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The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon
Abstract and Figures
As a result of a nuclear war vast areas of forests will go up in smoke-corresponding at least to the combined land mass of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In addition to the tremendous fires that will burn for weeks in cities and industrial centers, fires will also rage across croplands and it is likely that at least 1.5 billion tons of stored fossil fuels (mostly oil and gas) will be destroyed. The fires will produce a thick smoke layer that will drastically reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the earth's surface. This darkness would persist for many weeks, rendering any agricultural activity in the Northern Hemisphere virtually impossible if the war takes place during the growing season.
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... Paul Crutzen, one of the coiners of the concept, for example, pioneered research on "nuclear winter" (the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war) which was continued by Carl Sagan and others in the US, fostering an anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s. Crutzen considered this research his most important achievement "from a political point of view" (emphasis mine), and in this, he was a continuator of the opposition of climate science to the military-industrial complex (Crutzen & Birks 1982;Crutzen 1995, 218). ...
Climate science is one of the main political drivers of today's world, informing critical scholars and social movements alike. Yet, many scholars associate it with projects of domination (the Cold War, capitalism, imperialism) while relying on it to elaborate a critique of capital. This article proposes a new historical account of climate science. Drawing from archival findings, interpreted with historical sociology combined with the critique of political economy, the article shows that a conflict developed at the National Academy of Sciences during the Vietnam War, between scientists who wanted atmospheric research to be under the auspices of NATO, as proposed by the "father of the H-bomb" Edward Teller, and others who favored global cooperation, led by meteorologist Jule Charney. The resolution of this conflict had consequences for both the institutional framework and the content of what is today understood as climate science. It is argued that this conflict was part of the social movements of the time, and had momentous consequences for knowledge-making by rejecting the association of atmospheric science with the military-industrial complex, an essential component of capitalist accumulation. Most notably, it resulted in the conceptualization of the atmosphere as a commons, which undermines its treatment as a sink, private property, or commodity, and qualifies it as a potential informer of the allocation of resources in an emancipated society. Therefore, the article sheds light on the resonance between climate science and current social movements and critical scholars: the constitution of climate science was in mediation with a worldview that was critical of aspects of the capitalist political economy and its ontology of nature.
... The analysis of the first scientific publications on massive forest fires (Shostakovitch 1925;Smith 1950;Wexler 1950) brought to a conclusion that a global nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in the long-term cooling of the Earth's surface due to the air transport of particles, such as fine soil and smoke from fires and explosions, this phenomenon being later referred to as "nuclear winter" (Crutzen and Birks 1982;Turco et al. 1983;Pittock et al. 1985). Since 2007, there has been a new wave of interest in climate changes which can occur even due to local nuclear conflicts Toon et al. 2007Toon et al. , 2008Stenke et al. 2013;Mills et al. 2014). ...
The paper considers changes in the state of the environment in Krasnoyarsk and its vicinities in August 2021 when the smoke of large-scale Yakutia fires persisted. The observation system at our disposal made it possible to record data on weather conditions (temperature and humidity of atmospheric air, particle concentration РМ2.5), soil temperature, water temperature in the Yenisei River and photographic images of the atmosphere over the city. The spatio-temporal dynamics of the smoke was obtained on the basis of Earth remote sensing data. During the observation period, we recorded: a decrease in the temperature of the upper active soil layer (ΔT = 5.6 °C) caused by a decrease in solar radiation due to smoke aerosols; a decrease in the temperature of the lower surface layer of the atmosphere (ΔT = 1.9 °C) caused by a turbulent heat exchange with the soil; the formation of advection cooling fogs over the Yenisei River in Krasnoyarsk. These factors are significant in modeling the consequences of “nuclear winter” and accounting for the effects of the ongoing climate change.
... This phenomenon, another of Paul Crutzen's proj ects, had global implications. 76 According to the authors of a report published by the Scientific Committee on Prob lems of the Environment, [T]he indirect effects on populations of a large-scale nuclear war, particularly the climatic effects caused by smoke, could be potentially more consequential globally than the direct effects, and the risks of unpre ce dented consequences are great for non-combatant and combatant countries alike. 77 The South Pacific was no longer a refuge from superpower rivalries; Shute's dystopian vision had become a real ity. ...
