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Introduction
Neoliberalism has been conceived as a class reaction to the crisis of the 1970s (Harvey,
2005), whereby the Wall Street ^ Treasury nexus, in conjunction with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, worked to reconstitute the global (im)balance
of power by attempting to eradicate any residue of collectivism in the global South
through the imposition of brutal forms of economic discipline. Yet to focus exclusively
on such external forces risks producing an overgeneralized account of a ubiquitous
and singular neoliberalism, which is insufficient to account for the profusion of
local variations which currently comprise the neoliberal project as a series of articula-
tions with existing political economic circumstances. The emergent language of
`neoliberalization' (England and Ward, 2007; Springer, 2010c) counters this, encourag-
ing a geographical theorization insofar as it recognizes the hybridized, variegated, and
mutated forms of neoliberalism as it travels around our world. Peck and Tickell (2002)
initiated this more nuanced reading through their recognition of neoliberalism not
as an end state, but as a diverse series of protean, promiscuous, and processual
phenomena occurring both `out there' and `in here', with differing and uneven effects,
yet retaining the indication of an overarching `logic' due to its diffusion across space.
Through such an understanding of neoliberalization, we can appreciate the con-
sequences of inherited historical contexts, geographical landscapes, institutional
frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and ongoing political struggles as
continually redefining neoliberalism through processes of articulation (Peck, 2001;
Smith, 2007).
Articulated neoliberalism: the specificity of patronage,
kleptocracy, and violence in Cambodia's neoliberalization
Simon Springer
Department of Geography, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand;
e-mail: simonspringer@gmail.com
Received 1 September 2010; in revised form 7 May 2011
Environment and Planning A 2011, volume 43, pages 2554 ^ 2570
Abstract. An exclusive focus on external forces risks the production of an overgeneralized account
of a ubiquitous neoliberalism, which insuff iciently accounts for the profusion of local variations
that currently comprise the neoliberal project as a series of articulations with existing political
economic circumstances. Although the international financial institutions initially promoted
neoliberal economics in the global South, powerful elites were happy to oblige. Neoliberalism
frequently reveals opportunities for well-connected officials to informally control market and material
rewards, allowing them to line their own pockets. It is in this sense of the local appropriation of
neoliberal ideas that scholars must go beyond conceiving of `neoliberalism in general' as a singular
and fully realized policy regime, ideological form, or regulatory framework, and work towards
conceiving a plurality of `actually existing neoliberalisms' with particular characteristics arising
from mutable geohistorical outcomes embedded within national, regional, and local process
of market-driven sociospatial transformation. What constitutes `actually existing' neoliberalism in
Cambodia as distinctly Cambodian is the ways in which the patronage system has allowed local elites
to co-opt, transform, and (re)articulate neoliberal reforms through a framework which asset strips
public resources, thereby increasing people's exposure to corruption, coercion, and violence. It is to
such an `articulation agenda' that I attend to here as, in seeking to provide a more nuanced reading
to recent work on neoliberalism in Cambodia by outlining some of its salient characteristics, a more
empirical basis to theorizations of `articulated neoliberalism' is revealed.
doi:10.1068/a43402
Cambodia offers a unique example of neoliberalization inasmuch as this
transitional process was actually a mandated outcome of the United Nations peace
agreement of the early 1990s (UN, 1991). The prescribed transition was predated by
thirty years of war during the latter part of the 20th century and a genocide that saw
1.5 million people perish as a result of Khmer Rouge administration, incompetence,
and execution (Kiernan, 1996). Less well known is that the Pol Pot nightmare was
preceded by another abomination of comparable magnitude: from October 1965 to
August 1973 the United States mercilessly bombed this neutral country in an effort
to flush out Viet Cong forces thought to be operating within Cambodia (Owen and
Kiernan, 2006). The carpet bombing left approximately 600000 Cambodians dead
(Kiljunen, 1984), throwing thousands of outraged survivors into the waiting arms
of the Khmer Rouge who seized power on 17 April 1975. When Pol Pot's army finally
fell to Vietnamese forces on 7 January 1979, a decade of silence at the international
level followed (Chandler, 2008). Throughout the 1980s Cambodia was governed as
a client state of Hanoi, and with Cold War geopolitics informing the foreign policy
of global North governments, Cambodia and its holocaust were ignored. When the
Iron Curtain fell in 1989, the global political climate shifted and the Cambodian
question could finally be addressed. The United Nations Transitional Authority
(UNTAC) presided over a `triple transition': from a brutal state of war to a tenuous
peace, from overt authoritarianism to an unconsolidated `democracy', and from a
command economy to a particular version of free-market neoliberal economics.
Elsewhere in the global South, neoliberal economics were marketed as a series of
nostrums which, once implemented through the unfettering of market forces, would
ostensibly lead to improved lives for the majority. Despite the distinct element of
imposition in Cambodia's neoliberalization, this case clearly demonstrates that power-
ful elites are only too happy to oblige. Neoliberalism frequently opens opportunities
for well-connected government officials to informally control market and material
rewards, allowing them to easily line their own pockets. It is in this sense of the local
appropriation of neoliberal ideas that we must go beyond conceiving of `neoliberalism
in general' as a singular and fully realized policy regime, ideological form, or regu-
latory framework, and work towards conceiving a plurality of `actually existing
neoliberalisms', with particular characteristics arising from mutable geohistorical out-
comes that are embedded within national, regional, and local process of market-driven
sociospatial transformation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). What constitutes `actually
existing' neoliberalism in Cambodia as distinctly Cambodian are the ways in which
the patronage system has allowed local elites to co-opt, transform, and (re)articulate
neoliberal reforms through a framework that has `asset stripped' public resources
(Springer, 2010a), thereby increasing peoples' exposure to corruption, coercion, and
violence. Neoliberalization in Cambodia has been marked by considerable struggle,
contradiction, and compromise, which suggests that those scholars who insist on
focusing exclusively on an extraneously convened neoliberalism (see Thavat, 2010) do
so at the peril of overlooking the local geographies of existing political economic
circumstances and institutional frameworks, where variability, internal constitution,
societal influences, and individual agency all play a role in (re)producing, circulating,
and facilitating neoliberalism. It is to such an `articulation agenda' that this paper is
tuned, whereby the local circumstances of individual neoliberalizations are under-
stood as jointed with global processes of neoliberalism. In seeking to provide a
more nuanced reading of recent work on neoliberalism in Cambodia (Hughes,
2007; 2009; Springer, 2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010b; forthcoming) by outlining some
of its salient characteristics, I reveal a more empirical basis to theorizations of
`articulated neoliberalism'.
