Islam in Azerbaijan

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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 1
AZERBAIJAN: ISLAM IN A POST-SOVIET REPUBLIC
By Anar Valiyev*
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Communist ideas paved the way for an Islamic
revival in Azerbaijan. Being one of the most secular Muslim republics of the Soviet Union,
Azerbaijan is facing a dilemma concerning how to address contemporary religious issues. A
suppression of religious activities and organizations could lead to internal opposition and
radicalization. In contrast, freedom of religious activities could allow the neighboring state of Iran
to export an Islamist revolution and encourage the development of a radical brand of local
Islamism. The high percentage of poor people, as well as the presence of over 700,000 refugees in
the country, create a dangerous breeding ground for radical organizations to recruit members and
sympathizers for future struggles.
For centuries, religion was an integral and
binding part of public life in Azerbaijan.
Since antiquity, almost all wars, reforms, and
political processes occurred under the banner
of religion. Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and
Islam enriched the history of Azerbaijan and
have had a huge impact on the formation of
the identity of the Azerbaijani nation. Today,
Azerbaijan is experiencing a religious
revival. Ideological disorientation, the search
for national and cultural identity, and the
Karabakh conflict with Armenia are three
major factors which define the place of Islam
in modern Azerbaijan.
About 93.4 percent of Azerbaijan’s
populations are Muslim, 2.5 percent are
Russian Orthodox, 2.3 percent are Armenian
Orthodox, and 1.8 percent are classified as
“other.”1 Due to the outflow of Russians, the
number of adherents to Christianity in
Azerbaijan is steadily decreasing.
Meanwhile, Islam is experiencing a
renaissance. Over the past few years,
hundreds of new mosques were built; former
places of worship were restored; dozens of
religious organizations were registered; new
religious schools (madrasas) opened; and
many young Azerbaijanis are attending
Muslim religious universities in Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.
Islam permeates Azerbaijani social life. It
is now common to encounter young people
observing the Muslim traditions or young
women dressing in accordance to Islamic
traditions. Religion is also actively used by
political leaders as a means of pursuing their
interests. After the fall of the Communist
regime, political leaders began to observe
Muslim traditions. Heydar Aliyev, then
president of Azerbaijan and a former KGB
general, was the first Azerbaijani political
leader to visit Mecca in 1994. However, more
than anything else, this simply demonstrates
how Islam is being manipulated by relatively
secular politicians.
During the seventy years under
Communist rule, the people were prevented
from practicing Islamic traditions. However,

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2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005)
during the USSR’s perestroika era,
Azerbaijanis identified themselves more with
the Islamic than the Turkic world. For
example, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini was a popular symbolic alternative
to the Soviet system. His picture was often
displayed in people’s homes, despite the fact
that these individuals were unfamiliar with
his ideology and did not sympathize with his
worldview.2
Indeed, this apparent religious revival
remained rather superficial. Polls conducted
in 2000 showed that believers constituted
63.4 percent of all respondents, though only
6.7 percent considered themselves “firm
believers.” In contrast, 10.4 percent
pronounced themselves agnostic and 7.1
percent as non-be lievers. An additional 8.6
percent said they were indifferent. Just 3.8
percent of the respondents categorized
themselves as “firm atheists.” However,
when asked about their observance of the
religious commandments, only 17.7 percent
of the “believers” indicated observance of
one of the main pillars of Islam: namaz
(prayer). Thus, 82.3 percent of the
“believers” do not abide by this injunction.3
Despite its usefulness for the country’s
leaders, the revival of Islam in Azerbaijan
was nonetheless dangerous for the incumbent
rulers. One factor involved was the material
deprivation of the population, making them
inclined to seek a drastic alternative to the
status quo. According to the UN Human
Development Report, 49.6 percent of the
population lives below the poverty level.4
Although the Azerbaijani government
decreased the poverty level from 61 percent
in 1995 to 49.6 percent in 2001, the life of
almost half of the population remains in
desolate conditions. 5 Seventeen percent of
the total population, or 1.3 million, lived in
extreme poverty, with monthly consumption
below 72,000 Azeri manat (US $15) per
capita per month.6
The picture is exacerbated by high
numbers of refugees and internally displaced
persons. The occupation of about 20 percent
of Azerbaijan’s territories by Armenian
forces has resulted in the mass movement of
people seeking refuge. By the end of 2002,
there were 783,200 refugees and internally
displaced persons in Azerbaijan, accounting
for approximately one-seventh of the
country’s total population.7 The Iranian
Hizballah and Saudi missionary organizations
are very active in refugee camps, attempting
to recruit and to establish future terrorist
cells.
