Article

How Warnings about False Claims Become Recommendations

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Abstract

Telling people that a consumer claim is false can make them misremember it as true. In two experiments, older adults were especially susceptible to this "illusion of truth" effect. Repeatedly identifying a claim as false helped older adults remember it as false in the short term but paradoxically made them more likely to remember it as true after a 3 day delay. This unintended effect of repetition comes from increased familiarity with the claim itself but decreased recollection of the claim's original context. Findings provide insight into susceptibility over time to memory distortions and exploitation via repetition of claims in media and advertising. (c) 2005 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc..

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... Revising misconceptions appears to be more challenging for older adults than for younger adults, with researchers attributing this disadvantage to age-related deficits in memory (Ansburg, 2016;Skurnik et al., 2005;Swire et al., 2017). Unfortunately, research with older adults has frequently lacked a younger adult comparison group and has rarely used knowledge revision techniques that have been shown to be effective for younger adults. ...
... This may be particularly problematic for older adults due to their reliance on loweffort familiarity-based processes as opposed to more effortful processing (Hess, 2014;Prull et al., 2006). In a study specifically examining the effect of repetition on familiarity in memory, Skurnik et al. (2005) varied whether older adults viewed statements along with indicators of accuracy of the statement (i.e., true, false) once or 3 times. Older adults given a true/false test of those statements after a 30 min delay were better able to accurately respond to statements that had been repeated 3 times as opposed to statements shown once. ...
... Along similar lines, the memoryfor-change framework suggests that older adults do not update memory as effectively as do younger adults because they are less able to recall an earlier change and rely on their familiarity with the outdated information (Wahlheim, 2014;Wahlheim & Zacks, 2019). Overall, revising misconceptions may rely on the ability to explicitly recollect the relationship between a misconception and feedback indicating that information is incorrect (Skurnik et al., 2005;Wahlheim, 2014;Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). Because recollection tends to decline with age whereas familiarity-based processing remains intact, older adults might continue to rely on familiar misconceptions while being unable to specifically recollect the feedback they were provided about that false information. ...
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Article
Although ample younger adult research has detailed effective strategies for revising misconceptions, research with older adults is less extensive. Older adults may be less able to correct errors in knowledge due to age-related changes in cognition, but it is also possible that older adults’ revision of misconceptions has been limited by methodologies which do not provide adequate support for correction. In two experiments, we examined how older and younger adults revise health-related misconceptions when provided with cognitive support in the form of explicit detailed feedback and an immediate test. Older and younger adults in Experiment 1 answered true/false health statements, received feedback with a detailed explanation of the correct response, took an additional test on the same statements immediately following the initial test, and completed a final test 1-week later. Older and younger adults corrected a similar proportion of misconceptions immediately and maintained most of those revisions across a 1-week delay. In Experiment 2, older adults corrected the same proportion of misconceptions on the final test regardless of whether or not they received a test immediately following feedback. Overall, older adults revised health misconceptions as effectively as did younger adults but variables influencing correction (e.g., belief in feedback) may differ.
... Other explanations focus on perceptual fluency, positing that misinformation is generally more familiar than the retraction. This might lead to a greater metacognitive experience of fluency when the misinformation is later encountered, leading people to subsequently rely more on the misinformation than the retraction (Schwarz et al., 2007;Skurnik et al., 2005). ...
... Much research has focused on how retractions impact the extent to which participants continue to make inferences about the focal event based on the misinformation (e.g., Ecker & Ang, 2019;Ecker & Antonio, 2021;Ecker, Lewandowsky & Apai, 2011;Ecker et al., 2015;Ecker et al., 2014;Ecker, Lewandowsky, et al., 2011;Ecker et al., 2010;Johnson & Seifert, 1994;Rich & Zaragoza, 2016;Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). Other research has focused on how retractions impact continued belief that the misinformation is true (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2010;Nyhan et al., 2014;Nyhan et al., 2013;Schwarz et al., 2007;Skurnik et al., 2005;Swire, et al., 2017), though some of this research has measured both outcomes. ...
... First, we wanted to ask participants in both conditions about how uncomfortable they felt in response to something related to the misinformation that occurred at the same point in both reports. Additionally, we wanted to hold the number of references to the misinformation constant across conditions because past research has suggested that fluency with the misinformation might be involved in the occurrence of the CIE (Schwarz et al., 2007;Skurnik et al., 2005; but see also . Note that for clarity and consistency across conditions we refer to the information about storage of combustible materials in a side room as misinformation even though participants in the confirmation condition were not told that the misinformation was false. ...
Article
Research examining the continued influence effect (CIE) of misinformation has reliably found that belief in misinformation persists even after the misinformation has been retracted. However, much remains to be learned about the psychological mechanisms responsible for this phenomenon. Most theorizing in this domain has focused on cognitive mechanisms. Yet some proposed cognitive explanations provide reason to believe that motivational mechanisms might also play a role. The present research tested the prediction that retractions of misinformation produce feelings of psychological discomfort that motivate one to disregard the retraction to reduce this discomfort. Studies 1 and 2 found that retractions of misinformation elicit psychological discomfort, and this discomfort predicts continued belief in and use of misinformation. Study 3 showed that the relations between discomfort and continued belief in and use of misinformation are causal in nature by manipulating how participants appraised the meaning of discomfort. These findings suggest that discomfort could play a key mechanistic role in the CIE, and that changing how people interpret this discomfort can make retractions more effective at reducing continued belief in misinformation.
... Over time, the message may become dissociated from the source. An alarming example of a source memory failure is that messages that were labeled as false at the time of encoding may later on be believed to be true because the messages are still recognized as familiar but their source is not recollected (Bacon, 1979;Begg et al., 1992;Skurnik et al., 2005). Furthermore, it has been observed that people tend to incorporate misinformation from fictional narratives into their real-world beliefs and attitudes even though they know that fiction is unreliable as a source of information, possibly because they fail to remember the source of the fictional information (Green & Brock, 2000). ...
... In previous studies, it has been observed that recognized statements were associated with increased credibility (Bacon, 1979;Roggeveen & Johar, 2002). The participants' tendency to consider recognized information to be more credible than unrecognized information was particularly pronounced when recognition was only based on familiarity and source memory was absent (Begg et al., 1992;Law, 1998;Mitchell et al., 2005Mitchell et al., , 2006Skurnik et al., 2005). Based on these findings, one could have hypothesized that, in the absence of veridical source memory, recognized statements should have a higher probability to be attributed to the trustworthy source than unrecognized statements. ...
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Article
Consumers are exposed to large amounts of advertising every day. One way to avoid being manipulated is to monitor the sources of persuasive messages. In the present study it was tested whether high exposure to advertising affects the memory and guessing processes underlying source attributions. Participants were exposed to high or low proportions of advertising messages that were intermixed with product statements from a trustworthy source. In a subsequent memory test, participants had to remember the sources of these statements. In Experiments 1 and 2, high advertising exposure led to increased source memory and decreased recognition of the statements in comparison to low advertising exposure. High advertising exposure also induced an increased tendency toward guessing that statements whose sources were not remembered came from advertising. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that the presence of advertising, relative to its absence, leads to a skeptical guessing bias. Being exposed to advertising thus has pronounced effects on the memory and guessing processes underlying source attributions. These changes in source monitoring can be interpreted as coping mechanisms that serve to protect against the persuasive influence of advertising messages.
... Une explication dominante de l'effet de vérité est la familiarité associée à l'exposition répétée (e.g., Garcia-Marques, Silva, & Mello, 2017 ;Mitchell, Dodson, & Schacter, 2005 ;Mitchell, Sullivan, Schacter, & Budson, 2006 ;Mutter, Lindsey, & Pliske, 1995 ;Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). Des affirmations déjà vues seraient plus faciles à traiter que de nouvelles, et cette fluidité du traitement engendrerait un sentiment de familiarité dont l'origine réelle (l'exposition antérieure) ne serait pas identifiée au moment du jugement de vérité. ...
... D'après l'hypothèse de familiarité, la familiarité serait attribuée à la vérité en l'absence d'explication alternative évidente ; Garcia-Marques, Silva, & Mello, 2017 ;Mitchell, Dodson, & Schacter, 2005 ;Mitchell, Sullivan, Schacter, & Budson, 2006 ;Mutter, Lindsey, & Pliske, 1995 ;Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). Puisque la recollection de la source fournit justement une explication possible au sentiment de familiarité (e.g., « c'est familier parce que je me souviens l'avoir vu avant dans la phase d'étude »), les affirmations qui ont fait l'objet d'une recollection pourraient ne pas montrer un effet de vérité. ...
Thesis
La prolifération rapide de fausses informations est une face obscure de la diffusion massive d’informations. Comprendre comment nous jugeons la vérité des informations que nous rencontrons s’avère crucial. L’exposition répétée aux informations augmente la tendance à les juger vraies. Cet effet de vérité est couramment expliqué par la familiarité, qui serait incorrectement attribuée à la vérité des informations en l’absence de recollection, soit le souvenir précis d’y avoir été exposé avant. Nous pointons des limites de cette hypothèse et proposons une alternative : l’hypothèse de correspondance duale, qui suppose que nous évaluons la vérité des informations à travers leur correspondance avec des contenus récupérés en mémoire. La récupération de ces contenus peut être basée sur la familiarité comme sur la recollection, et ce en particulier lorsque nous ne pouvons pas récupérer des indices de vérité. Dégrader la recollection devrait ainsi augmenter l’effet de vérité pour l’hypothèse de familiarité, mais le diminuer pour l’hypothèse de correspondance duale. Nous avons estimé les mérites relatifs des deux hypothèses en manipulant l’attention à l’encodage et le délai. Les deux hypothèses expliquent aussi bien certains résultats ; des résultats que nous pensions attendus sous les deux hypothèses n’ont pas été mis en évidence ; et l’hypothèse de correspondance duale rend mieux compte de certains résultats que l’hypothèse de familiarité, mais l’inverse est aussi le cas. Dans un volet plus appliqué de la thèse, nous suggérons que l’effet de vérité pourrait exister avec des théories du complot dans des réanalyses corrélationnelles de deux enquêtes à grande échelle. L’hypothèse de correspondance duale est une alternative pertinente à l’hypothèse de familiarité, mais la confrontation des deux hypothèses est à poursuivre pour mieux comprendre les processus de mémoire impliqués dans l’effet de vérité. Cet effet pourrait en outre être impliqué dans des phénomènes sociétaux comme le conspirationnisme, invitant à doter les études d’une plus grande validité externe.
