phone, 30 May 2002) that Rabbi
Eliahu Hazan held a synagogue celebration for Bat Mitsva girls who had com-
pleted studies in religion and Jewish history in 1907 in Alexandria. Charlotte
Salomon had a Bat Mitsva in Berlin: see Mary Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint
Her Life (Berkeley, 1997); and Edda Servi Machlin describes her Bat Mitsva
experience in 1938 in Italy in her cookbook, The Classic Cuisine of Italian Jews
(New York, 1981), p. 69.
11. Jacob Rader Marcus, The American Jew, 1585–1990: A History (New
York, 1995), p. 196. Byron Sherwin claims the date to have been 1921 (Sher-
win, “Bar Mitzvah, Bat Mitzvah,” pp. 163–164). As noted above, there are refer-
ences to earlier occurrences in Europe. Gilad Gevaryahu, in a phone conversa-
tion (30 May 2002), informed me that he found a record of a Bat Mitsva
ceremony from 1907 in the Midwest.
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 257
12. See Brown’s appeal for standardization within the Orthodox world,
“The Bat Mitzvah,” p. 254. I would argue that while some form of standardiza-
tion is necessary, innovative tendencies and flexibility mark the Bat Mitsva cere-
monies with more meaning and inspiration.
13. Fishman, A Breath of Life, pp. 132–133.
14. I recently heard of Bat Mitsva ceremonies taking place in the Haredi
communities of Israel at the tomb of Rachel in the women’s section. I also
know of Lubavitch Bat Mitsva celebrations now taking place in synagogues in
Montreal. In some Habad communities the girl presents a discourse on one of
the Rebbe’s sichot. L. M. Berkowitz, e-mail communication (16 January 2001).
15. Many rabbis and scholars cite only his first and most negative respon-
sum. Getsel Ellinson, Ha-Isha Ve-Ha-Mitsvot (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 171–184; J.
David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol. 1 (New York, 1977), p. 77;
Michael Kaufman, The Woman in Jewish Law and Tradition (Northvale, 1997),
p. 257; Sherwin, “Bar Mitzvah, Bat Mitzvah”; Brown, “The Bat Mitzvah.” Only
Rabbi Alfred Cohen, in “Celebration of the Bat Mitzvah,” notes the variety of
responses in Rav Moshe’s responsa.
16. Many historians claim no evidence pre-1400. Byron Sherwin disputes
this theory of the late innovation of the ceremony. He claims dates for parts
of the ritual well before the fifteenth century. However, even he concludes:
“The exact origin of the bar mitzvah ceremony is indeterminable.” At times
the dispute is more a factor of confusion between the legal concept of Bar
Mitsva and the ceremonial celebration of that status (Sherwin, “Bar Mitzvah,
Bat Mitzvah,” p. 153).
17. Rabbi Feinstein is so uncomfortable with the celebration of even Bar
Mitsva that he states quite clearly, “If I had the power, I also would cancel the
celebration of Bar Mitsva for boys in our country.” IM OH 1: 104.
18. TB Bava Metzia 96a, Kid. 16b, and Nid. 45.
19. TB Yoma 85.
20. Rashi on “children,” TB Yoma 82a.
21. Avot 5:21.
22. Niddah 5:6.
23. TB Niddah 16b.
24. Yad, Ishut 2:9–10.
25. Soferim 18:5.
26. Kaplan, “Bar Mitzvah, Bat Mitzvah.” The clearest reference to a festive
meal for a boy on his thirteenth birthday is found in the work of Rabbi Shlomo
Luria (sixteenth-century Poland), Yam Shel Shlomo,TBBava Kamma, 7:37.
27. The absence of these ritual expressions for women is exactly the prob-
lem for many from either an Orthodox or feminist perspective. See Koller-Fox,
“Women and Jewish Education.”
28. Some sources are noted in: Ellinson, Ha-Isha Ve-Ha-Mitsvot, Vol. 1, p.
180; J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol. 1 (New York, 1977),
p. 78; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yabia Omer, Vol. 6, p. 29; and Yehaveh Da’at, Vol. 2, n.
29. There are indications of nineteenth-century celebrations in Italy (see note
10) and in Europe, under the authority of Rabbi Avraham Musafiya (see note
59).
258 Norma Baumel Joseph
The statement of the Ben Ish Hay, R. Joseph Hayyim b. Elijah, is found in his
discussion of parashat Re’eh, note 17, Vol. 1, p. 132. See also my discussion below.