Articulated neoliberalism: the case of Cambodia 2555
Methodologically I draw from a program of eighty-four interviews conducted in
Cambodia from November 2006 to August 2007, where the research aimed to under-
stand perceptions and experiences of violence in a `postconflict' society undergoing
neoliberalization. Although I worked with an interpreter throughout this ten-month
research program, my ability to speak Khmer helped to establish rapport with partici-
pants. My selection criterion for the inclusion of quotes in this paper was guided by the
sentiments expressed by the participants themselves. Interviews represented here were
conducted in Phnom Penh with key members of civil society, including: presidents
of well-known local human rights organizations; the leader of the official opposition
party; the leader of Cambodia's most influential labour union; the managing director
of a local psychological support organization; the executive director of a prominent
women's organization which supports victims of domestic violence; and Cambodian
staff members both of the Asian Development Bank and of the IMF. I have also
included sentiments expressed by an evictee of Spean Ches Village, Sihanoukville,
whose community was laid siege in 2007 by Royal Cambodian Armed Forces who
violently evicted villagers from their homes (LICADHO, 2007b). It is important to
acknowledge that statements made by participants in this study frequently reflect
political positions that are at odds with the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)
where, particularly those who work in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
international financial institutions (IFIs), have conflicting interests which themselves
often reflect neoliberal modalities. In particular, there are other forms of patronage
that operate between donors and their NGO clients which, although beyond the scope
of this paper [see Springer (2010a; 2010b) for discussions], are nonetheless important
to consider in interpreting my findings.
I begin by examining the RGC's discursive positioning of populism vis-a
©-vis
international `enemies' insofar as it offers a convenient pretext for the strains of
neoliberal development. This discussion critiques the ongoing implication that the
RGC maintains a `communist' disposition rather than acknowledging the kleptocratic
`shadow state' practices which have been adapted to a neoliberal modality. I then turn
my attention more specifically to the workings of Cambodia's patronage system via
an examination of privatization and primitive accumulation in relation to land
speculation. In the next section I assess the purview that legal reform will serve as
a developmental panacea, and contrast this with the realities of a judiciary firmly
entrenched within patron relations. The ongoing impunity of those connected to
power is the focus in the next section, where I assess the continuing constraints
of the poor with regards to patronage and the inequality and (in)security it affords.
In the final section I assess the implications of Cambodia's neoliberalization along-
side patronage with respect to the significant potential for both kleptocracy and
violence that this articulation engenders.
Discourses of enemy: continuing communism or a neoliberal shadow state?
The RGC positions itself as a populist government, frequently using the heavily
controlled Khmer-language media (LICADHO, 2008) as a launching pad for criticisms
of the IFIs and bilateral donors, which it portrays as `enemies' of Cambodian inter-
ests.
(1)
This discourse is in keeping with the same general premise that has existed in
Cambodian politics since the Khmer Rouge era, when the incumbent regime instilled
paranoia for `enemies of the revolution' among its ranks (Kiernan 1996). When used
against local opponents, the notion of `enemy' (khmaang) has provided a rationale for
(1)
I refer particularly to `Western'donors, as the RGC has been largely uncritical of money arriving
from Asia, which has risen considerably in recent years.
2556 S Springer
much of the overt political violence that has characterized elections and democratic
process:
``[Most government officials] lived through the war, and ... by having this mentality
`you are the enemy' because you belong to another political party... this regime
continues to kill, to intimidate the opponent.... even right now they consider their
competition as enemy... the ruling party continues to encourage this kind of
thinking'' (interview, Pung Chiv Kek, President, LICADHO, 6 July 2007, Phnom
Penh).
When employed against the international community, the language of `enemy' (setrov)
is less accusatory, only ever voiced in Khmer, and does not suggest that this opponent
will be stamped out.
(2)
Misgivings about the donor community expressed in the local
media are largely a posturing by Prime Minister Hun Sen for a homegrown audience
in order for the RGC to maintain a degree of popularity with its electorate, and as a
scapegoat when the strains of neoliberalization become acute.
It is from the rural population that the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP)
fundamentally derives its power base, even though this is also the location that receives
the fewest rewards from neoliberalizing processes as uneven development proceeds.
This can be explained insofar as the limited state provisions and benefits of develop-
ment that do trickle down to rural areas are not considered as sourced from the state.
