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The adaptable corporation
2
Article at a glance
Most companies are far better at executing their current activities than at adapting
to long-term changes in the business environment. Very few can do both well.
Three barriers to adaptability are deeply rooted in the nature of organizations:
inflexibility in the mental models of their managers; organizational complexity,
driven by the demands of execution; and mismatches between current resources
and future opportunities.
Overcoming these barriers requires a rethinking of what GE’s former CEO Jack
Welch has called an organization’s “social architecture”—the combination
of individual behavior, structure, and culture—which determines a company’s
long-term performance.
The adaptable corporation 77
Any business faces two basic demands: it must execute its current
activities to survive today’s challenges and adapt those activities to
survive tomorrow’s. Since both executing and adapting require resources,
managers face an unending competition for money, people, and time
to address the need to perform in the short run and the equally vital need
to invest in the long run. This problem raises an important question—
is it possible to do both well or is there an inevitable trade-off between
executing and adapting?
The adaptable corporation
To survive, organizations must execute in the present and adapt to the
future. Few of them manage to do both well.
Eric D. Beinhocker
The McKinsey Quarterly 2006 Number 2
78
Executing versus adapting
Tom Peters and Bob Waterman were
among the rst popular writers
to draw attention to the managerial
implications of this challenge, in
1982’s In Search of Excellence,1
where they argued that organizations
must simultaneously be “tight”
in executing and “loose” in adapting.
This dialectic has been a central
theme in management literature ever
since: James Collins and Jerry
Porras, for example, note the impor-
tance of both control and creativity
in Built to Last,2 Richard Foster and
Sarah Kaplan examine the need to
balance operating versus innovating
in Creative Destruction,3 and
Michael Tushman and Charles
O’Reilly paint their vision of an “ambidextrous” organization that can
operate as well as innovate in Winning through Innovation.4 One of the
best-known and most-cited academic papers on the topic, written in 1991
by Stanford’s James March, used the memorable terms “exploration”
versus “exploitation.”5
Each writer’s language and nuances may be different, but it is no coincidence
that the yin-yang theme of opposing challenges keeps cropping up. The
evidence suggests that most companies are far better at the executing half of
the dialectic than at the adapting half. Very few do both well.
In two major studies, published in 2002 and 2005 respectively, Robert
Wiggins, of the University of Memphis, and Tim Ruei, of the University
of Texas at Austin, show that while many companies can manage short-
term bursts of high performance, only a few sustain it in the longer run.
The authors stratied a sample of 6,772 companies over 23 years into
superior, modal (middle), and inferior performers in their industries.
1
Thomas J. Peters and Rober t H. Waterman Jr., In Search of E xcellenc e: Lessons from America’s Be st Run
Compa nies, New York: HarperBusiness , 2004.
2
James C . Collins and Jerry I . Porras, Built t o Las t: Successful Ha bits of Visionary Companies, New York:
HarperColl ins, 1997.
3 Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last Underper form
the Market— And How to Successfully Transfor m Them , New York: Currency, 2001.
4
Michael L. Tushma n and Charles A. O’Reil ly II I, Winning t hrough Innovation : A Practical G uide to Leading
Organizati onal C hange a nd Renewal, revised edit ion, Bo ston: Harvard Business School Press , 2002 .
5
James G . March, “Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning,” Organizatio n Scie nce,
1991, Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 71–87.
Andrea C obb/ i2iart.com
The adaptable corporation 79
Only 5 percent of these companies remained in the superior stratum for
10 years or more.6
Wiggins and Ruei concluded that the short-term performers were
successful executers that lost their way when the environment shifted.
All sources of competitive advantage are temporary, and very few
companies can create new sources of advantage after their historic
sources decline.
Taking another angle on the problem, Foster and Kaplan point out (in
Creative Destruction) that only a very small population of companies has
endured for a very long time: for example, of the original Forbes 100
companies, in 1917, only 13 have survived independently to the present
day. These companies must in some sense be highly adaptable, having
endured the Depression, World War II, globalization, and enormous
changes in markets and technologies. Yet as the authors observe, the long-
term survivors, with the exception of GE, have been mediocre to poor
performers relative to their industries and the overall market.
We thus have, on the one side, high-performing executers that can’t sustain
their performance and, on the other, long-term adapters that don’t
perform well. Companies that can both execute and adapt are very rare
indeed. Wiggins and Ruei found that fewer than 0.5 percent of the
companies in their sample stayed in the top stratum for more than 20 years.
