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The National-Religious Community and the Media: A Love-Hate Relationship
Author(s): Ines Gabéél
Source:
Israel Studies
, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall 2011), pp. 51-72
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.16.3.51
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Ines Gabél
e National-Religious Community
and the Media: A Love-Hate
Relationship
ABSTRACT
Interaction between a minority and the majority is usually multifaceted and
can be examined from different angles. is article explores the approach of
National-Religious Israelis towards the media, primarily television, radio,
and printed press, as a means to understanding the relationship of that
group to the larger society.
INTRODUCTION
T
significant influence in the construction of a community’s consciousness
and the shaping of its role in general society. Media provide wide-ranging
information about both the community and the world outside of it. is
information is likely to shape the content of the traits that are attributed
to the community and to help determine its place in the society vis-à-vis
other communities.
Exposure to mainstream media that are identified with the majority
brings the community close to issues that are on the society’s agenda, and
not necessarily on the minority’s agenda. us, a community that avoids
exposure to the mainstream media distances itself from the general dis-
course. is has far-reaching consequences for the community’s place in
society and for the self-image of its members. In most cases a community
that avoids exposure to the mainstream media is not heard in the public
discourse and is less aware of others’ voices. is creates a spiral process
whose results are damage to the dialogue between the community and the
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majority, a further distancing of the community from the general society,
and a growing sense of alienation. Hence, the research on culture consump-
tion by minorities can shed light on the self-image of a minority and its
place in the general society.
In recent years there has been a growing focus on the rifts in Israeli
society. Under the influence of sociologist Baruch Kimmerling, Israeli soci-
ety is portrayed as a collection of “tribes” that are distinguished by cultural
and ideological, and sometimes ethnic identity.¹ Each of these tribes has
developed its own social and cultural systems. In this context, exploring the
tribes’ cultural world in general and their media consumption in particular,
may help clarify their self-image and their location in the general society.
e present research deals with patterns of media exposure among members
of the tribe of the National-Religious.
had weakened in the modern world and was destined to disappear. By the
last decade of the twentieth century, however, and all the more so by the
beginning of the twenty-first, it had become clear that religiosity constitutes
a central factor in the cultural and political arena.² Accordingly, in recent
years the research literature has dealt extensively with the cultural world of
religious groups and with the points of interface between religiosity and
modernity and the culture of the West. Religiosity is an important factor
in the shaping of cultural taste and in the construction of unique patterns
of culture consumption.³
How religious groups relate to mass media and make use of them is
of particular interest, since media in general and new media in particular
are considered a threat to the cultural world of religious groups. e threat
that the media poses to religious communities involves a number of fac-
tors, including its modern character and the universalist values it embod-
ies, which sometimes contradict or clash with the particularist values of a
religious community.⁴
FEATURES OF THE NATIONALRELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
is work deals with the patterns of media exposure of the National-
Religious public in Israel. is group, which emerged at the beginning of the
twentieth century, sought to combine a religious lifestyle and the observance
of mitzvoth with modernity. In contrast to other Orthodox streams, the
spiritual leadership of the National-Religious community decided to join
the Zionist movement, notwithstanding its secularism, and to participate
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in the national effort to establish the state of Israel. Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak
Kook was a major figure in the development of the National-Religious
identity and its connection to the Zionist movement in Eretz Israel. Indeed,
dedication to the state became a religious mitzvah.⁵ Hence the National-
Religious community takes part in the cultural and economic life of the
state and regards itself as an inseparable part of Israeli society.
e establishment of the state was perceived as the victory of secular-
sank into a deep crisis and suffered from a marked sense of inferiority
vis-à-vis the secular public. Among its salient signs is the phenomenon of
the abandonment of the religion by many of the young people.⁶ e main
goal of Religious Zionism was to cultivate a “Zionist son of the Torah”
who maintains a religious lifestyle while being the equal of his secular
counterpart in the fulfillment of Zionism.
Gideon Aran defined the ideology that characterized the community
in the first years of statehood as “Religious Zionism”, meaning that the
main ideological system that guided the community was Zionism, while
religious identity remained in the individual or sectorial domain.⁷
e Six-Day War was a turning point for the National-Religious
public. e overwhelming military victory, and especially the return to
territories that were regarded as a historical and religious patrimony, fos-
tered a messianic awakening.⁸ As a result, Aran identifies a major ideological
change in this public, which moved from Religious Zionism to what he
called “Zionist religiosity”.⁹ In the new ideology the religious component
became the primary one while the national aspect became subordinate to
it. Gadi Taub also recognizes an ideological transition from political Zion-
ism to what he calls “redemptive Zionism”, which is based on religious
ideas of redemption. According to “redemptive Zionism”, the sovereign
framework, that is, the government and its institutions, are a means for
achieving the goal of settlement of the land. is ideology, with religious
and messianic motifs, draws connections between daily events and a process
of the redemption of the Jewish people. Hence, Zionism is not regarded
as a national political ideology but rather as an element in the messianic
vision that will bring on the messianic era.¹⁰
Over the past four decades the National-Religious community has
been the spearhead of the settlement enterprise. Even though the settlers
include secular people as well as haredim, the National-Religious public is
perceived as the leadership both in their own eyes and in those of society in
general.¹¹ In this context, the settlement enterprise offered the first oppor-
tunity for the National-Religious community to take part in the leadership
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of the society. Since participating in the life of the country is not enough for
the National-Religious community, they seek to assume a leadership role in
state institutions including the army, the political system, and the media.
