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RICHARD M. RYAN, VERONIKA HUTA and EDWARD L. DECI
LIVING WELL: A SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY
PERSPECTIVE ON EUDAIMONIA
ABSTRACT. This article distinguishes between hedonic and eudaimonic
approaches to wellness, with the former focusing on the outcome of happiness
or pleasure and the latter focusing not so much on outcomes as on the process
of living well. We present a model of eudaimonia that is based in self-deter-
mination theory, arguing that eudaimonic living can be characterized in terms
of four motivational concepts: (1) pursuing intrinsic goals and values for their
own sake, including personal growth, relationships, community, and health,
rather than extrinsic goals and values, such as wealth, fame, image, and power;
(2) behaving in autonomous, volitional, or consensual ways, rather than het-
eronomous or controlled ways; (3) being mindful and acting with a sense of
awareness; and (4) behaving in ways that satisfy basic psychological needs for
competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In fact, we theorize that the first three
of these aspects of eudaimonic living have their positive effects of psychological
and physica l wellness because they facilitate satisfaction of these basic, uni-
versal psychological needs. Studies indicate that people high in eudaimonic
living tend to behave in more prosocial ways, thus benefiting the collective as
well as themselves, and that conditions both within the family and in society
more generally contribute toward strengthening versus diminishing the degree
to which people live eudaimonic live s.
KEY WORDS: autonomy, awareness, happiness, intrinsic aspirations,
mindfulness, self-determination theory, the good life, wellness.
In both traditional and current views hedonia and eudaimonia
are often juxtaposed as opposing perspectives on human well-
ness. The hedonic approach defines well-being as happiness,
interpreted as the occurrence of positive affect and the absence
of negative affect (Kahneman et al., 1999). Hedonistic psychol-
ogy therefore has a clear and measurable target for research,
which is one of its major advantages as a focus for a science of
well-being. In contrast, the concept of eudaimonia, generally
Journal of Happiness Studies (2008) 9:139–170 Ó Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10902-006-9023-4
defined as living a complete human life, or the realization of
valued human potentials (Ryan and Deci, 2001) has been used
in more varied ways, and assessments of eudaimonia have been
multiple and not always well coordinated. In short there is a
notable imbalance in the exactingness with which hedonic and
eudaimonic well-being researchers have specified their targets.
Our principal aim is to articulate a framework for the general
study of eudaimonia, and to introduce a specific working model
of eudaimonia derived from self-determination theory (SDT;
Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000), with elements that
are amenable to empirically based testing and elaboration.
Because eudaimonia refers to living well, any theory of eudaimo-
nia consists of a set of prescriptions and proscriptions. How well
the theory fairs in terms of yielding a high quality life is thus an
empirical question. In other words, the criteria for judging a the-
ory of eudaimonia rest in its ability to predict, and when imple-
mented, bring about, outcomes that people value deeply and
that can be said to represent wellness. In this way, the proposed
framework is also intended to connect with the existing bodies
of research on values, motives, well-being, and quality of life.
A central premise of our thesis is that hedonic versus eudai-
monic psychologies do not in principle constitute a debate about
what well-being ‘‘feels like’’ or what ‘‘happiness,’’ considered as a
state of mind, entails. Rather, eudaimonic conceptions focus on
the content of one’s life, and the processes involved in living well,
whereas hedonic conceptions of well-being focus on a specific out-
come, namely the attainment of positive affect and an absence of
pain. Thus, in our view, hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives are
not distinct because they conceive of different types of well-being
states or outcomes but rather because they have altogether differ-
ent targets. The foci of eudaimonic research are to specify what
living well entails and to identify the expected consequences of
such living. These consequences may include hedonic satisfac-
tions, but typically eudaimonic theorists have been especially
interested in other outcomes indicative of a good life, such as
vitality, intimacy, health, and sense of meaning, among others.
By contrast, the focus of hedonic research is on a valued but
delimited state, namely pleasure. Although pleasure is often
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
140
demeaned as an important human outcome, it is in our view a
very significant one. Pleasure and positive affect are important
human experiences not only because they represent intrinsically
preferred states, but also because they can facilitate and suppo rt
other human functions (Isen, 2003; King et al., 2006). More-
over, it is clear that pleasure, psychological health, and optimal
functioning are inter-correlated.
Accordingly, from our perspective, positive affect and plea-
sure are both correlates and consequences of living well – of
eudaimonia. That is, a person who engages in meaningful
endeavors, actualizes potentials, and is ‘‘fully functioning’’ – all
characteristics frequently mentioned as hallmarks of eudaimonia
– will typically experience considerable happiness and pleasure
(Ryan and Deci, 2001). Yet antecedents of pleasure can also
include goals and lifestyles antithetical to most eudaimonic
conceptions, such as living a life of shallow values, greed, or
exploitation of others . There are, in short, multiple routes to
pleasure, not all of which entail living eudaimonically. The
hedonic/eudaimonic distinction is thus neither a trivial nor a
simple one.
Defining health and wellness is not only of theoretical interest
to researchers but also has substantial applied significance. If one
aims to develop interventions one has to know what the target is.
In the past, both psychological and medical researchers have
often done this negatively – seeing health and wellness as the
absence of disease or psychopathology. In the context of modern
positive psychology, both hedonic and eudaimonic conceptions
of wellness have gained salience, but each may lead to a different
set of prescriptions (Ryan and Deci, 2001; Maddux, 2002).
Because it can be so variously produced, we suggest that a
focus on hedonic outcomes cannot by itself reliably lead to
either individual or collective well-being. Indeed, in the view we
shall propose, the more directly one aims to maximize pleasure
and avoid pain the more likely one is to produce instead a life
bereft of depth, meaning, and community. Prescriptions based
on maximizing pleasure are too often associated with dead-end
routes to wellness such as selfishness, materialism, objectified
sexuality, and ecological destructiveness, thus demonstrating
LIVING WELL
141
how easily a map derived from hedonic thinking can mislead.
By contrast, specification of eudaimonic living might not only
be of value as a guide to a more complete and meaningful life;
it should also yield more stable and enduring hedonic happiness
(Huta and Ryan, 2006).
The distinction between eudaimonia and hedonia is also sig-
nificant on a broader societal level. Whether one is making com-
parative national health assessments or actually creating social
and economic policies, the kind of good life we are targeting
makes a difference. Numerous authors have pointed out that a
focus on hedonic happiness is by no means culturally neutral; it
is both presupposed by and a reflection of individualistic,
market-based economics (e.g., Ferguson, 1990; Christopher,
1999; Kasser et al., in press). Focusing instead on broader eudai-
monic outcomes may suggest important alternative routes to
individual and societal wellness and may play a critical function
with respect to economic and social policies.
