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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 33, No. 2 (2011), pp. 229–58 DOI: 10.1355/cs33-2d
© 2011 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic
Climate Change and Thailand:
Impact and Response
DANNY MARKS
The impacts of climate change on Thailand — namely prolonged
droughts, decreased agricultural and fishery yields, violent flooding,
sea level rise and health-related issues — are already serious and will
likely create or exacerbate a number of additional problems during
the next few decades. These include water management challenges,
heightening of class-related tensions, a flood of new immigrants and
refugees, damage to the tourism industry and conflict with China over
dam-building. While the government has begun framing policies to both
adapt to and mitigate climate change, its response so far has been
limited due to shortcomings in both the planning and implementation
processes. Thailand’s ongoing political crisis also diverts decision-maker’s
attention away from this issue. In the coming decades, Thailand’s
institutional structure and political economy will hinder its capacity
to address climate change and, while these capacities will improve as
the country democratizes, it will still be limited. Consequently, climate
change will retard the country’s growth and enormously strain the
country’s political system, state and society.
Keywords: Thailand, climate change, Thai institutional capacity, climate change
policy, Thai political economy.
In 2010 Thailand faced its worst drought in 20 years resulting
in the water level of the Mekong River falling to its lowest level
in 50 years. “According to villagers who live along the river in
Thailand … the Mekong [was] really drying. At some point, people
seem[ed] to be able to even walk across the river, which has never
DANNY MARKS is a consultant for the Rockefeller Foundation’s climate
change programme in Thailand.
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230 Danny Marks
happened before”, said Srisuwan Kuankajorn, co-director of the
Thai environmental non-governmental organization (NGO), Terra.1
According to Thailand’s Department of Disaster Prevention and
Mitigation, the drought negatively affected at least 7.6 million people
in 59 of the country’s 76 provinces. According to Kuankajorn, Thais
who lived in the north, particularly Chiang Rai, were “in big trouble”
because they could not fish, a vital source of income and protein.
Jeremy Bird, head of the Mekong River Commission (MRC), added,
“It is really a question of very low water levels for communities,
drinking supplies for agriculture, and for livestock.”2
The drought also heightened tensions over water resource
management within the region. A coalition of regional NGOs,
including Thai NGOs, charged that Chinese dam construction
along the upper levels of the Mekong River were causing unnatural
water level fluctuations. The Chinese government and international
water and some environmental experts, however, believe that
climate change was the major factor affecting the amount of
rainfall in the Mekong basin. According to Ian Campbell, a senior
environmentalist at the MRC, “The wet season started late and
ended early last year. This is why rivers such as the Mekong are
experiencing low water levels.”3
As evidenced by the recent drought, climate change is an
important issue for Thailand in both the medium and long term.
Floods, droughts and tropical storms — which cause numerous
natural disasters annually — will only multiply in frequency and
intensity. Major climate-induced changes could have severe negative
impacts on Thai food production, particularly rice. These adverse
impacts, such as droughts and floods, have political consequences
too, as they place a greater burden on the government to help those
afflicted and to distribute resources evenly. Climate change will most
likely also create friction between Thailand and its neighbours over
a number of issues such as water management, refugee settlement
and energy policy.
Using a scenario-building exercise, three recent studies have
predicted the political and social impacts of climate change upon the
Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia over the next several decades.4
While numerous studies have forecast the physical impacts of
climate change in Thailand, and some have surveyed Thailand’s
energy sector, none have analysed how these impacts will affect
the Thai state and society or have projected whether the country
has the capacity to respond to climate change. This paper seeks to
address this gap in the literature and, by projecting the negative
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Climate Change and Thailand 231
consequences of climate change, attempts to contribute to thinking
about how these consequences can be addressed.
To assess the impact of climate change on Thailand, and how
governments will respond to it, this paper is divided into three
sections. Summarizing other studies, the first section describes the
likely physical impacts of climate change in Thailand. The second
section forecasts how these impacts will affect the Thai state and
society, focusing on issues such as social change, migration and
relations with its neighbours. The third section discusses Thailand’s
current climate change policies, assesses its current capacity to
address climate change and predicts how future political and
economic changes will affect the country’s capacity. It argues that
Thailand’s current political economy, characterized by competitive
clientilism, narrow coalitions of elite politicians, and fragmented
politics, hinders its capacity to address climate change and, that
while ongoing political changes will improve that capacity to some
extent, it will still be limited in the coming decades. The concluding
section offers an overall assessment of the future impact of climate
change on Thailand.
Observed and Predicted Climate Change in Thailand
Climate change is set to drastically affect the world, and Thailand
will likely be one of the most affected countries given its geography,
economy and level of development. Thailand is already experiencing
the impacts of global climate change. Thailand’s Department of
Meteorology reported that the annual mean temperature in Thailand
rose by approximately one degree celsius from 1981 to 2007 (see
Figure 1). As stated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), the upward drift is very likely due to the increase
in greenhouse gas concentrations caused by anthropogenic (human-
based) activity.5 According to models developed locally, the mean
daily maximum temperature in Thailand will increase by 1.2 to 1.9
degree celsius by 2050.6 Further, the number of rainy days and the
level of precipitation in Thailand has decreased over the last fifty
years (see Figure 2).
The decline in annual precipitation has already had an impact
upon Thailand, most notably in the Mekong river drought mentioned
earlier. At the same time, scientists expect that precipitation events,
while shorter in duration and net amount, will increase in intensity
in the form of destructive storms and floods.
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232 Danny Marks
Figure 1
Annual Mean Temperatures in Thailand
Annual Mean Temperature (dry bulb)
in Thailand (Degree Celsius)
28.0
27.5
27.0
26.5
26.0
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Observed data Trend
Source: Department of Meteorology, 2008.
Year
Source: Department of Meteorology, 2008.
Figure 2
Annual Rainfall in Thailand
400
300
200
100
0
-100
-200
-300
-400
Source: Department of Meteorology, 2008.
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
Trend Line
Based on 1971–2000 Normals
Rainfall amount anomaly (mm)
Year
Source: Department of Meteorology, 2008.
04 Danny.indd 232 7/25/11 11:13:46 AM
Climate Change and Thailand 233
As the amount of carbon in the atmosphere accumulates, these
two trends — an increase in temperature and decline in annual
precipitation — plus others, such as an increase in extreme weather
events and a sea-level rise, are expected to accelerate over the
next few decades, causing numerous environmental problems for
Thailand. That being said, how climate change will impact some
of the determinants of precipitation patterns in Thailand, such as
tropical cyclones, El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events and
the Asian monsoon, is still uncertain and is being researched and
debated by scientists.7 Uncertainties about the future are unlikely
to be resolved soon, therefore making it more difficult for policy-
makers to respond to climate change in Thailand.8
Impact of Sea-level Rise and Storm Surges
Sea levels are rising globally, having already risen approximately
12–22 cm during the last century, and as a low lying country with
its capital close to the ocean, Thailand is extremely vulnerable.
According to the IPCC, the main causes of this rise include the
expansion of ocean waters due to warmer ocean temperatures and
the melting of glaciers and small ice caps.9 The rate of sea level
rise was fastest during the period 1993 to 2003 and IPCC predicts
that sea levels will increase by 18 to 60 cm by the year 2100.10 In
Thailand, saline intrusion from the sea has already contaminated some
underground water sources,11 and Yongyuth Yuthavong, the former
Minister of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, fears
that higher salt levels in the soil from coastal flooding — which will
intensify with rising sea levels — will make soils in Thai coastal
farms less productive.12
The sea level rise during the next few decades will likely intensify
coastal flooding. Recent scientific studies argue that climate change
is a significant factor in the increasing frequency and intensity of
tropical storms during the last 35 years.13 The IPCC asserts that there
is a greater than 66 per cent probability that sea-surface warming will
cause tropical storms to become more intense and heighten storm
surges during this century. These surges will cause more damaging
floods in coastal areas and low-lying areas.14
The IPCC also observes that Southeast Asia is one of the two
most vulnerable regions in the world to coastal flooding. Areas
along the Gulf of Thailand are likely to suffer periods of prolonged
flooding because the tidal range is small and the natural water level
is very low. This means that large areas of land would be unable
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234 Danny Marks
to drain.15 A World Bank study predicts that Thailand’s surge zone
will increase by 32.7 per cent, the third most in East Asia.16 Coastal
flooding will hit Bangkok and central Thailand the hardest.