... Long before the existence of social media platforms, researchers investigated how to mitigate the effect of exposure to false information. 21 22 Traditional measures used in the past include exposure to corrective advertising through mass media, content labelling the accuracy of information on consumer products, 23 and correcting misinformation and disinformation about certain public services. 24 The advent of social media and online platforms has provided a fertile medium for disinformation to flourish. ...
... This effect is characterized as an increase in misinformation belief following a correction, relative to a pre-correction baseline or no-exposure control condition. There are some findings that repeating corrections might lead to a tendency to recall false claims as true, especially after a 3-day delay or in older adults (age 70+ years) 287 . likewise, it has been argued that presenting 'myths versus facts' flyers that repeat to-be-debunked misinformation when correcting it could lead to familiarity backfire effects after a mere 30 min 288 . ...
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Poster
Critical thinking for sustainable development therefore focuses on the soft skills of positive values and attitudes while at the same time embracing social, economic, political, and environmental transformation for the good of everyone irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity, or status in society. Green marketing is developing and selling environmentally friendly goods or services. It helps improve credibility, enter a new audience segment, and stand out among competitors as more and more people become environmentally conscious. Using eco-friendly paper and inks for print marketing materials. Skipping the printed materials altogether and option for electronic marketing. Having a recycling program and responsible waste disposal practices. Using eco-friendly product packaging. Critical thinking helps people better understand themselves, their motivations and goals. When you can deduce information to find the most important parts and apply those to your life, you can change your situation and promote personal growth and overall happiness. The reason why innovation benefits from critical thinking is simple; critical thinking is used when judgment is needed to produce a desired set of valued outcomes. That is why the majority of innovation outcomes reflect incremental improvements built on a foundation of critically thought-out solutions. The results indicate that there are four factors that effectively influence fulfillment of green marketing, specifically, green labeling, compatibility, product value and green advertising. A green mission statement becomes the foundation of a company's sustainability efforts. It provides the organization and its stakeholders with an understanding of what's most important and what your company can do to protect the natural world and be more socially responsible.
... Tuttavia, questa attività di debunking non è sufficiente se non si interviene anche e soprattutto sull'ambiente che favorisce la diffusione di tali fake news e sulle predisposizioni emotive che conducono alla loro creazione [32]; • il contrasto alla disinformazione può essere un'arma a doppio taglio. È noto da tempo come trascorrere troppo tempo a esaminare e approfondire le fake news sui vaccini rischia di rafforzare queste convinzioni in chi le ascolta [67]. La disinformazione andrebbe identificata, ne andrebbe dichiarata la falsità e poi ci si dovrebbe rapidamente focalizzare sui fatti reali presentandoli in modo che appaiano semplici e comprensibili, rimpiazzando le informazioni errate nelle fake news circolanti [68]; • bisogna agire sulla trasparenza delle informazioni. ...
... The general lack of evidence of differences in the acceptance of misinformation after controlling for exposure, technical expertise, or experienced discrimination is predictable given literature on cognitive psychology regarding human information processing. Late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century psychology research has tended to support the idea that all humans accept new information as a default condition and then subsequently tag it as being true or false rather than being able to somehow detect false information initially (4,38,81). That observation essentially levels the playing field for all humans in terms of the inherent capacity to process information and misinformation, meaning that observed differences in misinformation exposure and acceptance likely reflect systemic resource disparities. ...
Article
The concepts of health misinformation and health disparities have been prominent in public health literature in recent years, in part because of the threat that each notion poses to public health. How exactly are misinformation proliferation and health disparities related, however? What roles might misinformation play in explaining the health disparities that we have documented in the United States and elsewhere? How might we mitigate the effects of misinformation exposure among people facing relatively poor health outcomes? In this review, we address such questions by first defining health disparities and misinformation as concepts and then considering how misinformation exposure might theoretically affect health decision-making and account for disparate health behavior and health outcomes. We also assess the potential for misinformation-focused interventions to address health disparities based on available literature and call for future research to address gaps in our current evidence base. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Public Health, Volume 44 is April 2023. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
... In addition to this admittedly somewhat suggestive evolutionary consideration, there are important empirical results that provide evidence for the Spinozan hypothesis (Gilbert 1991;Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone 1993;Hasson, Simmons, and Todorov 2005;Masip, Garrido, and Herrero 2006;Skurnik et al. 2005;Unkelbach 2007). For example, Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone (1993) designed six experiments which placed one group of participants under a cognitive load conditiona disabling performance constraintto make it harder for the participants to go through an evaluative process and compared these with a control group of participants who were not placed under a cognitive load. ...
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Article
Belief is said to be essentially subject to a norm of truth. This view has been challenged on the ground that the truth norm cannot provide guidance on an intuitive inferentialist model of guidance and thus cannot be genuinely normative. One response to the No Guidance argument is to show how the truth norm can guide belief-formation on the inferentialist model of guidance. In this paper, I argue that this response is inadequate in light of emerging empirical evidence about our system of belief-formation. I will then motivate an alternative response and present, in rough outline, a viable, reason-responsive model of epistemic guidance on which the truth norm can guide.
... The importance of recollection-based retrieval in overcoming interference is inherent in the dual-process account of the CIE (Jacoby, 1991(Jacoby, , 1999; for a review, see Lewandowsky et al., 2012), which assumes that misinformation continues to exert its influence when automatic memory is unopposed by strategic recollection. Findings to corroborate this perspective come from studies showing how susceptibility to the CIE is heightened when recollection is less available, such as with older participants (Skurnik et al., 2005;Swire et al., 2017), longer retention intervals (Brashier et al., 2021;Walter & Tukachinsky, 2020), and when attention is divided (Ecker et al., 2011). However, a limitation of the dual-process account is that without modification it cannot account for findings showing that recollection of misinformation is associated with correct recall (Moore & Lampinen, 2016) or recent neuroimaging evidence implying that misinformation recollection drives the CIE and not misinformation familiarity (Brydges et al., 2020;Gordon et al., 2019). ...
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Article
Fake news can impair memory leading to societal controversies such as COVID-19 vaccine efficacy. The pernicious influence of fake news is clear when ineffective corrections leave memories outdated. A key theoretical issue is whether people should recall fake news while reading corrections with contradictory details. The familiarity backfire view proposes that recalling fake news increases its familiarity, leading to interference. However, the integrative encoding view proposes that recalling fake news promotes co-activation and binding of contradictory details, leading to facilitation. Two experiments examined if one theory better accounts for memory updating after participants recalled actual fake news details when reading headlines that corrected misinformation. In Phase 1, participants read real and fake news headlines of unclear veracity taken from various internet sources. In Phase 2, participants read real news headlines that reaffirmed real news and corrected fake news from Phase 1. When they detected that Phase 2 real news corrected fake news, they attempted to recall Phase 1 fake news. In Phase 3, participants first recalled real news details. When they remembered that those details were corrections from Phase 2, they attempted to recall fake news from Phase 1. Recalling fake news when noticing corrections in Phase 2 led to better memory for real news in Phase 3 when fake news was recalled again and worse memory for real news in Phase 3 when fake news was not recalled again. Both views explain part of the memory differences associated with recalling fake news during corrections, but only when considering whether people recollected that fake news had been corrected.
... Most of the current research has settled upon correcting misinformation through remedial and/or reactive tools, but these are also limited by the compounding effects of fake news that arise when it is repeated without specific refutation. Not surprisingly, a review of refutational approaches reveals that they are also not particularly effective at fully reversing misapprehensions, and in some cases further concretizes the belief through increased familiarity (Schwarz et al., 2016, van der Linder et al., 2017Skurnik et al., 2005;Zengilowski et al., 2021). Yet one commonality of the above approaches is that they are all one-size-fits-all. ...
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Article
News consumption and the media landscape have fundamentally changed over the last decade. These changes exacerbate concerns surrounding the proliferation of misinformation, particularly fake news. Most researchers consider fake news misinformation that disguises itself as legitimate news, which we liken to another form of misinformation, pseudoscience, that spreads falsehoods by appropriating the legitimacy of science. We investigated the influence of religious identity, political ideology, and open-mindedness on pseudoscientific and paranormal beliefs. We predicted that increased belief in religiosity and political identity would contribute to stronger beliefs in pseudoscience and the paranormal. Results revealed that belief in the paranormal was significantly higher for religious undergraduates compared to their non-religious peers, but that the relationships between political ideology and pseudoscience are much more complex. In sum, our results support further exploring changing risk factors based upon individual differences and the type of misinformation to aid in combating both fake news and pseudoscience.
