ArticlePDF Available

Speaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as A Generalised Political Attitude

January 2014
European Journal of Personality 28(1):25-43

DOI:10.1002/per.1930

Authors:

Roland Imhoff

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Martin Bruder

German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval)

Conspiracy theories explain complex world events with reference to secret plots hatched by powerful groups. Belief in such theories is largely determined by a general propensity toward conspirational thinking. Such a conspiracy mentality can be understood as a generalized political attitude, distinct from established generalized political attitudes like right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Study 1a, N = 497) that is temporally relatively stable (Study 1b & 1c, total N = 196). Three further studies (combined N = 854) show that in contrast to RWA and SDO, conspiracy mentality is related to prejudice against high-power groups that are perceived as less likeable and more threatening than low-power groups, whereas SDO and RWA are associated with an opposite reaction to perceptions of power. Study 5 (N = 1,852) investigates the relationship of conspiracy mentality with political behavioral intentions in a specific catastrophic scenario (i.e., the damage to the Fukushima nuclear reactor after the 2011 tsunami in Japan) revealing a hitherto neglected role of conspiracy mentality in motivating social action aimed at changing the status quo.

Standardized regression coefficients (+SE) for right-wing authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality and social dominance orientation simultaneously predicting anti-Americanism (R2corr = .27), personalized anti-capitalism (R2corr = .27), anti-Semitism (R2corr = .33), Islamoprejudice (R2corr = .34) and antziganism (R2corr = .20). Asterisks indicate significant coefficients at p < .01.

…

Figures - uploaded by Roland Imhoff

Content may be subject to copyright.

Content uploaded by Roland Imhoff

Content may be subject to copyright.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 1

Speaking (Un-)Truth to Power:

Conspiracy Mentality as a Generalized Political Attitude

Roland Imhoff

University of Cologne

Martin Bruder

University of Konstanz

Accepted for publication in European Journal of Personality

This is the authors’ version. For the authoritative final version please refer

to the published article in the journal.

Correspondence regarding the article should be addressed to:

Roland Imhoff

Sozialpsychologie: Social Cognition

University of Cologne

Richard-Strauss-Str. 2

50931 Köln

Germany

rimhoff@uni-koeln.de

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 2

Abstract

Conspiracy theories explain complex world events with reference to secret plots

hatched by powerful groups. Belief in such theories is largely determined by a general

propensity toward conspirational thinking. Such a conspiracy mentality can be understood as

a generalized political attitude, distinct from established generalized political attitudes like

right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Study 1a, N =

497) that is temporally relatively stable (Study 1b & 1c, total N = 196). Three further studies

(combined N = 854) show that in contrast to RWA and SDO, conspiracy mentality is related

to prejudice against high-power groups that are perceived as less likeable and more

threatening than low-power groups, whereas SDO and RWA are associated with an opposite

reaction to perceptions of power. Study 5 (N = 1,852) investigates the relationship of

conspiracy mentality with political behavioral intentions in a specific catastrophic scenario

(i.e., the damage to the Fukushima nuclear reactor after the 2011 tsunami in Japan) revealing

a hitherto neglected role of conspiracy mentality in motivating social action aimed at

changing the status quo.

Keywords: conspiracy theories, conspiracy mentality, power, generalized political attitudes,

prejudice, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 3

Speaking (Un-)Truth to Power:

Conspiracy Mentality as a Generalized Political Attitude

Individuals harbor conspiracy theories about a great number of significant events that

seem to demand an explanation. Such events include, for example, the assassination of

prominent leaders (e.g., McCauley & Jacques, 1979), terrorist attacks (e.g., Swami,

Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010), or the appearance of new diseases like HIV (e.g.,

Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster, & Kilburn, 1999). The tendency to attribute these events to a

secret plot by a covert alliance of powerful individuals or to clandestine organizations rather

than to more mundane human (in)activity or natural forces has been reported for various

cultures (e.g., Byford & Billig, 2001; Goertzel, 1994; Graumann & Moscovici, 1987; Swami,

2012). Belief in conspiracies seems to be rather wide-spread (Goertzel, 1994) and can be

evoked by minimal exposure to relevant theories (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).

Several scholars have argued that one reason for the popularity of conspiracy theories is

their function in regaining control and predictability (McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Young,

Launer, & Austin, 1990; Zarefsky, 1984). If misfortunes are the result of intentional actions

of mean-spirited conspirators rather than simply due to chance, victims may perceive the

possibility to regain control by undermining the presumed conspiracy. In fact, experimental

research has found support for the hypothesis that lack of control increases compensatory

beliefs in conspiracy theories (e.g., Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010; Whitson &

Galinsky, 2008). In light of these functional and situation-dependent aspects of the

endorsement of conspiracy theories, one could assume that personality-related factors play

little to no role in the degree to which specific conspiracy theories are endorsed.

A general propensity to endorse conspiracy beliefs?

However, previous work has identified a number of personality variables associated

with the belief in specific conspiracy theories, such as low levels of trust (Goertzel, 1994),

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 4

feelings of powerlessness and low self-esteem (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory,

1999), low levels of agreeableness (Swami et al., 2011), schizotypy (Darwin, Neaves, &

Holmes, 2011), and death-related anxiety (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011). Importantly,

the endorsement of specific conspiracy theories is associated with greater beliefs in other

conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2010), even if they are fully fictitious (Swami et al., 2011,

Study 2). Further support for the notion of individual differences in conspiracy mentality

stems from research showing that mutually contradictory conspiracy beliefs are positively

correlated (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). Specifically, individuals who thought that

Princess Diana was assassinated were also more (not less) likely to believe that she faked her

own death.

The idea that such a general propensity to endorse conspiracy theories exists is perhaps

best captured in Moscovici’s (1987) notion of a “conspiracy mentality” or what Karl Popper

(1966) called the conspiracy theory of society, that is “the view that an explanation of a social

phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the

occurrence of this phenomenon […] and who have planned and conspired to bring it about”

(p. 295). We argue that this “mistaken theory that, whatever happens in society – especially

happenings such as war, unemployment, poverty, shortages, which people as a rule dislike –

is the result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups” (Popper, 1966, p. 295,

italics not in original) predisposes individuals to attribute significant events to the intentional

actions of mean-intending groups of individuals who are sufficiently powerful to carry out

the suspected conspirational act.

The present research puts to a test the idea that individual differences in the propensity

to belief in conspiracy theories uniquely predict (a) prejudicial attitudes toward powerful

societal groups and (b) politically relevant behavioral intentions designed to undermine the

perceived conspiracy.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 5

We argue that such a conspiracy mentality can be characterized as a generalized

political attitude, much like other well-established political attitudes such as right-wing

authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto,

Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). A generalized political attitude describes individual

differences in a stable ideological belief system that allows predicting attitudes to specific

attitude objects based on a specific attribute of the object such as, for example, its deviant

nature, its low status, or its high power. For instance, someone high in RWA will have a

markedly negative attitude to deviant groups or persons, whereas high SDO scores predict

negative attitudes against low status groups. With respect to conspiracy mentality we argue

that it is characterized by a ‘monological belief system’ (Goertzel, 1994) associated with

disliking powerful societal groups and perceiving them as responsible for political and

economic events with negative implications. For instance, individuals high in conspiracy

mentality will attribute the present financial crisis to the coordinated actions of greedy

managers and bankers rather than systemic dynamics in a complex economy. Likewise,

threat induced by ecological crises like a nuclear disaster will likely be resolved by attributing

this threat to the intentional (though hidden) misconduct of politicians and energy

corporations. Importantly, the groups seen as responsible have to be perceived as being high

in power and influence, otherwise it would be implausible to assume that they are able to

“pull off” the conspiracy and thereby cause the crisis. In contrast to the system-justifying

function of RWA and SDO (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), conspiracy mentality therefore

challenges existing power structures in society. This is because powerful groups in particular

are being seen as responsible for present and past crises which may result in behavioral

intentions to undermine the perceived conspiracy by these groups and therefore their position

in society.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 6

The distinction between high- and low-power groups therefore is an important (and

sometimes overlooked) distinction to make with regard to the relation between generalized

political attitudes and prejudice. Both SDO and RWA have been identified as significant, but

distinct, predictors of generalized prejudice (e.g., Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Whitley,

1999), social attitudes (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005), and behavior (e.g., Son

Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, & McBride, 2007). In fact, as far as prejudice is concerned, Asbrock

and colleagues (2010) state that “numerous independent studies have now shown that RWA

and SDO explain up to 50% of the variance in generalized prejudice with no other

psychological individual difference variables adding notably to variance predicted” (p. 325f.).

This contention is, for example, supported by research showing that RWA and SDO were the

proximal predictors of generalized prejudice mediating any effects of the “Big Five”

personality characteristics (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; but see

McFarland, 2010).

Although numerous studies observed independent contributions of RWA and SDO to

prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Yang-Wallentin, 2011; Duckitt & Sibley,

2007; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), these studies usually examined sexism or

prejudice against disadvantaged, supposedly relatively low-power groups such as ethnic or

religious minorities, homosexuals, and disabled people. Importantly, we argue that some

prejudice is directed at explicitly high-power groups and that conspiracy mentality is a

particularly potent predictor of such prejudicial attitudes. Anti-Semitism provides a case in

point: Anti-Semitic prejudice often involves ideas revolving around Jewish world

domination. It therefore explicitly targets a group that – despite often being a vulnerable

minority at the local level – is being perceived as powerful at the global level. We argue that

anti-Semitic prejudice is just one case among many in which prejudice against groups that are

perceived as high in power will be related to general conspiracy mentality.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 7

The Present Research

We conducted five studies, three of which tested our prediction that conspiracy

mentality is related to prejudice against high-power groups and that this prediction is unique

(compared to RWA and SDO) both in direction and in terms of explained variance. After

establishing that conspiracy mentality can be understood as a distinct and temporally stable

generalized political attitude in Study 1, Study 2 explored the link between conspiracy

mentality and anti-Semitism (even if no Jews were mentioned in the conspiracies) as well as

prejudice against low-power groups (Muslims, Gypsies) and high-power groups (capitalists,

Americans), controlling for RWA and SDO. Studies 3 and 4 tested the predicted association

between conspiracy mentality and negative attitudes toward powerful groups across a broader

range of societal groups. Participants rated their perceptions of power of each of 32 groups

as well as how likeable and how threatening they thought each group was. The

intraindividual correlations between power and likeability, respectively power and threat,

were then used as criterion variables predicted by conspiracy mentality, RWA, and SDO.

Whereas Study 3 assessed perceptions of general threat, Study 4 distinguished between

perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat. Finally, we conducted a fifth study to test the

novel idea that individuals high in conspiracy mentality not only distrust those in power but

actively work toward changing the status quo.

Study 1

Study 1 tested the psychometric properties and discriminant validity of the Conspiracy

Mentality Scale. First, we established discriminant validity in a large sample (Study 1a)

before testing the inter-temporal stability with two further samples in Study 1b and Study 1c.

Method Study 1a

Participants. A total of N = 497 participants (245 female, 240 male, 1 other, 11

missing; M

age

= 33.49, SD

age

= 12.25) were recruited via Amazon MTurk in a study on

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 8

personality and attitudes. The sample was diverse with respect to education, ethnic

background and income (see Table 2). Every participant received 25 ct as compensation for

their participation.

Conspiracy mentality. Twelve items tapping into a general propensity to believe in

conspiracies were either purpose-designed for this study or taken from the existing literature

(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). No item mentioned specific

conspiracies or specific groups responsible for these conspiracies. The scale was originally

developed in German and then independently translated into English by two translators

competent in both languages. The final items were then discussed between one translator and

two native English speakers (see Appendix for item wording in English and German).

Other measures. To establish discriminant validity we assessed the two most

prominent generalized political attitudes with well-established scales. The 12-items scale of

RWA (Funke, 2005), and the standard 16-item SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994) were included.

The RWA scale consists of three subfacets (authoritarian aggression, authoritarian

submission, and conventionalism) and each of these is measured by two positively phrased

and two reverse-coded items. The standard SDO scale has mostly been used as a one-

dimensional measure but recent research suggested that it may be better construed as two-

factorial with dominance and egalitarianism (reverse-coded) as the two factors (Ho et al.,

2012). As a parsimonious measure of general personality factors we used the Ten Item

Personality Measure (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) to get estimates of all Big

Five personality dimensions (based on two items per dimension).

Procedure. Participants gave informed consent before completing the TIPI, Conspiracy

Mentality, RWA, and SDO scale all on a 7-point scale. They subsequently provided

demographic information about gender, age, ethnicity, education, household income, political

orientation (on three item asking participants to position themselves on a left-right continuum

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 9

regarding social issues, economic issues, and in general), religious affiliation and religiosity.

No other variables were included in the study.

Results Study 1a

All scales showed satisfactory reliability with the exception of TIPI agreeableness

(Table 1). Conspiracy mentality was not only non-redundant but virtually unrelated both to

other political attitudes (RWA, SDO, political orientation) and to more basic personality

dimensions (Big Five). In contrast, SDO and RWA were highly interrelated and also

associated with a more right-wing political orientation and lower levels of openness to new

experiences. The only distinction between the two was the high correlation of RWA with

religiosity in contrast to the complete lack of association between SDO and religiosity. Age

was positively related to conspiracy mentality, r = .10, p = .02, and RWA, r = .10, p = .03,

but not SDO, r = -.07, p = .13. Across all other background variables, none had any effect on

the degree of conspiracy mentality, ps > .21, but some were related to RWA and SDO (see

Table 2).