Another potential problem is the division
of the population between Shi’a and Sunni
Muslims. Due to a lack of statistics, at
present it can only be assumed that out of
more than 7.6 million Azerbaijanis of Muslim
background, a majority of between 65 to 75
percent are connected to Shi’i traditions; the
rest consider themselves Sunni. It is
important to note that although for the most
part, religious knowledge is very poor, the
inhabitants of the different regions of the
country have preserved aspects of their Shi’a
or Sunni heritage. Until 1992, the division of
Azerbaijanis between Shi’a or Sunni Islam
was nominal. It was even possible to be a
member of the Communist Party and be
atheist, but to preserve Shi’a or Sunni cultural
traditions. In Azerbaijan, Islam, whether
Shi’a or Sunni, was considered a culture
rather than a religion.8 Traditionally, Sunni
Muslims populate the northern and western
part of Azerbaijan, while other sections,
including the capital Baku and its suburbs,
are home to Shi’a Muslims.
A new element in the picture is the Salafi
radical Islamists who are actively seeking to
establish their influence. They have had some

Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 3
success, especially among ethnic minorities
such as the Avars and Lezgins of northern
Azerbaijan. The anti-Shi’a feelings of many
Sunni Salafi Islamists could raise the
possibility of clashes between the two Islamic
streams.
How Islam will develop in Azerbaijan and
its influences on society and politics is one of
the most important issues the country faces.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
More than 2,100 years ago, Azerbaijan
became the center of Zoroastrianism, whose
founder was, according to legend, born in
South Azerbaijan (today northern Iran). Until
the seventh century, the religion dominated
Azerbaijan and played an important role in
shaping the worldview and traditions of the
Azeri people. The main holiday of Azerbaijan
remains Novruz Bayram, which announces
the start of spring and now coincides with the
Islamic New Year. Zoroastrian traditions can
still be found in the country’s legends,
fairytales, and music.9
In the fourth century, Christianity arrived,
though some churches date back to an even
earlier time.10 In the seventh century, a
Muslim Arab army defeated Persia and
conquered South Azerbaijan, which was part
of the Persian Sasanid Empire at the time.
While Islam treated Christians and Jews with
tolerance, it persecuted Zoroastrians as
pagans to the point that the religion soon
disappeared from Azerbaijan.
After the death of Muhammad, the
political struggle in the Arab Califate was
reflected in Azerbaijan as well, with the
division of Islam into Shi’a and Sunni
streams. Iranians, in part due to a sense of
having a separate history and identity from
the Arabs, chose to become Shi’a. Most
Azerbaijanis, feeling closer to the Persians
than to the Arabs, followed the same course.
When the Safavid Empire was established in
the sixteenth century, its founder, Ismail I,
declared Shi’ism the official religion and
expelled Sunni clerics. There were also
political considerations behind these actions.
The Azerbaijani state was the rival of the
Ottoman Empire, where Sunni Islam was the
official religion. In retrospect, Ismail’s
decision also helped preserve an Azeri
identity separate from that of other Turks and
the Ottomans.11
The Russian conquest of Azerbaijan
during the first quarter of nineteenth century
changed the situation. The Russian
authorities were inclined to eliminate Muslim
influence from the Caucasus to make this
region Christian, and thus pro-Russian.12
During the first ten years of Russian rule,
100,000 Azeris were expelled from Erivan,
Nakhichevan, Karabakh, and Lori to the
neighboring countries and were replaced by
Armenians and Russian colonists.
However, the vast and long-term nature of
this project led to a change in Russian policy.
The new policy aimed to establish Muslim
provinces that would be loyal to the Russian
empire and would be governed by Russian
officials. In 1823, the position of Shaykh al-
Islam was established in Tiflis, and Akhund
(Minister) Muhammad Ali Huseynzadeh was
appointed to this position. In 1872, the
Russians created a Shi’a and Sunni spiritual
department, which made the religious leaders
servants of the government. The creation of
two spiritual departments, headed by Mufti
for Sunni and Shaykh al-Islam for Shi’a,
pursued the aim of strengthening state control
over mosques and fueling Sunni-Shi’a
differences. By the end of the Czarist Empire,
there were 23 Shi’a and 16 Sunni judges in
Azerbaijan.13
Historically, the proportion of Sunni
Muslims in Russian-occupied Azerbaijan was

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much higher than among the Azeris of Iran.
Russian statistics from the 1830s show that
the ratio of Shi’a to Sunni was almost even,
with the latter having a small edge.14 The
proportion of Sunni, however, declined
remarkably. By 1860, figures indicate that
Shi’a Twelvers of the Jafari rite held a clear
majority of 2:1. The decrease in the
proportionate strength of the Sunni element
was the result of their immigration to
Turkey15. The main reason for immigration
was the hidden pressure of the Czarist regime
on the Sunni. Due to the long-term resistance
of Imam Shamil in Northern Caucasus, the
Czarist administration feared a Sunni uprising
in Azerbaijan.