We begin by briefly reviewing the concept of eudaimonia as
formulated by Aristotle, who introduced this seminal idea. We
then propose an SDT-based framework for eudaimonia that fo-
cuses on intrinsic goals, autonomy, basic psychological need
satisfactions, and the connections of these processes with both
hedonic phenomena and other, more eudaimonic indicators of
well-being. We will also review some of the empirical evidence
that supports SDT and its eudaimonic conception.
ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF EUDAIMONIA
The eudaimonic tradition in well-being studies derives from
Aristotle’s philosophy of happiness, especially as articulated
within his Nicomachian Ethics (translated by Broadie and Rowe,
2002). Therein he sets out a definition of human happiness that
is centered on what it means to live a good life, a life represent-
ing human excellence. Yet, by beginning with Aristotle we do
not suggest that his formulation of eudaimonia is fully defini-
tive. Aristotle had his own historically and culturally shaped
ideas of human excellences and the processes of obtaining them
that in no way should be taken as the ‘‘final word.’’ Indeed,
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
142
some of his emphases concerning optimal human living match
ours, and others do not. Moreover, whereas Aristotle’s
approach was wholly deductive, our intent is to use a scientific
approach that inherently entails openness to what the data tell
us about eudaimonia. Nonetheless, insofar as Aristotle supplied
the staring point for this school of thinking, his approach
merits consideration.
Eudaimonia Defined
In Aristotle’s view eudaimonia is the chief human good. He
defined eudaimonia as a character of persons that entails living
in accordance with reason and moderation, and aiming towar d
excellence and the realization of a complete human life. This
summary definition is quite complex, and has been variously
interpreted. Herein we highlight some of its essential features.
Feeling Good Versus Living Well
Most importantly, Aristotle distinguished between happiness as
experiencing pleasure (i.e., hedonia) versus happiness as living
well (i.e., eudaimonia). Broadie and Rowe (2002), in comment-
ing on the Nicomachian Ethics state that even Aristotle’s use of
the word eudaimonia implies this distinction. They suggested
that an ancient Greek citizen, knowing that someone was in a
state of pleasure, would not on that account apply the term
eudaimonia to him or her. Eudaimonia is not a ‘‘feeling’’, it is
instead a des cription of character: it is an adjective suggesting
an exemplary life. As they stated it: ‘‘gluttons smacking greasy
lips are happy, but not eudaimones. By contrast, to ascribe eu-
daimonia is to honor the recipient’’ (p. 12). Such a person has
qualities that characterize an excellent human life, whether or
not he or she happens to ‘‘feel good.’’ Eudaimonia is thus not
conceived of as a mental state, a positive feeling, or a cognitive
appraisal of satisfaction, but rather as a way of living.
Living Well Means Pursuing the Right Ends
For Aristotle eudaimonic living requires engaging one’s best
human capacities by actively pursuing virtues and excellences.
In this view, as people pursue excellence they are actualizing
their most authentic or highest natures (daimon), though not
LIVING WELL
143
their only natures. Moreover, Aristotle suggested that the pur-
suit of these excellences is an intrinsically worthy endeavor. It is
an end in itself. In contrast, he was particularly critical of the
pursuit of wealth or power, because these are ends without
inherent value. As he stated it: ‘‘wealth is clearly not the good
we are looking for, since it is useful, and for the sake of some-
thing else’’ (p. 98). Thus, whereas wealth and power have
extrinsic value, the pursuit of human excellences and virtue is
intrinsically valued. He went on to suggest that such elevation
of means, whether they be power, influence, or material goods,
compromises and distracts from eudaimonic living. Aristotle
similarly debated whether the pursuit of pleasure per se can be
eudaimonic, because pleasu re can at times be an end in itself.
Yet it became clear that, in his view, it is usually not. Pleasure
seeking typically stalls the pursuit of human excellences, reduc-
ing individuals to no better than ‘‘grazing cattle.’’
So what ends does the eudaimonic person specifically pursue?
Aristotle’s model of eudaimonia included a list of specific vir-
tues and excellences that constitute a good life, each of which
he defends with extensive arguments. The list includes attributes
such as courage, generosity, wisdom, and being fair and just in
relation to others. Without doubt, his list contained important
human goods, but what attributes it ought to include or exclude
is certainly open to debate.
Eudaimonia Entails Reflectiveness and Reason
Aristotle explicitly argued that in pursuing the excellent life the
eudaimonic person is continuously engaged in reflectivity and
deliberation concerning his or her actions and aims. A reflective
life, characterized by deliberation and reason, is thus one that
both facilitates the development of human excellence and is, he
believed, an end in itself that expresses uniquely human capaci-
ties. Indeed, for Aristotle, the contemplative or reflective life
was considered the most eudaimonic, expressing as it does a
uniquely human attribute of the highest intrinsic worth.
Philosophically, Aristotle’s view represents a self-affirming
stance, that would resonate for psychologists such as us who
value self-knowledge and awareness.
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
144
For Aristotle, application of reason and reflection included
seeing what is true and not being self-deceived. As he stated it,
‘‘what most distinguishes the good person is his ability to see what is true
in every set of circumstances...but most people are deceived, and the
deception seems to come about because of pleasure; for it appears a good
thing when it is not. So they choose what is pleasant as so mething good,
and they avoid pain as something bad’’ (p. 129).
He was suggesting that a focus on pleasure and pain, rewards
and punishments, can lead people to biased insights, or avoid-
ance of truths, because they bend their perceptions for hedonic
purposes.
Eudaimonia is Based on Volition and Reflects the Self
We cannot deem a person eudaimonic except insofar as we
attribute his or her seeking of excellence and virtues to the
person’s own volition. As Aristotle put it, the excellences
‘‘depend on us and are voluntary’’ (p. 132). Their pursuit is
actively chosen. Thus, external coercion and ignorance were
both considered obstacles to voluntary action through
which the excellences are pursued. Waterman (1993) high-
lighted this in his characterization of eudaimonia as personal
expressiveness.
To summarize, the Aristotelian view of eudaimonia considers
well-being not as a state of pleasure versus pain, but as living
well. As he put it, ‘‘the happy man both lives well and does
well’’ (p. 103). Living well entails actively and explicitly striving
for what is truly worthwhile and is of inherent or intrinsic hu-
man worth, and it contrasts with the pursuit of crass endeavors
such as materialism or pleasure seeking that pull one away from
virtues. Eudaimonia is characterized by reflectiveness and
reason. Finally, eudaimonic pursuits are voluntary, and are
expressions of the self rather than products of external control
or ignorance. Together, Aristotle’s eudaimonia is thus charac-
terized as living well, and entails being actively engaged in
excellent activity, reflectively making decisions, and behaving
voluntarily toward ends that represent the realization of our
highest human natures.