... Multiple retractions, each containing the misinformation, resulted in lower misinformation reliance compared to a single retraction, even under load. This further allays concerns regarding the potential impacts of repeating misinformation when correcting it, specifically that retractions can enhance CIEs by inadvertently boosting misinformation familiarity (Lewandowsky et al., 2012;Schwarz et al., 2007;Skurnik et al., 2005). Our results are in line with a growing number of studies yielding no evidence of such ironic familiarity-driven effects (Cameron et al., 2013;Ecker, Lewandowsky et al., 2020;Ecker et al., 2011;Ecker, O'Reilly et al., 2020;Rich & Zaragoza, 2016;Swire et al., 2017). ...
Article
Corrected misinformation can continue to influence inferential reasoning. It has been suggested that such continued influence is partially driven by misinformation familiarity, and that corrections should therefore avoid repeating misinformation to avoid inadvertent strengthening of misconceptions. However, evidence for such familiarity-backfire effects is scarce. We tested whether familiarity backfire may occur if corrections are processed under cognitive load. Although misinformation repetition may boost familiarity, load may impede integration of the correction, reducing its effectiveness and therefore allowing a backfire effect to emerge. Participants listened to corrections that repeated misinformation while in a driving simulator. Misinformation familiarity was manipulated through the number of corrections. Load was manipulated through a math task administered selectively during correction encoding. Multiple corrections were more effective than a single correction; cognitive load reduced correction effectiveness, with a single correction entirely ineffective under load. This provides further evidence against familiarity-backfire effects and has implications for real-world debunking.
... One explanation for this phenomenon is that debunking messages tend to repeat the to-be-debunked information, which increases the fluency of processing this information (Schwarz et al., 2007). Because people use the experienced fluency of processing information as a cue to judge its validity (Brashier & Marsh, 2020), debunking can have the ironic effect of strengthening people's belief in the debunked information (Skurnik et al., 2005). Such ironic effects can be exacerbated by the fact that negations of an idea require initial comprehension of the idea before it can be rejected (Gilbert, 1991). ...
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Article
Dual-process and single-process theories lead to conflicting predictions about whether debunking messages negating a state of affairs should change responses on implicit measures in a manner intended by the message. Two preregistered studies (N1 = 550; N2 = 880) tested these predictions using official health information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention debunking the idea that vaccines would cause autism. Consistent with predictions derived from dual-process learning theories, Experiment 1 found that debunking-via-negation increased responses linking vaccines to autism on implicit measures, although it effectively reduced self-reported judgments linking vaccines to autism on explicit measures. Using the same measures and materials, Experiment 2 found that debunking-via-negation effectively reduced responses linking vaccines to autism on both implicit and explicit measures, consistent with predictions derived from single-process propositional theories. Potential reasons for the conflicting outcomes are discussed, including their implications for the debate between dual-process and single-process theories.
... We also found that more frequent news consumption was associated with less accurate fake news detection, but again only among elderly older adults. Repeating false information has previously been shown to inadvertently strengthen the perceived accuracy of the information by making it more familiar (Skurnik et al., 2005). This phenomenon is known as an "illusory truth effect" (Dechêne et al., 2010;Hasher et al., 1977) and is more often observed with older age, possibly because familiarity-based memory is largely preserved in aging (see Spencer & Raz, 1995, for a review). ...
Article
Increasing misinformation spread poses a threat to older adults but there is little research on older adults within the fake news literature. Embedded in the Changes in Integration for Social Decisions in Aging (CISDA) model, this study examined the role of (a) analytical reasoning; (b) affect; (c) news consumption frequency, and their interplay with (d) news content on news veracity detection in aging. Conducted during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, the present study asked participants to view and evaluate COVID or non-COVID (i.e., everyday) news articles, followed by measures of analytical reasoning, affect, and news consumption frequency. News veracity detection was comparable between young and older adults. Additionally, fake news detection for non-COVID news was predicted by individual differences in analytic reasoning for both age groups. However, chronological age effects in fake news detection emerged within the older adult sample and interacted with the CISDA-derived components of analytical reasoning, affect, and news consumption frequency by news content. Collectively, these findings suggest that age-related vulnerabilities to deceptive news are only apparent in very old age. Our findings advance understanding of psychological mechanisms in news veracity detection in aging. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
... Briefly, being re-exposed to the misinformation can lead to an increased sense of familiarity, which in turn may strengthen belief in the misinformation. Important for purposes of age here, research suggests that older adults may be particularly prone to backfire effects because they tend to forget information associated with the retraction, which in turn leads to greater reliance on a sense of familiarity about the misinformation (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2005;Holliday, 2003;Jacoby, 1999) and are more likely to continue to believe misinformation is factual, despite being provided with a retraction stating that the misinformation was erroneous (Skurnik et al., 2005). In sum, additional research is warranted to better understand the extent to which age impacts the CIE. ...
Article
Research suggests exposure to misinformation continues to impact belief and reasoning, even if that misinformation has been corrected (referred to as the Continued Influence Effect, CIE). The present experiment explores two potentially important factors that may impact the effect: (1) learner age and (2) length of delay between retraction and final test. During initial learning, participants (both young and older adults) read six scenarios in which a critical piece of misinformation was either retracted or not retracted. Following no delay, a short (ten minutes) delay, or a long (two days) delay, participants then answered inferential reasoning questions about the previously‐studied scenarios to evaluate how (if at all) the prior retraction impacts reliance on misinformation. Outcomes help us to understand the ways in which misinformation (even following retraction) impacts reasoning, an issue of exceeding importance as the proliferation of fake news shows no signs of slowing. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
... All rights reserved Unfortunately, corrective advertisements commonly repeat the original falsehood in the process of correcting it. Repeating a falsehood during an attempted correction (e.g., "It is a myth that X" or "It is false that X") reduces the likelihood of successful belief revision, because repetition makes processing the falsehood easier (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012;Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005;Skurnik, Yoon, & Schwarz, 2007;cf. Ecker, Hogan, & Lewandowsky, 2017). ...
Article
Why do consumers sometimes fall for spurious claims – e.g., brain training games that prevent cognitive decline, toning sneakers that sculpt one's body, flower essence that cures depression – and how can consumers protect themselves in the modern world where information is shared quickly and easily? As cognitive scientists, we view this problem through the lens of what we know, more generally, about how people evaluate information for its veracity, and how people update their beliefs. That is, the same processes that support true belief can also encourage people to sometimes believe misleading or false information. Anchoring on the large literature on truth and belief updating allows predictions about consumer behavior; it also highlights possible solutions while casting doubt on other possible responses to misleading communications.
... The test-retest control was used to measure reliability of each item and as comparison condition for potential backfire effects in the correction condition. We included a three-week retention interval, given that both familiarity and worldview influences are theoretically more likely to occur after a long retention interval (Skurnik et al., 2005;Wittenberg & Berinsky, 2020). ...
Article
The backfire effect is when a correction increases belief in the very misconception it is attempting to correct, and it is often used as a reason not to correct misinformation. The current study aimed to test whether correcting misinformation increases belief more than a no-correction control. Furthermore, we aimed to examine whether item-level differences in backfire rates were associated with test-retest reliability or theoretically meaningful factors. These factors included worldview-related attributes, including perceived importance and strength of precorrection belief, and familiarity-related attributes, including perceived novelty and the illusory truth effect. In 2 nearly identical experiments, we conducted a longitudinal pre/post design with N = 388 and 532 participants. Participants rated 21 misinformation items and were assigned to a correction condition or test-retest control. We found that no items backfired more in the correction condition compared to test-retest control or initial belief ratings. Item backfire rates were strongly negatively correlated with item reliability (ρ = -.61/-.73) and did not correlate with worldview-related attributes. Familiarity-related attributes were significantly correlated with backfire rate, though they did not consistently account for unique variance beyond reliability. While there have been previous papers highlighting the nonreplicable nature of backfire effects, the current findings provide a potential mechanism for this poor replicability. It is crucial for future research into backfire effects to use reliable measures, report the reliability of their measures, and take reliability into account in analyses. Furthermore, fact-checkers and communicators should not avoid giving corrective information due to backfire concerns. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
... It was argued that they risked making the myths more familiar [36], and that they promoted shallow processing of the material [37]. For example, Skurnik, Yoon & Schwarz [38] found that after a 30-min delay, participants in a flu myth-busting condition mistakenly mislabelled myths as facts. They also found that intention to obtain the influenza vaccine was lowered following corrective information that included statements of the myth (a 'backfire' effect). ...
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Article
Background: COVID-19 misinformation is a danger to public health. A range of formats are used by health campaigns to correct beliefs but data on their effectiveness is limited. We aimed to identify A) whether three commonly used myth-busting formats are effective for correcting COVID-19 myths, immediately and after a delay, and B) which is the most effective. Methods: We tested whether three common correction formats could reduce beliefs in COVID-19 myths: (i) question-answer, ii) fact-only, (ii) fact-myth. n = 2215 participants (n = 1291 after attrition), UK representative of age and gender, were randomly assigned to one of the three formats. n = 11 myths were acquired from fact-checker websites and piloted to ensure believability. Participants rated myth belief at baseline, were shown correction images (the intervention), and then rated myth beliefs immediately post-intervention and after a delay of at least 6 days. A partial replication, n = 2084 UK representative, was also completed with immediate myth rating only. Analysis used mixed models with participants and myths as random effects. Results: Myth agreement ratings were significantly lower than baseline for all correction formats, both immediately and after the delay; all β's > 0.30, p's < .001. Thus, all formats were effective at lowering beliefs in COVID-19 misinformation. Correction formats only differed where baseline myth agreement was high, with question-answer and fact-myth more effective than fact-only immediately; β = 0.040, p = .022 (replication set: β = 0.053, p = .0075) and β = - 0.051, p = .0059 (replication set: β = - 0.061, p < .001), respectively. After the delay however, question-answer was more effective than fact-myth, β = 0.040, p =. 031. Conclusion: Our results imply that COVID-19 myths can be effectively corrected using materials and formats typical of health campaigns. Campaign designers can use our results to choose between correction formats. When myth belief was high, question-answer format was more effective than a fact-only format immediately post-intervention, and after delay, more effective than fact-myth format.