The Russian revolution and the
establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic (ADR) shook the dominant
positions of Islam. During the transition era
from 1918 to 1920, the founding fathers of
the ADR tried to build a modern state geared
toward the Western world. The establishment
of Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan led to
waves of terror in which 48,000 people died.
At first, though, the Bolsheviks considered
Islam as an ally in the struggle against
imperialistic states and even argued that
Islam’s view of politics and society did not
contradict Marxism. While the Russian
Orthodox Church in Russia was totally
destroyed, Islamic institutions in Azerbaijan
cooperated with authorities and were
integrated into the state.16
The Bolshevik policy toward Islam
suddenly changed in 1927. All Shari’a and
adat (traditional) courts, which dealt with
domestic and religious matters, were
liquidated. Mustafa Guliyev, the people’s
commissar for education of Soviet
Azerbaijan, organized the shutting down of
the mosques. He stated that in 1929 there
were 960 Shi’a and 400 Sunni mosques in the
country, but by 1933, only 17--eleven Shi’a,
two Sunni, and four mixed (where Shi’a and
Sunni Muslims prayed together)--had
survived.
During World War II, as the Soviets were
attempting to mobilize support among Turkic
people--some of whom were rebelling against
Soviet rule--this policy of religious
persecution was changed slightly. On April
14, 1944, the Spiritual Department of
Muslims of the Transcaucasus was restored
and headed by a Shi’a with a Sunni-deputy.
The authorities began re-opening mosques all
over the country.17
Out of 100 Muslim religious leaders, only
sixteen had received theological training at
the Islamic University of Tashkent or the Mir
Arab madrasa in Bukhara.18 Allahshukur
Pashazadeh, the future Shaykh al-Islam of the
Caucasian Muslims, was among them.
Whereas in 1976 there were only sixteen
registered mosques and one madrasa in
Azerbaijan, by the end of the Soviet period,
there were 200 mosques,, including
unregistered places of worship.19
Still, the manifestation of Islamic identity-
the profession of faith, pilgrimage to Mecca,
the month of the Ramadan fast, almsgiving,
and the five daily prayers--remained largely
non-existent.20 As an ideology, Islam has
been put on the margin of survival during the
seventy years of Soviet totalitarianism and
atheistic propaganda. The majority of the
clergy was arrested, killed, or isolated from
the community. At best, they were turned into
agents of the Soviet system. This docile
clergy created a negative attitude towards
spiritual leaders, which is still present today.
There were, however, those who continued to
act as independent representatives of Islam in
Azerbaijan and maintained the continuity of
piety and tradition. These included those of

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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 5
seyid (saintly) descent who maintained holy
places (pirs).
ISLAM IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA
At the dawn of the democratic movement
in Azerbaijan (1988-1991), the clergy joined
the struggle for national independence. Yet,
while secular nationalists and pious Muslims
cooperated, the political parties were
concerned with maintaining Islam as a
strictly ethical and religious element in social
life, one that would not seep into the political
arena.
During the rule of the national democrats
(1992-1993), the Law on Freedom of
Worship was adopted. All property taken by
the Soviets from mosques and religious
communities was to be returned. The
Spiritual Department of Transcaucasus
Muslims was separated from the state, and
state grants to the department and religious
communities were stopped. For the first time
in 200 years, the religious figures ceased to
receive state salaries and resorted to
collecting donations from the public.21
Though the post-Soviet government feared
the growth of an Islamist movement, it
granted full freedom of worship in order to
maintain believers’ support for state building.
Heydar Aliyev’s government, which came
to power in a 1993 coup, used official
religious figures extensively to legitimize its
rule. The clergy generally cooperated with
this program, in part because they supported
Azerbaijani nationalism over political
Islamism. The president of the secular state
swears fidelity to the constitution and to the
Koran; in exchange, the Spiritual Department
gives its a stamp of approval and creates
propaganda so that government actions are
viewed as conforming to Islamic norms. The
head of state occasionally visits a mosque,
some of which display his picture, and a
considerable number of the places allocated
by Muslim states for Azerbaijani pilgrims are
given to representatives of the government.
The Law on Freedom of Worship itself
underwent changes in the Aliyev years.
Having encoutered a number of unexpected
problems, such as Christian missionary
activity and Salafi and Iranian propaganda,
amendments were introduced to limit
missionary activity and to subordinate the
independent religious communities to semi-
state control. The religious department was
also restored to a cabinet level ministry.
Consequently, Islam during Aliyev’s
government appeared integrated in and
subordinate to the state system. Thus, the
religious revival did not generally appear to
conflict with the hegemony of nationalism
and the stability of the regime. New Islamic
educational institutions opened, mosques
were built, and pilgrimage to Mecca and
Medina became possible. Aliyev became the
first Azerbaijani leader in modern times to go
on Hajj, visited mosques on holidays, and
encouraged numerous Islamic conferences.22
This process continued throughout the
1990s. However, while encouraging official
spiritual leaders and activities, the state--and
its supporting clerics--opposed independent
preaching. Shaykh Hajji Allahshukur
Pashazade, head of the Clerical Management
Institution, rejected “self-appointed mullahs”
who were uneducated and not connected to
his organization.