Interviews with Cambodians indicated that such development is frequently conflated
with being from the ruling party, and in particular from Hun Sen. The confusion is not
incidental, as infrastructural projects always bear the monograph of Hun Sen and a
party sign, despite the fact that the money typically comes directly from state coffers,
and only occasionally from Hun Sen's own pocket (Hughes, 2003). The CPP has
become so thoroughly enmeshed with the RGC that many Cambodians no longer
identify a difference between the two. This strategy of confusion works in concert
with the government's symbolic hand washing concerning neoliberalization's negative
effects, as both position neoliberalization as a hegemonic project of imposition spear-
headed by foreign geopolitical machinations and foreign corporate greed, devoid
of connections to the mediations of Cambodian elites, who present themselves as
benevolent benefactors and the true champions of `development'
ö
all while robbing
state revenues through the `shadow state' (see Reno, 1995) they have constructed via
neoliberal reform. Of course, this is an advantageous rendering for Cambodian elites
as it obfuscates the way in which neoliberalism's ideological formation evolves through
a variety of spatial settings, including its articulation with local political economic
circumstances
ö
in this case the patronage system. Elsewhere I have shown how
Cambodian donors, and indeed many scholars of Cambodia, use a mirror image of
the discourse mounted by Cambodian elites, suggesting that the tensions of neoliber-
alization are outcomes of explicitly `local' political economic conditions, and in
particular a `culture of violence', with little consideration afforded to `global' political
economic circumstances (Springer, 2009a). Both positions are reductionist assessments
of the poli-tical economic complexity which comprises neoliberalization in `actually
existing' circumstances of articulation.
Interviews revealed that Cambodians frequently characterize Cambodia's state
form as `communist', a claim echoed by some scholars who point to the Cambodian
state's historical legacy and bloated bureaucracy. Etcheson (2005, page 143), for example,
suggests that although the CPP ``publicly abandoned socialism along with command-and-
control economic policies [in 1989]...The party did not, however, abandon its internal
(2)
The first sense of `enemy' (khmaang) is used to refer to adversaries in battle or war, whereas the
second sense (setrov) is used in a more general sense of opposition.
Articulated neoliberalism: the case of Cambodia 2557
Leninist structures and procedures, which it retains to this day.'' Cambodia's swollen
bureaucracy and internal party structures are not `Leninist' but, rather, distinctly
Cambodian and can be identified as one of the key characteristics of neoliberalism
in the country, contrasting with the notions of `small government' that are typically
associated with neoliberalism in other settings. These structures speak to Cambodia's
patronage system, which offers the foundation for the government's legitimacy.
Neoliberal ideology suggests that such patronage will be washed away as market
mechanisms come to dominate all social relations. Yet the Cambodian experience
demonstrates how patronage is in fact strengthened and entrenched (Slocomb, 2010).
High-ranking government officials may have adopted a neoliberal configuration
in Cambodia due to its latent potential to provide them not only with enrichment,
but also with the ability to control the monetary channels of privatization and
investment in such a way that only those connected to their systems of patronage
stand to receive any direct benefit. This condition is fundamentally a question of
the orientation of power in the country, which is far from being a transparent and
open system of exchange: neoliberalization in Cambodia is mired in the obscurity of
shadow state politics, where kickbacks are a required component of its substantive
roll-out.
The case of Sokimex is demonstrative of the shadow state. This homegrown
company, founded in 1990 to coincide with the country's transition towards a
free-market economy by local tycoon and close Hun Sen associate, Sok Kong, is
Cambodia's largest business conglomerate, repeatedly receiving special treatment
in securing lucrative government contacts under a veil of secrecy and nondisclosure
over its accounts (Cain, 2009). The company maintains a wide-ranging portfolio
which includes business ventures in petroleum importing, a service-station chain,
import ^ export services, garment manufacturing, hotels, property development,
construction, transportation industries, rubber plantations, a domestic airline, an
exclusive contract to supply the Cambodian military with clothing and fuel, and
the exclusive concession to manage ticket sales to Angkor Wat (Cain, 2009). Official
leader of the opposition, Sam Rainsy, has publicly criticized Sokimex, calling it the
``financial pillar for the ruling CPP'', where ``you cannot make the distinction
between Sokimex, the CPP, and the State. The CPP apparatchik is inextricably inter-
twined with the State. Sokimex was doing business not only for, but in the name of
the State'' (quoted in Phnom Penh Post 2000). On 14 February 2000 four Sam Rainsy
Party MPs sent a letter to Hun Sen requesting clarification about Sokimex's relation-
ship with the government. The RGC replied by indicating that the only reason it
appears to favor Sokimex is because the company has proven itself highly competent
and always fulfills its contractual obligations
ö
which is questionable given Sokimex's
record of shoddy construction projects (Phnom Penh Post 2000). While the transfer
of ownership from the public to the private sector maintains the ostensible goal of
making public holdings more capable, efficient, and profit generating, the Cambodian
characteristics of neoliberalization modify this idea through the country's patronage
system, so that efficiency and competency are of little concern, and profit for well-
connected powerbrokers becomes the primary motivation (Barton and Cheang Sokha,
2007b; Un and So, 2009).
The overarching contextualization of policy response in Cambodia is framed by
ongoing poverty in a country which has only recently emerged from decades of war
and genocide. This violent geohistorical context constitutes the initial `shock' (Klein,
2007) which permitted neoliberalization to step in as a purported panacea to Cambodia's
problems, while the Paris Peace Accords and UNTAC laid down the general legal
framework in attempting to ensure an `idealized' state form through which subsequent
2558 S Springer
neoliberal reforms could be implemented (see UN, 1991).
(3)
The agencies and institutions
involved in the evaluations of policy are multiple in the Cambodian context, including
the Cambodian ministries, local and international NGOs, as well as bilateral and
multilateral donors. Although the relevant Cambodian ministries are typically respon-
sible for oversight, the direction of policy and programme orientation largely flows
from the international donor community
ö
only to be reinterpreted by Cambodian
elites as they devise ways to ensure that their privileged positions go unchallenged.
As neoliberalization is increasingly viewed as an opportunity to shore up both mone-
tary and political power, the underlying logic of any given reform policy must adhere
to the general principle that it offers something of `value' to entrenched elites.
