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Corporate Lobbying in the European Community
... This is most likely to happen, it is argued, if the technical complexity of policy is high and if the lobbied institution has a technocratic function but little in-house resources to independently collect and process information. The EC only has the bureaucratic resources, staff and funding, of a larger city administration (Mclaughlin et al, 1993;Pedler and Schaefer, 1996) but has to draft legislation that will fit the diverse legal systems and conditions in the Member States. This leaves the EC relatively uninformed about the implications of different policy alternatives, at least initially, as well as unable to gather and process all policy-relevant information using only in-house resources (Mclaughlin et al, 1993). ...
... The EC only has the bureaucratic resources, staff and funding, of a larger city administration (Mclaughlin et al, 1993;Pedler and Schaefer, 1996) but has to draft legislation that will fit the diverse legal systems and conditions in the Member States. This leaves the EC relatively uninformed about the implications of different policy alternatives, at least initially, as well as unable to gather and process all policy-relevant information using only in-house resources (Mclaughlin et al, 1993). The EC is in other words a prime candidate for public institutions that need the expertise from stakeholders to fulfil their legislative drafting function (Haas, 1992;Lohmann, 1998;Warntjen and Wonka, 2004). ...
Is the political system of the European Union (EU), and the European Commission (EC) consultations in particular, systematically biased in favour of some interests over others? In the course of the EC’s stakeholder consultations, firms, interest groups and other stakeholders make competing policy recommendations. The EC rejects many such recommendations but adopt others in its policy proposals that initiate and steer the legislative procedures of the EU, creating winners and losers among stakeholders and prompting the question: What determines whether a policy recommendation from stakeholders will be adopted by the European Commission? Relying on a new data set of over 8000 policy recommendations from 693 stakeholders, with more specific measures of expertise and privileged access than previously available, this article evaluates whether the EC listens to stakeholders because of what they know, what they own or who they know. The article also presents a method that takes counter-lobbying into account statistically. Results indicate that lobbying success in the EC’s environmental stakeholder consultations is based in part on what stakeholders know, but the consultations also significantly favour wealthy business interests.
... Un point commun de nombreuses publications récentes sur le lobbying au niveau de l'Union européenne (UE) semble être une mise en question de la position et du rôle des euro-groupes traditionnels -organisations interprofessionnelles aussi bien qu'associations sectorielles ou sous-sectorielles -qui représentent les intérêts collectifs d'entreprises (Grant, 1993 ;Kohler-Koch, 1992 ;McLaughlin, Jordan et Maloney, 1993 ;Mazey et Richardson, 1993 ;Nugent, 1994 ;Van Schendelen, 1993). Depuis les années 1950 la forme la plus courante et, en tant que telle, "classique" d'euro-groupe est l'euro-fédération, c'est-à-dire une organisation à laquelle appartiennent des associations nationales d'entreprises. ...
... C'est cette définition du concept que nous avons reprise. L'affaire du lobbying par les constructeurs de matériels informatiques concernant la directive communautaire sur les copyrights de logiciels confirme ce que plusieurs études récentes sur l'eurolobbying ont déjà démontré (Greenwood et al., 1992 ;McLaughlin et al., 1993 ;Mazey et Richardson, 1993) : dans la mesure du possible des entreprises optent pour une approche "mixte" ("multipronged"). Dans ce sens la formation de coalitions ad hoc doit effectivement être comprise comme une "alternative". ...
Beaucoup de publications récentes sur le lobbying au niveau de l'Union européenne mettent en question la position et le rôle des euro-groupes qui représentent les intérêts collectifs d'entreprises. C'est en particulier le modèle fédératif d'euro-groupe, c'est-à-dire une organisation qui affilie des associations nationales d'entreprises, au sujet duquel plusieurs observateurs ont exprimé des réserves. En même temps les côtés positifs d'une autre formule pour la représentation et la défense des intérêts collectifs du monde patronal ont été mis en avant : l'euro-association qui affilie directement des entreprises. Un troisième type d'euro-lobby que l'on voit de plus en plus ces dernières années et qui pourrait à son tour constituer une alternative intéressante, au lieu de faire confiance aux euro-fédérations, est la coalition ponctuelle d'entreprises. Ici nous présentons une étude de cas exploratrice, décrivant les trois variantes d'euro-lobbying qui viennent d'être mentionnées. En deuxième partie de notre article des aspects spécifiques de la stratégie de la coalition ad hoc sont examinés.
... Jordan m.fl. hevder at i EU-tilfellet må disse lede til mange og svake europeiske interesseorganisasjoner på kapitaleiersiden (Jordan og McLaughlin 1993;Jordan og Maloney 1993:2100. De snur Olsons velkjente «free-rider»-argument på hodet når de hevder at kapitaleiere vil ønske medlemskap i omfattende europeiske organisasjoner for å forhindre at disse fremmer standpunkter som kan på føre dem selv negative konsekvenser. ...
