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Constitutional Medicine
Abstract
Acknowledging the growing attention being paid to constitutional engineering in post-conflict situations like Afghanistan, Iraq and the Sudan, among others, this article seeks to offer a new methodological framework through which to investigate the ability of democratic design to help manage conflict in fragile and divided societies. A theoretical construct rooted in theories of alignment and complementarities is outlined from which testable hypotheses can be drawn.The framework used to analyze the practice of constitutional design emerges from the lessons of medical diagnosis and treatment. (i) It is argued that designing a constitution to help stabilize a nation state is much like treating a sick patient -- and failed political settlements are often born of poor diagnosis or mistreatment. (ii) There is a temporal aspect to constitutional engineering which follows the medical continuum of triage, emergency medicine, convalescence, and longer term health management. Thus there is a pressing need for political institutions to be flexible enough to adapt to the differing needs of differing stages of democratic development. (iii) Within the constitutional framework political institutions need to be holistically integrated and compatible; i.e., that must be properly aligned. (iv) There has been a pattern of both rushing to surgery (elections) before the patient was stabilized and then compounding the danger by discharging the patient (donor's extrication) before the state is healthy enough for democracy to endure.
... This has created numerous criticisms on this theory. It has been criticised for being a therapy to be used as a measure of last resort when all other measures have failed due to its tendency to aggravate conflict situations in the long run (Reynolds, 2005;Noel, 2005). ...
... Horowitz (1985), the fiercest critic of Lijphart's (1977) consociational approach to power sharing, contends that consociationalism has tendencies of naturalising social cleavages and creating a fractured nation state that exists under conditions of a perpetual possibility of conflict whenever vested interests are violated. This is confirmed by other studies such as those by Reynolds (2005) and Noel (2005), who note that consociational power sharing has a tendency to aggravate conflict situations in the long term by making internal divisions within a state a permanent problem. They argue that consociationalism legislates identity politics at the expense of nation-building. ...
... This was in contrast to the Kenyan GNU, which was an oversized cabinet type of GNU that included only key political parties and had a limited life span. The inclusion of groups such as civil society, traditional leaders, and faith-based organisations that have crosscutting cleavages and greater segmentation in the grand coalition type of power sharing adopted in Liberia had the ability to neutralise the destabilising tendencies of consociational power sharing identified by Horowitz (1985), Reynolds (2005), and Noel (2005) experienced in Kenya's oversized-cabinet approach. These findings imply that for GNUs to be successful, they should include players who command overarching loyalties and have a longer life expectancy. ...
This study comparatively examined how governments of national unity (GNUs) in Liberia (2003), Kenya (2008), and Zimbabwe (2009) served as an institutional engineering mechanism for political stability, inclusion, and socio-economic and human development (SEHD) in sub-Saharan Africa. It was conducted under the auspices of consociational theory and the liberal institutional reform approach to peacebuilding. The main research question of this study was: Are GNUs a necessary political solution to facilitate political stability, as well as to facilitate post-conflict cooperative governance or coalitions for the advancement of economic development and human security as set out in Africa’s Agenda 2063? The study found that political stability measured in terms of peacefulness, rule of law, political inclusion, and political freedom indicators improved during GNU power sharing in two sampled GNU cases. Some SEHD indicators in the post-GNU segment also improved compared to the pre-GNU period. The study observed that capability of GNU power sharing to improve political stability and SEHD was more in cases that had more favourable contextual factors and adhered to more key conceptual principles of consociationalism in a power-sharing framework. External pressures
and guarantees were very useful in creating the sticks and carrots needed to create a successful GNU in all cases. The study contributes to liberal institutional reform approach to peacebuilding by redefining political stability to include indicators such as the rule of law, respect for human rights and SEHD in addition to the cessation of hostilities as key result areas to be assessed in evaluating the successes of GNUs. To consociational theory, the study contributed by developing analytical frames that can be used to collect and create public datasets on GNUs and conceptualise peacebuilding interventions in a manner that emphasises sustainable development goals. This study argues that the cessation of hostilities after GNUs can only mean sustainable political stability when accompanied by the institutionalisation of strong rule of law, respect for human rights and addressing socio-economic triggers of political instability. The conclusion that the inclusion of more conceptual tenets of consociational power sharing in GNUs increases political stability and SEHD in a post-conflict era is of primary interest to institutional designers in divided societies and regional and international peace and development players.