LIVING WELL
145
SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IT S
DEVELOPMENT
As already stated, we began with Aristotle’s view because he
was the originator of the eudaimonic tradition. We culled some
of the reasons why he was compelled to distinguish eudaimonic
happiness fro m hedonic happiness, and to denigrate the later.
In addition, we highlighted aspects of his conception of living
well that entailed pursuit or actualization of intrinsic human
excellences, accomplished through mindful reflection and
volition.
Many of these elements in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimo-
nia are at the core of self-determination theory’s (SDT’s)
conceptions of wellness. SDT began with a focus on intrinsic
motivation, or the pursuit of an activity because of its inherent
interest and enjoyability (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 1980). In this
research the role of rewards, the importance of competence, and
the central role of autonomy in motivation became topics of
study. We then shifted attention to extrinsically motivated
activities, those that are instrumental rather than inherently
enjoyable, and to how they are adopted and enacted. We dem-
onstrated that whereas many such activities are regulated by
external or introjected controls, others are assimilated and inte-
grated as personal values, and thus are more autonomously
pursued. The relative autonomy of extrinsic goals in turn has
strong predictive relations for human performance, persistence,
and well-being outcomes. The process of internalization,
through which external regulations and values become inte-
grated to the self, thus became a central focus of SDT (Deci
and Ry an, 1985; Ryan and Connell, 1989).
As we studied intrinsic motivation and internalization pro-
cesses and their determinants and consequences, it became
increasingly clear that there are some necessary conditions for
each to flourish, and moreover that these conditions were uni-
versally associated with personal and relational well-being. Thus
SDT articulated a theory of basic psychological needs that are
the foundations of personal growth (as manifest in intrinsic
motivation), integrity (as manifest in integrative processes), and
well-being (Ryan, 1995; Deci and Ryan, 2000). Building on this
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
146
basic needs theory, SDT research began to distinguish the types
of goals and aspirations people pursue in terms of their relation
to both basic needs and well-being outcomes (e.g., Kasser and
Ryan, 1996). Intrinsic aspirations, such those for personal
growth, deep relationships, and generativity, were empirically
distinguished from extrinsic aspira tions, such as those for
wealth, fame, or image, and shown to have differential relations
with psychological and physical wellness, and distinct social
antecedents. Most recently, as we explore the impact of varied
life goals, need satisfaction, and the social contexts that engen-
der volition and vitality, the central role of mindfulness and
awareness in volition and goal adoption has become a salient
concern (Brown and Ryan, 2003).
Throughout there has also been a practical or applied bent
to SDT, stemming from the aim of identifying the factors that
facilitate versus thwart motivation and wellness in development
in general, and in specific domains such as work, education,
sport, parenting, and clinical care.
This brief schematic of developments within SDT thus points
to the scope of the theory, and underscores why we can only
superficially review elements of the theory in this paper. More
importantly it suggests how extensively the foci of SDT research
overlap with the themes that occupied Aristotle in his writings on
eudaimonia. Our interests in intrinsic versus extrinsic life goals,
the basic and universal human needs underlying wellness, the crit-
ical role of reflection and awareness, and the centrality of volition
all exemplify obvious points of convergence. Thus, we will not re-
view the details of SDT or the empirical findings supporting it.
Instead, our aim is to specify a formal model of eudaimonia that
builds on our prior work, and to articulate some testable and
expandable ideas for future eudaimonic assessments and studies.
TOWARD A FORMAL THEORY OF EUDAIMONIA
As we stated at the outset, we conceive of eudaimonia as
referring to a way of living, not to a psychological state or out-
come. Specifically, it is a way of living that is focused on what is
intrinsically worthwhile to human beings. In stating this we are
LIVING WELL
147
making a broad claim that there are intrinsic values built into
human nature and that these values are universal (Deci and
Ryan, 2000). Within our formal theory of eudaimonia we spec-
ify at least some of these intrinsic values, and at the same time
we argue that the list is not in any way closed. In fact, because
we argue that intrinsic values have specific attributes and conse-
quences, there may be additional values that can be empirically
identified or that fit with the criteria we lay out.
Eudaimonia and the Pursuit of First-order Outcomes
The concept of intrinsic worth means more than simply that the
values in question are inherent or natural to humans. There are,
for example, inherent and natural attributes in humans that do
not represent intrinsic values. For example it is ‘‘natural’’ to
respond to threats with aggression or fear, but aggression and
fear are not intrinsically valued. People value these capacities
not for their inherent value, but because they can help us sur-
vive. Thus, life and survival are inherently val ued, but aggres-
sion is not. Thus, another attribute of an intrinsic value is that
it is a first-order value defined as: (1) a value not reducible to
other values, and (2) a value that does not exist for the sake of
another value. It must be a basic value in its own right.
We illustrate this with an example. First, consider the value
of wealth. If we asked a person, ‘‘Why are you working so
hard?’’ one common answer might be, ‘‘To accumulate money
or wealth.’’ If we then asked, ‘‘Why do you want wealth?’’ there
again might be various answers. One might be, ‘‘because I want
to be admired.’’ We would then need to ask, ‘‘Why do you
want to be admired?’’ Again, various answers might emerge,
because so far we have not reache d a ‘‘bottom line.’’ But sup-
pose the person answers, ‘‘because I want to feel loved.’’ When
we get to this answer we can try again, asking ‘‘Why do you
want to be loved?’’ But here our interviewee will likely be puz-
zled. When it comes to love, we seem to have hit an irreducible.
Our subject might say: ‘‘I don’t know what you mean, everyone
wants love;’’ or ‘‘Because love is good.’’ This is not to say that
some evolutionary theorists might not see love as instrumental
to adaptation, or some health specialists might argue that love
promotes immunological responsiveness. But at a fundamental
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
148
psychological level, love is irreducible. It is a good that explains
itself. It is a first-orde r value.
Eudaimonia is therefore a way of living in which intrinsic
values predominate in the sense that people are focused on
what has inherent worth and on the goals that are by nature
first order. We therefore can distinguish a eudaimonic lifestyle
from a non-eudaimonic one by the degree to which people’s
energies and interests are focused on intrinsic values versus sec-
ond- or third-order values and/or goals whose value is either
derivative or unclear.