A study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) ranked Bangkok as the seventh most vulnerable
port city in the world in terms of population exposed to coastal
flooding.17 This is due to the fact that the city is on average only
a metre above sea level (although some areas are already below
it) and that it is located next to the Gulf of Thailand, which has
been rising a quarter of a centimetre annually. To compound the
problem, Bangkok is sinking on its own: the enormous amount of
water used by the city’s residents lowers the water table, causing
the layers of clay below to subside. Smith Dharmasaroja, chairman
of the Committee of National Disaster Warning Administration,
ominously warned in 2007, “We feel that with the ground sinking
and the sea water rising, Bangkok will be under sea water in the
next 15 to 20 years — permanently.”18
A small rise in the sea level will also hurt coastal tourism.
Climate change erodes coasts and destroys mangroves and coral
reefs, which are natural protective barriers of the coast. Without
them, waves will move further inland and natural disasters, such as
tsunamis and cyclones, will likely damage coastal properties such
as hotels and restaurants.19
Impacts on Food Production and Food Security
Thailand is one of the world’s biggest rice exporters and food producers
with over 40 per cent of the population relying on agriculture for
their livelihoods. Nevertheless, pockets of malnutrition still exist,
particularly in the northeast of the country. Climate change effects
such as drought and flooding seriously threaten this economic
sector and overall food security of the country. Changes in rainfall
will aggravate problems related to water resource management for
farmers, who consume 70 per cent of the country’s water supply.
While overall precipitation is declining, studies have predicted more
intense bursts of precipitation and El-Nino and La-Nina events,20
which have been arising every four to ten years in Thailand.21
Both trends will lead to more tropical storms and amplify the risk
of flooding.22 Thailand recently experienced widespread floods in
October 2010, which killed 56 people and affected almost three
million.23 The rice production loss from the flooding was estimated
at 0.7 million tonnes.24
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Climate Change and Thailand 235
As mentioned in the introduction, in 2010 Thailand faced its
worst drought in many years. Due to the drought, water levels in
medium and large reservoirs sunk to 15 per cent of their total
capacity. Fearing that reserves will be exhausted, some local officials
in June requested that farmers delay planting rice.25 The drought has
also damaged river-side farming practices, such as growing rice and
vegetables used especially by ethnic minorities.26
Outside the central plains, most agriculture in Thailand is rain-
fed. Yields of the country’s most important crop, rice, are particularly
sensitive to climate change and are predicted to decrease from the
impacts of climate change. Research by Thai scientists suggests that
a rise in minimum and maximum temperatures and a fall in relative
humidity will cause more water to evaporate from paddies. Such
an increase would affect run-off, soil moisture, water in reservoirs
and groundwater table, and would result in either a decline in
irrigated rice yields or an increase in the demand for water to meet
past levels.27
Climate change could also threaten livestock production due to
heat stress, reduction in food quality and increased disease outbreaks.
One study found that the southern region, which has a hot and dry
climate, was at the highest risk of losing livestock.28 Freshwater fish
populations are predicted to shrink due to the reduction of wetlands
and changes in migration patterns.29 As an example, during the
2010 Mekong drought, fluctuations in the water level disrupted fish
migrations. Local fishermen reported less and smaller fish and the
disappearance of some species.30
Industrial, Health and Natural Disaster Risks
Water shortages induced by climate change will not only affect the
agricultural sector but also poses industrial, health and disaster
risks. In 2004, in the central and eastern regions, major industries
in Map Ta Phut encountered water shortages. As droughts become
more frequent and longer, many industries and sectors — such as
the agricultural sector — will face water management challenges.31
Competition for water between agriculture, industry and consumers
could hurt food security and industrial output.
Climate change will most likely multiply many health-related
risks in Thailand, especially heat stress, injuries, and water-borne
diseases. Rising temperatures and a greater amount of stagnant
water could increase the number of dengue cases.32 In 2008, nearly
190,000 Thais had to be treated for water-related illnesses and
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236 Danny Marks
injuries.33 Climate change also raises the risks of natural disasters,
especially landslides. According to the International Consortium on
Landslides (ICL), increased rainfall intensity drastically increases
landslide-associated casualties.34 In 2008, Thailand suffered 18 deaths
as a result of landslides.35 Moreover, as the temperature continues
to rise, increases in heat stress will lead to greater incidences of
heat cramps, exhaustion, and sunstroke, especially in industrial
and agricultural sites. A recent study surveyed five industrial and
agricultural sites and found that 80 per cent had heat indices in
the “extreme caution” zone, and 20 per cent in the “danger” zone
resulting in a drop in productivity.36
Impact of Mainstream Dams on the Mekong River
Dams provide a large part of Thailand’s energy production and
irrigation systems but have aroused controversy due to significant
ecological damage.37 The planned construction of multiple mainstream
dams on the Mekong River by China, Laos and Thailand threatens to
exacerbate domestic and regional tensions and will also worsen many
of the impacts of climate change in Thailand. By blocking migration
routes, disrupting flood pulses38 and shrinking wetlands, the dams
will also cause fish populations to decline.39 Over 70 per cent of
the fish in the Mekong Basin are dependent on these migrations.40
Further, by blocking large amounts of silt, which provides nutrients
critical for downstream agriculture, China’s dam construction along
the upper reaches of the Mekong in Yunnan Province (four have
been completed while four are still under construction) will adversely
affect food security in the Mekong Basin, including in Thailand.41
Lastly, river bank gardens, which have been recognized as important
in riparian livelihoods, will shrink or completely disappear because
dams will lead to long stretches of land along the mainstream Mekong
being inundated.42 These three trends — declining fish population,
agricultural yields and shrinking riverside land — would have already
occurred due to climate change but the building of mainstream dams
on the Mekong will accelerate and magnify them.
This section has demonstrated that climate change will have
numerous negative impacts in Thailand, including more severe
floods and droughts, damage to coastal areas, reduced rice and
fish yields, and health-related risks. However, scholars and research
organizations have so far been unable to produce a comprehensive
model or measure the potential scale or intensity at which the
impacts will manifest and when they will occur. Therefore there is
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Climate Change and Thailand 237
a need for more research on the impacts on Thailand in particular
and Southeast Asia in general to improve the degree of accuracy to
predict climate change and to diminish uncertainty. Until then, the
best that can be done is to forecast how these impacts will create
or exacerbate sociopolitical and economic problems in Thailand.
How Will these Impacts Affect the Thai State and Society?
The previous section detailed the numerous physical impacts of
climate change in Thailand. Based on these impacts, this section
forecasts their sociopolitical effects, focusing on the areas of social
change, migration and interstate relations.
Urban and Rural Social Change
Thailand is sometimes referred to as consisting of two countries:
Bangkok and everything else. Economic development in the past has
normally been Bangkok-centric, creating a huge socio-economic gap
between the capital and rural regions, particularly the northeast. This
gap has fuelled rising tensions between urban and rural dwellers.
While climate change will not trigger sweeping social changes
in Thailand, its impacts, such as sea level rise and prolonged
droughts, will exacerbate problems that have already arisen due
to environmental neglect, poor infrastructure and Bangkok-centric
development policies.