Only three companies—American Home Products, Eli Lilly, and 3M,
or 0.04 percent of the whole—made it to the 50-year mark. (This sample
didn’t include multibusiness companies, such as GE.)
Why is adapting and performing well so hard? The answer is that the
demands of execution create deep barriers to adaptability, and these
barriers afict every organization. Overcoming them requires a fundamen-
tal rethinking of what GE’s Jack Welch calls an organization’s “social
architecture”—the combination of individual behavior, structure, and
culture—which shapes long-term performance.
Barriers to adaptability
Any organization faces many potential barriers to adaptability, some
specic to itself. We will focus, however, on three that are deeply rooted in
the nature of organizations and thus widely shared.
6
Robert R . Wigg ins and Timothy W. Ruei, “Su stained competitive advantage: Temporal dynamics a nd the
incidence and persistence of super ior economic performance,” Organization Science, 20 02, Volume 13,
Number 1, pp. 81–105; and Wig gins a nd Rue i, “Schumpeter’s ghost: Is hypercompet ition ma king the best of
times shorter?” Strateg ic Management Jo urnal, 20 05, Volume 26, Number 10, pp. 887–911.
The McKinsey Quarterly 2006 Number 2
80
People: The price of experience
Much has been written about recent research in behavioral economics
showing that managers and other decision makers are not as perfectly
rational as traditional economic theory assumes.7 This research tends to
focus on common biases and errors, which affect the quality of decision
making. Such biases can undermine adaptability; the well-studied bias of
overoptimism, for example, can make organizational-change efforts
seem less urgent.8 What is less well known is that behavioral research also
offers insights into why people become set in their ways and have
difculty adapting to change.
We’ve all had the experience of arguing with people and believing that the
evidence for our position is crystal clear, though the other person “just
doesn’t get it.” Why is it that people sometimes “just don’t get it,” even in
the face of overwhelming evidence?
The answer may lie in the way we learn and categorize information in
our mental models.9 Many cognitive scientists believe that one important way
people learn involves condition-action (or if-then) rules. A child might,
for example, learn that, “If the stove is hot, then don’t touch.” Through
experience, we accumulate
a storehouse of such rules. Our
environment gives us feedback
about which do and don’t work.
Over time we tend to give more
weight to those that have worked
in the past. Mental models also organize rules into complex hierarchies
and webs of relationships. A child, for example, might have a hierarchy of
rules related to hot things, with a general rule—“don’t touch”—as
well as subcategories of specic forms of behavior for ovens, radiators,
food, bathwater, and the like.
This set-up of rules, weightings, and hierarchies has tremendous benets.
It enables us to learn from experience, to make decisions using ambiguous
information, and to make inferences across experiences. (A child might, for
example, categorize a radiator as like an oven; both are hot and not to be
touched.) But the downside is that our mental models tend to become more
rigid, more locked in, and more averse to novelty as we gain experience.
7
Charle s Roxburg h, “Hidden aws i n strate gy,” The McKinsey Quarterly, 2003 Nu mber 2, pp. 26–39 (www
.mckin seyquarterly.com /links /21100).
8
Dan Lovallo and Da niel Ka hneman, “Delusions of success: How optimism undermi nes executives’ decisions,”
Harvard Busines s Review, July 2 003, Volume 81, Number 7, pp. 56–63 (ww w.hbr.com).
9
John H. Holland , Keith J. Holyoak, Richard E. Nisbett , and Paul R . Thagard, In duct ion: Process es of
Inferen ce, L earning, and Di scovery, Ca mbridge, MA: MIT P ress, 1986.
Mental models become more rigid,
more locked in, and more averse to
novelty as we gain experience
The adaptable corporation 81
When we are young and inexperienced, our hierarchies of rules are fairly
shallow, so our views of the world are relatively general. This way of
thinking has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that such
mental models are easy to change: new experiences are readily absorbed, and
reorganizing the hierarchy of rules isn’t very difcult, because there isn’t
much to reorganize. The disadvantage is that we are less likely to respond
correctly in unfamiliar situations. Hence the stereotype that young people
are more adaptable but also more likely to behave inappropriately.
As we gain experience, our rule hierarchies ll up and the situation reverses:
we have a larger collection of specic experiences and more feedback
on what has and hasn’t worked. Our mental models grow into complex struc-
tures of categories, interlinked rules, and weightings. We become less
likely to perceive experiences as totally new and instead try to relate them
to previous ones, which we group into existing categories. Once in a
while, we encounter something outside our experience and must then create
a new category or rearrange an existing one. As mental models become
more complex over time, major rearrangements become more difcult.