A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to test the assumed factor

structure of the generalized political attitudes. To reduce the random error of manifest

variables we based our analyses on parcels of two items rather than individual items (Little,

Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Each parcel consisted of two items of identical

coding and subscale. The Conspiracy Mentality Scale was modeled as one-factorial, whereas

we followed Ho and colleagues (2012) in assuming a two-factorial solution for SDO with the

subfactors egalitarianism (SDO-E) and dominance (SDO-D) (Ho et al., 2012). The RWA

scale was modeled with each item predicted by a latent factor representing the respective

subscale (authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, conventionalism) and whether it

was reverse-coded or not (Funke, 2005). The CFA for the CM scale, χ

(9) = 26.10, p = .002,

/ df = 2.90, GFI = .98, TLI = .98, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .07, and for the RWA scale, χ

(3) =

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 10

8.81, p = .03, χ

/ df = 2.94, GFI = .99, TLI = .97, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .07, yielded an

acceptable fit whereas this was not true for the SDO scale, χ

(19) = 120.76, p < .001, χ

/ df =

6.36, GFI = .92, TLI = .94, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .11. All latent variables loaded significantly

on all item parcels for CM, |ß| > .49, RWA, |ß| > .46, and SDO, |ß| > .75.

To examine the associations between the three constructs and their subcomponents we

analyzed an overall model in which the latent variables were allowed to correlate. The model

had an acceptable fit, χ

(152) = 409.75, p < .001, χ

/ df = 2.70, GFI = .91, TLI = .94, CFI =

.95, RMSEA = .06. The three subfacets of RWA intercorrelated as expected, rs > .69, as did

the two subfacets of SDO, r = -.66. Conspiracy Mentality was unrelated to SDO-E, r = .02,

RWA conventionalism, r = .07, and RWA authoritarian submission, r = .05 and only

moderately related to SDO-D, r = .16, and RWA authoritarian aggression, r = .15. In

contrast, all subfacets of RWA and SDO were systematically related with correlations

ranging in magnitude (independent of direction) from r = -.28 between SDO-E and RWA

conventionalism to r = .54 between SDO-D and RWA authoritarian submission.

Methods and Results Study 1b and Study 1c

Study 1b and Study 1c were conducted to test the temporal stability of conspiracy

mentality over time. To this end, we asked participants to complete the German version of the

Conspiracy Mentality Scale twice with a time lag of 15 days (Study 1b) and one year (Study

1c) in between measurement occasions.

Participants. Both samples consisted of students who participated for course credit or

the chance to win a raffle for a 25 Euro (Study 1b) or 20 Euro (Study 1c) voucher at a large

internet store. In Study 1b, out of originally 176 participants who completed the study at t1,

133 also participated in the retest (50 men, 82 women, 1 without response; M

age

= 24.27,

age

= 5.21). Dropout was independent of conspiracy mentality at t1, t(175) = 0.54, p = .59.

In Study 1c, out of originally 105 participants, 63 participated in the retest (9 men, 54

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 11

women, M

age

= 21.90, SD

age

= 4.20). Dropout was independent of conspiracy mentality at t1,

t(103) = 1.15, p = .25.

Design. Participants completed an otherwise unrelated online survey that included the

Conspiracy Mentality Scale. Each participant was assigned a code that allowed matching t1

and t2 responses. Approximately 15 days (Study 1b), respectively 1 year (Study 1c) after

participating in the first part of the study they received an invitation to complete a second

survey that again contained the Conspiracy Mentality Scale.

Results. Conspiracy mentality proved to be relatively stable over time, as indicated by

re-test reliabilities of r

= .88, p < .001 (Study 1b), and r

= .67, p < .001 (Study 1c).

Discussion

Study 1 introduced a new, short, internally reliable, and temporally stable scale to

measure individual differences in conspiracy mentality. The scale had discriminant validity

compared to both RWA and SDO supporting the idea that conspiracy mentality forms a

meaningful individual difference variable that is not redundant with the two major established

generalized political attitudes RWA or SDO. Whereas this may not come as a surprise with

regard to SDO, for RWA this finding is less self-evident. Early conceptions of

authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950) have included beliefs in conspiracies as an integral part

of authoritarianism

. Furthermore, conspiracy mentality was not reducible to the influence of

any demographic factor (only a small covariation with age) or any more basic personality

variable (no significant covariation with any of the Big Five factors). Its retest reliability over

15 days and one year supported the notion of stable individual differences in conspiracy

mentality over time.

In their California F-Scale of authoritarianism Adorno et al. (1950) included the subscale of projectivity that

included items like “Most people don’t realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret

places”.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 12

Study 2

In Study 2 we were interested in the relation between generalized political attitudes and

prejudice. Specifically, we assessed prejudices against a number of social groups that differ

in their perceived power. We predicted that conspiracy mentality would be a particular

potent predictor of prejudice against high-power groups such as capitalists and Americans.

Muslims and Roma/Sinti were included as low-power groups for whom RWA and SDO were

expected to be particularly strong predictors of prejudice. We also included a measure of

anti-Semitism as a case in which a group is often seen as an outgroup minority (and thereby

may become a target of authoritarian aggression, e.g., Adorno et al., 1950) but is also seen as

a powerful group (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). We hypothesized that conspiracy

mentality would be related to prejudices against groups perceived as powerful (capitalist,

Americans, Jews) whereas RWA and SDO would be related to prejudice against classic

targets of discrimination like Roma/Sinti, Muslims, and Jews. Importantly, we predicted that

conspiracy mentality would predict anti-Semitism over and above its prediction by RWA and

SDO.

Method

Participants. Two hundred ninety-four participants (133 men, 161 women; M

Age

28.09, SD

Age

= 10.41) completed an online survey on political attitudes. The link was posted

on social networking sites and online bulletin boards. The majority of participants had a

relatively high level of education (81 had a university degree, 164 the highest German high-

school degree “Abitur”) and no migration background (n = 245).

Measures

Generalized political attitudes. The measures of conspiracy mentality, RWA, and

SDO were identical to Study 1. We used the German version of the Conspiracy Mentality

Scale (see Appendix), the German version of the same RWA measure (Funke, 2005), and the

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 13

German adaptation (von Collani, 2002) of the original 16-item SDO scale (Pratto et al.,

1994).

Anti-Semitism. Prejudice against Jews has long been connected to conspiracy beliefs

including, in particular, belief in a Jewish world conspiracy (Kofta & Sedek, 2005). We used

a 12-item, shortened version of an anti-Semitism scale used in previous research (Imhoff &

Banse, 2009; e.g., “Jews are always stirring up trouble with their ideas”). Note that none of

the items referred to the idea of a Jewish conspiracy.

Islamoprejudice. A 10-item version of the Islamoprejudice subscale of the Scale for

Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam (SIPSCI; Imhoff & Recker, 2012) was used to

tap into prejudice against Muslims (e.g., “Compared to Western Europeans Muslims are

rather irrational”).

Antiziganism. Antiziganism involves hostile prejudice against individuals belonging to

the groups of Roma and Sinti, often subsumed under the disputed label gypsies. Across many

European societies, these groups are perceived as having very low power and they often face

severe discrimination (Traynor, 2009) and unemployment rates of up to 100% (O’Higgins &

Ivanov, 2006). We created a nine-item scale that included items referring to the stereotype of

higher criminality (e.g., “I am convinced that Roma and Sinti are more often involved in theft

than native Germans.”), blaming of Roma and Sinti for the persecution they experience (e.g.,

“The persecution of Roma and Sinti is connected with their refusal to adjust to the dominant

norms “), or general preference for social distance (e.g., “It would be better to have no Roma

or Sinti in the country.”; see Appendix for full scale wording)

Anti-Americanism. The USA is commonly perceived as the most powerful nation in

the world and is a frequent target of prejudice (Fabbrini, 2004; O’Connor, 2007). We created

Control analyses with scales representing the three types of item wording yielded identical results to the

ones reported below for each of the subscales.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 14

an eight-item scale assessing prejudiced views of the USA and its inhabitants (e.g., “In my

perspective Americans are arrogant and superficial”; full scale wording in Appendix).

Personalized anti-capitalism. Personalized anti-capitalism blames the hardships

created by the capitalist economic system on the behavior of individuals rather than system-

inherent dynamics. We created an 11-item scale to tap into personalized anti-capitalism (e.g.,

“As a result of their greed, CEOs have lost all their morals”; full scale in Appendix).

Procedure. After providing demographic information, all participants responded to the

individual difference scales in the following order: RWA, conspiracy mentality, SDO,

personalized anti-capitalism, anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, Islamoprejudice, and

antiziganism. After each of the latter three scales, participants indicated how powerful they

perceived the respective group to be (Jews, Muslims, Roma/ Sinti) on a scale from 1 (group

has much less power and influence than me) to 5 (group has much more power and influence

than me). These items were included to test whether participants indeed perceived these

groups to be differentially powerful such that Jews are seen as more powerful than Muslims

who are, in turn, perceived as more powerful than Roma and Sinti. No other variables were

collected for all participants

Results

Although there is reason to suspect that conspiracy mentality and RWA are closely

interlinked (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), the two scales showed a correlation of only small-

to-moderate size (see Table 3), whereas SDO was unrelated to conspiracy mentality but

highly related to RWA. We tested the validity of our a priori assumption concerning the

To collect some data for exploratory analyses regarding potential correlates of conspiracy mentality, we

included measures at the end of the study that were not collected for all but each only for a subsample of

participants. As neither a scenario measure of Hostile Attribution Bias (Krahé & Möller, 2004), r = .05, p = .53,

nor belief in powerful others (FKK, Krampen, 1991), r = .00, p = .95, or need for cognitive closure (Schlink &

Walther, 2007), r = .12, p = .18, showed significant overlap with the Conspiracy Mentality Scale we do not

report any analyses including these variables for reasons of succinctness.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 15

different levels of perceived power for the three ethno-religious groups. As expected, Jews,

M = 3.19, SD = 0.71, were seen as more powerful than Muslims, M = 2.46, SD = 0.86, and

Roma/Sinti, M = 1.73, SD = 0.94, with all differences being highly significant in paired t-

tests, ts > 11.48, ps < .001, also after Bonferroni-adjusting the alpha level for conducting

three tests (α = .016).

We hypothesized that in contrast to RWA and SDO, which should be predominantly

related to prejudice against powerless groups, conspiracy mentality would specifically predict

prejudice against groups that are perceived as powerful. To test these hypotheses we

conducted five separate regression analyses with RWA, SDO, and conspiracy mentality as

simultaneous predictors for each of the prejudice scales. To account for multiple tests on one

data set we set the alpha level for all five regression analyses to α = .01 (Bonferroni-

adjusted). We always entered RWA as the first predictor, followed by SDO in the second step

and CM in the last step. Only if the total amount of explained variance was significantly

increased we interpreted the beta weights. Each additional step significantly increased the

explained variance, except for the inclusion of conspiracy mentality as a predictor of

Islamoprejudice and antiziganism.

Figure 1 shows the standardized regression coefficients. Indeed, conspiracy mentality

predicted prejudice against high power groups (i.e., Americans, capitalists, Jews), but not

against low-power groups (i.e., Muslims and Roma/ Sinti). Bonferroni-corrected Steiger z-

tests for dependent correlations (α = .016) revealed that conspiracy mentality was more

strongly related to anti-Semitism than to Islamoprejudice, z(273) = 3.43, p < .01, or

antiziganism, z(273) = 5.20, p < .01. (see Table 3 for all zero-order correlations).

In contrast, RWA was only related to prejudice against ethnic or religious minority

groups (i.e., Jews, Muslims, Roma/Sinti). All associations with prejudice against these

groups were significant and positive, albeit somewhat stronger with Islamoprejudice than

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 16

with antiziganism, z(276) = 3.24, p < .01. As RWA has been theoretically linked to negative

attitudes toward groups that are seen as threatening (Duckitt et al., 2002), this may be due to

the fact that Muslims are perceived as more threatening than Roma and Sinti. There was no

relationship between RWA and prejudice against Americans or capitalists, speaking to the

distinction between conspiracy mentality and RWA. In contrast, SDO was positively related

to all forms of prejudice against ethnic and religious groups and there was no significant

difference in the magnitude of the correlations, ps > .05. In line with its presumed hierarchy-

sustaining function (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), SDO was negatively related to prejudice against

powerful groups (Americans, capitalists).

Discussion

Study 2 tested the unique contribution of conspiracy mentality in predicting prejudices

over and above established political attitudes like SDO and RWA. Importantly, conspiracy

mentality not only added to the prediction of anti-Semitism but showed a highly specific

pattern of correlations with prejudice against low- versus high-power groups. Whereas both

RWA and SDO were consistently related to negative attitudes against low-power ethnic or

religious minority groups and unrelated or even negatively related to prejudice against high-

power groups like Americans or capitalists, conspiracy mentality consistently predicted

prejudice against high-power groups (i.e., Jews, Americans, capitalists).

Study 3

A limitation of Study 2 was that we had selected a relatively small number of social

groups assumed to differ in perceived power. Also, we only assessed differential power

perceptions for the three ethnic and religious minority groups, but not for Americans and

capitalists. To overcome these limitations, we conducted an additional study to test the

assumption that conspiracy mentality is specifically related to disliking powerful groups and

to the tendency to see them as threatening. We gathered data on perceptions of power,

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 17

likeability, and threat for 32 social groups and calculated individual associations between

power and likeability on the one hand and power and threat on the other hand. We expected

that conspiracy mentality would predict a more negative association of power with likeability

and a stronger positive association of power with threat. Beliefs stating that conspiring others

are responsible for life’s adversities gain plausibility if these others are sufficiently powerful

to exert high levels of control over others. The opposite was expected for RWA and SDO.

Method

Participants. We recruited a sample of online participants via an e-mail list of a

German university. We excluded all participants who either did not complete the experiment

or did not respond to more than 10% of the questions. The remaining sample consisted of N

= 280 participants (110 men, 165 women, 5 unidentified; M

age

= 23.71, SD

age

= 4.93). The

majority of participants had a high level of formal education (n = 163 had “Abitur”, n = 103 a

university degree) and no migration background (n = 234). At the end of the study,

participants could leave their e-mail address to be included in a lottery in which three

individuals won €25 each.