At the same time, paradoxically, the identification of the settlements
with the community has led to its segregation from the society. Some
maintain that it was the almost exclusive concern with the issue of the
territories, and the neglect of other civic and religious aspects, that led
to the collapse of the National Religious Party, which was identified with
this public for years, and to the party’s distancing from issues that affect
all citizens.¹² Ben-Rafael asserts that residence in small and isolated settle-
ments in hostile surroundings contributed to shaping a consciousness of a
segregated community.¹³
Conversely, some argue that most members of the National-Religious
community still belong to the bourgeoisie who live in the main cities within
the Green Line. is silent majority did not take part in the ideological
transformation and has not changed its attitude towards the state.¹⁴ It is
difficult to determine the position of the majority of the National-Religious
public because surveys have not been conducted among them.¹⁵ Even if
the majority is not involved in the ideological change, however, most of
the voices that are heard in the public discourse express the new ideology.
During the past three decades some sectors in the Religious Zionist
community have felt a growing alienation from the state in response to each
withdrawal or proposal of withdrawal of Israel from territory conquered in
leading rabbis and the state.¹⁶
Not all members of the community share this feeling. e National-
Religious community was never homogeneous and always included vari-
ous streams that were divided on political, religious, and social issues.¹⁷ In
recent decades the dissension in the National-Religious camp has deepened,
and three main factions have emerged.¹⁸ One that has drawn closer to the
haredi public seeks to segregate itself from the secular milieu. is public,
hardal (haredi-national) has adopted some of the attributes of the haredim,
including accepting the authority of rabbis on all issues, setting up sepa-
rate educational institutions for boys and girls, and rigorously intensifying
mitzvot such as women’s head covering. Generally they do not take part
in the general cultural life, including the consumption of secular media.¹⁹
e second faction, the “liberal-religious”, disagrees with the ten-
dency of distancing from the general society. Some favor strengthening
involvement in the civil life of the state including the army, the media, and
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academia. is goes hand in hand with moderation in mitzvah observance,
such as modesty rules. us many women wear pants and go without head
covering. e attempt to blend tradition and civic life is also expressed in
patterns of leisure consumption that resemble those of the secular public,
including mixed swimming in pools and attending cinema and theater.
²⁰e last faction consists of members of the mizrachi communities, who
practice a traditional way of life and, in recent years, have drawn closer to
the El Hamaayan educational network and to Shas. is public has actually
distanced itself from Religious Zionism.²¹
e ideological transition described by Aran has far-reaching implica-
tions for the cultural world of the National-Religious people in general and
for their media consumption in particular. In recent years this public has
undergone a revolution in its attitude toward the media. In the initial years
of statehood, this minority distanced itself from media activity. In the mid-
²² Although the
subject of his article was the paucity of writers who were identified with the
National-Religious public, his statement can also be applied to other areas
of culture including media.
is statement can be understood as a sort of apology, contrition,
and feeling of inferiority toward the majority society over the fact that the
National-Religious public proved unable to cultivate artists and intellectu-
als. On the other hand, it can also be interpreted as resentment against the
general society for not enabling the National-Religious public to penetrate
it. e common ground between both interpretations is the sense that the
creativity of the National-Religious community needs to be encouraged.
Over the past two decades a change has occurred in how this public
relates to cultural activity in general and the media in particular. Evident in
recent years is an attempt to take part in the media activity and not be satis-
fied with the role of audience. One aspect of this change was the founding
of the Maaleh film-making school in . Set up under the sponsorship
of the movement’s established leadership, Maaleh is not a manifestation of
subversive streams in Religious Zionism; instead it expressed a desire of the
leadership to become part of the media.²³ Likewise, religious journalists are
trying to become part of the general media activity, such as news programs
on commercial television channels. Most religious journalists prefer not to
deal with religious issues.²⁴
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MEDI A AND AUDIENCE
analysis as a way of understanding the social impact of media and the
assumption that the public is a passive captive in media industry’s hands.²⁵
eories that developed in that decade, such as “Uses and Gratifications”,
investigated factors that motivate the audience to be exposed to media.
According to the “Uses and Gratification” approach, research “should move
from what media do to people to what people do with media.”²⁶ is theory
rests on some basic assumptions. e first is that media consumption is pur-
posive and motivated, and the audience is active and chooses its patterns of
exposure in accordance with its needs. e public can articulate the reasons
for its decisions. Another assumption is that the social and psychological
environment in which the individual functions mediates communication
behavior. A further assumption is that the media competes with other ele-
ments that may satisfy the same needs. us, according to the “Uses and
Gratification” approach, the influence of the media is limited.²⁷
e social needs that are expressed in media use are divided into four
categories.²⁸ e first category includes cognitive needs, or in other words,
the need for information. e second category has to do with affective
needs, among them the desire to have experiences and to feel excitement
and joy. Other needs involve a desire for connection to the community, its
leadership, and its institutions. ese needs, which Katz calls “integrative”,
are composed of cognitive elements combined with emotional ones. e
last category, which includes affective needs for escape from reality, appears
when the individual seeks to disconnect from reality. Generally this involves
the need to release tension and to be distracted.