... This effect is characterized as an increase in misinformation belief following a correction, relative to a pre-correction baseline or no-exposure control condition. There are some findings that repeating corrections might lead to a tendency to recall false claims as true, especially after a 3-day delay or in older adults (age 70+ years) 287 . likewise, it has been argued that presenting 'myths versus facts' flyers that repeat to-be-debunked misinformation when correcting it could lead to familiarity backfire effects after a mere 30 min 288 . ...
Article
Misinformation has been identified as a major contributor to various contentious contemporary events ranging from elections and referenda to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only can belief in misinformation lead to poor judgements and decision-making, it also exerts a lingering influence on people’s reasoning after it has been corrected — an effect known as the continued influence effect. In this Review, we describe the cognitive, social and affective factors that lead people to form or endorse misinformed views, and the psychological barriers to knowledge revision after misinformation has been corrected, including theories of continued influence. We discuss the effectiveness of both pre-emptive (‘prebunking’) and reactive (‘debunking’) interventions to reduce the effects of misinformation, as well as implications for information consumers and practitioners in various areas including journalism, public health, policymaking and education.
... We also found that more frequent news consumption was associated with less accurate fake news detection, but again only among elderly older adults. Repeating false information has previously been shown to inadvertently strengthen the perceived accuracy of the information by making it more familiar (Skurnik et al., 2005). This phenomenon is known as an "illusory truth effect" (Dechêne et al., 2010;Hasher et al., 1977) and is more often observed with older age, possibly because familiarity-based memory is largely preserved in aging (see Spencer & Raz, 1995, for a review). ...
Preprint
Trust is crucial for successful social interaction across the lifespan. Perceiver age, facial age and facial emotion have been shown to influence trustworthiness perception, but the complex interplay between these perceiver and facial characteristics has not been examined. Adopting an adult lifespan developmental approach, 199 adults (aged 22-78 years) rated the trustworthiness of faces that systematically varied in age (young, middle-aged, older) and emotion (neutral, happy, sad, fearful, angry, disgusted) from the FACES Lifespan Database. The study yielded three key results. First, on an aggregated level, facial trustworthiness perception did not differ by perceiver age. Second, all perceivers rated young faces as most trustworthy; and middle-aged and older (but not young) perceivers rated older faces as least trustworthy. Third, facial emotions signaling threat (fear, anger, disgust) relative to neutral, happy, and sad expressions, moderated age effects on facial trustworthiness perception. Findings from this study highlight the impact of perceiver and facial characteristics on facial trustworthiness perception in adulthood and aging and have potential to inform first impression formation, with effects on trait attributions as well as behavior. This publication also provides normative data on perceived facial trustworthiness for the FACES Lifespan Database.
... Similarly the illusion of truth arises when claims are repeatedly explained to be false -the claim is recalled, but not the fact it was false. Skurnik, Yoon, Park, and Schwarz (2005) found that three days after explaining to elderly participants that a set of health claims were false, the claims were more likely to be remembered as true because they were familiar but their falsehood was forgotten. Deutsch, Gawronski, and Strack (2006) trained participants to evaluate words as positive or negative, e.g., "party" has a positive association. ...
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Article
This paper reviews recent research on cognitive factors associated with the poor response to the COVID-19 health crisis in the United States. First, group-level predictors were explored, with studies revealing that religious affiliation and conservative political orientation were associated with a failure to comply with medical recommendations. In order to explain these links, individual-level traits were further investigated. Studies indicated that a tendency towards conspiratorial thinking and susceptibility to fake news along with cognitive style, particularly intuitive processing, were forms of motivated cognition related to disbelief in science and a reluctance to follow precautions of medical experts. Additionally, research revealed that cognitive ability has been shown to be related to the two group-level predictors, religious and political orientation, as well as belief revision, which in turn influences one’s ability to problem-solve in response to novel challenges like the COVID-19 pandemic. Other aspects of cognitive ability such as neurological efficiency and working memory function were explored in regard to how they impact one’s ability to weigh evidence, process new information, and update one’s views. While none of these variables alone can fully explain the disregard and disbelief many American citizens displayed in response to the pandemic, taken together, the convergence of factors was likely to have influenced health outcomes across the nation, thereby contributing to the spread of the virus.
... Similarly the illusion of truth arises when claims are repeatedly explained to be false -the claim is recalled, but not the fact it was false. Skurnik, Yoon, Park, and Schwarz (2005) found that three days after explaining to elderly participants that a set of health claims were false, the claims were more likely to be remembered as true because they were familiar but their falsehood was forgotten. Deutsch, Gawronski, and Strack (2006) trained participants to evaluate words as positive or negative, e.g., "party" has a positive association. ...
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Article
Unconscious thought has been linked with a wide range of mechanisms, capacities, and limits. These claims have changed over time and across different domains of thought. The aim of this review is to synthesise the research on unconscious thinking across the domains of reasoning, judgment, decision making, insight problem solving, and creativity and identify the commonalities between them. Three mechanisms underpin unconscious thought in all of these domains: automaticity, reward-based association, and spreading activation. The mechanisms are triggered by cues in the environment or internal states, and the output of the mechanisms are either specific outputs or affective responses. The mechanisms also define the limits of unconscious thought, expressed here as a “principle of integration”: unconscious thought is not sufficient in tasks or problems that require concepts to be integrated in novel or unfamiliar ways. Where theories have made stronger claims for unconscious thought than this, analysis of the evidence supporting those theories proves equivocal. Nonetheless, unconscious thought based on these mechanisms is adaptive in frequently encountered situations and provides the capacity for highly effective thinking across a range of domains.
... Based on the Cartesian model, researchers believe that we use familiarity to infer truth (Skurnik et al., 2005). Take note that from the model above, there is a clear distinction between comprehension and evaluation. ...
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Article
We often encounter misleading claims, some of which have potential to influence decisions we make in our daily lives. Many people from all walks of life, even the most schooled, fall prey to the traps of misinformation and disinformation. How do such delusions enter our knowledge base and inform our public opinions and actions? I discuss in this editorial article the bases that underlie the issues of misinformation and disinformation that plague current COVID-19 vaccine and vaccination efforts. Such issues have a philosophical base anchored on the information processing theories and psychological base linked to our cognitive tendencies. I reflect in the end on our primary responsibility as teachers in these issues. I conclude that metacognition or a knowledge of our thinking, if we mindfully dare to pursue it, can help stimulate an enlightened perspective to ourselves that, with our vast influence as educators, may illuminate the perspectives of others.
... This is thought to be problematic because people are more likely to believe information when it is familiar (the illusory truth effect; e.g., Begg et al., 1992;DiFonzo et al., 2016;Fazio et al., 2015). Some researchers have therefore argued that it may be beneficial to avoid myth repetition entirely to not increase myth familiarity, and therefore corrections should focus exclusively on the facts (e.g., Peter & Koch, 2016; also see Skurnik et al., 2005). Skurnik et al., (2007;as cited in Schwarz et al., 2007) presented participants with vaccine information aiming to reduce vaccine misconceptions. ...
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Article
Given that being misinformed can have negative ramifications, finding optimal corrective techniques has become a key focus of research. In recent years, several divergent correction formats have been proposed as superior based on distinct theoretical frameworks. However, these correction formats have not been compared in controlled settings, so the suggested superiority of each format remains speculative. Across four experiments, the current paper investigated how altering the format of corrections influences people’s subsequent reliance on misinformation. We examined whether myth-first, fact-first, fact-only, or myth-only correction formats were most effective, using a range of different materials and participant pools. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on climate change misconceptions; participants were Qualtrics online panel members and students taking part in a massive open online course, respectively. Experiments 3 and 4 used misconceptions from a diverse set of topics, with Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdworkers and university student participants. We found that the impact of a correction on beliefs and inferential reasoning was largely independent of the specific format used. The clearest evidence for any potential relative superiority emerged in Experiment 4, which found that the myth-first format was more effective at myth correction than the fact-first format after a delayed retention interval. However, in general it appeared that as long as the key ingredients of a correction were presented, format did not make a considerable difference. This suggests that simply providing corrective information, regardless of format, is far more important than how the correction is presented.
... Our results call into question Gilbert's (1991) theory of belief acquisition, whereby the very processes which underlie belief formation result in new statements initially being encoded as true. This matters because Gilbert's account, and the 'truth bias' that comes with it, is often integral to predictions and explanations across many contexts, including misinformation, false beliefs and confirmation bias (Pennycook et al. 2015;Risen, 2016;Kessler et al., 2019), persuasion (Petty et al. 1998;Slater & Rouner, 2002;Green & Brock, 2000), fictional narrative processing (Appel & Richter, 2007;Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008), social networks and online influence (Williams et al., 2017;Marsh & Rajaram, 2019), unintended effects of medical warnings about false claims (Skurnik et al., 2005), the impact of confessions in criminal justice (Appleby & Kassin, 2019), and how children learn from testimony (Harris et al., 2018). Despite the fact that Gilbert's account is invoked in all of these contexts, there has been surprisingly little empirical scrutiny of Gilbert et al.'s (1990) results (the few exceptions are Sperber et al., 2010;Street & Kingstone, 2017;Hasson et al., 2005;Richter et al., 2009;Brashier & Marsh, 2019;Nadarevic & Erdfelder, 2019;see Mercier, 2017, for a review). ...