Power, likeability, and threat. Participants first rated each of 32 social groups for

their level of social power (“Please indicate how much power and influence each of the

following groups has”). They then provided likeability ratings for the same groups (“Please

rate how likeable you personally find each of these groups”). Subsequently, they rated the

same groups according to how threatening they perceived them to be (“How threatening is

each of these groups to you?”). Response scales ranged from 1 (not at all

powerful/likeable/threatening) to 11 (very powerful/likeable/threatening). The list was

comprised of the five groups used in Study 2 (capitalists, Americans, Jews, Muslims, and

Roma/ Sinti) and 27 further social groups (partially adapted from Fiske et al., 2002; see Table

4).

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 18

Generalized political attitudes. The measures of conspiracy mentality, RWA, and

SDO were identical to Study 2.

Procedure. Participants first rated the perceived power of all 32 social groups before

rating likeability and afterwards perceived threat. After these ratings they completed the

Conspiracy Mentality Scale, RWA, and SDO scales and provided demographic information.

No other variables were collected.

Results

As in the previous studies, conspiracy mentality (α = .89) only showed small or

negligible correlations with RWA (α = .76), r = .15, p = .01, and SDO (α = .87), r = -.05, p =

.41, whereas RWA and SDO were strongly associated, r = .57, p < .001.

Mean scores. We first aggregated the power ratings across all participants, ICC(2,1) =

.53, p < .001. Table 4 lists these ratings in descending order. Inclusion of the five target

groups of Study 2 allowed us to test whether the assumptions about the ordering of these

groups with respect to their perceived power were indeed borne out. As expected, both

Americans and capitalists were perceived as highly powerful. Further, the hierarchy of

perceived power from capitalists being most powerful to Roma and Sinti being least powerful

was both significant as a linear trend and all group differences were significant in Bonferroni-

corrected paired t-tests (α = .005). At the level of the 32 social groups, mean ratings of

power, ICC(2,k) = .997, were unrelated to ratings of likeability, ICC(2,k) = .992, r = -.04, p =

.83, and positively related to ratings of threat, ICC(2,k) = .995, r = .56, p = .001. Thus, more

powerful groups were seen as more threatening but neither as more nor as less likeable.

Bonferroni-corrected zero-order correlations between the three generalized political

attitudes and ratings of likeability and threat (Table 4) showed similar patterns for RWA and

SDO but not for conspiracy mentality. To formally test this, we conducted vector correlations

between the Fisher r-to-z-transformed correlations. Results show highly similar correlations

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 19

for RWA and SDO with likeability, r = .94, and threat, r = .96, ps < .001, whereas conspiracy

mentality did neither show the same correlation pattern with likeability ratings as RWA, r = -

.02, p = .87, or SDO, r = -.27, p = .13, nor for threat ratings, r = -.14, p = .45, with RWA

correlation, r = -.28, p = .12, with SDO correlations.

Specifically, results revealed that conspiracy mentality was associated with lower

ratings of likeability for politicians and capitalist as well as greater perceptions of threat

coming from politicians, power companies, managers, capitalists, physicists, and Turks. In

contrast, RWA predicted greater ratings of likeability for power companies and mangers and

lower liking for outgroups (Jews, Muslims, Foreigners, Roma and Sinti, asylum seekers),

poor people (unemployed, drug addicts, homeless), feminists, gay men and artists. With a few

exceptions (Jews, artists, homeless) the same groups were also seen as threatening by people

high in RWA, as were Turks and welfare recipients. Results for SDO were highly similar

with SDO predicting perceptions of threat for largely the same groups (except Roma and

Sinti and drug addicts), less liking for largely the same groups (except drug addicts but

additionally less liking for feminists, Muslims, gay men, Turks, and welfare recipients) and

like RWA greater liking of power companies (but not managers).

To formally underline the fact that high power groups were seen as less likeable but

more threatening by people high in conspiracy mentality, we treated the 32 social groups as

cases and computed correlations between their power ratings and the Fisher r-to-z-

transformed correlations of the likeability and threat rating with conspiracy mentality. Results

showed that indeed greater power was associated with more negative relations between

conspiracy mentality and likeability, r = -.35, p < .05, whereas the relation between

conspiracy mentality and threat ratings became more positive with increasing power, r = .47,

p = .006. An opposite pattern emerged for RWA and SDO for which increasing power led to

more positive relations with likeability ratings, r = .70 for RWA and r = .75 for SDO, and

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 20

more negative relations with threat ratings, r =-.72 for RWA and r = -.76 for SDO, all ps <

.001.

However, our hypotheses concerned the role of generalized political attitudes in the

intraindividual relationship between power and likeability/threat. We were particularly

interested in whether individuals’ degree of conspiracy mentality would be associated with

their more negative evaluation of powerful groups. To address whether this was the case we

calculated for each participant whether his or her ratings of power were associated with his or

her ratings of likeability and threat across the 32 groups. Positive scores on the power-

likeability coefficient indicated that participants rated more powerful groups as more likeable

whereas positive scores on the power-threat coefficient indicated that they perceived groups

as increasingly threatening with increasing power. We hypothesized that power and threat

should be more highly positively correlated, and power and likeability should be more highly

negatively correlated, with increasing conspiracy mentality. We expected the reverse pattern

for SDO and RWA. To test these hypotheses we conducted two multiple regression analyses

with the Fisher r-to-z-transformed intraindividual correlations as criteria, conspiracy

mentality, RWA, and SDO as predictors and an alpha level of α = .025 to account for

conducting two analyses.

Whereas individual associations between power and likeability revolved around zero,

average r = -.02, SD = .31, (ranging from r = -.77 to r = .74), the relation between power and

threat was positive on average (r = .38, SD = .31; ranging from r = -.60 to r = .80). As

expected, higher levels of conspiracy mentality were associated with more negative

individual-level correlations between power and likeability, ß = -.17, p = .002, whereas the

opposite was true for RWA, ß = .35, p < .001, and SDO, ß = .21, p = .001 (Figure 2a). In

contrast, this pattern reversed for the association of power and threat with conspiracy

mentality as a positive predictor, ß = .14, p =.02, unlike RWA, ß = -.27, p < .001, and SDO, ß

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 21

= -.17, p = .01 (Figure 2b). Thus, people high in conspiracy mentality rated higher-power

groups as less likeable and as more threatening, whereas people high in RWA and SDO had a

more positive view of higher-power groups and perceived lower-power groups as more

threatening. Importantly, all three effects were incremental to each other. A stepwise

procedure with RWA entered in a first step, SDO in a second and conspiracy mentality in a

third step yielded significant increases in the explained variance for each step, ps < .02.

Exploratory analyses including the cross-products revealed no significant interaction effects.

Discussion

Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 for a wide variety of social groups. The

results supported the hypothesis that conspiracy mentality is associated with more negative

attitudes toward the powerful and a perception of those in power as threatening. The opposite

was true for RWA and SDO. Both were associated predominantly with more negative

reactions toward low power groups like ethnic or religious outgroups and poor people.

Further, we could show that the individual associations between power and liking versus

threat were differentially predicted by conspiracy mentality in contrast to RWA and SDO.

Study 4

Study 4 was conducted to replicate the results of Study 3 and test the position of

conspiracy mentality within a larger nomological network of personality constructs.

Specifically, as conspiracy beliefs have previously been associated with powerlessness

(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), anomia (Goertzel, 1994), death anxiety (Newheiser et al.,

2011), lack of control (McCauley & Jacques, 1979), and general personality factors like

agreeableness (Swami et al., 2011), we assessed all these measures to (a) test their relation to

conspiracy mentality and (b) test whether any of these variables performs better in explaining

individuals’ associations of power with disliking and perceived threat. If that was the case, it

could be that the associations reported in the first two studies were merely due to an

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 22

individual difference confounded with conspiracy mentality rather than conspiracy mentality

itself. Moreover, we aimed to further elucidate the effect of perceived threat. Previous

research has identified subtypes of threat (for a review and meta-analysis see Riek, Mania, &

Gaertner, 2006). In particular, other groups can pose a realistic threat (i.e. threats that

concern the “physical or material well-being”, the “political and economic power” and,

ultimately, the “very existence” of the ingroup; Stephan & Stephan, 1996, p. 418) or a

symbolic threat (i.e., threats based on “group differences in morals, values, standards, beliefs,

and attitudes;” Stephan & Stephan, 1996, p. 418) to one’s ingroup. Given that most

conspiracies are more concerned with threats to life and health (e.g., assassinations, spread of

diseases like HIV, retention of scientific progress that could improve material situations) it is

conceivable that powerful groups are predominantly seen as a realistic threat, not a symbolic

threat, by people high in conspiracy mentality. We thus differentiated between the two types

of threat to explore which one’s perception was affected by conspiracy mentality.

We expected to fully replicate the findings of Study 3 with conspiracy mentality

predicting stronger association of power with threat and less or even negative association of

power with likeability. Importantly, this effect should not be due to shared variance with any

other variable (i.e., the inclusion of any other variable should not diminish this effect). Again,

we had opposite predictions for RWA and SDO (although we made no specific prediction

regarding the incremental validity over and above other variables).

Method

Participants. We recruited a sample of online participants via an e-mail list of a

German university. As in Study 3, we excluded all participants who either did not complete

the experiment or did not respond to more than 10% of the questions. The remaining sample

consisted of N = 280 participants (97 men, 181 women, 2 unidentified; M

Age

= 25.63, SD

Age

8.13). As in the previous studies, most participants had no migration background (n = 241)

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 23

and a high level of education (“Abitur”: n = 156; university degree: n = 103). At the end of

the study, participants could leave their e-mail address to be included in a lottery to win €20

(5 participants) or €10 (10 participants).

Power, likeability, realistic threat, and symbolic threat. The same 32 groups as in

Study 3 were rated on perceived power and likeability. The ratings of threat were

differentiated into realistic threat (“How threatening are these groups to your material and

physical well-being?”) and symbolic threat (“How threatening are these groups to your

values, convictions, norms, and general lifestyle?”; order counterbalanced).

Generalized political attitudes. The measures of conspiracy mentality, RWA, and

SDO were identical to Studies 2 and 3

Additional measures.

Spheres of control. Belief in conspiracies has often been connected to control

deprivation (McCauley & Jacques, 1979), and recent experimental studies have shown that

depriving individuals of control increases their endorsement of specific conspiracy theories

(Sullivan et al., 2010). We thus included a measure to tap into personal, interpersonal, and

sociopolitical spheres of perceived control (Paulhus, 1983). Sample items include “It is

difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office”

(sociopolitical control) or “Even when I'm feeling self-confident about most things, I still

seem to lack the ability to control social situations” (interpersonal control) and were rated on

scales ranging from 1 to 7.

We also included the Conspiracy Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011) that assesses

endorsement of specific conspiracy theories rather than a general mentality. Regressing these specific theories

on all other variables showed that conspiracy mentality was a significant predictor of each specific conspiracy

belief even when the other variables were included (average ß = .40). Except for this scale, no measures other

than the ones reported here were included.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 24

Powerlessness. Lack of power is also associated with conspiracy endorsement

(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). We thus included a measure of powerlessness as control

variable. Participants indicated their agreement with seven items partly taken from the

literature (e.g., “The problems of life are sometimes too big for me.”; Mackey & Ahlgren,

1977) and partly purpose-designed (e.g., “I often feel powerless to achieve what I want.”) on

a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 4 (fully agree).

Anomia. Another variable that has been discussed in relation to conspiracy beliefs is

the sociological concept of anomia (Goertzel, 1994). Broadly defined as “a loss of normative

orientation and of control over situations and goals of action” (Legge, Davidov, & Schmidt,

2008; p. 249), anomia scales tap into the perception that society has become too complicated

to understand. We included seven items to measure anomia (e.g., “Things have gotten so

confusing that nobody really knows what is what anymore”; Glatzer & Zapf, 1984).

Participants indicated their agreement on scales from 1 (do not agree at all) to 4 (fully agree)

Death anxiety. Because death anxiety can lead to conspirational thinking (Newheiser

et al., 2011), we compiled a relative short but internally consistent measure of death anxiety

by taking the five items with the highest loadings on the first factor from the Revised Death

Anxiety Scale (RDAS; Thorson & Powell, 1992; Items 2, 3, 12, 14, and 18). The five items

(e.g., “The idea of never thinking again after I die frightens me.”) were accompanied by

scales ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (fully agree).

Hyperactive agency detection (HAAD). Conspiracy theories often assume agency and

intentionality where there either is none or where it is highly unlikely. Thus, a hyperactive

tendency to detect or assume agency may be a predictor of conspirational thinking. As a

proxy of HAAD we included a measure of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism refers to

the tendency to attribute humanlike characteristics to nonhuman agents, thus presuming

agency where actually none exists. As a measure of this form of agency presumption we

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 25

included the 15-item Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ;

e.g., “To what extent does a television set experience emotions?”; Waytz, Cacioppo, &

Epley, 2010) rated on scales from 1 (not at all) to 11 (very strongly).

Big five personality factors. Previous research has reported a moderate negative

correlation between conspiracy endorsement and agreeableness (Swami et al., 2011). To

once more control for general personality variables, we included a short Big Five inventory

(BFI-K; Rammstedt & John, 2005). Items such as “I am rather reserved, shy” (extraversion)

were rated on 5-point scales ranging from very inapplicable to very applicable.

Order of scales. Participants first completed two scales on conspiracy beliefs, the one

described above and the CBQ (see footnote 4). The order of these two scales was

counterbalanced between participants. Afterwards, the fixed order of scales was RWA, SDO,

powerlessness, anomia, BFI-K, spheres of control, death anxiety, perceived power and

likeability of the 32 social groups. The following two scales on perceived threat were again

counterbalanced between participants (orthogonally to the first counterbalancing). Finally,

participants completed the anthropomorphism scale and gave demographic information. No

other variables were included in the study.