Most studies conducted in the spirit of the “Uses and Gratification”
approach deal, therefore, with the motives of the audience for being exposed
to media. Palmgreen and Lawrence examined the reasons for avoiding
media exposure and reached the conclusion that the public tends to avoid
exposure to contents that contradict its moral or religious values. In other
words, avoidance of exposure is often the result of a conscious decision;
therefore the reasons for such a decision should be examined.²⁹
Henk Westerik and his associates raised questions concerning a
number of issues about the theory of “Uses and Gratification”.³⁰ Accord-
ing to the theory, the public chooses its media exposure on the basis of
full information. Westerik and his associates dispute this assumption by
noting that the information sources for deciding how to be exposed to
the media are mainly the media itself. us it is not possible to speak of
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full information that enables viewers to decide independently about to
what to be exposed.
A further source of controversy is the assumption, which underlies
the “Uses and Gratification” theory, that the public is capable of assessing
the advantages and disadvantages of its behavior. Opponents of the theory
claim that in the context of media exposure, this assumption is problematic
since different studies have shown that the public is exposed to the media
in line with habits and not with conscious decisions.³¹
Another issue that arises is that researchers who identified with the
“Uses and Gratification” theory view the individual without reference to the
social context in which he acts. According to the opponents, exposure to
media is a social practice, and hence should be regarded as social behavior
that develops in a given social context. A sense of belonging to a group is a
central factor in the development of patterns of media exposure. Sometimes
a community cultivates unique patterns of culture consumption in general
and of media consumption in particular. Groups are likely to prefer certain
kinds of content or channels that suit their cultural characteristics, and to
avoid other kinds. us, sometimes communities develop a media environ-
ment of their own, which includes creating media for the minority that
are consumed along with media of other communities or of the majority.
e theory of “Uses and Gratifications” is considered outdated by
has gained popularity in audience research. He asserts that a text’s meaning
is located between its producer and the reader and audience, who decode
texts according to its characteristics.³² He has categorized three decoding
strategies. In the first strategy, known as “preferred reading”, the reader
interprets the text within the hegemonic frame. A different interpretative
strategy, the “oppositional code”, places the decoder opposite the encoder’s
position. erefore the reader’s interpretation can be subversive. Hall sug-
gests that the decoder may adopt a third strategy, a negotiated position,
which is to accept some aspects of the dominant meaning, but reject and
alter others.
MINORITIES, MAJORITIES, AND THE MEDIA
How does a media environment develop that serves minorities or differ-
ent sectors and reflect their media needs? Many factors can influence the
nature of a minority’s media environment. One of these is the minority’s
attitude toward the majority. e research literature offers several models
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of social and cultural absorption, each of which posits a different result of
this process. John W. Berry’s acculturation theory illustrates four different
models of relationship between minorities and majorities.³³ Even though
his theory deals with immigrants, it can be helpful when examining various
models of majority-minority relations.
In the assimilation model, members of a minority are expected, whether
out of desire or compliance with the demands of the absorbing society, to
adopt the values of the majority society and to abandon their own cultural
heritage. In the integration model, the minority members adopt the cultural
patterns of the majority while preserving their own unique patterns. In
the segregation model, the minority members tend to preserve their own
cultural patterns without adopting (or only very partially adopting) the
established patterns of the majority society. When the minority members
resist the cultural patterns of the majority, or are prevented from integrating
into it because of their non-acceptance by the majority group, a reaction
of segregation usually occurs. In the marginalization model, the minority
members suffer from a sense of alienation and are pushed to the margins
of the society.³⁴
e minority’s attitude toward the hegemonic culture is significant for
understanding its media environment. In cases where the minority’s stance
toward the majority can be characterized as segregation or even marginaliza-
tion, and the minority members feel alienation and difficulty taking part
in the public discourse, presumably the group will try to create for itself
a media network that will satisfy its needs and serve as a replacement for
the established media. e gap between the minority and the majority is
thereby likely to grow, to the point where the minority is excluded from
the majority’s cultural and ideological discourse.
Conversely, in cases where the minority participates in the general
discourse and its approach to the majority can be characterized as assimila-
tion or integration, the use of the general media will presumably be more
widespread and hence there will be less need to develop a separate media
environment.³⁵
Some minorities maintain an extensive media network that is unique
to them, sometimes in parallel with the established media of the majority
society and sometimes as an alternative to it. Economic and political inter-
ests and available, cheap technology can help the community develop its
unique media environment. Under certain circumstances the community
members are exposed to the general media despite the sense that it does
not necessarily express their way of life. In some cases minority members
choose to avoid exposure to the general media. Dan Caspi and his associates
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proposed distinguishing media organizations of minorities on the one hand,
and media aimed at minorities on the other. Whereas the former develop
among minority members and try to satisfy the minority’s unique media
needs, the latter originate in the majority and are designed to instill the
hegemonic values among the minority members.³⁶
e media is viewed as a virtual space that enables a public discourse.