Indeed, it follows from the above that most second and third-
order values will be associated with extrinsic aspirations. The
concept of extrinsic has twofold implications in this context: (1)
the aspirations will often be instrumental, having their salience
because there is something more basic that they serve, even
though the person may not be conscious of the connection, and
(2) they are goals without inherent value in their own right. In
addition, many extrinsic goals (though not all) are not inherent
in human nature but are acquired. Thus a woman stock trader
may have wealth and power as primary foci without realizing
that they are derivative. For example, she may be unaware that
the hyper-desire for power is actually driven by a need for
autonomy that was thwarted at an earlier age, or that her desire
for wealth is driven by a need for love or regard that was simi-
larly not well satisfied. Instead, these motives represent need
substitutes based in underlying intrinsic needs that were thwar-
ted (Deci, 1980). Put differently, a non-eudaimonic lifestyle is
often one in which an individual becomes preoccupied with sec-
ond and third-order values or motives that are derivative and
now disconnected from intrinsic needs that were unsati sfied.
In a different vein, a man who very highly values a first-
order content such as love may find himself overly invested in
achieving some greatness, be it material or symbolic, to enhance
the lives of those he loves. Yet in so doing, his time and interests
are drawn away from loving. Although such ‘‘sacrifice’’ may be in
some ways admirable, it nonetheless reduces the degree of
eudaimonia characterizing the man’s life. Such examples show
how many instrumental goals in life, even when well intended,
LIVING WELL
149
can move people away from eudaimonia, because they are
engaged in derivative activities that are too infrequently fulfilling.
This was an issue about which Aristo tle seemed acutely aware.
Are Intrinsic Goals Always First-order Goals?
Previously we argued that intrinsic goals are first-order goals,
insofar as they are not reducible to other goals, but are done
for their own sake. Typically that is the case. For example,
when a person has the goal of intimacy and relatedness, it is
nearly always valued in its own right. However, a person might
cultivate intimacy with someone in order to get an inheritance.
In this case, the ‘‘real’’ goal is money, not intimacy, and that in
turn, has its own underlying lower-order goals. Similarly a per-
son could value community contributions in order to impress
others, but again that shows that we still have not gotten to the
bottom line goal. In other words, an intrinsic goal is really only
an intrinsic goal when it is a first-order goal. This bespeaks the
importance of a thorough analysis of goal contents.
In most of the empirical investigations of goal contents
accomplished within SDT, it is the relative weight given to
intrinsic versus extrinsic goals that has been used to predict
well-being and mental health outcomes. This relative weight ap-
proach, originally develo ped by Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996)
provides an indication of where the most important emphasis is
within a person’s configuration of goals, and thus gives an esti-
mate of the degree to wh ich the person is focused on more
instrumental, extrinsic goals, or those goal contents that are
intrinsically valuable in the manner described by Aristotle.
We have suggested that there are values and goals that can
be distinguished as intrinsic and extrinsic in accord with the
definitions we provided above. From this it follows that we
should be able to distinguish between such values empirically
and to establish that they have differential consequences for
well-being outcomes. We turn now to each of these issues.
Distinguishing Intrinsic from Extrinsic Aspirations
Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) and Kasser (2002) initiated a
program of research exploring the distinction between intrinsic
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
150
and extrinsic aspirations. They specifically proposed that the re
are significant individual differences in people’s focus on intrin-
sic versus extrinsic aspirations and that these would have a pre-
dictable effect on a variety of wellness-relevant outcomes, from
subjective happiness, to relationship quality, to physical health.
In their first published study, Kasser and Ryan (1993) found
that persons whose aspirations for financial success were strong
relative to those for relationships, growth, and community had
lower well-being on a number of indicators. Subsequently, Kas-
ser and Ryan (1996) examined seven life goals. They hypothe-
sized that three of them, wealth and material possessions, social
recognition and fame, and image or attractiveness, would repre-
sent extrinsic goals. Four others were thought to represent
intrinsic goals: personal growth, affiliation and intimacy, con-
tributing to one’s community, and physical health. Kasser and
Ryan found that these aspirations loaded cleanly on two fac-
tors. Wealth, fame, and image loaded on a factor they labeled
extrinsic aspirations, while growth, affiliation, community con-
tribution, and health loaded on an intrinsic aspirations factor.
Further, results revealed that the strength of intrinsic relative to
extrinsic aspirations, as indexed by ratings of goal importance,
was positively related to a host of psychological well-being indi-
cators, including self-actualization, positive affect, and vitality,
and negatively to indicators of ill-being, including depression,
negative affect, anxiety, and physical symptoms.
Similar findings have since been found in a number of diverse
cultures, and with working adults as well as college students
(e.g., Ryan et al., 1999; Schmuck et al., 2000; Vansteenkiste
et al., 2004). Recently, in fact, Grouzet et al. (2005) demon-
strated that the intrinsic/extrinsic goal distinction stood up
empirically in samples from 15 different cultures, with the two
goal types lying on opposite sides of a circumplex model. Of
note in this piece is that additional values were placed in the de-
rived map of aspirations. Hedonism, a desire for fun and plea-
sure, interestingly turned out to fall midway between intrinsic
and extrinsic categories. This stands to reason insofar as hedonic
pursuits are in many circumstances done for their own sake and
worthwhile in terms of a good life. However, they are at other
LIVING WELL
151
times sought out as distractions, or ways of avoiding responsibil-
ities or anxieties, and in such cases will function more as extrin-
sic goals. Thus hedonic goals need to be differentiated for us to
understand their contributions to eudaimonia. Similarly, reli-
gious aspirations also fell midway between intrinsic and extrinsic
poles, representing the well-known fact that religious motiva-
tions can be both intrinsic and extrinsic in nature (e.g., Ryan et
al., 1993).
An important point here is that the question of how goals
align with these conceptual distinctions is today, unlike in Aris-
totle’s time, in part an empirical question that does not depend
solely on speculation and argument. The point of an empirical
model is to specify criteria by which we can distinguis h goals of
different types. Studies using this SDT framework have at least
some starting methods and criteria to support or disconfirm
theoretical proposals.
Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Goal Attainment
Many social-cognitive theorists suggest that people feel good
when they achieve their goals and that goal attainment (regard-
less of content) is beneficial to psychological health (e.g., Ban-
dura, 1989; Locke and Latham, 1990). However, SDT proposes
that such ‘‘expectancy’’ models must be qualified by the content
of goals. It is primarily when people achieve intrinsic (rather
than extrinsic) aspirations that they should experience greater
well-being and less ill-being.