Results

As in the previous studies, conspiracy mentality showed a small-to-moderate

correlation with RWA and SDO (Table 5). Conceptually replicating previous results, the

propensity to belief in conspiracies was associated with feelings of low sociopolitical control,

powerlessness, and anomia (Table 5). Interestingly, the tendency to ascribe agency to

nonhuman objects (HAAD or anthropomorphism) was also related to conspiracy mentality.

In contrast, conspiracy mentality was unrelated to death anxiety or big five personality

factors.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 26

The ratings of power, likeability were very similar to the data pattern from Study 3. To

empirically test the replicability of the results of Study 3 we computed vector correlations of

the results of Studies 3 and 4 (the corresponding table can be accessed at

http://imhoff.socialpsychology.org/files). The power ratings resulted in an almost identical

pattern in Study 4 as they did in Study 3, r > .99, p < .001. More importantly, we were

interested to learn whether the correlation of the likeability and threat ratings with the

generalized political attitudes would replicate across studies. To this end, we Fisher r-to-z-

transformed the correlations and computed vector correlations across the studies. The

correlation between conspiracy mentality and likeability across the group remained highly

similar, r = .86; this was also true for likeability as a function of RWA, r = .95, and SDO, r =

.93, for the groups, ps < .001. For the threat ratings, we assessed global threat in Study 3 but

two distinct types of threat in Study 4. Nevertheless, the correlation patterns stayed highly

similar with vector correlations ranging from r = .77 to r = .92 for all three generalized

attitudes and both types of threat, ps < .001.

To replicate Study 3, we computed intraindividual correlations between power and

likeability, power and realistic threat, and power and symbolic threat. These were then Fisher

r-to-z-transformed and entered as criterion variables in multivariate regression analyses with

conspiracy mentality, RWA, SDO, and all control variables as predictors. To avoid

collinearity problems but to still give equal chances to all variables to add explained variance

we chose a stepwise inclusion procedure. To correct for family-wise error we set the required

alpha level for each predictor to α = .01. Results revealed that individual differences in the

association of power and likeability (ranging from r = -.89 to r = .89) were predicted by

RWA, ß =.34, p < .001 (Step 1, R

corr = .15), conspiracy mentality, ß = -.22, p < .001 (Step

2, ∆ R

= .04), SDO, ß = .22, p < .001 (Step 3, ∆ R

= .03), extraversion, ß = .17, p = .001

(Step 4, ∆ R

= .03), and death anxiety, ß = .14, p = .01 (Step 5, ∆ R

= .02), R

2corr

= .26.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 27

The link between power and realistic threat (ranging from r = -.61 to r = .92) was

predicted by RWA, -.21, p = .002 (Step 1, R

2corr

= .07) and conspiracy mentality, ß = .20, p =

.001 (Step 2, ∆ R

= .03), R

2corr

= .10. Likewise, the relative strength of the individual-level

association between power and symbolic threat (ranging from r = -.52 to r = .96) was only

predicted by RWA, -.28, p < .001 (Step 1, R

2corr

= .05), and conspiracy mentality, ß = .21, p <

.001 (Step 2, ∆ R

= .04), R

2corr

= .08.

Thus, we replicated the dissociation between conspiracy mentality and RWA (and for

SDO in one case) in the reaction to high-power vs. low-power groups (see Figure 3 for

simple slopes based on regression analyses with only conspiracy mentality, RWA, and SDO

as simultaneous predictors). Importantly, no other variable provided a better explanation than

conspiracy mentality. In fact, although some of the other variables added incremental

validity, only openness to experience did so in the same direction as conspiracy mentality

(predicting higher associations between power and realistic threat). Thus, there is no support

for the idea that the association between conspiracy mentality and negative reactions to high-

power groups is an epiphenomenon of a more basic personality variable.

Discussion

First, Study 4 replicated Study 3 with regard to the unique relation of conspiracy

mentality to distrust against high power groups. No other variable provided a better

explanation of this relation. Second, the study differentiated between two important types of

threat: realistic and symbolic threat. We found that conspiracy mentality uniquely predicted

both types of threat independently of RWA and SDO and did so even allowing for a large

number of personality variables to be entered as controls.

The previous studies provided convincing and converging evidence that conspiracy

mentality is robustly associated with negative reactions toward groups in power (in contrast

to RWA and SDO) and that it does so above and beyond other individual difference

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 28

variables. We conducted a final study to test whether these negative attitudes to powerful

groups are consequential in actually encouraging opposition to those in power.

Study 5

Although prejudice and negative attitudes towards other groups are among the most

important and probably the most thoroughly investigated consequences of generalized

political attitudes, they are not the only ones. Generalized political attitudes are also

consequential in that they predict attributions of critical events and behavioral intentions

following such events. Although the previous three studies point to the dark side of

conspiracy mentality in that it predicts prejudice, they also invite speculation about a

previously unnoticed relationship to attribution and social action. In contrast to both SDO

and RWA, which predicted prejudice against low-power groups, conspiracy mentality

explicitly predicted prejudice against those in power. This observation is in line with the

finding that belief in conspiracies is particularly prevalent at both ends of the political left-

right spectrum and relates to general distrust in political institutions (Imhoff & Decker, 2013;

Ingleheart, 1987). As whoever is in power usually defines the relative mid-range of the

political spectrum, being at one of its ends implies a strong opposition toward those in power

and in all likelihood low levels of trust in the ruling forces. In contrast, values like tradition,

conformity, and security are positively associated with higher trust in institutions (Devos,

Spini, & Schwartz, 2002) as well as with RWA (Feather, 1996). We therefore propose that

attributions that question the trustworthiness of institutions and intentions to change the status

quo are differentially predicted by conspiracy mentality and RWA. We reasoned that,

whereas RWA should involve submission to authorities, conspiracy mentality should predict

the opposite: attributing blame to authorities and intending to act (individually and

collectively) against the perceived conspirators.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 29

Study 5 was conducted in the context of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and

the resulting catastrophe in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Data were collected

between March 15, 2011 and April 29, 2011 (i.e., between four and 49 days after the

incident). We expected a dissociation between conspiracy mentality and RWA such that

participants with a strong conspiracy mentality would be more prone to attribute the disaster

to intentional misconduct or gross negligence by authorities (e.g., the power company owning

the plant or the Japanese government) whereas people who endorse authoritarianism would

defend these authorities, for example by blaming the incident on chance. Furthermore, RWA

should be associated with opposition to a nuclear phase-out whereas conspiracy mentality

should be associated with intentions to act in support of such a phase-out.

Method

Participants. A total of 1,852 participants were recruited for an online study on

“Emotional reactions to Fukushima” via online bulletin boards (5.6%) and an e-mail listserv

(94.4%; soscisurvey.de). The 1,086 women and 735 men ranged in age from 14 to 80 years

(M = 30.68, SD = 11.97) and were German residents. Most had finished high school with the

“Abitur” (36%) or even received a university degree (47.1%) and had no migration

background (89.4%).

Measures

Conspiracy mentality and RWA. We used the same scales as in the previous three

studies.

Attributions of responsibility. Six items assessed the degree to which participants

attributed the nuclear catastrophe to misconduct of authorities. Three items clearly blamed

authorities for intentional misconduct (unscrupulous greed of the operating company,

spoofing by a nuclear power lobby, wrong political decisions), two items only indirectly

blamed authorities for negligent behavior that was not clearly intentional (human error,

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 30

outdated safety-engineering), and one item reflected an attribution that did not blame

institutions at all (a sequence of chance accidents). Participants indicated the degree to which

they believed that each of these reasons was responsible for the catastrophe on slider scales

ranging from 0 to 100.

Behavioral intentions. Participants estimated the likelihood that they would engage in

eight different anti-nuclear actions over the course of the next six months on a scale from 1

(rather unlikely) to 5 (definitely). These actions ranged from signing an online petition or

donating money to an environmental organization to organizing or participating in protests

and blockades.

Support for nuclear phase-out. To estimate participants’ attitudes regarding whether

the government should phase out the civil use of nuclear power they indicated their

agreement with four statements, two in favor of and two in opposition to a nuclear phase-out.

Example items read “Nuclear power is an expedient technology that we should not give up”

and “We should back out of the nuclear energy program as soon as possible”, respectively.

Procedure. After a short questionnaire on emotional reactions to the Fukushima

incident not reported here

, participants indicated their attributions of responsibility, their

behavioral intentions, and their support for nuclear phase-out. They then completed the two

scales tapping into conspiracy mentality and RWA before providing demographic

information. No other variables were included in the study.

Results

The items measuring attributions to intentional misconduct, attributions to non-

intentional human error, behavioral intentions to protest, and support for nuclear phase-out

Emotional reactions to the Fukushima incident were used as a cover story to motivate participation. Results

revealed that conspiracy mentality was generally related to greater anger, fear, guilt, and sadness in response to

the incident. Details are available on request.

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 31

were all averaged to create scales that proved to be internally consistent with the exception of

attributions to non-intentional human error (see Table 6 for descriptive statistics and internal

consistencies). Attributions to non-intentional human error consisted of two items that

showed almost identical correlations with conspiracy mentality and RWA and were thus

averaged despite suboptimal reliability. We conducted regression analyses to predict three

different attribution patterns, three different forms of civil engagement (plus one average of

overall engagement), and attitudes toward nuclear phase-out with conspiracy mentality and

RWA. To adjust for multiple testing, the alpha level of all tests was set to α = .00625.

To test the hypothesis that conspiracy mentality and RWA would show a dissociation in

their relationships to attributions concerning the nuclear disaster, we conducted separate

regression analyses with conspiracy mentality and RWA simultaneously predicting the three

attribution styles. As expected, conspiracy mentality was associated with attributing greater

blame to intentional misconduct by humans, ß = .39, p < .001, and a greater tendency to

blame even non-intentional negligence and human error, ß = .15, p < .001, but was negatively

associated with attribution to chance, ß = -.10, p < .001. In contrast, the higher the RWA

score, the less likely participants were to blame intentional misconduct, ß = -.26, p < .001,

and the more likely they were to blame chance, ß = .12, p < .001. Differences in RWA were

not associated with attribution to human error, ß = -.04, p > .05.

A similar dissociation emerged for intentions to engage in anti-nuclear protests.

Whereas conspiracy mentality was related to greater intentions to engage in behavior ranging

from protest notes to civil disobedience, ß = .28, p < .001, the opposite was true for RWA, ß

= -.40, p < .001. Because recent work on collective action has shown, different routes may

lead to either normative or non-normative collective action (Tausch et al., 2011), we explored

whether the same was true in this case. We created separate scales tapping into the

willingness to engage individually (sign an online petition, base one’s voting decision on the

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 32

issue, accept higher energy bills to terminate nuclear power, donate to an environmental

organization, join an interest group in online social networks; α = .80), the willingness to

participate in normative collective action (organize a citizen protest, join an anti-nuclear

demonstration; α = .64), and the willingness to engage in non-normative collective action

(join an act of civil disobedience to block a nuclear waste transport). Regressions parallel to

those reported above yielded the same pattern of results for all three forms of protest:

Conspiracy mentality was a significant positive predictor of individual engagement, ß = .26, p

< .001, normative collective action, ß = .24, p < .001, and non-normative collective action, ß

= .19, p < .001. In contrast, RWA was a significant negative predictor of all three modes of

action, ß = -.40, ß = -.35, and ß = -.19, respectively, ps < .001.

A parallel pattern emerged for support for nuclear phase-out, for which conspiracy

mentality was a positive predictor, ß = .25, p < .001, and RWA was a negative predictor, ß =

-.43, p < .001. One might be tempted to argue that the concrete behavioral intentions were

related to conspiracy mentality only due to their association with the more general support for

a phase-out. We thus entered general support for nuclear phase-out as a control variable into

a reanalysis of the regression of the behavioral intentions on conspiracy mentality and RWA.

The general pattern remained unaltered, with conspiracy mentality, ß = .13, p < .001, RWA, ß

= -.15, p < .001, and support for nuclear phase-out, ß = .59, p < .001, all predicting unique

parts of the variance in behavioral intentions, R

= .47, p < .001. The same was true for

analyses examining the three different subscales of behavioral intentions (individual

engagement, normative collective action, non-normative collective action) separately.

Discussion

Study 5 further supported the previous findings of a distinct and coherent conspiracy

mentality that is different from authoritarianism. The study showed that conspiracy mentality

and RWA not only inversely predicted attributions of responsibility concerning the

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 33

Fukushima disaster (predominantly to intentional misconduct for conspiracy mentality,

predominantly to chance for RWA), but they also dissociated in their associations with

participants’ behavioral intentions concerning reactions to the incident. Conspiracy mentality

was associated with a higher self-rated likelihood of engaging in different kinds of protest

against nuclear power whereas authoritarianism was negatively related to such intentions.

These findings shed light on conspiracy mentality and its role in social change. Skepticism

about those in power may not only motivate negatively biased views of powerful people and

groups (Studies 1 to 3), but may also lead to specific attributions blaming negative incidents

on such groups and trigger behavior aimed at challenging the status quo and its prevailing

power relations.

General Discussion

In five studies, we found empirical support for the idea that conspiracy mentality has all

the hallmarks of a coherent and distinct generalized political attitude. Most importantly,

conspiracy mentality uniquely predicted prejudice over and above other well-established

generalized political attitudes (RWA and SDO; Studies 2 to 4). Further, conspiracy mentality

had predictive validity for attributions blaming authorities for intentional misconduct as well

as unintentional error and for behavioral intentions aimed at undermining or at least

influencing these authorities.