Social problems in urban areas, especially Bangkok, will amplify
for a number of reasons. First, because Thailand will receive less
rain, its cities will face the dual challenge of acquiring sufficient
freshwater supplies and distributing these supplies evenly. Second,
more people, especially those in Bangkok, will have health problems
from air pollution. While some air pollutants demonstrate weather-
related seasonal cycles, the overall concentration of air pollutants
will likely grow stronger because pollutants’ formations depends
partially on temperature and humidity, both of which are predicted
to rise.43 According to the Pollution Control Department, air pollution
in Bangkok has already reached critical levels, with concentrations
of benzene over three times the acceptable standards in some
areas.44 Third, cities in Thailand, especially Bangkok, have central
“urban heat islands”45 which can be up to ten degrees higher than
the surrounding areas. The intensity of these islands are important
for secondary chemical reactions in the urban atmosphere, creating
higher concentrations of some pollutants.46 This phenomenon, plus
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an increase in heat waves in summer months due to climate change,
will also affect the health, labour productivity and energy usage of
the urban population.47 Storm surges and flooding will make traffic
more congested, wear down infrastructure and damage the economy,
and could lead to the displacement of people residing in low-lying
areas of Bangkok.48
Disproportionately affected by climate change, the urban poor
and recent migrants could protest and pressure the government to
deliver better services to its constituents. Also, the government will
encounter increasingly contentious policy trade-offs, such as water
allocation and construction of flood walls. If urban governments
continue to mostly favour richer neighbourhoods — which have been
their preference thus far — these unequal policies could deepen
already existing socio-economic conflicts.49
Likewise, social problems in rural areas will be exacerbated. First,
as already discussed, climate change will reduce the number of fish
in rivers such as the Mekong. Second, in order to contain flooding
and maintain consistent sources of water, there will be demands for
the government to improve its irrigation and water storage systems.
There may be demands by certain groups for the government to build
more dams but other groups will oppose further dam construction.
For example, in June 2010, when the government announced plans
to revive the controversial Kaeng Sua Ten dam as part of its effort
to solve the water crisis, villagers of tambon Sa-iab protested and
burned an effigy of Deputy Prime Minister Sanan Kachornprasart.50
Third, climate change will lower rice yields and affect crop prices
in general. Sudden price shifts, such as that occurred in 2008, will
be more frequent. In 2010, during times of droughts, the government
will likely advise farmers not to plant a second rice crop. Future
demands from the government to revive dams or not to plant
multiple rice crops will further inflame anti-Bangkok sentiment in
rural communities in the north and northeast, regions loyal to the
so-called Red Shirt movement.51 These problems will further divide
Thai society along rural-urban and class lines.
Impact on Migration
The IPCC, the Stern Review, and others expect that the adverse
impacts of climate change will cause a worldwide mass movement
of people, resulting in up to 250 million environmental refugees by
2050.52 Thailand, particularly Bangkok, is predicted to receive large
groups of such migrants and will be affected by their relocation.53
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Climate Change and Thailand 239
Migration could trigger social conflict in Thailand’s urban and rural
areas. First, the number of permanent migrants from the countryside
to the city is rising and will continue to do so. Two reasons are
that higher-educated youths and newlyweds are moving from the
village to the city, either to find better paid jobs or to reunite with
their urban-based spouses. A third reason will be climate change. A
study found that in years of climate stress, average rice yields fell
by approximately 45 per cent, causing farmers to lose nearly half
of their household income. To mitigate this risk, farmers sought to
diversify their sources of income through off-farm sources, which
are not as sensitive to climate change. They do so primarily by
migrating to work in cities, sometimes permanently.54 As the impacts
on farmers worsen in the future, the number of migrants moving to
the city will swell. Moreover, as coasts erode, fishing populations
dwindle, and saline intrusion increases, coastal dwellers will also
relocate to the city. The rise in migrants will aggravate usage of the
city’s infrastructure, competition over limited resources and pressure
on the government to meet the needs of newcomers. Concurrently,
in Bangkok, sea-level rise, storm surges, and river-induced flooding
could displace large swathes of the population, particularly those
living in low-lying areas of the city. This would alter Bangkok’s
role not only as a destination for Thai immigrants but also likely
deter foreign retirees and expatriates with skills valuable to helping
develop the economy.55
However, some in rural areas will choose to stay and seek to
maintain their way of life. They will experience more hardships due
to climate change unless the government significantly intervenes.
This could create communal conflict because competition for limited
resources will intensify.
Climate change will also affect international migration patterns,
enlarging the number of emigrants and immigrants. While the
number of Thais working abroad is much less than that of other
Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines (estimated to be
8.6 to 11 million in 2009)56 and Indonesia (estimated to be at least
2.7 million in 2007),57 there are still tens of thousands of Thais
working abroad (at least 160,000 in 2008).58 East Asian countries,
such as Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and Malaysia, have replaced the
Middle East as the most popular destination of Thais working abroad.59
Because the impacts of climate change will affect livelihoods, some
Thais, especially low-skilled labourers, could be compelled to seek
work abroad, especially in more developed countries. Since Thais do
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not need a visa to enter Malaysia or Singapore, these two countries
will be the most likely destinations.
At the same time, Thailand should expect that the number of
immigrants from its poorer neighbours to increase drastically. This
trend is already apparent: in August 2010 in Banteay Meanchey, a
northwest province in Cambodia, hundreds of villagers facing food
shortages due to the drought crossed the border illegally in order
to find jobs in Thailand.60 The number of migrants will most likely
continue to rise because the Tonle Sap, which supports the livelihoods
of one third of Cambodians, is threatened by climate change.61 Another
of Thailand’s neighbours, Myanmar, was ranked by Germanwatch
Global Climate Risk Index as second (behind Bangladesh) globally
in terms of countries most affected by extreme weather events from
1990 to 2008. The World Meteorological Organization predicts that
tropical cyclones will become less frequent but more intense over
the coming decades.62 Currently, there are an estimated two million
migrants in Thailand, with 80–90 per cent originating from Myanmar.63
The Thai government must put in place policies that will help cope
with large streams of new migrants and refugees. Their influx will
most likely not only elevate the risks of transnational and local
crime, illegal drugs, HIV, and drug trafficking but also affect the
Thai labour market and the healthcare and education systems.
Interstate Relations and Foreign Policy
Climate change will unlikely change the dimensions of Thailand’s
current domestic and international conflicts. In 2010 and 2011, Thai
soldiers were involved in skirmishes with Cambodian troops near
the Preah Vihear Temple and were injured during fighting between
splinter brigades of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and the
Myanmar military along the Thai-Myanmar border. Thai civilians
have been injured and killed in both conflicts. While the insurgency
in the far south continues to rage, it most likely will stay confined
to the southernmost provinces.
Climate change, however, could exacerbate two existing sources
of tension between Thailand and its neighbours. The estimated rise
in the number of illegal migrants from Myanmar will create tensions
with Naypyidaw and potentially human rights groups and international
organizations. The international community, including human rights
groups and US lawmakers, have accused Thai employers, police
and military of violating human rights in their treatment of these
migrants.64 Moreover, as noted earlier, some of these migrants will
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Climate Change and Thailand 241
likely exacerbate non-traditional security challenges such as infectious
diseases and place a greater strain on international organizations,
such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and
NGOs. Thailand has generally cooperated in helping refugees, but
does not want to become an indefinite host and has threatened
to send refugees home. The Thai government, therefore, considers
Myanmar to be the greatest source of its refugee problems.
The second source of tension could arise over management
of the Mekong River. In 2008, several groups in Thailand blamed
Chinese dams for exacerbating flood damage in North and Northeast
Thailand.65 In 2010, these tensions rose again when the low level
of water on the upper Mekong revived criticisms of China’s existing
and planned hydropower dams, just as they were made in 2008.
In 2010, The Thai government was the most outspoken, not only
requesting the other three MRC member countries, Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam to diplomatically pressure China,66 but also, reflecting
public sentiment, then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajiva publicly aired
Thailand’s grievances and suggested that the Chinese government
take action. Among the MRC members, Thailand clearly has the
most clout due to its size and close relations with China.67
As they continue to suffer the impacts of climate, communities
in Thailand, particularly in the North and Northeast, could put
pressure on the central Thai government to defend its sovereignty
and autonomy. As a result, Thailand’s relations with China could
deteriorate unless Beijing can convince MRC members that it is
taking a basin-wide approach and not only caring about the impacts
within China. However, since China faces its own water and energy
challenges and has not signed any international water agreements, it
seems unlikely that it will change its dam expansion plans or reform
its river management practices. While China’s influence in Thailand
has risen over the past decade due to increased investment, problems
in US-Thai relations and Beijing’s political “charm offensive”,68
tensions over the Mekong could have a negative impact on Sino-Thai
relations. This scenario would present an opportunity for the United
States to recapture its influence in Thailand, which has waned over
the past couple of decades. The US recently announced the Lower
Mekong Initiative (LMI), the centrepiece being a Mississippi-Mekong
“sister river” agreement. The LMI also entails providing US expertise
in areas such as climate flood management, hydropower assessments
and water resource management.69 If successful, this initiative could
increase American influence in Thailand as the country sorely needs
such expertise.