Keywords: Government of national unity, Power sharing, Socio-economic and human
development, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Liberia
... U našem radu su takođe testirani efekti centripetalnog izbornog sistema ali za slučaj zakonodavnog organa, pri čemu smo došli do drugačijih zaključaka. Sa druge strane, zagovornici centripetalnog ili integracionističkog pristupa kritikuju list-PR zbog toga što on samo preslikava društvene podjele u političke institucije umjesto da ih na određen način prevazilazi (Horowitz 1991(Horowitz , 2002Reilly 2001Reilly , 2006Reynolds 2005). U etnički podijeljenim društvima politički djelatnici su motivisani da mobilišu glasove samo od pripadnika vlastite etničke grupe u čemu im pomaže list-PR upravo zbog toga što ravnomjerno transponuje glasove određene etničke grupe u broj mjesta u parlamentu. ...
... U kontekstu postojećeg izbornog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini autori su predlagali izmjene u pravcu integracionističkog glasanja kako bi se oslabile podjele i podstaknuo centripetalizam u stranačkom sistemu (Rajli 1997;Reynolds 2005;Mujkić 2008). Političko umjerenjaštvo se može podsticati pomoću STV jer bi stranke druge preferencije tražile u "tuđim" etničkim zajednicama (Rajli 1997: 140), pa bi se samim tim ohrabrilo prekoetničko glasanje (Mujkić 2008: 131). ...
Unutar naučne literature koja se bavi političkom i institucionalnom regulacijom duboko podijeljenih i postkonfliktnih društava izborni sistem ima veoma zapaženo mjesto. Jedna od pretpostavki je da izborni sistem podstiče političke aktere na umjerenije ili radikalnije ponašanje i djelovanje. Proporcionalni izborni sistemi su veoma rasprostranjeni i generalno se smatra kako su najadekvatniji za predstavljanje društvenih grupa iako je uspješnost njihovih efekata sporna. Dva tipa proporcionalnih sistema-sistem stranačkih lista i pojedinačni prenosivi glas-su suprotstavljeni jedan drugome sa stanovišta podsticanja političkih aktera na politički umjereno ponašanje. Sistem stranačkih lista je kritikovan zbog podsticanja radikalnijeg ponašanja za razliku od pojedinačnog prenosivog glasa koji podstiče umjerenije ponašanje. Efekti navedena dva tipa proporcionalnih sistema će se komparirati na studiji slučaja izbora za Predstavnički dom Parlamentarne skupštine Bosne i Hecegovine 2000. godine, upotrebom protivčinjenične simulacije. Suprotno očekivanim ishodima pojedinačnog prenosivog glasa izborna simulacija će pokazati kako se sistem stranačkih lista pokazao kao uspješnije institucionalno rješenje sa stanovišta podsticanja političkog umjerenjaštva. Pojedinačni prenosivi glas ne bi uticao na međuetničku razmjenu preferencija niti bi umjerene manje stranke bile predstavljene za razliku od sistema stranačkih lista koji je omogućio njihovu predstavljenost. Ključne riječi: Izborni sistem; proporcionalni sistem; izbori; Bosna i Hercegovina Stefan Vukojević Simulacija primjene izbornog sistema pojedinačnog prenosivog glasa u Bosni i Hercegovini-slučaj izbora za Parlamentarnu skupštinu 2000. godine DHS 1 (18) (2022), 313-332
... The question is, why do post-communist elites undermine the very democratic institutions they helped create? Studies of transitions in Central and Eastern Europe have, for the most part, viewed them as engineered over a (relatively) short period of time, by elites making choices formally establishing democratic institutions: adopting or amending constitutions, electoral systems, parliaments and (Constitutional) courts (Bunce 2003Elster et al. 1998Di Palma 1990;O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986;Offe 1991;Reynolds 2005). Developments and choices taking place from the start of weakening of authoritarian rule to the first free elections were considered crucial for the shape of the emerging regimes, making "immediate influences more important than historical considerations" (Bunce 2003, 170). ...
This article proposes that to understand backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe, we need a broad “Tillyian perspective” emphasising elite–citizen interactions and the role of the state. The article views backsliding as the outcome of processes of state capture by rent-seeking elites united in party ideological or network configurations. Simultaneously, citizen protests provide an indication of (Tillyian) struggles for the growth of democracies with a broader societal basis. As different societal interests emerge, some engage in a struggle against elite coalitions, while others embrace conservative values. Based on this analysis, sustainable democracy will depend on broad societal mobilisation to defend democratic principles.