In particular, we tested specific predictions regarding the correlates of these three

generalized political attitudes. Whereas all three unidirectionally predicted anti-Semitism,

i.e., prejudice against a group that is paradoxically often perceived as a minority suffering

from discrimination but also as powerful (Fiske et al. 2002), the three constructs showed clear

dissociations in their relationships to prejudice against (a) powerful groups that are not

victims of discrimination and (b) unequivocally low power groups. Conspiracy mentality

was specifically associated with disliking and feeling threatened by powerful groups. This is

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 34

compatible with the general structure of conspiracy theories: Blaming the malicious intent of

conspiring groups for negative events. Logically, these conspirators can only be blamed if

they are perceived as sufficiently powerful to implement their alleged plots. In contrast,

generalized political attitudes that legitimize the status quo (SDO) or that are partly defined

by submission under whichever authority is in power (RWA) produced a contrasting pattern:

Individuals high in SDO or RWA perceived powerful groups as being relatively more

likeable and less threatening than they perceived low-power groups.

This finding resonates well with previous results that suggest members of powerless

groups are more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs than members of powerful groups

(Goertzel, 1994; Stempel, Hargrove, & Stempel, 2007). Blaming one’s group’s powerless

position on the system of conspiracies (rather than oneself) is more advantageous for both

personal and collective self-esteem (Crocker, Luthanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999).

Conspiracy thinking may thus be an effective way to cope with a negative social identity

when group boundaries are not permeable and individuals cannot just leave their ingroup

(e.g., the group of people low in power). Social identity theory posits that individuals can

either change their view on the ingroup in comparison to other groups by changing the

dimension of comparison (social creativity) or change the status quo by social actions.

Conspiracy thinking may form a cognitive operation of lending a plausible explanation for

the lack of power and facilitating changing the status quo.

We speculate that believing in a critical causal role of conspirators in bringing about

negative events may make it easier to take a firm stand on complex issues such as nuclear

power or the global economy. Instead of being overwhelmed by the complexities of these

issues (potentially resulting in anomia), the mental shortcut of blaming individuals or groups

may facilitate social action aimed at undermining the actions or goals of those perceived to be

conspirators. Our research reveals an important but often neglected effect of conspiracy

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 35

thinking: Challenging the status quo – even if for potentially misguided reasons and irrational

ideas about the goals and influence of specific groups. This may empower disadvantaged

groups to take action and actively pursue their goals even in opposition to those in power. On

the flipside, social protest supported by conspiracy beliefs may also be particularly prone to

turn ugly by targeting single groups or individuals and using them as scapegoats.

Limitations

The major strength of the present research lies in its systematic investigation of

individual differences in generalized political attitudes and their effects on prejudice and

behavioral intentions using relatively large samples and producing consistent and robust

results across a set of independent studies. However, a limitation of our research lies in the

cross-sectional nature of the data. Future studies could make use of longitudinal approaches

to explore antecedents of conspiracy mentality and more directly test the causal relationship

between generalized political attitudes, prejudice toward social groups, and intentions to

engage in individual or collective political action.

Future directions

Other research might take a closer look at the cognitive underpinnings of conspiracy

beliefs. The role of ambiguity tolerance and general mental ability in conspiracy beliefs is

hitherto unclarified and could both go in both directions. Conspiracy beliefs provide closure

on the search for an explanation for societal events and could thus be related to dispositional

need for closure (but see the zero correlation in Study 1, footnote 1) and low tolerance of

ambiguity. At the same time, conspiracy theories often leave the logic of evidential reasoning

to provide much more complex narratives of how events came about than a sober look at the

facts would, which might be aversive for individuals seeking cognitive closure. The latter,

creative aspect of conspiracies suggests that it might be related to divergent thinking and

potentially to other cognitive abilities like fluid intelligence. At the same time, these

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 36

cognitive abilities often come with higher standards for evidence (and often also higher

status), making conspirational thinking more unlikely. It is thus open to future research to

further explore the relation between general cognitive style and abilities and conspirational

thinking.

Given what we know about differences in cognitive style across cultures (Nisbett, Peng,

Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) this reasoning also raises the possibility of cross-cultural

differences in conspiracy mentality. Recent cross-cultural research (Bruder, Haffke, Neave,

Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013) finds marked differences in mean-level conspiracy mentality

across cultures corroborating the idea that conspiracy thinking is particularly rife in the

Middle East. However, we know nothing about the individual-level and group-level

processes responsible for such cultural differences.

If some level of conspiracy mentality can be functional for social change (as Study 5

suggests), this begs the question whether conspiracy theories may also be able to reveal truth.

Clearly, many conspiracy theories contradict available scientific evidence (e.g., theories

about alien encounters). This irrational aspect is further highlighted by the fact that

sometimes individuals endorse mutually incompatible conspiracy theories (e.g., Wood et al.

2012). However, sometimes conspiracy theories may harbor at least a kernel of truth. Even

seemingly more extreme conspiracy theories have sometimes proven to be true – the

Watergate scandal being the most well-known example. In that sense, conspiracy mentality

might be best conceptualized as a continuum ranging from naïve trust in the canonical

version of contemporary history to extremely paranoid conspiracy thinking. Given the multi-

causal and dynamic nature of most controversial world events, it is rarely possible to

ultimately decide exactly the extent to which conspiracy speculation is objectively valid.

However, given what we know from history, there is reason to believe that both very high

and very low levels of conspiracy mentality may produce explanations for world events that

Running head: Conspiracy Mentality 37

are likely not objectively true. Despite its pejorative label, it is thus questionable whether the

lowest possible levels of conspiracy mentality is ultimately instrumental for learning the

truth.

In sum, whether individuals endorse a specific conspiracy theory largely depends on

whether they are prone to accept conspiracy beliefs in general. Such a ‘conspiracy mentality’

forms a generalized political attitude associated with negatively biased views of those in

power and with the behavioral intention to challenge the status quo. Under specific

circumstances such conspirational thinking may be adaptive at the individual and collective

level in the service of truth and social progress. What these circumstances are and under

which circumstances conspiracy mentality turns into a paranoid mindset immune to rational

argument and prone to identify certain social groups as scapegoats provides an exciting

agenda for future research.

References

Abalakina-Paap, M., Stephan, W. G., Craig, T. Y., & Gregory, W. L. (1999). Beliefs in

conspiracies. Political Psychology, 20, 637-647. doi:10.1111/0162-895X.00160

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, N. (1950). The authoritarian

personality. New York, NY: Harper.

Akrami, N., Ekehammar, B., & Yang-Wallentin, F. (2011). Personality and social psychology

factors explaining sexism. Journal of Individual Differences, 32, 153-160.

doi:10.1027/1614-0001/a000043

Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism. San

Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.

Asbrock, F., Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2010). Right-wing authoritarianism and social

dominance orientation and the dimensions of generalized prejudice: A longitudinal test.

European Journal of Personality, 24, 324-340.

Bruder, M., Haffke, P., Neave, N., Nouripanah, N., & Imhoff, R. (2013). Measuring

individual differences in conspiracy mentality across cultures: The Conspiracy Beliefs

Questionnaire (CBQ). Manuscript submitted for publication, University of Konstanz.

Byford, J. T., & Billig, M. (2001). The emergence of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in

Yugoslavia during the war with NATO. Patterns of Prejudice, 35, 50-63.

doi:10.1080/003132201128811287

Cohrs, C., Kielmann, S., Maes, J., & Moschner, B. (2005). Effects of right-wing

authoritarianism and threat from terrorism on restriction of civil liberties. Analyses of

Social Issues and Public Policy, 5, 263-276. doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2005.00071.x

Crocker, J., Luthanen, R., Broadnax, S., & Blaine, B. E. (1999). Belief in U.S. government

conspiracies against Blacks among Black and White college students: Powerlessness or

system blame? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 941-953.

doi:10.1177/01461672992511003

Darwin, H., Neave, N., & Holmes, J. (2011). Belief in conspiracy theories. The role of

paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. Personality and Individual

Differences, 50, 1289-1293. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.02.027

Devos, T., Spini, D., & Schwartz, S. (2002). Conflicts among human values and trust in

institutions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 481-494.

doi:10.1348/014466602321149849

Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2008). The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived

and actual impact of theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana. Journal of Social

Psychology, 148, 210-221. doi:10.3200/SOCP.148.2.210-222

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2007). Right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation

and the dimensions of generalized prejudice. European Journal of Personality, 21, 113-

130. doi:10.1002/per.614

Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., du Plessis, I. & Birum, I. (2002). The psychological bases of ideology

and prejudice: Testing a dual-process model. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 83, 75-93. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.75

Ekehammar, B., Akrami, N., Gylje, M., & Zakrisson, I. (2004). What matters most to

prejudice: Big five personality, social dominance orientation, or right-wing

authoritarianism? European Journal of Personality, 18, 463-482. doi:10.1002/per.526

Fabbrini, S. (2004). Layers of anti-Americanism: Americanization, American unilateralism

and anti-Americanism in a European perspective. European Journal of American

Culture, 23, 79–94. doi:10.1386/ejac.23.2.79/0.

Feather, N. T. (1996). Reaction to penalties for an offense in relation to authoritarianism,

values, perceived responsibility, perceived seriousness, and deservingness. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 571-587. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.571

Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype

content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from status and competition.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82, 878-902. doi:10.1037/0022-

3514.82.6.878

Funke, F. (2005). The dimensionality of right-wing authoritarianism: Lessons from the

dilemma between theory and measurement. Political Psychology, 26, 195-218.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00415.x

Glatzer, W., & Zapf, W. (1984). Lebensqualität in der Bundesrepublik: objektive

Lebensbedingungen und subjektives Wohlbefinden. Frankfurt: Campus.

Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15, 731–742.

doi:10.2307/3791630

Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A Very Brief Measure of the Big

Five Personality Domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528.

doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1

Graumann, C. F., & Moscovici, S. (Eds.) (1987). Changing conceptions of conspiracy. New

York, NY: Springer.

Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Levin, S., Thomsen, L., Kteily, N., & Sheehy-Skeffington,

J. (2012). Social dominance orientation: revisiting the structure and function of a

variable predicting social and political attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology

Bulletin, 38, 583-606. doi: 10.1177/0146167211432765

Imhoff, R. & Decker, O. (2013). Verschwörungsmentalität als Weltbild [Conpiracy mentality

as a world view]. In: O. Decker, J. Kiess, & E. Brähler (Hrsg.) Rechtsextremismus der

Mitte (S. 130- 145). Wiesbaden: Psychosozial Verlag.

Imhoff, R., & Banse, R. (2009) Ongoing victim suffering increases prejudice: The case of

secondary anti-Semitism. Psychological Science, 20, 1443-1447. doi:10.1111/j.1467-

9280.2009.02457.x

Imhoff, R., & Recker, J. (2012). Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a new scale to

measure Islamoprejudice and Secular Islam Critique. Political Psychology, 33, 811-824.

Inglehart, R. (1987). Extremist political positions and perceptions of conspiracy: Even

paranoids have real enemies. In C. F. Graumann & S. Moscovici (Eds.) Changing

conceptions of conspiracy (pp. 231-244). New York, NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-

4612-4618-3_14

Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying

ideologies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 260-265.

doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00377.x

Kofta, M., & Sedek, M. (2005). Conspiracy stereotypes of Jews during systematic

transformation in Poland. International Journal of Sociology, 35, 40-64.

Krahé, B., & Möller, I. (2004). Playing violent electronic games, hostile attribution bias and

aggression-related norms in German adolescents. Journal of Adolescence, 27, 53-69.

Krampen, G. (1991). Fragebogen zu Kompetenz- und Kontrollüberzeugungen (FKK).

Göttingen: Hogrefe.

Legge, S., Davidov, E., & Schmidt, P. (2008). Social structural effects on the level and

development of the individual experience of anomie in the German population.

International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2, 248-267.

Little, T. D., Cunningham, W. A., Shahar, G., & Widaman, K. F. (2002). To parcel or not to

parcel: Exploring the question and weighing the merits. Structural Equation Modeling,

9, 151-173.

Mackey, J., & Ahlgren, A. (1977). Dimensions of adolescent alienation. Applied

Psychological Measurement, 1, 219-232. doi:10.1177/014662167700100208

McCauley, C. & Jacques, S. (1979). The popularity of conspiracy theories of presidential

assassination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 637–644.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.5.637

McFarland, S. (2010). Authoritarianism, social dominance, and other roots of generalized

prejudice. Political Psychology, 31, 453-477. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00765.x

Moscovici, S. (1987). The conspiracy mentality. In C. F. Graumann & S. Moscovici (Eds.)

Changing conceptions of conspiracy (pp. 151-169). New York, NY: Springer.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4618-3_9

Newheiser, A., Farias, M., & Tausch, N. (2011). The functional nature of conspiracy beliefs:

Examining the underpinnings of belief in the Da Vinci Code conspiracy. Personality

and Individual Differences, 51, 1007-1011. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.08.011

Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought:

Holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108, 291-310.

doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.2.291

O’Connor, B. (Ed.). (2007). Anti-Americanism. Volume 4: In the 21

century. Oxford, UK:

Greenwood.

O’Higgins, N., & Ivanov, A. (2006). Education and employment opportunities for the Roma.

Comparative Economic Studies, 48, 6–19. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100147

Parsons, S., Simmons, W., Shinhoster, F., & Kilburn, J. (1999). A test of the grapevine: An

empirical investigation of conspiracy theories among African Americans. Sociological

Spectrum, 19, 201-222. doi:10.1080/027321799280235

Paulhus, D. (1983). Sphere-specific measures of perceived control. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 44, 1253-1265. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.6.1253

Popper, K. (1966). The open society and its enemies (5th ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance

orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741-763. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741

Rammstedt, B., & John, O. P. (2005). Kurzversion des Big Five Inventory (BFI-K):

Entwicklung und Validierung eines ökonomischen Inventars zur Erfassung der fünf

Faktoren der Persönlichkeit [Short version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-K):

Development and validation of an economic inventory for assessment of the five factors

of personality]. Diagnostica, 51, 195-206. doi:10.1026/0012-1924.51.4.195

Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes:

A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 336-353.

doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_4

Schlink, S., & Walther, E. (2007). Kurz und gut: Eine deutsche Kurzskala zur Erfassung des

Bedürfnisses nach kognitiver Geschlossenheit [Short and sweet: A German short scale

to measure need for cognitive closure]. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 38, 153-161.