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242 Danny Marks
Thailand’s Capacity to Respond to Climate Change
As the previous section illustrates, even if the extent of the projected
impacts of climate change are difficult to predict, there will certainly
be significant deleterious effects on the Thai economy and society.
For example, prolonged droughts will threaten overall food security,
create problems with China and could spur regional and domestic
migration to Bangkok. More frequent and intense floods, originating
from storm surges and severe bouts of precipitation, will amplify
health risks, increase the number of landslides and could engulf
parts of sinking Bangkok.
In the coming decades, the Thai state will need to be proactive
in responding to these looming environmental dangers. It needs to
adapt in order to reduce risks and the level of damage. To successfully
adapt, the government must first meet the challenges of determining
the best technologies and incentives to improve infrastructure water
resource management, agriculture and information systems, and most
importantly, of marshalling the political will to allocate sufficient
resources to invest in these areas.
One example is a land reform bill that would incentivize farmers
to invest in their land in sustainable ways given the microclimate
risks.70 Strengthening social safety nets, such as the provision of
disaster insurance, cash transfers and workfare programmes,71 would
also be a positive step forward, for the impacts of climate change
disproportionately hurt the poor and they will need the most help
when natural disasters strike. The government must also increase
public awareness of climate change which is currently low. In a
2009 public opinion poll concerning major problems facing Thailand,
natural resource degradation (1.6 per cent) and excess consumption
of energy (0.9 per cent) ranked ninth and tenth of the eleven
problems listed.72
Concurrently, most officials, NGOs, academics and some private
sector leaders, agree that Thailand should curb its carbon emissions.
The country’s current level is high compared to its level of economic
development: in 2007, Thailand contribute about 1 per cent of global
emissions. In comparison, Vietnam emits only 0.4 per cent whereas
Indonesia emits 1.3 per cent.73 In the near future, as countries seek
to cut carbon emissions, Thailand will inevitably be pressured to
follow suit.74 It should do so by becoming more energy efficient
and using more renewable energy. Thailand has considerable scope
to improve its energy efficiency: its energy consumption is about
15 per cent of GDP while in many developed countries it is only
about 8 per cent.75
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Climate Change and Thailand 243
While Thailand should create and implement these long-term
policies, the key question is whether the government has the
capacity and political will to do so. In order to answer this ques-
tion, the following sections provide an analysis of past environ-
mental policies, current climate change policy, and will attempt
to forecast what will happen to the Thai political system over the
next few decades.
Past Environmental Policy
Judging from the experience of the past few decades, Thai policy-
makers are unlikely to change the practice of giving higher priority to
economic growth over environmental protection. The high economic
growth rates from the 1950s to the 1980s occurred at the expense of
environmental degradation, particularly deforestation. Huge swathes
of forested areas were denuded so that they could be used to grow
commercial crops, such as rice, cassava, maize and sugarcane. In
fact, the Thai Forest Department was nicknamed “Forest Death” in
Thai and its initial purpose was not the protection of forestry but
the promotion of commercial logging.76 Consequently, in the post-war
period, Thailand experienced one of the fastest rates of deforestation
in the world: its forest cover declined from 54 per cent in 1961 to
around 25 per cent in 2005.77 Because forests serve as carbon sinks,
the country’s rapid deforestation has also contributed to Thailand’s
greenhouse gas emissions.
While the rate of deforestation has slowed over the last two
decades, and the government has initiated replanting programmes
in some areas, recent environmentally-damaging economic activities
such as tourism, transportation, and fisheries, have caused coastal
erosion, fishery and coral reef depletion and wetland loss.78 It is
unlikely that the government will be willing or able to implement
policies that will dramatically change such economic activities to
make them less harmful to the environment.
Current Climate Change Policy
The government’s response to climate change has improved during
the last few years but still remains very limited. On the positive
side, in 2006 the government created the National Committee on
Climate Change, and in 2007 the Climate Change Office Coordination
(OCCC) in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and
the Thailand Greenhouse Gas Management Organization (TGGO)
to promote investments in mitigation activities.79 In January 2008,
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244 Danny Marks
the government issued its National Strategy on Climate Change for
2008–12. The document focuses on building capacity to respond to
climate change through raising public awareness, supporting research,
strengthening government agencies and reducing emissions.
However, the document contains numerous shortcomings: it is
mostly a collection of plans from other agencies; it does not develop
greenhouse gas reduction targets based on scientific knowledge and
the country’s current greenhouse gas inventory;80 and does not create
space for public participation — instead it gives higher priority
to the interests and views of government officials and the private
sector.81 Accordingly, NGOs have lambasted the plan and in January
2011 Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajiva responded to their criticisms by
demanding that the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental
Policy and Planning, (ONEP), the author of the plan, revise it such
that all stakeholders be involved.82
The glaring gap between the planning and implementation
of the climate change plan and other environmental regulations
further weakens the government’s current capacity to respond.
This gap has emerged for several reasons. First, ONEP is the focal
point of climate change but does not have enough authority or
influence to command other agencies to implement climate change
policies. It also lacks manpower, with only 11 staff working on
climate change and funding. As a result, it is often let down by
other ministries. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperatives and the Ministry of Industry have not given much
priority to climate change policies. Second, there is a lack of
coordination among government ministries: each agency has its
own jurisdiction, plans and budgets and often resists sharing
information with other ministries.83 Third, frequent changes in
government impede the implementation of clear and consistent
climate change policies. Fourth, local governments have authority
to implement environmental regulations but lack financial support
from the central government and necessary technical knowledge.84
Fifth, officials do not strongly enforce existing environmental laws,
such as those pertaining to environmental quality control and
natural resource management. These laws are also not integrated
into any comprehensive framework on climate change.85
In the short run, it is also clear that the current political crisis
is distracting Thailand’s top political leaders from addressing climate
change. In other countries, particularly South Korea and Indonesia,
the involvement and commitment of top political leaders has been a
key factor in forming forward-leaning climate change policies.86 Until
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Climate Change and Thailand 245
this current political crisis is settled, not only is climate change not
a priority to Thai leaders but the government is severely hindered
in its ability to effectively implement long-term policies.
Groups Supporting Climate Change Action
At least three concerned groups are pushing the government to
act. The first group is composed of NGOs who began campaigning
for environmental protection in the 1970s and 1980s by opposing,
for instance, the construction of a cable car to the summit of Doi
Suthep and forcing the cancellation of the proposed Nam Choan
dam.87 Since then, they have focused on issues such as enforcing
illegal logging bans, opposing privatization of state-owned energy
companies and most recently campaigning for “climate justice”. While
their campaigns have not always resulted in policy changes, they
have succeeded in bringing environmental issues to the attention of
the public, press and politicians.88
On the issue of climate change, Thai NGOs, led by the Thai
Working Group for Climate Justice (TCJ), submitted civil society’s
position at the Copenhagen climate change conference in 2009. In
the document, they assert that developing countries should not
be forced to cut emissions but should voluntarily adopt a more
sustainable, low-emission development path while ensuring popular
participation. They also argued that the agricultural sector should
not be forced to cut emissions since its emissions are part of the
natural carbon cycle. They also believe that developed countries
need to help developing ones adapt to climate change.89 However,
some academics have criticized NGOs for lambasting only developed
countries as the source of climate change and in doing so absolving
the government of any responsibility to reduce its emissions.90 Thus
far, NGOs have achieved greater success in holding the government
accountable for environmental degradation, but have been less
successful in persuading the government to cut emissions. In the
future, as they become more knowledgeable about climate change
and as environmental problems worsen, they will most likely push
the government harder on this issue.