Jürgen Habermas saw the media as capable of bringing about a significant
change through the democratization of information and the opening of
the public discourse to all citizens.³⁷ His critics cast doubt on the ability of
sociologically or ideologically peripheral sectors to take part in the public
discourse.³⁸ It is possible to discern a hierarchy in every society according to
which different groups receive inequitable treatment, status, and resources.
e social gaps are also manifested in access to the media. Certain groups
are not able to express themselves in the media and usually are presented
in negative contexts.³⁹ ese communities, which are called “mute”, often
develop a particular public space, a sort of public space of their own, paral-
lel to the general discourse.⁴⁰ is minority’s particular space functions as
an arena for members of the community to discourse on different subjects,
including subjects that concern the community itself.
e issue of minorities’ participation in the public space is important
because it sheds light on their place in the society as a whole. Minorities
that are absent from the public discourse, whether by choice or by force,
disappear from social awareness. In cases where these minorities develop
particular public space, the detachment between them and the majority is
likely to increase as a unique discourse develops in the minority sphere that
deals with issues not necessarily connected with the general society. is
discourse is conducted in a special language and concerns motifs that are
relevant to the community. For the most part the discourse is conducted
with the help of virtual symbols that are meaningful to the community. e
sectoral discourse is likely to develop independently, far from the public
space. Under such conditions the ideological and cultural gap between
minority and majority is likely to grow.
Participation in the public discourse can, however, help minorities
penetrate the social awareness of the majority. Some maintain that the way
in which a minority is presented in the media and the context in which it
appears can often damage its public image.⁴¹ Participation in the public
discourse is not a guarantee that the minority will succeed in presenting its
cultural world or its social demands. Different issues need to be considered,
such as how the minority is presented, to what extent it is given the right to
express itself, and in what context it appears. At the same time, the minority’s
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disappearance from the public discourse will likely preclude any possibility
of penetrating the public awareness. Apparently, even if minorities’ presence
in the public space does not guarantee their integration or the improvement
of their status, their distancing is likely to have worse consequences.
METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
e present research discusses three connected issues. e first is the com-
munity members’ attitude toward the media; that is, how the research
subjects assess the functioning of the media, its level of professionalism, and
its treatment of the National-Religious public. e second issue concerns
media consumption. Following the “Uses and Gratification” approach, we
asked to which media the research subjects choose to be exposed. e third
issue involves exploring the motives for media exposure.
-
jects who defined themselves as National-Religious. Interviewees who were
not willing to define themselves as belonging to this community were not
-
pean countries but have lived in Israel for many years. Most of them possess
higher education, and two were students in higher-education institutions
at the time of the interview. Most of the interviewees are residents of Israeli
cities, such as Jerusalem, Petah Tikva, Beer-Sheva, and Kiryat Motzkin.
Four live in settlements and four others live in religious settlements within
the Green Line. Most of the interviews were conducted by telephone (see
Appendix ). e main questions that were asked in the interviews are
presented in Appendix .
On the first issue, most of the interviewees agreed: viewing the media
as looking for drama, untrustworthy, and unprofessional. ey said the
media does not check the veracity of its reporting and does not observe the
rules of ethics.⁴² As Shimon (Bet-El) explains, “Nobody believes the news.
Who can trust the media? Everybody knows they publish whatever sells.”
Interviewees agreed that the National-Religious public is not presented
in the media except for their cultural and social life. Tikva ( Jerusalem)
says, “ey (journalists) only refer to us in political issues. You never hear
anything about other issues.”
main characters are National-Religious. “Srugim” (“knitted”) portrays the
daily lives of single religious young people; another drama was “Others’
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lives”, whose protagonist is a young religious man who deals with doubts
concerning his faith and his determination to become a dancer.
programs and their opinion of them. Although most viewed several epi-
sodes of the programs, they expressed different views on the representation
of National-Religious young people. Some said they were very pleased to
see religious people in daily situations. Tammy ( Jerusalem) says, “Religious
people are people. So they deal with many issues, and not just their reli-
giousness or the territories’ fate. It is the first time I see religious people in
a television series that are not ‘occupying’ anything.”
Others resented the fact that some characters are represented as having
doubts about their faith. Aviva (moshav Nehalim) says, “Television has no
interest in religious people. ese series portray mainly people who have
doubts about their religious faith, or they live the normal ‘Tel-Aviv’ lifestyle,
not the real religious lifestyle.” On the two other issues, however, interview-
ees differed widely. Some testified that they are connected to digital cables
or to a satellite and watch all the programs shown on the television chan-
nels, including popular reality programs.⁴³ ese read at least one weekly
newspaper—usually Yediot Aharonot (the most popular) and sometimes
even two newspapers over the weekend, Yediot Aharonot and Maariv (the
second most popular).
Other interviewees, however, testified that they avoid exposure to the
media. ey do not have a television in their home, or have one that is only
connected to a video player so as to limit viewing. ey also avoid exposure
to newspapers aimed at the general public. Some only read newspapers of
the religious public such as B’Sheva, which take a right-wing political line.
Two said that they avoid reading newspapers altogether, including those
identified with the religious public. Avihai (Guivon Hahadasha) says, “I
hate this newspaper culture. I decided that I am not going to waste my time
and my energies reading newspapers. Believe me, I don’t miss it.”
A medium widespread in the National-Religious community is the
bulletins of the synagogues that are distributed in synagogues under the
auspices of rabbis or yeshivas, and include varied contents such as educa-
tion, the weekly Torah portion, sermons of rabbis, and tales of wise men.⁴⁴
Most interviewees read the synagogue bulletins with great interest as they
deal with issues relevant to the National-Religious community. e bul-
letins’ popularity lies also in the use of language and a world of images that
are meaningful to the target audience.