Son Hing, L. S., Bobocel, D. R., Zanna, M. P., & McBride, M. V. (2007). Authoritarian

dynamics and unethical decision making: High SDO leaders and high RWA followers.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 67-81. doi:10.1037/0022-

3514.92.1.67

Stempel, C., Hargrove, T, & Stempel, G. H. (2007). Media use, social structure, and belief in

9/11 conspiracy theories. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 84, 353-372.

doi:10.1177/107769900708400210

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1996). Predicting prejudice. International Journal of

Intercultural Relations, 20, 409-426. doi:10.1016/0147-1767(96)00026-0

Sullivan, D., Landau, M. J., & Rothschild, Z. K. (2010). An existential function of

enemyship: Evidence that people attribute influence to personal and political enemies to

compensate for threats to control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98,

434-494. doi:10.1037/a0017457

Swami, V. (2012). Social psychological origins of conspiracy theories: The case of the Jewish

conspiracy theory in Malaysia. Frontiers in Psychology. Retrieved from

http://www.frontiersin.org/Personality_Science_and_Individual_Differences/10.3389/fp

syg.2012.00280/abstract

Swami, V., Chamorro-Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2010). Unanswered questions: A

preliminary investigation of personality and individual difference predictors of 9/11

conspiracist beliefs. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24, 49-61. doi:10.1002/acp.1583

Swami, V., Coles, R., Stieger, S., Pietschnig, J., Furnham, A., Rehim, S., & Voracek, M.

(2011). Conspiracist ideation in Britain and Austria: Evidence of a monological belief

system and associations between individual psychological differences and real-world

and fictitious conspiracy theories. British Journal of Psychology, 102, 443-463.

doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.2010.02004.x

Tausch, N., Becker, J., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R.N. (2011).

Explaining radical group behaviour: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to

normative and non-normative collective action. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 101, 129-148. doi:10.1037/a0022728

Thorson, J. A., & Powell, F. C. (1992). A revised death anxiety scale. Death Studies, 16, 517-

531. doi:10.1080/07481189208252595

Traynor, I. (23 April 2009). Gypsies suffer widespread racism in European Union. London,

UK: Guardian. Retrieved October 19, 2011 from

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/23/eu-roma-racism-discrimination.

von Collani, G. (2002). Das Konstrukt der Sozialen Dominanzorientierung als generalisierte

Einstellung: Eine Replikation [The construct of Social Dominance Orientation as a

generalized attitude: A replication]. Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie, 10, 263-282.

Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? Perspectives on

Psychological Science, 5, 219-232. doi:10.1177/1745691610369336

Whitley, B. R. (1999). Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and

prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 126-134.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.1.126

Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking control increases illusory pattern

perception. Science, 322, 115-117. doi:10.1126/science.1159845

Wood, M., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in contradictory

conspiracy theories. Social Psychology and Personality Science.

doi:10.1177/1948550611434786

Young, M. J., Launer, M. K., & Austin, C. C. (1990). The need for evaluative criteria.

Argumentation and Advocacy, 26, 89–107.

Zarefsky, D. (1984). Conspiracy arguments in the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Journal of the

American Forensic Association, 21, 63–75.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of all Scales Included in Study 1

Descriptives Intercorrelations

α M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

1. Conspiracy Mentality .90 4.76 1.07

2. RWA .85 3.61 1.34

.05

3. SDO .93 2.63 1.23

.03 .40

4. TIPI Extraversion .75 3.64 1.52

.03 .11 .00

5. TIPI Conscientiousness .65 5.30 1.29

.01 .16 -.09 .14

6. TIPI Openness .60 5.06 1.28

.10 -.20 -.24 .35 .11

7. TIPI Neuroticism .73 3.21 1.45

.03 -.05 .08 -.17 -.37 -.13

8. TIPI Agreeableness .37 5.04 1.20

-.03 .08 -.26 .06 .31 .17 -.33

9. Political Orientation .92 4.45 1.96

.07 .61 .52 .00 .07 -.17 -.06 -.03

10. Religiosity - 2.37 1.10

.08 .48 .04 .16 .05 .03 -.07 .22 .34

Note. N = 496. 1.-8. on scales from 1 to 7, 9. on scale from 1 to 9, 10. on scale from 1 to 4. Correlations coefficient of |r| > .13 significant at p < .00111

(Bonferroni-ajusted alpha for 45 bivariate correlations).

Table 2

Generalized Political Attitudes as a Function of Demographic Factors

Conspiracy

Mentality RWA SDO

Demographic variables n M SD M SD M SD

Gender

Male 240 4.72 1.06 3.60 1.12 2.85

1.18

Female 245 4.78 1.07 3.62 1.17 2.41

1.04

Ethnicity

Asian 36 4.63 0.94 3.75 0.86 2.86

1.27

Hispanic 27 4.74 0.82 3.64 1.07 2.55

0.94

Black – Non-Hispanic 37 4.82 1.02 4.06 0.98 1.97

0.95

White – Non-Hispanic 369 4.77 1.10 3.53 1.16 2.66

1.12

Religion

Christian catholic 86 4.81 1.10 4.12

0.84 3.10

1.21

Christian protestant 136 4.60 1.03 4.16

0.93 2.63

1.12

Atheists 114 4.65 1.18 2.77

0.98 2.50

1.08

Education

High school graduate 48 4.86 1.02 3.98 0.86 2.80 1.08

Some college 151 4.78 1.10 3.60 1.11 2.68 1.15

Associate’s degree 50 4.88 0.99 3.79 1.09 2.79 1.19

Bachelor’s degree 144 4.64 1.06 3.47 1.13 2.50 1.12

Some graduate school 27 5.04 1.14 3.54 1.14 2.66 1.16

Master’s degree 42 4.65 1.13 3.35 1.23 2.51 1.12

Income level

Less than $10,000 171 4.61 1.08 3.57 1.16 2.55 1.16

$10,000 - $20,000 75 4.80 1.08 3.65 1.26 2.59 1.16

$20,000 - $30,000 81 4.85 1.04 3.49 1.10 2.60 0.96

$30,000 - $40,000 52 5.04 1.06 3.48 1.09 2.55 1.06

$40,000 - $50,000 33 4.92 1.23 3.61 1.01 2.70 1.24

$50,000 - $60,000 35 4.74 0.76 3.71 1.05 2.65 1.14

More than $60,000 48 4.67 1.16 3.92 1.06 3.04 1.16

Note. Subscripts indicate an effect of demographic factor, different letter indicate significant mean differences. Due

to small numbers the following groups are not listed: Gender: other (n=1); ethnicity: American Indian/ Alaskan

Native (n=6), Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander (n=1), Multi-racial, Black and White (n = 6), Multi-racial, other

(n= 7), other or unknown (n=6); religion: Muslim (n=8), Jewish (n=6); education: some high school (n=5), M.B.A.

(n=5), J.D. (n=5), M.D. (n=3), Ph.D. (n=6). All household income levels above $60,000 per year were combined

into one income level

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of all Scales Included in Study 2

α M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

1. Conspiracy Mentality .89 4.41 1.09

2. RWA .81 3.00 0.99

.16

3. SDO .90 2.54 1.03

-.05 .50

4. Anti-Americanism .81 4.52 1.10

.50 .08 -.17

5. Personalized anti-capitalism .84 4.82 0.98

.39 -.16 -.37 .41

6. Anti-Semitism .89 2.98 1.21

.37 .47 .37 .29 .10

7. Islamoprejudice .89 3.16 1.33

.14 .56 .45 -.01 .02 .33

8. Antiziganism .90 2.89 1.28

-.01 .38 .37 -.03 -.05 .25 .40

Note. N between 276 and 294 due to missing data. All scales range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7

(strongly agree). All correlations |r| > .27 significant at p < .0018 (Bonferroni-adjusted alpha for 28

bivariate correlations).

Table 4

Ratings of Perceived Power, Likeability, and Threat for 32 Social Groups and Correlations of Likeability and Threat With Conspiracy Mentality, RWA, and

SDO (Study 3)

Ratings

Correlations with

Power Likeability Threat Conspiracy Mentality RWA SDO

Groups M SD M SD M SD Likeability Threat Likeability Threat Likeability Threat

1. Politicians 9.33 1.45 5.09 2.10 5.82 2.96 -.36 .31 .14 .02 .19 -.03

2. Power companies 9.29 1.59 3.54 1.96 7.25 2.97 -.17 .37 .28 -.11 .26 -.22

3. Managers 9.03 1.49 5.52 2.27 6.04 2.88 -.13 .31 .24 -.09 .22 -.12

4. Lobbyists 8.98 2.11 3.85 2.23 7.68 2.77 -.15 .17 .19 -.14 .22 -.10

5. Journalists 8.69 1.63 6.86 2.04 4.73 2.93 -.15 .21 -.11 .15 -.09 .12

6. Capitalist 8.48 2.08 4.33 2.25 6.72 3.10 -.25 .32 .16 -.03 .22 -.14

7. Physicists 7.82 1.77 7.35 2.01 3.61 2.45 -.05 .26 .17 .03 .11 -.03

8. Men 7.77 1.91 7.74 1.85 4.51 2.77 .12 .10 .14 .04 .04 .00

9. Americans 6.26 2.13 6.10 2.14 4.15 2.83 -.08 .18 .02 .09 -.07 .02

10. Women 6.04 1.81 8.52 1.80 2.77 2.15 .08 .10 .05 .14 -.09 .08

11. Married people 5.93 1.68 7.61 1.74 2.32 1.79 -.01 .14 .21 -.03 .04 -.02

12. Singles 5.67 1.89 7.45 1.81 2.78 2.23 .05 .12 -.02 .14 -.12 .15

13. Musicians 5.58 2.26 7.90 2.08 2.25 1.72 .09 .06 -.11 .10 -.16 .08

14. Jews 5.39 1.98 6.67 1.92 2.77 2.18 -.06 .21 -.24 .19 -.36 .22

15. Feminists 5.36 2.07 4.93 2.64 4.18 2.95 .01 .11 -.23 .24 -.34 .23

16. Artists 5.03 2.12 7.39 2.31 2.31 1.67 .04 .13 -.24 .12 -.24 .06

17. Blue collar workers 5.03 1.76 7.25 1.80 2.67 1.96 .04 .12 .02 .09 -.11 .10

18. Athletes 4.99 2.18 7.00 2.05 2.41 1.78 .20 .11 .15 .11 -.04 .09

19. Senior citizens 4.76 2.25 6.90 1.93 2.67 2.17 .02 .09 .15 .07 -.04 .12

20. White collar workers 4.71 1.78 7.26 1.80 2.44 1.84 .04 .10 .02 .03 -.11 .04

21. Muslims 4.59 1.92 6.10 1.95 4.61 2.84 -.05 .20 -.27 .34 -.38 .34

22. Gay men 4.58 1.87 6.93 2.25 2.43 1.99 .01 .16 -.28 .28 -.29 .24

23. Turks 4.52 1.80 5.97 2.04 4.05 2.77 -.05 .25 -.33 .31 -.41 .30

24. Students 4.47 1.87 9.08 1.77 2.78 2.12 .03 .00 .01 .15 -.11 .22

25. Foreigners 4.26 1.76 6.94 1.77 3.95 2.46 -.02 .20 -.25 .37 -.38 .37

26. Housewives 3.20 1.78 7.50 2.02 1.84 1.48 .06 -.02 .20 .03 .07 .03

27. Welfare recipients 2.64 1.36 5.21 1.91 3.28 2.36 -.09 .19 -.20 .23 -.24 .27

28. Unemployed 2.56 1.59 5.04 1.94 3.60 2.46 .06 .17 -.29 .25 -.30 .31

29. Roma and Sinti 2.54 1.73 5.77 2.03 3.63 2.60 -.12 .18 -.31 .28 -.32 .22

30. Drug addicts 2.19 1.42 3.10 2.05 5.71 3.27 -.11 .15 -.25 .25 -.19 .20

31. Asylum seekers 1.88 1.26 5.65 2.09 3.64 2.54 -.13 .21 -.43 .36 -.43 .33

32. Homeless 1.51 .958 4.75 2.05 3.70 2.62 -.09 .16 -.28 .18 -.26 .18

Note. N between 276 and 280 (due to single missing values). Power, likeability, and threat ratings ranged from 1 to 11. All correlations |r| > .22 significant at p

< .00026 (Bonferroni-adjusted alpha for 192 bivariate correlations).