From privatization to land grabbing: patronage in practice
The capacity for the Cambodian elite to entrench their positions of privilege is
demonstrated by the leasing of the rights to collect admission on national monu-
ments such as Angkor Wat and Choeung Ek to private ventures (Kea, 2006) and the
numerous land-swap deals involving central Phnom Penh and Siem Reap locations
where institutional facilities, such as ministries and police headquarters, are
exchanged for cash and privately held lands on the periphery of these cities (Wasson
and Yun Samean, 2006). Such transfers of public holdings to private investors have
been criticized by the NGO community as examples of unpopular policies where
corruption of the neoliberalization process has occurred as the bulk of financial
remuneration mysteriously disappears from state ledgers and the value of public
assets are purposefully underestimated (Ghai, 2007; Lesley and Sam Rith, 2005).
Land speculation in particular has been tainted by the insignia of primitive accumu-
lation under Cambodia's neoliberalization, as over the past fifteen years private
investors have purchased an astonishing 45% of the country's land area (Global
Witness, 2009). An interview with Sam Rainsy, Leader of the Opposition, illuminates
the underlying logic:
``Land disputes are related to corruption ... when there is corruption at the top of the
state, the leaders transfer all of the state assets to personal, individual assets, and
land grabbing is related to this. ... Those private hands are a small group of the top
hierarchy of the former communist party. ... of course such a phenomenon may
exist everywhere in any transitional period, but in Cambodia it has reached an
unprecedented scale. ... they confiscate all the land and sell it to companies that
can afford to pay millions of dollars. And it is the municipality who sells the land
without any transparency. Most of the money lands in the pocket of small group, a
small number of corrupt people. So this is a very specific approach that you cannot
find in other countries'' (interview, Sam Rainsy, Official Leader of the Opposition
Sam Rainsy Party, 19 July 2007, Phnom Penh).
What Sam Rainsy characterizes as distinctly Cambodian is how patronage shapes
the privatization of land, making this a significant feature of neoliberal policy in the
country. Although in my interview with Sam Rainsy he indicated that he supported
a promarket orientation, he has recently stated publicly that, should he be elected as
Prime Minister, he will nationalize the millions of hectares of land that have been illegally
acquired by businesspeople through land swaps and land grabs (Meas Sokchea, 2008).
(3)
Cambodian elites were not oblivious to this `shock'. The 1980s were characterized by de facto
privatization. Prior to UNTAC, the RGC was already committed to economic reform including
revised marketing, land-tenure, investment, and taxation legislation designed to attract foreign
capital, as well as reductions on subsidies and the privatization of state holdings (Slocomb,
2010).
Articulated neoliberalism: the case of Cambodia 2559
In contrast, Cambodia's donors have long advocated that a cadastral property system be
put in place, which means an ordering and bounding of all available space in the country
into the structures of private ownership backed by legal rights and obligations. The call is
for further legal reform, rather than a redistribution of the land that has been acquired
through questionable means. The RGC has obliged this policy insofar as it affords
a monumental opportunity for enrichment through the circuits of patronage, as this
system's networks percolate through the judiciary, ensuring that legal processes are always
interpreted in ways which benefit well-connected powerbrokers (Ghai, 2007; LICADHO,
2007a).
Conditions of patronage in Cambodia engender considerable violence, as those
without its protections are frequently forcibly removed from their lands when and
where speculation determines a monetary value. Speculation alone precipitated the
capture of land in Mittapheap District, Sihanoukville, where 105 families were violently
evicted from their village on 20 April 2007. The land they had lived on unchallenged
for the previous twenty years
ö
thus granting them legal ownership rights under the
current land law
ö
was now an area demarcated as a `development zone' (LICADHO,
2007b). Tourism in the area has increased substantially in recent years, and offshore oil
exploration threatens to turn Sihanoukville into a boomtown economy, heightening
speculative activities (McDermid and Cheang Sokha, 2007). I interviewed evictees
from this village in June 2007, and one participant, who complained of the complicity
that local CPP officials had in their current situation, revealed the extent of the patronage
system in Cambodia's neoliberalizing process:
``The village chief did not help us. He didn't have any problem like us because he
lives in a different place. ... He came once after this happened and he just blamed
us! He said it's our fault because we did not go to inform the authorities that we
live here....The commune chief did not come at all. When there is an election, they
come and ask about our problems and say they will help us, but when we have a
real problem like this, no one comes to help us. They are CPP, and at election they
give us money, and clothes, like a T-Shirt and promise to help us [if we vote for
them], but after the election nothing. They just wait until after the election, and then
destroy our homes and get rich by selling our land'' (interview, farmer and fisher,
female, age 48, 20 June 2007, Sihanoukville).
Given pleas such as this, and the significant media attention that has been focused
on land grabbing, one would like to think that investor ethics would slow the pace
of violent evictions. The reality, however, is that evictions are taking place under
the pretexts of `beautification' and `development' (Springer, 2009b; 2010a), where
local tycoons initially acquire the land in question, and only subsequently offer it
for lease or sale to private foreign companies (Amnesty International, 2008). None-
theless, the drive for profits outstrips concerns for human well-being as at least
10000 families have been evicted from Phnom Penh over the last eight years in
making way for various development projects, and many of these families never
receive money or resettlement in compensation for the loss of their homes (Phnom
Penh Post 2008).
Rule of law or entrenchment of violence? Accumulation through patronage
Interviews conducted with NGO directors and recent evictees revealed that private
companies frequently exploit the services of the military and police as private armies
to effect evictions. The reaction from the donor community is an ongoing call for
respect of legal norms, and a deepening of the rule of law so that `less dubious'
investors (meaning foreign) will want to become involved:
2560 S Springer
``there is no respect in the security force, there is no trust in the government, there
is no trust in the court system, and that's why there is no big company investor to
come to Cambodia, because they do not trust in the rule of law and the court
system. If the government fix that too, then you don't need to go to US, Canada,
and Europe to ask investors to Cambodia, they will come if they are sure that their
interests are protected by the rule of law'' (interview, anonymous, Program Officer,
Asian Development Bank, 3 August 2007, Phnom Penh).