Yet despite the revival of Islamic
traditions in Azerbaijan, public knowledge of
Islam still is at a low level. Fortunetellers
insist that they are foretelling the future by
using the Koran. Many Shi’a claim that the
flagellation ritual on the tenth day of
Muha rram is the most important ceremony
under Muslim law, even though they do not
pray or know any of the basic principles of

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6 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005)
Islam. The most widely celebrated religious
holiday remains the non-Muslim Novruz
Bayram.
Even such a basic ritual as the funeral
service--the ceremony most often connected
with Islam in Azerbaijan--is sometimes
carried out with errors contradicting Islam.
Existing practices or the ignorance of mullahs
are simply too deeply entrenched. No one
would think, for example, of reciting a sura
(line) from the Koran at a wedding. Such an
individual would simply be thrown out of the
wedding having created a funereal
atmosphere or, even worse, might be branded
as a Salafi or Wahhabi adherent. Of course,
Wahhabi Islam is unlikely to have any
success among the predominantly Shi’a
Azerbaijanis.
While most Azerbaijanis consider Islam a
part of their national identity, any mixing of
religion with the political sphere is rejected
by the vast majority of the population.
Critical to understanding this issue is that the
Azerbaijani view of Islam is one of a
common national characteristic, inseparable
from its Turkic ethnic identity, which no
single group can try to monopolize for its
own rhetoric. As such, it lends little appeal as
a driving or dividing force in the political
arena.23
One startling point about the shallowness
of the Islamic revival in Azerbaijan is that it
is probably the only country in the Muslim
world where the quota allocated by the
government of the Saudi Arabia for a Hajj
pilgrimage remains unclaimed. Vacant places
are resold to pilgrims from the Chechen
Republic and Dagestan. In 1998, the king of
Saudi Arabia offered to cover the expenses of
200 Azerbaijani pilgrims. However, there
were some ardent atheists among those who
accepted and went, and these individuals
continued to spread anti-Islamic views after
their return.24
Another indicator of the unique
Azerbaijani view of Islam concerns women’s
rights. Nayereh Tohidi, a researcher from
California State University, describes the
attitude of the average Azeri woman towards
veiling. “In June 1992, when a delegation of
22 Islamist women headed by Zehra
Mostafavi, daughter of Khomeini, visited
Baku, Azerbaijan, wrapped in heavy chadors
in the heat of summer, they were met with
stares and disdainful reactions everywhere
they went. On one occasion, a middle-aged
Azeri woman asked, ‘Do not you feel hot
under this heavy black garment in this hot
summer?’ ‘But the fire in hell is much hotter
if one fails to follow Allah’s orders,’” one of
the Iranians replied. Baffled by her response
the Azeri woman mumbled, “What a cruel
God you have! The Allah that I know is much
kinder to women.” 25
However, the points noted above do not
necessarily indicate that the situation will
forever remain as it is. Some other countries
with a relatively high level of secularism or
moderate interpretation of Islam have seen a
large portion of their people turn in a militant
direction. In the so-called “Islamist belt” of
the country’s southern districts, Iranian
preachers have been active. In villages near
Baku one can see portraits of Khomeini and
Islamic quotes in the windows of houses and
on walls. The rallies staged by the Union of
Azerbaijani Forces in 2002 became one of the
biggest protest actions by the opposition, with
many Islamists carrying green banners of
Islam and shouting “Allahu Akbar”
participating. A couple of years ago, few
could take the threat of fundamentalism in
Azerbaijan seriously. However, the threat of
Islamic fundamentalism now seems
imminent.

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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 7
ISLAMIST RADICAL RGANIZATIONS
AND PARTIES IN AZERBAIJAN
Due to its strategic geographical position
and relative religious vacuum, Azerbaijan has
attracted the attention of many religious as
well as radical organizations. Weak law-
enforcement agencies, a corrupt
governmental system, a high percentage of
refugees, and wide-spread poverty have
brought Islamist radical groups to view
Azerbaijan as possessing great potential for a
takeover. These radical religious groups have
come from three directions:
--The first and strongest “export base” is
Iran. Through its affiliated organizations such
as Hizballah, the Imam Khomeini Fund, and
others, Iran could spread its influence over
large parts of Azerbaijan’s territory.
--The second, and less influential, group
are Turkish non-traditional religious
organizations, such as the Nurchular or
Fattulachilar.
--Last, but not least, are the Wahhabi or
Salafi movements. The adherents of the
Salafi Islamists in Azerbaijan are growing
faster than any other stream of Islam.