Table 5

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of all Scales Included in Study 4

Descriptives Intercorrelations

α M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

1. Conspiracy Mentality .89 4.25 1.07

2. RWA .81 2.73 0.92

.29

3. SDO .89 2.42 0.92

.14 .48

4. Personal Control .62 4.82 0.71

.03 .07 .00

5. Interpersonal Control .79 4.67 0.94

-.09 -.07 -.09 .40

6. Sociopolitical Control .70 4.10 0.79

-.23 -.26 -.28 .11 .29

7. Powerlessness .70 1.98 0.47

.27 .17 .08 -.39 -.49 -.37

8. Anomia .75 1.98 0.54

.27 .20 .17 -.36 -.56 -.34 .72

9. Death Anxiety .92 2.79 1.82

.08 .08 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.13 .14 .13

10. Anthropomorphism .89 3.69 1.71

.31 .22 .06 -.02 .03 -.04 .16 .14 .13

11. Extraversion .85 3.37 0.95

-.02 -.03 -.10 .16 .63 .19 -.30 -.42 -.01 .04

12. Conscientiousness .69 3.63 0.69

.01 .11 -.03 .55 .36 .08 -.32 -.37 -.06 .02 .16

13. Openness .73 4.01 0.70

.06 -.14 -.16 .13 .23 .23 -.10 -.16 -.04 .06 .15 .16

14. Neuroticism .80 3.08 0.95

.06 .05 -.04 -.22 -.30 -.15 .48 .52 .24 .06 -.25 -.16 .09

15. Agreeableness .60 2.90 0.75

-.10 -.13 -.26 -.02 .13 .11 -.01 -.14 -.06 -.08 .13 -.01 .09 -.04

Note. N between 278 and 280 (due to missing values). 1.-6. and 9. on scales from 1 to 7, 7.-8. on a scale from 1 to 4, 10. on a scale from 1 to 11, 11.-15. on a scale

from 1 to 5. Correlations coefficient of |r| > .21 significant at p < .00047 (Bonferroni-ajusted alpha for 105 bivariate correlations).

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of all Scales Included in Study 5

α M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

1. Conspiracy Mentality .89 4.16 1.14

2. RWA .79 2.84 0.93

.22

3. Attribution to

intentional misconduct .84 67.26 25.60

.33 -.17

4. Attribution to non-

intentional human

error

.36 54.21 22.91

.14 -.01 .51

5. Attribution to chance - 70.68 27.20

-.07 .10 -.24 -.05

6. Anti-nuclear

behavioral intentions .86 2.39 0.92

.19 -.34 .49 .22 -.17

7. Support for nuclear

phase-out .87 3.84 1.10

.15 -.38 .51 .22 -.20 .67

Note. N between 1,776 and 1,846 due to missing values. First two scales from 1 (low conspiracy mentality, resp.

RWA) to 7 (high conspiracy mentality, resp. RWA). Attribution rating on slider scales from 0 (has no influence on

Fukushima nuclear disaster) to 100 (has strong influence on Fukushima nuclear disaster). Anti-nuclear behavioral

intentions and support for nuclear phase-out from 1 (pro-nuclear) to 5 (anti-nuclear). All correlations |r| > .07

significant at p < .0023 (Bonferroni adjusted alpha for 21 bivariate correlations).

Figure Captions

Figure 1. Standardized regression coefficients (+SE) for RWA, CM, and SDO simultaneously

predicting anti-Americanism (R

2corr

= .27), personalized anti-capitalism (R

2corr

= .27), anti-

Semitism (R

2corr

= .33), Islamoprejudice (R

2corr

= .34), and antziganism (R

2corr

= .20).

Asterisks indicate significant coefficients at p < .01.

Figure 2. Unique relations between conspiracy mentality, RWA, and SDO when

simultaneously predicting intraindividual correlations of (a) power and likeability (R

2corr

.26), and (b) power and threat (R

2corr

= .15). Point estimates are plotted for each predictor at -

1SD and +1SD at the mean value of the other predictors. Regressions are based on Fisher r-

to-z-transformed coefficients that were inverse-transformed for the plots.

Figure 3. Unique relations between conspiracy mentality, RWA, and SDO when

simultaneously predicting intraindividual correlations of (a) power and likeability (R

2corr

.22), (b) power and realistic threat (R

2corr

= .11), and (c) power and symbolic threat (R

2corr

.09). Point estimates are plotted for each predictor at -1SD and +1SD at the mean value of the

other predictors. Regressions are based on Fisher r-to-z-transformed coefficients that were

inverse-transformed for the plots.

Figure 1

Dependent Variable

Anti-capitalism Anti-Americanism Anti-Semitism Islamoprejudice Antiziganism

Standardized Regression Coefficients

-.40

-.20

.00

.20

.40

.60

Conspiracy Mentality

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Social Dominance Orientation

***

Figure 2

-1SD +1SD

Intraindividual Correlations Power-Likeability

-0,15

-0,10

-0,05

0,00

0,05

0,10

0,15

Conspiracy Mentality

RWA

SDO

-1SD +1SD

Intraindividual Correlations Power-Threat

0,25

0,30

0,35

0,40

0,45

0,50

Conspiracy Mentality

RWA

SDO

(a) Power - Likeability

(b) Power - Threat

Figure 3

-1SD + 1SD

Intraindividual Correlations Power-Likeability

-0,25

-0,20

-0,15

-0,10

-0,05

0,0 0

0,0 5

0,1 0

Co nspira cy M enta lity

RW A

SD O

-1SD + 1SD

Intraindividual Correlations Power-Realistic Threat

0,2 5

0,3 0

0,3 5

0,4 0

0,4 5

0,5 0

Co nspira cy M enta lity

RW A

SD O

-1SD + 1SD

Intraindividual Correlations Power-Symbolic Threat

0,3 0

0,3 5

0,4 0

0,4 5

0,5 0

Co nspira cy M enta lity

RW A

SD O

(a) Power - Likeability

(b) Power - Realistic Threat

Table S1. Conspiracy Mentality Scale in English and German with Corrected Item-Total Correlations.

Corrected Item-Total Correlations

Study 1a

Study2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5

1. There are many very important things happening in the world about which the public is not informed.

Es geschehen sehr viele wichtige Dinge in der Welt, über die die Öffentlichkeit nie informiert wird. .43 .52 .53 .49 .49

2. Those at the top do whatever they want.

Die da oben machen ja eh was sie wollen. .45 .45 .59 .47 .56

3. A few powerful groups of people determine the destiny of millions.

Ein paar mächtige Personengruppen bestimmen über das Schicksal von Millionen von Menschen. .53 .60 .58 .61 .61

4. There are secret organizations that have great influence on political decisions.

Es gibt geheime Organisationen, die großen Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungen haben. .77 .74 .66 .74 .71

5. I think that the various conspiracy theories circulating in the media are absolute nonsense.

(R)

Die verschiedenen in den Medien zirkulierenden Verschwörungstheorien halte ich für ausgemachten Blödsinn. .48 .43 .47 .61 .43

6. Politicians and other leaders are nothing but the string puppets of powers operating in the background.

Politiker und andere Führungspersönlichkeiten sind nur Marionetten der dahinterstehenden Mächte. .65 .64 .63 .58 .59

7. Most people do not recognize to what extent our life is determined by conspiracies that are concocted in secret.

Die meisten Menschen erkennen nicht, in welchem Ausmaß unser Leben durch Verschwörungen bestimmt wird,

die im Geheimen ausgeheckt werden.

.79 .75 .64 .72 .73

8. There is no good reason to distrust governments, intelligence agencies, or the media.

(R)

Es gibt keinen vernünftigen Grund, Regierungen, Geheimdiensten oder Medien zu misstrauen. .32 .36 .53 .41 .43

9. International intelligence agencies have their hands in our everyday life to a much larger degree than people

assume.

Die internationalen Geheimdienste mischen viel mehr in alltäglichen Dingen mit, als man denkt.

.67 .61 .52 .54 .60

10. Secret organizations can manipulate people psychologically so that they do not notice how their life is being

controlled by others.

Geheime Organisationen können Leute psychisch so manipulieren, dass diese nicht wissen, dass ihr Leben von

außen bestimmt wird.

.68 .63 .56 .58 .63

11. There are certain political circles with secret agendas that are very influential.

Es gibt bestimmte politische Zirkel, die geheime Pläne verfolgen und sehr viel Einfluss haben. .70 .73 .65 .70 .70

12. Most people do not see how much our lives are determined by plots hatched in secret.

Die meisten Menschen machen sich keine Vorstellung davon, wie sehr unser Leben bestimmt wird von im

Geheimen geschmiedeten Plänen.

.80 .77 .71 .69 .77

Table S2. Original German item wording, English translation and corrected item-total correlation for three purpose-designed scales in Study 2

Anti-Americanism

Die USA als 'Schlachtbank der Indianer' und dem 'Gefängnis Afrikas' haben bis heute nichts aus ihrer Geschichte gelernt.

(Until today, the USA as the ‚Shambles of American Indians‘ and ‚Prison of Africa‘ have learned nothing from their history.) .57

Die amerikanische Verfassung ist ein leuchtendes Vorbild für Demokratien weltweit. (R)

(The American constitution is a shining example for democracies worldwide). .20

Die amerikanische Regierung wird kontrolliert von einer Lobby aus Öl- und Waffenindustrie.

(The American government is controlled by a lobby of oil and weapon industries) .44

Ich finde es gut, wie die USA versuchen, Frieden und Demokratie in andere Länder zu bringen. (R)

(I like how the USA tries to bring peace and democracy to other countries). .36

Meiner Meinung nach sind Amerikaner arrogant und oberflächlich.

(In my view Americans are arrogant and superficial.) .52

Die USA sind der größte Kriegstreiber weltweit.

(The USA is the world’s greatest warmonger). .64

Die USA spielen sich als Weltpolizei auf und kriegen noch nicht mal ihre eigenen Probleme in den Griff.

(The USA acts up as the world police when they can’t even get their own problems under control). .72

Amerika hat es nie geschafft, eine eigene Kultur zu entwickeln, so wie Europa eine hat.

(America has never succeeded in developing a culture like Europe). .59

Anti-Capitalism

Ehrliche Arbeit wird heute in Zeiten von internationalen Finanzjongleuren viel zu wenig geschätzt.

(In today’s times of international financial speculators, honest work is not being appreciated enough anymore.) .44

Manche Finanzinvestoren verschwenden keinen Gedanken an die Menschen, deren Arbeitsplätze sie vernichten - sie bleiben anonym, haben kein Gesicht, fallen wie

Heuschreckenschwärme über Unternehmen her, grasen ab und ziehen weiter.

(Some investors don’t waste a thought on the people whose jobs they destroy. They remain anonymous and faceless, raiding companies like a cloud of locusts: grazing

them and leaving them deserted.)

.49

Multinationale Konzerne sind schuld an den meisten Problemen der Welt.

(Multinational corporations are to be blamed for most of the world’s problems.) .59

Die Bundesregierung sollte nicht nur Mindestlöhne, sondern auch Höchstverdienste für gierige Manager gesetzlich festlegen.

(Federal government should not only implement minimum wages by law, but also maximum wages for greedy managers.) .50

Ich mag das Gerede von den 'Heuschrecken', die böswillig Firmen zerschlagen nicht. (R)

(I don’t like this tattle of ‘locusts’ that maliciously shatter companies.) .29

Durch wirtschaftliche Interessen verkommt unsere soziale Marktwirtschaft zum puren Kapitalismus.

(Economic interests push our system away from protecting vulnerable groups and toward pure competition) .64

Ohne Wirtschaftsmanager und Spekulanten wäre es um den deutschen Wohlstand heute nicht so gut bestellt. (R)

(Without corporate executives and speculators German prosperity wouldn’t be in such a good position.) .23

Ein großes Problem am momentanen Kapitalismus ist, dass große Hedgefonds nur Profit machen wollen.

(A huge problem of today’s capitalism is that hedge funds only want to make profits.) .65

Firmenmanager haben vor lauter Geldgier alle moralischen Werte vergessen.

(As a result of their greed, CEOs have lost all their morals.) .64

Skrupelloses Profitstreben bringt unser ganzes Wirtschaftssystem in Misskredit.

(Unscrupulous profit seeking discredits our whole economic system.) .57

Allen auf der Welt würde es besser gehen, wenn es weniger internationale Finanzspekulanten gäbe.

(Everybody in this world would be better off if there were fewer international financial speculators.) .59

Antiziganism

Es würde mich überhaupt nicht stören, Roma und Sinti als Nachbarn zu haben. (R)

(I would not mind at all to have Roma and Sinti as neighbours.) .63

Dass Roma und Sinti mehr klauen als normale Deutsche davon bin ich überzeugt.

(I am convinced that Roma and Sinti steal more than normal Germans.) .74

Es wäre besser, keine Roma und Sinti im Land zu haben.

(It would be better to have no Roma or Sinti in the country.) .71

Die Verfolgung der Roma und Sinti hängt auch mit deren Weigerung zusammen, sich an herrschende Normen anzupassen.

(The persecution of Roma and Sinti is connected with their refusal to adjust to the dominant norms.) .50

Ich gehöre zu denen, die keine Roma und Sinti mögen.

(I belong to those who do not like Roma or Sinti.) .73

Viele Roma und Sinti erziehen ihre Kinder zu anderen Werten und Fähigkeiten, als hier gebraucht werden, um erfolgreich zu sein.

(Many Roma and Sinti teach their children different values and abilities than are needed to be successful.) .42

Wenn man sich den Anteil Krimineller unter den Roma und Sinti anschaut, so ist der bestimmt höher als z.B. bei Deutschen.

(If one inspects the crime rate among Roma and Sinti, it is for sure higher than that of, for instance, Germans.) .76

Ich kann es gut verstehen, wenn man etwas gegen Roma und Sinti hat.

(I can sympathize with having something against Roma and Sinti.) .77

Dass Roma und Sinti in so vielen verschiedenen Ländern verfolgt wurden, ist für mich ein Zeichen dafür, dass es zumindest zum Teil auch an ihnen selber liegt.

(That Roma and Sinti have been persecuted in so many countries is an indication that it is at least partially their own fault.) .74

Full table of mean scores and correlations in Study 4

Data

March 2013

Roland Imhoff · Martin Bruder

Download

Conspiracy beliefs and negative attitudes towards outgroups in times of crises: Experimental evidence from Germany

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2024
PLOS ONE

While research on the determinants of conspiracy beliefs has been growing, there is still limited attention given to the broader consequences of conspiracy theories. This study examines the effects of conspiratorial framing on outgroup evaluations in the context of societal crises. Using an experimental design and a large representative sample of the German population, we exposed participants to conspiratorial framings of health, economic, and security crisis scenarios. The findings reveal that exposure to conspiratorial framing of crises leads to significantly more negative attitudes towards outgroups compared to control conditions. The impact is most pronounced in the security crisis treatment condition, particularly in war scenarios. Additionally, our study demonstrates the important role of political ideology, as individuals with left- as well as right-wing ideologies displayed more negative attitudes towards outgroups when exposed to conspiratorial framings of crises. These findings contribute to the literature by providing experimental evidence of the detrimental effects of conspiracy narratives on intergroup attitudes during crises.