The problem with this interpretation is that the protections offered by a legal frame-
work are primarily oriented around procuring the stability of a property system, where
human security is a secondary concern. Elsewhere I have argued that the property
system can be understood as a mechanism which confers legitimacy on processes of
violent accumulation (Springer, forthcoming). In effect, respect for the rule of law in
accordance with donor standards would only entrench the violence of Cambodia's
evictions by concealing its underlying character of primitive accumulation through
rendering this process legitimate. The fundamental difference with the current situation
is that observance of the rule of law, and the breakdown of the patronage system which
neoliberals theorize such respect would engender, levels the playing field between
Cambodian elites and their foreign counterparts in terms of access to the means of
accumulation by dispossession. This is the essence of neoliberalization's objective from
the perspective of donors, whereas neoliberal reform is something Cambodian elites
will only allow when it is evident that they alone stand to gain.
When the criterion of financial reward is either jeopardized or not met, there is
typically a prolonged stalling process on legislation. The adoption of Cambodian
children by foreigners offers an example of obstruction tactics by the RGC. In 2001
US immigration officials investigating adoptions accused Cambodian officials at the
highest levels of government of complicity in scams that involved hundreds of babies
and millions of US dollars (Cochrane and Sam Rith, 2005). Moratoriums on adop-
tions from Cambodia were established by a number of countries, while members
of Cambodia's international donor community such as the United States, Canada,
and France have been pressuring the RGC to establish legislation that will regulate
adoptions in light of fears over human trafficking. In addition to concerns over `baby
buying', another major goal of an adoption law on the part of the donor community
is to build confidence in Cambodia's legal system and the rule of law; conditions that
will enhance liberalization and investment in their view (Development Partner's Con-
sensus Statement on Governance, 2008; Mussomeli, 2007). The RGC stalled for years
on this issue, because of the requirement that a `fixed price' on the processing of
adoptions be established. Currently, processing fees range from being essentially free
up to tens of thousands of US dollars, depending on the connections of the individ-
ual facilitating the adoption. International agencies are charged higher rates than are
local facilitators, and those prospective parents negotiating the process themselves
are not required to pay but must bear the burden of much longer wait times and fend
off ongoing requests for bribes from officials to see that their paperwork is moved
through the Cambodian ministries.
(4)
The broader implication for neoliberalization in
Cambodia is that those policies which attempt to cut out the ability of the patronage
system to accumulate capital are stonewalled, while those which facilitate capital
accumulation within the patronage system are rushed through.
As a country heavily dependent on aid, with international donors having provided
over 50% of the government's annual budget for more than a decade now (Global
(4)
These observations are based on my own family's experience of adopting a Cambodian child
in early 2007.
Articulated neoliberalism: the case of Cambodia 2561
Witness, 2009), the intended audience for Cambodia's privatization, liberalization, and
deregulation policies is primarily the donor community that is requesting them. How-
ever, there are shades to this as it is not simply a case of donor demands being
implemented in full whenever and wherever they are requested. The donor community
frequently complains about the lack of transparency in the mechanisms through which
policies are being pushed through. In particular, bidding processes on government
contracts and the sale of public holdings are frequently criticized as being corrupt:
``the Fund has been pushing for transparency, and if there was transparency in the
[procurement of land] concessions for example, it wouldn't be a problem. So you
debate openly, and then you have to pay for the resettlement, so there is no
problem. But currently this is opaque. This is the issue, and if you look at the
Fund website, we are pushing very hard for transparency. Bidding documents,
sometimes you go to buy bidding documents and they say no. There is no trans-
parency'' (interview, anonymous Cambodian, Economist, IMF, 10 August 2007,
Phnom Penh).
Policy reform therefore proceeds as though the curtain on a stage is only partially open.
The substantive acts of the protagonist (ie, neoliberalization) that are occurring at
center stage are witnessed and applauded, while the other character in this Cambodian
play (ie, patronage) is still behind the curtain and out of view. What this means is that
`neoliberalism with Cambodian characteristics' is an extremely secretive affair, and the
connections within the patronage system that inform neoliberalization in the country
can only be speculated upon. The same small group of individuals invariably walk
away with the reward of a contract or newly privatized asset in their hands, making
the top of the patronage system quite apparent and well documented in a number of
reports by watchdog groups (ADHOC, 2008; Global Witness 2009), yet what occurs
below the top rungs of patron power is murky and not well mapped, although some
evidence has recently come to light to suggest that processes operate along familial
lines (Global Witness, 2007; Phnom Penh Post 2007).
What can be determined from Cambodia's patronage system is that, as a long-
standing, clandestine, and hierarchical mode of power relations in the country, it
engenders significant violence (Slocomb, 2010), which carries over into the contemporary
political economy of neoliberalization. This violence proceeds through particular channels
as it keeps key mediators of social relations (ie, judges, top monks, high-ranking
military and police officials, journalists and media outlets, and commune chiefs) on
an unofficial `payroll'. This payroll is not simply orchestrated by the ruling CPP as a
whole but, rather, through two rival patronage systems within the party, where the two
key players are Hun Sen, and Party Chairman, President of the Senate, and Acting
Head of State
ö
Chea Sim (Global Witness, 2009). These adversarial factions are not
on equal footing, as it appears that Chea Sim is much less involved in corruption than
is the Prime Minister, and accordingly has fewer supporters than Hun Sen who has
control over both the military and the police. Conflicts between these two opponents
have been numerous over the years, culminating in July 2004, with Chea Sim fleeing
Cambodia after apparently refusing to sign controversial legislation to allow a new
government to be formed following the 2003 national elections (Rand and MacIssac,
2004). He returned ten days later, stating that he had required medical treatment in
Thailand, but no explanation was ever offered as to why military forces surrounded
his home on the day of his departure, suggesting that Chea Sim and Hun Sen had
come to an agreement concerning their differences and the conditions of his return to
Cambodia (Yun Samean, 2004).