The second group is the tourism industry. If categorized as an
export industry, tourism clearly ranks as Thailand’s largest industry. On
average from 1998 to 2005, tourism directly and indirectly accounted
for 13 per cent of GDP, employed 10 per cent of the labour force
and attracted 12 per cent of investment.91 The tourism industry is
also important because it has numerous linkages with other industries
and its decline would have a negative ripple effect.
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246 Danny Marks
The Thai government is concerned that climate change will
damage the tourism industry, not only because of the reasons listed
above, but also due to extensive coral bleaching which shut down
18 dive sites in February 2011,92 and due to flooding in tourist
areas in the far south in March 2011, driving thousands of tourists
away.93 Consequently, the Thai tourism industry has expressed strong
support for efforts to both mitigate and adapt to climate change and
has adopted a number of green initiatives, such as developing green
tourism destinations and identifying environmentally-responsible
tourism operators.94 While these initiatives will have only a minimal
impact on Thailand’s overall emissions or adaptation efforts, they
can act as positive examples. Moreover, because the tourism industry
is so vital to the Thai economy, it could become important voice
pushing for climate change action.
A third group which has pushed for the government to mitigate
emissions supports dam-building and nuclear energy. The pro-dam
group claims that hydropower can help the country cuts its emissions
and has called on the government to revive plans to build dams that
were postponed due to protests, such as the Kaeng Sua Ten dam, and
commit to investing in new dams and other hydro infrastructure.95
Also, under the government’s twenty-year power development plan,
the country would build five nuclear plants by 2020–25. However,
in the wake of the meltdowns at the earthquake-hit nuclear power
plant in Japan in March 2011, the government announced that it
would indefinitely suspend its plan to build the plants.96
Thailand’s Future Capacity to Respond
While Thailand’s current capacity to both formulate and implement
climate change policies is limited, the country’s future capacity will
likely improve, though not sufficiently to offset the worst effects of
climate change. While increasing political awareness and activism
should improve accountability and social safety nets, Thailand’s
overall capacity will not change greatly due to continued fragmented
politics and political economy challenges.
Political Economy: The Lack of Institutional Capacity, Policy
Manipulation and Rampant Corruption
The planning and implementation problems in the climate change
policy process mentioned earlier are not only confined to climate
change policies. Rather, they are a microcosm of Thailand’s low
level of institutional capacity. The education system is hobbled by
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Climate Change and Thailand 247
a lack of innovation, technical incompetence, endemic corruption
and inability to monitor policy implementation.97 Water manage-
ment is also a major problem as there is no single regulatory frame-
work in place; eight different agencies — none of which coordinate
with each other — are responsible for regulating water policies.
Technical weaknesses, such as inaccurate methods of measuring
rainfall and river flows, further enfeeble the government’s ability
to manage water.98
Thai political economy expert Richard Doner argues that
Thailand’s low level of institutional capacity, particularly its
inability to consult, make credible commitments, and monitor these
commitments, has prevented the country from addressing collective
action problems which need to be surmounted to advance economic
growth. Similarly to reforming education and managing water
resources competently, a country needs strong institutions to mitigate
and adapt to climate change, since both collective action problems
require technical information and a large number of players, some
of whom will lose from certain policies. To be able to better tackle
such problems, a country needs to strengthen its institutions. Doner
argues that this can only occur when political leaders, who want to
keep coalitions as narrow as possible, face threats, such as political
protests, budget constraints and external threats, and, as a result, feel
compelled to broaden their coalitions which would in turn stimulate
public goods. Thailand’s strengthening, however, has been restricted,
mainly because its elite have faced limited threats.99 The fragmented
nature of Thai politics also has enervated the country’s institutions.
Numerous parties and factions, which Doner calls “veto players”,
have thwarted the provision of public goods, while concurrently
bestowing favours to their clients.100 The dominant character of the
political economy of Thai business before the 1997–98 financial
crisis was competitive clientilism, in which firms sought to earn
unusually high profits through rent-seeking activities, normally by
using political connections to numerous political factions to gain a
privileged, oligopolistic position in the market.101
After the crisis, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched
a project to create a new monopolistic pattern of rent-seeking that
centralized power around himself and where businessmen-politicians
gained rents through policy corruption. Thaksin and his cronies
manipulated government regulations to their benefit, apportioned
public resources to the business sector and used executive power
to benefit specific firms. Because budgetary resources were diverted,
public investment in infrastructure tumbled. Thaksin also scrapped
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248 Danny Marks
wide-sweeping plans to reform education.102 While education
improvements could lead to higher wages and standards of living,
and consequently more energy consumption, overall they help
improve a country’s ability to respond to climate change because the
population will be better informed about the environment. Moreover,
a strong education system will significantly improve a country’s
level of capacity to absorb new technologies and a higher level of
absorptive capacity will enable the country to reap more benefits
from FDI and to better upgrade its technology.103 Thaksin also never
fulfilled his promise to enact a sweeping land reform law which
would have distributed land to the landless which, as mentioned
earlier, would have given farmers a greater incentive to invest in
their land in sustainable ways.104 Both developments would have
improved Thailand’s capacity to respond to climate change.
Thaksin’s ouster in 2006, however, did not end monopolistic
control of and competitive clientilism in the Thai economy; a high
degree of capital concentration and rent-seeking activities remains.
Because Thai firms continue to seek support from the government,
both rents and incentives for corruption remain high.105 In fact,
the level of corruption in Thailand has climbed over the last
decade according to both the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators 106 and Transparency International.107 Corruption weakens
the country’s ability to upgrade infrastructure and develop human
capacity. Further, while Prime Minister Abhisit proposed a land
tax which would have levied high taxes on those who leave land
unused, as Prabart Pintobtang argues, this proposal did not tackle
the core challenge of reallocating concentrated land ownership to
the masses.108 Until Thailand’s leaders undertake such politically
difficult but much needed reforms, the country’s ability to address
climate change will remain limited.
Democratization and Political Participation
In general, countries with democratic systems and a high degree
of political participation have been most responsive to climate
change, such as that found in Europe. Thailand is undergoing a
complicated transition to democracy. While hitting speed bumps in
the last decade, the country should stabilize in the medium term.
According to Thai political expert Michael Montesano, “Thailand
has entered an era of mass politics.”109 Thaksin helped usher in
this new era by promising populist policies, using clever marketing
and symbolically embracing the rural majority as part of Thailand’s
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Climate Change and Thailand 249
political community.110 Simultaneously, higher levels of education,
access to the media, income levels, social and physical mobility and
political organization also contributed to empowering the masses and
made them more cognizant of their own political interests.111 During
the past couple of years, at the grassroots level, the Red Shirts have
skillfully organized sustained resistance and raised doubts about the
fairness of the traditional structure of Thai society.112
However, the establishment, which most commentators identify
as the monarchy, military, and bureaucracy, continues to uphold
traditional values. The military has been the key power broker since
2006. Increasingly under challenge, the traditional centres of power
are aggressively protecting their interests by stressing traditional
values as the core of national identity. Over the past several years,
academics, NGOs and journalists have helped create space for
cultural and social change by questioning these traditional values,
official state narratives and government policies. Most recently, the
Red Shirt movement has carried forward this process of cultural
transformation by criticizing members of the Privy Council, proudly
calling themselves prai (commoners), criticizing double standards and
marching from rural areas to Bangkok, the centre of power.
While the fact that neither side is willing to compromise
bodes poorly for an end to the political crisis in the near future,
the protracted turmoil positively reveals a high degree of political
activism and grassroots level organization. In addition, examples from
many countries show that once the masses demand better treatment
and a greater stake in the polity, they were eventually incorporated
into the mainstream. This transformation occurred violently in
some places and peacefully in others.113 Thus, the recent turmoil
portends a long-term evolution of Thai democracy and a higher
level of accountability. What also bodes well for the future is that,
as during many times in the past, Thailand has been able to invoke
long-standing traditions of harmony and compromise.