... International involvement in constitution building also deserves further scholarly attention. "Constitutional medicine" (Reynolds 2005) imposed by foreigners has the noble aim of "curing the patient," but in terms of addressing the root causes of the conflict the result have at times been less than successful. In conflicts where ethnic identities have been salient, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, foreign advice for post-conflict constitutions has resulted in the institutionalization of ethnicity, resulting in challenges for long-term peace and democratization (Belloni 2004). ...
... He sketches favourable conditions for consociational democracy. He and other scholars pay much attention to the importance of constitution to make democracy works properly (Lijphart 2004;Horowitz 2000;Issacharoff 2004;Reynolds 2005). ...
... Also, as Andrew Reynolds has noted 'like medications, institutional remedies themselves are seldom if ever sufficient' and 'constitutional therapists often get it wrong'. (Reynolds 2005). Even scholars like Roger Southall who believe that proportional representation deserves more consideration in Kenya admit there 'is a marked circularity about Kenyan politics' that has 'negated reform and left politicians unaccountable' (Southall 2009). ...
This paper examines the lessons learned from Kenya's 2007 post election violence and what has happened since then. It notes that the root causes of the violence still persist, have not been addressed, and easily could be reignited. Faced with a situation where institutions and the rule of law have been weakened deliberately and where diffused violence is widespread, both Kenya's transition to democracy and the fate of the nation remain vulnerable. The argument here is that the problems faced in holding and managing elections in conflict situations often are not simply technical. Instead, in Kenya and elsewhere, many difficulties are symptomatic of larger political and institutional questions related to democratic change that are more difficult to analyze in causal terms or to address.
... He sketches favourable conditions for consociational democracy. He and other scholars pay much attention to the importance of constitution to make democracy works properly (Lijphart 2004;Horowitz 2000;Issacharoff 2004;Reynolds 2005). ...
To build a democracy is to choose a model of democracy. Countries that are building their democracy have often been faced to choose a model of democracy that is suitable to their particular needs. Theoretically and practically, there are some models of democracy. This article discusses the prospect of constitutional democracy for divided societies by putting constitution as a social contract for them. It argues that if a common consensus for a constitution has been reached, then the prospect of a harmonized society can be realized since people have a common platform that binds them legally, politically and socially. By taking Indonesia as a case, it argues that constitutional democracy is relatively able to overcome potential conflict in a divided society. Thus constitutional democracy should be considered as a resolution for divided societies.
This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.
This paper analyses the introduction and functioning of certain consociational elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia. These states share the common experience within the SFRY and they both emerged from its dissolution. The Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 and the Ohrid Agreement of 2001 terminated the conflict which had resulted from deep divisions within these societies. Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of segments of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, accompanied with Muslim (Islamic), Orthodox and Catholic religions. In Macedonia the Macedonian and Albanian segments are dominant, accompanied with Orthodox and Muslim religions as well as with different languages. While BiH is institutionalized with a high level of decentralization of two entities, the Federation and the Republic of Srpska, with federal elements, the solutions offered in Macedonia remained within the framework of a unitary state. The horizontal division of power is characterized by a kind of proportional representation and power-sharing. The Dayton and Ohrid Agreements left aside the guarantees for protection of smaller national communities. The choice of this model was rather under the external than under the internal influence. The solutions, initiated mostly from outside, led to termination of conflicts, however without producing functional states. The example of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia mostly confirms certain critiques addressed to the consociational model of democracy. Existence of actual economic problems, increase of unemployment and corruption cannot be directly put into connection with consociational arrangements. An impression is obtained that (constitutional) patriotism is rather reduced to one’s own entity or ethnic group than related to the state as a whole. Prevention of conflicts has been obtained. Whether this is their freezing or regulation and to what extent the solutions are (self)sustainable, the time will show.
The rise of identity politics has been surprising in two countries that have benefitted extensively from EU membership. To address the puzzle, the paper suggests that the EU vision of common and inclusive identity, grounded in a formal set of rules, had its strongest effect before and immediately after accession. Yet, its intensity was short-lived and mistaken for a popular embrace of multiculturalism. To understand this dynamic, the paper traces the interactions between citizens and elites, as well as the tradeoffs and complementarities between democracy and legitimacy in the two countries.