Article
Most of the claims we encounter in real life can be assigned some degree of plausibility, even if they are new to us. On Gilbert's (1991) influential account of belief formation, whereby understanding a sentence implies representing it as true, all new propositions are initially accepted, before any assessment of their veracity. As a result, plausibility cannot have any role in initial belief formation on this account. In order to isolate belief formation experimentally, Gilbert, Krull, and Malone (1990) employed a dual-task design: if a secondary task disrupts participants' evaluation of novel claims presented to them, then the initial encoding should be all there is, and if that initial encoding consistently renders claims ‘true’ (even where participants were told in the learning phase that the claims they had seen were false), then Gilbert's account is confirmed. In this pre-registered study, we replicate one of Gilbert et al.'s (1990) seminal studies (“The Hopi Language Experiment”) while additionally introducing a plausibility variable. Our results show that Gilbert's ‘truth bias' does not hold for implausible statements — instead, initial encoding seemingly renders implausible statements ‘false’. As alternative explanations of this finding that would be compatible with Gilbert's account can be ruled out, it questions Gilbert's account.
... Innym dowodem wydaje się zjawisko znane jako efekt ognia wstecznego zaznajomienia (familiarity backfire effect), polegający na tym, że korekty mogą powodować paradoksalne zwiększanie polegania na dezinformacji dlatego, że jest ona powtarzana przy korektach i przez to bardziej znajoma, co skutkuje zwiększeniem siły asocjacji między reprezentacjami (np. Peter i Koch, 2016;Pluviano i in., 2017;Skurnik i in., 2005;2007;patrz jednak: Ecker i in., 2020b). Również fakt, że badani odnoszą się do dezinformacji, nawet jeśli tylko wspomniano o niej podczas korekty, nie indukując jej wcześniej, sugeruje, że to dostępność informacji, a nie jej rola w modelu mentalnym jest przyczyną przynajmniej niektórych przypadków CIE (Connor Desai, 2018 Thorson (2016) uważają, że motywowane rozumowanie (np. ...
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Thesis
Efekt przedłużonego wpływu dezinformacji (CIE) jest zjawiskiem polegającym na tym, że pewna informacja, mimo że została wycofana i skorygowana, nadal ma wpływ na relacje o zdarzeniu, rozumowanie, wnioskowanie i decyzje. W niniejszej pracy przedstawiono eksperyment, który miał na celu zbadanie, w jakim stopniu efekt ten uda się zredukować przy użyciu procedury inokulacji, polegającej na „zaszczepieniu” przeciwko wpływowi, w tym dezinformacji, oraz jak efekt ten może być moderowany przez wiarygodność korekt. Potwierdzono większość z postawionych hipotez. Wyniki pokazały, że wiarygodność źródeł korekt nie miała wpływu na ich przetwarzanie, gdy do inokulacji nie dochodziło, jednak wśród osób zaszczepionych doszło do znaczącej redukcji polegania na dezinformacji, jeśli jej korekta pochodziła z wysoce wiarygodnego źródła. Dla tego warunku źródła, w wyniku inokulacji, doszło również do znaczącego zwiększenia wiary w wycofanie, a także zmniejszenia wiary w dezinformację. Wbrew poprzednim doniesieniom okazało się również, że to wiara w dezinformację, a nie w wycofanie jest predyktorem polegania na dezinformacji. Ustalenia te mają duże znaczenie z perspektywy praktycznej, ponieważ odkryto warunki brzegowe techniki redukowania wpływu dezinformacji o sporej aplikowalności, a także teoretycznej, ponieważ umożliwiają one wgląd w mechanizmy odpowiedzialne za CIE. Wyniki interpretowano zarówno w związku z dotychczasowymi teoriami CIE, jak również w ramach modelu pamiętania.
... This research examines the role of consumption during retirement, and its role in (re-)defining identity in this stage in the consumer's lifecycle. Skurnik, Yoon, Park & Schwarz (2005) • Age Elderly (vs. younger) consumers were vulnerable to the "illusion of truth" effect (i.e., elderly were told that a claim was false were more likely to later accept it as true). ...
Article
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) has become ubiquitous in public and academic discourse. This is despite ongoing contests over definitions and the lack of a clear consensus about the relative importance (and even the appropriate order) of each component. For our purposes, diversity refers broadly to real or perceived physical or socio-cultural differences attributed to people and the representation of these differences in research, market spaces, and organizations. Equity refers to fairness in the treatment of people in terms of both opportunity and outcome. Inclusion refers to creating a culture that fosters belonging and incorporation of diverse groups and is usually operationalized as opposition to exclusion or marginalization. Taken together, DEI is typically accompanied by an axiological orientation toward procedural and distributive justice in organizations and institutions. In this curation, we highlight representative research published in the Journal of Consumer Research that directly and indirectly explores DEI issues.
... In fact, the majority of studies (62%) we cite have been published since 2019. This recent research complements an existing body of psychological research on mitigating the effects of exposure to false information (Johnson & Seifert, 1994;Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988), including exposure to corrective advertising via traditional mass media (Dyer & Kuehl, 1978), the role of a source's trustworthiness and expertise in determining how individuals feel about information (McGinnies & Ward, 1980), the effect of content labeling the veracity of claims about consumer products (Skurnik et al., 2005), and the impact of providing corrections to medical misinformation about the Affordable Care Act (Nyhan et al., 2013). ...
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Article
Despite ongoing discussion of the need for increased regulation and oversight of social media, as well as debate over the extent to which the platforms themselves should be responsible for containing misinformation, there is little consensus on which interventions work to address the problem of influence operations and disinformation campaigns. To provide policymakers and scholars a baseline on academic evidence about the efficacy of countermeasures, the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project conducted a systematic review of research articles that aimed to estimate the impact of interventions that could reduce the impact of misinformation.
... For example, individuals who seek out information confirming the false belief "vaccines cause autism", are less likely to be presented with information incongruent to their viewpoint. This constant repetition of misinformation can actually strengthen the individual memory for the misinformation (Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). ...
Thesis
Every day, individuals are bombarded with readily available information, not all of which is accurate. Unfortunately, people make all kinds of decisions based on this faulty information, such as whether they should vaccinate their children, who to vote for, or what medical treatment to select. Furthermore, much research has established that it is extremely difficult to alter people’s false beliefs and that correcting false beliefs can backfire. One promising approach (Horne et al., 2015) is actually to not address the false belief per se, and instead focus on individuals’ decision-making processes associated with those beliefs. For example, when deciding whether to vaccinate one’s children, one must weigh the possible risks of a vaccine (including, possibly, the false belief that vaccines cause autism) and the risk of the diseases that they prevent. Horne and colleagues found that focusing attention on disease risk led to changes in attitudes towards vaccines without explicitly addressing people’s false beliefs. In Studies 1 and 2, I replicated and extended this approach in the context of vaccination. Study 1 directly replicated Horne et al (2015). As predicted, a focus on disease risk was more effective than an intervention that directly countered false beliefs about vaccines and autism. Study 2 extended this line of research with three specific aims: (1) again replicate the Horne et al (2015) and Study 1 findings, (2) address a potential confound in the earlier work, and (3) test a combined correction approach. Specifically, the earlier disease risk condition in the original studies included pictures and was significantly longer than the autism correction condition. Thus, Study 2 included a more thorough autism correction condition. Overall, there was no differential impact of the various interventions on attitudes and beliefs about vaccination, suggesting that the impact of addressing disease risk may not be robust. The third study in this dissertation used a similar approach to Horne et al (2015) and Studies 1 and 2 but applied to a different context; the safety of human consumption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Specifically, Studies 3a and 3b addressed a common misperception about the safety of GMOs in food. Study 3a found a marginal effect of a GMO explanation condition (designed to parallel the disease risk condition seen in Studies 1 and 2 and proposed by Horne et al (2015)) on individual beliefs about GMOs. Additionally, the GMO explanation condition was the most effective at altering GMO behavior/intentions scale items and individual beliefs about the environmental impact of GMOs. Finally, Study 3b was a preregistered replication of Study 3a, with a larger sample size (n = 692). The results of Study 3b suggested that a GMO explanation condition designed to parallel the disease risk condition, was successful at altering individual attitudes, beliefs, and behavior/intentions toward GMOs. These findings further support that effective misinformation correction approaches may applicable to different contexts when focusing on the risks associated with failing to engage in a certain behavior and the influence it has on the individual and society.
... A potential for backlash is always present in countermessaging campaigns [100,101]. Additionally, while the so-called "backlash effect" (that is, the theory that factual counterargument entrenches false beliefs) has been credibly challenged [102], there is ample evidence that carelessly repeating false information can help spread it [103][104][105][106]. Therefore, public health messaging that addresses anti-vaccination audiences, already hardened in their beliefs, must be preceded by especially rigorous testing. ...
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Article
Vaccine hesitancy (delay in obtaining a vaccine, despite availability) represents a significant hurdle to managing the COVID-19 pandemic. Vaccine hesitancy is in part related to the prevalence of anti-vaccine misinformation and disinformation, which are spread through social media and user-generated content platforms. This study uses qualitative coding methodology to identify salient narratives and rhetorical styles common to anti-vaccine and COVID-denialist media. It organizes these narratives and rhetorics according to theme, imagined antagonist, and frequency. Most frequent were narratives centered on “corrupt elites” and rhetorics appealing to the vulnerability of children. The identification of these narratives and rhetorics may assist in developing effective public health messaging campaigns, since narrative and emotion have demonstrated persuasive effectiveness in other public health communication settings.
... Studies on persuasion through fiction suggested that people change their real-world beliefs upon engaging with fictional stories (Green and Brock, 2002;Marsh and Fazio, 2006;Appel and Richter, 2007). Other studies found that repeated warnings about false consumer claims foster the remembering of those claims as true (Skurnik et al., 2005). Still other studies have shown that repetition increases statements' perceived truthfulness, even when those statements contradict well-known facts (Fazio et al., 2019). ...