2562 S Springer
Impunity and inequality: human security or security on investments?
Those connected to the patronage system face considerable pressure to conform which,
as the case of Heng Pov (detailed below) confirms, often entails being an agent or
accomplice in the murder of political adversaries, or at least a participant in an
ongoing conspiracy of silence. Heng Pov, as a former Undersecretary of State and
assistant to the Minister of the Interior, as well as Police Commissioner of Phnom
Penh and a personal advisor to Hun Sen, was long connected to the Prime Minister's
patronage circuits, amassing considerable wealth. What has not been determined
is Heng Pov's role in any violence. After a falling-out with the Prime Minister,
Cambodian authorities issued a warrant for Heng Pov's arrest on 21 July 2006, accus-
ing him of involvement in the 2003 assassination of Municipal Court Judge Sok
Sethamony and linking him to a string of other crimes (Barton, 2006). Heng Pov fled
Cambodia on 23 July 2006 and raids on his home apparently uncovered counterfeit
dollars, weapons, and US$1 million in cash. Heng Pov now alleges involvement by
government officials in the 30 March 1997 grenade attack on a peaceful protest outside
the National Assembly, and also claims that a government official ordered the 7 July
1999 murder of actress Piseth Pilika, and the 7 July 1997 assassination of then
Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior, Hor Sok, both of whom were vocal
critics of corruption within the ruling party (Gillison and Phann Ana, 2006). Which
side is to be believed in this dispute on who murdered who is anyone's guess, but what
is clear is that the patronage system engenders violence and provides the necessary
framework and concealment to ensure it proceeds with impunity:
``Nowadays, they don't kill directly like Pol Pot ... .They contract someone to kill
another person for them.... in the case of my brother, CheaVichea, the real killer is
hidden because they hire someone else to kill. When someone challenges a govern-
ment official, they will investigate about this person first, and then have someone
else do the killing of the person who challenged them. So for example, when they
killed Mr Hor Sok after the 1997 coup, they kill the people who worked in
government, but today they kill people who work in the union when they speak
out against the government, like my brother Chea Vichea, Ros Sovannareth, and
Hy Vuthy.... the government says they give 100% freedom for the people, but the
civil society groups feel this is not true....You can say what you want to say, as long
as it isn't critical of the government or a high-ranking official. So they kill journal-
ists like Youk Tharidh, and the singers like Piseth Pilika and Pov Panhapich, and
a high-ranking monk, Bun Thoeun, they killed him as well'' (interview, Chea Mony,
President, Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 10 July
2007, Phnom Penh).
What Chea Mony's statement reveals is how the violence of political rivalry in
Cambodia has to some extent transitioned alongside neoliberalization. This partic-
ular form of violence now focuses its malevolent energies on those who challenge
the logic of neoliberalization in the country, as it is neoliberalism that forms the
contemporary backbone of political economic power that Cambodian elites enjoy.
Many of the Cambodian NGO directors I interviewed were acutely aware of the
rising tide of inequality in the country, and viewed this as a product of Cambodia's
transitional political economy:
``we have a few percentage of really, really rich, and we have many really, really
poor. So you don't have a middle class in this country...You know, the question
about the quality of life, when we look at this and we compare the poorest of the
poor in this country, now the fact that these rich people are so rich and that these
people are so much better off than the poor are, it's actually making the poor much
worse off in terms of poverty. Even if they are making the same amount of money,
Articulated neoliberalism: the case of Cambodia 2563
they are still worse off today, whereas before you can depend on other people's free
time to lend you a hand for example when problems happen ... now officially they
have to work for an employer and earn an income and they spend all the money on
survival'' (interview, Ou Virak, President, Cambodian Center for Human Rights,
4 July 2007, Phnom Penh).
Piled on top of intensifying socioeconomic disparity (Hayman, 2007) is the country's
historical legacy of war and genocide, where people continue to function with a
survival mentality. Interviews with Cambodians revealed that human security is tenu-
ous as people are more concerned with how much rice they are going to have for
dinner than they are with the patterns of wealth disparity, except when it threatens
their livelihood directly through violent evictions. What Cambodia's historical context
in concert with ongoing poverty and inequality means in terms of neoliberal govern-
mentality is that most individuals in Cambodia are already well conditioned to fending
for themselves. They have never known state provisions of social welfare, and repeat-
edly look to the patronage system as their only potential security blanket. On the other
hand, their subjectivation to neoliberalism (see Springer, 2010b) in terms of its ability
to foster an entrepreneurial spirit is mixed. Individuals know how to make ends meet
and often engage in the informal sector, but this does not always translate into
sophisticated economic knowledge:
``I think that the trauma and violence from the past somehow has [an] impact on
people from participating in... livelihood production [to] increase their access to
[the] marketplace. So that could cause a problem for them, for example, people go
to the bank right? So they will hand over their land title for their property to the
bank in exchange for a loan, and while the people are still struggling with their
daily lives, with trauma, with violence, I think that a lot end up losing their land,
losing their property. So big institutions like the banks, people lose their land to
them. I think it's really a problem, so market economy, yes that's good, but... with-
out proper education or without helping people make a proper plan or whatever,
I think its going to be the rich become richer, the poor become poorer'' (interview,
Sotheara Chhim, Managing Director, Transcultural Psychosocial Organization,
23 July 2007, Phnom Penh).
Neoliberal governmentality in Cambodia thus ensures that individuals are caught
between a Scylla and Charybdis of violence. The poor must either look to the domina-
tion of the patronage system to ensure their livelihoods, or seek official economic
channels as an alternative
ö
where they become easy prey to usury. A Cambodian
economist with the IMF even went as far as to make excuses for this particular form
of accumulation by dispossession:
``look at the lending rate, the interest rate, what you [are] getting from the private
moneylenders is very high. The rate now is, the gap is smaller, but still large.