Den sosiale dialog betegner de europeiske arbeidslivspartenes regelmessige deltagelse i utformingen og iverksettingen av Den europeiske unions arbeidslivspolitikk. Slik deltagelse kan for eksempel innebære at Kommisjonen konsulterer organisasjonene, eventuelt at det helt eller delvis overlates til disse å utforme og iverksette politikken på delegasjon fra EU.1 Den sosiale dialog har eksistert i ulike former siden inngåelsen av Roma-traktaten i 1957, Men den ble først formelt anerkjent som en del av EUs beslutnings- og iverksettingssystem gjennom Den europeiske enhetsakt (1987) og dens pre sise status og form innen dette systemet ble ikke klarlagt før inngåelsen av Amsterdam-traktaten ijuni 1997. Dette kapittelet tar opp teoretiske og begrepsmessige problemer i analysen av Den sosiale dialog.
... The closed and non-transparent negotiations in the Council and its preparatory bodies are typical examples of instances where interest groups are not able to influence the behaviour of the country's ministers or higher civil servants unless these have been "captured" in advance by domestic groups aiming to obstruct the proposal. Otherwise, the complex trade-offs during secluded Council negotiations are often marked by inherent political dynamics that interest groups cannot anticipate nor influence (McLaughlin, Jordan, and Maloney 1993;Grande 1996). Therefore, the challenges of the access to interest groups exist in their (in)ability to influence the process of shaping the positions of national governments in the Council of the EUthis will also be partly discussed in the context of prevailing discourse on openness and transparency which is directly related to lobbying and strategic behaviour of organised interests (Beyers 2004). ...
The relationship between interest groups and national governments in shaping the decision-making in the Council of the EU is still largely unobserved. By focusing on the case study of Croatia, this article contests the general assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism about the process and character of national preference formation and demonstrates that economic and societal interests do not have primacy in influencing a national government’s positions in the Council. It is argued that the legacy of a country’s EU accession process, coupled with weak oversight and accountability mechanisms, are among the most important factors in explaining the government's non-inclusive management of EU affairs.
... The logic of functional spillover holds that, initially, because of the interconnected features of techno-economic affairs, cooperation on certain issues triggers the coordination of one or more other issues in interrelated fields. Subsequently, integration in technical fields shapes respective actors in domestic politics, in either the public or private sector (McLaughlin, Jordan, and Maloney 1993). These actors struggle to promote their own interests by defending regional integration over national politics; this represents the logic of political spillover. ...
... There are several reasons why consumers are more suspicious of large companies. In particular, the increasing influence of large companies in politics and policymaking (Mclaughlin et al., 1993), may make the consumer more skeptical, considering that they see large companies having more influence on government regulations, and ability to evade them. The largest five oil and gas companies spent $200 million in lobbying against climate change policies, with BP spending $13 million to successfully stop the carbon tax in Washington State (Laville, 2019). ...
With the increasing trend toward sustainable purchasing, companies invest vast sums of money advertising their sustainability. Yet there are also companies doing the exact opposite for fear of consumer skepticism toward sustainability claims. Consumer skepticism can have adverse effects on company image and performance. Therefore, for the success of a company's sustainability campaign, it is essential that they are familiar with the factors resulting in consumer skepticism. This research has investigated these factors. Through a survey-based approach and analysis using structural equation modeling, it has been found that a main cause of consumer skepticism is previous incidents of greenwashing. Furthermore, consumers are more skeptical of large companies than smaller companies. The research also indicates that consumer skepticism towards a company is industry-specific, with the oil industry being the least trusted. The effect of demographics was also studied, finding that women are more skeptical. Contrary to previous literature, collectivist cultures were found to be more skeptical than individualistic cultures. This research has also explored consumer perspectives towards silent sustainability, finding that highly skeptical consumers prefer companies to limit their sustainability advertisements. Companies silent about their sustainability invoke less consumer skepticism than those advertising sustainability. This research has filled major research gaps in the field of consumer skepticism and silent sustainability and carries important implications for companies advertising in today's market, as well as for policy makers.
... Such corporate political activity (CPA) has been defined as a company's effort to influence government policy in ways favorable to the company itself (Hillman et al. 2004). CPA spans multiple industries (Lawton et al. 2013;Martin et al. 2018) and is typically manifested as attempts to influence government institutions or agencies to favor certain decisions (Lord 2000), fund political parties (McMenamin 2012), engage in battles to protect communities and territories (Lock and Seele 2018), or direct lobbying activities (McLaughlin et al. 1993). ...
This research explores how corporate political activity (CPA) affects consumers’ online behavior. Recently, brands’ engagement in the political realm has expanded as results of new trends such as globalization and technology advancement. However, it is still not clear how this more activist approach is perceived by consumers. Drawing from attribution theory and corporate hypocrisy, this study explains how consumers’ e-WOM spread once brands develop CPAs in terms of action and communication. A mixed-method design combining a content analysis (Study 1) with an online experiment (Study 2) is presented to obtain a multifaceted representation of the phenomenon. Study 1 provides information on consumers’ reactions toward CPAs shared online, while Study 2 delves deeper to test the effect of CPA on consumers’ negative e-WOM, by comparing a political communication initiative with a political action and proposing perceived genuine concern and hypocrisy as the underlying mechanisms of this effect. This research offers insightful theoretical and practical implications, providing brand managers actionable levers on how to reduce negative e-WOM.