Reorganizing an older, more experienced mental model resembles reorga-
nizing General Motors, whereas reorganizing a younger, less experienced
model is more like reorganizing a start-up. Mental models tend to settle over
time, and bigger and bigger shocks are needed to shake them up.
This is not an ageist argument; certainly there are 20-year-old fuddy-
duddies and adaptable people of 70. But in broad terms, the structures of
mental models change over time, and each stage of development has its
strengths and weaknesses.
The implications for organizational adaptability are critical. Companies
tend to be organized as hierarchies, with the most experienced, successful
people on top. This arrangement presents a trade-off: the mental models
at the top are usually among the best for execution in a stable environment.
These executives have extensive experience and a large storehouse of
specic responses that are quite likely to be appropriate.
Yet when the environment changes signicantly, such individuals may have
difculty recognizing the change and then, once they do, may draw too
heavily on what has worked in the past. This kind of inertia helps to explain
the hero-rogue syndrome: a CEO executes successfully in one environment,
is lauded by the press and investors, and then falls off a cliff when the
environment changes. It also helps to explain why many turnarounds involve
wholesale changes in top management: it is often easier and faster to change
which people occupy the executive suite than to change their mental models.
The McKinsey Quarterly 2006 Number 2
82
Structure: The risk of complexity catastrophes
Organizations can be viewed as a form of network in which webs of people
interact. A very general phenomenon in networks, called a complexity
catastrophe, helps explain why large organizations often nd it harder than
small ones to adapt.10
The idea is simple. In any network with more than one connection per
node, as the number of nodes grows, the number of connections or interde-
pendencies grows even faster. (A three-node network where everything is
connected to everything else has three connections, for instance, but a four-
node network has six.) The more interdependencies, the more potential for
conicts that constrain the range of solutions. Getting three friends to agree
on where to meet for dinner might be easy, for example, but getting six
friends to agree is much more difcult because one, say, likes meat, another
is a vegetarian, yet another has to stay near home, and so on. Conicting
constraints make change difcult because a positive change in one part of
the network can ripple through and have a negative impact somewhere
else. Highly interdependent systems, such as large software programs, jet
engine designs, and international trade agreements, can sometimes
become so complex that they go into gridlock and change becomes impossible.
That is a complexity catastrophe.
An example of a complexity catastrophe in the business world was Dell’s
assault on the PC industry in the 1980s and ’90s. In 1984 a 19-year-old
Michael Dell, using $1,000 raised by selling his stamp collection, started
a company that 13 years later eclipsed IBM, Compaq, HP, Fujitsu, and
other corporate giants to become the world’s leading seller of PCs. A
natural question is, if Dell’s low-
cost, customer-friendly business
model was so successful, why didn’t
any of these larger, better-resourced
competitors imitate it? Companies
can often succeed in changing
one dimension of their business model, but simultaneously changing multiple
dimensions inevitably leads to conicting constraints. In order for the
incumbents to move to a direct sales model for consumers they would have
had to manage conicts with their existing retail channels, for example, as
well as simultaneously change their manufacturing and logistics systems and
brand positioning. As a start-up, Dell had more degrees of freedom than
the established players, making it easier for it to create a new business model
than for the incumbents to adapt theirs.
Highly interdependent systems can
sometimes become so complicated
that they go into gridlock
and change becomes impossible
10 Stuart Kau ffman, At Home in the Unive rse: The Search for the L aws of Self-O rganization and Compl exit y,
New York: Oxford University Pres s, 1995.
The adaptable corporation 83
As an organization’s size and complexity grow, its degrees of freedom
drop. Yet size and complexity are just what execution demands. Scott Page,
of the University of Michigan, has studied why some organizations
are complex and hierarchical while others are simple and at. He concludes
that organizations evolve in response to the problems they have to solve.
Complex problems that must be divided into lots of chunks and then carefully
sequenced and coordinated require deep hierarchical organizations
with many managers and trafc cops. Simpler tasks can be solved by simpler,
atter organizations.11 The execution tasks of most large companies tend
to be quite complicated, whether the challenge is getting oil from remote
parts of the world into the cars of millions of consumers or coordinating
risks in a global bank. This complexity of execution inevitably leads to
interdependencies and organizational complexity, which in turn create
the potential for gridlock: a complexity catastrophe.
Resources: The path to dependence
In 1959, long before the idea of a tension between exploration and exploi-
tation became popular in management circles, Edith Penrose, an economist
at the London School of Economics, published a slim but inuential
volume: The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.12 Penrose viewed this growth
as a process of search and exploration. Management teams seek out
new opportunities in the environment and then use corporate resources to
exploit them.