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Article
The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth‐apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.
... The effect seems robust to individual differences in cognitive ability (De keersmaecker et al., 2019). It persists even when participants are warned to avoid it (Nadarevic & Aßfalg, 2017), possess knowledge about the factual answer (Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015), or are explicitly informed about which statements are true and which are false (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992;Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990;Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). Repeatedly reading misinformation might even reduce how unethical it feels to share that unambiguously false information on social media (Effron & Raj, 2019). ...
Full-text available
Article
Repeated statements are rated as subjectively truer than comparable new statements, even though repetition alone provides no new, probative information (the illusory truth effect). Contrary to some theoretical predictions, the illusory truth effect seems to be similar in magnitude for repetitions occurring after minutes or weeks. This Registered Report describes a longitudinal investigation of the illusory truth effect (n = 608, n = 567 analysed) in which we systematically manipulated intersession interval (immediately, one day, one week, and one month) in order to test whether the illusory truth effect is immune to time. Both our hypotheses were supported: We observed an illusory truth effect at all four intervals (overall effect: χ 2(1) = 169.91; M repeated = 4.52, M new = 4.14; H1), with the effect diminishing as delay increased (H2). False information repeated over short timescales might have a greater effect on truth judgements than repetitions over longer timescales. Researchers should consider the implications of the choice of intersession interval when designing future illusory truth effect research.
Chapter
The half-truth fallacy—for example, quoting only parts of the data that support a writer’s argument—in the news can be fact-checked by human experts, but fact-checking takes at least a few hours during which readers can be exposed to less-than-valid arguments. As an interim solution, this study proposes the aTag:half_truth to warn of the potential half-truth fallacy before expert fact-checking. It visualises the data–assumption–claim structure and provides rebuttal comments on the information currently missing but necessary for claim validity check. The aTag:half_truth was tested using an online questionnaire for effectiveness in enhancing readers’ understanding of the issue, revealing the insufficiency of data in the original news text, and questioning the validity of the claims in the news. The analysis of data confirmed that, in the experimental group who read four fallacious claims with the aTag:half_truth, comprehension scores were higher and the scores were inversely correlated to perceived information sufficiency of news text and perceived validity of the claims. The experimental group found the aTag:half_truth rebuttal comments useful, and the percentage of the participants’ responses grounded into the rebuttal comments was significantly higher. The perceived validity of claims, however, was not significantly lower in the experimental group than in the control group for three out of four claims. Such a result was attributed to the political nature of the topics where the effects of fact-checking are limited due to readers’ interests and biases.KeywordsMobile user interface designArgument visualisationHalf-truth fallacyMedia literacyCritical thinking
Chapter
Beliefs play a central role in our lives. They lie at the heart of what makes us human, they shape the organization and functioning of our minds, they define the boundaries of our culture, and they guide our motivation and behavior. Given their central importance, researchers across a number of disciplines have studied beliefs, leading to results and literatures that do not always interact. The Cognitive Science of Belief aims to integrate these disconnected lines of research to start a broader dialogue on the nature, role, and consequences of beliefs. It tackles timeless questions, as well as applications of beliefs that speak to current social issues. This multidisciplinary approach to beliefs will benefit graduate students and researchers in cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, political science, economics, and religious studies.
Chapter
Beliefs play a central role in our lives. They lie at the heart of what makes us human, they shape the organization and functioning of our minds, they define the boundaries of our culture, and they guide our motivation and behavior. Given their central importance, researchers across a number of disciplines have studied beliefs, leading to results and literatures that do not always interact. The Cognitive Science of Belief aims to integrate these disconnected lines of research to start a broader dialogue on the nature, role, and consequences of beliefs. It tackles timeless questions, as well as applications of beliefs that speak to current social issues. This multidisciplinary approach to beliefs will benefit graduate students and researchers in cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, political science, economics, and religious studies.
Chapter
This text introduces students, scholars, and interested educated readers to the issues of human memory broadly considered, encompassing both individual memory, collective remembering by societies, and the construction of history. The book is organised around several major questions: How do memories construct our past? How do we build shared collective memories? How does memory shape history? This volume presents a special perspective, emphasising the role of memory processes in the construction of self-identity, of shared cultural norms and concepts, and of historical awareness. Although the results are fairly new and the techniques suitably modern, the vision itself is of course related to the work of such precursors as Frederic Bartlett and Aleksandr Luria, who in very different ways represent the starting point of a serious psychology of human culture.
Chapter
This text introduces students, scholars, and interested educated readers to the issues of human memory broadly considered, encompassing both individual memory, collective remembering by societies, and the construction of history. The book is organised around several major questions: How do memories construct our past? How do we build shared collective memories? How does memory shape history? This volume presents a special perspective, emphasising the role of memory processes in the construction of self-identity, of shared cultural norms and concepts, and of historical awareness. Although the results are fairly new and the techniques suitably modern, the vision itself is of course related to the work of such precursors as Frederic Bartlett and Aleksandr Luria, who in very different ways represent the starting point of a serious psychology of human culture.
Chapter
This text introduces students, scholars, and interested educated readers to the issues of human memory broadly considered, encompassing both individual memory, collective remembering by societies, and the construction of history. The book is organised around several major questions: How do memories construct our past? How do we build shared collective memories? How does memory shape history? This volume presents a special perspective, emphasising the role of memory processes in the construction of self-identity, of shared cultural norms and concepts, and of historical awareness. Although the results are fairly new and the techniques suitably modern, the vision itself is of course related to the work of such precursors as Frederic Bartlett and Aleksandr Luria, who in very different ways represent the starting point of a serious psychology of human culture.
Chapter
This text introduces students, scholars, and interested educated readers to the issues of human memory broadly considered, encompassing both individual memory, collective remembering by societies, and the construction of history. The book is organised around several major questions: How do memories construct our past? How do we build shared collective memories? How does memory shape history? This volume presents a special perspective, emphasising the role of memory processes in the construction of self-identity, of shared cultural norms and concepts, and of historical awareness. Although the results are fairly new and the techniques suitably modern, the vision itself is of course related to the work of such precursors as Frederic Bartlett and Aleksandr Luria, who in very different ways represent the starting point of a serious psychology of human culture.
Chapter
This text introduces students, scholars, and interested educated readers to the issues of human memory broadly considered, encompassing both individual memory, collective remembering by societies, and the construction of history. The book is organised around several major questions: How do memories construct our past? How do we build shared collective memories? How does memory shape history? This volume presents a special perspective, emphasising the role of memory processes in the construction of self-identity, of shared cultural norms and concepts, and of historical awareness. Although the results are fairly new and the techniques suitably modern, the vision itself is of course related to the work of such precursors as Frederic Bartlett and Aleksandr Luria, who in very different ways represent the starting point of a serious psychology of human culture.
Chapter
The spread of misinformation and disinformation related to science and technology has impeded public and policy efforts to mitigate threats such as COVID-19 and anthropogenic climate change. In the digital age, such so-called fake science can propagate faster and capture the public imagination to a greater extent than accurate science. Therefore, ensuring the most reliable science reaches and is accepted by audiences now entails understanding the origins of fake science so that effective measures can be operationalized to recognize misinformation and inhibit its spread. In this chapter, we review the potential weaknesses of science publishing and assessment as an origin of misinformation; the interplay between science, the media, and society; and the limitations of literacy as an inoculation against misinformation; and we offer guidance on the most effective ways to frame science to engage non-expert audiences. We conclude by offering avenues for future science communication research.
Chapter
The Coronavirus Disease of 2019, or COVID-19 epidemic has generated unprecedented levels of uncertainty and confusion regarding public health amongst the world population. A second “pandemic” or infodemic, exacerbated by social media, warrants just as much focus as the amplification of COVID-19 misinformation could erode trust, instigate conflict and undermine measures to control the pandemic. This chapter provides a background on the use of instant messaging platforms in Asia and discuss how these platforms are dangerous breeding grounds for misinformation. Through a content analysis of COVID-19 claims circulated via instant messaging platforms, we identified the dominant false narratives, and multimedia (image, video or audio) misinformation. We review the current legislative and non-legislative initiatives that discouraged the creation and propagation of false COVID-19 information as well as the growing body of psychological research on message cues, cognitive vulnerabilities and personality predispositions that make people susceptible to false information. This will contribute toward a more comprehensive strategy to combat misinformation in the longer term.