... Furthermore, studies on EU lobbying distinguished actors involved in the policy process: business groups (McLaughlin et al., 1993;Coen, 1998;Bouwen, 2002;Grossman, 2004), diffuse interests (Pollack, 1997), farmers (Klandermans et al., 2001;Bush and Simi, 2001), trade associations (Martin and Ross, 2001), regional interests (Hooghe and Keating, 2001), and consultancies (Lahusen, 2002;Mahoney, 2008). Nevertheless, Mahoney (2008: 7) resumes that EU lobbying studies have focused on mapping interest and issue characteristics while there are very few addressing both together. ...
... Empirical research on transnational lobbying patterns began in Europe, in the early 1990s, as scholars charted the proliferation of lobbies and lobbying at the EU level (Greenwood et al. 1992;Mazey and Richardson 1993), including the rapid growth in the formal representation of regional governments in Brussels (Keating 1993;Marks et al. 1996;Mazey and Mitchell 1993). These studies found state and non-state actors using one or more subnational, national, and supranational channels in their efforts to create and shape policy (Beyers 2002;Coen 1997;Constantelos 1996;Eising 2004;Greenwood et al. 1992;Guiraudon 2000;Mazey and Richardson 1993;McAteer and Mitchell 1996;McLaughlin et al. 1993;Tatham 2010). ...
Drawing on the veto player and multilevel lobbying literatures, the article analyzes the impact of policymaking vetoes on cross-territorial lobbying patterns. This comparative study of the American states finds that the incidence of federal lobbying by state interest groups and corporations is higher from states with divided government. Federal lobbying is higher also from states with unified Democratic Party control. The findings of a two-level statistical analysis of Lobbying Disclosure Act data from 2005 to 2015 suggest that subnational actors partially redirect their lobbying effort to the federal level when state policymaking channels are blocked. The empirical analysis builds on a multilevel interactive game and is supported further by a case study of lobbying patterns that followed the 2010 elections, when the Republican Party gained control of many state legislative chambers. Future research on lobbying in multilevel polities must simultaneously consider the relative powers of government levels and the partisan control of those levels.
... During the last decade the literature on interest representation in Europe has seen a remarkable transformation, both in terms of empirical research and theoretical richness. While there was already a well-established and lively tradition of scholarly research on the variety of national systems of interest intermediation across member states of the European Union (EU), as well as on the similarities and differences between them and the American system (Eising 2003;Streeck and Smitter 1991;Traxler and Smitter 1995;Gruning et al., 2008;Dür and Mateo 2013;Rommetvedt et al., 2014), it was only with the remarkable growth of interest representation at the supranational level of the European Union following the adoption of the Single European Act (1986) that the EU's system of interest representation became a subject of scholarly interest (Jordan et al. 1993;Mazey and Richardson 1993;Greenwood 1997). ...
There is consensus in the literature that policymaking in the United States (US) and Europe generates different lobbying styles. Two explanations for these differences have been developed so far. The first posits that distinct lobbying styles reflect different
political cultures
. The second attributes distinct lobbying styles to variation in the
institutional
context in which lobbyists operate. Studies that have analysed lobbying within the US and Europe and assessed the relative importance of these arguments are problematic because both explanations are consistent with observed differences in lobbying style. In this article, we circumvent problems of observational equivalence by focussing on European and American lobbyists who are active in a similar institutional venue – that is, international diplomatic conferences. Relying on evidence collected at World Trade Organization Ministerial Conferences and United Nation Climate Summits, we tested the relevance of alternative explanations for the variation in lobbying styles between European and American lobbyists. Our results give robust support to the institutional argument.
... In order to produce such policies, the Commission needs policy-relevant information from societal actors represented by national and European-level interest organizations (Crombez 2002;Klüver 2013). The Commission therefore consults with interest groups to maximize the subsequent success of its policy proposals (Bouwen 2002;Klüver 2013;McLaughlin, Jordan and Maloney 1993). ...
Why are legislative proposals closer to the positions of some organized interests than of others? The literature proposes that policy-makers are attentive to the demands of lobbyists that provide relevant information. At the same time, being part of a policy community is also claimed to enable lobbyists to shape policy formulation. We argue that both factors reinforce each other: Informational resources are particularly effective in reducing the gap between the Commission’s policy position and the position of lobbyists if both actors are part of the same policy community. Analysing data on over 100 policy issues in the European Union, we find that the context of a friendly Directorate-General reinforces the effectiveness of lobbyists’ informational resources. However, on its own, a context of friendly relations between the policy-maker and the lobbyist contribibutes little to explaining why the European Commission’s policy position is closer to some actors than to others.
... Corporations are likely to have an interest in policy and advocate for their interests regardless of national boundary (e.g. Barley: Building an Institutional Field to Corral a Government McLaughlin et al. 1993;Siegel 2007;Kautto 2009). Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that corporations exert influence though institutional fields on all governments whether they be national, regional (e.g. the European Union), or global (e.g. ...
Although organizational theorists have given much attention to how environments shape organizations, they have given much less attention to how organizations mold their environments. This paper demonstrates what organizational scholars could contribute if they were to study how organizations shape environments. Specifically, the paper synthesizes work by historians, political scientists and students of corporate political action to document how corporations systematically built an institutional field during the 1970s and 1980s to exert greater influence on the US Federal government. The resulting network, composed of nine distinct populations of organizations and the relationships that bind them into a system, channels and amplifies corporate political influence, while simultaneously shielding corporations from appearing to directly influence Congress and the administration.