The aim of this text is to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the theory of consoci- ational democracy. Following an introduction, discussion and criticism of this theory, the paper briefly discusses other selected models of institutional arrangements being designed to facilitate stable democracies in divided societies, centripetalism or integrative (inclusive) majoritarianism and integrative consensualism, respectively. These two models of conflict management in plural societies have grown from the criticism of the original consociatio- nal framework. While the consociational model is based on a communal perspective and its main objectives are inclusiveness and proportionality, the latter two models build on an integrative perspective on conflict management in plural societies while they place the main emphasis on electoral system as a key institution for inter-ethnic accommodation. While centripetalism focuses on the moderation and accommodation of conflict, integrative con- sensualism seeks to synthesize both previous models to eliminate their shortcomings and to show their positive qualities. Empirical experience, however, shows that all the theoretical models represent “only” ideal types of conflict management. In the practice of constitutio- nal engineering in heterogenous societies, there are often different combinations of these approaches, and rarely one of these types is applied in terms of the divided companies in pure form.
Lebanon’s complex consociational democracy has been the subject of intense scholarly debate, especially with regard to its outdated and controversial electoral system. This paper argues that the current majoritarian electoral lawsserves to undermine democracy and exacerbate sectarian tensions, as it now runs counter to the original integrationist goals for which it was designed. After exploring the numerous existing reform proposals within the broader debate on power sharing in divided states, an alternative electoral formula that accounts for Lebanon’s political geography and reform objectives shall be proposed. This multi-phased approach could in turn provide a framework for electoral engineering in other conflict-ridden, multi-ethnic states.
At the heart of all civil war endings is the question of institutional choice. At stake in these conflicts, in the most general sense, is the configuration of the political system. The question is not (or no longer) the boundaries around the state, but what type of government should rule its population. At stake too, in the aftermath of war, is the issue of rebuilding a viable political system that reduces, not exacerbates, conflict. A civil war can destroy a country’s infrastructure as well as administrative and political institutions, and typically cause a high degree of conflict and distrust between different population groups. Such conditions are not fertile grounds for the establishment of democracy. Thus, determining the appropriate political system for a country emerging from an internal war is just the first step—the second, and often more difficult, step is determining the appropriate process of establishing a viable democracy.
Consociational democracy is both highly contested in the academic literature and widely used by constitutional engineers working to re-establish democratic governance in deeply divided polities. This work seeks to understand why elites in Cyprus have been thus far unprepared to share power. As a first step in this project, the present chapter will examine whether the body of ‘consociational’ ideas, on which efforts at a political settlement have drawn, can create a stable political system which promotes and reinforces co-operation, and is able to manage potential political conflict. There are a number of important criticisms of consociational theory which are also highlighted by the Cyprus case. These criticisms, described initially in this chapter and examined further in later chapters, provide insight into why political settlement has been so elusive in Cyprus.
Dieser Beitrag betrachtet Wahlsysteme und fasst die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse aus der Literatur zu Wahlsystemen in etablierten und jungen Demokratien zusammen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf den Auswirkungen des Wahlrechts auf den Typus des Parteiensystems und dessen Rolle als Vermittler zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat in pluralen Gesellschaften.
Dieser Beitrag betrachtet Wahlsysteme und fasst die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse aus der Literatur zu Wahlsystemen in etablierten und jungen Demokratien zusammen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf den Auswirkungen des Wahlrechts auf den Typus des Parteiensystems und dessen Rolle als Vermittler zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat in pluralen Gesellschaften.
The United Nations and many members were unenthusiastic when Nicaragua, a sovereign state, invited the UN to observe its elections in 1989. However, the UN accepted the invitation, and UN electoral services have since reached over 100 members. This article investigates UN involvement in elections from 1989 to 2006 and identifies important changes over that time in the kinds of electoral services that the UN provided. These changes cannot be explained solely by shifts in member interests, international norms, the distribution of power, or the market for electoral services. Instead, the UN made modest reforms to manage the conflicting pressures that these external shifts produced without stretching scarce resources or weakening its perceived legitimacy. However, each modest reform-an exception, symbolic institutional change, or new leadership vision-triggered additional changes by reconstituting member or bureaucratic preferences. This article specifically highlights three change processes that these reforms triggered: normalizing deviance, expanding demand, and offering political cover. These findings have important implications for scholarship on UN reform, the provision of electoral services, and the role of the UN's leadership.