Article
Background: The spread of false and misleading health information on social media can cause individual and social harm. Research on debunking has shown that properly designed corrections can mitigate the impact of misinformation, but little is known about the impact of correction in the context of prolonged social media debates. For example, when a social media user takes to Facebook to make a false claim about a health-related practice, and a health expert subsequently refutes the claim, the conversation rarely ends there. Often, the social media user proceeds by rebuking the critic and doubling down on the claim. Objective: The present research examines the impact of such extended back and forth between false claims and debunking attempts on observers' dispositions toward behavior that science favors. We test competing predictions about the effect of extended exposure on people's attitudes and intentions toward masking in public during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic and explore several psychological processes potentially underlying this effect. Methods: Five hundred US residents took part in an online experiment in October 2020. They reported on their attitudes and intentions toward wearing masks in public. Then, they were randomly assigned to one of four social media exposure conditions (misinformation only vs. misinformation + correction vs. misinformation + correction + rebuke vs. misinformation + correction + rebuke + second correction) and reported their attitudes and intentions for a second time. They also indicated whether they would consider sharing the thread if they were to see it on social media and answered questions on potential mediators and covariates. Results: Exposure to misinformation has a negative impact on attitudes and intentions toward masking (beta = -.35, 95% CI = [-.42, -.29], P < .001). Moreover, initial debunking of a false claim generally improves attitudes and intentions toward masking (beta = .35, 95% CI = [.16, .54], P < .001). However, this improvement is washed out by further exposure to false claims and debunking attempts (beta = -.53, 95% CI = [-.72, -.34], P < .001). The latter result is partially explained by a decrease in the perceived objectivity of truth. That is, extended exposure to false claims and debunking attempts appears to weaken belief that there is an objectively correct answer to how people ought to behave in this situation, which in turn leads to less positive reactions toward masking as the prescribed behavior. Conclusions: Health professionals and science advocates face an underappreciated challenge in attempting to debunk misinformation on social media. While engaging in extended debates with science deniers and other purveyors of bunk appears necessary, more research is needed to address the unintended consequences of such engagement. Clinicaltrial:
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American democracy is built, in part, on the ideal of a “free marketplace of ideas.” Consumers are assumed to have access to the same arguments, and through deliberation, come to a consensus about which arguments are true, and therefore, best. In this article, we explain how deceptive communication undermines this ideal. We focus on two key dimensions—the motive of deception and the perception of dishonesty—that influence people's propensity to deceive and the social rewards of doing so. Deception is seen as the most justified when it is morally motivated and when it involves indirect tactics that are not perceived as particularly dishonest. We argue, therefore, that morally motivated half‐truths, rather than blatantly selfish lies, may do the greatest damage to the marketplace of ideas. Ultimately, this article advances our understanding of the causes and consequences of deception and helps to explain the dynamics that lead to widespread misinformation in our social world.
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Drawing from a content analysis of publicly-traded companies’ privacy notices, a survey of managers, a field study, and five online experiments, this research investigates how consumers respond to privacy notices. A privacy notice, by placing legally-enforceable limits on a firm’s data practices, communicating safeguards, and signaling transparency, might be expected to promote confidence that personal data will not be misused. Indeed, most managers expected a privacy notice to make customers feel more secure (Study 1). Yet, consistent with the analogy that bulletproof glass can increase feelings of vulnerability despite the protection offered, formal privacy notices undermined consumer trust and decreased purchase interest even when they emphasized objective protection (Studies 2, 3, and 5) or omitted any mention of potentially concerning data practices (Study 6). These unintended consequences did not occur, however, when consumers had an a priori reason to be distrustful (Study 4) or when benevolence cues were added to privacy notices (Studies 5-6). Finally, Study 7 showed that both the presence and conspicuous absence of privacy information are sufficient to trigger decreased purchase intent. Together, these results provide actionable guidance to managers on how to effectively convey privacy information (without hurting purchase interest).
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Why people still rely on misinformation after clear corrections is a major concern driving relevant research. Different fields, from psychology to marketing, have been seeking answers. Yet there remains no systematic review to integrate these theoretical and empirical insights. To fill the gap, this article reviewed 135 articles on misinformation correction and its effects written before 2020 to examine the knowledge generated in the field. Our findings indicate a consistent interest on this topic over the past four decades, and a sharp increase of relevant scholarly work in the last ten years. Nevertheless, most studies have been built upon psychological inquiries and quantitative methodologies. What is lacking includes longitudinal measurements of debunking effectiveness, theoretical insights beyond cognitive sciences, methodological contributions from qualitative approaches, and empirical evidence from non-western societies. With this analysis, we propose worthwhile focuses for future exploration.
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False and misleading information is readily accessible in people's environments, oftentimes reaching people repeatedly. This repeated exposure can significantly affect people's beliefs about the world, as has been noted by scholars in political science, communication, and cognitive, developmental, and social psychology. In particular, repetition increases belief in false information, even when the misinformation contradicts prior knowledge. We review work across these disciplines, identifying factors that may heighten, diminish, or have no impact on these adverse effects of repetition on belief. Specifically, we organize our discussion around variations in what information is repeated, to whom the information is repeated, how people interact with this repetition, and how people's beliefs are measured. A key cross‐disciplinary theme is that the most influential factor is how carefully or critically people process the false information. However, several open questions remain when comparing findings across different fields and approaches. We conclude by noting a need for more interdisciplinary work to help resolve these questions, as well as a need for more work in naturalistic settings so that we can better understand and combat the effects of repeated circulation of false and misleading information in society. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Factors that have been shown to influence how repetition affects belief. Factors that have been shown to heighten the effects of repetition on belief in information are listed above, and factors that have been shown to reduce these effects are listed below the time course of repeated exposure. Factors for which there is no evidence of impact are in the oval at the bottom.
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Purpose A counterintuitive finding of existing research is that negative reviews can produce positive effects; for example, they can increase purchase likelihood and sales by increasing product awareness. It is important to continue highlighting this fact and to develop further insights into this positive effect, as a more thorough analysis can provide online retailers with a more comprehensive understanding of how to effectively manage and use negative reviews. Thus, by using an eye-tracking method, this paper attempts to provide a further thorough analysis of positive effects of negative reviews from a cognitive perspective. Design/methodology/approach An eye-tracking experiment with two tests over a time delay was performed to examine whether negative reviews have some positive effects. Review valence (positive vs. negative), brand popularity (popular vs. unpopular) and advertising exposure (no repetition vs. repetition) were considered in the experiment. Findings The results show that a cognitive process of attention allocation happens when consumers deal with brand popularity cues and that arousal evoking and attention allocation occur when handling review valence. Allocation of more attention to unpopular brands helps improve brand awareness and enhance brand memory, and larger arousal from negative reviews narrows attention and leads to a better memory of products and brands. However, with the passage of time, the memory of review valence can dissociate and fade, and the remaining awareness of and familiarity with unpopular brands with negative reviews contribute to a positive reversion, which leads to the production of positive effects from negative reviews. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature on online reviews by examining the visual processing of review valence and brand popularity with an eye-tracking method and by revealing the cognitive mechanism of positive effects of negative reviews from a visual attention perspective.
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This research studied difficult-to-pronounce product names which are prevalent in certain product categories. In study 1, consumers tried golf balls that varied in name pronounceability but were otherwise identical and, despite direct experience, concluded balls with difficult versus easy-to-pronounce names were less controllable and less preferable. In study 2, consumers were asked to look for a dog that was highly (less highly) controllable for an urban (rural) setting, and the dog with the difficult-to-pronounce name was viewed as less controllable because it seemed less familiar and was less preferred for the urban setting. Study 3 verified the effects of difficult-to-pronounce names on familiarity and controllability perceptions and found preference effects among those with high trait desire for control. Study 4 documented the prevalence of difficult-to-pronounce names on a popular ecommerce site for tires. Overall, our findings indicate managers should avoid using difficult-to-pronounce product names when consumers strongly desire product controllability.
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If the meaning contained in a remedial message has not been satisfactorily comprehended, then its intended impact upon consumer beliefs cannot logically be achieved. The present investigation, employing three heterogeneous samples, found that remedial messages using "plain English" developed and proposed by the FTC may be widely misunderstood by large segments of the population.
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The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of aging on credibility judgments and source memory for statements expressing new “factual” knowledge. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of familiarity in young and older adults' credibility judgments by comparing their truth ratings for repeated and nonrepeated statements of unknown credibility. In Experiment 2, we provided information on the actual truth or falsity of some of the repeated statements to determine whether this objective evidence would have less influence in older adults' later credibility judgments than in younger adults' judgments. In both experiments, we examined age-related differences in source memory for the statements. the major findings were as follows: (a) the influence of knowledge familiarity as a subjective basis for credibility judgment did not decline with age; (b) compared to young adults, older adults were just as likely to use objective evidence of statement credibility in their judgments when this evidence confirmed the truth of their knowledge, but were somewhat less likely to do so when this evidence disconfirmed the truth of their knowledge; and (c) older adults' memory for the source of their knowledge was consistently less accurate than that of young adults. These findings suggest that older adults will not be at a disadvantage relative to young adults when their credibility judgments can be based on the subjective evidence of knowledge familiarity, but they will sometimes be at a disadvantage when a more objective basis for judgment is required. In particular, age-related declines in the ability to process evidence that disconfirms the credibility of knowledge may lead to a magnification of the natural tendency to believe rather than disbelieve (cf. Gilbert, 1991).
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The familiarity of names produced by their prior presentation can be misinterpreted as fame. We used this false fame effect to separately study the effects of divided attention on familiarity versus conscious recollection. In a first experiment, famous and nonfamous names were presented to be read under conditions of full vs. divided attention. Divided attention greatly reduced later recognition memory performance but had no effect on gains in familiarity as measured by fame judgments. In later experiments, we placed recognition memory and familiarity in opposition by presenting only nonfamous names to be read in the first phase. Recognizing a name as earlier read on the later fame test allowed Ss to be certain that it was nonfamous. Divided attention at study or during the fame test reduced list recognition performance but had no effect on familiarity. We conclude that conscious recollection is an attention-demanding act that is separate from assessing familiarity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Using factual information of uncertain truth value as the stimulus material, previous investigators have found that repeated statements are rated more valid than non-repeated statements. Experiments 1 and 1A were designed to determine if this effect would also occur for opinion statements and for statements initially rated either true or false. Subjects were exposed to a 108-statement list one week and a second list of the same length a week later. This second list was comprised of some of the statements seen earlier plus some statements seen for the first time. Results suggested that all types of repeated statements are rated as more valid than their non-repeated counterparts. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the validity-enhancing effect of repetition does not occur in subject domains about which a person claims not be knowledgeable. From the results of both studies we concluded that familiarity is a basis for the judged validity of statements. The relation between this phenomenon and the judged validity of decisions and predictions was also discussed.