... , on the basis of an analy the car industry,McLaughlin, Jordan and Maloney (1993) suggest that there are weaknesses in European-level groups stemming from company uncertainty about how their interests aggregate with other firms in the industry, providing incentives for companies to initiate their own efforts through inhouse staff or commercial consultants. .Overall, systems of interest intermediation matter, yet it is no clear which of the rival implications derived from national systems of interest group intermediation provides the bigger impetus for firms' behavior at the EU level, and whether national practice These considerations suggest the following model of firm European lobbying behavior: f es to to escape national practice. ...
What role do national patterns of interest representation play in influencing corporate political action at the European Union (EU) level? How general are findings from the American research? And which institutions do firms favor in their political strategies? To address these questions we extend the standard model of business lobbying to incorporate the particular incentives that result from variation in the patterns and avenues of interest representation and the supranational nature of the political institutions. We test the model using data on EU political activities of 2,000 companies. Our results show that firms' size and their exposure to EU policymaking are the main determinants of lobbying. We also find evidence that firms active in European markets but without a government patron at the supranational level are more likely to lobby. By contrast, conventional distinctions between patterns of interest intermediation or traditions of lobbying practices at the national level are largely irrelevant to corporate lobbying in Brussels and Strasbourg.
... In addition to a number of recent studies this paper undertakes an analysis of this process [see Greenwood et al, 1992;Greenwood and Cram, 1996;Greenwood, 1995;Howell, 1997;1998;Mazey and Richardson, 1996;McLaughlin et al, 1993;McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995;McLaughlin, 1995]. Camerra-Rowe (1996) pointed out that different sectors can undertake different strategies when it comes to lobbying European institutions. ...
This article asks why public officials perceive some interest groups as influential for policy outcomes. Theoretically, we rely on resource exchange and behavioral approaches. Perceived influence of interest groups does not only follow from the policy capacities they bring to the table; it also relates to the extent to which public officials consider groups as policy insiders. Both effects are assumed to be conditional on advocacy salience, i.e., the number of stakeholders mobilized in each legislative proposal. We rely on a new dataset of 103 prominent interest groups involved in 28 legislative proposals passed between 2015 and 2016 at the European Union level. Our findings show that interest groups associated with high analytical and political capacities are perceived as more influential for final policy outcomes than other groups with less policy capacities. Yet, in policy issues with high advocacy salience, interest groups characterized by higher ‘insiderness’ are perceived as more influential among public officials.
The corporation has become an increasingly dominant force in contemporary society. However, comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the concept of the corporation is often restricted, or limited to one disciplinary approach. This handbook brings together the cutting-edge scholarship, expertise and insight of leading scholars in a wide range of disciplines, notably management studies, law, history, political science, anthropology, sociology and criminology, using a critical approach to dissect and understand the corporation. Ten chapters provide overviews of the state of play of critical scholarship on the corporation in each of these disciplines. Further contributors tackle current hot topics, such as corporate social responsibility, corporate crime, global value chains, financialization, and the interaction between corporations and communities. Finally, they consider resistance and alternatives to the corporation. With its interdisciplinary approach, this book is an invaluable resource for all readers studying the past, present and future of the corporation.
Are the interest groups (IGs) that constitute European umbrella organizations capable of cooperating in a way that contributes to the throughput legitimacy of the EU? To answer this question, the representativeness of supranational actors is developed as the central criteria of throughput legitimacy, thereby reconfiguring throughput legitimacy as a two‐level concept. Representativeness is operationalized as consisting of regular contacts between the constituent and the umbrella organization as well as the satisfaction of the former with the representation by the latter. The article looks empirically at agricultural, environmental and anti‐poverty groups. Whereas there are different degrees of contact depending on the policy area, the satisfaction with the representation by the umbrella is compromised for all three IGs. This is closely linked to lowest common denominator policies which reduce the representativeness of the umbrellas and therefore the throughput legitimacy of the EU, a problem that also exists for other actors of supranational governance.
Offering insights of unusual richness, this book examines one of the world’s most important business environments to determine the way that organizations can develop through interaction with their environments. It fills a gap in our understanding of the evolution of the Chinese business environment and throws light on the theory of co-evolution in order to inspire management practice.
“Responsible lobbying” is an increasingly salient topic within business and management. We make a contribution to the literature on “responsible lobbying” in three ways. First, we provide novel definitions and, thereby, make a clear distinction between lobbying and corporate political activity. We then define responsible lobbying with respect to its content, process, organization, and environment, resulting in a typology of responsible lobbying, a conceptual model that informs the rest of the paper. Second, the paper provides a thematic overview of the current literature underpinning lobbying and the responsible firm, and the underlying paradigms informing this literature. Third, the paper makes specific suggestions for a future research agenda, ending with a consideration of methodological implications of such research.