A number of studies have examined this hypothesis. For
example, Kasser and Ryan (2001) examined the relation of the
attainment of intrinsic versus extrinsic aspirations to various
mental health outcomes in two samples. In the first sample,
they found that the attainment of intrinsic goals was positively
related to a composite index of well-being, whereas attainment
of extrinsic goals was not. Moreover, the attainment of both
intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations, relative to the attainment of
intrinsic aspirations alone, did not additionally contribute to
psychological health. Finally, the adjustment of people who
attained only extrinsic aspirations was comparable to those who
were low in their attainment of both intrinsic and extrinsic
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
152
aspirations. In another sample, the attainment of intrinsic (rela-
tive to extrinsic) aspirations was again associated with higher
well-being and more positive relationships. In addition, people
high in their attainment of extrinsic aspirations reported lower
quality of friendships, relative to those who were high in their
attainment of intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations. Sheldon and
Kasser (1998) assessed the impact of intrinsic versus extrinsic
goal progress on changes in well-being over a several month
interval, finding that although progress toward the attainment
of all goals positively predicted changes in well-being, these
relations were most apparent for intrinsic goals. Finally, Ryan
et al. (1999) examined intrinsic and extrinsic aspiration attain-
ments in samples from both the U.S. and Russia. They demon-
strated that whereas attainment of extrinsic goals did not
predict greater well-being when controlling for intrinsic goal
attainment, intrinsic goal attainment predicted enhanced well-
being even when controlling for extrinsic attainments. These
results suggest that the attainment of intrinsic aspirations is
beneficial for well-being and social functioning whereas the
attainment of extrinsic aspirations is largely unrelated to
psychological health.
Basic Psychological Needs and Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aspirations
Ryan et al. (1996) suggested that the key difference between the
intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations, and the reason that the
pursuit and attainment of the two groups of aspirations are
differentially related to psychological health, is the degree to
which they are linked to the satisfaction of the basic psychologi-
cal needs for autonomy, competen ce, and relatedness. The need
for autonomy refers to a sense of choice and volition in the reg-
ulation of behavior. The need for competence concerns the sense
of efficacy one has with respect to both internal and external
environments. The need for relatedness refers to feeling
connected to and cared about by others. According to SDT
satisfaction of these basic needs fosters well-being, and support
for and satisfaction of each is a necessary condition for a per-
son’s growt h, integrity, and well-being, both within and across
domains. Deci and Ryan (2000) supplied an extensive review of
the theory of basic needs and its empirical support.
LIVING WELL
153
Intrinsic goals and aspirations are particularly apt at satisfying
these three psychological needs. For instance, take the example of
personal growth. A person who is focused on personal growth,
which includes self-development, learning, and assimilation, is
likely to a high degree to experience greater competence and to be
involved in volitional and social activities. Similarly, community
contributions, and altruistic or generative acts more generally, are
hypothesized to satisfy all three needs fairly directly. When a per-
son willingly gives to others he or she will exercise autonomy and
feel a sense of connection with others. Further, the act of giving is
likely to be associated with a sense of competence, as it means
that people are in the position of being able to help.
SDT therefore hypothesizes that the attainment of intrinsic
goals satisfies these needs, and in turn those attainments should
enhance well-being. That is, psychological need satisfaction is
specifically hypothesized to mediate between intrinsic goal attain-
ments and well-being. By contrast, extrinsic goals are typically
not as well linked with basic need satisfaction, and thus will not
typically facilitate greater well-being, even when attained. This
proposition was recently tested by Niemiec et al. (2006). They
examined the consequences of pursuing and attaining intrinsic
versus extrinsic aspirations over a 1-year period, beginning one
year after the participants had graduated from college. Results
indicated that although valuing either intrinsic or extrinsic aspi-
rations led to greater attainment of the respective goals, only the
attainment of intrinsic aspirations facilitated psychological well-
being. In fact, on some measures extrinsic goal attainment was
associated with greater ill being. Moreover, the positive relations
between intrinsic goal attainment and well-being were mediated
by satisfaction of the basic needs for autonomy, competen ce, and
relatedness, which extrinsic attainments did not foster.
The What and Why of Life Goals
Numerous studies have demonstrated the systematic relations
between intrinsic and extrinsic goal contents and well-being
outcomes. However, SDT also views all behaviors as capable
of being regulated by both controlled and autonomous motivations,
raising the idea that, beyond goal contents – that is, beyond the
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
154
‘‘what’’ of goals – the reasons why the goal was undertaken is also
of import in predicting well-being.
Regarding this ‘‘why’’ behind behavior, SDT specifies a con-
tinuum of types of regulation that vary along the dimension of
autonomy. The most heteronomous form of regulation on this
dimension is external regulation, which is exemplified by a per-
son acting to avoid punishments or obtain contingent rewards.
A somewhat less controlling reason for acting is introjection,in
which the person acts because of internally controlling states,
including contingent self-regard, or avoidance of shame and
guilt. Still more autonomous is identified regulation, in which
the motivation for acting is based on an explicit value for the
action and/or its outcomes. One can be even more autonomous
if such values are well integrated into oneÕs system of values,
which constitutes integrated regulation. Finally intrinsic motiva-
tion also represents a highly autonomous form of regulation.
Beginning with Ryan and Connell (1989), dozens of studies
accomplished in diverse cultures have shown empirically that
this continuum of relative autonomy applies to behaviors in
multiple domains (Vallerand, 1997; Ryan and Deci, 2000).
First, it is noteworthy that several studies have shown that,
on average, intrinsic goals tend to be more autonomously
enacted than extrinsic goals. That is, people are more likely to
enact goals for money, image, or fame because of introjects or
external regulations. They feel pressured to make more, look
better, or attain recognition. By contrast, relatedness, growth,
health, and community contribution all tend to be supported by
autonomous reasons, including identified or integrated values,
and, in some cases, intrinsic motivation.
Nonetheless, the relative autonomy of a goal can be consid-
ered independently of the intrinsic or extrinsic content of the
goal, and SDT predicts that each of these issues will bear on
well-being. For instance one could give to one’s community, a
presumably intrinsic goal content, but do so because one feels
pressured to do so by others or by one’s introjects. Alternatively
one could contribute because of an integrated value, and thus
the giving would be autonomous. Put differently, SDT predicts
that both the ‘‘what’’ (goal contents) and the ‘‘why’’ (the relative
LIVING WELL
155
autonomy underlying actions) are important to consider in the
relations between goals and well-being outcomes. This too has
been demonst rated in numerous studies. Perhaps the first was
accomplished by Carver and Baird (1998) whose results showed
independent variance associated with both the ‘‘what’’ and the
‘‘why’’ of a monetary goal in predicting self-actualization. Shel-
don et al. (2004) provided three studies showing the independent
contributions of the se what and why effects, on a variety of well-
being outcomes, which they demonstrated at both within- and
between-subject levels of analysis.