Can democratic states transplant the seeds of democracy into developing countries? What have political thinkers going back to the Greek city–states thought about their capacity to promote democracy? How can democracy be established in divided societies? In this timely volume a distinguished group of political scientists seeks answers to these and other fundamental questions behind the concept known as “democracy promotion.” Following an illuminating concise discussion of what political philosophers from Plato to Montesquieu thought about the issue, the authors explore the structural preconditions (culture, divided societies, civil society) as well as the institutions and processes of democracy building (constitutions, elections, security sector reform, conflict, and trade). Along the way they share insights about what policies have worked, which ones need to be improved or discarded, and, more generally, what advanced democracies can do to further the cause of democratization in a globalizing world. In other words, they seek answers to the question, Is democracy exportable?
Although peacebuilders do not operate from a common template, liberal values so define their activities that their efforts can be called liberal peacebuilding. Many postconflict operations aspire to create a state that contains the rule of law, markets, and democracy. Growing evidence suggests, however, that liberal peacebuilding is re-creating the conditions of conflict; states emerging from war do not have the necessary institutions or civic culture to absorb the pressures associated with political and market competition. In recognition of these problems and dangers, there is an emerging call for greater attention to the state and institutionalization before liberalization. These critiques, and lessons learned from recent operations, point to an alternativerepublican peacebuilding. Drawing from republican political theory, this article argues that the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation can help states after war address the threats to stability that derive from arbitrary power and factional conflict and, in the process, develop some legitimacy. Republican peacebuilding is not only good for postconflict states; it also is appropriate for international peacebuilders, who also can exercise arbitrary power.
Nigeria is the African country that implemented ethnic party bans most systematically. At different points in time, a total of at least 64 parties has been denied registration for failing to demonstrate ‘national presence’. Nigeria is also the African country with the longest record in institutional engineering. Ethnic party bans are one instrument in a broader repertoire of incentives for the creation of national parties that transcend the manifold socio-cultural differences. This article provides an overview of the often highly innovative ways in which successive Nigerian leaders, especially military, have sought to control the political organization of ethnicity in the process of democratization.
Since 1990 the banning of ethnic and other identity-based parties has become the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. This article focuses on three East-African countries – Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – which opted for different ways of dealing with such parties. The analysis shows that the laws have actually been enforced by the responsible regulatory institutions. However, they have only marginally influenced the character of the political parties in the three countries: a comparison of regional voting patterns suggests that bans on particularistic parties have not ensured the emergence of aggregative parties with a national following in Tanzania and Uganda. In Kenya on the other hand, where such a ban has been absent until 2008, parties proved not to be more regionally based. In all three countries governing parties were clearly more nationalized than opposition parties, while the overall level of party nationalization is lower than in other world regions.
Electoral engineering determines prospects for
centripetal politics in postconflict societies. Lebanon's postwar
elections have been contested by interethnic electoral alliances in
multi-ethnic electoral districts. Interethnic coalitions, vote pooling and
bargaining have structured the results of these elections, as have the
electoral laws demarcating the boundaries of electoral districts.
Democratization, peace building and ethnic harmony have been the main
victims of these cross-ethnic alliances, however. This paper seeks to
explain this Lebanese puzzle by examining the institutional determinants
of cross-ethnic electoral alliances in the 1992, 1996 and 2000
parliamentary elections.
The conflict between ethical universalism and cultural diversity remains a pre-eminent problem of the present international legal system. International law is in a dilemma. It cannot abstain from adopting some material values as the international community cannot be indifferent to the suppressions of citizens or certain minorities by totalitarian regimes. Yet the international legal system must not become an instrument of Western cultural imperialism by negating any cultural differences. This contribution argues that international law is a framework concept prescribing certain basic values. However, these values are not absolute and must be balanced against competing interests. In this balancing process, states have considerable political discretion. This concept will be exemplified by an analysis of the debate on the existence of a right to democratic governance in international law. It will be shown that even though international law does not require states to be democratic, it nevertheless imposes certain standards of legitimacy.