Many have listed Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger of Germany as favoring some form
of puberty celebration. Rabbi Mordecai Breuer stated that he heard from
Rabbi Shlomo Adler, who had seen a printed sermon of Rabbi Ettlinger honor-
ing a Bat Mitsva, Ma’ayan, Vol. 2 (1972), p. 61. This is cited in Ellinson, p.
178. The confusion about his position has continued despite Judith Bleich’s
refutation in her Ph.D. dissertation, “Jacob Ettlinger, His Life and Works”
(New York University, 1974) and her “Between East and West: Modernity and
Traditionalism in the Writings of Rabbi Yehi’el Ya’akov Weinberg,” in Engag-
ing Modernity, ed. Moshe Sokol (Northvale, 1997), pp. 169–273. However, it is
clear in Ettlinger’s Binyan Tzion, 107 (1867), p. 145, that he opposed confirma-
tion and any similar celebration. Rather, in accordance with Danish regula-
tions, he gave some girls a public exam on the completion of their religious
studies (limudei kodesh) and then delivered a sermon. All this took place in the
synagogue. According to Gilad J. Gevaryahu, e-mail posting of H-Judaic (14
January 2001, #1), Ettlinger “did participate in a ‘ceremony’ in the middle of
the 1800s—but it was not called ‘confirmation’ nor ‘bat mitzvah’ and was educa-
tional in nature.” I am indebted to Gevaryahu, who is researching the history
of these events.
29. The laws forbidding imitation of non-Jewish customs are biblical (Lev.
18:3). Whether this drifts into a prohibition to mimic the customs of the non-
Orthodox—or, as some claimed, the heretics—marks the assorted responsa.
30. It is ironic to note that his disdain for the ceremony parallels that of
the early Reform movement in America, since his disapproval, in part, ema-
nates from his assumption that the ceremony comes from the Reform move-
ment. See the discussion of Reform and Conservative disapproval in Jenna
Joselit, op. cit.
31. He is very critical of one respondent who mistakenly claims that women
are not Bat Mitsva. IM YD 2:45.
32. There are a number of twentieth century rabbinic decisors who assert
that a se’udat mitsva is held in honor of a girl’s Bat Mitsva on her birthday.
Rabbi Y. Nissim, Noam 7:4; Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Yabia Omer 6:29.4; Rabbi Cha-
noch Grossberg, Ma’ayan 13:42.
33. In fact, he only sees possible violations of law. But he recognizes that
he cannot stop the Bar Mitsva celebrations and so he does not argue that an act
which leads one to sin, by violating the Sabbath, is prohibited. Undoubtedly, if
he thought the act directly violated the law, he would issue an explicit ruling
prohibiting such a ceremony. Nonetheless, Jewish legal categories might allow
for such a prohibition based on the resulting violations. Instead he allows the
custom to stand. Yet, in yielding to the prevalent system, he manages to sustain
his disapproval. It is possible that he is using this opportunity to indicate to
the elite that even for boys the ceremony is problematic. He states his doubts
and his preference, but does not issue a ruling because he is not confident that
anyone will stop the boys’ celebrations. He asserts that it is too difficult to
suppress. This statement is a very interesting acceptance of the limit of his
power or authority in a document whose ruling is presented solely on the basis
of that authority.
Ritual, Law, and Praxis 259
34. Rabbi Feinstein never refers to the visible absence of girls from the
men’s section after their Bat Mitsva.
35. Rabbi Feinstein’s unique development of the se’udat mitsva concept is
discussed later in this section.
36. One aspect of the Bar Mitsva ceremony not discussed by Rabbi
Feinstein is the blessing Barukh she-petarani me’onsho shel zeh. The argument
amongst decisors claiming a father cannot say it on the occasion of a Bat Mitsva
relies on the fact that he is not obligated to teach his daughter Torah. See
Brown, “The Bat Mitzvah,” p. 234, and Ellinson, Ha-Isha Ve-Ha-Mitsvot, pp.
172–173. Leon Katz, citing some of the same sources, claims that this blessing
can also apply to a Bat Mitsva and should be part of the ceremony in “Halakhic
Aspects of Bar-Mitzvah and Bat-Mitzvah,” p. 28.
37. See my “Jewish Education for Women: Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s Map of
America,” American Jewish History, Vol. 83 (1995), pp. 205–222.
38. Ira Robinson, “Because of Our Many Sins,” Judaism, Vol. 35 (1986), pp.
35–46.
39. Regrettably, there is no indication of what the rabbi had permitted.
40. Interestingly, the Ben Ish Hay determines that a father should buy a
twelve-year-old girl a new dress so that she might say the sheheheyanu blessing.
Thus, he uses the new article of clothing to give the girl an opportunity to say
this blessing on the occasion of her Bat Mitsva.
