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Technology and Culture 41.1 (2000) 51-79
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In 1979, the New York City Planning Commission proposed a new
vision for mass transit on the streets of Manhattan. The commission
proposed to replace sixty-eight crosstown buses on Forty-second
Street with twelve electric streetcars, which, asserted the
commission, would run twice as fast with lower operating costs, and
without noxious exhaust fumes. Ironically, streetcars had in fact
rolled along Forty-second Street until 1946, and city officials had
hailed as progress the replacement of Manhattan's trolleys with
diesel or gasoline buses. Moreover, the 1979 commission proposed to
replace the buses of the New York City Transit Authority with a
light rail system operated by a private company, whereas several
New York City administrations in the 1920s and 1930s had worked to
substitute municipally operated for privately owned transit.
It is no coincidence that vehicle type and operating authority
were debated simultaneously in both cases. A fight over vehicle
type often represents just the top layer of a deep conflict over
who is to provide urban transit under what terms. Though transit
executives, politicians, and other players boasted of the technical
advantages of bus or streetcar, many cared more about regulation,
taxation, and ownership than the merits of rubber tires or steel
rails. Their decisions to abandon streetcars, in New York and in
other cities throughout the United States, cannot be explained
either by inherent technical advantages of buses or the
conspiracies of bus manufacturers. Rather, the bitter antagonism
between transit companies and local politicians moved both the
companies and the politicians toward support of the bus as a means
to rewrite old rules. They understood that the eight decades of
tradition, custom, and regulation fettering the street railway had
not yet gripped the new machine. As one upstart bus company put it,
"the bus is young and honest."
The current historical debate over the motorization of mass
transit in the United States began in earnest in 1974 with the
publication and presentation to the United States Senate of
American Ground Transport by Bradford Snell. Snell charged
that General Motors had destroyed mass transit in the United States
by purchasing controlling shares of electric railways and
converting them to diesel bus operation, not only to sell more GM
buses but to weaken mass transit, forcing Americans into GM cars.
In his report, Snell disparages the bus. "Due to their high cost of
operation and slow speed on congested streets . . . these buses
ultimately contributed to the collapse of several hundred public
transit systems and to the diversion of hundreds of thousands of
patrons to automobiles."
Snell's thesis remains alive both in scholarly literature and in
popular culture. Many books and journal articles uncritically cite
American Ground Transport. David St. Clair's Motorization
of American Cities fills in Snell's sketchy arguments with
additional evidence. Using aggregated data for the years 1935-50,
St. Clair compares streetcars, trolley coaches (rubber-tired buses
powered by electricity drawn from overhead wires), and motor buses
and finds "the streetcar was more economical than the motor bus, at
least on the more heavily patronized lines," and that only an
intent to weaken public transit can explain motorization.
Snell has his critics. General Motors defended itself in 1974 by
noting that the decision to abandon streetcars preceded GM's
investment in transit companies and citing early movement toward
buses in both Los Angeles and New York. Historian Sy Adler bluntly
complains that "everything Bradford Snell wrote in American
Ground Transport about transit in Los Angeles is wrong,"
attributing the abandonment of passenger interurbans there to a
desire to use their rails for freight service. In their studies of
Los Angeles and Chicago, respectively, Scott Bottles and Paul
Barrett blame a transit industry characterized in 1900 by
monopolistic practices, unsavory "traction barons," and crowded,
decrepit streetcars. They argue that buses slowed, rather than
hastened, the decline of mass transit. Donald F. Davis adds that
many riders preferred buses to streetcars, and the short life span
of individual buses may actually have been an advantage since it
gave passengers more chances to ride new vehicles.
Martha Bianco's study of Portland, Oregon, takes a middle
ground...