What are the reasons for the patterns of media exposure, what moti-
vates the interviewees’ exposure to certain media contents, and why do they
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avoid others? ose exposed to varied contents appearing in the general
media said the reasons for their media consumption lie in the desire for
entertainment or for acquiring information about what is going on. Some
also explained their choice in terms of the desire to know what “others”
think—meaning the general public. ese people sometimes have reserva-
tions about the media that are unique to the community. Hanna (Kiryiat
Motzkin) says, “ey [the media that is identified with the National-
Religious minority] always present our side as if we are always right.”
Some interviewees said, however, that the decision to avoid exposure
to media stems from the nature of the secular media, which they view as
very far from their ideological and normative world and as irrelevant to the
media needs of the religious public. e idea that the media is not “prin-
cipled” recurred often in their responses. Elhanan (Adam) says, “I cannot
bring home Yediot Ahronot and let my children see what is published there.
Everything is dirty.” ese people prefer to be exposed only to media that
express the religious or right-wing ethos, such as the Makor Rishon news-
paper or religion programs on the public channel. Many interviewees said
that they listened to religious radio stations.⁴⁵ Some testified that they did
not own a television out of fear that it would harm the familial fabric and
the creativity of the children.⁴⁶ Daniel (Beer-Sheva) said that he avoids
exposure to any kind of media because it is a waste of time.⁴⁷
Some testified that they subscribed or bought religious or right-wing
newspapers such as Makor Rishon, or in the past Hatsofeh, which was
published by the National Religious Party⁴⁸ as an act of support and iden-
tification with the opinions. Tammy ( Jerusalem) explained that, “I think
Hatsofeh is not very professional. ey always write good news about the
right wing or the religious community. We are always ‘perfect’. Yet, I read
it to support them, because they really need financial help.” Others want to
support these papers economically to help ensure that the religious-rightist
voice does not disappear. e fact that Makor Rishon is privately owned is
not considered relevant or important by the interviewees.
Another question related to how the community is portrayed in the
general media; the answers of most interviewees showed confusion between
the settler community and the National-Religious sector. Even though
they do not live in the settlements, their answers reflected the fact that the
distinction between the religious sector and the settlers is not clear, and
for many the two communities are similar if not identical. Many reported
unease about how the settlers are presented in the media, and most of
them expressed the belief that the National-Religious and settler publics
appear mainly in political contexts and in a negative light. Avi (Beer-Sheva)
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expressed this view, “People think settlers are wild people that are all the
time planning how to make trouble. But actually they are normal people
that go to work every day. I am really fed up with the way they are por-
trayed.” is perception was shared both by the interviewees who were
exposed to the media and by those who avoided it.
DISCUSSION
e community’s patterns of media exposure can shed light on its social
structure and attitudes toward other groups. Accordingly, the discussion
of the research findings will examine the nature of the National-Religious
community and the central question of whether one can speak of the
National-Religious as a community having distinctive social and cultural
characteristics and social coherence or, instead, it has ceased to exist and has
split into different streams with no common denominators. e second part
of the discussion deals with the minority’s attitude toward the majority and
the question of how the minority views its place vis-à-vis the general society.
e research findings raise the question of whether the National-
Religious can be viewed as a community. One of the manifestations of the
existence of a community with a shared cultural and ideological system
is the creation of a distinct media-consumption pattern. e religious
research subjects reported on very diverse media-consumption habits. e
interviewees manifested a wide variety in their cultural world and in how
they make use of leisure time. e responses indicate that the National-
Religious sector is heterogeneous and has significantly varying patterns of
media exposure. ere are those who have consciously decided to distance
themselves from the media in general and the secular media in particular,
while others want to be exposed to different contents and perhaps even
prefer the general to the sectoral media.
Is the conclusion that a group with unique cultural patterns does
not exist? It appears that such a conclusion is too hasty. Despite the
variety in the research subjects’ answers, there is a common denomina-
tor. One point that arises among most of the interviewees is a sense of
alienation from mainstream media. is feeling is expressed both by those
who avoid exposure to the media, serving as a basis for their distancing,
and by those who testify that they are media consumers. Most who are
exposed to varied content in the general media said the motive for this is
to know what others are doing or saying. e desire to know what people
in the general public think about different issues in general and about the
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National-Religious community in particular is a common explanation
among the media consumers.
Following the “Uses and Gratification” theory, which considers that
the media satisfies different needs of the audience, we asked what motivates
the research subjects to be exposed to media despite the sense of alienation
from it. Apparently, the exposure to media can be interpreted as an expres-
sion of involvement in the public discourse. Nonetheless, not one of the
interviewees felt that their voice is represented in the general media. All of
the research subjects said that their way of life, their language, and their
cultural world are not to be seen in this media. ose who nevertheless
seek exposure to it do so in order to be entertained, and to receive infor-
mation about what others think, but not because they view themselves as
belonging to this discourse. Media exposure does not indicate identification
with the contents or a sense of participation in the public discourse. Para-
doxically, it may be that one of the motives for exposure to the media—to
know what others think—reflects the alienation that the National-Religious
community feels toward the hegemonic culture.
e source of the alienation may not be the secularity of the media,
but rather the leftist positions that are ascribed to it.⁴⁹ Presumably there is
a political aspect to the sense of alienation, but it is not the only one; most
of the interviewees expressed a moral reservation about the sex and violence
that in their opinion characterize the Israeli media. us the alienation does
not stem from political factors alone but also from religious ones.
e sense of alienation is also conveyed in the oppositional read-
ing that leads interviewees to confuse the National-Religious community,
which is greatly appreciated, and the settlers, who are in the midst of a
profound political and cultural controversy in Israeli society.