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Studies of age differences in face recognition have shown age-related increases in false-alarm errors: elderly persons exceed young adults in judging new faces to be old. To distinguish among theoretical accounts of this finding, we compared young and elderly subjects in two recognition tasks: (1) that of judging whether faces were recent or nonrecent, and (2) that of judging whether faces were famous or nonfamous. The major independent variable was prior presentation of faces—including nonrecent and nonfamous foils—1 week before the test. Falserecent judgments in response to nonrecent faces and falsefamous judgments in response to nonfamous faces were higher among the elderly. Moreover, these age-related differences in false-alarm rates were larger for faces viewed 1 week previously than for entirely new faces. The findings suggest that, compared to young adults, older individuals rely relatively more on perceived familiarity, and relatively less on recollection of context, in making recognition decisions.
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The authors reviewed the evidence of age differences in episodic memory for content of a message and the context associated with it. Specifically, the authors tested a hypothesis that memory for context is more vulnerable to aging than memory for content. In addition, the authors inquired whether effort at encoding and retrieval and type of stimulus material moderate the magnitude of age differences in both memory domains. The results of the meta-analysis of 46 studies confirmed the main hypothesis: Age differences in context memory are reliably greater than those in memory for content. Tasks that required greater effort during retrieval yielded larger age differences in content but not in context memory. The greatest magnitude of age differences in context memory was observed for those contextual features that were more likely to have been encoded independently from content. Possible mechanisms that may underlie age differences in context memory-attentional deficit, reduced working memory capacity, and failure of inhibitory processing are discussed.
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Numerous empirical and theoretical observations point to the constructive nature of human memory. This paper reviews contemporary research pertaining to two major types of memory distortions that illustrate such constructive processes: (a) false recognition and (b) intrusions and confabulations. A general integrative framework that outlines the types of problems that the human memory system must solve in order to produce mainly accurate representations of past experience is first described. This constructive memory framework (CMF) emphasizes processes that operate at encoding (initially binding distributed features of an episode together as a coherent trace; ensuring sufficient pattern separation of similar episodes) and also at retrieval (formation of a sufficiently focused retrieval description with which to query memory; postretrieval monitoring and verification). The framework is applied to findings from four different areas of research: cognitive studies of young adults, neuropsychological investigations of brain-damaged patients, neuroimaging studies, and studies of cognitive aging.
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An "on-air" radio test was made of the Listerine corrective advertising remedy. The method applied is an improvement on previously used approaches in terms of "natural" exposure, multiple exposure to the corrective commercial, and a separation of experimental treatments from the dependent measures. In contrast to the results of previous studies, the corrective commercial is found to be effective in lowering target beliefs, yet precise enough to have no significant effect on any other dependent variables.
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This research examined the effects of corrective advertising (advertising that corrects for previously made ad claims found to be deceptive) on brand and advertiser evaluations. Experiment 1 showed that brand evaluations were less favorable after (vs. before) company-sponsored corrective advertising when prior evaluations of the advertiser were negative, but not when they were positive. On the other hand, advertiser evaluations were less favorable after corrective advertising when prior evaluations of the advertiser were positive, but not when they were negative. Experiment 2 was designed to examine the mechanisms underlying these effects. Brand beliefs and cognitive responses to the corrective ad were found to mediate the effects of prior advertiser evaluations on brand evaluations. Advertiser evaluations were affected by cognitive and affective responses made to the corrective ad. Implications of these findings are discussed.
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Several suggestions for a class of theories of recognition memory have been proposed during the past decade. These models address predictions about judgments of prior occurrence of an event, not the identification of what it is. The history and current status of one of these models is discussed. The model postulates the detection of familiarity and the utilization of retrieval mechanisms as additive and separate processes. The phenomenal experience of familiarity is assigned to intraevent organizational integrative processes; retrieval depends on interevent elaborative processes. Other current theoretical options are described, and relevant supportive data from the literature are reviewed. New tests of the model involving both free recall and word pair paradigms are presented. The dual process model is extended to the word frequency effect and to the recognition difficulties of amnesic patients. (68 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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In four experiments we examine the ability of simple concurrent disclosures to correct invalid inferences about brand quality based on advertising claims. We ensure that the disclosure is always encoded, yet we find that it is utilized to correct invalid inferences only under high-capacity conditions. Across the experiments, cognitive capacity is operationalized as opportunity to process (time), ability (explicitness of disclosure), and motivation (accuracy incentive). Two experiments use open-ended brand-claim recall and cognitive responses to establish that elaboration on the qualified claim and disclosure mediates its utilization in updating quality judgments. Given an impression-formation goal, such elaboration can occur on-line at the time of processing brand information or at the time of judgment, provided that the disclosure is internally or externally available. Practical strategies for facilitating the use of disclosures to correct inference errors are offered. Copyright 2000 by the University of Chicago.
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This research examines the impact of age-related deficits in recognition and source memory on repetition-induced increases in belief in fictitious statements (the "truth effect"). Young and elderly subjects made recognition-memory judgments and rated the credibility of new and previously presented statements. Experiment 1 assessed the level of memory impairment in the elderly, as compared to the young, and its influence on the truth effect. The elderly, who had a greater tendency to make false-alarm errors in recognition and had poorer source memory for the claims, were more susceptible to the truth-inflating effect of repetition than were the young. Deeper (semantic vs. perceptual) processing was ineffective in reducing age-related deficits in memory or sensitivity to repetition-induced beliefs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that an imagery encoding task did provide more environmental support (a greater improvement in recognition and source memory for the elderly than the young) than did a perceptual encoding task. When both young and elderly subjects engaged in an imagery task during encoding, their memory performance was equivalent and age-related differences in the truth effect were abolished. Thus, it appears that the elderly are more susceptible to the truth-inflating effect of repetition, and this effect seems to be mediated via their poor memory. However, if memory is enhanced using environmental support, the elderly are no longer especially vulnerable to the truth effect.
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Four experiments examined ironic effects of repetition, effects opposite to those desired (cf. D. M. Wegner, 1994). For an exclusion task, participants were to respond "yes" to words heard earlier but "no" to words that were read earlier. Results from young adults given adequate time to respond showed that false alarms to earlier-read words decreased with their repetition. An opposite, ironic effect of repetition was found for elderly adults--false alarms to earlier-read words increased with repetition. Younger adults forced to respond quickly or to perform a secondary task while reading words showed the same ironic effect of repetition as did elderly adults. The process-dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991, 1998) was used to show that factors that produce ironic effects do so by reducing recollection while leaving effects of repetition on familiarity unchanged.
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Are age differences in source memory inevitable? The two experiments reported here examined the hypothesis that the type of source information being tested mediates the magnitude of age differences in source memory. In these studies, participants listened to statements made by two different speakers. We compared younger and older adults' source memory in a traditional perceptual source task (memory for voice) and in two affective, conceptually based source tasks (truth of the statements, character of a person in a photo). In both studies, the perceptual and conceptual source information were conveyed in the same manner, as one speaker was associated with one type of information (e.g., female voice speaks truth). Age differences were robust for decisions regarding who said each statement but were negligible or truth or character decisions. These findings are provocative because they suggest that the type of information can influence age-related patterns of performance for source-conveyed information.
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Passage of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act in 1994 restricted the Food and Drug Administration's control over dietary supplements, leading to enormous growth in their promotion. The Internet is often used by consumers as a source of information on such therapies. To assess the information presented and indications claimed on the Internet for the 8 best-selling herbal products. We searched the Internet using the 5 most commonly used search engines. For each, we entered the names of the 8 most widely used herbal supplements (ginkgo biloba, St John's wort, echinacea, ginseng, garlic, saw palmetto, kava kava, and valerian root). We analyzed the health content of all Web sites listed on the first page of the search results. We analyzed all accessible, English-language Web sites that pertained to oral herbal supplements. A total of 522 Web sites were identified; of these, 443 sites met inclusion criteria for the analysis. The nature of the Web site (retail or nonretail), whether it was a sponsored link, and all references, indications, claims, and disclaimers were recorded. Two reviewers independently categorized medical claims as disease or nondisease according to Food and Drug Administration criteria. Among 443 Web sites, 338 (76%) were retail sites either selling product or directly linked to a vendor. A total of 273 (81%) of the 338 retail Web sites made 1 or more health claims; of these, 149 (55%) claimed to treat, prevent, diagnose, or cure specific diseases. More than half (153/292; 52%) of sites with a health claim omitted the standard federal disclaimer. Nonretail sites were more likely than retail sites to include literature references, although only 52 (12%) of the 443 Web sites provided referenced information without a link to a distributor or vendor. Consumers may be misled by vendors' claims that herbal products can treat, prevent, diagnose, or cure specific diseases, despite regulations prohibiting such statements. Physicians should be aware of this widespread and easily accessible information. More effective regulation is required to put this class of therapeutics on the same evidence-based footing as other medicinal products.
Biases in Remembering True and False Information: Illusions of Truth and Falseness, " unpublished manuscript Drawing Inferences from Feelings: The Role of Naive Be-liefs, " in The Message Within: The Role of Subjective Ex-perience in Social Cognition and Behavior
  • Skurnik
  • Gordon B Ian
  • Marcia K Moskowitz
  • Johnson
Skurnik, Ian, Gordon B. Moskowitz, and Marcia K. Johnson (2005), " Biases in Remembering True and False Information: Illusions of Truth and Falseness, " unpublished manuscript, University of Toronto. Skurnik, Ian, Norbert Schwarz, and Piotr Winkielman (2000), " Drawing Inferences from Feelings: The Role of Naive Be-liefs, " in The Message Within: The Role of Subjective Ex-perience in Social Cognition and Behavior, ed. Herbert Bless and Joseph P. Forgas, Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 162–75.