The future maturation of the Thai democratic process, ongoing
cultural transformation and higher level of accountability will help
Thailand respond to climate change. Grassroots organizations will
be better organized to demand that politicians implement policies
that will lessen the impacts of natural disasters. Some local NGOs,
such as Palang Thai and the Sustainable Development Foundation,
are already lobbying the government to become more energy efficient
and enact more sustainable policies.114 Further, just as the Abhisit
government wooed voters by doling out free school supplies, cash
payments to the elderly and income guarantees for farmers,115 future
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250 Danny Marks
governments will need to follow Thaksin’s lead of strengthening the
country’s social safety nets. Stronger social safety nets will soften
the shocks of the impacts of climate change on the poor.
Overall Response
Thailand’s practice of giving higher priority to economic growth
than environmental protection, as well as high levels of corruption,
monopolies and rent-seeking, are unlikely to change significantly
in the coming decades. Domestic economic policies such as fair
competition laws, educational reforms and land reforms are unlikely
to be passed given the powerful positions of entrenched vested
interests. The continuation of this economic model will hinder
Thailand’s ability to respond to climate change, particularly in
terms of improving infrastructure, promoting the right technologies
and cutting emissions.
On the other hand, Thailand’s institutional capacity to respond
to climate change will be strengthened somewhat due to the
awakening of the masses. This will in the long-term lead to a new
more democratic political consensus that is more inclusive and
accountable to citizens and has a more robust civil society and media.
As a result, social safety nets will be strengthened, monitoring of
regulations will be improved, and, because politicians will be more
responsive to voters’ demands, the impacts of extreme weather events
will be softened. Thus, Thailand’s overall future capacity will be
higher, but only slightly.
Conclusion
While cutting carbon emissions is the only way to mitigate climate
change, based on their actions so far, countries are unlikely to
make a meaningful effort to prevent global emissions rising in the
foreseeable future. This means that the impacts facing Thailand,
some of which have already manifested themselves, will certainly
become more severe and are to be ignored at great peril. The
impacts include prolonged droughts, decreased agricultural and
fishery yields, violent flooding, rising sea levels and health-related
concerns. The problems these impacts could create or exacerbate
include water management challenges, heightening of class-related
tensions, floods of new immigrants and refugees, damage to the
tourism industry and conflict with neighbouring countries over
dam-building.
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Climate Change and Thailand 251
The government has begun crafting policies to both adapt to
and mitigate climate change, but so far they have had limited effect
due to the country’s low level of institutional capacity. The current
political crisis has also diverted Thai leaders’ attention away from
this issue. The sooner the crisis is solved, the sooner Thailand can
begin implementing policies and investing in infrastructure that will
enable it to better respond to climate change.
In short, Thailand’s ability to respond to climate change
will improve over the long term, but only incrementally. While
a broader political consensus will enable the country to become
more democratic, thus increasing overall accountability, due to
the ongoing fragmentation of politics and the threat to elites, the
prospect of Thailand dramatically increasing its capacity to a level
such as that of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, is not bright.
This means that Thailand’s hope of becoming a “green economy”
will be unfounded and that the country will increasingly succumb
to the impacts of climate change, such as the devastating drought
and floods of 2010.
NOTES
1 Miranda Leitsinger, “Drought grips parts of China, Southeast Asia amid dam
concerns”, CNN.com, 7 April 2010 <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/
asiapcf/04/06/china.mekong. river.thailand.laos/index.html>.
2 Ibid.
3 Cheng Guangjin and Ma Liyao, “Climate change to blame for Mekong drought”,
Chinadaily.com, 3 April 2010 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-04/03/
content_9684768.htm>.
4 See Paul Hutchcroft, “Climate Change and Regional Security: The Philippines”,
Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam and the Impact of Climate Change” and Michael Malley,
“Indonesian Responses to Climate Change”, in Climate Change and National
Security: A Country-Level Analysis, edited by Daniel Moran (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2010).
5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical
Science Basis — Summary for Policymakers (Cambridge, UK and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 2.
6 The World Bank, Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok
Metropolitan Region: Final Report (Bangkok: World Bank, March 2009), p. x.
7 Nkrintra Singhrattna, Balaji Rajagopalan, K. Krishna Kumar, and Martyn Clark,
“Interannual and interdecadal variability of Thailand summer monsoon season”,
Journal of Climate 18, no. 11 (June 2005): 1697–708.
8 Suppakorn Chinvanno, Future Climate Projection for Thailand and Surrounding
Countries: Climate Change Scenario of 21st Century (Bangkok: South East Asian
04 Danny.indd 251 7/25/11 11:13:50 AM
252 Danny Marks
— Global Change System for Analysis, Research and Training, March 2009),
p. 13.
9 US Environmental Protection Agency, Sea Level Changes, April 2011 <http://
www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/recentslc.html>.
10 US Environmental Protection Agency, Future Sea Level Changes, April 2011
<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/futureslc.html>.
11 South East Asian — Global Change System for Analysis, Research and Training,
“Climate Change Impacts in Krabi Province, Thailand: A study of environmental,
social, and economic challenges” (Bangkok: South East Asian — Global Change
System for Analysis, Research and Training, December 2009), <http://cc.start.
or.th/climateChange/Document/Doc_eng_11.pdf>.
12 Yongyuth Yuthavong, “Thai strategies to fight climate change”, The Nation,
26 December 2007.
13 Richard Anthes, Robert W. Corell, Greg Holland, James W. Hurrell, Michael C.
MacCracken, and Kevin Trenberth, “Hurricanes and Global Warming: Potential
Linkages and Consequences”, American Meteorology Society 87, no. 5 (May
2006): 623–28.
14 Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Siobhan Murray, and David Wheeler, Sea-
Level Rise and Storm Surges: A Comparative Analysis of Impacts in Developing
Countries (Bangkok: World Bank, April 2009).
15 Limsakul Atsamon, Limjirakan Sangchan, and Sriburi Thavivongse, “Assessment
of Extreme Weather Events Along the Coastal Areas of Thailand”, The 89th AMS
Conference Meeting, Arizona, January 2009 <http://www.vncold.vn/Modules/
CMS/Upload/13/Science/TCVanEwv09_160509/identification%20sea%20level%2
0rise%20impacts%20on%20MK%20delta_5april.pdf>.
16 Dasgupta et al., Sea Level Rise, op. cit., p. 20.
17 Robert Nicholls, Celine Heirweijer, and Stephane Hellegatte, Screening Study:
Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes:
Interim Analysis: Exposure Estimates (Paris: OECD, 2007).
18 Denis Gray, “Bangkok underwater by end of century”, Associated Press, 23
October 2007 <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/travel/news/ocean-will-swallow-
bangkok/story-e6frezi0-1111114705177>.
19 Corinne Kisner, Climate Change in Thailand: Impacts and Adaptation Strategies
(Washington, D.C.: Climate Institute, July 2008), <http://www.climate.org/topics/
international-action/thailand.htm>.
20 El Niño/La Niña-Southern Oscillation is a periodic climate pattern of which has
been arising across the tropical Pacific Ocean approximately every five years.
These patterns include variations in the surface temperature of the tropical
eastern Pacific Ocean and in air surface pressure in the tropical western Pacific.
El Niño’s characteristics are a warming of the surface temperature in the eastern
Pacific Ocean and high air surface pressure in the western Pacific, whereas La
Niña’s characteristics are a cooling of the surface temperature in the eastern
Pacific Ocean and low air surface pressure in the western Pacific Ocean. The
two oscillations create extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts, in
many regions of the world. Developing countries dependent upon agriculture
and fishing, particularly those along the Pacific Ocean, are the most affected.
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Climate Change and Thailand 253
21 Patcharapim Sethaputra, National Capacity Self-assessment for Thailand: Final
Report for the Convention of Climate Change (Bangkok: Office of Natural
Resources and Environment, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
of the Kingdom of Thailand, September 2009), <http://chm-thai.onep.go.th/chm/
pr/doc/CCC_Draft_Final_Report.pdf>.
22 Climate Change and Water, edited by Bryson Bates, Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz,
Shaohong Wu and Jean Palutikof (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2008), p. 3.
23 “Floods devastate Thailand: 56 dead, 30 affected provinces”, AsiaNews,
26 October 2010 <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Floods-devastate-Thailand:-
56-dead,-30-affected-provinces-19818.html>.