The corporation has become an increasingly dominant force in contemporary society. However, comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the concept of the corporation is often restricted, or limited to one disciplinary approach. This handbook brings together the cutting-edge scholarship, expertise and insight of leading scholars in a wide range of disciplines, notably management studies, law, history, political science, anthropology, sociology and criminology, using a critical approach to dissect and understand the corporation. Ten chapters provide overviews of the state of play of critical scholarship on the corporation in each of these disciplines. Further contributors tackle current hot topics, such as corporate social responsibility, corporate crime, global value chains, financialization, and the interaction between corporations and communities. Finally, they consider resistance and alternatives to the corporation. With its interdisciplinary approach, this book is an invaluable resource for all readers studying the past, present and future of the corporation. The first text to offer a critical analysis of the corporation from an inter-disciplinary perspective, allowing readers to consider the approaches of multiple disciplines Provides an overview of the history of the corporation, as well as a breakdown of current issues and possible outcomes for the future Presents an impetus to finding new solutions to current issues around the corporation in global society.
The article investigates the substantive and dimensional aspect of advisers’ policy work in the cabinets of European Commissioners. Advisers’ roles are mapped using Connaughton's (2010a) typology of four adviser types and Maley's (2015) framework of three arenas. Using data collected via a survey and follow-up face-to-face interviews with European Commissioner cabinet advisers in the Juncker Commission in 2015, it is shown that the majority of those agents perform policy coordination and political bodyguard functions. They are both policy managers who steer policy and political bodyguards who mind the Commissioner. It is also their core work responsibility to be highly active across three arenas: orientate and mobilize officials in the Directorate Generals, coordinate policy across Commissioner cabinets, and build political support through consulting and bargaining with external stakeholders. European Commissioner cabinet advisers are individual agents active within a variant of the ministerial cabinet system tradition.
At the outset I would like to record that I was very pleased to be invited to speak on a topic relating to multinational companies.1 This is so because one of the major research projects of the new Institute of Globalization, International Economic Law and Dispute Settlement (GLODIS) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam concerns the status of multinational companies under international law.2 A closer look, however, revealed that the particular theme “multinational enterprises and treaty-making” appears to be almost a non-topic. It seems that multinational enterprises, at least de lege lata,hardly have a formal role to play in international law, apart from the largely unsuccessful attempts of States to treat them as objects of international regulation. They are actors that barely exist on the formal level of international law. Nevertheless, recently a vivid discussion has emerged on the decline of the State in international relations and international law and on the emergence (or enhanced role) of so-called non-State actors, including such diverse entities as international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), minorities, indigenous peoples, and last not least, multinational enterprises. The discussion often centres on the issue of whether and to what extent they may be regarded as “subjects” of international law.3
This is a unique collection of papers which brings together those who work in and with EU business associations at the very highest level with many of the leading academic authors on associations over the past two decades. It examines the factors that influence the effectiveness of EU business associations, and the prospects for associations and their members to influence these. It is designed to appeal both to analysts of debates about interest groups, collective action and European integration, and to those who work in and with EU business associations.
During the last few decades the environment of political systems in advanced industrial society has changed dramatically. Growing international expansion of economic transactions, in large part driven by a revolution in communication technologies, has led to an unprecedented degree of mobility in capital, goods, and services. It has also caused national polities to be increasingly dependent on political and economic processes that are beyond their immediate control. Although this did not lead to the end of the nation state as some alarmist accounts predicted, it undoubtedly resulted in a change within power structures and the division of labor in political systems. A growing strand of literature argues that control is increasingly being transferred to the international level and that private actors such as trade associations, multinational corporations, and social movements are gaining in importance within political processes.
In the years since its formal creation in the Treaty on European Union, ‘European’ citizenship has proved a disappointment. Those who envisaged it teleologically as the harbinger of a federal state (on the grounds that after Maastricht good governance required this step-change in integration) have yet to have their hopes realised. So too have those who expected it to provide the means by which member-state nationals might both engage more frequently with the EU decision-making process and develop a sense of cross-border solidarity with each other in the interests of democracy rather than integration per se. ‘Citizenship practice’ (Wiener 1998) is now feasible, although difficult, in the EU, thanks to the creation of a bundle of rights and policies under primary and secondary legislation. It is also vital if the Union’s democratisation process is to succeed. However, few EU citizens appear to wish to avail themselves of this opportunity; indeed, if turn-out rates for European Parliament (EP) elections (when all member state nationals form one electorate as a consequence of citizenship provisions in the Treaty) are taken as an indicator, popular interest in engaging with the European Union appears to be declining, even if new kinds of actors representing social movements and NGOs have an increasing interest in, and ability to shape, EU policy (Marks and McAdam 1996; Greenwood 1997; Warleigh 2000).
PurposeEuropeanization involves institutional development as well as the adaptation of Member States policy and regulation towards EU directed expectations and transformations.
Design/methodology/approachEuropeanization provides a means of mapping, analysing changes and enables a starting point for developing leadership strategies within the EU.
FindingsThrough discourse, leaders in the EU and Member States continue to consider issues relating to late capitalism, democratic accountability and the efficiency and effectiveness of socio-economic models and problems regarding these when assessing the changing role of the nation-state in a transforming global environment.
Research limitations/implicationsEven though a transformation in leadership and discourse became apparent to ensure the continuation of the Eurozone the research does not clearly map how far treaty amendments will enable closer fiscal and political integration.