By resources, Penrose primarily meant physical assets and talent, but
modern theorists have extended her denition to include less tangible but
equally important resources, such as knowledge, brands, reputations,
and relationships. In short, resources are whatever management uses to
exploit opportunities.
This theory has two implications. First, the particular opportunities that
management wants to exploit determine a company’s resources. A team
that sees opportunities in nanotechnology, for example, will nd the relevant
researchers and machines and then attempt to build a brand and a repu-
tation for expertise in that eld.
The ip side is that a company’s resources dene and limit its ability to
explore. Say that a management team is running a sh-processing plant and
the CEO wakes up one day enamored of nanotechnology. The opportunity
may exist, but the company’s resources (canning machines, its workers’ skill
at lleting sh, and a brand such as Taste o’ the Sea) conne its real
opportunities to sh processing.
11 Scott E. Page, “Two measures of dif culty,” Econo mic The ory, 1996, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp. 321–46.
12 Edith Penrose, The T heor y of the Gro wth of the Firm, revis ed edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
The McKinsey Quarterly 2006 Number 2
84
According to Penrose, management’s job is to search for protable business
plans. Naturally, the search is limited to plans the managers believe they
can execute. The organization’s resources determine what those plans will
be. But in executing a plan, management changes a company’s conguration
of resources. As the company hires people, invests in assets, and so on
to execute its current plan, those actions dene its future opportunities. A
coevolutionary loop thus links the resources a company employs to execute
today with the business plans of tomorrow.
Another important barrier to innovation is the coevolution of plans and
resources, which creates what researchers call “path dependence” in the
structure of organizations. In other words, history matters because decisions
that helped companies execute in the past constrain their ability to adapt in
the future. A company therefore might be stuck with the wrong resources to
go in a given direction because reconguring them would take too much
time and money.
Creating an adaptive social architecture
Thus three critical and widespread barriers to adaptability are a lack of
exibility in individual mental models, complexity catastrophes, and path
dependence in resources. Overcoming these barriers isn’t easy—if it were,
far more than 0.5 percent of all companies would perform well over many
decades. But by understanding the nature of the barriers, we can begin
to address them.
Companies have two ways of overcoming these barriers. One is what Jack
Welch called the “hardware” of an organization (its structure and processes),
the other the “software” (norms and culture). The two sides must be con-
sistent and mutually reinforcing to create a coherent social architecture.
Organizational hardware
The hardware xes for the adaptability problem, though challenging, are in
many ways the easier ones. Companies can use three key approaches:
• Reduce hierarchy.
• Increase autonomy.
• Encourage diversity.
Reducing the level of hierarchy can help to prevent a small number of
mental models from dominating the organization, while increasing the level
of autonomy helps to reduce interdependencies and to lower the risk
of complexity catastrophes. Encouraging a diversity of mental models,
resources, and business plans increases the odds that if the environment
shifts, a company will have, somewhere inside it, the ability to respond.
The adaptable corporation 85
Achieving this kind of shift requires changes
not only in the organizational chart but
also in important processes. Human resources
(HR), for example, must support diverse
mental models through hiring, training, and
career paths. Likewise, strategic planning
must support experimentation, and budgeting
must promote appropriate trade-offs between
efciency and exibility.13
In the 1990s, many organizations went down this path, chopping out layers
of hierarchy and giving business units more autonomy. For some companies,
these moves brought greater adaptability, but for many they created execu-
tion and control problems that forced the corporate center to reassert itself
and often negated gains in adaptability. Why? Because hardware is only
half of the story; an adaptable social architecture also requires critical changes
to organizational software.
Organizational software
Flatness, autonomy, and diversity are diametrically opposed to the control,
coordination, and consistency that successful execution requires. But the
software of norms and culture can help organizations have their adaptive
cake and execute it too.
An organization’s norms are “should” or “ought” statements about what
it regards as the right, appropriate, or expected thing to do in a given
situation. Taken together, norms create an organizational culture. Just as
Tolstoy famously said, “All happy families resemble one another, but
each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,” the norms of companies
that are both high performing and adaptive have a family resemblance.
These norms fall into three categories:
• Cooperating norms. One of the key roles of a hierarchy is to enforce
cooperation among individuals—in particular, to ensure that people
coordinate tasks and share information. Norms that encourage trust,
reciprocity, and shared purpose can achieve the same effect, but in a
more exible way.