The Islamist Party of Azerbaijan (IPA)
The highest-profile organization in this
category is the Islamist Party of Azerbaijan
(IPA), which has been very much influenced
by Iran. Iranian religious missionaries ha ve
been energetic in southern Azerbaijan, as
well as in villages around Baku, where the
population is predominantly Shi’a Muslim.
The IPA was established in November 1991
in the village of Nardaran near Baku. The
party was officially registered in 1992. Its
leader, Al Akram Hajji, is a trained
philologist who, apparently unqualified in his
profession, long worked loading trucks and as
a food shop clerk.26
With a leadership of only semi-literate
mullahs boasting no more than a secondary
school education, the IPA could not involve
members of the educated elite in its ranks. It
appealed mainly to rural populations. The
party’s basic ideology is the belief that only
Islam can structure an independent
Azerbaijan. According to Hajji, the republic
will not be able to extricate itself from crisis
until its leaders have accepted Islamic values
and concepts of state building.
The IPA preaches an anti-Turkic, anti-
Semitic, and anti-American doctrine threaded
with conspiracy theories. Considering any
form of nationalism as Shirk (i.e.,
worshipping anything other than Allah,
breaking strict Muslim monotheism), it
rejects loyalty to a larger Turkic community
as anti-Islamic. The main task of Muslim
society, according to the party, is to block the
spread of American civilization. But the true
principal enemy of the Muslim world is a
Masonic conspiracy directed by Israel. In a
bizarre rapprochement with Russian neo-
fascist ideology, the IPA advocates an
alliance between Islamists and the Russian
Orthodox Church to destroy the “enemies of
humanity” at their Tel Aviv headquarters.27
Such ideas, propagated in the party’s
organs Islam Dunyasi (Islamic World) and
Islamyn Sesi (Voice of Islam), were not well
received elsewhere in Azerbaijan since they
conflicted with the country’s generally held
beliefs. The main influences on the IPA’s
ideology are in fact external--late Soviet and
Iranian ideas. Furthermore, there exists what
might be called a crackpot tone to the IPA’s
propaganda that does not play well in
Azerbaijan. It asserts, for instance, that
organizations like the UN, UNESCO, and
OSCE are being manipulated by Masons and
Zionists to make Azerbaijan an American
vassal.28 This rhetoric stirs up antagonism

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8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005)
within nationalist groups, because it echoes
Iranian attacks on Azerbaijan for cooperating
with the United States and Israel. Finally, in
1995, the party’s top leadership was accused
of a coup attempt and imprisoned.
Hizballah
As early as 1993, the Iranian group
Hizballah began working in Azerbaijani
refugee camps. By early 1997, newspapers
reported that hundreds of young Azerbaijanis
had been trained in Iranian Hizballah camps.
After their graduation, they were sent back
home to proliferate Hizballah’s ideas. It is
very difficult to analyze the activity of
Hizballah in Azerbaijan due to the lack of
reliable information. In February 1997, a
famous Azerbaijani scholar, the academician
Ziya Bunyatov, was assassinated in Baku.
The Ministry of National Security (MNS)
accused Hizballah of the political
assassination. Leaders of Hizballah,
according to MNS, accused Bunyatov of
being an agent of the Israeli Mossad and of
disseminating Zionism in Azerbaijan. Five
people were arrested and sentenced to long
terms. However, the head of the organization,
Tariel Ramazanov, successfully escaped to
Iran.
The death of this scholar became a signal
for a full-scale attack against all Iranian-
affiliated organizations. In the fall of 2001,
the MNA arrested six citizens in possession
of documents proving their connection with
Hizballah. Additionally, a network consisting
of thirty people was revealed. During the
interrogations, members of Hizballah openly
rejected the secular regime of Azerbaijan.
The Committee Imdad Khomeini
Ever since December 1993, Iranian
organizations have targeted Azerbaijani
displaced persons for extensive propaganda,
the Imdad Khomeini committee being one of
the main such groups. By 2001, the
committee had 415 offices across Azerbaijan.
The committee distributed humanitarian aid
for free and built new houses and
infrastructure while also illegally smuggling
radical religious literature from Iran into
Azerbaijan.
The Salafi Islamists
Numerous articles and news reports have
been published concerning Salafi Islamist
activity in Azerbaijan. However, most tend to
be antagonistic and superficial. Journalists,
the government, and the official Shi’a clergy
have all helped create a negative public
opinion of Salafi Islamists, tending to present
them as either terrorists, heretics, or both.
Many Azeris often refer to Salafi Islamists in
a derogatory manner and dismiss them as
“Wahhabis,” sakkalilar (bearded people), or
garasakkalilar (black-bearded people).