24 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Thailand: Grain and Feed Update, Rice
Update (Bangkok: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, December 2010), <http://
gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20and%20Feed%20U
pdate_Bangkok_Thailand_12-23-2010.pdf>.
25 Kinan Suchaovanich, “Drought threatens Thailand’s rice crop”, The Associated
Press, 9 June 2010 <http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9G7HUHG0.
htm>.
26 Alex Ellgee, “Mekong Drought Affects Shan Communities”, The Irrawaddy,
17 March 2010 <http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18057>.
27 Winai Chaowiwat and Kanchit Likitdecharote, “Effect of Climate Change on
Potential Evapotranspiration Case Study: Lower Chaopraya Basin”, paper presented
at First Annual NPRU Academic Conference, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, October
2008.
28 Chinvanno, Future Climate Projection, op. cit., p. 30.
29 United National Development Programme (UNDP), Human Security, Today and
Tomorrow: Thailand Human Development Report (Bangkok: United Nations
Development Programme, 2009), p. 87.
30 Ellgee, “Mekong Drought Affects Shan Communities”, op. cit.
31 Chinvanno, Future Climate Projection, op. cit., p. 26.
32 Michael A. Johansson, Derek A.T. Cummings and Gregory E. Glass, “Multiyear
Climate Variability and Dengue-El Niño Southern Oscillation, Weather and
Dengue Incidence in Puerto Rico, Mexico, and Thailand: A longitudinal data
analysis”, PLoS Medicine 6, no. 11 (November 2009): 2.
33 Darren Schuettler, “Floods, landslides kill 50 in Vietnam, Thailand”, Reuters,
28 September 2008 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/28/us-vietnam-floods-
idUSTRE48R06Y20080928>.
34 “Climate change will mean more landslides, experts warn”, United Nations
University Newsletter, no. 40 (2006) <http://update.unu.edu/issue40_10.htm>.
35 Schuettler, “Floods, landslides kill 50 in Vietnam, Thailand”, op. cit.
36 Uma Langkulsen, Nuntavarn Vichit-Vadakan, and Sasitorn Taptagaporn, “Health
Impact of Climate Change on Occupational Health and Productivity in Thailand”,
Epidemiology 22, no. 1 (September 2010): 17.
37 For example, the Nam Prom (Chulabhorn) multipurpose dam, completed in
the northeastern province of Chaiyaphum in 1973, generated hydropower but
04 Danny.indd 253 7/25/11 11:13:51 AM
254 Danny Marks
irregular release of water from the dam caused a shortage of water for farming,
extinction of aquatic life in the river and ecological devastation on both banks
downstream from the dam. See Prachoom Chomchai, “Environmental governance:
A Thai perspective”, workshop on “Mekong Regional Environmental Governance,
The Regional Environmental Forum (REF) for Mainland Southeast Asia”, Chiang
Mai, November 2001.
38 The flood pulse consists of seasonal and occasional flood events which
periodically flood areas surrounding a river, the river flood plain. This area
is only covered by water during the flooding. The flood pulse helps maintain
genetic and species diversity in the flood plain ecosystem, brings oxygen to
help fauna and decomposition, and serves as hibernation spots, and spawning
locations for many species.
39 Mekong River Commission Secretariat, MRC Sea For Hydropower On The
Mekong Mainstream: Impacts Assessment (Vientiane: Mekong River Commission
Secretariat, May 2010), <http://www.mrcmekong.org/ish/SEA-Baseline/SEA_
impacts_assessment_report_Discussion_Draft-15May.pdf>.
40 Patrick Dugan, “Mainstream Dams as Barriers to Fish Migration: International
Learning and Implications for the Mekong”, Catch and Culture 14, no. 3
(December 2008): 9–14.
41 Richard Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, Mekong Tipping Point (Washington, D.C.:
The Stimson Center, April 2010), <http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/
Mekong_Tipping_Point-Complete.pdf>.
42 MRC Secretariat, MRC Sea For Hydropower On The Mekong, op. cit., p. 15.
43 Ulisses Confalonieri, Bettina Menne, Rais Akhtar, Kristie L. Ebi, Maria Hauengue,
R. Sari Kovats, Boris Revich, and Alistair Woodward, “Chapter 8: Human Health”,
in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, edited by
Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani, Jean Palutikof, Paul van der Linden and Clair
Hanson, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 391–431.
44 Apinya Wipatayotin, “Bangkok air pollution”, Bangkok Post, 2 February 2011
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/219531/bangkok-air-
pollution>.
45 Heat islands are caused by modifications of the land surface by urban development
which uses materials which effectively retain heat <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Urban_heat_island>.
46 Confalonieri et al., “Chapter 8: Human Health”, op. cit.
47 David Satterthwaite, “Climate Change and Urbanization: Effects and Implications
for Urban Governance”, paper for United Nations Expert Group Meeting on
Population Distribution, Urbanization, Internal Migration and Development, New
York, January 2008.
48 Douglas Bardsley and Graeme Hugo, “Migration and Climate Change: Examining
Thresholds of Change to Guide Effective Adaptation Decision-making”, Population
Environment 32 (September 2010): 254.
49 Malley, “Indonesian Responses to Climate Change”, op. cit., p. 13.
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Climate Change and Thailand 255
50 Thaweesak Sukkhasem, “Villagers burn effigy of pro-dam Sanan”, Bangkok Post,
20 June 2010 <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/39058/villagers-burn-
effigy-of-pro-dam-sanan>.
51 Ben Doherty, “Drought edict turns farmers against Thai government”, Sydney
Morning Herald, 12 June 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/water-issues/
drought-edict-turns-farmers-against-thai-government-20100611-y3k5.html>.
52 Simon Tay and Phir Paungmalit, “Climate Change and Security in the Asia-
Pacific”, conference paper presented at the “2nd Tokyo Seminar on Common
Security Challenges”, 26 March 2010, p. 21.
53 Asian Development Bank, Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific
(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011).
54 Vichean Kerdsuk, “Health Impacts of Climate Change: Case Study on Rain-fed
Farmers in Kula Ronghai Field”, paper presented at “Asia and Pacific Regional
Conference on Health Impacts Assessment”, Chiang Mai, Thailand, April 2009
<http://www.hia2008chiangmai.com/pdf/C4.2_fullpaper.pdf>.
55 Asian Development Bank, Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific,
op. cit.
56 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Stock Estimate of Overseas
Filipinos as of December 2009 (Manila: Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, 2009), <http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/Stock%20Estmate%202009.
pdf>.
57 Aris Ananta, “Estimating the value of the business of sending low-skilled workers
abroad: an Indonesian case”, paper presented at “XXVI IUSSP International
Population Conference”, Marrakech, Morocco, September 2009.
58 Overseas Employment Administration Office, Department of Employment, Thai
Ministry of Labor, “Total number Thai workers abroad by Occupation” (Bangkok:
Overseas Employment Administration Office, Department of Employment, Thai
Ministry of Labor, 2008), <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/
Resources/4-9_Musingchai.ppt>.
59 Ching-lung Tsay, “Labour Migration and Regional Changes in East Asia: Outflows
of Thai Workers to Taiwan”, paper presented at international workshop on
“Labour Migration and Socio-economic Change in Southeast and East Asia”,
Lund, Sweden, 2001.
60 Tep Nimol, “Drought prompting cross-border exodus”, Phnom Penh Post,
25 August 2010 <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2010082541485/
National-news/drought-prompting-cross-border-exodus.html>.
61 UNDP, Human Security, Today and Tomorrow, op. cit., p. 88.
62 “Climate Change in Burma Briefing”, Oneworld, May 2010 <http://uk.oneworld.
net/guides/burma/climate-change>.
63 Jonathan Rigg, Southeast Asia: The Human Landscape of Modernization and
Development (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 187.
64 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congressional
Research Service, 21 June 2010, p. 18 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
AD=ADA524082&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.
65 Brian McCartan, “When the Mekong runs dry”, Asia Times Online, 13 March
2010 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LC13Ae01.html>.