Originality/valueEuropeanization is conceptualised on a number of different levels; initially it may be considered as an extension of ideas relating to civil constitution and international law through recognition and dialectical or transformational discourse. Second, Europeanization may be seen as the means by which EU polity provisions affect Member States or as an important mechanism for the development of EU structures/institutions and cultural transformation. Through transformations in discourse propagated by the leadership an intensification of Europeanization in terms of content, mechanism and processes became apparent.
Die EU-Institutionen unterscheiden sich in hohem Maße von den politischen Systemen der Mitgliedstaaten (Eising/Kohler-Koch 1999). Sie sind erst zwischen 1951 und 1957 ins Leben gerufen worden und zeichnen sich durch eine äußerst dynamische Entwicklung aus. Dies belegen die Aufnahme neuer Mitglieder seit den 70er Jahren, der graduelle Aufgabenzuwachs der EU und auch die Vertragsrevisionen seit Mitte der 80er Jahre. Diese Entwicklungen haben zu einer Ausweitung der territorialen Reichweite von EU-Regeln und der Befugnisse der europäischen Institutionen geführt. Mit dem Maastrichter Unionsvertrag von 1991 ist die Europäische Union ins Leben gerufen worden, die sich aus drei Pfeilern zusammensetzt: der auf den drei Gründungsverträgen basierenden Europäischen Gemeinschaft, dem Pfeiler Inneres und Justiz sowie der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Für die Mehrzahl der Interessenorganisationen ist vor allem der erste Pfeiler der EU von Belang, in den mit dem Amsterdamer Vertrag von 1997 auch Teile der Innen- und Justizpolitik integriert worden sind. Im folgenden wird daher im wesentlichen das Institutionengefüge der Europäischen Gemeinschaft beschrieben.1
Institutionen kanalisieren politisches Verhalten und wirken sich auf die Einflusschancen von Akteuren aus. Demgemäß prägen die EU-Institutionen die politische Interessenvermittlung. Zwischen 1951 und 1957 ins Leben gerufen, zeichnen sich die EU-Institutionen durch eine äußerst dynamische Entwicklung aus. Dies belegen die Ausweitung der Mitglieder von sechs auf siebenundzwanzig, der graduelle Aufgabenzuwachs der EU, der ihre Kompetenzen deutlich über die Marktintegration hinaus erweitert hat, und auch die vertraglichen Revisionen der Institutionen und Entscheidungsverfahren von der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte (EEA) 1986 bis zum Lissaboner Vertrag 2007.
Dieser Aufsatz analysiert die demokratische Qualität verbandlicher Interessenvertretung in der Europäischen Union (EU). In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland untersuchte Theodor Eschenburg (1963) bereits frühzeitig die Rolle von Verbänden unter demokratietheoretischen Gesichtspunkten. Er hob die Gefahr hervor, dass Verbände als Träger partieller Interessen die politische Repräsentation durch gewählte Entscheidungsträger unterminieren könnten, um eigene Vorteile zu erlangen. Amerikanische Pluralismustheoretiker wie David Truman verwiesen zwar immer wieder auf die Begrenzung der Macht von Interessengruppen durch latente Gruppen, einen breiten ideologischen Konsens, überlappende Mitgliedschaften und Gegengruppen (1951: 159–164, 510–514; vgl. auch Scharpf 1993), dennoch kann die These einer „Herrschaft der Verbände“ nicht nur in der ‚korporatistischen’ Bundesrepublik nicht einfach von der Hand gewiesen werden. Gerade in Bezug auf die Europäische Union könnte sie von besonderer Brisanz sein. Die EU zeichnet sich nach landläufiger Ansicht durch ein gravierendes demokratisches Defizit aus. Alleine aufgrund ihrer Größe ist sie auf Verbände als Vermittlungsinstanzen zwischen den EU-Institutionen und den Unionsbürgern angewiesen (vgl. Weßels 1999). Ihre Institutionen sind auch aufgrund begrenzter interner Ressourcen in hohem Maße auf die Kooperation mit Interessengruppen angewiesen.
Die Verlagerung von politischen Entscheidungskompetenzen auf die europäische Ebene hat im Zuge der 1990er Jahre zu einer starken Europäisierung der politischen Interessenvertretung beigetragen. Traditionell föderal strukturierte Verbände haben in diesem Zusammenhang Entscheidungsverfahren zentralisiert, neue Großkonzerngruppen entstanden. Neben den Wirtschaftsverbänden greifen vermehrt einzelne Unternehmen und Lobby-Dienstleister in das Geschehen ein, aber auch Gewerkschaften, NGOs, Think Tanks und soziale Bewegungen. Der Beitrag untersucht die europäischen Einfluss- und Mitgliederlogiken der Lobby-Gruppen in qualitativer und quantitativer Hinsicht u.a. anhand von Datenbanken und dem europäischen Transparenzregister. Dokumentiert werden können veränderte Machtverhältnisse und spezifische Erweiterungen der Lobbyarbeit zur Beeinflussung der Öffentlichkeit.