41. Note 17, parashat re’eh, Vol. 1.
42. Obviously, there are many explanations. One pertinent factor is the
influence of twentieth-century America on Rabbi Feinstein.
43. According to his distinctions, use of a social hall in the synagogue is
permitted.
44. Rabbi Feinstein’s refusal to accept a woman saying an English prayer in
the synagogue (IM OH 4:70) might be offset by this approval of milim from a
girl in synagogue.
45. TB Megillah 28, ShA OH 151:1.
46. TJ Sanhedrin 8:2.
47. For a different approach see Yehaveh Da’at 3:10 in which R. Ovadia
Yosef cites many of the sources, including Feinstein’s earlier one.
48. Moshe Meiselman, Jewish Woman in Jewish Law (New York, 1978), p. 135.
49. In fact, women are counted in the quorum of three women for grace
and ten people for megillah and martyrdom. However, the primary quorum is
the one for public prayer.
50. This emphasis raises questions on the nature of the obligatory meal for
a wedding, a pidyon ha’ben, or a circumcision.
51. TB Bava Kamma 87a.
52. TB Pesachim 116.
53. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef criticizes the use of nikar in this fashion as having
no foundation in law, Yehaveh Da’at 2:29. Rabbi Gombiner, the Magen Avra-
ham, uses the same reasoning of public, quorum, and recognizable in explain-
ing why a father says the blessing, Barukh she-petarani, only for sons (425:4).
54. Judith Romney Wegner, Chattel Or Person? The Status of Women in the
Mishnah (New York, 1988).
55. See note 32.
260 Norma Baumel Joseph
56. TB Bava Kamma 7:37.
57. Gadol metsuveh ve’oseh, discussed in TB Bava Kamma 87a and Kid-
dushin 31a.
58. Yehaveh Da’at 2:29, 1978; Yabia Omer 6:29.4, 1986.
59. His one condition is that the se’udah conforms to the rules of modesty.
He then relates the decision of Rabbi Abraham Musafia, written in the latter
part of the nineteenth century but first printed in Noam, 7 (5724, 1964), p. 4,
who claims that there is no difference between a boy and a girl in terms of the
obligatory nature of the festive meal and that this festive meal is customarily
held for boys and girls in France.
60. Rabbi Feinstein does address the use of the term in two other docu-
ments, OH 1:157 and OH 2:12. In both texts, he expands on the obligation to
have a se’udat mitsva after completing the study of a specific text corpus. How-
ever, even in these, he does not clarify the full concept nor explore the range
of application.
61. This concern is also specified in the responsa of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.
62. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef favorably quotes Rabbi A. Aburbia who recom-
mends saying the blessing without God’s name. Yabi’a Omer OH 6:29, p. 98.
63. Rabbi Feinstein’s disapproval of the Bat Mitsva is based, among other
things, on his desire to maintain gender distinctions. Reform movement sup-
porters’ early disapproval emanated from their fear that it was a way to main-
tain gender separation and avoid their egalitarian confirmation standard.
64. See the biography of Rabbi Weinberg by Marc Shapiro, Between the Ye-
shiva World and Modern Orthodoxy (London, 1999). Pages 209–221 discuss R.
Weinberg’s Bat Mitsva responsum.
65. Rabbi Yosef’s battle appears to be against Ashkenazic customs found
amongst the Sephardim.
66. Interestingly, he affirms the status of a female adult as a Bat Mitsva,
ritually responsible, in his ruling on a woman as a mashgiah (IM YD 2:45).
67. It is difficult to understand this position. Is this desecration of the Sab-
bath found in the Orthodox community according to Rabbi Feinstein? The
questioners are rabbis known within the Orthodox world. Are their congre-
gants violating the Sabbath so rampantly? Clearly, this is part of his disdain for
the evils of America and for its negative influence on American Jews.
68. This issue is discussed in my article “Searching for a Woman’s Voice in
Responsa Literature,” in Shofar, guest editor Rochelle Millen (Summer 1998),
pp. 40–50.
69. Fishman quotes a study in which girls described their Bat Mitsva experi-
ence as “profoundly spiritual and moving” in A Breath of Life, pp. 133–134. She
also presents an interesting argument, namely that it was due to the prepara-
tory needs of the Bat Mitsva ceremony that Conservative and Reform Jews
began to send their daughters to Jewish schools (A Breath of Life, p. 191). The
growth of adult Bat Mitsva ceremonies adds a whole new chapter to this issue.
70. We do have rabbinic reference to birthday celebrations. The Ben Ish
Hay, in writing about the Bat Mitsva girl’s celebration, notes the custom of
having a birthday party at home.