04 Danny.indd 255 7/25/11 11:13:51 AM
256 Danny Marks
66 Ibid.
67 Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Charm Offensive’ Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia
[Part II]”, China Brief 10, no. 10 (13 May 2010), <http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36372>.
68 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia”, Current History
105, no. 692 (September 2006): 274.
69 Richard Cronin, “Mekong Dams and the Perils of Peace”, Survival 51, no. 6
(December 2009): 147–60.
70 “Land reform key to combat climate change — expert”, Davao Today, 5 June
2010 <http://davaotoday.com/2010/06/05/land-reform-key-to-combat-climate-
change-expert/>.
71 Rasmus Heltberg, Steen Lau Jorgensen, and Paul Bennett Siege, “Climate Change:
Challenges for Social Protection in Africa”, paper presented at “Social Protection
for the Poorest in Africa”, Washington, D.C., July 2008.
72 Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, Prioritizing
Natural Resources and Environmental Problems in Thailand: Public opinion
and Local Government Perspective (Bangkok: Office of Natural Resources and
Environmental Policy and Planning, 2009).
73 Tom Boden, Gregg Marland, and Bob Andres, “Ranking of the world’s countries
by 2007 total CO2 emissions” (Oak Ridge, TN: Carbon Dioxide Information
Analysis Center, 2007), <http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/top2007.tot>.
74 UNDP, Human Security, Today and Tomorrow, op. cit., p. xiii.
75 “Peer Review on Energy Efficiency in Thailand”, Report for the APEC Energy
Working Group, March 2010.
76 Author interview with Kampanad Bhaktikul, 5 October 2010.
77 Somboon Siriprachai, “The Thai Economy: Structural Changes and Challenges
Ahead”, Thammasat Economic Journal 27, no. 1 (March 2009): 184–85.
78 World Bank, 2006 Thailand Environment Monitor (Bangkok: World Bank, 2006),
pp. 4–10.
79 Sethaputra, National Capacity Self-assessment For Thailand, op. cit., p. 9.
80 Author interview with USAID official, 3 December 2010.
81 Author interview with Patcharapim Sethaputra, 15 December 2010.
82 “Thai PM requests new climate document”, ASEAN Affairs, 7 January 2011
<http://www.aseanaffairs.com/thailand_news/environment/thai_pm_requests_new_
climate_document>.
83 Author interview with Suthep Jongwannasiri, 8 December 2010.
84 Author interview with Pakamas Thinpanga, 16 November 2010.
85 “National Capacity Self-assessment For Thailand”, op. cit., pp. 9, 24, 42.
86 Michael J. Green, Charles Freeman, and Amy Searight, Green Dragons: The
Politics of Climate Change in Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, November 2010), p. 3.
87 Timothy Forsyth, “Environmental Social Movements in Thailand: How Important
is Class?”, Asian Journal of Social Sciences 29, no. 1 (2001): 35–51, <http://
personal.lse.ac.uk/FORSYTHT/How%20important%20class.pdf>.
04 Danny.indd 256 7/25/11 11:13:51 AM
Climate Change and Thailand 257
88 Sunil Pednekar, “NGOs and Natural Resource Management in Mainland Southeast
Asia”, TDRI Quarterly Review 10, no. 3 (September 1995): 21–27.
89 Thai Working Group for Climate Justice, Thai Civil Society’s Recommendations
to Thai Government Towards COP15 (Bangkok: Thai Working Group for Climate
Justice, December 2009), <http://sathai.org/images/Article/0069-TCJ-Doc/0069-
Short%20Eng%20Ver%20ThaI%20Position%20for%20COP15.pdf>.
90 Giles Ji Ungpakorn, “Asia: NGOs display ‘lobby cretinism’ over ASEAN human
rights commission”, Links: International Journal of Social Renewal, 25 October
2009 <http://links.org.au/node/1319>.
91 Anan Wattanakuljarus and Ian Coxhead, “Is Tourism-Based Development Good
for the Poor? A General Equilibrium Analysis for Thailand”, Journal of Policy
Modeling 30, no. 6 (November 2008): 929–55.
92 David Wilson, “Coral Bleaching Outbreak in Thailand Shutting Dive Sites and
Slowing Tourism”, Solve Climate News, 8 February 2011 <http://solveclimatenews.
com/news/20110208/coral-bleaching-outbreak-thailand-shutting-dive-sites-and-
slowing-tourism>.
93 Michelle Jana Ch an, “Thailand floods: strand ed tourists criticize lack of
information”, The Telegraph, 31 March 2011 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/
travelnews/8418356/Thailand-floods-stranded-tourists-criticise-lack-of-information.
html>.
94 “Thai Tourism Going ‘Green’”, Tourism Authority of Thailand, 1 November
2008 <http://www.tatnews.org/tat_news/3852.asp>.
95 Rosalia Sciortino, “Climate Change Paints Mekong Dams Green”, Inter Press Services
Asia-Pacific, 17 January 2010 <http://www.laffsociety.org/blog/?p=464>.
96 “Thailand freezes nuclear power plant plans”, Business Times, 17 March 2011
<http://www.eco-business.com/news/thailand-freezes-nuclear-power-plant-
plans/>.
97 Richard Doner, The Politics of Uneven Development (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), p. 51.
98 Daniel Unger and Patchaparee Siroros, “Trying to Make Decisions Stick: Natural
Resource Policy Making in Thailand”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 2
(May 2011): 206–28.
99 The Politics of Uneven Development, op. cit., pp. 53–71, 89–90, 140.
100 Richard Doner, “Politics and the State in Economic Upgrading”, presentation
to the Thailand Development Research Institute, Bangkok, January 2009.
101 Thanee Chaiwit and Pasuk Phongpaichit, “Rents and rent-seeking in the Thaksin
era”, in Thai Capital after the 1997 Crisis, edited by Pasuk Phongpaichit and
Chris Baker (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008), pp. 249–77.
102 Ibid., p. 275.
103 Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, “Innovation and Learning: The
Two Faces of R&D”, The Economic Journal 99, no. 397 (September 1989):
569–96.
104 Pokpong Wongkaeo, “PM Vows to Press Ahead with Land Reform”, National
News Bureau of Thailand, 16 September 2003 <http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.
php?id=254609160008>.
04 Danny.indd 257 7/25/11 11:13:52 AM
258 Danny Marks
105 Thanee and Pasuk, “Rents and rent-seeking in the Thaksin era”, pp. 258–60.
106 Thailand’s control of corruption score dropped from 57.8 in 1998 to 43.0 in
2008. See the World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, 2010), <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.
107 In the Corruption Perception Index, Thailand dropped from 63rd out of
163 countries in 2007 to 84th out of 180 countries in 2009. See Wichit
Chantanusornsiri, “Abhisit: Corruption root of problems”, Bangkok Post, 17 July
2010 <http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/38898/abhisit-corruption-
root-of-problems>.
108 Ongart Decha, “Community Title Deeds”, Prachatai, 1 November 2009 <http://
www.prachatai.com/english/node/1470>.
109 Michael J. Montesano, “The Death of Tolerance in Thailand”, Wall Street Journal,
31 May 2010 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870370370457527
7262807468660.html>.
110 Danny Unger, “How to bridge Thailand’s divide”, Asia Times Online, 15 May
2009 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KE15Ae01.html>.
111 Chang Noi, “Whatever happened to the gold-legged frog?”, 19 April 2010 <http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/04/19/opinion/Whatever-happened-to-the-
gold-legged-frog-30127387.html>.
112 James Stent, “Thoughts on Thailand’s Turmoil, by James Stent”, Poppy Field
Journal, 11 June 2010 <http://poppyfieldjournal.blogspot.com/p/thoughts-on-
thailands-turmoil-by-james.html>.
113 Ibid.
114 “ ” [Sustainable Development Foundation], Sustainable
Development Foundation (SDF), 2011 <http://www.sdfthai.org/about%20us.
html>.
115 Daniel Ten Kate and Haslinda Amin, “Abhisit hails gains for poor Thais as he
targets Thaksin’s base”, Business Week, 21 May 2010 <http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2010-03-21/abhisit-hails-gains-for-poor-thais-as-he-targets-thaksin-s-base.
html>.
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