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Measuring Individual Differences in Generic Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Across Cultures: Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire

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  • German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval)

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Conspiracy theories are ubiquitous when it comes to explaining political events and societal phenomena. Individuals differ not only in the degree to which they believe in specific conspiracy theories, but also in their general susceptibility to explanations based on such theories, that is, their conspiracy mentality. We present the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), an instrument designed to efficiently assess differences in the generic tendency to engage in conspiracist ideation within and across cultures. The CMQ is available in English, German, and Turkish. In four studies, we examined the CMQ’s factorial structure, reliability, measurement equivalence across cultures, and its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. Analyses based on a cross-cultural sample (Study 1a; N = 7,766) supported the conceptualization of conspiracy mentality as a one-dimensional construct across the three language versions of the CMQ that is stable across time (Study 1b; N = 141). Multigroup confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated cross-cultural measurement equivalence of the CMQ items. The instrument could therefore be used to examine differences in conspiracy mentality between European, North American, and Middle Eastern cultures. In Studies 2-4 (total N = 476), we report (re-)analyses of 3 datasets demonstrating the validity of the CMQ in student and working population samples in the UK and Germany. First, attesting to its convergent validity, the CMQ was highly correlated with another measure of generic conspiracy belief. Second, the CMQ showed patterns of meaningful associations with personality measures (e.g., Big Five dimensions, schizotypy), other generalized political attitudes (e.g., social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism), and further individual differences (e.g., paranormal belief, lack of socio-political control). Finally, the CMQ predicted beliefs in specific conspiracy theories over and above other individual difference measures.
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... As we postulate that motivation is not necessary for the fundamental beliefs to arise, we also propose that motivation is not a necessary ingredient for self-or group-favoring outcomes. Crucially, this is at odds with the most commonly accepted theoretical explanation for in-group bias-the social-identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;Turner et al., 1987), which posits that (a) memberships in social groups are an essential part of individuals' self-concepts (see also R. Brown, 2000) and (b) individuals strive to see themselves in a positive light. Following from these two postulates, there is a fundamental tendency to favor the social group they identify with (i.e., in-group bias; e.g., M. B. Brewer, 2007;Hewstone et al., 2002). ...
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