A further point that arises from most of the interviews—closely con-
nected with the previous one—is the sense that the general media does not
reflect the religious reality. e research subjects claimed that the media
does not enable the wide public to understand the National-Religious
world, its culture, symbols, and language. e unique fabric of Religious
Zionism, which includes cultural, ideological, and educational systems,
remains hidden. As a result, the National-Religious community contin-
ues to be mute. Moreover, in their opinion, the media tends to cover the
community mostly in political contexts, especially regarding the debate
on the future of the territories in the West Bank. In most cases the com-
munity is painted in a negative light. e sense that the media harasses the
religious-rightist public is expressed even among those who seek to enhance
cooperation with the secular state.
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e third point common to most of the interviewees is the interest in
synagogue bulletins. ese bulletins are distributed to synagogues by dif-
ferent yeshivas or rabbis, not always identified with the National-Religious
public. Most of the interviewees said they find these bulletins particularly
interesting, dealing as they do with issues that are relevant and important
to religious life. Although they ostensibly do not deal with daily reality, in
fact they offer their readers alternative frameworks to the news. Perhaps
these bulletins are popular mainly because people look for something to
read and they are available. Nevertheless some interviews revealed that
people are interested in them. Shay (Petah Tikva) explains, “I always read
these bulletins. ere are many articles about different issues and they are
very interesting. Also I read them because you don’t feel it is rubbish.” e
attraction to the synagogue bulletins indicates the interest in contents that
are directly designed for the religious reader. is is understandable in light
of the alienation from the contents of the secular media that the religious
reader expresses.
e conclusion is that despite the variety of the research subjects’
answers, a broad common denominator exists. Moreover, the answers indi-
cate that the research subjects feel that they belong to a distinct group with
unique characteristics.
e second subject of discussion is the minority’s attitude toward the
majority. In this context the question is what can be learned about the
minority’s attitude toward the majority from the patterns of media expo-
sure. Do minority members see themselves as part of the majority, or have
they instead detached themselves from it?
In the early years marked by partnership with secular Zionism, the
National-Religious saw themselves as a minority that preserved its cultural
uniqueness while seeking to participate in the public space of the general
society. ey maintained a special way of life alongside the general society
and not in conflict with it. In recent years a profound change has occurred
in the status of the National-Religious community. e process began in the
with the proposal of the disengagement plan, its implementation, and the
-
tion in the settlements for ten months.⁵⁰ e National-Religious public,
despite not necessarily living in the settlements, feels identification with
Religious-Zionist rabbis and the government over protest actions by soldiers
who proclaimed that they would not be prepared to evacuate settlements.
Some of the rabbis supported the soldiers’ right to engage in public protest
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and others opposed it. In any case, tension remains between the religious
leadership of this public and the government and institutions of the state.
A concomitant change has occurred regarding the desire of the
National-Religious community to conduct a dialogue with the major-
ity. As noted, Berry examined minorities’ attitudes toward maintaining
mutual relations with the general society, as a measure of a community’s
location in the majority society.⁵¹ In recent years, and all the more so since
the disengagement from Gaza and northern Samaria, an ideological and
normative rupture has occurred in the National-Religious community that
is manifested, among other things, in calls for withdrawal from the secular
society and for segregation.⁵² Whereas in the first years of the state the
National-Religious community’s attitude toward dialogue with the majority
was positive, today voices are heard that call for severing the connection
with civil society. ese tendencies are manifested, among other things, in
disengagement from the secular culture in general and from the media in
particular.
EPILOGUE AND PERHAPS THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
-
tions against the evacuation of settlements by soldiers who are identified
with the National-Religious public, and after the Netanyahu government
succeeded in passing a resolution on freezing construction in the settle-
ments for ten months—it is not yet clear where the National-Religious
community is headed. Voices are heard that call for segregation from a
secular society that has turned its back on the vision of the integral Land
of Israel. Some, however, are asking the religious community not to give up
its place and its contribution to civil society. e dilemma of the National-
Religious public lies in the choice between “Israeliness” and “Jewishness”.⁵³
Will the National-Religious public return to dialogue with the general
society or instead withdraw from it? Will the minority adopt a strategy of
integration, or abjure this as a group that has withdrawn? It is too early to
know where Religious Zionism is going.
One of the factors likely to influence the minority’s future decisions is
the sense of alienation from the general society. An important question with
far-reaching implications for the future of the National-Religious sector is
how this sense of alienation will be channeled. Will it lead to separation
and segregation, the emergence of two cultural worlds—that of the major-
ity and that of the minority—which develop on parallel paths without
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coming into contact? or instead, will the alienation induce the minority to
integrate into the majority discourse, thus making its mark on the public
space? If the National-Religious community chooses the first possibility, it
will draw closer to the haredi public and abandon the effort to be part of
Israeli society. In that case it will be possible to regard it as an involuntary
minority whose values are suppressed by the majority.