Despite this campaign, the number and
influence of Salafi Islamists in Azerbaijan is
steadily gr owing. Salafi ideas are becoming
increasingly popular among the younger
generation. In Baku alone, which is the ultra-
secular capital of Azerbaijan, the number of
Salafi Islamists has reportedly reached
15,000.29
The first Salafi missionaries arrived in
Azerbaijan from the Northern Caucasus in
the mid-1990s. The majority of them came
from Chechnya and Dagestan, where the
Salafi Islamists had some influence primarily
due to the Russian-Chechen wars. For a short
while, Salafi Islamists made some inroads in
Chechnya and were even able to create their
own self-ruled area in the Dagestani villages
of Karamaxi and Chobanmakhi. However,
Salafi Islamists did not stop in Chechnya and
Dagestan, and instead, extended their
activities into Azerbaijan. Initially, they did

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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 9
not gain wide support among Azeris, as
nationalism and pan-Turkism were much
more popular than Islam. Moreover, in the
immediate aftermath of the collapse of the
USSR, Azeri society was not as deeply
impoverished and divided as it is today. In
addition, 65 to 70 percent of Azeris are
adherents of Shi’a Islam, and hence have
little regard for Salafi ideas. The Shi’a
Muslims of Azerbaijan–for both historical
and cultural reasons–are heavily influenced
by Iran, a country whose government is
widely regarded as the archrival of the Salafi
Islamists. Given Azerbaijan’s Shi’a
complexion, the religious Sunni of rural
northern Azerbaijan form the primary
constituency of Salafism in the country.
The second wave of Salafi expansion
started with the beginning of the Second
Russo-Chechen War in 1999. The Russian
military command tried to push Chechen
rebels–particularly those of Salafi
orientation–out of the Northern Caucasus into
the neighboring states of Georgia and
Azerbaijan. Thus, some of the 8,000 Chechen
refugees who arrived in Azerbaijan in 1999-
2000 were persecuted Chechen Salafi
Islamists.30 Meanwhile, missionaries from the
Persian Gulf countries dramatically increased
their activities in Azerbaijan.
By 2003, 65 new Salafi-controlled
mosques had been established in Azerbaijan.
One of the largest Salafi mosques in the
country is the Abu Bakr mosque. Built in
1997 in Baku by the Azeri branch of the
Kuwaiti society Revival of Islamic Heritage,
Abu Bakr became one of the most successful
mosques in Azerbaijan. While the Shi’a or
Sunni mosques are usually able to attract
approximately 300 people for Friday prayers,
the number of people visiting the Abu Bakr
mosque typically reaches 5,000 to 7,000
people.31 The imam of the Abu Bakr mosque
is Gammet Suleyma nov, a graduate of the
World Islamic University of Medina, a
leading center for the study and export of
Salafism.
There are essentially three factors driving
the expansion of Salafism in Azerbaijan.
First, the overwhelming majority of
indigenous Salafi Islamists are Sunni
Muslims from ethnic minorities. This
constituency sees Salafism as a counter-
balance to the growing Iranian influence in
Azerbaijan.
Second, the rapid polarization and
impoverishment of Azeri society has led to a
pervasive disillusionment with traditional
institutions and modern Western democratic
ideas. Salafi Islamists have cleverly tapped
into this pool of profound discontent,
frequently criticizing the corruption of the
government, the decline of morality and
traditions, as well as the rise of criminality in
the country.
Thirdly, Salafi Islamists tout the
universalistic qualities of their ideology, and
the fact that it supposedly transcends all
Islamist sects and traditions. This is
particularly appealing in Azerbaijan where
sectarian rivalry between Shi’a and Sunni has
been on the rise.
The government of Azerbaijan does not
condone Salafism or its adherents. In the
mid-1990s, the Azeri government tolerated
Salafi Islamists, fearing that intolerance
would irritate the rich Persian Gulf states
from whom it sought financial aid. From
2001 to 2003, however, the situation changed
dramatically, as the Azeri government began
to persecute the Salafi Islamists. One of the
main reasons for this policy shift was the
rapidly increasing number of Salafi mosques.
Another reason was the Salafi community’s
preference for electing their imams

Anar Valiyev
10 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005)
themselves rather than allowing the
government to appoint them.
However, arguably, the most important
reason is the Salafi Islamists’ serious
opposition to the current autocratic Azeri
regime. In their preaching, Salafi Islamists
blame the government for a number of
failures, ranging from the defeat in the
Karabakh conflict with Armenia to the moral
decay of society. Alarmingly for the Azeri
establishment, Salafi Islamists do not make a
secret of their aspirations to acquire political
power in Azerbaijan. In 2001, the Court on
Heavy Crimes sentenced twelve Azeris who
aspired to fight in Chechnya. During the trial,
Suleymanov, the imam of the Abu Bakr
mosque (who is often referred to as “emir”
rather than “imam” in order to differentiate
himself from the Shi’a), was summoned to
the court to testify. All the would-be
mujahideen had been frequent visitors of the
Abu Bakr mosque and were recruited there
by Chechen rebels.