... These are long-term possibilities, unlikely in the near (centuries to millennia) future when the current phase of human impacts will -at least initially -play out. A more likely and imminent possibility is that of a global nuclear conflagration and its effects, another scenario researched by Paul Crutzen (Crutzen and Birks, 1982). This has been an ever-present danger since 1949, when rival states developed these weapons, and one likely to continue for the foreseeable future (Spen-cer, 2022). ...
The Anthropocene as a prospective new, ongoing series/epoch must be defensible against all relevant concerns. We address the seven, still-relevant challenges posed to the Anthropocene Working Group by the Chair, International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS), in 2014. (1) Concept or reality? The Anthropocene possesses a substantial, sharply distinctive stratigraphic record recognisable through many proxy signals from the mid-20th century onwards; (2) GSSP or GSSA? The Anthropocene can be defined by a GSSP and correlated globally; (3) Past or future? The Anthropocene unquestionably represents geological time, its transformations having already moved the Earth System beyond Holocene norms towards an irreversible future trajectory; (4) Utility? The Anthropocene’s distinctive material content allows useful delineation on geological sections/maps; (5) Indelibility? Many of the Anthropocene’s transformative effects cannot be subsequently effaced or overprinted; (6) Fit within the Geological Time Scale (GTS)? The Anthropocene represents a unique, youngest, interval in Earth history and strata of profound significance; (7) What is its value? The chronostratigraphic Anthropocene has conceptual usefulness even informally, but would then lack the clarity, stability and recognition that formalization provides. Without its formalization, the GTS would no longer accurately reflect Earth history, diminishing the relevance of geological science for analysis of ongoing planetary change.
In March 2024, the Anthropocene Working Group’s proposal for a formal Anthropocene Series/Epoch of the Geologic Time Scale was formally rejected by the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy. What does the failed formalization effort reveal about the relationship between science and normativity under conditions of ‘climate crisis’? Drawing on four years of ethnographic observation of the Anthropocene Working Group, this article explains how the Group developed its proposal, why it failed, and what it reveals about the social construction of geological truth. The effort to formalize an Anthropocene unit was based on a coupling of science and politics, wherein geo-scientists could make normative assertions in the register of scientific fact. Ultimately, the Group failed because it was seen as appropriating incumbent geological techniques to advance claims about the future, transitioning geology from a descriptive science about the past to a site of warning.
This paper explores the political uses of images generated by Earth System science. It argues that images of possible climate futures, maps of potential worlds of heatwaves and wildfires, are made legible to policymakers by an alliance with a class of climate-economy models that associate scientific estimates of climate impacts with a prescribed international policy and technology mix. While environmental models have successfully mobilized policymakers in the past by providing images of “planetary scenarios” accompanying different emissions pathways, with climate change a political actor outside the administrative state is required to overcome the entrenchment of fossil capital. The paper suggests such actors are empowered not by the rhetoric of scenario modeling but by the emerging practice of “planetary sensing,” where activists and stakeholders directly mobilize the planetary images generated by Earth System science as they work to evacuate prisons, track pollutants, and repair pipelines.
This article attempts to identify the relationship between memory, time, and environment, and to answer the question of whether (and how) memory can be perceived as a form of human environment. The paper, by elaborating on the already established notions of environmental memory and temporal environments, connects different diagnoses regarding our current temporality (Hartog, Chakrabarty, Malm) with the research on the Remembering-Imagining System (Conway et al.) and indicates that they may be useful to define how collective ris works. Finally, by analysing three different literary examples (Gospodinov, Dukaj, Szczerek), it addresses the question of why does it seemingly become more difficult to understand our temporal environment and imagine our collective future?