It is possible, however, that the National-Religious public will choose
the second possibility—that of enhancing its integration into the society
and attempting to express its unique voice in the public space. In that case
there is a chance that the National-Religious camp will become a significant
factor in the creation of the Israeli culture. At the same time, it will presum-
ably maintain its place as a distinct group with a special cultural world, and
perhaps will even develop its own, parallel minispace.
e two possibilities are open to the National-Religious camp. e
quotations below illustrate the two paths for channeling the alienation.
In the first, Shimon (Neveh Tsuf) said, “I have no subscription to any
newspaper and don’t buy newspapers. I don’t want to occupy myself with
nonsense, it’s just a waste of time. Idle chatter. I often don’t agree with the
commentary. e Bible is the most relevant newspaper.”
Conversely, Neta Ariel, director of the Maaleh film-making school
notes that, “Since the establishment of the state, sectors and monopolies
have been created for dealing with the Israeli and Jewish cultures: the secu-
lars create the Israeli culture and the religious are responsible for the culture.
e seculars do not have a monopoly on Israeli culture!”
N
1. Baruch Kimmerling viewed Israeli society as a collection of “tribes”, which
includes the Israeli Arabs, the haredi public, immigrants from the former Soviet
Union, the mizrahim, and the National-Religious community. See e Invention
and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military
2.
Robert A. White, “e Media, Culture and Religion Perspective,”
Communication Research Trends
3. Stuart Hall, “Race, Culture, and Communications: Looking Backward and
Forward at Cultural Studies,” Rethinking Marxism -
soli, “e Imaginary and the Sacred in Durkheim’s Sociology,” Current Sociology
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4.
Greg G. Armfield and R. Lance Holbert, “e Relationship between
Religiosity and Internet Use,” Journal of Media and Religion
5.
Eliezer Ben-Rafael, “e Faces of Religiosity in Israel: Cleavages or
Continuum?” Israel Studies
6. On the crisis in religious Zionism during the first years of statehood, see
Gideon Aran, “From Pioneering to Torah Study: Background to the Growth of
Religious Zionism,” in A Hundred Years of Religious Zionism, ed. Avi Sagi and Dov
7.
On the changes in the ideology of the National-Religious public, see Gideon
Aran, “From Religious Zionism to Zionist Religion: e Roots of Gush Emunim,”
Studies in Contemporary Jewry
8.
See David Newman, “Gush Emunim: Between Fundamentalism and
Pragmatism,” Jerusalem Quarterly Messianism,
Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism
9. Aran, “From Religious Zionism to Zionist Religion”.
10. Gadi Taub, e Settlers and the Struggle over the Meaning of Zionism (Tel-
11. On the perception that the National-Religious community leads the settle-
ment movement see Inés Gabel, e National-Religious Community and the Media:
A Love-Hatred Relationship
12. e National Religious Party represented the National-Religious public.
things, in a drastic decline in the number of Knesset members.
13. Ben-Rafael, “Faces of Religiosity”.
14. Asher Cohen, “e Knitted Kippa and what is Behind it: Proliferation of
Identities in Religious Zionism,” Akademot
15. Gabel, e National-Religious Community and the Media.
16.
Several confrontations between rabbis and the judicial system and the police
occurred during recent years, mainly about the freedom of speech.
17. Moshe Hellinger, “e Religious-Zionist Movement at the Beginning of
the Twenty-First Century: Between Moribundity and Possible Revival,” Akademot
18.
Asher Cohen maintains that these factions represent a minority of the
National-Religious public and that most of this public is not identified with any
of them. Note, however, that his research focused on the National-Religious public
residing in the large cities, or what is called the “silent bourgeois majority”. It
appears, though, that the ideological leadership is not necessarily part of this public.
19.
Cohen, “Knitted Kippa”; Yair Sheleg, e New Religious People: A
Contemporary View of the Religious Society in Israel
20. Sheleg, e New Religious People.
21. Idem.
22. Israel Harel, “A Cultural Profile,” Nekuda
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23. David Jacobson, “e Ma’ale School: Catalyst for the Entrance of Religious
Zionists into the World of Media Production,” Israel Studies
24.
Several religious journalists work in television news such as Amit Segal,
political issues; Sara Beck, welfare and education issues; Baruch Krah, judicial issues.
25. Henk Westerik, Karsten Renckstorf, Jan Lammers, and Fred Wester, “Tran-
scending ‘Uses and Gratifications’: Media Use as Social Action and the Use of Event
History Analysis,” Communications
26. Elihu Katz, “Mass Communication in Research and the Study of Popular
Culture,” Studies in Public Communication
27. Elihu Katz, J. G. Blumler, and Michael Gurevitch, “Utilization of Mass
Communication by the Individual,” in e Uses of Mass Communications: Current
Perspectives on Gratifications Research, ed. J. G. Blumler and Elihu Katz (Beverly
28.
Elihu Katz and Michael Gurevitch, e Secularization of Leisure: Culture and
Communication in Israel
“Avoidances, Gratifications, and Consumption of eatrical Films: e Rest of the
Story,” in Current Research in Film: Audiences, Economics, and Law, vol. , ed. B. A.