Another trial concerning the Pan-Islamist
Hizb-ut Tahrir organization also revealed that
its members had visited the Abu Bakr
mosque. In May 2002, the deputy minister of
national security, Tofiq Babayev, stated that a
number of Arab countries were interested in
spreading radical Wahhabism in Azerbaijan.
According to Babayev, over 300 Azeris had
been trained in Wahhabi centers in Dagestan.
The deputy minister identified three stages in
the effort to make Wahhabism a grassroots
movement in Azerbaijan. First, there is the
spread of Wahhabi literature and the
provision of financial assistance to potential
activists. The second stage involves the
efficient training of the activists, and the final
stage deals with the mobilization of active
members for acts of terrorism designed to
destabilize the state.32
By the end of 2001, Azeri authorities
launched an unofficial campaign against the
Salafi Islamists. Taking into consideration
that large groups of Salafi Islamists are
Chechens, the authorities attempted to create
unfavorable conditions for Chechen refugees.
As a result, Aslan Maskhadov, the leader of
the Chechen resistance, advised Chechens to
leave Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, the
authorities started a ruthless campaign against
Azeri Salafi Islamists. For a short while,
many mosques were shut down and regional
police forces were instructed to crush Salafi
cells by any means necessary.
Turkish Direction
The Turkish Islamist organization called
Nurcular has expanded its network in
Azerbaijan as well. This organization has
founded several secondary schools in
Azerbaijan and has links with some Turkish
politicians and companies. The Turkish mass
media reported that the Turkish Education
Ministry is conducting an investigation,
which could result in the closure of many
educational institutions both in Turkey and
Azerbaijan, because they were set up by
followers of last century’s Islamic scholar
Said Nursi (1876-1960). Nurcular appeared
in Azerbaijan right after the country gained
independence. They began by creating a
television channel, but lacking a large
audience, soon turned their priority to
schools. This group, however, is not seen as a
subversive threat.
THE PROSPECTS
As in many other countries, which have
adopted the religion, Islam in Azerbaijan has
always been unique because of the influence
of the particular local history and conditions.
For Azeris, the pirs (the tombs of “saints” or
people with extraordinary abilities) became

Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 11
places of prayer and worship rather than
mosques. For the majority of the population,
Islam was considered a tradition rather than a
religion. That is why for many Azerbaijanis it
seems to be blasphemy or a form of
intimidation to return to what foreign
Islamists consider to be “pure Islam.” It can
well be said that in Azerbaijan, Islam does
not act as an independent force in society or
politics. It is respected, it is used, but it is not
obeyed.33 Most likely, the secular tendencies
of materialism and popular culture will
prevail.
However, things could change. Elements
of today’s religious situation in Azerbaijan
are similar to those of Iran in the early 1970s:
disenchantment with a debauched and
corrupted government, concern over a grave
economic situation, anger over repression,
and disappointment with democracy. If this
situation continues, it is clear that religious
organizations with ample foreign financing
will recruit more followers. After all, even
during the Iranian revolution a large portion
of the population did not want Islamism but
simply united behind an Islamist leadership
to overthrow an unpopular government.
As the leader of the opposition Popular
Front Party, Ali Karimli, stated in February
2005, due to the restriction of the secular
political opposition, Islamists are getting
stronger. As Karimli put it, “On Fridays more
than three or four thousand people turn up at
services in every mosque in a country where I
cannot gather fifty people together for a
meeting!” In discussing the issues being
exploited by Islamists he cited the Karabakh
conflict, arguing that though Azerbaijani
territory is invaded and there are four UN
resolutions supporting this, “because we are
Muslim, our rights are not respected.” He
also pointed out that the Islamists highlight
the “extreme poverty and the huge inequality
between the average person and the top one
or two percent who own everything;” and
take advantage of the fact that “no one seems
to care” about democracy.34 These signs, in a
country that neighbors Iran, should elicit
concern.
Meanwhile, the proliferation of Salafi
Islamist ideas among religious and ethnic
minorities could create powerful centrifugal
forces that will in due course threaten the
national unity of Azerbaijan. Contrary to their
own propaganda, the Salafi Islamists are
exacerbating sectarian tensions in the
country. They have already destroyed several
Shi’a places of worship, which has created ill
feeling. In the very worst-case scenario,
serious violence directed toward the majority
Shi’a community could provoke some form
of Iranian intervention, not least because the
Iranians are anxious to curtail Salafi
influence in Azerbaijan. But more alarming is
the Salafi Islamists’ skillful exposure and
manipulation of the establishment’s
incompetence, coupled with the increasing
impoverishment of the country, which could
make them a powerful political force in the
mid- term. This will inevitably lead to a harsh
security crackdown, which could, in turn,
provoke serious acts of terrorism in the
country. Aside from destabilizing the
government, the risks to the United States--
which has made considerable diplomatic,
economic and security investments in
Azerbaijan--are self-evident.