Basically I think, because I also know who lends money and who borrows money,
it's roughly three to four times the commercial banks. But who do you want to
blame? No one! [laughs]. How can you blame for this? You look at the history, you
look at the rule of law here, if you try to give them cheap credit and you don't have
any recourse to act to force them to pay you back, so that's the big mistake for the
market, the whole market in Cambodia. So that's the, you know, the rule of law,
which donors are pushing for reform in the court system'' (interview, anonymous
Cambodian economist, IMF, 10 August 2007, Phnom Penh).
In other words, in order to rescind the violence of ongoing primitive accumulation in
the form of predatory lending practices, Cambodia must replace it with a new form of
violence, a `force' that will provide a security on investments called `law'. In effect, this
is a call for a different form of concealed violence, wherein should one fail to make
2564 S Springer
payments on a loan, due to economic hardship or otherwise, the law will step in to
dispossess the individual of whatever meager means s/he has left, or strip them of their
spatial liberty through incarceration. Neoliberalization in this sense would see the penal
system do more of the dirty work (Wacquant, 2001), and thus entail a `legitimization'
of the means of accumulation by dispossession through a legal framework.
Violence, apathy, and greed: klepto-neoliberalism
`Neoliberalism with Cambodian characteristics' is a powder keg waiting to explode,
which may precipitate a repeat of the violent revolution of the 1970s should a prover-
bial match be dropped on the discontent that boils just beneath the surface. Ongoing
violent dispossessions may very well be the trigger (Cheang Sokha, 2007; Lempert,
2006)
ö
something Hun Sen well recognizes, as he frequently addresses the Cambodian
media with paranoid invocations of his firm grip on political and military power (Koh
Santepheap 2008; Saing Soenthrith and Yun Samean, 2004) and, even more tellingly,
on 3 March 2007 he declared ``war on land-grabbing'' to symbolically demonstrate his
concern
ö
not for the people of Cambodia, but for his own position of power (Yun
Samean, 2007). For now, what can be witnessed are episodic cracks in the structure
that Cambodian neoliberalism has erected, where rapes, murders, and assaults have
become a common lived experience for the poor as marginalization and minor differ-
ences are magnified, resulting in a pattern of conflict primarily between `underdogs'
(Uvin, 2003).
(5)
In contrast, elites effectively insulate themselves from potential reprisal
through an ever-tightening security regime which utilizes the apparatus of the state,
such as authoritarian clampdowns on public space, as well as private measures visible
in the landscape, such as fenced properties patrolled by armed guards (Springer,
2010a). Likewise, there is some evidence to suggest that domestic violence is also on
the rise:
``In 1995 we presented our national survey to the government ...and the results show
that 15% of women suffer from domestic violence ...The law drafted in 1993 was
sent to Council of Ministries and was lost in red tape there for a long time
because ... the government still feels that domestic violence is a private matter.
And in 1999 we had a women's movement... [a] 60-day campaign against violence
on women....We came up with the press conference and the statement for the
Prime Minister, that we [are] concerned about domestic violence and would like
to have a domestic violence law. And the Prime Minister at that time in 2000, and
since 1993, he didn't believe that we suffer a lot, so he got the Ministry of Planning
to conduct the research with the Health Demographic Survey. But here they include
twenty questions [on domestic violence]... and the result come up in 2000 that 25%
of women in Cambodia suffer from domestic violence. From that time our Prime
Minister finally agreed that domestic violence is not a private matter'' (interview,
Phally Hor, Executive Director, Project Against Domestic Violence, 6 July 2007,
Phnom Penh; see also Ministry of Women's Affairs, 2005).
Although the government eventually responded to this phenomenon by acknowl-
edging it as a social problem, the push to see a law on domestic violence passed
through the National Assembly represents yet another exercise in bureaucratic
foot-dragging
ö
presumably because Cambodian elites had little to gain.
The slow pace of progress on the domestic violence law stands in stark contrast
to the rapid establishment of a pseudo-legal framework for oil and gas exploration
(Un and So, 2009). In the 1990s oil exploration was only speculatively on the agenda,
(5)
A reading of the `police blotter' section in any issue of the PhnomPenhPostwill confirm this
claim.