Perhaps most impressively, Vansteenkiste and his colleagues
have engaged in a series of studies in multiple domains where
goal contents and relative autonomy have been experimentally
manipulated. Goal contents are manipulated by goal framing,in
which the focus of the activity is differently introduced.
For example, in introducing people to a dietary regimen, they
could either be told that it will make them more attractive (an
extrinsic goal) or more healthy (an intrinsic goal). They could at
the same time be subjected to a more controlling motivational
approach (‘‘you should do this’’) or a more autonomy supportive
approach (‘‘it is your choice’’). In studies of obesity, learning,
exercise, second language learning, ecological behaviors, and job
searching, among other goals, Vansteenkiste and his co-workers
have consistently demonstrated the significant impact of both the
what and the why, not only on well-being outcomes, but also on
goal persistence and success (see Vansteenkiste et al., 2006 for a
recent review of this body of work).
Furthermore, the measures of both the what and why of
goals have been directly linked to measures of eudaimonia. In a
study that assessed Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia in rela-
tion to peopleÕs strivings and actual daily activities, the mea-
sures of eudaimonia had moderately positive correlations with
indices of both what and why (Huta and Ryan, 2006).
AUTONOMY AND MINDFULNESS IN EUDAIMONIC LIVING
Aristotle, as we indicated, depicted a eudaimonic life as one
in which the individual is reflective and applies a sense of
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
156
reason to his or her activities. In line with this we have already
highlighted that goals associated with eudaimonia tend to be
autonomous, and that autonomy is associated with greater well-
ness, as well as more persistence and higher quality perfor-
mance in what one does. We now briefly consider the issue of
autonomy in somewhat more depth, especially its association
with mindfulness, or awareness of what is truly occurring.
The term autonomy literally means ‘‘self-governing’’ and
implies, therefore, the experience of regulation by the self. Its
opposite, heteronomy, refers to regulation from outside the self,
by alien or external forces. An autonomous act is one done
freely and willingly by the actor. In the case of intrinsic moti-
vation this is obvious, because intrinsic motivation represents
doing an activity because of its inherent satisfactions, which
one typically does quite freely. But in the case of activities that
are not intrinsically motivated, the issue is not inherent enjoy-
ment, but rather inherent and self-endorsed value. A person
who acts autonomously reflectively embraces an activity as his
or her own, endorsing it at the highest order of reflection. This
idea of reflective endorsement of one’s actions is indeed central
to nearly all sophisticated philosophical treatments of the con-
cept of autonomy, be they phenomenological (e.g., Ricoeur,
1966; Pfander, 1967) or analytic (e.g., Dworkin, 1988; Fried-
man, 2003). It is especially important to note that auton omy
does not require acting in the absence of constraints or de-
mands, nor does acting in opposition to a constraint or de-
mand necessarily imply autonomy. Specifically, if one behaves
in accord with constraints or external influences the key issue
is whether the person reflectively concurs with them. A person
could, for example, pay taxes out of fear of the consequences
of not doing so, in which case the behavior would be heteron-
omous (i.e., controlled) and compliant. But a person could also
pay taxes autonomously because he or she concurs with the
importance of collecting this revenue for the good of all. Simi-
larly, a per son could refrain from paying taxes by cheating be-
cause he or she does not care about the needs of the many, in
which case the behavior would be heteronomous (i.e., con-
trolled) and defiant. But a person could also honestly withhold
LIVING WELL
157
a portion of his or her taxes because of a moral objection to
the way that portion of the taxes are being used, in which case
the action would be autonomous. The point is that autonomy
is defined by one’s reflective and thoughtful endorsement of
actions (whether in accord with or in opposition to a con-
straint or demand), and heteronomy is defined as action that
does not involve a reflective self-endorsement (see Ryan, 1993,
for a fuller discussion).
This leads to yet a further strong claim: eudaimonia is neces-
sarily rooted in human autonomy, as Aristotle also claimed.
One cannot be following one’s true self and not be autono-
mous. Indeed, autonomy is ideally behaving in accord with
one’s daimon, as Waterman among others has emphasized. Nor
can one be eudaimonic and unreflective (Ryan and Deci, 2004).
It is through reflective consideration of one’s goals and activi-
ties that one can come to endorse some and reject others. Thus
reflective capacities support the development of autonomy, and
vice versa (Ryan, 2005). Eudaimonia therefore necessitates the
exercise of reflective capacities, in which one considers the
meaning and value of one’s way of living.
Brown and Ryan (2003) recently began empirically investi-
gating the role of awareness and reflectivity in action through
the concept of mindfulness. Mindfulness is defined as awareness
of what is occurring in the present moment, and is character-
ized by an open and receptive processing of events, both inter-
nal and external. It is akin to what Aristotle was describing
when he said the eudaimonic person sees what is true in every
set of circumstances. When mindful people are aware of what is
really occurring, and thus they are in a better position to make
meaningful choices and to act in an integrated manner.
Evidence from recent research underscores the importance of
mindfulness and awareness in promoting both autonomous reg-
ulation and enactment of values. Brown and Ryan (2003)
showed at both within- and between-person levels of analysis an
association between greater mindfulness and autonomous self-
regulation. More recently, studies have shown that people who
are more mindful are less materialistic, embrace more intrinsic
(relative to extrinsic) values, and experienc e less discrepancy
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
158
between what they have and what they want (Brown and Ryan,
2004). Thus, it seems minimally that mindfulness is characteris-
tic of people who are engaged in eudaimonic living. It is likely,
however, that mindfulness actually conduces to eudaimonia, by
facilitating awareness of what is worth doing, and doing it well.
THE OUTCOMES OF EUDAIMO NIC LIVING
A central aspect of our model is that eudaimonia refers to
the contents and process of living—to a lifestyle—and is not
defined by its specific outcomes. Nonetheless we hypothesize
that eudaimonia is predictably associated wit h numerous out-
comes, including varied aspects of psychological well-being,
relationship qualities, and one’s impact on collective outcomes.
Subjective Well-being
First, consider subjective well-being (SWB; Diener, 1984), con-
ceived of as pleasure and satisfaction in life, which Kahneman
et al. (1999) described as hedonic well-being. In our model,
both eudaimonic and non-eudaimonic activities can lead to
SWB (Ryan and Deci, 2001). That is, eudaimonia supplies one
route to feeling good, but not an exclusive one. In fact, the
direct pursuit of hedonic activities may also be a way of attain-
ing pleasure, especially in the very short run. A person who
exploits others, greedily consumes goods, or pursues fun and
sensation may not be eudaimonic, but the person may derive
pleasure.