Constitution-making is a ubiquitous but poorly understood phenomenon. There is much speculation but relatively little evidence about the impact of different design processes on constitutional outcomes. Much of the debate reduces to the question of who is involved in the process and when. We consider two central issues in this regard. The first is the problem of institutional self-dealing, or whether governmental organs that have something to gain from the constitutional outcome should be involved in the process. The second has to do with the merits of public involvement in the process. Both of these concerns have clear normative implications and both are amenable to straightforward social scientific analysis. This article surveys the relevant research on constitution-making, describes the conceptual issues involved in understanding constitution-making, reviews the various claims regarding variation in constitution-making processes, and presents a set of baseline empirical results from a new set of data on the content and process of constitution-making.
This article seeks to challenge a potentially dangerous assumption that constitution-drafting is an appropriate peacemaking tool in countries suffering from on-going violent conflict. A recent trend in conflict resolution is to use constitution-drafting as a form of peace negotiation and the resultant constitution as a peace treaty, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and Nepal. Policy-makers simply assume that the goals and needs of constitution-drafting and peacemaking are compatible. On closer examination, however, while theoretically the goals and needs of the two processes can be harmonized, in practice, a combined constitution-drafting/peacemaking process causes deep, inherent tensions to erupt that make it far too likely that peacemaking needs will subordinate constitution-drafting goals. In doing so, the merged process not only risks the failure of the constitution but also risks renewing violence. When warring parties demand constitutional change to secure peace, however, it may be impossible to prevent the merger. This article concludes that the best way to salvage this peacemaking tool is through an interim constitutional process that allows parties to make the immediate constitutional change necessary for a cease-fire in a temporary constitution while giving society the room to meet constitutional needs when drafting a permanent constitution.
Ever since the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart “discovered” consociational democracy in the late 1960s as a model for maintaining democracy in plural societies, power-sharing and democracy have been viewed as closely linked. The work by Lijphart on consociational democracy and later also consensus democracy constituted a breakthrough in the thinking about democracy in divided societies as it showed that the two are not as incompatible as was often thought and claimed, not least by authoritarian rulers trying to justify their non-democratic regimes by invoking the overriding need for national unity. Lijphart’s research demonstrated that democracy in divided societies was possible if elites cooperated, even when the masses remained divided. In a consociational democracy, elite cooperation takes the form of executive coalitions in which the leaders of all main social groups are represented; proportional representation in assemblies as well as a proportional allocation of offices and resources; autonomy for social groups in the spheres important to them, such as education; and a mutual veto for groups that see their vital interests at stake (Bogaards 2000). For Lijphart and many with him, democracy in deeply divided societies is possible only when power is shared instead of monopolised, devolved rather than centralised. Majoritarian democracy is judged unsuitable for plural societies, because the winner-takes-all character and concentration of power allow a dominant group or coalition of groups to capture state power, relegating the minority into permanent opposition. The breakdown of democracy in many post-colonial states in Africa and Asia was attributed to the adoption of Westminster-style democracy, inherited from the (British) colonial powers. Power-sharing became synonymous with democracy.
Journal of Democracy 8.3 (1997) 32-46
It was late in the afternoon in Kampala on 31 March 1994. Journalists were waiting impatiently for an announcement from international election observers. United Nations officials stated for the third time their argument that the observers should declare the March 28 elections for Uganda's Constituent Assembly "free and fair." But the election observers avoided that phrase. They had monitored only part of the electoral process; moreover, they knew that calling the election "free and fair" would hinder or preclude discussion of the problems they had discovered. In the end, the elections in Uganda -- which were no worse than many other elections that have taken place in emerging democracies -- were not declared "free and fair."
As this incident shows, election observers encounter great pressure-- and not just from overeager journalists -- to judge whether the elections in question were "free and fair." Indeed, sometimes it seems that this is all people want to know. "Free and fair" has become the catchphrase of UN officials, journalists, politicians, and political scientists alike. It exemplifies what Giovanni Sartori once called "conceptual stretching": "The wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to travel." But what actually constitutes a "free and fair" election? Does the phrase mean only that the election was "acceptable," or does it imply something more?
International organizations have long been involved in monitoring and assessing elections and referendums. Especially notable has been the UN's role in referendums on independence, which began to take place in the late 1950s. Before the UN could recognize former colonies and trust territories as independent states, it had to know whether these votes had been "free and fair." This concept supposedly made its first appearance in a report on Togoland's 1956 independence referendum.