*Anar Valiyev is a Ph.D. candidate in Public
Affairs at the University of Louisville in
Kentucky. His areas of interest include urban
terrorism, public policy of post-Soviet
countries, governance, and democracy. The
author would like to thank Diana Schwarz for
her insightful comments.

Anar Valiyev
12 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005)
NOTES
1 CIA, The World Factbook
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factb
ook /geos/aj.html. Religious affiliation is
still nominal in Azerbaijan. In its surveys,
the State Statistical Committee does
inquire about religious affiliation.
2 A. Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste
Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo
Azerbaijana,” Istoriya, Vol. 28 (Winter
1999), p. 11.
http://www.1september.ru/ru/his/99/his28
.htm.
3 Tair Faradov, “Religiosity in Post-
Soviet Azerbaijan: A Sociological
Survey,” ISIM Newsletter (September
2001), p. 28.
http://www.isim.nl/files/newsl_8.pdf.
4 Human Development Report 2004 (New
York, United Nations Development
Program, 2004).
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/.
5 Alec Rasizade, “Azerbaijan in
Transition to the ‘New Age of
Democracy,’” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3
(2003), pp. 342-43.
6 Azerbaijan - Poverty reduction strategy
paper and joint IDA-IMF staff
assessment, Vol. 1, World Bank report,
April 2003, p. 4. Access online at:
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_
Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_2
0030506140627
7 State Statistical Committee of
Azerbaijan Republic.
http://www.azstat.org/publications/yearbo
ok/2002/en/002_20.shtml.
8 Raul Motika, “Islam in Post-Soviet
Azerbaijan,” Archives de Sciences Sociales
des
Religions, Vol. 115 (Summer 2001),
p.113.
9 Anar Valiyev, Impact of Zoroastrianism
on Mentality and Traditions of
Azerbaijanis (1999). Unpublished
manuscript.
10 Farida Mammadova, Political History
and Historical Geography of
Caucasian Albania (Baku: Nashr, 1986),
pp. 37-38.
11 Valiyev, Impact of Zoroastrianism.
12 Ali Abasov, “Islam v Sovremennom
Azerbaijane: Obrazhi I Realii,” in D.E.
Furman (ed.), Azerbaijan I Rossia:
Obshhestva I Gosudarstva (Moscow:
Sakharov Foundation, 2001).
http://www.sakharov-
center.ru/azrus/az_009.htm.
13 Ibid.
14 Tadeusz Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan:
The Hidden Faces of Islam,” World
Policy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall
2002), p. 69.
15 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian
Azerbaijan 1905-1920 (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1985), p. 8.
16 Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: The
Hidden Faces of Islam,” p. 70.

Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) 13
17 Abasov, “Islam v Sovremennom
Azerbaijane: Obrazhi I Realii.”
18 Abasov, “Islam v Sovremennom
Azerbaijane: Obrazhi I Realii.”
19 Ibid.
20 Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: The
Hidden Faces of Islam,” p. 72.
21 Law on Freedom of Worship, 1992.
Azerbaijan Legislature. Baku, 1996.
22 Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste
Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo
Azerbaijana,” p. 11.
23 Ibid, p. 11.
24 Turan News Agency, September 3,
1998. www.turaninfo.com.
25 Nairi Tohidi, “The Global-Local
Intersection of Feminism in Muslim
Societies: The Cases of Iran and
Azerbaijan,” Social Research, Vol 69,
No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 853-54.
26 Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste
Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo
Azerbaijana,” p. 12.
27 Islam Dunyasi, April, 1994.
28 R.M. Hasanov, “Islam v
Obshhestvenno-Politicheskoi Zhizni
Azerbaijana,” Socis, Vol. 1 (Spring
2003).
http://2001.isras.ru/SocIs/SocIsArticles/2
003_03/GasanovRM.doc.
29 Azeri Official Lauds Shrinking Clout
of Missionaries. Azerbaijan TV station
ANS, December 28, 2004.
30 Anar Valiyev, “The Rise of Salafi
Islam in Azerbaijan,” Terrorism Monitor,
Vol. 3, No. 13 (July 1, 2005), p. 6.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/new
s/article.php?articleid=2369735.
31 Interview with Imam of Abu Bakr
mosque, Kavkazskiy Vestnik. Accessed
May 24, 2004. www.kvestnik.org.
32 Turan News Agency, March 17, 2001.
www.turaninfo.com.
33 Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste
Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo
Azerbaijana,” p. 13.
34 Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony
Committee. Testimony by Zeyno Baran,
Director of International Security and
Energy Programs, The Nixon Center,
March 8, 2005.