Among the benefits of eudaimonic pursuits is that they may
yield a more enduring sense of subjective well-being. Recent
work by Huta and Ryan (2006) has supported this prediction.
They followed students using an experience sampling method.
Their results indicated that, at a within-person, momentary,
level of analysis, only hedonic activities were consistently posi-
tively linked with positive affect and negatively linked with
negative affect; eudaimonic activities on average had little rela-
tion with these. Yet, at the between-person level, it was people
who engaged in a lot of eudaimonic activity or had eudaimonic
goals who consistently had high life satisfaction and a high
LIVING WELL
159
mean level of positive affect. By contrast, people occupied with
hedonic activities or goals did not show these enduring benefits.
These findings were consistent with the expectation that eudai-
monia gradually enhances a person’s baseline level of well-
being, whereas hedonia has more temporary effects.
Psychological Well-being
In addition to greater SWB, there are other aspects of well-being
that may be more enhanced by eudaimonic than non-eudaimonic
ways of living, as revealed by research on both autonomous
regulation, and intrinsic and extrinsic goals. Many of these are
captured by Ryff and Singer’s (1998) dimensions of psychological
well-being (PWB), which Ryff and Singer construed as outcomes
of a life well lived. Measures of PWB include indicators of
personal growth, environmental mastery, positive relationships,
life purpose, self-acceptance, and autonomy (conceived of within
the PWB model as being primarily ind ependence rather than
self-endorsement and volition as in SDT). Moreover, Ryff and
Singer have shown that PWB in turn fosters additional outcomes
in terms of physical health and wellness.
In terms of the model being proposed in this paper, we con-
strue the dimensions of PWB not as a measure of eudaimonia
per se, but rather as indicators that one has been living well.
That is, as assessed, PWB is more a measure of a set of out-
comes of eudaimonic living rather than a definition of eudaimo-
nia. Accordingly, Huta and Ryan (2006) has shown that her
measures of eudaimonia, which assesses striving to be the best
one can be, developing one’s potential, and having concerns for
the greater good, are indeed positively related to most of Ryff
and Sin ger’s fac ets of psychological well-being.
Although we have just portrayed PWB as an outcome of
eudaimonic living, it is important to recognize that PWB can, in
turn, yield other outcomes such as the presence of healthy
psychological and physical functioning and the absence of
psychopathology and disease. Indeed, in their paper in this issue,
Ryff and Singer reviewed several studies showing that PWB did
in fact lead to better physical health. When viewed in this way,
PWB can be understood as a set of processes that mediate
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
160
between the independent variables of intrinsic goals and autono-
mous regulation on the one hand, and the dependent variables of
psychological and physical wellness on the other hand. This
would place PWB in the same type of mediating role in which we
have placed basic psychological need satisfaction.
Other Outcomes Associated with Eudaimonic Living
Meaning
A sense of meaning, which is one of the PWB dimensions men-
tioned above is also sometimes viewed as an outcome of eudai-
monia (e.g., McGregor and Little, 1998). In our view,
eudaimonic living as represented by a focus on intrinsic goals
and a practice of reflection and mindfulness would undoubtedly
produce a sense of meaning and a greate r sense of purpose in
life (Ryan and Deci, 2004). Moreover, eudaimonic living as we
define it ought to provide a strong elixir against a sense of
alienation or lack of life purpose, presumed opposites of finding
meaning. Indeed, Huta and Ryan (2006) found that eudaimonic
goals and activities were positively related to several measures
of meaning in life.
Vitality
One interesting variable that we have considered to be enhanced
through eudaimonia is subjective vitality (Ryan and Frederick,
1997). Subjective vitality is defined in terms of a sense of psy-
chological and physical energy that is available to the self for
life pursui ts. Ryan and Frederick (1997) assessed people’s sub-
jective vitality and showed its close associations with autonomy,
and Nix et al. (1999) showed in experimental settings how
behaviors regulated by external controls reduced vitality relative
to comparisons that were not controlled. Numerous studies
comparing intrinsic and extrinsic goals have shown greater sub-
jective vitality associated with, or in many cases, brought about
by, investment in or attainment of intrinsic goals (e.g., Kasser
and Ryan, 1996, 2001; Niemiec et al., 2006). Several studies
have shown the close association between mindfulness and vital-
ity, such that, when mindful, people experience more available
energy (Brown and Ryan, 2003). Finally, Huta and Ryan (2006)
LIVING WELL
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found that trait eudaimonia had a consistent positive link with
vitality. In short, this configuration of distinct variables, namely
autonomous regulation, intrinsic goal focus, and mindfulness all
enhance subjective vitality, which in turn strongly covaries with
an array of mental and physical health outcomes.
Physical Health
In some studies of intrinsic goals, autonomous regulation, and
mindfulness, physical symptoms and physical health have been
assessed and positively related to these independent variables
(e.g., Kasser and Ryan, 1996; Williams et al., 1998). Moreover,
basic psychological need satisfaction, which in the current mod-
el plays a mediational role, also predicts physical sympt oms and
health outcomes (e.g., Reis et al., 2000). Physical health is a
major focus of Ryff and Singer’s research, which they have
directly related to PWB (see their article in this issue). Some of
this body of work makes it plausible that it is eudaimonic living
that yields better physic al health, such as the within-person
approach of Reis et al. (2000) and some of the in-depth studies
accomplished by Ryff and colleagues. At the same time, because
physical health makes living well more possible, there are
undoubted reciprocal relations at work, making for an intrigu-
ing area of study. Currently we are working to disentangle
relations between mindfulness and health through intervention
studies (see Brown and Ryan, 2003, for a preliminary study of
this kind).
Still Other Outcomes
Research has also been initiated to map out additional kinds of
well-being to which eudaimonia might be linked. Huta and
Ryan (2006) hypothesized that eudaimonia often produces
states and outcomes that are subtle or not fully captured by the
well-being concepts typically assessed. The researchers showed
that eudaimonic individuals: have high levels of inner peace, as
well as frequent experiences of moral elevation and deep appre-
ciation of life; feel connected not only with themselves but also
with a greater whole that transcends them as individuals; have a
sense of where they fit in to a bigger picture and are able to put
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
162
things in perspective; and describe themselves as ‘‘feeling right’’
(as opposed to ‘‘feeling good,’’ the state that hedonically ori-
ented individuals seem to pursue). A life of hedonia has in most
analyses been unrelated to these outcomes.