The UN's involvement in the November 1989 referendum in Namibia was fundamentally different: In that case the vote was not just an element of the colony's long liberation process but also an integral part of the UN's peacekeeping efforts in the area. In February 1990, the UN supervised presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. Interestingly, this was done at the request of the country itself, and as part of an assessment of the entire electoral process, not just of election-day events. Thus the UN acquired a major role in the electoral process of an independent member country -- something that not all UN members saw as a positive development.
Subsequent elections and referendums in which the UN has been directly involved, either as part of peacekeeping efforts or because the countries in question sought its approval, include those in Haiti (December 1990), Angola (September 1992), Cambodia (May 1993), and Mozambique (October 1994). One might add to that list Eritrea (April 1993), South Africa (April 1994), and Malawi (June 1993 and May 1994), though the UN's involvement in these cases was less extensive and due in part to other factors.
Besides the civil war-torn countries noted above, many other nations have taken dramatic steps toward democracy during the past decade. In many cases, individual Western countries have provided support for these developments; in other cases, the primary actors have been international organizations other than the UN (especially the Organization of American States, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the Commonwealth Secretariat). Both national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have also become involved. Many of these NGOs have received substantial funding from governments and other public sources.
Over the past decade, countless election observers have been dispatched to every region of the globe. This increased activity has been accompanied by an intensified demand for standardized assessment criteria, but the development of "checklists" has been hindered by disagreement over what should be included. In addition, cooperation among different countries, organizations, and election authorities has been uneven. Thus a discussion of the basis on which an election or referendum can be labeled "free and fair," or at least "acceptable," is long overdue.
Although criteria for declaring an election "free and fair" have been developed in various contexts, translating such theoretical concepts...
In the six years since the first post-war elections in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the country has developed a technically impressive
democratic system, with the help of a large corps of international
experts supported by considerable administrative authority. Yet
advanced democratic procedures have continued to generate outcomes that
international authorities believe to be inimical to the creation of a
durable, integrated, and fully democratic state in Bosnia. Specifically,
the wartime nationalist parties continue to dominate in free and fair
electoral contests. Elections are part of a larger strategy framed
by the Dayton peace accord to rebuild Bosnia as a multiethnic state,
a strategy which relies in part on the reconfiguring of underlying
political cleavages and a transformation in the way interests are both
articulated and aggregated by political parties. This article examines
the part elections have played in this state-building strategy and
highlights the limitations of that strategy.
Can the extraordinary powers of the international mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina be justified by reference to a state of emergency, and do
they facilitate its objectives of state-building and democratization? A
review of the history of the international protectorate—and in
particular the Office of the High Representative—finds that the
answers to these questions are negative. Its philosophy, as revealed by
its actions, is very similar to that of 19th century liberal imperialism;
but the theory of emergency powers of the constitutional dictator of
Niccolo Machiavelli offers a better roadmap for future post-conflict
missions. The specification and independent monitoring of a red line
beyond which international power will not be used is vital to their
legitimacy and effectiveness.
In the liberal political tradition, representative government, civil society and some form of market are widely regarded as indispensable ingredients of democracy. The first two are essentially ‘home grown’, embedded in the enduring, albeit not immutable, political culture of a given society if they are to have substance as well as form. None the less, western democracies have been actively engaged in transplanting organizations to bolster civil society, along with political institutions, constitutions, and legal codes to Central‐East Europe (CEE) since 1989 as part of their democratization assistance.This article examines if, and how, external assistance can intervene constructively to promote the development of democracy. A brief discussion of western assumptions about post‐communist society in CEE is followed by a review of the roles assigned to culture and institutions in the transition literature which undergird these assumptions. The comparative cultural advantages of the United States and Germany ‐ the two primary western actors in the region ‐ are outlined, coupled with a more detailed examination of German political foundation engagement in CEE.The German political foundations were selected to anchor the study empirically because in terms of method and strategy, resources and level of engagement, they do everything right according to studies critical of western democratization assistance. In addition, their home political culture is very similar to that of the host societies in CEE. In short, their operational conditions present a best case scenario.None the less, the study shows that in some of their highest priority, politically motivated projects, the foundations have not made much of an impression on the CEE landscape. New parties and labour unions they supported have failed or are terminally ill. Many new non‐governmental organizations have been set up but their sustainability is open to question. Projecting donor preferences onto CEE is integral to the problem. The greatest risk is to fabricate the appearance of deep‐rooted democracy by focusing on form at the expense of content. The proliferation of parties and nongovernmental organizations per se tells us little about their ability to integrate the public actively and constructively into the new systems.