• Performing norms. One of the arguments against increased autonomy
is the diminution of senior management’s centralized control over
13 Eric D. Beinhocker, “On t he origin of strategies ,” The McKinse y Quarterly, 200 0 strategy anthology:
On st rategy, pp. 167–76 (w ww.mckinseyquarterly.com/ links /21101); and Er ic D. B ein hocker and Sarah
Kaplan, “Tired of strategic plann ing?” The McKinse y Quar terly, 20 02 specia l edition: R isk and resilience,
pp. 48–57 (ww w.mckinseyqua rterly.com /l inks /21102).
The McKinsey Quarterly 2006 Number 2
86
performance. Companies can counter this problem by instilling norms
that create strong expectations for individual performance, so that
employees will go the extra mile, take the initiative, be honest and
transparent, and believe that success will be rewarded.
• Innovating norms. Structures and processes that support experimentation
and diversity must have norms to back them up. Vital innovating norms
include the belief that facts matter more than hierarchy, that good ideas
can come from anywhere, and (to borrow a phrase from Jim Collins
and Jerry Porras) that “good enough never is.”
Explore & Exploit Incorporated
An example will help to illustrate how the hardware and software sides of a
business can work together to overcome the barriers to adaptability. Imagine
a company called Explore & Exploit (E&E) Incorporated, which has a at
organizational structure of highly autonomous business units and minimal
hierarchy within them. In addition, the organization has an innovating
norm—“speak truth to power”—that encourages younger, more junior people
to challenge senior colleagues by pointing to facts. This combination
of structure and norms counters mental-model lock-in. In addition, E&E’s
HR policies encourage practices such as hiring people from a variety of
backgrounds and rotating employees through businesses and experiences,
thereby creating a natural diversity of mental models.
The autonomy of the units means that the organization has relatively few
interdependencies. Changes and innovative ideas don’t require approval
from many parts of the organization, so there is less potential for complexity
catastrophes. At other companies, the result might be efs and a lack
of cooperation, but at E&E a deeply embedded “one-company” norm and
a shared sense of purpose counteract this tendency. Furthermore, high
expectations for individual performance, a competitive spirit among units,
and a culture of accountability (backed by appropriate HR and budgeting
systems) enable senior executives to manage near-term performance without
centralizing control.
Finally, E&E’s strategy process encourages the creation of “portfolios of
initiatives”: experiments in medium- and long-term growth opportunities.14
The processes that support experimentation are backed by an innovating
norm to “fail small and succeed big.” One important benet is that not all of
E&E’s resources address the near-term demands of the business; the company
can array a diverse base of talent, assets, partnerships, and other resources to
14
Lowell L . Brya n, “Just-in-ti me strategy for a t urbulent world,” The McKinsey Quart erly, 2002 special edition:
Risk and resilience, pp. 16–27 (ww w.mckinseyquar terly.com /li nks/21111).
The adaptable corporation 87
exploit growth opportunities and hedge against shifts in the environment.
E&E manages the cost implications of this approach by requiring its units
not only to maintain vibrant portfolios of initiatives but also to be cost
competitive with their industry peers. This pressure drives innovation in
near-term execution as well as long-term adaptation.
Of course, E&E’s management still faces difcult trade-offs between the
near-term benets of scale, greater coordination, and more centralized
control, on the one hand, and the long-term risks of mental-model lock-in,
complexity catastrophes, and resource stagnation, on the other. The
company’s intense performance culture tends to drive the organization to
execute well in the near term, so senior managers see their job as tilting
the bias back toward long-term adaptability, without sacricing performance.
They also realize that the deeply embedded cultural norms of E&E explain
its ability to perform this double act—if the norms were just slogans on the
wall, both adaptability and execution would suffer. The CEO and top
team thus invest substantial time in propagating and reinforcing the norms.
Executing and adapting appear to be irreconcilable opposites, and the
empirical data suggest that most companies are destined to favor the former
over the latter. But understanding the sources of this schism can help us
to see the outlines of a potential solution. By creating a social architecture
that marries a exible structure to a cooperative, performance-driven,
and innovative culture, companies can begin to overcome the problems that
keep organizations from adapting to an ever-changing environment. Q
Eric Beinhocker, who is based in London, serves as an adviser to McKinsey.
This article is adapted from his book The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexit y, and the
Radical Remaking of Economics, to be published on June 1, 2006, by
Harvard Business School Press (North A merica) and Random House (the United Kingdom and
the Commonwealth). Copyright © 2006 McKinsey & Company.
All rights reserved.
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