29. Philip Palmgreen and P. Ettkin Lawrence, “Avoidances, Gratifications, and
Consumption of eatrical Films”.
30. Westerik et al., “Transcending ‘Uses and Gratifications’.”
31. Alan M. Rubin, “Ritualized and Instrumental Television Viewing,” Journal
of Communication
32. See Stuart Hall, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse (Birming-
Culture, Media, Language Working Papers
in Cultural Studies, 1972–1979
33. John W. Berry wrote several articles on this topic, “Marginality, Stress and
Ethnic Identification in an Acculturated Aboriginal Community,” Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology
Society,” International Migration,
34.
For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Clint C. Wilson and Felix
Gutierrez, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Media: From Mass to Class Communication
(ousand Oaks, CA, ).
35.
e desire to develop a distinct media environment is not always real-
ized. Different factors may influence this, including the resources available to the
community.
36. Hanna Adoni, Dan Caspi, and Akiba A. Cohen, Media, Minorities and
Hybrid Identities: e Arab and Russian Communities in Israel
37. Jurgen Habermas, e Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, ).
38. James Curran, “Rethinking the Media as a Public Sphere,” in Communica-
tion and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere, ed. Peter Dahlgren and Colin
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39. On the representation of the peripheral sectors in negative contexts, see
Eli Avraham and Anat First, “Space, Power and Media: Ways of Constructing the
Periphery as ‘Other’,” Social and Cultural Geography
40. Mark Orbe, Constructing Co-Cultural eory: An Explanation of Culture,
Power and Communication (ousand Oaks, CA, ).
41.
Eli Avraham, Behind Media Marginality: Coverage of Social Groups and Places
in the Israeli Press
42. Presumably these views not only characterize the National-Religious public
but are common in the secular public as well.
43. During the editing of the interviews, reality shows on television, such as
Survival and Big Brother
44.
Jonathan Cohen, “Politics, Alienation and the Consolidation of Group
Identity: e Case of Synagogue Pamphlets,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs
45. ere are many illegal radio stations in Israel. A study on the phenomenon
of the numerous pirate stations and the reasons for their proliferation reveals that
many of these stations broadcast religious content and have considerable popu-
larity. See Yehiel Limor and Hanan Naveh, Pirate Radio in Israel
[Hebrew].
46.
e fear of television’s negative effects on the family structure in general and
on children in particular is not unique to religious families.
47. e concept of “wasting time” concerns activities without benefit in place
of occupation with Torah study.
48. Hatsofeh
Makor Rishon,
Hatsofeh ceased to
appear.
49.
is claim was made by Dr. Asher Cohen and by Israel Harel in a conference
at Tel-Aviv University.
50. -
ment’s decision to freeze construction in the settlements, and it is not clear what
broke out between Religious-Zionist rabbis, especially those in hesder yeshivas
(which give instruction to soldiers), and state institutions, including the Ministry
of Defense.
51. Berry, “Acculturation and Adaptation”.
52. Yigal Ariel, “e Spiritual Disengagement Is Already Here,” Eretz Aheret,
53. Gadi Taub discusses the ideological changes occurring among the settlers
and their supporters, e Settlers and the Struggle over the Meaning of Zionism (Tel-
Gabel, A Newspaper as a Tool in the Construction of a Community’s Political and
Sectarian Identity: e Case Study of Nekud
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APPENDIX
Most interviewees were unwilling to provide information about themselves
such as work or other activities. ey were assured that only their name,
their age, and their place of residence would appear in the article.
MAJOR CITIES
Petah Tikva Kiryat Motzkin
Petah Tikva Kiryat Motzkin
Beer-Sheva Jonathan, , Raanana
Avi, , Beer-Sheva Neta Ariel, Jerusalem
Dalia, , Raanana Kiryat Motzkin
Jerusalem Raanana
Beer-Sheva Jerusalem
Einat, , Ashdod Petah Tikva
Stavit, , Petah Tikva Petah Tikva
Jerusalem Jerusalem
Ashdod Ashdod
SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK
Avihai, , Guivon Hahadash Neveh Tsuf
Adam Bet-El
RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENTS WITHIN THE GREEN LINE
moshav Nehalim kibbutz Tirat Zvi
David, , kibbutz Lavi kibbutz Lavi
APPENDIX
Questions about the interviewees’ attitude toward the media
1. What do you think about media contents?
2. Do you think journalists are motivated by professional or ethical
principles?
3. Do you think journalists are trustworthy?
4. Do you think journalists are objective?
5. Do you think media reflects society properly?
6.
How do journalists portray the National-Religious community?
What do you think about the way the community is presented in
the news or in other media contents?
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Questions about media consumption
1. Do you read newspapers during the week or in the weekend?
2. Which newspaper do you read?
3. Do you listen to radio? Which radio channels do you prefer? Which
radio content?
4. Do you watch television? Which programs do you watch? Do you
watch Israeli channels? Do you watch foreign channels?
Questions about motives for media exposure
1. Why do you read the newspapers you read or watch the programs
you watch? Why don’t you read other newspapers?
2.
3.
What do you expect from other media, such as radio and newspapers?
4.
Why did you decide to watch that program? Why don’t you see other
programs such as . . .?
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