Are conspiracy theory believers drawn to conspiratorial explanations, alternatives explanations, or both?

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2024
J EXP SOC PSYCHOL

Conspiracy Theories: Groups, Ideology, and Status as Three Distinct Bases for Expressions in Society

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2024

Conspiracy theories have been treated mostly as a homogeneous phenomenon in empirical research. However, to fully understand their causes and consequences, a multifaceted approach to conspiracy theories would be useful. Here, we propose an organizational framework with three facets (groups, ideology, and status) to conceptualize conspiracy theories. Based on a review of recent research, the current contribution highlights the psychological differences between (a) perceived conspiracies within or outside of one’s valued community; (b) ideological versus nonideological conspiracy beliefs, based on whether conspiracy beliefs are directly relevant for people’s core values; and (c) upward versus downward conspiracy beliefs, that is, whether the perceived conspiracy involves a relatively high- or low-status group. Finally, we discuss some distinct consequences of these facets in affecting societally consequential behaviors, such as collective action, protest, hostility, or polarization.

The Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT): Applying Appraisal Theories to Understand Emotional and Behavioral Reactions to Conspiracy Theories

Preprint

Full-text available

Nov 2024

2024) The appraisal model of conspiracy theories (AMCT): Applying appraisal theories to understand emotional and behavioral reactions to conspiracy theories. Psychological Inquiry. ISSN 1047-840X. (In press) Kent Academic Repository Downloaded from https://kar.

The Crisis of Misinformation and Dark Creativity

Chapter

Full-text available

Oct 2024

The checkered history of false knowledge, deliberate (disinformation) or otherwise (misinformation), has been long and varied, ranging from propaganda to memes. In recent times, the crisis of misinformation has been amplified owing to multiple agents on social media, usually comprising user-driven platforms where unchecked “facts” can be posted. This chapter explores the intersection of dark creativity and misinformation, particularly conspiratorial misinformation. Dark creativity refers to the use of ideational processes to meet less desirable (and even harmful) goals. Recent research has also reconceptualized conspiracies as creative narratives, and therefore, we propose features common to creative and conspiratorial thinking. We also discuss features associated with individuals who may be more susceptible to believing and spreading misinformation, as well as their creative characteristics. The chapter also proposes ways to emerge from the crisis, harnessing critical thinking skills that can assist in debunking or pre-bunking misinformation.

Debunking and exposing misinformation among fringe communities: Testing source exposure and debunking anti-Ukrainian misinformation among German fringe communities

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2024

Through an online field experiment, we test traditional and novel counter-misinformation strategies among fringe communities. Though generally effective, traditional strategies have not been tested in fringe communities, and do not address the online infrastructure of misinformation sources supporting such consumption. Instead, we propose to activate source criticism by exposing sources’ unreliability. Based on a snowball sampling of German fringe communities on Facebook, we test if debunking and source exposure reduce groups’ consumption levels of two popular misinformation sources. Results support a proactively engaging counter-misinformation approach to reduce consumption of misinformation sources.

Exploring the Extremes: The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Populism on Conspiracy Beliefs in Austria

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2024

Diana Lucia Hofmann

(1) Background: Populist radical right-wing parties and politicians have used conspiracy theories to perpetuate the antagonism between an evil elite conspiring against the good and unknowing people. Yet, less is known about whether and to what extent radical right-wing populism at the individual level is associated with different conspiracy beliefs. This analysis explores how the main components of radical right-wing populism—populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes—relate to both a general conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy theories prevalent in political discourse. (2) Methods: Using data from an original 2023 online survey conducted in Austria, a stronghold of the populist radical right, this study includes new questions on immigration, COVID-19, and climate change, as well as a conspiracy mentality scale. (3) Results: The analyses reveal that all the main components are positively associated with different conspiracy beliefs, albeit to varying degrees. Across models, the strongest predictor is populism, followed by nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism varies the most across different conspiracy beliefs and is particularly associated with the belief in conspiracy theories related to immigration and climate change. (4) Conclusions: The results highlight the prevalence of radical right-wing populist attitudes across various conspiracy beliefs, reflecting how populist radical right-wing actors leverage conspiracy theories in their political discourse.

Public agreement with misinformation about wind farms

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2024

Misinformation campaigns target wind farms, but levels of agreement with this misinformation among the broader public are unclear. Across six nationally quota-based samples in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia (total N = 6008), over a quarter of respondents agree with half or more of contrarian claims about wind farms. Agreement with diverse claims is highly correlated, suggesting an underlying belief system directed at wind farm rejection. Consistent with this, agreement is best predicted (positively) by a conspiracist worldview (i.e., the general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories; explained variance ΔR² = 0.11–0.20) and (negatively) by a pro-ecological worldview (ΔR² = 0.04–0.13). Exploratory analyses show that agreement with contrarian claims is associated with lower support for pro-wind policies and greater intentions to protest against wind farms. We conclude that wind farm contrarianism is a mainstream phenomenon, rooted in people’s worldviews and that poses a challenge for communicators and institutions committed to accelerating the energy transition.

Association of the belief in conspiracy narratives with vaccination status and recommendation behaviours of German physicians

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2024

Vaccine hesitancy has been identified as one of the top ten threats to global health by the World Health Organization (WHO). The belief in conspiracy narratives is repeatedly discussed as a major driver of vaccine hesitancy among the general population. However, there is a lack of research investigating the role of the belief in conspiracy narratives in vaccination decisions and recommendation behaviours of physicians. This is particularly relevant as physicians are one of the major and trusted sources of information for patients’ vaccination decisions. This study therefore investigated the association between believing in COVID-19-related conspiracy narratives and physicians’ own COVID-19 vaccination status and their recommendation behavior for COVID-19 and other vaccines (e.g., HPV or flu). In a cross-sectional survey among German physicians (N = 602, April 2022) two conspiracy narratives were assessed, stating that the coronavirus is a hoax or that it is human-made. Additional control variables included trust in health institutions, the rejection of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), the 5C psychological antecedents of vaccination (confidence, complacency, constraints, calculation, and collective responsibility) and demographic variables. Hierarchical regressions indicated that greater belief in the conspiracy narrative claiming that the coronavirus is a hoax was associated with lower COVID-19 vaccination uptake and fewer COVID-19 vaccination recommendations among physicians. The results for recommendation behavior remain robust even when controlling for other variables. Contrary to our assumption, believing that the coronavirus is human-made was not related to vaccination status nor vaccine recommendation behavior. In conclusion, believing in conspiracy narratives that question the existence and thus also the danger of the virus is an important independent predictor of vaccine hesitancy among physicians that should be addressed in future public health interventions.

Do stress and anxiety lead to belief in conspiracy theories?

Article

Nov 2024

Conspiracies happen, and some conspiracy theories are warranted by evidence. Nevertheless, a non-trivial proportion of the public express belief in conspiracy theories that are not warranted by evidence. Psychological research has therefore investigated the motives that might lead someone to believe a conspiracy theory even where the available evidence for the theory is weak. Two potential causes that have been proposed in the literature and embedded in theorising are psychological stress and anxiety. Prior studies have provided some evidence that stress and anxiety are positively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories, but it remains unclear whether this apparent effect might be accounted for by plausible confounding variables. Furthermore, there have been few preregistered examinations of the proposed effects of stress and anxiety, rendering it unclear to what degree this proposition has yet been subjected to a severe test. In two preregistered cross-sectional survey studies, we tested whether higher perceived stress and anxiety significantly predicted belief in conspiracy theories while controlling for plausible confounding variables (age, education, subjective social status, and political orientation). We analysed data using structural equation models, allowing measurement error to be explicitly modelled and accounted for. In Study 1 ( N =502), a cross-sectional survey of Australasian participants indicated that perceived stress and anxiety did not have significant estimated effects on belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 2 ( N =1020), a cross-sectional survey of US participants showed a small significant positive effect of perceived stress, but not anxiety, on belief in conspiracy theories. The present results provide very tentative evidence for an effect of perceived stress on belief in conspiracy theories. However, it is increasingly evident that this effect, if it exists at all, is not large.

Reactions to Penalties for an Offense in Relation to Authoritarianism, Values, Perceived Responsibility, Perceived Seriousness, and Deservingness

Article

Full-text available

Sep 1996

N. T. Feather

Two studies involving participants from metropolitan Adelaide, South Australia (Study 1: N = 220, Study 2: N = 181) examined variables that were assumed to influence cognitive and affective reactions to penalties imposed for offenses relating to domestic violence, plagiarism, and shoplifting (in Study 1), and resisting a police order in a protest against logging (in Study 2). Results of path analyses supported a model that assumed paths linking perceived responsibility to the perceived seriousness of an offense; responsibility and seriousness to deservingness of the penalty; deservingness to the perceived harshness of the penalty, to reported positive affect about the penalty, and to reported sympathy for the offender; and perceived harshness of the penalty to reported positive affect and sympathy. Right-wing authoritarianism and relevant values had direct effects on perceived seriousness consistent with the assumption that values affect the way an offense is construed in relation to its negative valence or aversiveness. Deservingness had a central role as a mediator of reactions.

The Psychological Bases of Ideology and Prejudice: Testing a Dual Process Model

Article

Full-text available

Jul 2002

The issue of personality and prejudice has been largely investigated in terms of authontananism and social dominance orientation. However, these seem more appropriately conceptualized as ideological attitudes than as personality dimensions. The authors describe a causal model linking dual dimensions of personality social world view, ideological attitudes, and intergroup attitudes. Structural equation modeling with data from American and White Afrikaner students supported the model, suggesting that social conformity and belief in a dangerous world influence authoritarian attitudes, whereas toughmindedness and belief in a competitive jungle world influence social dominance attitudes, and these two ideological attitude dimensions influence intergroup attitudes. The model implies that dual motivational and cognitive processes, which may be activated by different kinds of situational and intergroup dynamics, may underlie 2 distinct dimensions of prejudice.

A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2002

Stereotype research emphasizes systematic processes over seemingly arbitrary contents, but content also may prove systematic. On the basis of stereotypes' intergroup functions, the stereotype content model hypothesizes that (a) 2 primary dimensions are competence and warmth, (b) frequent mixed clusters combine high warmth with low competence (paternalistic) or high competence with low warmth (envious), and (c) distinct emotions (pity, envy, admiration, contempt) differentiate the 4 competence-warmth combinations. Stereotypically, (d) status predicts high competence, and competition predicts low warmth. Nine varied samples rated gender, ethnicity, race, class, age, and disability out-groups. Contrary to antipathy models, 2 dimensions mattered, and many stereotypes were mixed, either pitying (low competence, high warmth subordinates) or envying (high competence, low warmth competitors). Stereotypically, status predicted competence, and competition predicted low warmth.

The Need for Evaluative Criteria: Conspiracy Argument Revisited

Article

Full-text available

Dec 1990

Since the conspiratist Weltanschauung uses logical or rhetorical fallacies to conceal the issues and exploit the ambiguities of uncertain situations, this essay advocates the application of traditional tests of evidence and argument to conspiratist discourse. Using the conspiracy interpretation of the Soviet shootdown of Korean Air Lines 007 as an exemplar, the authors demonstrate that conspiratist arguments, by their very nature, demand that the critic develop an evaluative system to explicate the dynamics of such arguments.

Authoritarian dynamics and unethical decision making: High SDO leaders and high RWA followers

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2007
J PERS SOC PSYCHOL

The Open Society and Its Enemies

Book

Nov 2012

‘If in this book harsh words are spoken about some of the greatest among the intellectual leaders of mankind, my motive is not, I hope, to belittle them. it springs rather from my conviction that, if our civilization is to survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men.’

Extremist Political Positions and Perceptions of Conspiracy: Even Paranoids Have Real Enemies

Chapter

Jan 1987

Inglehart Ronald

Conspiracy implies secret communication. It occurs when a group is plotting to attain some goal, and keeping their actions secret from those who would otherwise oppose them.

The Conspiracy Mentality

Chapter

Jan 1987

Serge Moscovici

Periodically, people are accused of conspiring against their country, against their religion, or against the party of which they are members. Now, a conspiracy is, by definition, the work of a minority. One of the most pronounced, if not the most pronounced, aspects of this accusation becomes immediately apparent: The minority is alien; either it is composed of foreigners or it is financed by and in league with foreign powers. One always seems to detect what one calls “the hand of the stranger” behind the beliefs and actions of the minority. An event will trigger this habitual thought process that one has recourse to, as if by reflex. A few examples will enable us to give our ideas more concrete form. A few years ago Indira Ghandi, India’s prime minister, was assassinated by Sikh bodyguards. The murder occurred at the same time the Sikh minority was claiming its independence, and the Indian Army had been called in to intervene against it. A few days after the assassination, Rajiv Ghandi, who had succeeded his mother, proclaimed in front of an audience of 100, 000 in New Delhi: “The assassination of Indira Ghandi is the doing of a vast conspiracy whose object is to weaken and divide India” (LeMonde, 1984). He added that the assassins were aided and abetted by foreign accomplices. Also recently, an event had great repercussions in France. Agents of the French secret service sank the Rainbow Warrior, a ship belonging to the ecological organization Greenpeace, in the port of Auckland. The ship was to take part in a demonstration against French nuclear experiments in the Pacific. Without awaiting the results of the official nuclear experiments in the Pacific.

The Authoritarian Personality.

Article