PUTTING IT TOGETHER: AN INTEGRATIVE, YET OPEN,
EMPIRICAL MODEL
To summarize our model, eudaimonia is viewed as living
well, defined in terms both of pursuing goals that are intrinsi-
cally valued and of processes that are characterized by auton-
omy and awareness. The ways in which goals, regulatory styles,
and capacities for mindfulness operate together has been
detailed over many studies, but our major claim here is that
they are all aspects of eudaimonic living. A further claim is that
eudaimonic living is associated with a wide array of wellness
outcomes. Those outcomes include hedonic happiness as typi-
cally assessed, but it also produces a fuller, more stable and
enduring type of happiness than that obtained when one’s goals
are more directly hedonistic. Among these enduring positive
outcomes are a sense of meaning, subjective vitality, higher
quality relationships, and better physical health indicators, espe-
cially with respect to symptoms related to stress. Finally we
claim that these relations between eudaimonia and well-being
outcomes are mediated by satisfaction of the basic psychologi-
cal needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. That is,
eudaimonic living fosters well-being because it provides satisfac-
tion of people’s most fundamental psychological needs.
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF EUDAIMONIC LIVING
The starting point for our model of eudaimonia was the ques-
tion of what constitutes the ‘‘good life’’, or living well. As we
have outlined, we consid er living well to involve pursing intrinsic
goals, acting autonomously and volitionally, and fos tering one’s
own aware ness or mindfulness. Considerable research has con-
nected these three motivational processes to psychological and
physical health outcomes, and has shown that satisfaction of the
LIVING WELL
163
basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and
autonomy mediate the relations between the motivational pro-
cesses and the wellness outcomes.
We now turn to a consideration of broader issues that ad-
dress two important and related questions, specifically: (1) what
are the implica tions of eudaimonia for societal and collective
well-being; and (2) what are the conditions within a society that
conduce toward its members being able to pursue the kind of
life represented by eudaimonia?
The Prosocial Nature of People High in Eudaimonia
Given our depiction of people high in eudaimonia as pursuing
worthwhile goals and being mindfully self-regulated, it follows
that such persons would likely be more socially responsible. The
emerging evidence suggests that to be so. For example, Brown
and Kasser (2005) found that people embracing the extrinsic
goal of materialism consumed more and left bigger environmen-
tal footprints. Sheldon and McGregor (2000) used a ‘‘tragedy of
the commons’’ paradigm to show that people with more intrin-
sic goals were less likely to over-consume, and thus were more
likely to foster a sustainable environment. McHoskey (1999)
demonstrated that people embracing intrinsic goals were less
prone to Machiavellian behavior and more prone towards social
interests. These and other studies attest to the fact that promo-
tion of eudaimonic living may be better for a society as a
whole, insofar as its members show more care, concern, and
responsibility in their actions. Waterman (1981) also reviewed
studies showing that eudaimonia is positively linked to proso-
cial concerns.
What Kinds of Families and Societies Foster Eudaimonic
Lifestyles
A tougher question concerns what kind of social contexts facili-
tate people becoming eudaimonic. We can ask that question at
the micro level of the family, as well as at the more macro level
of cultural and economic conditions. We take each in turn.
Kasser et al. (1995) tapped into an ongoing longitudinal
project to examine the antecedents of intrinsic versus materialistic,
RICHARD M. RYAN ET AL.
164
extrinsic goals in a sample of largely urban 18-year olds. The
researchers found that psychological need support – specifically
a maternal environment characterized by greater autonomy sup-
port and greater warmth – promoted the adoption of less mate-
rialistic goals, greater community participation, and in general
better mental health. This study employed multiple methods to
assess maternal environments and well-being outcomes, includ-
ing maternal reports, clinical interview ratings, and self-reports
from the teens. Moreover, the study showed that these supports
for autonomy and relatedness were prospectively predictive of
the intrinsic versus extrinsic goal outcomes. Kasser et al. sug-
gested that to the extent children are provided with supports for
basic needs they will develop more eudaimonic lifestyles. In
contrast those treated in controlling ways, or who experienced
coldness or rejection from caregivers were more prone to inse-
curity and low self-esteem, which in turn appears to have made
them more susceptible to extrinsic goals. That is, they seek
external trappings of worth to the extent they have felt inwardly
unloved or unworthy (see also Ryan et al., 1996; Kasser, 2002).
A study by Williams et al. (2000) of high school students found
that those students whose parents tended to be need thwarting
also expressed strong extrinsic aspirations and engaged in high
risk behaviors such as using tobacco and alcohol.
On a more societal level it does seem clear that within mod-
ern capitalistic societies, which are increasingly dominating the
global scene, there are pervasive forces that pull people away
from eudaimonic living. Consumerism is prompted by continu-
ous exposure to desire-creating advertisements, which often
attempt to promote insecurity in order to create a sense of
need. Moreover, the winner take all atmosphere associated with
the values of a competitive market economy can crowd out
altruism, sense of community, and other prosocial attitudes. It
seems that the eudaimonic life is continuously threatened by the
individualistic attitudes associated with such economies, whereas
hedonic well-being has a much closer fit with the capitalist ethic
(Kasser et al., in press). It is indeed paradoxical that, whereas
the capitalistic system provides resources that could facilitate
eudaimonic living among those individuals who have not fallen
LIVING WELL
165
through the bottom of the system, it also has seductive and
coercive aspects that undermine the very goals, values, and life-
styles that constitute eudaimonic living.
At the same time, some policy makers and social scholars do
seem attuned to the fact that competitive individualism and he-
donic happiness for the masses will lead to and ultimately be
compromised by an unsustainable environment. Indeed, the
tragedy of the commons is ever becoming our real situation, ra-
ther than a simula tion game. Moreover, there is increasing
awareness, in part aided by many of the studies reviewed here-
in, that materi alistic living, even when successfully attained,
does not significantly enhance well-being – even hedonic well-
being let alone eudaimonic living. Instead, human happiness
and quality of life will be facilitated best by policies and struc-
tures that allow people to feel both maximal psycholo gical free-
dom and strong relatedness to one another, neither of which is
facilitated by materialism.
As we move further into our new century, it appears that the
topic of eudaimonia is ever more relevant and timely. In this
respect the study of what constitutes eudaimonia, and what
promotes it, are among the most important agendas in contem-
porary behavioral science, much as it was a critical part of
ancient philosophies.
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Address for correspondence:
RICHARD M. RYAN
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
USA
E-mail: ryan@psych.rochester.edu
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