Articulated neoliberalism: the case of Cambodia 2565
but petroleum legislation was quickly passed in 1991 (Council of Ministries, 1991),
coinciding with the structural changes that would ensue as Cambodia transitioned to
a free-market economy under the Paris Peace Accords. Throughout the 1990s, quiet
amendments were made to the existing petroleum legislation, paving the way for the
dubious establishment of the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority (CNPA) in
1999, without primary legislation passed by the National Assembly. This placed
direct control of the institution into the hands of Hun Sen and his deputy, Sok An
(Carmichael, 2003), making the institution highly politicized from the outset as
exercise of this power sidelines those who are supportive of the Senate President,
Chea Sim. The establishment of the CNPA by royal decree means that it operates
without oversight from the Cambodian parliament or other relevant ministries. By
2006 a rush for mineral resources was underway as the Council for the Development
of Cambodia, the body in charge of foreign investment, had approved US$403
million worth of investment initiatives. Global Witness (2009) has charged that
concession allocations have occurred under a blanket of secrecy, where financial
bonuses, totaling millions of dollars, paid to secure concessions do not show up
in the 2006 or 2007 revenue reports from the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Once again, Sokimex is the company that stands to profit the most from these
developments, having entered the petroleum business in May 1996 through its pur-
chase of the state-owned oil company, Compagnie Kampuchea des Carburants,
as part of the RGC's market-oriented privatization program. The deal tasked the
company with the import, storage, and distribution of petroleum in Cambodia, and
gave Sokimex a stranglehold on the industry with a market share of approximately
40%, giving rise to further speculation concerning Sok Kong's close ties to Hun Sen
and the CPP (Cain, 2009), and leading many observers to predict a looming `resource
curse' (Barton and Cheang Sokha, 2007a). These patterns of corruption and patron-
age within the country's extractive industries are replications of what occurred in the
1990s, when the political elite focused their attention on resource exploitation
in Cambodia's forestry sector (Global Witness, 2007, Le Billon, 2002). In short,
`neoliberalism with Cambodian characteristics' is shaped by a kleptocratic system
of nepotism, where `legitimacy' is conferred through partisan control of the military,
a quasi-legal framework with a thoroughly corrupt judiciary (Sam Rith and Poynton,
2007), and a labyrinthine system of patronage that extends down to the lowest levels
of government in the village.
Conclusion
Neoliberalism as a conceptual category requires an appreciation for the complexity of
exchanges between local and extralocal forces operating within the global political
economy. It is crucial to recognize and account for the traction of neoliberalization
on its travels around the globe and to attend to how neoliberalism is always necessarily
coconstituted with existing economic frameworks and political circumstances. Simi-
larly, it is important to acknowledge that an inordinate focus on either external
or internal phenomena to the exclusion of relational connections across space is
insufficient in addressing the necessary features and significant articulations of
neoliberalism as a series of `glocal' processes. Hence, to dismiss neoliberalism as
a `bogeyman' figure (Thavat, 2010), demonstrates a remarkable lack of understanding
for the processes of articulation whereby existing economic circumstances and institu-
tional frameworks are reconstituted as variable societal influences circulate and
thereby transform neoliberalism into its `actually existing' circumstances of neoliber-
alization. Worse still, such a view simplistically retrogrades the theoretical gains
that geographers have made over the past decade in returning neoliberalism to an
2566 S Springer
ill-conceived and ageographical `bulldozer effect' by insisting that it is a singular,
monolithic, and static phenomenon. But most deleterious of all is that condescending
accounts like that of Thavat (2010) make no consideration of how retaining the
abstraction of neoliberalism as a `global' project
ö
albeit one that bites down in partic-
ular locales with a high degree of contextually specificity
ö
enables spatially diffuse
phenomena like poverty and inequality to find a point of similarity. Put differently,
it allows us to recognize how the structural violence of capitalism operates in diverse
settings. Such disarticulation of the scope of neoliberalism effectively paralyzes
attempts at building and sustaining solidarity beyond the micropolitics of the `local',
thereby undermining a potentially emancipatory basis among the world's poorest and
most vulnerable people.
In theorizing neoliberalization as an articulated, processual, hybridized, protean,
variegated, promiscuous, and travelling phenomenon, as in the cutting edge in the
geographical literature today (Brenner et al, 2010; Springer, 2010c), the particularity
of the Cambodian context suggests that the four-way relationship between neoliberal-
ism, violence, kleptocracy, and patronage is necessarily imbued with characteristics
that are unique to this given setting. My argument is thus not to make a plenary,
transgeohistorical argument that suggests that the substantive effects of neoliberalism
are everywhere and always the same. Instead, I have attempted to draw out some of
the articulations that neoliberalism has
ö
in this case with violence, kleptocracy, and
patronage
ö
by locating these intersections within the specificity of a particular context.
As the Cambodian state is increasingly neoliberalized in its developmental agenda,
planning agencies, decision-making powers, and economic orientation, as each
becomes more and more integrated into transnational circuits of capital and expertise
(Sneddon, 2007), violence becomes ever more woven into the fabric of Cambodian life
through the existing patronage system. Patron politics, of course, predate Cambodia's
encounter with neoliberal ideas, but it is clear that such relations have since become
inextricably bound-up in processes of neoliberalization. While `neoliberalism with
Cambodian characteristics' points to a unique geohistorical set of power relations
operating in conjunction with a wider hegemonic ideological project, this does not
mean that this study can be considered relevant only to the Cambodian setting. The
`in here' implications of Cambodia's particular imbrications between neoliberalism,
patronage, kleptocracy, and violence have wider `out there' relevance given the similar-
ities of experience that countries on the losing end of colonialism have faced and now
continue to encounter under global capitalism. Determining precisely how far such
theorizations can be carried requires comparative analysis and detailed empirical
research in other countries where articulated neoliberalisms are unfolding. Although
I can speculate that patterns characterizing the relationship between neoliberalism,
patronage, kleptocracy, and violence would emerge in (post)colonial locales like
many African states and, particularly, other Southeast Asian nations with similar
cultural histories and political legacies, this would always be checkered with con-
tingencies and contradictions dependent on context, where at times the brutality of
neoliberalism may prove to be more or less intense than is currently found in the
Cambodian setting. This paper is by no means the final appraisal, and instead should
be considered as a point of departure for further grounded empirical research.
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Jamie Peck, Philippe Le Billon, Jim Glassman, Derek Gregory,
Sorpong Peou, James Sidaway, Eric Sheppard, the anonymous referees, and my Cambodian
informants. The usual disclaimers apply.
Articulated neoliberalism: the case of Cambodia 2567
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