Present day status of planet earth is perilous. In January 2023, the “Doomsday Clock” (a serving global indicator for worldwide catastrophe) crept up to 90 seconds before midnight. According to the bulletin of atomic scientists, the Doomsday Clock aims to designate humanity’s closeness to annihilation; with midnight being the instance of ignition and thus, the point of no return from Armageddon. Because 90 seconds is the closest the clock has ever been to midnight, the year 2023 is therefore, planet earth’s nearest to Armageddon. But why is planet earth perilously close to extinction? The bulletin of atomic scientists cited threats from War; Disease; Climate change; and Disruptive technologies as major contributors. In the context of climate change mitigation, this chapter attempts to present contributions of the circular bioeconomy paradigm that could help humanity to dial back the Doomsday Clock. Anaerobic digestion (AD), integrated regenerative agriculture (IRA), controlled ecological life support system (CELSS), bioregenerative life support system (BLSS), note by note cuisine (NNC), circularity, and molecular pharming are some of the solutions isolated.
Two independent calculations suggest that temperate marine zooplankton would starve to death relatively quickly if phytoplankton photosynthesis were to cease. A sudden atmospheric darkening, blocking 99% of sunlight, as might accompany the impact of a large meteor, would be sufficient to stop global photosynthesis. An equation derived from basic principles, solved using North Sea plankton data, gives 9-41 days as the duration of the shortest atmospheric darkening needed to initiate a zooplankton starvation crisis during the spring season. An adaptation of a simple plankton model gives outer limits ranging from 104 days in January to 33 days in July and August for critical blackout durations. Such an event cannot be discounted as a cause of the widespread terminal Cretaceous plankton extinction. -from Authors
Analogue and modelling approaches to paleoclimatic reconstruction are reviewed. Analogue methods include calculations of regional snowline lowering from field data and the analysis of extreme climatic events. Several examples are discussed. The relationship between changes in climate and changes in the frequency of circulation type is shown to be problematic, at least on short time-scales. Finally, the use of GCMS in paleoclimatic reconstruction is briefly discussed with reference to Glacial Maximum conditions.
Latitudinal distributions of ethane, propane, propene, and acetylene in air over the Atlantic from 48°N to 4°S are reported. In addition, measurements of saturated and unsaturated hydrocarbons (C2–C5) at low latitudes and from 55°N to 80°N are presented. The mixing ratios of ethane, propane, and acetylene were found to vary systematically between a few tenths of a ppb and a few ppb. The alkene and higher alkane (C4 and C5) mixing ratios were found to be in the ppt range. The data are discussed with respect to the source distributions and atmospheric lifetimes of the different hydrocarbons.
PAN and ozone or oxidant measurements were made at four different sites. Three of these sites were urban locations, the other was rural. PAN and corresponding ozone and oxidant measurements were compared. The maximum O/sub 3//PAN or O/sub x//PAN ratios varied at each sampling site thus preventing the prediction of PAN concentrations estimates from ambient ozone concentration alone. Generally high ozone concentrations were observed when corresponding high PAN concentrations were measured. However, high ozone was observed when PAN concentrations were low. These observations concur with simulated chamber irradiations and modeling predictions of ozone and PAN concentrations.
Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)
Hydrogen sulfide emissions resulting from a natural gas well blowout in Alberta were studied. Plume transport and dispersion of H2S were monitored. Impact of the blowout on area air quality was assessed. While the H2S emissions contributed to a general deterioration of area air quality, no adverse health or environmental impacts from the blowout were noted. (2 maps, 2 references, 2 tables)
Rate constants were measured for the reaction HO2+O3-->OH+2O2(k1) using a discharge-flow system with laser magnetic resonance detection of both HO2 and OH. k1 was determined directly from the first order decay of HO2 in excess O3 when C2F3Cl was added to scavenge the OH product and prevent interference from the faster reaction OH+O3-->HO2+O2(k2). The ratio k2/k1 was independently determined from the steady-state [HO2]/[OH] ratio obtained without C2F3Cl. Results from the scavenger method are given by k1= (1.4+/-0.4)×10-14 exp [-(580+/-100)/T] cm3 s-1 for 245 K