Die Europäische Gemeinschaft beruht auf drei Gründungsverträgen. Diese sind der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS, 1951), der Vertrag über die Europäische Atomgemeinschaft (EAG, 1957) und der Vertrag über die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG, 1957). Die letzten beiden werden auch Römische Verträge genannt. „Nach einigen kleineren Revisionen — z.B. durch den Fusionsvertrag vom 8. April 1965 — wurden die Gründungsverträge der drei EG erstmals durch die Einheitliche Europäische Akte (EEA) vom 17. bzw. 28. Februar 1986 umfassender novelliert.“156
„Proletarier aller Länder vereinigt Euch!“ Vor fast 150 Jahren rief das Kommunistische Manifest die Arbeiter zur „grenzenlosen“ Solidarität auf. Arbeitnehmer organisierten sich zuerst in Europa und Nordamerika, dann in aller Welt, jedoch entgegen Marx und Engels vor allem in nationalen Gewerkschaftsbewegungen. „Grenzenlose” Solidarität war und bleibt ein idealistisches Ziel. Heute stellen weltweite Verflechtungen und politische Integration Herausforderungen an die „begrenzte“ Solidarität unter Arbeitnehmern. Während Kapital und Politik sich internationalisieren, geraten die Arbeitnehmer ins Hintertreffen, teilweise als Folge der erfolgreichen nationalen Integration, teilweise weil es eine mühselige Aufgabe ist, Solidarität unter Arbeitnehmern einer Weltwirtschaft neu zu schaffen.
Why are some interest groups able to successfully feed their preferences into the policy-making process in the European Union whereas others fail in their lobbying attempts? This study argues that lobbying success can largely be explained by the information that interest groups supply to the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. What is decisive is however not the provision of information by individual interest groups, but the information supply by entire lobbying coalitions composed of interest groups fighting for the same policy objective. Based on a quantitative text analysis of Commission consultations, the theoretical expectations are empirically tested based on a multilevel analysis of 2696 interest groups and 56 policy initiatives.
The way a company engages with the political process is directly relevant to its ”character,” yet lobbying and corporate social responsibility (CSR) are often seen as separate. Taking a narrative approach, the author examines the automotive industry’s processes around lobbying, in the light of legislation to restrict emissions of CO2 from cars in the European Union. The author uses the data generated through interviews to generate a narrative model of political engagement, and to start to apply Basu and Palazzo’s process model of CSR. This article shows competing narratives within the industry, which range from broadly cooperative toward regulatory activity, to broadly instrumental. The author argues that lobbying needs to be included in the scope of corporate citizenship theorizing and discusses changes to corporate character.
Perhaps policy-makers are not the most progressive of actors when it comes to incorporating online technologies in their everyday workflow, but they are certainly not dismissive of the Internet and its potential for policy-making (e.g. European Commission, 2011, 2012). Could online insourcing, for example, be a way to improve the quality of new legislation?This article presents the current view from the European Commission (‘EC’). We have found that many of its Directorates-General (‘DG’) are actively investigating into the possibilities of insourcing more and better policy contributors at the pre-legislative stage, by means of online technology. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The aim of this contribution is to critically evaluate one of the theoretical approaches used to study the European Union (EU) political system and interest groups activity: the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). ACF considers that the outcome of legislative procedures is influenced by the alignment and role played by advocacy coalitions. This contribution assesses the impact of ACF on our understanding of the influences on the EU policy processes, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. The main argument is that the ACF, although very useful in studying the EU political system, shows shortcomings when applied to the study of EU interest groups' performance. The contribution ends with a consideration of future directions for theoretical and empirical ACF research, alone and as part of wider integrated theoretical approaches to understanding the dynamics of influence in the EU.
Theories of interest intermediation in the European Union (EU) increasingly emphasize how domestic embeddedness influences the strategies of domestic interest groups. This article investigates a number of hypotheses advanced in this area empirically, based on analysis of the mobilization of local government interests in Denmark, Ireland and the Britain in relation to EU environmental directives. Interest groups that have a weak influence over national governments may be tempted into a 'by-pass' strategy, while interests that have a privileged position in domestic policy networks may be initially reluctant to embark on EU-level strategies. However, such strategies are not static but rather evolve and change over time - there is evidence of policy learning and a trend towards 'venue shopping' at both national and EU levels. On the other hand, those interests that remain weak at national level may also remain weak at European level.
Setting out the legal framework for European collective bargaining, the Social Policy Agreement appended to the Maastricht Treaty appears to introduce some corporatist characteristics to the Union policy process. This article explores whether this legal framework really does represent a sufficient basis for introducing a new, corporatist policy formation mode at the European level. The main conclusion is that the existing infrastructure of organized management and labour at the European level, as well as that of the European Union (EU) institutions concerned, does not provide the appropriate institutional set‐up for corporatist policy partnership formalized by the Maastricht Social Annex. Nevertheless, the Agreement is not without utility. If its ‘reflexive potential’ (i.e. its capability to shape European collective bargaining by defining procedural norms and limiting or expanding the competences of the social partners) is taken into account, the Agreement can be regarded as a framework under which the legal premises can be transformed into self‐regulatory procedures for social policy in the Union.
1. Theoretical Perspective: Social Forces and the Struggle Over European Order 2. Global Restructuring, Transnational Capitalism and Rival Projects for European Order 3. The European Roundtable: an Elite Forum of Europe's Emergent Transnational Capitalist Class 4. The Roundtable's Changing Strategic Project and the Transnational Struggle over European Order 5. Transnational Class Agency, the Rise of 'Embedded Neo-Liberalism' and the Evolving European Order References
Nuffield European Studies Series editors: Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright This series provides students and teachers in the social sciences and related disciplines with interdisciplinary and comparative works dealing with significant political, economic, legal, and social problems confronting European nation-states and the European Community. It will comprise both research monographs and the edited proceedings of conferences organized by the Centre for European Studies at Nuffield College, Oxford. The role of interest groups in the formulation of EC policy is a central aspect of the development of the European Community. This book is unique in providing both an academic analysis of the system and an insider's view of how lobbying actually works. The first part examines the consequences of the increasing transference of power to Brussels in terms of the EC policy process, the activities of the Commission of the EC as an `adolescent' bureaucracy, and the behaviour of interest associations at national and European level. Subsequent chapters look in detail at the wide range of interest groups involved in lobbying, including business, industry, the financial sector, and voluntary organizations. The combination of contributions from academic specialists and practitioners, including Commission officials and interest group leaders, will make this book uniquely interesting as a study of a key area of the evolving European policy process. Contributors: Lynn Collie, Martin Donnelly, Dick Eberlie, Wyn Grant, Brian Harvey, Robert Hull, Grant Jordan, Jeffrey Knight, Andrew McLaughlin, James Mitchell, Jean-Pierre Peckstadt, Jane Sargent.
Large firms as political actors are compared in the chemical industry in three countries. In West Germany, co‐ordinated action through the industry associations is important, but firms are developing their own political capabilities. In Italy links with political parties are important, but the operating environment of firms has become less politicised. Britain conforms more to a ‘company state’ model, with the government relations divisions of firms playing a key role. The greatest divergence between the three countries is in terms of relationships with political parties. In general, there is a trend towards greater convergence in government‐business relations in the industry in the three countries, internationalisation being a key factor.
Interest group theory traditionally assumed that policies advocated by group representatives in some sense grow out of the interests or values of the group's members. Mancur Olson and others compelled important revisions in this assumption, but still left the process of interest advocacy to membership groups. It is contended here that institutions, such as corporations or local governments, occupy a dominant position with respect to interest representation in Washington, and this finding requires substantial revisions in both theoretical and descriptive formulations of the governmental process.
The paper offers a comprehensive and integrative review of the current literature on corporate political strategies sharing common boundaries with finance, accounting and corporate governance. While there appears to be a heightened interest among researchers in studying the value relevance of corporate political strategies [Chen etal. (2010), Goldman etal. (2009), Cooper etal. (2010), Richter etal. (2008), Hochberg etal. (2007), de Figueiredo and Edwards (2007), Faccio and Parsley (2009), and Myers (2009) among others], interestingly, finance and corporate governance scholars have yet to embrace the research on political strategies as part of their mainstream research. Taking a micro perspective at the firm level, we review the major scholarly works in the economics, finance and management disciplines with respect to the firm attributes shaping the corporate decision to engage politically, modes of corporate political participation, and the value impact of corporate political activity. The overarching theme of the review article is to integrate diverse political economy and management paradigms of corporate political participation and rationalize the value relevance within the corporate finance and corporate governance perspective. The paper also presents focused preliminary evidence on the determinants and value impact of corporate lobbying strategies. For the sample of 5452 firm-year observations, the results indicate that while for large firms corporate lobbying may not be agency driven and may create value, for small firms, despite low shareholder rights associating with higher lobbying engagements, lobbying still relates positively to value added.
Business interest associations in the European chemical industry have traditionally been well organized and enjoyed a harmonious relationship with governments of various complexions. This very favourable balance for the industry has been disturbed by the salience of the environmental issue. This has led to a certain deregulation, or breakdown of existing regulatory mechanisms. Increasing concentration on the European Community level as the locus of environmental policymaking has led to a dual response on the part of business interest associations, reflecting an older contrast between national styles of government/business relations. The British chemical industry has preferred the national route, is much more hostile to environmental regulation than its German counterpart, and often finds itself isolated, depending on the Department of Trade and Industry to ensure that its viewpoint is articulated by the British Government in EC negotiations. The German industry still clings to self-regulation, but, given the high level of environmental consciousness in the Federal Republic, has developed a reluctant preference for action at the European level. This has been manifested both in the Europeanisation of its links with the German Economics Ministry and in its support for the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers Associations; the latter is well placed to exert influence on both the EC Commission and the European Parliament.
The renewed attention to the strengthening of the internal market of the European Community heralded by the Single European
Act of 1986 is likely to produce a quantum leap in pressure group activity in Brussels, as business interests line up to exert
their influence on the many harmonisation measures that are in the pipeline. How great an influence have European pressure
groups exerted up till now? In what spheres has this influence been felt most strongly?
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Organised Interests and the European Community’. Paper prepared for the VIth International Colloquim of the Feltrinelli Foundation ‘Organised Interests and Democracy - Perspectives on West and East
- W Granit
The Lobbying Process’. Paper presented to the workshop on ‘Pressure Groups and Policy-making in the European Community
- R Hull
Modes of Policy-Making and Patterns of State-interest Group Relationships: The EC 1992 and the Consumer Electronics Industry
- A Cawson